

# DE REALI PRAESENTIA CHRISTI IN EUCHARISTIA

## (Concerning the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist)

A discourse resubmitted to the University of Riversmeet  
by Ifor of Gwent, *Anno Societatis XXIX*.

### Preface

The name Eucharist is given to the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar in its twofold aspect of Sacrament and Sacrifice of Mass, from the Greek *eucharistia* (thanksgiving). The priest takes the Host, which is unleavened wheaten bread, and over it pronounces the words *hoc est enim Corpus meum* (“for this is my Body”) and thereafter he takes the Chalice, in which he has mingled wine and water, and declares *hic est enim Calix Sanguinis mei* (“for this is the Cup of my Blood”); and by divine power the bread and wine are transformed into the Body and Blood of Christ.

Without doubt this is one of the most exalted mysteries of the Church, instituted by Christ himself before his death; in the words of S. Thomas Aquinas: “the Eucharist is the greatest of all the sacraments” [1]. The Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist and Transubstantiation are the central dogmata which will here be discussed, together with the allied dogmata of the Totality of Presence, the Permanence of Presence, and the Adorableness of the Eucharist.

This discourse was originally inspired by a small book donated to the brothers at Barwell-in-the-Fens by Robert fitz John, who is wont to gift such to us, when they come into his hands. This includes a reproduction of a book published during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, between 1566 and 1570, titled “A Sermon of the Paschall Lambe, and of the Sacramentall Body and Bloud of Christ our Saviour, written in the old Saxon tounge before the Conquest, and appoynted in the reigne of the Saxons to be spoken vnto the people at Easter before they shoulde receaue the Communion, and now first translated into our common Englishe speche.” Therein is presented, with a translation alongside, the Old English text of Ælfric’s *The Sermon of the Paschall Lambe*, wherefore it is described as “the first book known to have been printed in the Saxon character”.

The Introduction explains that the object of the publication was to show that the doctrine of the nascent Church of England was no innovation, but instead a revival of the doctrine maintained by the Catholic church in England before the Norman Conquest. Let us here decline to question the rectitude of the English Church in those days, and whether it was the judgement of God upon them that William the Duke of Normandy should conquer their land and reform their practices!

In his ‘Preface to the Christian Reader’, the Elizabethan compiler begins as follows:

Great contention hath nowe been of longe tyme about the moste comfortable sacrament of the body & bloud of Christ our Sauour : in the inquisition and determination wherof many be charged and condemned of heresy, and reproued as bringers vp of new doctryne, not knowen of olde in the church here is set forth vnto thee a testimonye of verye auncient tyme, wherin is plainly shewed what was the iudgement of the learned men in thys matter, in the dayes of the Saxons before the conquest. Fyrst thou hast here a Sermon or homelye, for the holy day of Easter, written in the olde Englishe or Saxon speech, which doth of set purpose and at large, intreate of thys doctryne ... [2]

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1 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 65, Article 3, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

2 Matthew Parker (?), preface to ‘The Sermon of the Paschall Lambe’, (1566-1570); reproduced in ‘Select Monuments of the Doctrine and Worship of the Catholic Church in England Before the Norman Conquest’.

Ælfric commenced his Paschal Sermon in this wise:

MEN ða leofostan gelome eow is gesæd ymbe ures hæendes æriste hu he on ðisum andweardan dæge after his ðrowunge mihtiglice of deaþe aras ; Nu wille we eow geopenian ðurh Godes gife be ðam halgan husle ðe ge nu to gan sceolon & gewissian eower andgyt ymbe ðære gerynu ægþer ge after þære ealdan gecyþnyse ge after þære niwan ðylas ðe anig tweonunge eow derian mæge be þam liflicū gereorde ; [3]

MEN beloued, it hath bene often sayd vnto you aboute our Saviours resurrection, how he on this present day after hys suffering, mightly rose from death. Now will we open vnto you through Gods grace, of the holy housel, whiche ye shoulde nowe goe vnto, and instructe your vnderstandyng aboute thys mysterie, both after the olde couenaunte, and also after the newe, that no doubting may trouble you about thys liuelye foode. [3]

In this discourse I shall proceed from Ælfric's sermon to examine the doctrine of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, with evidence from Scripture and Tradition, followed by a discussion of several points pertaining thereto, and especially upon the great mystery named Transubstantiation.

## Chapter I

*In which an extract from the Paschal Sermon of Ælfric is presented.*

Ælfric (c.955 – c.1010), grammarian and Abbot of Eynsham – or so it appears, and not (as some have claimed) Archbishop of Canterbury (995 – 1005) or of York (1023 – 1051) – is reputed to be, of the known writers of the Old English period, the most prolific. Of his 130 homilies in English, the bulk are to be found in the *Sermones Catholici* (Catholic Homilies), two series of forty texts first produced between 990 and 995, which he subsequently revised, inserting new writings and refining the originals. And I shall here quote from the central part of his Paschal Sermon only, for the sake of brevity.

Nu smeodon gehwilce men oft and git gelome smeagaþ hu se hlaf ðe biþ of corne gegearcod and ðurh fyres hatan abacen mæge beon awend to Cristes lichaman oððe \$ win þe biþ of manegum berium awrunge. weorþe awend ðurh anigre bletsunge to Drihtnes blode ; Nu secge we gehwilcum mannum \$ sume ðing sind gecwedene be Criste ðurh getacunge sume ðurh gewissum ðinge ; Soþ ðing is and gewis \$ Crist was of mædene acenned & sylfwilles ðrowode deaþ and was bebyriged. & on ðisum dæge of deaþe aras ; He is gecweden hlaf ðurh getacunge and lamb & leo and gehu elles ; He is hlaf gehaten forþan ðe he is ure lif & engla ; He is lamb gecweden for his unscapþignysse ; Leo for ðære strence ðe he oferswilde ðone strangan deofol ; Ac swa ðeah after soþum gecynde nis Crist naþor ne hlaf ne lamb ne leo ;

Now seueral men haue often searched, and do yet often search, howe bread that is gathered of corne, and through fyres heate baked, may bee turned to Christes body, or how wyne that is pressed out of many grapes is turned through any blessing to the Lordes bloude. Now saye we to suche men, that some thinges be spoken of Christ by signification, some by thyng certaine. True thyng is and certaine, that Christ was borne of a maide, and suffred death of his own accorde, and was buried, and on thys daye rose from death. He is sayd bread by signification, and a lambe, and a lyon, and so forth. He is called bread, because he is our life and angells life. He is sayd to be a lambe for his innocencie. A lyon for strength, wher-with he ouercame the strong deuill. But Christ is not so notwithstanding after true nature, neither bread, nor a lambe, nor a Lyon.

3 Ælfric Grammaticus, quoted and translated in 'The Sermon of the Paschall Lambe', (1566-1570); reproduced in 'Select Monuments of the Doctrine and Worship of the Catholic Church in England Before the Norman Conquest'.

Hwi is ðonne \$ halige husell gecweden Cristes lichama: oþþe his blod: gif hit nis soþlice \$ \$ hit gehaten is ; Soþlice se hlaf and \$ win ðe beoþ ðurh sacerda massan gehalgode oþer ðing hi ateowiaþ menniscum andgitum wiþutan: and oþer ðing hi clypiaþ wiþinnan geleaffullum modum ; wiþutan hi beoþ gesewene hlaf & win ægher ge on hiwe ge on swæcce ac hi beoþ soþlice æfter þære halgunge Cristes lichama and his blod ðurh gastlice gerynu ; Hæfen cild biþ gefullod: ac hit ne Bret na his hiw wiþutan ðeah ðe hit beo wiþinnan awend ; Hit biþ gebroht synfull ðurh adames forgædnysse to ðam fant-fate ; Ac hit biþ aþwogen fram eallum synnum wiþinnan: ðeah ðe hit wiþutan his hiw ne awende ; Eac swylce \$ halige fant-wæter ðe is gehaten lifes wylspring is gelic on hiwe oþrū wæterum and is underðeod brosnunge ac ðas halgan gastes miht genealgæcþ þam brosnigendlicum wætere ðurh sacerda bletsunge & hit mæg syþþan lichaman & sawle aþwean fram eallum synnū þurh gastlice mihte ; Efne nu we geseoþ twa ðing on ðisum anum gesceafte ; After soþum gecynde \$ wæter is brosnindlic wæta: & æfter gastlicre gerynu hæfþ halwende mihte ; Swa eac gif we sceawiaþ \$ halige husel æfter lichamlicū andgite: ðonne geseo we \$ hit is gesceaft brosnindlic & awendedlic ; Gif we ða gastlican mihte ðæron tocnawaþ ðonne undergite we \$ ðær is lif on: and forgifþ undeallicnysse ðam ðe hit mid geleafan þicgaþ

Micel is betwux ðære ungesewenlican mihte ðas halgan husles: and ðam gesewenlican hiwe agenes gecynde ; Hit is on gecynde brosnindlic hlaf and brosnindlic win: & is æfter mihte godcundes wordes: soþlice Cristes lichama and his blod: na swa-þeah lichamlice ac gastlice ; Micel is betwux ðam lichaman ðe Crist on ðrowode and ðam lichaman ðe to husle biþ gehalgod ; Se lichama soþlice ðe Crist on ðrowode was geboren of Marian flæsce mid blode & mid banum: mid felle & mid sinum on menniscū limum: mid gesceadwisre sawle geliffast & his gastlica lichama ðe we husel hataþis of manegum cornum gegaderod: buton blode & bane: limleas & sawulleas: and nis forþi nan ðing ðæron to understandenne lichamlice ac is eall gastlice to understandenne ; Swa hwæt swa on ðam husle is ðe us lifes edwist forgifþ \$ is of ðære gastlican mihte and

Why is then the holy housell called Christs body, or his bloud, if it be not truely that it is called ? Truely the bread and the wine which by the masse of the priest be halowed, shewe one thyng without to humayne vnderstanding and an other thing they call within to beleuing mindes. Without they bee sene bread and wine both in figure and in tast : but they be truely after the halowing, Christes body and hys bloude through ghostly mistery. An heathen childe is baptized, yet he altereth not hys shape without though he be chaunged within. He is brought to the font-vat sinfull though Adams disobedience. Howbeit he is washed from all sinne within, though he hath not chaunged his shape without. Euen so the holy fonte-water that is called the welspring of lyfe is lyke in shape to other waters, and is subiecte to corruption, but the holy Ghostes might commeth to the corruptible water through the priestes blessing, and it may after wash the body and soule from all sinne, through ghostly myghte. Beholde now we see two thynges in this one creature. After true nature the water is corruptible water, and after ghostlye misterye, hath healing mighte. So also if we beholde the holy housell after bodely vnderstanding, then see we that it is a creature corruptible and mutable : if we acknowledge therein ghostly myght, than vnderstand we that lyfe is therein, and that it geueth immortalitie to them that eate it with beliefe.

Muche is betwixte the inuisible myghte of the holye housell, and the visible shape of hys proper nature. It is naturally corruptible bread, and corruptible wine : and is by myghte of Gods worde truely Christes bodye, and hys bloude : not so notwithstanding bodely, but ghostly. Much is betwixte the body Christ suffred in, and the bodye that is halowed to housell. The body truely that Christ suffered in was borne of the flesh of Mary, with bloud and with bone, with skinne and with synowes, in humane limmes, with a reasonable soule liuing : and his ghostlye body, whiche we call the housell, is gathered of many cornes : without bloude and bone, without lymme and without soule : and therefore nothing is to be vnderstode therein bodelye, but all is ghostlye to be vnderstode. What soeuer is in that housell, whiche geueth substaunce of lyfe, that

ungesewenlicre fremmincge ; Forþi is \$ halige husel gehaten gerynu forþan ðe oþer ðing is ðaron gesewen and oþer ðing undergiten ; Ðæt \$ ðær gesewen is hæfþlichamlic hiw & \$ \$ we ðaron understandaþ hæfþgastlice mihte

Witodlice Cristes lichama ðe deaþ ðrowode and of deaþe aras ne swylt næfre heonon forþ ac is ece and unþrowiendlic ; Ðæt husel is hwilwendlic na ece ; Brosniendlic & biþsticcmædum todæd ; Betwux to þum tocower and into ðam buce asend ac hit biþ ðeah hwæpære æfter gastlicre mihte on æcum dæe eall ; Manega underfoþ ðone halgan lichaman and he biþ swa ðeah on æcum dæe eall æfter gastlicre gerynu ; Deah sumü menn gesceote læssa dæ ne biþ swa-ðeah na mare miht on ðam maran dæe ðonne on ðam lassar for ðan ðe hit biþ on æcum menn ansund æfter ðære ungesewenlican mihte

Þeos gerynu is wedd and hiw ; Cristes lichama is soþfastnyss ; Ðis wedd we heald aþ gerynelice oþ \$ we becumon to ðære soþfastnyse and þonne biþ þis wedd geendod ; Soþlice hit is swa swa we ær cwædon Cristes lichama and his blod na lichamlice ac gastlice ; Ne sceole ge smeagan hu hit gedon sy ac healdan on eowrum geleafan \$ hit swa gedon sy ; [3]

is of the ghostlye might, and inuisible doing. Therefore is the holy housel called a misterye, because there is one thing in it seene, and an other thing vnderstode. That which is ther sene, hath bodely shape : and that we do there vnderstand, hath ghostlye might.

Certaynely Christes bodye which suffred death, and rose from death, neuer dyeth henceforth : but is eternall and vnpassible. The housell is temporall, not eternall. Corruptible, and dealed into sondrye partes. Chewed betwene teeth, and sent into the bellye : howbeit neuerthesse after ghostlye myght, it is all in euery part. Manye receaue the holye body : and yet notwithstanding, it is so all in euerye parte after ghostly mystery. Though to some man fall a lesse deale, yet is there no more myghte notwithstanding in the more parte, then in the lesse : because it is all in each man after the inuisible myght.

Thys misterye is a pledge and a figure : Christes bodye is truth itselfe. Thys pledge we doe keepe mystically, vntill that we be come to the truth itselfe : and then is this pledge ended. Truelye it is so as we before haue said Christes bodye, and hys bloude : not bodelye, but ghostlye. And ye shoulde not searche how it is done, but hold it in your beliefe that it is so done. [3]

The Elizabethan compiler annotated the above with five points of difference, inferred by him from Ælfric's text, between the body of Christ and the substance of the host. Item 1: that his body be flesh, born of the Virgin Mary, whereas the host is bread, baked of corn. Item 2: that the host has the appearance of bread, and not of flesh. Items 3 and 4: that the resurrected body of Christ is incorruptible and eternal, but the host is corruptible and does not endure. Item 5: that the host is a remembrance of Christ, rather than his true body.

## Chapter II

*In which is described that doctrine which is the subject of this discourse.*

In the first chapter I have presented the opinion of Ælfric on this matter. Now I shall set forth, in outline, the teaching of Holy Mother Church, which I shall later examine in greater detail.

In this matter I may most usefully begin by quoting the Fifth Article of the Tridentine Creed, set forth by Pius IV in the Bulls *Iniunctum Nobis* and *In Sacrosancta*:

Profiteor pariter, in Missa offerri Deo verum, proprium et propitiatorium sacrificium pro vivis et defunctis, atque in sanctissimo Eucharistiae Sacramento esse vere, realiter et substantialiter Corpus et Sanguinem, una cum anima et divinitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi, fierique conversionem totius substantiae panis in Corpus at totius substantiae vini in Sanguinem, quam conversionem Ecclesia catholica transsubstantiationem appellat. Fateor etiam sub altera tantum specie totum atque integrum Christum verumque Sacramentum sumi. [4]

I profess, likewise, that in the Mass there is offered to God a true, proper, and propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead; and that in the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist there is truly, really, and substantially, the Body and Blood, together with the soul and divinity, of our Lord Jesus Christ; and that there is made a conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the Body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the Blood, which conversion the Catholic Church calls Transubstantiation. I also confess that under either kind alone Christ is received whole and entire, and a true sacrament. [4]

At the Last Supper, Christ instituted the Sacrament of the Eucharist, wherein simple bread and wine are converted into his Body and Blood, to be consumed by the faithful as spiritual nourishment, uttering the words of Institution: *hoc est corpus meum*, and *hic est sanguis meus*, and instructing his disciples to follow his example forever more: *hoc facite in meam commemorationem*. Thus, before the consecration the priest says:

Quam oblationem tu, Deus, in omnibus, quaesumus, benedictam, adscriptam, ratam, rationabilem, acceptabilemque facere digneris, ut nobis Corpus, et Sanguis fiat dilectissimi Filii tui Domini nostri Jesu Christi. [5]

O God, deign to bless what we offer, and make it approved, effective, right, and wholly pleasing in every way, that it may become for our good, the Body and Blood of Your dearly beloved Son, our Lord Jesus Christ. [5]

The doctrine of the Real Presence affirms that Christ is present in the Eucharistic Species after the consecration: that the bread and wine are no mere figures or symbols, but ‘truly’ and ‘really’ become his Body and Blood. That this transformation is ‘substantial’, such that the very essence of the species is changed, although the outward appearance remains unaltered, is expressed in the doctrine of Transubstantiation.

The Council of Trent, seeking to counter the Protestant heresies arising in the sixteenth century, in its Thirteenth Session issued its ‘Decree Concerning the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist’. This included eleven Canons, the first two of which admirably summarise the matter at hand:

Can. I. Si quis negaverit, in sanctissimae Eucharistiae sacramento contineri vere, realiter et substantialiter, corpus et sanguinem una cum anima et divinitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi ac proinde totum Christum; sed dixerit, tantummodo esse in eo ut in signo vel figura, aut virtute: anathema sit.

CANON I. If any one denieth, that, in the sacrament of the most holy Eucharist, are contained truly, really, and substantially, the body and blood together with the soul and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and consequently the whole Christ; but saith that He is only therein as in a sign, or in figure, or virtue; let him be anathema.

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4 ‘Professio fidei Tridentinae’ (‘Tridentine Creed’), Fifth Article, from the Bulls ‘Injunctum Nobis’, (13 November 1564) and ‘In Sacrosancta’, (9 December 1564).

5 Tridentine Ordo Missae, with an English translation of the Missale Romanum.

Can. II. Si quis dixerit, in sacrosancto Eucharistiae sacramento remanere substantiam panis et vini una cum corpore et sanguine Domini nostri Jesu Christi, negaveritque mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem totius substantiae panis in corpus et totius substantiae vini in sanguinem, manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini, quam quidem conversionem catholica Ecclesia aptissime transsubstantiationem appellat: anathema sit. [6]

CANON II. If any one saith, that, in the sacred and holy sacrament of the Eucharist, the substance of the bread and wine remains conjointly with the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and denieth that wonderful and singular conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the Body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the Blood – the species only of the bread and wine remaining – which conversion indeed the Catholic Church most aptly calls Transubstantiation; let him be anathema. [6]

Now it is true that Christ is present in his Church in more ways than one. He is present when she prays, for, in the words of S. Augustine, he “both prays for us, and prays in us, and is prayed to by us. He prays for us, as our Priest; He prays in us, as our Head; He is prayed to by us, as our God.” [7] Christ himself promised: *ubi enim sunt duo vel tres congregati in nomine meo ibi sum in medio eorum.* [8] And although the Sacraments are administered by men, it is Christ who gives them effect.

His spiritual presence in his Church is truly marvellous; yet in the Sacrament of the Eucharist Christ is present substantially, whole and entire, in physical form before the faithful, and it is this holy mystery which I seek to address in my discourse.

### Chapter III

#### *In which is elucidated further the nature and purpose of the Eucharist.*

Having in the second Chapter summarised the doctrine of the Real Presence, I shall now make plain that the Eucharist combines both the functions of a sacrament and of a sacrifice, and that it confers grace upon the worthy communicant.

It is clear that the Mass is a Sacrament, as S. Thomas Aquinas noted in *Summa Theologica*: “The Church’s sacraments are ordained for helping man in the spiritual life. But the spiritual life is analogous to the corporeal, since corporeal things bear a resemblance to spiritual. Now it is clear that just as generation is required for corporeal life, since thereby man receives life; and growth, whereby man is brought to maturity: so likewise food is required for the preservation of life. Consequently, just as for the spiritual life there had to be Baptism, which is spiritual generation; and Confirmation, which is spiritual growth: so there needed to be the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is spiritual food.” [9]

The Sacrifice of the Mass is also a true and proper sacrifice, for which the prototype was shown to us in the actions of Christ at the Last Supper. It would be a grave error, though one easily made by the untutored, to suppose that the act of sacrifice lay in the crucifixion of our Lord by the Romans at Golgotha. For the slaying of the sacrificial gift was carried out by temple servants, whereas the ritual spilling of blood, *aspersio sanguinis*, was performed solely by the priests [10];

6 Council of Trent, Canons I and II on the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, (11 October 1551); English translation by J. Waterworth; Latin text from Der Innsbrucker Theologische Leseraum.

7 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘Enarrationes in Psalmos’, Ps 86, part 1, (392-c.418). Alternatively this may be numbered as Psalm 85.

8 Mt 18:20: “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.”

9 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 73, Article 1, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

10 See Lev 1-7.

wherefore the Sacrifice of the Cross is not the act which we celebrate in the Eucharist, for therein our Saviour in no way resembled his priestly prototype. Instead, he instituted the new covenant with an unbloody food-offering as antitype, wherein he accomplished the sacrifice of his Body and Blood under the forms of bread and wine; and the Mass is a continual repetition of this, as commanded by Christ himself, who said *hoc facite in meam commemorationem*.

The abolition of the Levitical sacrifices and the institution of the new was foretold by the prophets, and especially by Malachias, when he wrote:

**non est mihi voluntas in vobis dicit Dominus exercituum et munus non suscipiam de manu vestra <sup>11</sup> ab ortu enim solis usque ad occasum magnum est nomen meum in gentibus et in omni loco sacrificatur et offertur nomini meo oblatio munda [11]**

I have no pleasure in you, saith the Lord of hosts, neither will I accept an offering at your hand. <sup>11</sup> For from the rising of the sun even unto the going down of the same my name shall be great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense shall be offered unto my name, and a pure offering: [11]

And the Hebrew word here translated as *oblatio* is “minchah”, which is used especially for an unbloody sacrifice, as in Leviticus: “if thou bring an oblation of a grain offering (*minchah*) baked in the oven, [it shall be] unleavened cakes of fine flour mingled with oil, or unleavened wafers anointed with oil.” [12]

Now, in the enactment of a sacrifice there are four necessary elements, as even heathens will admit: first, the *res oblata*, which is the gift; second, the *minister legitimus*, who is the duly appointed person, typically a priest or *sacerdos*, who is entitled to enact it; third, the *actio sacrificata*, which is the action itself; and fourth the *finis sacrificii*, its end, object or metaphysical purpose.

And it may be said that this accords with what Aristotle wrote in *Metaphysics* concerning the causes of things: “‘Cause’ means (1) that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being, e.g. the bronze is the cause of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and so are the classes which include these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the definition of the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general are causes of the octave), and the parts included in the definition. (3) That from which the change or the resting from change first begins; e.g. the adviser is a cause of the action, and the father a cause of the child, and in general the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. (4) The end, i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is; e.g. health is the cause of walking.” [13] From this, I understand that the first cause is the *res oblata*, the second is the *actio sacrificata*, the third is the *minister*, and the fourth is the *finis sacrificii*. And to support the identification of the second cause with the sacrificial act, I observe that S. Thomas Aquinas repeatedly used the phrase *forma sacramenti* when discussing this subject in *Summa Theologica* [14].

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11 Mal 1:10-11

12 Lev 2:4 I have used “grain”, after the Hebrew, where the King James Version has “meat” in its old meaning of “food”.

13 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book V, Part 2, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

14 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 78, ‘Of The Form Of This Sacrament’, (1266-1273): “forma sacramenti” means “the form of the sacrament”.

Now Christ is the perfect priest, as S. Paul bore witness to the Hebrews:

**<sup>1</sup> Capitulum autem super ea quae dicuntur talem habemus pontificem qui consedit in dextera sedis Magnitudinis in caelis <sup>2</sup> sanctorum minister et tabernaculi veri quod fixit Dominus et non homo. [15]**

<sup>1</sup> Now of the things which we have spoken this is the sum: We have such an high priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens; <sup>2</sup> A minister of the sanctuary, and of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, and not man. [15]

Yet he is also the gift, as S. Augustine noted in *De Civitate Dei*: “He is both the Priest who offers and the Sacrifice offered.” [16] And it is fitting that the ministration of the Eucharist be performed by men, for its efficacy comes from the Passion of Christ, and hence from Christ as a man.

**<sup>1</sup> Sic nos existimet homo ut ministros Christi et dispensatores mysteriorum Dei. [17]**

<sup>1</sup> Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God. [17]

For this sacrament a duly ordained minister is required. Nevertheless, as the Angelic Doctor wrote: “in this sacrament the consecration of the matter consists in the miraculous change of the substance, which can only be done by God; hence the minister in performing this sacrament has no other act save the pronouncing of the words. And because the form should suit the thing, therefore the form of this sacrament differs from the forms of the other sacraments in two respects. First, because the form of the other sacraments implies the use of the matter, as for instance, baptizing, or signing; but the form of this sacrament implies merely the consecration of the matter, which consists in transubstantiation, as when it is said, ‘This is My body,’ or, ‘This is the chalice of My blood.’ Secondly, because the forms of the other sacraments are pronounced in the person of the minister ... But the form of this sacrament is pronounced as if Christ were speaking in person, so that it is given to be understood that the minister does nothing in perfecting this sacrament, except to pronounce the words of Christ.” [18] Moreover, it is to be understood that the virtue of the sacrament is conferred *ex opere operato* (from the action having been performed), not *ex opere operantis* (from the action of the agent), which latter would mean that the efficacy of the sacrament depended upon the worthiness of the minister or of the recipient.

As to the *res oblatae*, the proper matter is wheaten bread and wine made from grapes, for we understand these to be the species employed by the Lord at his Last Supper. As to whether the bread should be leavened, the Council of Florence stated: “the body of Christ is truly confectioned in both unleavened and leavened wheat bread, and priests should confection the body of Christ in either, that is, each priest according to the custom of his western or eastern church.” [19] But in the Roman church we use unleavened bread, as S. Thomas expounded: “First, on account of Christ’s institution: for He instituted this sacrament ‘on the first day of the Azymes’ (*Mat. 26:17; Mk. 14:12; Lk. 22:7*), on which day there ought to be nothing fermented in the houses of the Jews, as is stated in *Ex. 12:15,19*. Secondly, because bread is properly the sacrament of Christ’s body, which was conceived without corruption ... Thirdly, because this is more in keeping with the sincerity of the faithful, which is required in the use of this sacrament, according to *1 Cor. 5:7*: ‘Christ our Pasch is sacrificed: therefore let us feast ... with the unleavened bread of

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15 Heb 8:1-2 Though I might quote many other examples from this Epistle, I trust this one will suffice.

16 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘*De Civitate Dei*’ (‘The City of God’), (413-426); translated by Rev. Marcus Dods.

17 Heb 5:1

18 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘*Summa Theologica*’, Part III, Q. 78, Article 1, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

19 Council of Florence, Session 6, (6 July 1439); translation taken from ‘*Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*’, ed. Norman P. Tanner.

sincerity and truth.” [20] And the wine is mingled with water, as S. Cyprian explained: “For because Christ bore us all, in that He also bore our sins, we see that in the water is understood the people, but in the wine is showed the blood of Christ. But when the water is mingled in the cup with wine, the people is made one with Christ, and the assembly of believers is associated and conjoined with Him on whom it believes” [21]

The *finis sacrificii*, the purpose for which Christ instituted this most holy Sacrament, was summarised by the Council of Trent as follows: “Wherefore, our Saviour, when about to depart out of this world to the Father, instituted this Sacrament, in which He poured forth as it were the riches of His divine love towards man, making a remembrance of his wonderful works; and He commanded us, in the participation thereof, to venerate His memory, and to show forth his death until He come to judge the world. And He would also that this sacrament should be received as the spiritual food of souls, whereby may be fed and strengthened those who live with His life who said, He that eateth me, the same also shall live by me; and as an antidote, whereby we may be freed from daily faults, and be preserved from mortal sins. He would, furthermore, have it be a pledge of our glory to come, and everlasting happiness, and thus be a symbol of that one body whereof He is the head, and to which He would fain have us as members be united by the closest bond of faith, hope, and charity, that we might all speak the same things, and there might be no schisms amongst us.” [22]

And thus have I shown the nature of the Eucharist, that it is both sacrifice and sacrament, and that its proper elements are wheaten bread and wine mingled with a little water. I have also explained the purpose of this sacrament, regarding which I shall further quote from the Bull *Exsultate Deo* of Pope Eugenius IV, in which he declared: “The effect of this sacrament, which is produced in the soul of one who receives it worthily, is the union of him or her with Christ. Since by grace a person is incorporated in Christ and is united with his members, the consequence is that grace is increased by this sacrament in those who receive it worthily, and that every effect that material food and drink produce for corporal life – sustaining, increasing, repairing and delighting – this sacrament works for spiritual life. For in it, as Pope Urban said, we recall the gracious memory of our Saviour, we are withdrawn from evil, we are strengthened in good and we receive an increase of virtues and graces.” [23]

## Chapter IV

### *In which are described in outline certain related dogmata.*

Of these matters I shall treat only briefly, they not being the central theme of this my discourse; yet I deem it needful to describe them here to ensure the completeness of understanding.

We do not receive the body of Christ alone in the Sacred Host, nor his blood alone in the Chalice. Instead, he is present whole and entire in both forms, wherefore it is permissible to receive Communion under only one kind, as has been the practice at various times and for several reasons. As S. Thomas Aquinas wrote in his *Summa Contra Gentiles*: “Because the Body of Christ in its nature is not without His Blood, the Body and Blood are contained under both species; the Body under the species of bread by force of conversion, and the Blood by natural concomitance; and conversely under the species of wine.” [24]

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20 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 74, Article 4, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

21 Saint Cyprian of Carthage, Epistle LXII [LXIII in the Oxford edition], (253); translator unknown.

22 Council of Trent, Session XIII, ‘Decree Concerning the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist’, cap. ii, (11 October 1551); translated by J. Waterworth.

23 Pope Eugenius IV, Bull ‘Exsultate Deo’, Council of Florence, Session 8, (22 November 1439); translation taken from ‘Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils’, ed. Norman P. Tanner.

24 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Contra Gentiles’, Book IV:64; translation by Joseph Rickaby.

Nor let it be thought that, whereas Christ spoke only of his body and blood, these alone are present in the Eucharist. In accordance with the Tridentine statement [25] of the indissoluble hypostatic union of Christ's Divinity and Humanity, whereby the Body, Blood, Soul and Logos of the risen Saviour are inseparable, when by virtue of the words of consecration, *ex vi verborum*, the Body and Blood of Christ are made present in the Eucharist, then also by reason of that hypostatic union there simultaneously become present as a natural consequence, *per concomitantiam*, his Soul and Divinity. To quote S. Thomas again: "Clearly, the term into which conversion of the bread is made is not the Divinity of Christ, nor His Soul: nevertheless the Soul and the Divinity of Christ are under the species of bread, because of the real union of them both with the Body of Christ." [24] This is termed the Totality of Presence.

We are led thus to a further truth, also raised to the status of dogma by the Council of Trent [26], that Christ in his entirety is present in every particle and drop of either species: "for Christ whole and entire is under the species of bread, and under any part whatsoever of that species; likewise the whole [Christ] is under the species of wine, and under the parts thereof". [25] This is the principle to which Ælfric was referring in the extract above, where he states that the Presence is all in every part, and there is no more might in a greater portion than in a lesser.

The Council of Trent moreover emphasised the permanence of the Eucharistic Presence following the Consecration: "If any one saith, that, after the consecration is completed, the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ are not in the admirable sacrament of the Eucharist, but [are there] only during the use, whilst it is being taken, and not either before or after; and that, in the hosts, or consecrated particles, which are reserved or which remain after communion, the true Body of the Lord remaineth not; let him be anathema." [27] This has been the tradition of the Church from the earliest days, when the Blessed Sacrament was often taken to the homes of the faithful, or to the incarcerated and the infirm. From the fourth century has been customary to celebrate the Mass of the Presanctified in which the Sacred Hosts are consecrated one or more days beforehand. This illustrates the unique nature of the Eucharist: that there is a lapse of time between the confection and the reception, whereas both are coincident in the other sacraments. However, *permanent* does not mean *eternal*: when the Eucharistic Species become corrupt, then Christ has discontinued his presence therein, according to the aforementioned Council; and this I shall discuss in more detail later.

The Adorableness of the Eucharist is consequent upon the presence of Christ; wherefore the same worship is due to the Divinity in his presence in the Blessed Sacrament as in heaven. For this reason, as S. Paul wrote [28], whoever partakes of the Eucharist in a profane manner, eats and drinks condemnation upon himself. It was her veneration for the Blessed Sacrament that led S. Juliana to beseech the Church for a feast in its honour. The fruition of her devotion came on 8 September 1264, when Urban IV instituted the Feast of Corpus Christi in his Bull *Transiturus*. And so confirmed the Council of Trent: "Wherefore, there is no room left for doubt, that all the faithful of Christ may, according to the custom ever received in the Catholic Church, render in veneration the worship of latria, which is due to the true God, to this most holy sacrament." [29]

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25 Council of Trent, Session XIII, 'Decree Concerning the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist', cap. iii, (11 October 1551); translated by J. Waterworth.

26 Council of Trent, Canon III on the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, (11 October 1551); translated by J. Waterworth.

27 Council of Trent, Canon IV on the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, (11 October 1551); translated by J. Waterworth.

28 1 Cor 11:27

29 Council of Trent, Session XIII, 'Decree Concerning the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist', cap. v, (11 October 1551); translated by J. Waterworth. See also Canon VI on the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist.

## Chapter V

### *In which the primary evidence from Scripture is presented.*

In the preceding chapters I have outlined the doctrine of the Holy Mother Church. Now I shall present the evidence, the detailed discussion of which will form part of this discourse.

Our chiefest source of learning must be Scripture, wherefore I shall here set forth those passages which best illuminate the doctrine of the Real Presence.

In this matter the primary source is the Words of Institution, spoken by Christ and recorded in the Petrine and Pauline gospels, as quoted hereafter. These words were spoken at the Last Supper, in the presence of his disciples, on the first day of the azymes, on which the Passover lamb was to be sacrificed, the day before his crucifixion.

<sup>26</sup> *Cenantibus autem eis accepit Iesus panem et benedixit ac fregit deditque discipulis suis et ait accipite et comedite hoc est corpus meum.* <sup>27</sup> *Et accipiens calicem gratias egit et dedit illis dicens bibite ex hoc omnes* <sup>28</sup> *hic est enim sanguis meus nobi testamenti qui pro multis effunditur in remissionem peccatorum.* [30]

<sup>22</sup> *Et manducantibus illis accepit Iesus panem et benedicens fregit et dedit eis et ait sumite hoc est corpus meum.* <sup>23</sup> *Et accepto calice gratias agens dedit eis et biberunt ex illo omnes* <sup>24</sup> *et ait illis hic est sanguis meus nobi testamenti qui pro multis effunditur.* [31]

<sup>17</sup> *et accepto calice gratias egit et dixit accipite et dividite inter vos* <sup>18</sup> *dico enim vobis quod non bibam de generatione vitis donec regnum Dei veniat.* <sup>19</sup> *Et accepto pane gratias egit et fregit et dedit eis dicens hoc est corpus meum quod pro vobis datur hoc facite in meam commemorationem.* <sup>20</sup> *Similiter et calicem postquam cenavit dicens hic est calix nobum testamentum in sanguine meo quod pro vobis funditur.* [32]

<sup>26</sup> And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and brake it, and gave it to the disciples, and said, Take, eat; this is my body.

<sup>27</sup> And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all of it; <sup>28</sup> For this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins. [30]

<sup>22</sup> And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake it, and gave it to them, and said, Take, eat: this is my body. <sup>23</sup> And he took the cup, and when he had given thanks, he gave it to them: and they all drank of it. <sup>24</sup> And he said unto them, This is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many. [31]

<sup>17</sup> And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and said, Take this, and divide it among yourselves:

<sup>18</sup> For I say unto you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine, until the kingdom of God shall come. <sup>19</sup> And he took bread, and gave thanks, and brake it, and gave unto them, saying, This is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me. <sup>20</sup> Likewise also the cup after supper, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood, which is shed for you. [32]

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30 Mt 26:26-29

31 Mk 14:22-25

32 Lk 22:17-20 Some versions omit "which is given ... shed for you."

<sup>23</sup> Ego enim accepi a Domino quod et tradidi vobis quoniam Dominus Jesus in qua nocte tradebatur accepit panem <sup>24</sup> et gratias agens fregit et dixit hoc est corpus meum pro vobis hoc facite in meam commemorationem. <sup>25</sup> Similiter et calicem postquam cenavit dicens hic calix nobis testamentum est in meo sanguine hoc facite quotienscumque bibetis in meam commemorationem. <sup>26</sup> Quotienscumque enim manducabitis panem hunc et calicem bibetis mortem Domini annuntiatis donec veniat. <sup>27</sup> Itaque quicumque manducaverit panem vel biberit calicem Domini indigne reus erit corporis et sanguinis Domini. [33]

<sup>23</sup> For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you. That the Lord Jesus the same night in which he was betrayed took bread: <sup>24</sup> And when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat: this is my body, which is for you: this do in remembrance of me. <sup>25</sup> After the same manner also he took the cup, when he had supped, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood: this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me. <sup>26</sup> For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do shew the Lord's death till he come. <sup>27</sup> Wherefore whosoever shall eat *the* bread, or drink *the* cup of the Lord, unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord. [33]

The Gospel of S. John instead relates the Words of Promise, spoken by Christ in the synagogue at Capernaum.

<sup>35</sup> Dixit autem eis Jesus ego sum panis vitae qui veniet ad me non esuriet et qui credit in me non sitiet umquam.

<sup>35</sup> And Jesus said unto them, I am the bread of life: he that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst.

<sup>51</sup> Ego sum panis vivus qui de caelo descendi <sup>52</sup> si quis manducaverit ex hoc pane vivet in aeternum et panis quem ego dabo caro mea est pro mundi vita. <sup>53</sup> Litigabant ergo Iudaei ad invicem dicentes quomodo potest hic nobis carnem suam dare ad manducandum? <sup>54</sup> Dixit ergo eis Jesus amen amen dico vobis nisi manducaveritis carnem Filii hominis et biberitis eius sanguinem non habetis vitam in vobis. <sup>55</sup> Qui manducat meam carnem et bibit meum sanguinem habet vitam aeternam et ego resuscitabo eum in nobilissimo die. <sup>56</sup> Caro enim mea vere est cibus et sanguinis meus vere est potus. <sup>57</sup> Qui manducat meam carnem et bibit meum sanguinem in me manet et ego in illo. <sup>58</sup> Sicut misit me vivens Pater et ego vivo propter Patrem et qui manducat me et ipse vivet propter me. <sup>59</sup> Hic est panis qui de caelo descendit non sicut manducaverunt patres vestri manna et mortui sunt qui manducat hunc panem vivet in aeternum. [34]

<sup>51</sup> I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. <sup>52</sup> The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us his flesh to eat? <sup>53</sup> Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. <sup>54</sup> Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day. <sup>55</sup> For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. <sup>56</sup> He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him. <sup>57</sup> As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father: so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me. <sup>58</sup> This is that bread which came down from heaven: not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead; he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever. [34]

33 1 Cor 11:23-27 In the English text, I have omitted "broken" from 11:24 and amended 11:27 somewhat. In 11:27, "arraigned by" would be closer to the Latin than "guilty of".

34 Jn 6:35,51-59/58 The Latin and English texts are numbered differently.

In addition, the following tract is of significance in this matter:

<sup>16</sup> *Calicem benedictionis cui benedicimus nonne communicatio sanguinis Christi est et panis quem frangimus nonne participatio corporis Domini est* <sup>17</sup> *quoniam unus panis unum corpus multi sumus omnes quidem de uno pane participamus.* [35]

<sup>16</sup> The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? <sup>17</sup> For we being many are one bread, and one body: for we are all partakers of that one bread. [35]

## Chapter VI

### *In which is presented evidence from Tradition.*

And they continued stedfastly in the apostles doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers. [36]

Thus, from the time of the Apostles the Eucharist has been celebrated by the Christian church. And in this chapter I shall present evidence that from the first Christ has been understood to be truly present in this sacrament; yet I shall not attempt a comprehensive account, for many words have been written on a subject so dear to the pious heart.

S. Ignatius of Antioch, who is said to have been a disciple both of S. Peter and of S. John, wrote as follows to the Romans: “I have no delight in corruptible food, nor in the pleasures of this life. I desire the bread of God, the heavenly bread, the bread of life, which is the flesh of Jesus Christ, the Son of God ... and I desire the drink of God, namely His blood, which is incorruptible love and eternal life.” [37] To the Philadelphians he wrote: “Take ye heed, then, to have but one Eucharist. For there is one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ, and one cup to [show forth] the unity of His blood” [38] And he warned the Smyrnaeans: “But consider those who are of a different opinion with respect to the grace of Christ which has come unto us, how opposed they are to the will of God.” “They abstain from the Eucharist and from prayer, because they confess not the Eucharist to be the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which suffered for our sins, and which the Father, of His goodness, raised up again.” [39]

S. Justin Martyr wrote his *First Apology* to the Roman Emperor in defence of Christianity, describing the service of the early Church thus: “Having ended the prayers, we salute one another with a kiss. There is then brought to the president of the brethren bread and a cup of wine mixed with water; and he taking them, gives praise and glory to the Father of the universe, through the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, and offers thanks at considerable length for our being counted worthy to receive these things at His hands.” “And when the president has given thanks, and all the people have expressed their assent, those who are called by us deacons give to each of those present to partake of the bread and wine mixed with water over which the thanksgiving was pronounced, and to those who are absent they carry away a portion. And this food is called among us *Eucharistia*, of which no one is allowed to partake but the man who believes that the things which we teach are true, and who has been washed with the washing that is for the remission of sins, and unto regeneration, and who is so living as Christ has enjoined. For not as common bread and common drink do we receive these; but in like manner as Jesus Christ our Saviour, having been made flesh by the Word of God, had both flesh and blood for our salvation, so likewise have we been taught that the food which is blessed by the prayer of His word, and

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35 1 Cor 10:16-17 *communicatio* means “an imparting” and *participatio* means “the receiving of a share”.

36 Acts 2:42

37 Saint Ignatius of Antioch, ‘Epistle to the Romans’, Ch. 7, (c.110); translator unidentified.

38 Saint Ignatius of Antioch, ‘Epistle to the Philadelphians’, Ch. 4, (c.110); translator unidentified.

39 Saint Ignatius of Antioch, ‘Epistle to the Smyrnaeans’, Ch. 6 & 7, (c.110); translator unidentified.

from which our blood and flesh by transmutation are nourished, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh.” [40]

S. Irenaeus of Lyons, in *Adversus Haereses*, wrote: “For as the bread, which is produced from the earth, when it receives the invocation of God, is no longer common bread, but the Eucharist, consisting of two realities, earthly and heavenly; so also our bodies, when they receive the Eucharist, are no longer corruptible, having the hope of the resurrection to eternity.” [41]

Advancing from the second to the fourth century, it appears the First Ecumenical Council of the Catholic Church, held at Nicaea in 325, saw no need to pronounce upon the Eucharist, other than to order, in Canon XVIII, that deacons must not administer it to presbyters. We may assume there was at that time no significant doubt concerning the sacrament itself.

Thereafter, S. Cyril of Jerusalem wrote in his *Catecheses*: “Consider therefore the Bread and the Wine not as bare elements, for they are, according to the Lord’s declaration, the Body and Blood of Christ; for even though sense suggests this to thee, yet let faith establish thee. Judge not the matter from the taste, but from faith be fully assured without misgiving, that the Body and Blood of Christ have been vouch-safed to thee.” “[Be] fully assured that the seeming bread is not bread, though sensible to taste, but the Body of Christ; and that the seeming wine is not wine, though the taste will have it so, but the Blood of Christ” [42]

And S. Ambrose, in *De Mysteriis*, wrote: “Perhaps you will say, ‘I see something else, how is it that you assert that I receive the Body of Christ?’ And this is the point which remains for us to prove. And what evidence shall we make use of? Let us prove that this is not what nature made, but what the blessing consecrated, and the power of blessing is greater than that of nature, because by blessing nature itself is changed.” “For that sacrament which you receive is made what it is by the word of Christ. But if the word of Elijah had such power as to bring down fire from heaven, shall not the word of Christ have power to change the nature of the elements? You read concerning the making of the whole world: ‘He spake and they were made, He commanded and they were created.’ Shall not the word of Christ, which was able to make out of nothing that which was not, be able to change things which already are into what they were not? For it is not less to give a new nature to things than to change them.” [43]

Here we perceive that these two authors, seeking to instruct catechumens, addressed two points of which I shall treat later, namely the persistence of the appearance of the bread and wine, while the underlying substance is transformed. Indeed, S. Ambrose, in *De Fide*, referred to “the Sacramental Elements, which by the mysterious efficacy of holy prayer are transformed (*transfigurantur*) into the Flesh and the Blood” [44] And lest there be doubt as to the significance of ‘transfiguration’, I quote Tertullian in *Adversus Praxeam*, where he was discussing Christ’s Incarnation: “Transfiguration (*transfiguratio*) is the destruction of that which previously existed. For whatsoever is transfigured (*transfiguratur*) into some other thing ceases to be that which it had been, and begins to be that which it previously was not.” [45]

Whereupon, having demonstrated that belief in the Real Presence, and in some form of transubstantiation, dates back to the very time of the Apostles, I shall now address those controversies that later arose on the subject.

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40 Saint Justin Martyr, ‘First Apology’, Ch. 65 & 66, (c.152); translator unidentified.

41 Saint Irenaeus, ‘Adversus Haereses’, (‘Against Heresies’), Book IV, Ch. 18, (182-188); translator unidentified.

42 Saint Cyril of Jerusalem, ‘Catecheses’, Lecture XXII, (347 or 348); translated by Edwin Hamilton Gifford.

43 Saint Ambrose, ‘De Mysteriis’ (‘On the Mysteries’), Ch. IX, (c.387); translated by the Rev. H. De Romestin, with the Rev. E. De Romestin and the Rev. H. T. F. Duckworth.

44 Saint Ambrose, ‘De Fide’ (‘On the Christian Faith’), Book IV, Ch. X, (380); translated by the Rev. H. De Romestin, with the Rev. E. De Romestin and the Rev. H. T. F. Duckworth.

45 Tertullian, ‘Adversus Praxeam’ (‘Against Praxeas’), Ch. XXVII, (213-217); translated by Peter Holmes.

In 831 S. Paschasius Radbertus wrote his *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, which he later revised and sent in 844 to Emperor Charles the Bald. In this work he emphasised the identity of the Eucharistic body of Christ with his natural earthly body in rather exaggerated terms such that the difference between the two modes of existence was not made sufficiently clear. The Emperor commissioned Ratramnus of Corbie to write a treatise against Radbertus, which he did, giving it the same title. In this Ratramnus denied the substantial conversion of the bread, declaring that the Body of Christ is present by a spiritual mode of existence and therefore as an *invisibilis substantia*, but his Body in the sacred Host is not the same as that born of Mary and crucified.

Both opinions received support from a number of ecclesiastics, as the doctrine of the time was undecided on the issue, but by the end of the millennium the consensus favoured the miraculous transformation of the eucharistic elements. Nevertheless Ælfric, whom I quoted in my first chapter, appears to have adopted the views of Ratramnus.

In the eleventh century another dispute arose when Berengarius of Tours, some time after 1040, began to speak against the doctrine of S. Paschasius Radbertus. In 1049 he wrote a letter on the subject to Lanfranc of Bec, who later found favour with Duke William II of Normandy and became Archbishop of Canterbury. Lanfranc forwarded this to Rome, and over the next three decades and at several Synods Berengarius was repeatedly censured. Twice he was forced to renounce his views on pain of death and accept a formula of recantation affirming the substantial conversion, but doubt remains as to whether he did so from fear rather than true belief. For his part, Lanfranc wrote his own *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini adversus Berengarium Turonensem*, around 1080.

The salient points propounded by Berengarius were as follows. Firstly, that the sacramental elements remain in substance as well as in appearance after the consecration, although they acquire a new significance. Secondly, that nevertheless the bread and wine are not mere symbols, but are in a sense converted by consecration, whereby they cease to be empty and become efficacious to the believer. Thirdly, that Christ is spiritually present and is spiritually received by faith. Fourthly, that the communion in the Lord's Supper involves the whole undivided person of Christ, not his flesh and blood as separate elements.

The term 'transubstantiation' seems to have been first used by Hildebert of Tours, *circa* 1079. At the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 Innocent III presented seventy decrees for approval by the great assembly of eminent ecclesiastics, of which the first canon expresses the orthodox belief in the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Eucharist and Baptism. Concerning the Eucharist, it stated: "There is one Universal Church of the faithful, outside of which there is absolutely no salvation. In which there is the same priest and sacrifice, Jesus Christ, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms of bread and wine; the bread being changed (*transsubstantiatio*) by divine power into the body, and the wine into the blood, so that to realize the mystery of unity we may receive of Him what He has received of us. And this sacrament no one can effect except the priest who has been duly ordained in accordance with the keys of the Church, which Jesus Christ Himself gave to the Apostles and their successors." [46]

Later in the thirteenth century, S. Thomas Aquinas wrote a comprehensive exposition upon the subject of the Eucharist in his *Summa Theologica*, of which I shall present a précis in Chapter XVII. The esteem in which he was held during his life has increased with the passage of time since his death, so that his works have become as it were a touchstone for Catholic doctrine.

Around the time at which the Western Schism (1378 – 1417) began, John Wyclif came to prominence in England with the rise of an anti-clerical faction. A series of Bulls from Rome notwithstanding, his heretical tendencies grew ever worse, but in 1382 he fell out of political favour and he was forced into retirement. A number of his prominent followers, called 'Lollards',

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46 Fourth Lateran Council, Canon I, (November 1215); translated by Rev. H.J. Schroeder.

were forced to make retractations, but from their leader nothing more was required than a promise not to preach. He died and was buried in 1384, but at the behest of the Council of Constance his remains were disinterred in 1428.

That Council, in its Eighth Session, issued a ‘Sentence condemning various articles of John Wyclif’, which identified forty-five articles asserted by him and declared: “After the articles had been examined it was found, as indeed is the case, that some of them, indeed many, were and are notoriously heretical and have already been condemned by holy fathers, others are not catholic but erroneous, others scandalous and blasphemous, some offensive to the ears of the devout and some rash and seditious. It was also found that his books contain many other similar articles and introduce into God’s church teaching that is unsound and hostile to faith and morals. This holy synod, therefore, in the name of our lord Jesus Christ, in ratifying and approving the sentences of the aforesaid archbishops and of the council of Rome, repudiates and condemns for ever, by this decree, the aforesaid articles and each one of them in particular, and the books of John Wyclif.” [47] They also condemned two hundred and sixty articles previously denounced by the University of Oxford in 1411 and pronounced him a heretic.

In the initial list of condemned articles, the first three were: “(1) The material substance of bread, and similarly the material substance of wine, remain in the sacrament of the altar. (2) The accidents of bread do not remain without their subject in the said sacrament. (3) Christ is not identically and really present in the said sacrament in his own bodily persona.” [47]

I shall now turn to the sixteenth century and the teachings of those so-called ‘reformers’ who have come to be known as Protestants. I shall not recount the multiple heresies contained therein, nor the numerous attempts by which the Catholic Church has sought to counter them, but shall address only those opinions concerning the mode of Christ’s Presence in the Eucharist.

Martin Luther, in his *Large Catechism*, expressed views which are not entirely heterodox. Concerning the Sacrament he declared: “It is the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, in and under the bread and wine which we Christians are commanded by the Word of Christ to eat and to drink. And as we have said of Baptism that it is not simple water, so here also we say the Sacrament is bread and wine, but not mere bread and wine, such as are ordinarily served at the table, but bread and wine comprehended in, and connected with, the Word of God.” [48]

He continued: “It is the Word (I say) which makes and distinguishes this Sacrament, so that it is not mere bread and wine, but is, and is called, the body and blood of Christ. For it is said: *Accedat verbum ad elementum, et at sacramentum*. If the Word be joined to the element it becomes a Sacrament. This saying of St. Augustine is so properly and so well put that he has scarcely said anything better. The Word must make a Sacrament of the element, else it remains a mere element.” [48]

This denial of Transubstantiation may be seen as a form of ‘consubstantiation’: a union of the bread and wine with the body and blood of Christ which is not hypostatic, nor of mixture, nor locally inclusive, but of some other transcendent and mysterious mode. This is essentially the same concept as that of Berengarius: *panis sacratus in altari, salva sua substantia, est corpus Christi, non amittens quod erat sed assumens quod non erat*. [49]

Unlike Luther, Ulrich Zwingli, the founder of the Reformation in Switzerland, denied the Real Presence, assigning the Eucharist a purely symbolic status. And, with the others, John Calvin

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47 Council of Constance, Session 8, (4 May 1415); translator unidentified.

48 Martin Luther, ‘The Large Catechism’, Part 5: ‘Of the Sacrament of the Altar’, (1529 or 1530); translated by F. Bente and W. H. T. Dau.

49 Berengarius of Tours, (c.1050); quoted in ‘Catholic Encyclopedia’ under ‘Consubstantiation’ and in ‘History of the Christian Church’, Volume IV, Section 128. “The bread consecrated on the altar, retaining its substance, is the body of Christ, not losing anything which it was, but assuming something which it was not.”

rejected the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist: “The Lord, therefore, has given us a table at which we may feast, not an altar on which a victim may be offered; he has not consecrated priests to sacrifice, but ministers to distribute a sacred feast.” [50]

Calvin, in his *Institutes on the Christian Religion*, discussed the question of Christ’s presence in the Sacrament in much detail. He denied both transubstantiation and consubstantiation, but affirmed a spiritual Presence: “The presence of Christ in the Supper we must hold to be such as neither affixes him to the element of bread, nor encloses him in bread, nor circumscribes him in any way (this would obviously detract from his celestial glory); and it must, moreover, be such as neither divests him of his just dimensions, nor dissevers him by differences of place, nor assigns to him a body of boundless dimensions, diffused through heaven and earth. All these things are clearly repugnant to his true human nature. Let us never allow ourselves to lose sight of the two restrictions. First, Let there be nothing derogatory to the heavenly glory of Christ. This happens whenever he is brought under the corruptible elements of this world, or is affixed to any earthly creatures. Secondly, Let no property be assigned to his body inconsistent with his human nature. This is done when it is either said to be infinite, or made to occupy a variety of places at the same time. But when these absurdities are discarded, I willingly admit anything which helps to express the true and substantial communication of the body and blood of the Lord, as exhibited to believers under the sacred symbols of the Supper, understanding that they are received not by the imagination or intellect merely, but are enjoyed in reality as the food of eternal life.” [51]

Calvin also discounted the doctrine of concomitance: “For since they affirm that the body is in the bread, and the blood is in the cup, while the bread and wine are, in regard to space, at some distance from each other, they cannot, by any quibble, evade the conclusion that the body must be separated from the blood. Their usual pretence – viz. that the blood is in the body, and the body again in the blood, by what they call concomitance, is more than frivolous, since the symbols in which they are included are thus distinguished. But if we are carried to heaven with our eyes and minds, that we may there behold Christ in the glory of his kingdom, as the symbols invite us to him in his integrity, so, under the symbol of bread, we must feed on his body, and, under the symbol of wine, drink separately of his blood, and thereby have the full enjoyment of him.” [52]

The final word under this heading concerning the subject of this discourse is best given to the holy, œcumenical and general Synod of Trent which, under Julius III in 1551, promulgated a comprehensive decree on the Sacrament of the Eucharist to counter the errors and schisms of the time, in which may be seen the influence of the wisdom of the *Angelicus Doctor*.

Concerning the Real Presence, those learned men declared: “in the august sacrament of the holy Eucharist, after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and man, is truly, really, and substantially contained under the species of those sensible things.” “For thus all our forefathers, as many as were in the true Church of Christ, who have treated of this most holy Sacrament, have most openly professed, that our Redeemer instituted this so admirable a sacrament at the last supper, when, after the blessing of the bread and wine, He testified, in express and clear words, that He gave them His own very Body, and His own Blood; words which, recorded by the holy Evangelists, and afterwards repeated by Saint Paul, whereas they

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50 John Calvin, ‘Institutes of the Christian Religion’, Book 4, Chapter 18, Section 12, (1536-1559); translated by Henry Beveridge.

51 John Calvin, ‘Institutes of the Christian Religion’, Book 4, Chapter 17, Section 19, (1536-1559); translated by Henry Beveridge.

52 John Calvin, ‘Institutes of the Christian Religion’, Book 4, Chapter 17, Section 18, (1536-1559); translated by Henry Beveridge.

carry with them that proper and most manifest meaning in which they were understood by the Fathers”. [53]

On Transubstantiation, they stated: “because that Christ, our Redeemer, declared that which He offered under the species of bread to be truly His own body, therefore has it ever been a firm belief in the Church of God, and this holy Synod doth now declare it anew, that, by the consecration of the bread and of the wine, a conversion is made of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of His blood; which conversion is, by the holy Catholic Church, suitably and properly called Transubstantiation.” [54]

Thus I have provided evidence from learned writers that throughout the history of the Church the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist has been an article of faith amongst true believers.

## Chapter VII

*In which certain issues regarding the interpretation of Scripture are discussed.*

In undertaking a study of this nature, it behoves the student to bear in mind what S. Augustine wrote in *De Doctrina Christiana* (‘On Christian Doctrine’) regarding “the mode of ascertaining the proper meaning” [55] of Scripture.

In Book I he began: “All instruction is either about things or about signs; but things are learnt by means of signs. I now use the word ‘thing’ in a strict sense, to signify that which is never employed as a sign of anything else: for example, wood, stone, cattle, and other things of that kind. Not, however, the wood which we read Moses cast into the bitter waters to make them sweet, nor the stone which Jacob used as a pillow, nor the ram which Abraham offered up instead of his son; for these, though they are things, are also signs of other things. There are signs of another kind, those which are never employed except as signs: for example, words. No one uses words except as signs of something else; and hence may be understood what I call signs: those things, to wit, which are used to indicate something else. Accordingly, every sign is also a thing; for what is not a thing is nothing at all. Every thing, however, is not also a sign.” [56]

In the remainder of Book I he described the relationship between God and Man, and especially regarding love, explaining: “we should clearly understand that the fulfilment and the end of the Law, and of all Holy Scripture, is the love of God and our neighbour” [57].

He continued: “Whoever, then, thinks that he understands the Holy Scriptures, or any part of them, but puts such an interpretation upon them as does not tend to build up this twofold love of God and our neighbour, does not yet understand them as he ought. If, on the other hand, a man draws a meaning from them that may be used for the building up of love, even though he does not happen upon the precise meaning which the author whom he reads intended to express in that place, his error is not pernicious, and he is wholly clear from the charge of deception. For there is involved in deception the intention to say what is false;” [58] whereas he who derives a faulty inference, but with faith, hope and love, has no such motive. Wherefore S. Augustine indicated: “Whoever takes another meaning out of Scripture than the writer intended, goes astray, but not

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53 Council of Trent, Session XIII, ‘Decree Concerning the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist’, cap. i, (11 October 1551); translated by J. Waterworth.

54 Council of Trent, Session XIII, ‘Decree Concerning the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist’, cap. iv, (11 October 1551); translated by J. Waterworth.

55 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book I, Ch. 1, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

56 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book I, Ch. 2, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

57 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book I, Ch. 35, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw. The word order has been altered slightly for brevity and clarity.

58 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book I, Ch. 36, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

through any falsehood in Scripture. Nevertheless, as I was going to say, if his mistaken interpretation tends to build up love, which is the end of the commandment, he goes astray in much the same way as a man who by mistake quits the high road, but yet reaches through the fields the same place to which the road leads. He is to be corrected, however, and to be shown how much better it is not to quit the straight road, lest, if he get into a habit of going astray, he may sometimes take cross roads, or even go in the wrong direction altogether.” [58] And he concludes: “And, therefore, if a man fully understands that ‘the end of the commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned,’ and is bent upon making all his understanding of Scripture to bear upon these three graces, he may come to the interpretation of these books with an easy mind.” [59]

In Book II, S. Augustine turned to the matter of signs. “Now some signs are natural, others conventional. Natural signs are those which, apart from any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the knowledge of something else, as, for example, smoke when it indicates fire.” [60] “Conventional signs, on the other hand, are those which living beings mutually exchange for the purpose of showing, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds, or their perceptions, or their thoughts.” [61]

He did not pursue the topic of natural signs, nor did he concern himself with those conventional signs which “like the expression or the cry of a man in grief, follow the movement of the mind instinctively and apart from any purpose” [61]. Instead, he directed his attention to words, which are perhaps the most subtle of signs; and the words of Scripture present particular difficulties, he noted, on account of their having been translated at various times and in several ways.

He observed: “Now there are two causes which prevent what is written from being understood: its being veiled either under unknown, or under ambiguous signs. Signs are either proper or figurative. They are called proper when they are used to point out the objects they were designed to point out, as we say *bos* when we mean an ox, because all men who with us use the Latin tongue call it by this name. Signs are figurative when the things themselves which we indicate by the proper names are used to signify something else, as we say *bos*, and understand by that syllable the ox, which is ordinarily called by that name; but then further by that ox understand a preacher of the gospel, as Scripture signifies, according to the apostle’s explanation, when it says: ‘Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn.’” [62]

Now, in seeking to interpret signs, we should heed not only the writings of the faithful, but also those of the heathen. For although many of their institutions were founded upon superstition and idolatry, yet there may be found gold amongst the dross, which should not be rejected. “Nay, but let every good and true Christian understand that wherever truth may be found, it belongs to his Master.” [63] “Moreover, if those who are called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, have said aught that is true and in harmony with our faith, we are not only not to shrink from it, but to claim it for our own use from those who have unlawful possession of it.” [64]

S. Augustine further noted: “The science of reasoning is of very great service in searching into and unravelling all sorts of questions that come up in Scripture, only in the use of it we must guard against the love of wrangling, and the childish vanity of entrapping an adversary. For there are many of what are called sophisms, inferences in reasoning that are false, and yet so close an imitation of the true, as to deceive not only dull people, but clever men too, when they are not on

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59 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book I, Ch. 40, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

60 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book II, Ch. 1, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

61 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book II, Ch. 2, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

62 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book II, Ch. 10, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

63 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book II, Ch. 18, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

64 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book II, Ch. 40, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

their guard. For example, one man lays before another with whom he is talking, the proposition, 'What I am, you are not.' The other assents, for the proposition is in part true, the one man being cunning and the other simple. Then the first speaker adds: 'I am a man;' and when the other has given his assent to this also, the first draws his conclusion: "Then you are not a man." [65] Such vanity is detestable and is to be avoided and guarded against by all right-minded students.

In Book III, S. Augustine explained how to resolve ambiguous signs, describing such techniques as may be employed in diverse cases. Concerning the interpretation of passages that may be either literal or metaphorical, he noted: "In the first place, we must beware of taking a figurative expression literally. For the saying of the apostle applies in this case too: 'The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.'" "It is a wretched slavery which takes the figurative expressions of Scripture in a literal sense." [66] Conversely, "we must also pay heed to that which tells us not to take a literal form of speech as if it were figurative. In the first place, then, we must show the way to find out whether a phrase is literal or figurative. And the way is certainly as follows: Whatever there is in the word of God that cannot, when taken literally, be referred either to purity of life or soundness of doctrine, you may set down as figurative. Purity of life has reference to the love of God and one's neighbour; soundness of doctrine to the knowledge of God and one's neighbour. Every man, moreover, has hope in his own conscience, so far as he perceives that he has attained to the love and knowledge of God and his neighbour." [67]

Thus I have shown from an authoritative source that the faithful student commits no grievous wrong if he errs in an honest attempt at the interpretation of Scripture; that care must be taken in unravelling ambiguous signs; and that all sources of learning may be employed to illuminate the words of Scripture, even heathen texts, to the extent that they are not superstitious or otherwise fallacious or pernicious.

## Chapter VIII

### *In which is presented a summary of certain teachings of Aristotle.*

In the previous chapter I demonstrated that the writings of the ancients are valuable in the study of Christian doctrine, wherefore I shall now attempt to elucidate those parts of Aristotle's teaching that are necessary for the discussion of the doctrine of Transubstantiation.

Turning first to the *Categories*:

"Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject. By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject." [68] Of any given man – Socrates, for example – it may be said of him that he is a 'man': that is to say, 'man' is predicable of the subject 'Socrates'. Furthermore, the species 'man' is capable of existence without needing to be present in a subject.

"Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything." [68] Of the subject 'a pale man', a particular shade of the colour white may be said to be present in him. Such a thing, however, is incapable of separate existence: a shade of white cannot exist except it be present in a subject.

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65 Saint Augustine of Hippo, 'De Doctrina Christiana', Book II, Ch. 31, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

66 Saint Augustine of Hippo, 'De Doctrina Christiana', Book III, Ch. 5, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

67 Saint Augustine of Hippo, 'De Doctrina Christiana', Book III, Ch. 10, (397); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

68 Aristotle, 'Categories', Section 1 Part 2, (c. 350BC); translated by E. M. Edghill.

“Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.” [68] Similarly, if the subject is the aforementioned shade of white, it may be said of it that it is a ‘colour’: wherefore, ‘colour’ is predicable of the shade of white, and is present in the pale man.

“There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject.” [68] There is nothing of which it may be said ‘this is a Socrates’, for Socrates is an individual in and of himself: ‘Socrates’ is not predicable of any subject; nor is Socrates present in any subject, for he is capable of separate existence.

“Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species ‘man’, and the genus to which the species belongs is ‘animal’; these, therefore – that is to say, the species ‘man’ and the genus ‘animal’ – are termed secondary substances.” [69] Socrates is thus a primary substance. The pale man’s shade of white is not a substance, nor is any member of the species ‘colour’, for such cannot exist unless present in a subject.

“Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are ‘man’ or ‘the horse’, of quantity, such terms as ‘two cubits long’ or ‘three cubits long’, of quality, such attributes as ‘white’, ‘grammatical’. ‘Double’, ‘half’, ‘greater’, fall under the category of relation; ‘in a the market place’, ‘in the Lyceum’, under that of place; ‘yesterday’, ‘last year’, under that of time. ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’, are terms indicating position, ‘shod’, ‘armed’, state; ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’, action; ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized’, affection.” [70] Of these expressions, we may observe that substance is unique in that it is not present in a subject, whereas the others must be.

“This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur. ‘Animal’ is predicated of the species ‘man’, therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species ‘man’ at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.” [69]

This brings us to the *Metaphysics*:

In this work, Aristotle provides many definitions, of which it is useful here to summarise one. “‘Accident’ means (1) that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor usually, e.g. ... a musical man might be pale; but since this does not happen of necessity nor usually, we call it an accident. Therefore since there are attributes and they attach to subjects, and some of them attach to these only in a particular place and at a particular time, whatever attaches to a subject, but not because it was this subject, or the time this time, or the place this place, will be an accident.” “‘Accident’ has also (2) another meaning, i.e. all that attaches to each thing in virtue of itself but is not in its essence, as having its angles equal to two right angles attaches to the triangle. And accidents of this sort may be eternal, but no accident of

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69 Aristotle, ‘Categories’, Section 1 Part 5, (c. 350BC); translated by E. M. Edghill.

70 Aristotle, ‘Categories’, Section 1 Part 4, (c. 350BC); translated by E. M. Edghill.

the other sort is.” [71] Thus, an accident is some attribute which attaches to a subject – for example, the particular shade of white to the pale man – but is not of the essence of that subject. Conversely, ‘rational’ is a definiens of ‘man’, wherefore it not an accident that the pale man is rational.

Returning now to the question of substance, Aristotle states: “The word ‘substance’ is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus, are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third, the compound of these. (By the matter I mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape the pattern of its form, and by the compound of these the statue, the concrete whole.)” [72]

I shall return to the roles of matter and form shortly, but first I shall elucidate the meaning of ‘essence’. “Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we determine substance, and one of these was thought to be the essence, we must investigate this. And first let us make some linguistic remarks about it. The essence of each thing is what it is said to be *propter se*. For being you is not being musical, since you are not by your very nature musical. What, then, you are by your very nature is your essence.” “And ... essence will belong, just as ‘what a thing is’ does, primarily and in the simple sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories also; not essence in the simple sense, but the essence of a quality or of a quantity.” [73] So, primary essences are substances. Other ‘essences’, say that of ‘musical’, are secondary.

“Each thing itself, then, and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments and because to know each thing, at least, is just to know its essence, so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one.” “Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence.” [74] It must be noted that Aristotle sought to define things themselves, not the words used to label them. The definition of a tiger is not the meaning of the word ‘tiger’; it is what a tiger is in itself. To define ‘tiger’ it is necessary to identify its essence – the ‘what it is to be’ of a tiger, what is predicated of the tiger *per se*.

“Since anything which is produced is produced by something (and this I call the starting-point of the production), and from something (and let this be taken to be not the privation but the matter; for the meaning we attach to this has already been explained), and since something is produced (and this is either a sphere or a circle or whatever else it may chance to be), just as we do not make the substratum (the brass), so we do not make the sphere, except incidentally, because the brazen sphere is a sphere and we make the form.” [75] That is, we do not make the form ‘sphere’, but instead we make a substance (the particular brazen sphere) which contains the form of a sphere.

“But that there is a brazen sphere, this we make. For we make it out of brass and the sphere; we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a brazen sphere. But if the essence of sphere in general is to be produced, something must be produced out of something. For the product will always have to be divisible, and one part must be this and another that; I mean the

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71 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book V, Part 30, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

72 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book VII, Part 3, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

73 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book VII, Part 4, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

74 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book VII, Part 6, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

75 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book VII, Part 8, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

one must be matter and the other form. If, then, a sphere is ‘the figure whose circumference is at all points equidistant from the centre’, part of this will be the medium in which the thing made will be, and part will be in that medium, and the whole will be the thing produced, which corresponds to the brazen sphere. It is obvious, then, from what has been said, that that which is spoken of as form or substance is not produced, but the concrete thing which gets its name from this is produced, and that in everything which is generated matter is present, and one part of the thing is matter and the other form.” [75] Thus, substance is said to be a ‘hylomorphic compound’, comprising both matter (*hylê*) and form (*morphê*).

In regard to the creation or destruction of substances, we may consult Aristotle’s *Physics*:

“Everything that comes to be either passes away from, or passes into, its contrary or an intermediate state. But the intermediates are derived from the contraries – colours, for instance, from black and white. Everything, therefore, that comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contraries.” [76] And in the case of creation and destruction, the contraries are the presence and the absence of form.

“Generally things which come to be, come to be in different ways: (1) by change of shape, as a statue; (2) by addition, as things which grow; (3) by taking away, as the Hermes from the stone; (4) by putting together, as a house; (5) by alteration, as things which ‘turn’ in respect of their material substance. It is plain that these are all cases of coming to be from a substratum. Thus, clearly, from what has been said, whatever comes to be is always complex. There is, on the one hand, (a) something which comes into existence, and again (b) something which becomes that – the latter (b) in two senses, either the subject or the opposite. By the ‘opposite’ I mean the ‘unmusical’, by the ‘subject’ ‘man’, and similarly I call the absence of shape or form or order the ‘opposite’, and the bronze or stone or gold the ‘subject’. [77] That is, when a man learns music, the subject of change is the man, and the opposites are the attributes ‘unmusical’ and ‘musical’. Or, more relevant to our discussion, when a statue is created the subject is the material of which it is made – the bronze or stone or gold or whatever it may be – and the contraries are the absence and the presence of form.

“The matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not. As that which contains the privation, it ceases to be in its own nature, for what ceases to be – the privation – is contained within it. But as potentiality it does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be. For if it came to be, something must have existed as a primary substratum from which it should come and which should persist in it; but this is its own special nature, so that it will be before coming to be. (For my definition of matter is just this – the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result.)” [78] So matter exists as a potentiality, being neither created nor destroyed, but acting as the primary substratum from which substances may come to be by the imposition of form.

Finally, let us turn to *De Anima*:

“Among substances are by general consent reckoned bodies and especially natural bodies; for they are the principles of all other bodies. Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with its correlative decay). It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite. But since it is also a body of such and such a kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it. Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a

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76 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book I Part 5, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye. I have amended “or passes away” to “either passes away”.

77 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book I Part 7, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.

78 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book I Part 9, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.

natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.” [79] That is to say, the soul is the essence of a living being, and its body is the matter. Similarly, in *Metaphysics* Aristotle gave one meaning of ‘substance’ as “That which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of an animal”. [80]

“We have now given an answer to the question, What is soul? – an answer which applies to it in its full extent. It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing’s essence. That means that it is ‘the essential whatness’ of a body of the character just assigned.” [79]

It is important to note that, for Aristotle, the body is only truly a body when ensouled. “Suppose that the eye were an animal – sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name – it is no more a real eye than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure.” [79] While alive, Socrates was a hylomorphic compound of body and soul. When his soul departed, what remained was merely a cadaver. It could only be identified with Socrates homonymously, just as one might say of a statue made in his likeness: This is Socrates.

For confirmation that the soul is the form of the body, I cite the Council of Vienne, which, in its First Decree, declared: “we reject as erroneous and contrary to the truth of the catholic faith every doctrine or proposition rashly asserting that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form of the human body”. [81]

Thus have I outlined what is ‘substance’, that it is both substratum or matter and essence or form, that substances come to be by the imposition of form upon matter, and that the essence of a living being is its soul. Those attributes of a substance that inhere in it not as part of its essence, but merely incidentally – such as its position, dimensions and colour – are termed ‘accidents’, and these cannot exist unless they be present in a subject.

## Chapter IX

### *In which the Doctrine of the Real Presence is examined.*

I have, in the preceding chapters, presented the evidence and defined such terms as are used in metaphysical discussion, wherefore I shall now examine the doctrine of the Real Presence. And here the principal point of contention is whether, when our Lord uttered the Words of Institution, he meant them figuratively or literally; for, as discussed in Chapter VII, we must be careful to distinguish between these modes of speech.

Now, it has been argued that Christ would not have used some unusual figure when speaking to his disciples, for they were simple folk, lacking education in rhetoric. Against this, I argue that when our Lord first spoke to them, saying [82]: “Follow me, and I will make you fishers of men,” they understood that he meant not for them to ensnare people as they would fish, for “they straightway left their nets, and followed him.” Furthermore, S. John has told us that Christ, at his Last Supper, declared: “These things have I spoken unto you in proverbs: but the time cometh, when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs,” [83] and this he said after prophesying to

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79 Aristotle, ‘De Anima’, Book II Chapter 1, (c. 350BC); translated by J. A. Smith.

80 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book V, Part 8, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

81 Council of Vienne (1311-1312), Decree 1; from ‘Corpus Iuris Canonici’, ed. E. Richter and E. Friedberg; translator unidentified.

82 Mat 4:19-20

83 Jn 16:25

S. Peter: “The cock shall not crow, till thou hast denied me thrice,” [84] and therefore after the Institution. Yet this latter does not prove that the Words were meant figuratively, in the manner of a proverb, but that it is not impossible that they were so meant.

Thus John Calvin wrote: “Christ declares that *the bread is his body*. These words relate to a sacrament; and it must be acknowledged, that a sacrament consists of a visible sign, with which is connected the thing signified, which is the reality of it. It must be well known, on the other hand, that the name of the thing signified is transferred to the sign; and therefore, no person who is tolerably well acquainted with Scripture will deny that a sacramental mode of expression ought to be taken metonymically. I pass by general figures, which occur frequently in Scripture, and only say this: whenever an outward sign is said to be that which it represents, it is universally agreed to be an instance of metonymy. If *baptism* be called *the laver of regeneration*, (Titus in. 5;) if *the rock*, from which water flowed to the Fathers in the wilderness, be called *Christ*, (1 Corinthians 10:4;) if *a dove* be called *the Holy Spirit*, (John 1:32;) no man will question but the signs receive the name of the things which they represent. How comes it, then, that persons who profess to entertain a veneration for the words of the Lord will not permit us to apply to the Lord’s Supper what is common to all the sacraments?” [85] And Berengarius in his time argued likewise.

Yet, to the contrary, in all four accounts it is written that Christ said *hoc est corpus meum*, whereas none indicate this was a figure, as in “this is a symbol of my body”; nevertheless it could be argued that the symbolism lies in the breaking, as Christ’s body was broken at Calvary, or in the sharing, in that they all ate of the one bread, as we all partake of the one Christ.

To quote the arguments of Calvin again: “Had it not occurred to the apostles that the bread was called the body figuratively, as being a symbol of the body, the extraordinary nature of the thing would doubtless have filled them with perplexity. For, at this very period, John relates, that the slightest difficulties perplexed them (John 14:5,8; 16:17). They debate, among themselves, how Christ is to go to the Father, and not understanding that the things which were said referred to the heavenly Father, raise a question as to how he is to go out of the world until they shall see him? How, then, could they have been so ready to believe what is repugnant to all reason – viz. that Christ was seated at table under their eye, and yet was contained invisible under the bread? As they attest their consent by eating this bread without hesitation, it is plain that they understood the words of Christ in the same sense as we do, considering what ought not to seem unusual when mysteries are spoken of, that the name of the thing signified was transferred to the sign.” [86]

Against this, I observe that the Institution follows the Words of Promise, in which our Saviour said *panis quem ego dabo caro mea est*; and it is clear that they who heard those words understood them literally, for S. John recorded that “the Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us his flesh to eat?” and “many therefore of his disciples, when they had heard this, said, This is an hard saying; who can hear it?” wherefore “from that time many of his disciples went back, and walked no more with him.” [87] Yet the twelve did not go away, but declared their faith in him, wherefore they understood the Words of Institution according to the words spoken at Capernaum.

Just so, S. John Damascene stated: “The bread and the wine are not merely figures of the body and blood of Christ (God forbid!) but the deified body of the Lord itself: for the Lord has said,

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84 Jn 13:38 – cf Mat 26:34, Mk 14:30, Lk 22:34

85 John Calvin, ‘Commentary on a Harmony Of The Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, and Luke’, Matthew 26:26-30; Mark 14:22-26; Luke 22:17-20, (1555); translated by the Rev. William Pringle.

86 John Calvin, ‘Institutes of the Christian Religion’, Book 4, Chapter 17, Section 23, (1536-1559); translated by Henry Beveridge.

87 Jn 6:52; Jn 6:60; Jn 6:66

‘This is My body,’ not, this is a figure of My body: and ‘My blood,’ not, a figure of My blood.” [88]

Likewise, Martin Luther himself declared in his *Large Catechism*: “With this Word you can strengthen your conscience and say: If a hundred thousand devils, together with all fanatics, should rush forward, crying, How can bread and wine be the body and blood of Christ? etc., I know that all spirits and scholars together are not as wise as is the Divine Majesty in His little finger. Now here stands the Word of Christ: Take, eat; this is My body; Drink ye all of it; this is the new testament in My blood, etc. ... It is true, indeed, that if you take away the Word or regard it without the words, you have nothing but mere bread and wine. But if the words remain with them as they shall and must, then, in virtue of the same, it is truly the body and blood of Christ. For as the lips of Christ say and speak, so it is, as He can never lie or deceive.” [48]

Furthermore, I have already shown in Chapter VI that Christian writers from the time of the Apostles onward have affirmed that Christ is truly present in the Eucharist. On this there has ever been a consensus, although the mode of his presence was not extensively discussed until the eleventh century. Thereafter, in the thirteenth century, S. Thomas Aquinas felt no need to defend the doctrine at any length, instead analysing the more difficult subject of transubstantiation, which I shall consider later; and finally, in the sixteenth century, to oppose the pernicious teachings of the Protestants, the Council of Trent made the dogmatic statement: *in almo sanctae Eucharistiae sacramento post panis et vini consecrationem Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum verum Deum atque hominem vere, realiter ac substantialiter*. [53]

Thus we must acknowledge that the doctrine of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist is sound and certain. As S. Cyril avowed: “Since then He Himself declared and said of the Bread, This is My Body, who shall dare to doubt any longer? And since He has Himself affirmed and said, This is My Blood, who shall ever hesitate, saying, that it is not His blood?” [42] And likewise S. Hilary declared: “As to the verity of the flesh and blood there is no room left for doubt. For now both from the declaration of the Lord Himself and our own faith, it is verily flesh and verily blood.” [89]

## Chapter X

### *In which the mode of the Real Presence is described.*

The Council of Vienne, in its First Decree, stated: “the only begotten Son of God, subsisting eternally together with the Father in everything in which God the Father exists, assumed in time in the womb of a virgin the parts of our nature united together, from which he himself true God became true man: namely the human, passible body and the intellectual or rational soul truly of itself and essentially informing the body.” [81] But, as Ælfric rightly stated: “Much is betwixte the body Christ suffred in, and the bodye that is halowed to housell.” Wherefore I shall investigate the manner in which Christ is present in the Eucharist.

Now, the Council of Trent indicated: “that our Saviour Himself always sitteth at the right hand of the Father in heaven, according to the natural mode of existing, and that, nevertheless, He be, in many other places, sacramentally present to us in his own substance, by a manner of existing, which, though we can scarcely express it in words, yet can we, by the understanding illuminated by faith, conceive, and we ought most firmly to believe, to be possible unto God”. [53]

To comprehend this, it is first necessary to consider ‘place’, as Aristotle did in Book IV of *Physics*: “What then after all is place? The answer to this question may be elucidated as follows. Let us take for granted about it the various characteristics which are supposed correctly to belong

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88 Saint John of Damascus, ‘De Fide Orthodoxa’, Book IV, Ch. 13, (early 8<sup>th</sup> Century); translated by the Rev. S. D. F. Salmond, assisted by James L. Salmond.

89 Saint Hilary of Poitiers, ‘De Trinitate’ (‘On the Trinity’), Book VIII, (359-360); translated by E. N. Bennett.

to it essentially. We assume then: (1) Place is what contains that of which it is the place. (2) Place is no part of the thing. (3) The immediate place of a thing is neither less nor greater than the thing. (4) Place can be left behind by the thing and is separable. In addition: (5) All place admits of the distinction of up and down, and each of the bodies is naturally carried to its appropriate place and rests there, and this makes the place either up or down.” [90] He concluded: “the innermost motionless boundary of what contains is place.” “For this reason, too, place is thought to be a kind of surface, and as it were a vessel, i.e. a container of the thing. Further, place is coincident with the thing, for boundaries are coincident with the bounded.” [90]

Now, it is the proper nature of a physical body that it is in a place ‘circumscriptively’ inasmuch as each individual point of its exterior surfaces is coincident with the corresponding point of the immediately envioning surfaces that constitute its place. That is to say, the subject is circumscribed by the place predicated of it.

Conversely, the proper mode of location for unembodied spirits such as angels, and for the embodied human soul, cannot be circumscriptive, for such an entity has no component parts which can be in extensional contact with the surrounding dimensions, but instead it is by nature entire within every portion of whatever space it occupies. Wherefore, a spiritual being is virtually rather than formally *in loco*, and is said to be in place ‘definitively’.

The Angelic Doctor noted: “So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.” [91]

Having thus made this distinction clear, I shall now elucidate an aspect of the aforementioned doctrine which many find obscure: namely the presence of our Saviour whole and entire in the sacramental species, notwithstanding the dimensive quantity of the latter is much less than the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body. S. Thomas Aquinas wrote of this in detail [92], but I shall interpret briefly lest this chapter grow too long.

Dimensive quantity is an accidental property, and the accidents of the bread and wine remain after consecration, wherefore the dimensions of the Eucharistic Species persist; yet as the whole Christ is truly present in the Sacrament, his entire dimensive quantity is present by real concomitance (*per concomitantiam*), not after the manner of ‘quantity’ (*per modum quantitatis*), but of ‘substance’ (*per modum substantiae*). Likewise, his body is not present locally and circumscriptively on the altar or in the ciborium, but substantially; whereas he is in heaven definitively under his own species.

Thus is explained how Christ sits at the right hand of the Father while his body and blood are simultaneously present in many places across the world. For a spiritual being is present in a place according to the definitive mode: just so, the whole of the human soul is present in all parts of the body, which is termed ‘continuous definitive multilocation’. But if the whole Christ is present in each part of a Host, and this is then broken, then it is evident that the whole Christ is thereafter present accidentally in two places, which is termed ‘discontinuous multilocation’. So, too, can Christ be present in many Hosts and many Chalices; yet this multilocation exists solely as regards the dimensive accidents which, having ceased to be in the subjects of the bread and wine, by no means inhere in the substance of Christ himself, who remains whole and undivided.

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90 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book IV, Part 4, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.

91 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part I, Q. 52, Article 2, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

92 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 76, Articles 4 & 5, (1266-1273).

## Chapter XI

*In which is considered by what means the virtue of the Eucharistic Species is transmitted to the body of the communicant.*

It is evident from the Words of Institution quoted above that the Eucharistic Species are intended as veritable aliment: *caro vere est cibus et sanguinis vere est potus*. True, this “liuelye foode” (to quote Ælfric) contains spiritual nourishment for the soul rather than physical nutriment for the body. Yet both manners of food are conveyed to the mouth and consumed, as Ælfric stresses, and as S. John emphasises by the use of the verb *trôgein* (to chew).

As S. Thomas Aquinas wrote in Book IV of his *Summa Contra Gentiles* [93]: “Because spiritual effects are produced on the pattern of visible effects, it was fitting that our spiritual nourishment should be given us under the appearances of those things that men commonly use for their bodily nourishment, namely bread and wine. And for the further correspondence of spiritual signs with bodily effects, in the spiritual regeneration of Baptism the mystery of the Word Incarnate is united with us otherwise than as it is united in this Sacrament of the Eucharist, which is our spiritual nourishment. In Baptism the Word Incarnate is only virtually contained, but in the Sacrament of the Eucharist we confess Him to be contained substantially, as nourishment must be substantially united with the nourished. And because the completion of our salvation was wrought by Christ's passion and death, whereby His Blood was separated from His Body, therefore the Sacrament of His Body is given us separately under the species of bread, and His Blood under the species of wine.”

But, in reading this last, we must be mindful of the dogma of the Totality of Presence, as described in Chapter IV. Furthermore, I observe that S. Thomas also wrote: “before actual reception of this sacrament, a man can obtain salvation through the desire of receiving it” [94] although I do not propose to expound further upon this topic.

The purpose of its ingestion is to bring about a spiritual and mystical union with Christ: *qui manducat meam carnem et bibit meum sanguinem in me manet et ego in illo*. In the words of S. Thomas, the Sacrament of the Eucharist “was instituted ... for nourishing spiritually through union between Christ and His members, as nourishment is united with the person nourished.” [95].

S. Gregory of Nyssa, in his *Great Catechism*, indicated that consumption is indispensable to this assimilation: “For, in the manner that, as the Apostle says (*1 Cor 5:6*), a little leaven assimilates to itself the whole lump, so in like manner that body to which immortality has been given it by God, when it is in ours, translates and transmutes the whole into itself.” “Yet in no other way can anything enter within the body but by being transfused through the vitals by eating and drinking. It is, therefore, incumbent on the body to admit this life-producing power in the one way that its constitution makes possible.” [96]

Is there then a mechanism – that is, a physical process – by which the virtue inherent in the Eucharistic Species is distributed throughout the body for the nutrition of the soul there indwelling? There seems no *prima facie* reason why such a distributive motion should be necessary, for just as the virtue of the Eucharist resides in every mote of its species, so the soul dwells all in every part of the body – *tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte* – and could, in

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93 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Contra Gentiles’, Book IV, cap. 61, (1258-1264); translation by Joseph Rickaby.

94 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 73, Article 3, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

95 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 79, Article 5, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

96 Saint Gregory of Nyssa, ‘Great Catechism’, cap. xxxvii, (385); translated by the Rev. William Moore.

principle, receive the benefit by touch alone. Nevertheless, mere adjacency is insufficient for the proper imparting of the spiritual nourishment, for the Words of Promise are specific in requiring ingestion: *nisi manducaveritis carnem Filii hominis et biberitis eius sanguinem non habetis vitam in vobis* – and here S. John uses the verb *phagein* (to eat) instead of *trôgein*, for it is the conveyance to the stomach that is important, not the manner of doing it.

Here we may turn to the erudition of Galen in *On the Natural Faculties*: a work that is carefully argued and drawn from his own observations. Therein he described how aliment, after ingestion, is chylified in the stomach and digested there and in the intestines and related organs, following which the nutriment is transformed into blood and the other humours within the veins: “Thus we say that there exists in the veins a blood-making faculty, as also a digestive faculty in the stomach, a pulsatile faculty in the heart, and in each of the other parts a special faculty corresponding to the function or activity of that part.” [97] The blood thereafter flows as required through the veins to the various parts of the body, bringing them nourishment: “Numerous conduits distributed through the various limbs bring them pure blood, much like the garden water-supply, and, further, the intervals between these conduits have been wonderfully arranged by Nature from the outset so that the intervening parts should be plentifully provided for when absorbing blood, and that they should never be deluged by a quantity of superfluous fluid running in at unsuitable times.” [98]

Let us not pursue this purely physical reasoning too far, however, lest we be misled by it, as were those opponents of Transubstantiation known as Stercoranists, who in the tenth century sought to misinterpret these words spoken by Christ:

**17 Non intellegitis quia omne quod in os intrat in ventrem vadit et in secessum emittitur 18 quae autem procedunt de ore de corde exeunt et ea coinquinant hominem. 19 De corde enim exeunt cogitationes malae homicidia adulteria fornicationes furta falsa testimonia blasphemiae [99]**

17 Do not ye yet understand, that whatsoever entereth in at the mouth goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the draught? 18 But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile the man. 19 For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies: [99]

They claimed that the phrase *quod in os intrat in secessum emittitur* represents the major premise of a categorical syllogism, to which they added the minor premise that the consecrated elements enter in at the mouth, drawing the revolting conclusion that the Eucharistic Body and Blood of our Lord must therefore pass from the body after the way of Nature.

Gerbert (later Pope Sylvester II, 999 – 1003) regarded stercoranism as a diabolical blasphemy, arguing against it in the second part of his work *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini* [100]:

**IX. Sed illorum jam ineptiis respondendum, qui humano aut saeculi sensu in Dei rebus putant loquendum. Dominus etenim noster non de spiritali cibo, sed de carnali locutus est, cum diceret: Omne quod intrat in os, in ventrem vadit, et in secessum emittitur (Matth. XV, 17). Non autem in Scripturis omnibus semper pro categorico syllogismo**

9. But now a response should be made to the absurdities of those men, who claim one ought to speak from human or secular experience about Divine matters. Surely our Lord spoke not of spiritual, but of bodily nourishment, when he said: “whatsoever entereth in at the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the draught” (*Mat 15:17*). Moreover, something is never definitively accepted as a categorical syllogism in any

97 Galen, ‘On the Natural Faculties’, Book I, ch. 4, (c. 170); translated by Arthur John Brock.

98 Galen, ‘On the Natural Faculties’, Book III, ch. 15, (c. 170); translated by Arthur John Brock.

99 Mat 15:17-19

100 Gerbert, ‘De Corpore et Sanguine Domini’, Chapter 9, (c. 1000); my translation.

praediffinite accipitur: cum, etsi de corde exeunt cogitationes malae (Matth. XV, 19), ut idem Dominus dicit, non possunt exire etiam bonae? Calumniati sunt haeretici ex hoc sermone, Dominum physicae ignarum fuisse; physica enim sic se habet: Ignea virtus, cujus sedes in corde est, tibi potusque subtilem per occultos poros in diversas corporis partes vaporem distribuit; faeculentum vero in secessum discernit. Et nos saepe videmus non modo infirmos sed etiam sanos, quod per os intromittunt, per vomitum rejectare, et aliquos per multa tempora sine digestionem duxisse [f. suppl. vitam] Et, licet quod sumebant, per nauseam stomachi revomeretur, subtilior tamen succus per membra usque ad unguis diffundebatur. Ergo dicendum, aut Dominum non praediffinite locutum, aut quamcunque aporiam corporis, qua se subtilis tibi vapor diffundit, secessum dictum; et hoc, ne haereticus garriat. Caeterum quia vere credimus non solum animam sed et carnem nostram hoc mysterio recreari (totum enim hominem assumpsit qui totum hominem in Sabbato curavit), carni quidem caro spiritualiter conviscerata transformatur, ut et Christi substantia in nostra carne inveniatur, sicut et ipse nostram in suam constat assumpsisse deitatem: ut qui manducat ejus carnem et bibit sanguinem, vivat per animam et nunc et in aeternum, et caro de terrae pulvere resuscitata vivificetur in nobissimo die. Quapropter cujus potenti virtute panis iste communis quem quotidie sumimus, cum sit candidus, mutatur intra nos in colorem sanguineum vel alium humorem fluidum, ipsius potentia caro et sanguis ejus sumpta non in noxios et superfluos humores, sed in carne vere resuscitanda debeat reseruari conformata.

Scriptures: when, even if “out of the heart proceed evil thoughts” (*Mat 15:19*), as the Lord likewise says, cannot good things also come forth? From this saying, heretics have falsely claimed that the Lord was unaware of physics; for physics has it thus: the fiery virtue, whose seat is in the heart, distributes the refined vapour of the food and drink through hidden pores into the various parts of the body; the feculent matter it indeed separates into the waste. Often we see both that not only infirm but also healthy men reject in vomit whatever they introduce through the mouth, and that some people have gone through [life] without digestion on many occasions. For, although whatever they were taking in was being regurgitated owing to the nausea of the stomach, nevertheless the more refined fluid was being distributed throughout the members as far as the extremities. Therefore it must be asserted either that the Lord did not speak definitively, or that whatever convolution of the body it is, by which the refined vapour of the food distributes itself, was being called the draught; and that, let no heretic dispute! Moreover, because we truly believe that not only our spirit but also our body is refreshed by this mystery (for he who healed a whole man on the Sabbath (*Jn 7:23*) assumed the whole [nature of] man), then indeed the flesh is transformed when spiritually incorporated into the flesh, so that the substance of Christ might be found in our flesh, just as it is indisputable that he himself assumed our substance into his divinity: so that he who eats his body and drinks his blood may live through his spirit both now and forever, when the body, having been restored out of the dust of the earth, is brought to life on the final day. Wherefore by his mighty virtue this communal bread which we consume daily, although it be white, is changed within us to the colour of blood or some other fluid humour, and so by its intrinsic power his body and blood is retained, not absorbed into the noxious and superfluous humours, but merged into the flesh so that it might be truly revived.

We must surely agree, with Gerbert, that Christ’s words were not meant *praedefinite*, so as to apply in all circumstances: our Saviour was explaining that victuals put into the mouth – even those foodstuffs held by the Jews to be unclean – have no power to defile the body, for in due course they pass out in the waste. It is assuredly foolish to assert that Christ intended this as a universal premise, and to argue therefrom that any and every item consumed must necessarily be excreted.

Instead, Gerbert proposed that the consecrated elements do not pass out of the body *innoxios et superfluos humores*, but instead are reserved in the flesh for resurrection on the Day of Judgement. I suggest such an incorporation, taken literally, must be deemed unlikely: for, if a man were to consume half a drachm of host together with a drachm of consecrated wine every day for threescore years and ten, their accumulated quantity would exceed two hundredweight!

Now Galen observed, concerning the superfluities: “we are unable to draw any nourishment from grass, although this is possible for cattle, similarly we can derive nourishment from radishes, albeit not to the same extent as from meat; for almost the whole of the latter is mastered by our natures; it is transformed and altered and constituted useful blood; but, notwithstanding, in the radish, what is appropriate and capable of being altered (and that only with difficulty, and with much labour) is the very smallest part; almost the whole of it is surplus matter, and passes through the digestive organs, only a very little being taken up into the veins as blood – nor is this itself entirely utilisable blood.” [101] Following this to its logical limit, it may be deduced that a perfect food would be taken up entirely, leaving no waste: and our Lord’s Supper is surely such a superlative repast.

However, to address the question as to the material quantity consumed by the communicant, which as I indicated above could exceed that of the human body, I propose the explanation that, once the Eucharistic substances have begun to be acted upon by the stomach, Christ’s essence separates from them to merge with the soul of the faithful communicant, leaving the base matter to be digested after the manner of other foods. And in support of this proposition, I cite the authority of S. Thomas, who explained [102] that “the species last so long as the substance of the bread would remain, if it were there”, “hence Christ’s body remains just as long under the sacramental species”, continuing “until digested by natural heat”. Once Christ has ceased to be present in the species, the *Angelicus Doctor* tells us that they become food for the body, for “something must be generated necessarily from the sacramental species if they be corrupted,” [103] wherefore “the sacramental species can be converted into a substance generated from them. And they can be converted into the human body for the same reason as they can into ashes or worms. Consequently, it is evident that they nourish.” [104] So, let us not concern ourselves further with controversy over what happens to mere matter once the sacrament has achieved its purpose.

Thus I conclude that the Eucharistic elements, once consumed as our Lord ordained, and having entered the stomach, are absorbed in their entirety through the natural faculties of the body, so that the grace of the sacrament might be carried to all parts of the body, providing spiritual nourishment in a manner correspondent with that in which ordinary food brings bodily sustenance.

## Chapter XII

### *In which is considered whether the Eucharistic Species can ever bring harm instead of good.*

I discussed in the previous chapter how the virtue of the Eucharistic Species can be transmitted to the faithful communicant; now I shall consider whether these may bring harm to the unworthy. Albeit not directly relevant to my discourse, I feel it my duty to include these warnings for the edification of those who might benefit therefrom.

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101 Galen, ‘On the Natural Faculties’, Book I, ch. 10, (c. 170); translated by Arthur John Brock.

102 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Book III, Q. 80, Article 3, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

103 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Book III, Q. 77, Article 5, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

104 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Book III, Q. 77, Article 6, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

S. Paul wrote directly of this:

**<sup>28</sup> Probet autem se ipsum homo et sic de pane illo edat et de calice bibat. <sup>29</sup> Qui enim manducat et bibit indigne iudicium sibi manducat et bibit non diiudicans corpus. <sup>30</sup> Ideo inter vos multi infirmes et inbecilles et dormiunt multi. [105]**

<sup>28</sup> But let a man *prove* himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup. <sup>29</sup> For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself, not discerning the Lord's body. <sup>30</sup> For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep. [105]

Now, we are taught that, for Holy Communion to be received not only validly, but also fruitfully, there is required the appropriate disposition both of body and of soul.

To prepare the body, a person must fast, taking neither food nor drink. This is for three reasons, as explained by S. Thomas: "First, as Augustine says (*Resp. ad Januar., Ep. liv*), 'out of respect for this sacrament,' so that it may enter into a mouth not yet contaminated by any food or drink. Secondly, because of its signification. i.e. to give us to understand that Christ, Who is the reality of this sacrament, and His charity, ought to be first of all established in our hearts, according to Mat. 6:33: 'Seek first the kingdom of God.' Thirdly, on account of the danger of vomiting and intemperance, which sometimes arise from over-indulging in food, as the Apostle says (*1 Cor. 11:21*): 'One, indeed, is hungry, and another is drunk.' Nevertheless the sick are exempted from this general rule, for they should be given Communion at once, even after food, should there be any doubt as to their danger, lest they die without Communion, because necessity has no law." [106].

For the soul, the principal necessary disposition is freedom from mortal sin or ecclesiastical censure. Wherefore, "he who would communicate, ought to recall to mind the precept of the Apostle; Let a man prove himself. Now ecclesiastical usage declares that necessary proof to be, that no one, conscious to himself of mortal sin, how contrite soever he may seem to himself, ought to approach to the sacred Eucharist without previous sacramental confession." [107]

Indeed, as S. Paul wrote: *probet se ipsum homo*, where the meaning of *probare* is 'to prove', 'to show oneself worthy of approval'. And the Angelic Doctor expounded further: "whoever receives this sacrament, expresses thereby that he is made one with Christ, and incorporated in His members; and this is done by living faith, which no one has who is in mortal sin. And therefore it is manifest that whoever receives this sacrament while in mortal sin, is guilty of lying to this sacrament, and consequently of sacrilege, because he profanes the sacrament: and therefore he sins mortally." [108]

Yet it may further be said that the faults for which S. Paul was admonishing the Corinthians also were divisions within the community and want of charity, as S. John Chrysostom expounded in his Homily on this passage [109], or unworthily approaching the Eucharist without proper reverence, even disbelieving that it holds the Real Presence of Christ, *non diiudicans corpus*.

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105 1 Cor 11:28-30 Greek: *koimōntai*, 'have fallen asleep' – that is, 'are dead'. In 11:28 I have amended 'examine' to 'prove', as explained in the text.

106 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Book III, Q. 80, Article 8, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

107 Council of Trent, Session XIII, 'Decree Concerning the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist', cap. vii, (11 October 1551); translated by J. Waterworth. See also Canon XI on the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist.

108 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Book III, Q. 80, Article 4, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

109 Saint John Chrysostom, 'Homilies on First Corinthians', Homily XXVII: 1 Cor. xi.17, (c. 391); translated by the Rev. Hubert Kestell Cornish and the Rev. John Medley, revised by the Rev. Talbot W. Chambers. 1 Cor 11:18 – *audio scissuras esse*, 'I hear that there be divisions among you'.

Ælfric in his sermon also stressed the importance of unity, *quoniam unus panis unum corpus multi sumus*:

Crist gehalgode on his beode ða gerynu ure sibbe & ure annisse: se þe underfehþ ðære annysse gerynu & ne hilt þone bend ðære soþan sibbe: ne underfehþ he na gerynu for him sylfum: ac gecyðnyse togeanes him sylfum ;

Micel gód biþ cristenum mannum \$ hi gelome to husle gan: gif hi unscæþþignysse on heora heortan berap to ðam weofode: gif hi ne beoþ mid leahtrum ofsette ; Þam yfelan men ne becymþ to nanum góde: ac to forwyrd: gif he ðas halgan husles unwurþe onbyrigþ ; [3]

Christ hallowed on hys table the mysterye of our peace, and of our vnytye: he whyche receyueth the mysterye of vnytye, and kepeth not the bonde of true peace, he receyueth not a mysterye for hym selfe, but a wisse agaynst hym selfe.

It is very good for Christen men, that they goe often to housell, if they brynge wyth them to the alter innocencye in their harte ; if they be not possessed with vices. To the euill man it turneth to no good, but to destruction, if he receiue vnworthily the holy housel. [3]

Still worse it is for one who does not believe in the holy mystery to partake of this sacrament, as S. Thomas explained, for “the sin of unbelief, which fundamentally severs a man from the unity of the Church, simply speaking, makes him to be utterly unfit for receiving this sacrament; because it is the sacrament of the Church's unity... Hence the unbeliever who receives this sacrament sins more grievously than the believer who is in sin; and shows greater contempt towards Christ Who is in the sacrament, especially if he does not believe Christ to be truly in this sacrament.” [110]

Moreover, I should caution here – for the priest should be alert for it – that the communicant betimes does not swallow the Host, but reserves it in the mouth, to be removed later in secret. Such persons then sacrilegiously use the Body of our Lord for superstitious practices or even witchcraft, as has often been attested.

So it was that that Caesar who was master of the novices and prior in the monastery at Heisterbach recorded in his *Dialogus Miraculorum* that the mistress of novices at Sankt Nicolas Insel, a convent of nuns on an island in the river Moselle, had told him: “On the same island a maiden, not a nun, whom I saw there, was possessed. When the devil was asked by a priest why he had so long and so cruelly tortured Hartdyfa de Cogheme, he replied through the mouth of the girl. ‘Why? She has most certainly deserved it. She scattered the Most High upon her vegetables.’ Since he did not at all understand the saying and the devil was unwilling to explain, the priest went to the woman and told her what the devil had said about her, advising her not to deny if she understood. She immediately confessed her guilt, saying, ‘I understand the saying well, although I have never told any man of it. When I was a young girl and had a garden to cultivate, I received a wandering woman as a guest one night. When I told her of the losses in my garden, saying that all the vegetables were being devoured by caterpillars, she replied, “I will tell you a good remedy. Receive the body of the Lord, break it in pieces, scatter it over your vegetables, and the plague will cease at once.” I, wretched one! who cared more for my garden than for the sacrament, when I had received the body of our Lord at Easter, took it out of my mouth and did with it as I had been taught. What I had intended as a remedy for my vegetables, became a source of torment to me, as the devil is my witness.’ ... Therefore, up to the present day she atones for that heinous sin and suffers unheard-of tortures. Let those who employ the divine sacrament for temporal gain, or what is more execrable, for evil-doing, give heed to this punishment, even if they do not consider the sinfulness.” [111]

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110 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Book III, Q. 80, Article 5, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

111 Caesar of Heisterbach, ‘Dialogus Miraculorum’, (c.1220-1235); Dist. IX, Cap. IX. (Vol II, pp. 173-74.) in ‘Caesarii Heisterbacensis monachi ordinis Cisterciensis Dialogus Miraculorum’, edited by Joseph Strange.

Likewise, the Inquisitors Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger warn in *Malleus Maleficarum*: “It is also to be noted that when witches communicate they observe this custom, that, when they can do so without being noticed, they receive the Lord’s Body under their tongue instead of on the top. And as far as can be seen, the reason is that they never wish to receive any remedy that might counteract their abjuration of the faith ... and secondly, because in this way it is easier for them to take the Lord’s Body out of their mouths so that they can apply it, as has been said, to their own uses, to the greater offence of the Creator. For this reason all rectors of the Church and those who communicate the people are enjoined to take the utmost care when they communicate women that the mouth shall be well open and the tongue thrust well out, and their garments be kept quite clear.” [112]

## Chapter XIII

### *In which is considered whether Baptism may involve a type of Transubstantiation.*

S. Thomas Aquinas, quoted in Chapter XI, referred to Baptism as “spiritual regeneration”. In this chapter I shall consider whether a baptized child is a different substance from an unbaptized child.

Aelfric wrote: “An heathen childe is baptized, yet he altereth not hys shape without though he be changed within”. In this it may be said he erred somewhat, for the recipient of baptism must be a Christian – by profession if an adult, by representation if a child. Nevertheless we may perceive the sense of Aelfric’s words: that the child, after baptism, maintains outwardly his former appearance, yet inwardly he is remade.

In his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, S. Thomas wrote: “Baptism therefore, or spiritual generation, was needed to serve the purpose of taking away original sin and all actual sins. And because the sensible sign of a Sacrament must be suited to represent the spiritual effect of the Sacrament, and the washing away of filth is done by water, therefore Baptism is fittingly conferred in water sanctified by the word of God. And because what is brought into being by generation loses its previous form and the properties consequent upon that form, therefore Baptism, as being a spiritual generation, not only takes away sins, but also all the liabilities contracted by sins.” [113]

Observe that S. Thomas specifically refers here to ‘form’. Expanding further upon this theme, he continues: “With the acquisition of a new form there goes also the acquisition of the activity consequent upon that form; and therefore the baptised become immediately capable of spiritual actions, such as the reception of the other Sacraments.” [113] He concludes: “One and the same thing can be generated only once: therefore, as Baptism is a spiritual generation, one man is to be baptised only once.” [113]

Moreover, in *Summa Theologica* he also wrote: “when a thing is generated, it receives together with the form, the form’s effect ... when a man is baptized, he receives the character, which is like a form; and he receives in consequence its proper effect, which is grace whereby all his sins are remitted.” [114] “Baptism imprints a character, which is indelible.” [115]

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112 Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger, ‘Malleus Maleficarum’, Part II, Q. 1, Ch. 5, (1486); translated by Montague Summers.

113 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Contra Gentiles’, Book IV, cap. 59, (1258-1264); translation by Joseph Rickaby, (1905).

114 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Book III, Q. 69, Article 10, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947).

115 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Book III, Q. 66, Article 9, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947).

<sup>17</sup> *Si qua ergo in Christo nova creatura vetera transierunt ecce facta sunt nova.* [116]

<sup>17</sup> Therefore if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new. [116]

Since the essence of substance is form, these words of S. Thomas suggest that, in baptism, the recipient ceases to be one substance and becomes another, though remaining unchanged in outward appearance. And this is the signature of transubstantiation: that the one substance is replaced by another, the accidents remaining.

And in support of this hypothesis, we may note that many authors, including Fathers of the Church, have likened the Sacrament of Baptism to that of the Eucharist. As Ælfric wrote:

Se þe tuwa halgapan ofletan to husle se biþ þam gedwolan gelice þe an cild fullaþ tuwa ; [117]

He that doth twise hallow one host to housell, is lyke vnto the heretike, who doth christen twyse one childe. [117]

S. John Chrysostom, in his 82<sup>nd</sup> *Homily on the Gospel According to S. Matthew*, wrote: “Since then the word saith, ‘This is my body,’ let us both be persuaded and believe, and look at it with the eyes of the mind. For Christ hath given nothing sensible, but though in things sensible yet all to be perceived by the mind. So also in baptism, the gift is bestowed by a sensible thing, that is, by water; but that which is done is perceived by the mind, the birth, I mean, and the renewal.” [118]

Now a child, as an individual being, must be a primary substance. This leads to the proposition that, qua spiritual nature, there must be two different secondary substances – that is, species – which we may describe as ‘unbaptized person’ and ‘baptized person’, or more loosely: ‘heathen’ and ‘Christian’, and ‘man’ may be held to be the genus to which these species belong.

Under this hypothesis, ‘man’ is predicated both of baptized and of unbaptized persons. Since Aristotle tells us: “when one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject” [119] it follows that all the differentiae pertaining to ‘man’ (as opposed to, say, some other animal) will apply also to the two species I have proposed: “for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.” [119]

Nevertheless there must be at least one differentia to distinguish between the species; and this must be of a spiritual nature, as I indicated above, wherefore it is not perceptible to the corporeal senses, just as S. John Chrysostom wrote: “neither is the birth of that which is spiritual visible to our bodily eyes”. [120] And the principal differentia is this: that a baptized person is part of the Church, and hence is one with Christ, as the *Angelicus Doctor* stated: “by Baptism, man is incorporated in Christ, and is made His member” [121]

Another differentia, though consequent upon the former, is that only the baptized may enter God’s kingdom. And in final support of the hypothesis, I quote from the famous *Decretum de Justificatione* of the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent: “the Justification of the impious is

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116 2 Cor 5:17 *Creatura* may be ‘creature’ or ‘creation’.

117 Ælfric Grammaticus, ‘Epistola ad Wulfstanum’ (‘Epistle to Wulfstane’), (c.1010); included in ‘Select Monuments of the Doctrine and Worship of the Catholic Church in England Before the Norman Conquest’.

118 Saint John Chrysostom, ‘Homilies on the Gospel According to St Matthew’, Homily LXXXII: Matt. xxvi.26-28, (c. 390); translated by Rev. Sir George Prevost.

119 Aristotle, ‘Categories’, Section 1 Part 3, (c. 350BC); translated by E. M. Edghill.

120 Saint John Chrysostom, ‘Homilies on the Gospel According to Saint John’, Homily XXVI: John iii.6, (c. 389); The Oxford Translation, edited by Rev. Philip Schaff.

121 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Book III, Q. 69, Article 3, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

indicated, as being a translation, from that state wherein man is born a child of the first Adam, to the state of grace, and of the adoption of the sons of God, through the second Adam, Jesus Christ, our Saviour. And this translation, since the promulgation of the Gospel, cannot be effected, without the laver of regeneration, or the desire thereof, as it is written; unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God. (*Jn 3:5*)” [122]

But let us now consider the alternative: that baptism causes an accidental change, rather than a substantial one. This requires the possibility that an indelible but accidental alteration may occur in a man, which does not alter his substance, but which is effected instantaneously, or nearly so: for the latter is the case with baptism. Now, an example of such is the blinding of a man in one eye, which may be done in an instant and its effect is permanent, yet the victim remains the same man – and therefore the same substance – whilst having undergone the accidental motion from ‘two-eyed’ to ‘one-eyed’.

Yet it may be argued against this that it is the way of Nature that a faculty may be lost in an instant, whereas the gaining of the bodily faculties is a process that requires a considerable span of time; and therefore the analogy fails. And that which can be acquired in a moment, for example a certain item of knowledge, is not always permanent, for knowledge can be forgotten.

S. John Chrysostom, comparing natural birth with spiritual rebirth, concurred: “That which is fashioned in the womb requires time, not so that in water, but all is done in a single moment. Here our life is perishable, and takes its origin from the decay of other bodies; that which is to be born comes slowly, (for such is the nature of bodies, they acquire perfection by time,) but it is not so with spiritual things. And why? Because the things made are formed perfect from the beginning.” [120] As the effect of baptism is not natural but supernatural, the power of the Holy Ghost makes a change instantly and irreversibly where Nature could not.

Also to the contrary, I showed in Chapter VIII that the soul is the essence of a rational creature, wherefore a spiritual change must cause an essential alteration; and since substance is essence and substratum, baptism must bring about a substantial conversion. But against this it could be argued that the change is more properly described as ‘formal’, as the matter remains unaltered; whereas in the sacrament of the Eucharist, “a conversion is made of the whole substance” [54], where *totius substantiae* is understood as implying ‘all being’: matter and form together, which point I shall address in Chapter XVII.

Thus I have demonstrated that baptism may involve a kind of transubstantiation, or at least a formal conversion. And if Baptism, then perhaps also Confirmation and Ordination also, for the Council of Trent decreed: “If any one saith, that, in the three sacraments, Baptism, to wit, Confirmation, and Order, there is not imprinted in the soul a character, that is, a certain spiritual and indelible Sign, on account of which they cannot be repeated; let him be anathema.” [123]

## Chapter XIV

### *In which the nature of ‘matter’ or ‘substratum’ is discussed further.*

In Chapter VIII I provided an outline of those parts of Aristotle’s philosophy that are germane to a discussion of the Real Presence. Yet it is still not clear precisely what is the nature of that principle he calls ‘matter’ or ‘substratum’, wherefore I shall investigate this further.

Aristotle tells us in Book I of *Physics*: “We physicists, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion which is indeed made

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122 Council of Trent, Session VI, ‘Decree on Justification’, Cap. iv, (13 January 1547); translated by J. Waterworth.

123 Council of Trent, Session VII, ‘Decree on the Sacraments’, ‘On the Sacraments in General’ Canon IX, (3 March 1547); translated by J. Waterworth.

plain by induction.” [124] For physics is the study of being qua movable; that is, it deals with things that exist (*ta onta* – beings) as regards their ability to be the subjects of change.

Of motion, Aristotle says: “Again, there is no such thing as motion over and above the things. It is always with respect to substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes changes. But it is impossible, as we assert, to find anything common to these which is neither ‘this’ nor quantum nor quale nor any of the other predicates. Hence neither will motion and change have reference to something over and above the things mentioned, for there is nothing over and above them.” [125] That is, motion is a property of the subject which undergoes change.

He provides the following definition: “The fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially, is motion – namely, of what is alterable qua alterable, alteration: of what can be increased and its opposite what can be decreased (there is no common name), increase and decrease: of what can come to be and can pass away, coming to be and passing away: of what can be carried along, locomotion.” [125]

As explained before, two of the principles of motion are the contraries, while the third is the substratum, for “one can gather from surveying the various cases of becoming in the way we are describing that, as we say, there must always be an underlying something, namely that which becomes”. [77] Aristotle described this principle as a potentiality that contains the other two principles: in the case of something coming to be, beforehand it contains the privation, and afterward it contains the form.

Thus we understand that primary substratum is an element of all substances and of all change. As to the sense in which it is ‘primary’, it must be so either ontologically or epistemologically – the latter in the sense that it cannot with the tools at our disposal be resolved into anything more primitive – but that question I shall not pursue.

Instead, I shall now examine the origin of all matter, which must surely be the Creation, as many authorities have declared. For instance S. Thomas Aquinas, in *Summa Theologica*, wrote: “whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are ‘such’ by accidental forms, nor according as they are ‘these’ by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things.” [126]

Every thing, including primary substratum, was made *ex nihilo* by God, as S. John Damascene declared: “Our God Himself, Whom we glorify as Three in One, created the heaven and the earth and all that they contain, and brought all things out of nothing into being: some He made out of no pre-existing basis of matter, such as heaven, earth, air, fire, water: and the rest out of these elements that He had created, such as living creatures, plants, seeds. For these are made up of earth, and water, and air, and fire, at the bidding of the Creator.” [127]

In *De Genesi ad Litteram* S. Augustine explained: “There can be no doubt, therefore, that this unformed matter, however slight its nature, was made by God alone and created together with the works that were formed from it. Now, we may suppose that this unformed matter is meant by the following words: ‘But the earth was invisible and formless, and darkness was over the abyss. And the Spirit of God was stirring above the water.’ With the exception of the mention of the Spirit of God, we can surely presume that the whole passage refers to the visible creation but implies its unformed state in terms that are adapted to the unlearned. For these two elements, earth and

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124 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book I Part 2, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.

125 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book III Part 1, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.

126 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part I, Q. 44, Article 2, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

127 Saint John of Damascus, ‘De Fide Orthodoxa’, Book II, Ch. 5, (early 8<sup>th</sup> Century); translated by the Rev. S. D. F. Salmond, assisted by James L. Salmond.

water, are more pliable than the others in the hands of an artisan, and so with these two words it was quite fitting to indicate the unformed matter of things.” [128]

When Moses described the Creation he used the words ‘earth’ and ‘water’, for the Israelites could not have comprehended more subtle terms, nor could he have anticipated by a thousand years the philosophy of the Greeks:

**<sup>1</sup> In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram;  
<sup>2</sup> terra autem erat inanis et vacua et tenebrae  
super faciem abyssi et spiritus Dei ferebatur  
super aquas. [129]**

<sup>1</sup> In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. <sup>2</sup> And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. [129]

I suggest the Latin phrase *inanis et vacua* is tautologous, for both adjectives mean ‘empty, void, worthless, useless, vain, unprofitable’. Therefore, following the advice of S. Augustine in *On Christian Doctrine*, I consider other tongues. The Greek has “*kai aoratos kai akataskeuastos*”, where *aoratos* signifies ‘unseen, invisible’ and *akataskeuastos* means ‘unwrought, unformed’. In Hebrew it is written “*tohu vabohu*”, *tohu* indicating ‘formlessness, confusion, unreality, emptiness, nothingness, vanity’ and *bohu* representing ‘emptiness, void, waste’. From these I deduce the sense to be ‘formless and empty’, and this I shall interpret.

To explain how the earth could be said to be ‘empty’ after the first creation, I turn to Aristotle. Although matter was present as substratum or ‘primaeval ocean’ (*tehom*), without form nothing could be said ontologically to exist as substance. “Whence,” noted Plotinus in *The Second Ennead*, “the identification that has been made of Matter with The Void”. [130]

In Book XII of his *Confessions*, S. Augustine wrote thus: “Hast not Thou taught me, O Lord, that before Thou didst form and separate this formless matter, there was nothing, neither colour, nor figure, nor body, nor spirit? Yet not altogether nothing; there was a certain formlessness without any shape. [131]

Yet it is said by many philosophers that primary substratum is purely a potentiality, rather than something that can be said to have existence. Plotinus wrote: “Matter is, so to speak, the outcast of Being, it is utterly removed, irredeemably what it was from the beginning: in origin it was Non-Being and so it remains.” [132] Therefore we must ask: did God create the primary substratum – this ‘non-being’ – first, and then inform it, or were matter and form ‘concreated’ – that is, generated together, at the same time?

S. Augustine argues for the latter viewpoint in *De Genesi ad Litteram*: “we must not suppose that unformed matter is prior in time to things that are formed; both the thing made and the matter from which it was made were created together. A voice is the matter from which words are fashioned, and words imply a voice that is formed. But the speaker does not first utter a formless sound of his voice and later gather it together and shape it into words. Similarly, God the Creator did not first make unformed matter and later, as if after further reflection, form it according to the series of works He produced. He created formed matter. It is true that the material out of which something is made, though not prior by time, is in a sense by its origin prior to the object

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128 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Genesi ad Litteram’ (‘On the Literal Meaning of Genesis’), Book I, Ch. 15, (401-415); from ‘St. Augustine, the Literal Meaning of Genesis’ vol. 1, Ancient Christian Writers, vol. 41; translated by John Hammond Taylor.

129 Gen 1:1-2

130 Plotinus, ‘The Six Enneads’, 2nd Ennead, 4th Tractate, (250); translated by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page.

131 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘Confessions’, Book XII, Chapters 3-4, (397-400); translated by J. G. Pilkington.

132 Plotinus, ‘The Six Enneads’, 2nd Ennead, 5th Tractate, (250); translated by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page.

produced. Accordingly, the sacred writer was able to separate in the time of his narrative what God did not separate in time in His creative act.” [133]

Yet Scripture makes plain that the work of Creation spanned six days, wherein God took that which he had created *in principio* and acted upon it, until at last all was completed:

<sup>1</sup> *⁊gitur perfecti sunt caeli et terra et omnis ornatus eorum.* [134]

<sup>1</sup> Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the *adornments thereof*. [134]

(Here the King James Version has “all the host of them”, but ‘ornatus’ means ‘adornments, decorations, embellishments, ornaments, furnishings’: that is, those things the provision of which are the perfection of a work.)

While he noted in his *Summa Theologica* that other learned authors, among them SS. Basil (the Great), Ambrose and John Chrysostom, appeared to support the opposite opinion, S. Thomas Aquinas concluded: “we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in duration.” [135].

Thus, S. Basil asked in the second of his homilies *On the Hexaemeron*: “what was the unfinished condition of the earth?” He answered: “The fertility of the earth is its perfect finishing; growth of all kinds of plants, the upspringing of tall trees, both productive and sterile, flowers’ sweet scents and fair colours, and all that which, a little later, at the voice of God came forth from the earth to beautify her, their universal Mother.” But in the beginning, “as nothing of all this yet existed, Scripture is right in calling the earth ‘without form’.” [136]

Indeed in his first homily, addressing the formation of the world, S. Basil wrote: “as concerns the earth, let us resolve not to torment ourselves by trying to find out its essence, not to tire our reason by seeking for the substance which it conceals. Do not let us seek for any nature devoid of qualities by the conditions of its existence, but let us know that all the phenomena with which we see it clothed regard the conditions of its existence and complete its essence. Try to take away by reason each of the qualities it possesses, and you will arrive at nothing. Take away black, cold, weight, density, the qualities which concern taste, in one word all these which we see in it, and the substance vanishes.” [137]

Just so, S. Thomas Aquinas explained in *De Principiis Naturae*: “It should also be noted that some matter has a composition of form; for example, although the bronze is the matter with respect to the statue, nevertheless, the bronze itself is a composite of matter and form. Therefore, bronze cannot be called prime matter because it has a matter. Only that matter which can be understood without any form and privation, but which is the subject of both form and privation, is

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133 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Genesi ad Litteram’ (‘On the Literal Meaning of Genesis’), Book 1, Chapter 15, (401-415); translated by John Hammond Taylor, in ‘Ancient Christian Writers’, vol 41.

134 Gen 2:1

135 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part I, Q. 66, Article 1, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

136 Saint Basil the Great, ‘In Hexaemeron’, Homily II, part 1, (before 370); translated by the Rev. Blomfield Jackson.

137 Saint Basil the Great, ‘In Hexaemeron’, Homily I, part 8, (before 370); translated by the Rev. Blomfield Jackson.

called prime matter because there is not any other matter prior to it. And this prime matter is also called ‘hyle’.” [138]

So we must conclude that in the First Creation, when God brought matter into being, it was not entirely formless, for without form it could not exist for any temporal duration. Instead its essence was primitive and imperfect, yet with great potential to be wrought by God by division and adornment during the Hexaemeron proper – those six days known as the Second Creation. It was this primaeval matter that Scripture identifies as *terra*, *aquae* and *abyssus*.

With this S. Augustine concurs: “By the word ‘earth’ we should then understand earth with its own fully developed form and the waters clearly marked by their visible form flooding over the earth. Accordingly, where Holy Scripture goes on to say, ‘The earth was invisible and formless, and darkness was over the abyss, and the Spirit of God was stirring above the water,’ we should not imagine any unformed matter, but earth and water already constituted with their familiar qualities, but without light, which had not yet been created.” [139]

Now if it be asked: if primary substratum was not, and then came to be, what is the principle or potentiality underlying this motion? I should answer: God, for he exists outside of creation, as S. Thomas Aquinas wrote: “God by his essence is distinct from those things of which he is the principle by creation.” [140]

I have therefore made clear the distinction between two kinds of substratum: the primal potentiality which God first created (though he simultaneously imbued it with primitive forms) is properly termed ‘primary substratum’, while that which admits of qualities perceptible to our mortal senses is what we commonly call ‘matter’. And the experience of those senses advises us that those things regarded as ‘matter’ – such as clay or wood or bronze – have some degree of form, albeit imperfect, else we could not perceive them at all, even whilst they remain indefinite in the sense that they contain the potential to become many things by the hand of the craftsman or the processes of Nature.

It is not the place here to inquire as to the composition of this matter: whether its elements be air, fire, water and earth, or mercury, sulphur and salt (as Paracelsus proposed); nor whether its constituents be continuous or discrete (as the atoms posited by Democritus). Instead, I wish to observe that ‘matter’, as I have defined it, is attended by certain accidents, which experience teaches us are typical to the material, whatever it be.

As Origen wrote in Book II of *De Principiis*: “we next consider the nature of corporeal being, seeing the diversity in the world cannot exist without bodies ... our object is to discuss the nature of bodily matter. By matter, therefore, we understand that which is placed under bodies, viz., that by which, through the bestowing and implanting of qualities, bodies exist; and we mention four qualities – heat, cold, dryness, humidity. These four qualities being implanted in the *hulê*, or matter (for matter is found to exist in its own nature without those qualities before mentioned), produce the different kinds of bodies. Although this matter is, as we have said above, according to its own proper nature without qualities, it is never found to exist without a quality.” [141]

Thus, if a certain chalice is yellow, is heavy, and does not corrode or tarnish, we identify these attributes as accidents, for not all chalices are so. Yet these properties are to be expected if the chalice be golden, for gold typically is yellow, and is heavy, and – being a noble metal – is not

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138 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘De principiis naturae, ad fratrem Sylvestrum’ (‘On the Principles of Nature’), Cap. 2, (c.1255); translated by Prof. Gerry Campbell.

139 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Genesi ad Litteram’ (‘On the Literal Meaning of Genesis’), Book 1, Chapter 13, (401-415); translated by John Hammond Taylor, in ‘Ancient Christian Writers’, vol 41.

140 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part I, Q. 41, Article 4, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

141 Origen, ‘De Principiis’, Book II, Chapter 1, (220-230); translated by the Rev. Frederick Crombie.

susceptible to corruption. Moreover, a golden statue will also have like attributes, as will a golden coin, and so forth. On the other hand, if a silver coin be struck from the identical die, its form will be the same as the golden coin, but certain of its accidents will be those associated with silver, for instance it will be white in colour and apt to tarnish.

Wherefore evidence suggests that certain accidents – but unquestionably not all – inhere in the matter itself, for they endure when form is imposed upon it. Thus, 11oz 2dwt of silver may be alloyed with 18dwt of base metal (as is the common practice), the ingot may be hammered out, divided into two hundred and forty planchets, and struck into pennies. Thereupon the weight of the coins will be found to be one pound, demonstrating that this quantity remains constant, notwithstanding the imposition of form upon the matter. Furthermore, that property called *densitas* is characteristic of each metal, so that the weight of a volume of gold is always greater than that of the same volume of silver, an observation famously used by Archimedes to assay King Hiero's crown.

And thus I have set forth the nature of matter: that what is commonly called by that name is not primary substratum, but is informed to a degree, though imperfect in that it remains a potentiality from which may be made many things. Yet I deduce that it admits the inherence of certain accidents, these being characteristic to each particular kind of matter; and this agrees with what S. Thomas Aquinas wrote in *De Ente et Essentia*: “Since the parts of substance are matter and form, certain accidents are principally a consequence of form, and certain accidents are principally a consequence of matter.” [142]

## Chapter XV

### *In which is interposed a disquisition concerning the nature of 'being'.*

It is needful here for me to include a more detailed examination of the nature of 'being', and to compare the terminology employed, firstly by Aristotle, and secondly by S. Thomas Aquinas and other Christian authors, in order to be more sure of understanding what they wrote.

Now, metaphysics is the study of being qua being; that is, it deals with entities inasmuch as they have being. Yet this is a subject about which much has been written and less agreed, wherefore I shall limit myself to a synopsis of the principal concepts, chiefly as they relate to the distinction between substances and accidents. And lest we be hindered by semantic quandaries, let us agree directly that our words, although immediately they signify concepts in the human mind, are also ultimately signs of the objects of those concepts.

In Book IV of his *Metaphysics* Aristotle asserted: “there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these things or of substance itself.” [143] And I have described 'substance', albeit briefly, in Chapter VIII.

In Book V, he continued: “Things are said to 'be' (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their own nature. (1) In an accidental sense, e.g. we say 'the righteous doer is musical', and 'the man is musical', and 'the musician is a man'... for here 'one thing is another' means 'one is an accident of another'.” “Thus when one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is. (2) The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of

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142 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'De Ente et Essentia' ('On Being and Essence'), Ch. 6, (1254-1256); translated by Robert T. Miller.

143 Aristotle, 'Metaphysics', Book IV, Part 2, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross. (Text corrected.)

predication; for the senses of ‘being’ are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its ‘where’, others its ‘when’, ‘being’ has a meaning answering to each of these... (3) Again, ‘being’ and ‘is’ mean that a statement is true, ‘not being’ that it is not true but false... (4) Again, ‘being’ and ‘that which is’ mean that some of the things we have mentioned ‘are’ potentially, others in complete reality. For we say both of that which sees potentially and of that which sees actually, that it is ‘seeing’... And similarly in the case of substances; we say the Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the line is in the line, and we say of that which is not yet ripe that it is corn.” [144]

And in Book VI he summarised: “the unqualified term ‘being’ has several meanings, of which one was seen to be the accidental, and another the true (‘non-being’ being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g. the ‘what’, quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which ‘being’ may have), and again besides all these there is that which ‘is’ potentially or actually.” [145]

Thus, enumerating as in his Fifth Book, I may reiterate the Philosopher’s analysis as follows. (1) Coincidental being, or *ens per accidens*, means a conjunction of things which may themselves have essential being, but which stand in relation to one another only in an accidental way, as when we speak of ‘pale musician’ because a man is both pale and musical. (2) Essential being refers to real entities that can be categorised according to the ten figures of predication: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action and affection. (3) ‘Is’ may also be applied to indicate truth, *ens ut verum*, rather than proper being, *ens proprium*. (4) At a transcendental level, a thing may exist potentially or in actuality; and of potential being I made brief mention in Chapter XIV.

Regarding *ens per accidens*, lest there be uncertainty as to the distinction between ‘accidental being’ and ‘being an accident’, I shall quote from S. Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on Book V of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*:

**Dicit ergo, quod ens dicitur quoddam secundum se, et quoddam secundum accidens. Sciendum tamen est quod illa divisio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione qua dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens. Quod ex hoc patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de genere accidentis. Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidens, et homo substantia. Sed ens secundum accidens prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substantiam. Quae quidem comparatio significatur hoc verbo, est, cum dicitur, homo est albus. Unde hoc totum, homo est albus, est ens per accidens. Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens,**

Therefore, he states that being is said to be a certain thing in relation to itself, and a certain thing in relation to accident. Nevertheless it should be understood that this division of being is not the same as that division by which being is divided into substance and accident. Which it is evident from this, because after its own fashion, being as regards itself divides into the ten figures of predication, of which nine are from the genus of accident. Therefore being is divided into substance and accident, according to an absolute consideration of being, just as whiteness considered in itself is said to be an accident, and man [is said to be] a substance. But being in relation to accident, inasmuch as this is granted, ought to be interpreted by comparing accident with substance. Indeed what manner of comparison is signified by the word ‘is’ when it is said that a man is white. Whence the whole statement, ‘the man is white’, is an accidental being. From which it is evident that division of an entity as regards itself

144 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book V, Part 7, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

145 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book VI, Part 2, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur  
de aliquo per se vel per accidens. Divisio  
vero entis in substantiam et accidens  
attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in  
natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens.  
[146]

and as regards accident is considered according to whether something is predicated of something in itself or by accident. However, division of being into substance and accident is considered according to whether something in its nature is either substance or accident.

That is to say, ‘a pale man’, or its equivalent ‘the man is pale’, has coincidental being in that man by nature is not always pale, wherefore the conjunction of pallor and humanity is merely accidental. However, the man and the particular shade of white are real entities in themselves (*entia secundum se*): the first a substance and the second an accident; and this distinction is considered further below.

Turning next to *ens ut verum*, S. Thomas described a division of entities into real beings (*entia realia*) and beings of reason (*entia rationis*): “the Philosopher shows that ‘being’ is predicated in many ways. For in one sense ‘being’ is predicated as it is divided by the ten genera. And in this sense ‘being’ signifies something existing in the nature of things, whether it is a substance, as a man, or an accident, as a colour. In another sense ‘being’ signifies the truth of a proposition; as when it is said that an affirmation is true when it signifies to be what is, and a negation is true when it signifies not to be what is not; and this ‘being’ signifies composition produced by the judgment-forming intellect.” [147]

He repeated this theme in *De Ente et Essentia*: “In one sense, being signifies that which is divided into the ten categories; in another sense, that which signifies the truth of propositions. The difference between these is that, in the second sense, anything can be called a being about which an affirmative proposition can be formed, even if the thing posits nothing in reality. In this way, privations and negations are called beings, as when we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, or that blindness is in the eye. But in the first sense, nothing can be called a being unless it posits something in reality, and thus in this first sense blindness and similar things are not beings.” [148]

Thus, a privation is not an entity in reality, but rather it indicates the lack of some real being. For example, ‘bald’ may truly be predicated of a bald man on account of the lack of hair on his head: it is the actuality of his baldness – the real lack of hair on his head – that verifies the predicate ‘bald’ as applied to him. Nevertheless the actuality of this lack does not make his baldness a real being: although such baldness is actual, it has ‘being’ in a different sense than real entities such as the hair which would be on his head were he hirsute.

In conclusion, Aristotle declared: “As to that which ‘is’ in the sense of being true or of being by accident, the former depends on a combination in thought and is an affection of thought ... and the latter is not necessary but indeterminate (I mean the accidental); and of such a thing the causes are unordered and indefinite.” [149] Furthermore, “we must say regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of it. This is confirmed by the fact that no science practical, productive, or theoretical troubles itself about it.” [145]

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146 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Sententia libri Metaphysicae’, Book V, Lectio 9, (1270-1272), textum Taurini 1950 editum; my translation.

147 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Scriptum super Sententiis’, Book II, Dist. 34, Q. 1, Art. 1, (1256?), textum Parmae 1856 editum; translation taken from Gyula Klima, ‘The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being’, in ‘Medieval Philosophy and Theology’, (5)1996, pp. 87-141.

148 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘De Ente et Essentia’ (‘On Being and Essence’), Ch. 1, (1254-1256); translated by Robert T. Miller.

149 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book XI, Part 8, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

Therefore, having enumerated and described the several modes of being, I shall now set aside all but *ens reale*. And to understand the nature of essential being, it is first necessary to consider how the essence of an entity may be defined.

The Angelic Doctor addressed this as follows: “The term essence is not taken from being in the second sense, for in this sense some things are called beings that have no essence, as is clear with privations. Rather, the term essence is taken from being in the first sense. ... And since, as said above, being in this sense is divided into the ten categories, essence signifies something common to all natures through which the various beings are placed in the various genera and species, as humanity is the essence of man, and so on.” [148]

Now, in Book VII of *Metaphysics* the Philosopher wrote: “We must first inquire about definitions reached by the method of divisions. There is nothing in the definition except the first-named and the differentiae. The other genera are the first genus and along with this the differentiae that are taken with it, e.g. the first may be ‘animal’, the next ‘animal which is two-footed’, and again ‘animal which is two-footed and featherless’, and similarly if the definition includes more terms. And in general it makes no difference whether it includes many or few terms, nor, therefore, whether it includes few or simply two; and of the two the one is differentia and the other genus; e.g. in ‘two-footed animal’ ‘animal’ is genus, and the other is differentia.” [150]

So, to determine the essence of a species it is necessary to provide a definition or formula in which is posited the genus together with all the differentiae which characterise that species and set it apart from all other species within the genus. And these differentiae, being part of the definition of the species, are of the essence of all beings belonging to that species. “But it is also necessary that the division be by the differentia of the differentia; e.g. ‘endowed with feet’ is a differentia of ‘animal’; again the differentia of ‘animal endowed with feet’ must be of it qua endowed with feet. Therefore ... we must divide it only into cloven-footed and not cloven; for these are differentiae in the foot; cloven-footedness is a form of footedness. And the process wants always to go on so till it reaches the species that contain no differences. And then there will be as many kinds of foot as there are differentiae, and the kinds of animals endowed with feet will be equal in number to the differentiae. If then this is so, clearly the last differentia will be the substance of the thing and its definition.” [150]

Thus, substances which are individuals of a species are characterised by the differentiae they hold in common. Accidental variations between such individuals are not of their essence: “if we divide according to accidental qualities, e.g. if we were to divide that which is endowed with feet into the white and the black, there will be as many differentiae as there are cuts.” [150]

To provide a further example, ‘position’ is predicated of a man accidentally, for there is nothing in the definition of mankind that dictates that he must be standing or sitting or lying. Yet the Philosopher observed: “some things are characterized ... by position, e.g. threshold and lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way); ... a thing is a threshold because it lies in such and such a position, and its being means its lying in that position.” “If we had to define a threshold, we should say ‘wood or stone in such and such a position’, and a house we should define as ‘bricks and timbers in such and such a position’.” [151] So ‘position’ can in such cases be part of the essence of a substance, being part of its form as a differentia.

And, having thus described how the essence of something may be defined, I shall now consider the terminology used by learned authors.

Philosophers use the term *quidditas* (‘quiddity’) to describe the ‘whatness’ of a thing, which is defined in terms of essence, as S. Thomas indicated: “Since that through which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is signified by the definition indicating what the

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150 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book VII, Part 12, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

151 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book VIII, Part 2, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

thing is, philosophers introduced the term quiddity to mean the same as the term essence; and this is the same thing that the Philosopher frequently terms ‘what it is to be a thing’ (*quod quid erat esse*), that is, that through which something has being as a particular kind of thing.” [148]

Here *quod quid erat esse* is a direct translation of Aristotle’s *to ti ên einai* – a phrase which prompted his Roman translators to coin the word *essentia* in order to render it more succinctly. And, as noted above, he also declared *kath’ hauta de einai legetai hosaper sêmainei ta schêmata tês katêgorias*, wherein *kath’ hauta einai* means ‘to be in virtue of itself’, denoting essential being, or *ens secundum se*. Just so, in explaining ‘in virtue of itself’ (*kath’ hauta*) the Philosopher gave its primary meaning as: “the essence of each thing, e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself Callias (*kath’ hauton Kallias*) and what it was to be Callias (*to ti ên einai Kalliai*).” [152]

Furthermore, Aristotle related essence to species: “For the essence is precisely what something is; but when an attribute is asserted of a subject other than itself, the complex is not precisely what some ‘this’ is, e.g. ‘white man’ is not precisely what some ‘this’ is, since thisness belongs only to substances. Therefore there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition. But we have a definition ... where there is a formula of something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one element in them of another element. Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence – only species will have it.” [73]

Now, the word *species* means ‘the outward appearance, shape, form, figure or mien’, and classically it was synonymous with *forma*. Hence by transference the word is used to mean ‘a particular sort or kind’; wherefore in speaking of ‘species’ as a category, we implicitly refer to the set of differentiae that characterise entities of that species.

Just so, having examined learned texts concerning the Holy Eucharist, and especially S. Thomas’ *Summa Theologica* and the pronouncements of the Council of Trent, I observe that the term *species* is used in at least two different but related senses. On the one hand it may signify a species in the categorical sense, as when the Angelic Doctor noted: “it is impossible for genera to be multiplied without the species being multiplied” [153]. On the other it may mean ‘the external figure’, as when the Council of Trent declared “after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and man, is truly, really, and substantially contained under the species of those sensible things (*sub specie illarum rerum sensibilium*).” [53] And while this is evidently intended to denote something more than the mere appearance of the bread and wine, it must indicate rather less than their essences, for these cannot remain if the substances do not, just as S. Thomas wrote: “since the substance of the bread and the wine does not remain, it seems that these species remain without a subject (*species sint sine subiecto*).” [154] Thus I conclude that in the latter sense of *species sensibilis* the term signifies all the perceptible attributes of the bread and wine, and especially those characteristics by which those substances are distinguished.

In his works, Aristotle used *to sumbebêkos* to denote a contingent attribute or ‘accident’, as defined in Chapter VIII; and we have seen that *kata sumbebêkos* (‘accidentally’) stood contrary to *kath’ hauta* (‘essentially’). However, the learned doctors of our time use the word *accidens* in contrast to *substantia* – in Greek, *ousia* – in the division of essential being. Yet whereas the Philosopher asserts that some attributes are part of the form of the substance, in that they are differentiae of its species, while others are ‘accidental’, the later authors do not consider this distinction. Instead, they use the term ‘accidents’ to refer not only to accidental properties, but also to the specific differentiae, as when in *Summa Theologica* the Angelic Doctor wrote: “The

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152 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book V, Part 18, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

153 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 73, Article 2, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

154 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 77, Article 1, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

species which remain in this sacrament ... suffice for its signification; because the nature of the substance is known by its accidents.” [155]

Hereafter this work will concern itself with doctrine as set forth by Christian writers, wherefore I shall henceforth employ the word ‘accident’ to describe the nine figures of predication that are not substance, unless annotated otherwise. And now I shall examine the distinction between substance and accidents, as so defined.

S. Thomas categorised the essence of substances as follows: “There are three ways in which substances may have an essence. First, surely, is the way God has his essence, which is his very existence itself.” “In a second way, essence is found in created intellectual substances, in which existence is other than essence, although in these substances the essence is without matter. Hence, their existence is not absolute but received, and so finite and limited by the capacity of the receiving nature; but their nature or quiddity is absolute and is not received in any matter.” “In a third way, essence is found in substances composed of matter and form, in which existence is both received and limited because such substances have existence from another, and again because the nature or quiddity of such substances is received in signate matter. And ... because of the division of signate matter, there can be a multiplication of individuals in one species.” [156] And it is this third, material, kind of substantiality that is being considered in this work.

The term ‘signate matter’ he introduced when comparing the manner in which individuals belong to a species to that in which species belong to their genus: “signate matter is the principle of individuation. I call signate matter matter considered under determinate dimensions. Signate matter is not included in the definition of man as man, but signate matter would be included in the definition of Socrates if Socrates had a definition. In the definition of man, however, is included non-signate matter: in the definition of man we do not include this bone and this flesh but only bone and flesh absolutely, which are the non-signate matter of man.” [157] So, within a genus, species are distinguished by their specific differentiae; but within a species, individuals are distinguished by ‘signate matter’; and I shall discuss individuation further in later chapters.

In the final chapter of *De Ente et Essentia*, S. Thomas described the essence of accidents: “We should now see in what way there are essences in accidents, having said already how essences are found in all types of substances. Now, since, as said above, the essence is that which is signified by the definition, accidents will thus have essences in the same way in which they have definitions. But accidents have incomplete definitions, because they cannot be defined unless we put a subject in their definitions, and this is because they do not have absolute existence per se apart from a subject, but just as from the form and the matter substantial existence results when a substance is compounded, so too from the accident and the subject does accidental existence result when the accident comes to the subject.” [142]

Thus I have shown in this chapter, both from the words of Aristotle and from those of S. Thomas Aquinas, in what ways entities are said to have being. Of the ten genera of beings in the primary sense, which have essences, only substance has being in and of itself (*ens per se*), whereas the others, collectively termed ‘accidents’, have being only insofar as they exist in something else (*ens in alio*). By its essence a substance is a compound of a form, which defines its quiddity, given individual existence by a particular parcel of matter, whereas an accident is only given existence by its inherence in a substance; wherefore an accident can no more exist without a

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155 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 75, Article 2, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

156 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘De Ente et Essentia’ (‘On Being and Essence’), Ch. 5, (1254-1256); translated by Robert T. Miller.

157 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘De Ente et Essentia’ (‘On Being and Essence’), Ch. 2, (1254-1256); translated by Robert T. Miller.

substance than a substance can have real existence without matter. And I shall consider further the dependence of accidents upon their subject in Chapter XVIII.

## Chapter XVI

### *In which the relationship between the body and soul is examined.*

In Chapter VIII was set forth the Aristotelian viewpoint, that the soul is the form of the human body, which otherwise is mere matter. On this, S. Thomas Aquinas expounded at length in *Summa Contra Gentiles* [158], wherein he asserted that soul and body unified constitute man, and that this unity can only be achieved by such a union as that of form with matter: that is, of an active and determinant principle with a passive and determinable one. He followed this by demonstrating that “a subsistent intelligence can be the substantial form” of a body.

He continued: “Nor yet does the union of a subsistent intelligence with a body by its being that body’s form stand in the way of intelligence being separable from body. In a soul we have to observe as well its essence as also its power. In point of essence it gives being to such and such a body, while in point of power it executes its own proper acts. In any activity of the soul therefore which is completed by a bodily organ, the power of the soul which is the principle of that activity must bring to act that part of the body whereby its activity is completed, as sight brings the eye to act. But in any activity of the soul that we may suppose not to be completed by any bodily organ, the corresponding power will not bring anything in the body to act; and this is the sense in which the intellect is said to be ‘separate,’ – not but that the substance of the soul, whereof intellect is a power, or the intellectual soul, brings the body to act, inasmuch as it is the form which gives being to such body.” [158]

Now, when a human being dies, and the soul ceases to inform that assemblage of matter, is what remains the same body that existed just before death? In order to exist, the body requires a substantial form; yet if the soul be its only form, after death its form *ex hypothesi* is no longer present: what remains is merely matter arranged corpse-wise. But if the sole thing responsible for informing the matter has departed, should it not immediately lose its organisation? Furthermore, it sometimes happens that a man may suffer a malady that causes his vital signs to be so abated that he appears dead, yet still he lives and oftentimes recovers: thus it seems there is little to differentiate between an almost-dead body and a newly-deceased corpse.

Furthermore, Aristotle wrote: “the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool; the body corresponds to what exists in potentiality; as the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal.” [79] Now if an eye shall have lost its sight, it no longer serves the true function of an eye, yet the physical organ does not immediately cease to exist; there is a sense in which it continues to be the very same eye, albeit imperfect of form.

Similarly, John Duns Scotus opined that the corpse is the identical body that existed before death. He argued in his *Ordinatio* that some substances have more than one substantial form, the human being possessing at least two: the *forma corporeitatis*, the bodily form, which gives a quantity of matter its status as an individual human body, and the animating form, the soul, which gives life to that body. At death, the animating soul ceases to vivify the body, yet numerically the same body remains; the corporeal form persists, maintaining the organisation of the matter for a while. However, this form is too weak to keep the body in existence indefinitely without the animating principle, wherefore in due course it decomposes.

Thus the *Doctor Subtilis* posited a plurality of forms in the same thing. The human *forma corporeitatis* is transmitted to a child by its parents, whereas the *anima rationalis* is infused by

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158 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Contra Gentiles’, Book II, cap. 56 & 69, (1258-1264); translation by Joseph Rickaby.

God himself. The *forma corporeitatis* gives the body a sort of human form, though temporal and imperfect, but it is the immortal rational soul which is the essential form of mankind, as the Council of Vienne asserted; this constitutes with the body one being, one substance, one person.

It is true that philosophers identify more than one aspect or faculty within the soul, as the *Angelicus Doctor* noted: “There is only one soul in man, but we can distinguish in it several forms; for conceptually the intellectual is not the same as the sensitive, nor is this identical with the vegetative, nor the vegetative with that which gives the body, as such, its form; yet all these belong formally, by their concept and essence, to the one indivisible soul.” [159] However, the distinction need not concern us here.

Now the *anima vegetativa*, the vegetative or nutritive soul, is so called because it is the only type of soul possessed by plants, and its faculty is nutrition and reproduction. Aristotle wrote: “the nutritive soul is found along with all the others and is the most primitive and widely distributed power of soul, being indeed that one in virtue of which all are said to have life.” [160] As the vivifying principle, we must regard it as a perfect or complete form, whereas the *forma corporeitatis* is imperfect or incomplete, wherefore it decays once the soul ceases to sustain it.

Against this hypothesis it may be argued that if a body has two different forms, it must be two different things; but this is similar to a matter addressed by S. Thomas in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, wherefrom I may adapt a reply. He wrote: “The principle of corresponding unity of produced, production, and producer, holds good to the exclusion of a plurality of productive agents not acting in co-ordination with one another. Where they are co-ordinate, several agents have but one effect.” [161] Just so do the corporeal form and the vegetative soul co-operate to inform the body; furthermore, we may suppose that the superior form – the soul – while it is present, ‘supersedes’ the inferior.

This superposition of forms suggests an explanation of how changes can occur to the body, for example the loss of a limb, without a corresponding change within the essence of that body, namely the soul: it may be deduced that the alteration of the body merely affects the corporeal form. Conversely, it may be argued that such alterations are accidental and not formal, for the presence or absence of a component does not affect the essence of a thing.

But what if the body be so corrupted by injury or disease that, as experience teaches us, it is no longer apt to contain life? Such a loss of organisation would be an essential change, inasmuch as the flesh would no longer maintain the *forma corporeitatis* of a potentially living human being. Now, it seems inappropriate that destruction of the inferior form should affect the superior form; but in fact there is no such incongruity, for the loss of the bodily form does not annihilate the soul, but merely disembodies it, since it cannot reside in a physical entity that is not potentially a human being. As Aristotle explained in *De Anima*: “Since then the complex here is the living thing, the body cannot be the actuality of the soul; it is the soul which is the actuality of a certain kind of body. Hence the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot be a body; it is not a body but something relative to a body. That is why it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind. It was a mistake, therefore, to do as former thinkers did, merely to fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind or character of that body. Reflection confirms the observed fact; the actuality of any given thing can only be realized in what is already potentially that thing, i.e. in a matter of its own appropriate to it. From all this it

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159 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘*Summa Contra Gentiles*’, Book II, cap. 58, (1258-1264); translation by Joseph Rickaby. Cf. Aristotle, ‘*De Anima*’, Book I, Chapter 5.

160 Aristotle, ‘*De Anima*’, Book II Chapter 4, (c. 350BC); translated by J. A. Smith.

161 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘*Summa Contra Gentiles*’, Book II, cap. 88 & 89, (1258-1264); translation by Joseph Rickaby.

follows that soul is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being besouled.” [162]

In *De Ente et Essentia* the Angelic Doctor elucidated further concerning body and soul. In Chapter II he wrote [157]: “Body is said to be in the genus of substance in that it has a nature such that three dimensions can be designated in the body. These three designated dimensions are the body that is in the genus of quantity. Now, it sometimes happens that what has one perfection may attain to a further perfection as well, as is clear in man, who has a sensitive nature and, further, an intellective one. Similarly, above this perfection of having a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, there can be joined another perfection, as life or some similar thing. This term body, therefore, can signify a certain thing that has a form such that from the form there follows in the thing designatability in three dimensions and nothing more, such that, in other words, from this form no further perfection follows, but if some other thing is superadded, it is beyond the signification of body thus understood. And understood in this way, body will be an integral and material part of the animal, because in this way the soul will be beyond what is signified by the term body, and it will supervene on the body such that from these two, namely the soul and the body, the animal is constituted as from parts.” Yet this must not be understood in the sense that the limbs and organs are parts of an animal, but rather “man is said to be composed of soul and body as from two things from which a third thing is constituted different from each of the two.”

In Chapter IV he wrote [163]: “We should now see how essences exist in separated substances, that is, in the soul, in the intelligences, and in the first cause.” Separate substances are those that do not acquire existence through matter: “In no way is there a composition of matter and form in either the soul or the intelligences, such that an essence is received in these as in corporeal substances.” S. Thomas explained: “When we find a form that cannot exist except in matter, this happens because such forms are distant from the first principle, which is primary and pure act. Hence, those forms that are nearest the first principle are subsisting forms essentially without matter, for not the whole genus of forms requires matter, as said above, and the intelligences are forms of this type. ... Therefore, the essence of a composite substance and that of a simple substance differ in that the essence of a composite substance is not form alone but embraces both form and matter, while the essence of a simple substance is form alone.” Or, rather, “the intelligences are form and existence and have existence from the first being, which is existence alone, and this is the first cause, which is God.”

Further, he indicated [163]: “Although substances of this kind are form alone and are without matter, they are nevertheless not in every way simple, and they are not pure act; rather, they have an admixture of potency.” “There is thus a distinction among separate substances according to their grade of potency and act such that the superior intelligences, which are nearer the first cause, have more act and less potency, and so on. This scale comes to an end with the human soul, which holds the lowest place among intellectual substances.” “Since, among intellectual substances, the soul has the most potency, it is so close to material things that a material thing is brought to participate in its existence: that is, from the soul and the body there results one existence in one composite thing, although this existence, as the existence of the soul, is not dependent on the body. Therefore, beyond this form that is the soul, there are other forms having more potency and being closer to matter, and so much so that they have no existence without matter. Among these forms there is an order and gradation down to the primary forms of the elements, which are closest to matter.”

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162 Aristotle, ‘De Anima’, Book II Chapter 2, (c. 350BC); translated by J. A. Smith.

163 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘De Ente et Essentia’ (‘On Being and Essence’), Ch. 4, (1254-1256); translated by Robert T. Miller.

Moreover, it is necessary that the human soul be embodied in matter, in order that man might fulfil his purpose as intended by God. “Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom. vii*). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.” [164]

And thus I have disclosed the relationship between body and soul: that whereas the soul is the ultimate essence of the body, it cannot persist in that body if the latter ceases to have the character which gives it the potential to be ensouled; that perhaps that potentiality is associated with the presence of a separate but imperfect corporeal form; and if so this duality of forms is possible because they are co-ordinate in effect.

But now I shall append a short explication of the manner in which the embryo acquires a soul. As Aristotle indicates in Book II of *De Generatione Animalium*, “since both the semen and the embryo of an animal have every bit as much life as a plant... That then they possess the nutritive soul is plain (and plain is it from the discussions elsewhere about soul why this soul must be acquired first). As they develop they also acquire the sensitive soul in virtue of which an animal is an animal. ... For the end is developed last, and the peculiar character of the species is the end of the generation in each individual. Hence arises a question of the greatest difficulty, which we must strive to solve to the best of our ability and as far as possible. When and how and whence is a share in reason acquired by those animals that participate in this principle?” [165] And since man may be defined as a rational animal, reason should be expected to be the last faculty that the human embryo acquires, at least in potentiality. (I say “in potentiality” because, while the embryo must have, for example, the potential for walking, it cannot walk in actuality until its body is sufficiently developed.)

S. Thomas indicated: “it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle. Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen.” “Again, since the intellectual soul ... is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.” [166]

He observed: “Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul. Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul

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164 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part I, Q. 76, Article 5, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

165 Aristotle, ‘On the Generation of Animals’, Book II, Chapter 3, (c. 350 BC); translated by Arthur Platt.

166 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part I, Q. 118, Article 2, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

supervenes; and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. ... Others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without.” [166] But these proposals he refuted, instead stating: “We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.” [166]

To summarise, the embryo first has a vegetative soul, which imparts its capability to acquire nutriment and to grow. The power of the soul of the male parent, acting through the semen, then generates the sensitive soul, which gives operation to the newly formed organs of sense, and which replaces the vegetative soul. Finally, by an act of special creation God imparts to the embryo an immortal rational soul, discarding the mortal animal soul. Nor are man and woman able themselves to generate a rational soul in their offspring, for mankind reproduces after the manner of other mammals, and “the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal.” [167]

## Chapter XVII

### *In which the Doctrine of Transubstantiation is described further.*

I have already quoted, in Chapter II and Chapter VI, the pronouncements of the Council of Trent regarding Transubstantiation: that Christ is truly, really, and substantially contained under the species of bread and wine [53]; that the whole substance of the bread is converted into the substance of his body, and the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood [54]; that the whole Christ – body, blood, soul and Godhead – is present under both species [25]; and that only the species of the bread and wine remain [6]. And, as explained in Chapter XV, ‘species’ here represents all the outward characteristics of the bread and wine.

S. Thomas Aquinas wrote of this miraculous conversion in much detail in Part III of *Summa Theologica*, from which I shall quote such passages as seem best to illuminate the subject at hand.

First, as to whether the substance of the bread and wine remains after consecration, he stated: “Christ’s body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament except by change of the substance of bread into itself. But what is changed into another thing, no longer remains after such change. Hence the conclusion is that, saving the truth of this sacrament, the substance of the bread cannot remain after the consecration.” [155] And likewise for the substance of the wine.

Second, as to the manner of the conversion, he indicated: “this change is not like natural changes, but is entirely supernatural, and effected by God’s power alone.” He continued: “every created agent is limited in its act, as being of a determinate genus and species: and consequently the action of every created agent bears upon some determinate act. Now the determination of every thing in actual existence comes from its form. Consequently, no natural or created agent can act except by changing the form in something; and on this account every change made according to nature’s laws is a formal change. But God is infinite act, ... hence His action extends to the whole

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167 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part I, Q. 118, Article 1, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

nature of being. Therefore He can work not only formal conversion, so that diverse forms succeed each other in the same subject; but also the change of all being, so that, to wit, the whole substance of one thing be changed into the whole substance of another. And this is done by Divine power in this sacrament; for the whole substance of the bread is changed into the whole substance of Christ's body, and the whole substance of the wine into the whole substance of Christ's blood. Hence this is not a formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it a kind of natural movement: but, with a name of its own, it can be called 'transubstantiation.'" [168]

He illustrated this further by comparison with creation and natural transmutation. "Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every natural transmutation. Again, this conversion has something in common with natural transmutation in two respects, although not in the same fashion. First of all because in both, one of the extremes passes into the other, as bread into Christ's body, and air into fire; whereas non-being is not converted into being. But this comes to pass differently on the one side and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance of the bread passes into the whole body of Christ; whereas in natural transmutation the matter of the one receives the form of the other, the previous form being laid aside. Secondly, they have this in common, that on both sides something remains the same; whereas this does not happen in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject remains in natural transmutation; whereas in this sacrament the same accidents remain." [169] And here 'accidents' refers to all the attributes predicated of the bread and wine, including those that may be regarded as specific differentiae of the species, as explained in Chapter XV.

Thirdly, as to whether these accidents remain after consecration, he noted: "It is evident to sense that all the accidents of the bread and wine remain after the consecration. And this is reasonably done by Divine providence. First of all, because it is not customary, but horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood. And therefore Christ's flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of under the species of those things which are the more commonly used by men, namely, bread and wine." [170]

Yet this may be thought inappropriate, for it suggests some falsehood within the Sacrament, that Christ's body and blood should present the appearances of other things. However, the Angelic Doctor explained: "There is no deception in this sacrament; for the accidents which are discerned by the senses are truly present. But the intellect, whose proper object is substance as is said in *De Anima iii*, is preserved by faith from deception." [170]

Fourthly, as to whether the accidents remain in the sacrament without a subject, he wrote: "The species of the bread and wine, which are perceived by our senses to remain in this sacrament after consecration, are not subjected in the substance of the bread and wine, for that does not remain, as stated above; nor in the substantial form, for that does not remain, and if it did remain, 'it could not be a subject,' as Boethius declares (*De Trin. i*). Furthermore it is manifest that these accidents are not subjected in the substance of Christ's body and blood, because the substance of the human body cannot in any way be affected by such accidents; nor is it possible for Christ's glorious and impassible body to be altered so as to receive these qualities." [154]

He concluded: "Therefore it follows that the accidents continue in this sacrament without a subject. This can be done by Divine power: for since an effect depends more upon the first cause than on the second, God Who is the first cause both of substance and accident, can by His

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168 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Part III, Q. 75, Article 4, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

169 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Part III, Q. 75, Article 8, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

170 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Part III, Q. 75, Article 5, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

unlimited power preserve an accident in existence when the substance is withdrawn whereby it was preserved in existence as by its proper cause, just as without natural causes He can produce other effects of natural causes.” [154]

Fifthly, he noted: “We perceive by our senses that the consecrated hosts become putrefied and corrupted.” [171] And Ælfric commented likewise in his *Epistola ad Wulfstanum*:

SUME preostas gefyllaðheora husel-box on  
eastron & healdað ofer twelf monaðto  
untrimum mannum: swylce ðæt husel sy  
haligre þonne ofer ; Ac hi doð unwislice  
forþam þe hit wannaþ oþþe mid ealle forrotað  
on swa langum fyrste [117]

SOME priests fil their boxe for husel on  
Easter day, and so reserue it a whole yere for  
sicke men, as though that husel were more  
holy then any other. But they doe  
vnadusedlye, bicause it waxeth hory, or al  
together rotten by keping it so long space.  
[117]

S. Thomas continued: “Corruption is ‘movement from being into non-being’ (*Aristotle, Phys. v*). Now it has been stated that the sacramental species retain the same being as they had before when the substance of the bread was present. Consequently, as the being of those accidents could be corrupted while the substance of the bread and wine was present, so likewise they can be corrupted now that the substance has passed away. But such accidents could have been previously corrupted in two ways: in one way, of themselves; in another way, accidentally.” “Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between each of the aforesaid corruptions; because, when the body and the blood of Christ succeed in this sacrament to the substance of the bread and wine, if there be such change on the part of the accidents as would not have sufficed for the corruption of the bread and wine, then the body and blood of Christ do not cease to be under this sacrament on account of such change, whether the change be on the part of the quality, as for instance, when the color or the savor of the bread or wine is slightly modified; or on the part of the quantity, as when the bread or the wine is divided into such parts as to keep in them the nature of bread or of wine. But if the change be so great that the substance of the bread or wine would have been corrupted, then Christ’s body and blood do not remain under this sacrament; and this either on the part of the qualities, as when the color, savor, and other qualities of the bread and wine are so altered as to be incompatible with the nature of bread or of wine; or else on the part of the quantity, as, for instance, if the bread be reduced to fine particles, or the wine divided into such tiny drops that the species of bread or wine no longer remain.” [171]

In short, this point may be summarised as follows: “Since it belongs essentially to corruption to take away the being of a thing, in so far as the being of some form is in matter, it results that by corruption the form is separated from the matter. But if such being were not in matter, yet like such being as is in matter, it could be taken away by corruption, even where there is no matter; as takes place in this sacrament, as is evident from what was said above.” “This corruption of species is not miraculous, but natural; nevertheless, it presupposes the miracle which is wrought in the consecration, namely, that those sacramental species retain without a subject, the same being as they had in a subject.” [171]

And thus have I derived five points pertaining to the doctrine of Transubstantiation, which I shall address in the remaining chapters of this work.

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171 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 77, Article 4, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

## Chapter XVIII

*In which is introduced a discussion concerning the persistence of the ‘species’ or ‘accidents’.*

In the preceding chapter I summarised the reasoning of S. Thomas Aquinas, whereupon I shall now address the question of the persistence of the species (that is, the outward appearance) of the bread and wine after consecration.

But first, in order to recapitulate the contents of Chapter XV, I shall quote from the Angelic Doctor’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Fourth Book of *Metaphysics*: “We should know that the above-mentioned modes of being can be reduced to four. For one of them, which is the weakest, is only in reason, namely, negation and privation, which we say are in reason because reason considers them as if they were some beings, when it affirms or denies of them something.” “Another [mode of being], which is the closest to this one in weakness, is according to which generation and corruption and motions are said to be beings. For they have some privation and negation mixed with them. For motion is imperfect actuality, as is said in Book III of the *Physics*. [A being] in the third sense has nothing of non-being mixed with it, but it has a weak existence, for [it has existence] not by itself, but in something else, as [do] qualities, quantities and properties of substance. The fourth kind is which is the most perfect, namely, which has existence in nature without any admixture of privation, and has firm and solid existence, as it exists by itself, as do substances. And it is to this [last one], as primary and principal, that all the others are related. For qualities and quantities are said to be insofar as they are in a substance; motions and generations are said to be insofar as they tend to substance or to some other of the above-said [beings]; and privations and negations are said to be insofar as they remove some of the above-said three.” [172] Thus, that which is an accident has only a weak existence (*habet esse debile*) for it exists not by itself, but only in another entity (*non per se, sed in alio*), wherefore accidents can only be said to ‘be’ insofar as they are in a substance (*esse inquantum insunt substantiae*).

As discussed in Chapter XV, ‘accidents’ must here be regarded as referring not only to properties that are truly accidental in that they are present by happenstance, but also to those attributes that belong essentially to a substance.

Now, the difficulty which must be addressed may be discovered in four significant points of philosophy. Firstly, as I have shown in Chapter XV, the quidditative definition of an entity signifies its essence. Secondly, likewise, the quidditative definition of an accident, in the most general sense, is *quod est in subjecto* (‘something which is in a subject’) or *ens in alio* (‘a being in something else’) or some equivalent formula. Thirdly, it is contradictory for an entity to lack something involved in its quidditative definition: just so, ‘cold flame’ is a contradiction, for hotness is of the essence of flame. Finally, it is said that even God cannot cause two contradictory things both to be true at one and the same time.

And in support of this fourth point, S. Thomas himself averred: “since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, ‘God can do all things,’ is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent.” But “a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject” [173]. And lest this be thought to imply a limitation on the divine omnipotence, in the sense of a lack of power in God, it should be understood that to be unable to make contradictories true implies no defect in God’s creative power, but rather a defect in the ability of contradictories to receive

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172 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Sententia libri Metaphysicae’, Book IV, Lectio 1, (1270-1272), textum Taurini 1950 editum; translation taken from Gyula Klima, ‘The Semantic Principles Underlying Saint Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Being’, in ‘Medieval Philosophy and Theology’, (5)1996, pp. 87-141.

173 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part I, Q. 25, Article 3, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

being. Just so, the Angelic Doctor stated: “God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible.” [174]

Alternatively, it may be stated that absolute truths, which are in no way contingent and whose opposite would be contradictory, depend not upon the Will of God but upon his Essence, wherefore such truths are always valid, and their opposites must be false. As S. Thomas wrote: “the understanding of God is His substance; and the very act of understanding, as it is the being of God, is perfect as the being of God is perfect, not by any superadded perfection, but by itself. It remains therefore that the divine substance is truth itself.” [175]

Thus the statements ‘unicorns exist’ and ‘unicorns do not exist’ are plainly contradictory and cannot simultaneously be true, nor can God make them so. And whereas it might be contended that ‘unicorns exist in the imagination’ and ‘unicorns do not exist as real entities’ are both true, that does not contradict the original assertion, for those are statements with qualification and refer to different modes of being, as discussed in Chapter XV.

Wherefore we see wherein lies the difficulty; for doctrine asserts that the species of the sacramental bread and wine remain without their subject, yet philosophy contends that they would thereby lack something fundamental from their quiddity, which is a contradiction, and so impossible even to the power of Christ.

S. Thomas, in his Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, posed the problem thus:

**Quicumque separat definitionem a definito, ponit duo contradictoria esse simul vera: quia hoc ipsum quod est homo, est animal rationale mortale; et ita si ponatur esse homo et non esse animal rationale mortale, ponitur esse homo et non esse. Sed definitio accidentis est quod inest substantiae; unde etiam in definitione singulorum accidentium oportet quod ponatur substantia. Ergo cum Deus non possit facere contradictoria simul esse vera, neque facere poterit quod accidens sit sine substantia. [176]**

Whoever separates the definition from the thing defined, asserts two contradictories to be simultaneously true: since in itself a thing that is a man, is a rational mortal animal; it follows that if it is asserted both that man is and that rational mortal animal is not, it is asserted that man exists and does not exist. But the definition of an accident is that which is in a substance; wherefore it is necessary that a substance must be included in the definition of individual accidents. Therefore since God cannot cause contradictories to be true at the same time, neither will he be able to bring it about that an accident can be without a substance.

To which he answered:

**Dicendum, quod sicut probat Avicenna in sua *Metaph.*, per se existere non est definitio substantiae: quia per hoc non demonstratur quidditas ejus, sed ejus esse; et sua quidditas non est suum esse; alias non posset esse genus: quia esse non potest esse commune per modum generis, cum singula contenta in genere differant secundum esse; sed definitio, vel quasi**

It should be stated, that as Avicenna demonstrates in his *Metaphysics*, to exist *per se* is not the definition of a substance: because by this is not designated its quiddity, but its being; and its quiddity is not its being; moreover [its being] could not be a genus: because being cannot be something which is held in common after the manner of a genus, since individuals contained in a genus may differ as regards their being; but the definition, or quasi-definition, of substance is a thing having

174 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part I, Q. 25, Article 4, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

175 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Contra Gentiles’, Book I, cap. 60, (1258-1264); translation by Joseph Rickaby.

176 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Scriptum super Sententiis’, Book IV, dist. 12, Q. 1, art. 1, qc. 1, (1256), textum Parmae 1858 editum; my translation.

definitio, substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse, vel debetur, ut non in alio; et similiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio; et hoc nunquam separatur ab aliquo accidente, nec separari potest: quia illi rei quae est accidens, secundum rationem suae quidditatis semper debetur esse in alio. Sed potest esse quod illud quod debetur alicui secundum rationem suae quidditatis, ei virtute divina agente non conveniat; et sic patet quod facere accidens esse sine substantia, non est separare definitionem a definito; et si aliquando hoc dicatur definitio accidentis, praedicto modo intelligenda est definitio dicta. [176]

quiddity, to which its being has been attached, or should be, such that [it is] not in another thing; and similarly being in a subject is not the definition of an accident, but to the contrary [it is] a thing which must be in another; and from any accident this [other] thing can never be separated, nor is it possible [for it] to be separated: because on account of that thing it is an accident, [and] according to the nature of its quiddity it is always required to exist in another thing. But it is possible that although its being is owed to something [else] according to the nature of its quiddity, it may not be attached to it due to the action of divine power; and thus it becomes possible because to make an accident a being without a substance, is not to separate the definition from that which is defined; and if at times this is called the definition of an accident, the stated definition is to be understood in the aforesaid manner.

Avicenna's argument may be summarised as follows. Consider the premise that what 'substance' signifies, namely the quiddity of substance, is the same as what 'being' signifies in all substances: it follows that 'substance' would be common to all substances just as 'being' is. But 'substance' is a genus, as shown in Chapter XV, whereas 'being' cannot be: for that which is generic signifies something held in common by all individuals within the genus, but 'being' signifies not what is common, but what is individual, for each thing differs from another on account of its being itself. Therefore the premise is false.

Now the definitions, or quasi-definitions, *ens per se* and *ens in alio*, describe the being of substances and accidents, since they contain the term 'ens'; but from the argument above this is not the same as the quiddity of those things. Therefore, it is not proven that an accident which is not attached to a substance necessarily lacks something from its quiddity.

Instead, S. Thomas proposed that by its nature an accident has a 'disposition' to be in a substance, but this disposition can be thwarted by a sufficiently great power. As he wrote in *Summa Theologica*: "that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment." [177]

Likewise, in one of his *opuscula* he wrote:

Nihil enim prohibet aliquid non habere in sua natura causam alicuius, quod tamen habet illud ex alia causa: sicut grave non habet ex sua natura quod sit sursum, tamen grave esse sursum, non includit contradictionem; sed grave esse sursum secundum suam naturam contradictionem includeret. [178]

For nothing prevents an entity which does not have in its nature the cause of something, from instead acquiring it from another cause: just as a heavy object does not possess from its nature the ability to be aloft, nevertheless for a heavy object to be aloft does not involve a contradiction; but for a heavy object to be aloft on account of its nature would involve a contradiction.

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177 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Part I, Q. 49, Article 1, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

178 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas' ('On the Unity of the Intellect, against the Averroists'), cap. 5, (1270), textum a L. W. Keeler Taurini 1954 editum; my translation.

Thus, an entity is able to adopt some aspect of being even if there is nothing in its nature that causes it to do so, provided some other cause imposes that aspect of being upon it. His example is that nothing in the nature of a heavy object causes it to be high up, but there is no contradiction implied by its being aloft, provided something else is holding it up. However, there would be a contradiction if it were aloft on account of its heaviness, because that heaviness should cause it to fall down, not stay up. To put it more simply, a heavy object by its nature should fall to the ground, but nothing prevents it from being aloft provided it is compelled to be so by some external influence. Likewise, the *Angelicus Doctor* proposed, an accident would lack something from its quiddity if it did not have a disposition to be in something else, so that would be impossible; but if a sufficient force prevented it from inhering in another entity, that would not imply a contradiction, and no matter how difficult it may be to overcome this disposition, if it is not contradictory it must be possible to the divine power.

A similar proposition was made by John Duns Scotus, who argued that ‘being’ can be infinite or finite, and the latter mode is divided into the ten genera. ‘Being’ is said univocally of all ten categories, wherefore accidents have being without recourse to a subject. He declared that inherence characterises accidents in a manner analogous to the way proper attributes distinguish their subjects. A proper attribute is one that includes its subject in its definition, whereas the converse is not true: hence a proper attribute is not part of the essence of its subject. The inherence is a necessary concomitant of the accident, but is not part of its essence; wherefore removal of the inherence, by divine power, does not subtract from the quiddity of the accident. Although substances have priority over accidents in many ways, the difference in their natures is not quidditative.

In *Quaestiones Subtilissimae in Metaphysicam* he countered the objection from Aristotle thus:

quando dicitur quod accidens non est ens nisi quia entis , dicendum quod haec coniunctio quia non mediat inter praedicatum ens et subiectum quod est accidens, quasi reddens causam formalem entitatis ipsius accidentis, sed solum efficientem et materialem. Et ideo non sequitur quod essentia accidentis sit includens in suo conceptu quidditativo ipsam inhaerentiam

Aliter dicendum quod ibi committitur fallacia consequentis. Nam arguitur a destructione antecedentis. Philosophus enim sic dicit quod accidentia sunt entia, quia sunt talis entis , et infero igitur accidentia non sunt entia nisi quia sunt entis ; non ualet. [179]

When it is said that “an accident is not an entity unless because [it is] of an entity”, it should be said that the conjunction ‘quia’ does not mediate between the referred-to ‘entity’ and the subject of which it is an accident, as though imparting the formal cause of its being in itself an accident, but merely the efficient and material [cause]. And for that reason it does not follow that the essence of an accident ought to include in its quidditative definition its own inherence...

Alternatively it should be said that a Fallacy of the Consequent is committed there. For it is argued by Denial of the Antecedent. For as the Philosopher said that “accidents are entities, because they are of such an entity”, and you infer “therefore accidents are not entities unless because they are of an entity”; it is not valid.

Thus, he rejected the argument as a logical fallacy: just as, if I were to take the premise “a coin is valuable because it is made of gold”, and reason therefrom that “a coin is not valuable unless it is made of gold”, the inference would be false, for a coin also has value if it be silvren, albeit less than if golden.

Instead, he asserted that the subject is not the formal cause of the accident, but its efficient and material cause. Now, the four causes as characterised by Aristotle [13] were described in Chapter III: the efficient cause is “that from which the change or the resting from change first

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179 John Duns Scotus, ‘Quaestiones Subtilissimae in Metaphysicam’, Book VII, Q. 1, (c. 1300); my translation.

begins”, the material cause is “that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being”, while the formal cause is “the form or pattern, i.e. the definition of the essence”. So, according to the Subtle Doctor, the subject is the source of the accident, but does not supply its form or essence.

In Part III of *Summa Theologica*, S. Thomas considered further the disposition of the accidents: “It is necessary to say that the other accidents which remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having quantity and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first disposition of matter is dimensive quantity, hence Plato also assigned ‘great’ and ‘small’ as the first differences of matter (*Aristotle, Metaph. iv*). And because the first subject is matter, the consequence is that all other accidents are related to their subject through the medium of dimensive quantity; just as the first subject of color is said to be the surface, on which account some have maintained that dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is said in *Metaph. iii*. And since, when the subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to the being which they had before, it follows that all accidents remain founded upon dimensive quantity.” [180]

He continued: “Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation.” [180] Now, “matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms” [180] because we may distinguish, say, one coin from another by the fact that the form of one is in ‘this’ matter, while the other is in ‘that’ matter. And so, “it must be maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensive quantity. For ... it is on account of quantity that substance can be divided, as is said in *Phys. i*. And therefore dimensive quantity itself is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts of the matter.” [180]

And with this Thomas of Sutton agreed in his First *Quodlibet*, by reference to the *ratio* – that is, the formal character – appropriate to an individuating principle: “those [principles] that distinguish individuals of the same species have to be things of the same *ratio*, insofar as they are parts of the same nature. For if they were things of diverse natures, then they would distinguish [whatever they distinguish] in species, and thus the latter would not be individuals of the same species. Indeed, rational and irrational, by which man and brutes are distinguished are not of the same nature, and so they distinguish [man and brutes] by species. But it is only quantity and nothing else that has parts of the same *ratio*. ... for quantity is *per se* divided into parts of the same *ratio*, and not by substance or something else, because position, which is the order of parts in the whole is included in its *ratio*. For dimensive quantity is that which has position. And so the parts of quantity of the same species are distinguished on account of the diversity of their positions.” [181]

But against the analogy between the disposition of accidents to inhere in a subject and the tendency of heavy objects to fall, I observe that the former admits of no contrary or degree, whereas it is evident either that gravity stands in opposition to levity, or that ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ denote degrees in the measurement of weight.

Thus, in Book VIII of *Physics*, Aristotle wrote: “how can we account for the motion of light things and heavy things to their proper situations? The reason for it is that they have a natural tendency respectively towards a certain position: and this constitutes the essence of lightness and

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180 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘*Summa Theologica*’, Part III, Q. 77, Article 2, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

181 Thomas of Sutton, *Quodlibeta*, Book I, Q.21, (c.1290); quoted and translated in Gyula Klima, ‘Thomas Sutton on Individuation’.

heaviness, the former being determined by an upward, the latter by a downward, tendency.” [182] And in *De Caelo* he explained: “The local movement of each body into its own place must be regarded as similar to what happens in connexion with other forms of generation and change.” “Now, that which produces upward and downward movement is that which produces weight and lightness, and that which is moved is that which is potentially heavy or light, and the movement of each body to its own place is motion towards its own form.” [183] We may say that weight is the action of something that is heavy, and it is heavy because it is potentially down, but is restrained from being down: that is, its weight is a consequence of its entelechy – its ‘being-at-work-being-itself’ – which includes its appetite to achieve a lower place. But this is a difficult topic, which I had best reserve for another treatise.

Even so, it should be said that heaviness is a quality, and hence an accidental property, wherefore it must belong to a substance. By contrast the disposition to be in a subject cannot be a quality, for an accident cannot inhere in an accident, as Aristotle indicated in Book IV of *Metaphysics*: “an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. I mean, for instance, that the white is musical and the latter is white, only because both are accidental to man.” [184] Thus the imperative for an accident to inhere in its subject must be part of its being and not susceptible to alteration or prevention.

Now I shall explore an alternative proposition. First, consider that division of the genus of animals called ‘quadrupeds’, to which we may assign the definition ‘four-footed animals’; yet should it so happen that a dog lose one of its limbs, we do not say it is no longer a dog, despite its not possessing four feet. Likewise we do not deny, on account of his lack of an eye, that S. Potamon was a man. Thus we observe that an entity may be regarded as belonging to a species, notwithstanding the absence of some attribute defined in the formula of that species; and this is the case where the attribute is removed by a privation, as where a four-footed animal has only three legs or where a man has but one eye. And it should be noted that such a privation must be accidental, for it is not part of the definition of the species: the deficit could not be part of the essential being of the entity, else the species would contain individuals with differing quidditative definitions, which is contrary to what is meant by ‘species’.

From this I formulate a hypothesis: that perhaps an individual accident – that is, an *ens in alio* – may be deprived of its subject without creating a contradiction, by analogy with the cases cited above; wherefore it becomes an *ens per accidens*, comprising the accident itself and the supervening privation.

Yet what would be the nature of such an entity? Can the particular redness of an individual cup of wine exist without that wine? And here I must emphasise that this signifies, not the vinous shade of red considered as a colour, but the particular instance of redness that belongs to that particular cupful of wine. For a substance has being on account of itself, wherefore the removal of a part does not negate the existence of the remainder. Indeed, I contend that it is in the nature of animals that they may be deprived of certain of their parts without dying, wherefore it is not contrary to the essence of an animal for it to be the subject of such a privation.

Conversely, accidents “are said to be insofar as they are in a substance” [172] and therefore to part the accident from the substance would be to negate the very being of the former. That is, since an accident is an *ens in alio*, to deprive it of its subject would cause it to become both a ‘being in another’ and a ‘being without another’, which is plainly contradictory; nor does the Angelic Doctor’s reasoning solve this, for *esse in alio* clearly describes the being (*esse*) of an accident, not its quiddity. Therefore it appears this hypothesis must fall.

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182 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book VIII Part 4, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.

183 Aristotle, ‘De Caelo’ (‘On the Heavens’), Book IV, Part 3, (c. 350 BC); translated by J. L. Stocks.

184 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book IV, Part 4, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

Moreover, although S. Thomas asserted: “after the consecration the accidents which remain have being; hence they are compounded of existence and essence,” [154] I contend that this reverses the proper order of reasoning, for instead it must surely be demonstrated that something has existence and essence, wherefore it has being. Now, even if an accident dissociated from its substance may have an essence that does not involve a contradiction, as proposed above, how can it be said to have existence, since Aristotle stated “none of the categories other than substance can exist apart”? [185] And, as quoted in Chapter XV, the Angelic Doctor himself identified the existence of an accident as analogous to that of a form; and “just as the substantial form has no absolute existence per se without that to which the form comes ... namely matter,” [142] neither can an accident have real individual existence without a subject.

In his First Book of *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle described essential or ‘*per se*’ attributes: “Essential attributes are (1) such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature (e.g. line thus belongs to triangle, point to line; for the very being or ‘substance’ of triangle and line is composed of these elements, which are contained in the formulae defining triangle and line); (2) such that, while they belong to certain subjects, the subjects to which they belong are contained in the attribute’s own defining formula. Thus straight and curved belong to line, odd and even, prime and compound, square and oblong, to number; and also the formula defining any one of these attributes contains its subject – e.g. line or number as the case may be.” [186]

Furthermore: “all attributes which ... are essential either in the sense that their subjects are contained in them, or in the sense that they are contained in their subjects, are necessary as well as consequentially connected with their subjects. For it is impossible for them not to inhere in their subjects either simply or in the qualified sense that one or other of a pair of opposites must inhere in the subject; e.g. in line must be either straightness or curvature, in number either oddness or evenness. For within a single identical genus the contrary of a given attribute is either its privative or its contradictory; e.g. within number what is not odd is even, inasmuch as within this sphere even is a necessary consequent of not-odd. So, since any given predicate must be either affirmed or denied of any subject, essential attributes must inhere in their subjects of necessity.” [186]

Wherefore I suggest that ‘vinosity’ – that is, the distinctive body, colour and taste of a wine – is an essential attribute of that wine, as it includes the wine in its definition. Moreover, as a skilled taster can often identify the region and variety of the grapes used in making a wine, evidently its vinosity is consequent upon its material cause. It is then difficult to explain how this essential attribute remains without its subject, if the matter and the form of the wine are entirely replaced.

And so I have outlined the difficulty concerning the persistence of accidents without their subjects, which appears to be contradictory according to philosophy. I have outlined certain subtle arguments that attempt to remove this impediment, and of these the solution propounded by John Duns Scotus has much merit, if his premisses be valid. Yet I conclude that, while these learned men have cast doubt upon the proofs used to demonstrate the contradiction, they do not conclusively eliminate it.

## Chapter XIX

### *In which certain difficulties regarding Transubstantiation are considered.*

In the previous chapter I presented in detail the doctrine of Transubstantiation as taught by S. Thomas Aquinas. Yet a number of difficulties remain, and in particular two, which relate to the fourth and fifth points in Chapter XVII: how the accidents remain without a subject, and what occurs when the sacramental species become corrupted.

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185 Aristotle, ‘*Metaphysics*’, Book XII, Part 1, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

186 Aristotle, ‘*Posterior Analytics*’, Book I, Part 4, (c. 350BC); translated by G. R. G. Mure.

As regards the fourth point, S. Thomas asserted that the contraction of the form to the individual depends upon *materia quantitate signata* – matter signed with quantity. John Duns Scotus rejected this opinion, observing that quantity is an accident, wherefore individuality would be reduced to the level of an accident. Instead he argued that individuality must be derived from the form, which is the basis of being. Thus, while the species (*forma*) determines a being's *quidditas* or 'whatness', there is further an entitative perfection, which the *forma* acquires on passage from specific difference to individual determination, which the Subtle Doctor called *haecceitas* or 'thisness'. When an *ens per se* – a primary substance – is instantiated from its *forma*, the latter supplies its quiddity – that is, all the differentiae that indicate what it is in terms of species – but this is perfected by the addition of its haecceity, which individuates the entity and gives it the status of a primary substance.

I suggest this is particularly appropriate in the case of living creatures, which ingest, excrete, grow and shrink (especially in the case of plants), and therefore change their matter and its quantity while nevertheless remaining the same individual; and since their form is the soul, their haecceity must be a modal signature of each individual soul. This being so, the principle of individuation is neither dimensive quantity nor any other accident.

Another point that should be raised is that dimensions, along with certain other types of accident, are *per se sensibilia*: that is, they are attributes which, in themselves, can directly affect one or more of the senses. S. Thomas averred that the senses perceive that which is singular – namely substance – whereas the intellect comprehends the universal – namely species and genera.

Thus, in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, he wrote: "we should know that a sense is a power in a corporeal organ; whereas the intellect is an immaterial power, which is not the actuality of some corporeal organ. But everything is received in a subject in accordance with the nature of the recipient. ... Therefore, a sense has to receive the similitude of the thing sensed in a corporeal and material manner. The intellect, on the other hand, receives the similitude of what is understood in an incorporeal and immaterial manner. However, the common nature of corporeal and material things is individuated by their corporeal matter contained under determinate dimensions; whereas a universal is abstracted from this sort of matter and from the material individuating conditions." [187]

Thus, sensations are caused by the action of a material cause upon the material senses. In some cases this is direct, as in the case of touch or taste; in others it is indirect, where the object sets in motion some medium which conveys the sensation to the organ of sense, as in the case of smell or sight. As Aristotle explained: "Whatever is visible is colour and colour is what lies upon what is in its own nature visible; 'in its own nature' here means not that visibility is involved in the definition of what thus underlies colour, but that that substratum contains in itself the cause of visibility. Every colour has in it the power to set in movement what is actually transparent; that power constitutes its very nature." "Colour sets in movement not the sense organ but what is transparent, e.g. the air, and that, extending continuously from the object to the organ, sets the latter in movement." [188] Wherefore if there should be accidents lacking a material subject – that is, not inherent in a substance – they would be powerless to induce sensation, and hence they could neither be felt, nor tasted, nor seen.

Nor do I agree that all accidents attach to a subject in virtue of its dimensive quantity. For example, if a crystal of salt be dissolved in a certain volume of water, the crystal loses its dimensions, yet its salinity remains. Certainly, a small crystal will be found to impart a little saltiness, while a large crystal imparts much saltiness, but the saline taste itself does not depend upon the dimensions of the individual crystal. And this may be demonstrated if another crystal,

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187 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Sentencia Libri De Anima', Book II, Lectio 12, (1267-1268); translation from Gyula Klima, 'Singularity by Similarity vs. Causality in Aquinas, Ockham and Buridan'.

188 Aristotle, 'De Anima', Book II Chapter 7, (c. 350BC); translated by J. A. Smith.

identical in appearance to the first, but of some other soluble material, be dissolved in the same amount of water, for the taste – sweet, bitter, astringent, or whatever – is found to depend upon the material and not its shape or quantity. Experience shows us that whatever form or dimensions may be imposed upon salt, the resultant object will always be found to be salty. And from these observations I infer, in accordance with my conclusions in Chapter XIV, that the accident of taste is a quality of the matter, not of the dimensive quantity of the individual substance.

Now, if it is true that not all accidents naturally inhere in the dimensive quantity, it must be that transubstantiation causes those accidents to cease to inhere in the substance of the bread and wine, and begin to be subjected in the dimensive quantity. Yet S. Thomas himself stated “accidents do not pass from subject to subject, so that the same identical accident which was first in one subject be afterwards in another.” [154]

Besides, even if the dimensive quantity were the subject of the other accidents, nevertheless quantity is itself an accident and, as noted before, Aristotle taught that accidents cannot exist without a subject, for “everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance” [69] and “not even more than two terms can be combined in accidental predication. For (1) an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject.” [184]

Moreover, “if we consider the various senses of ‘being’, firstly the subject is prior, so that substance is prior;” [189] wherefore “since, then, after consecration, the substance of the bread does not remain in this sacrament, it seems that its accidents cannot remain.” “For when that which comes first is removed, that which follows is also taken away.” [170] To this the *Angelicus Doctor* replied: “As is said in the book *De Causis*, an effect depends more on the first cause than on the second. And therefore by God’s power, which is the first cause of all things, it is possible for that which follows to remain, while that which is first is taken away.” [170]

This relies upon an interpretation of *Liber De Causis* – an abridged Latin translation, through the Arabic, of the *Stoicheiōsis Theologikē* (‘Theological Teaching’) of Proclus, a Greek author of the fifth century – which commences:

**Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda. Cum ergo removet causa universalis secunda virtutem suam a re, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea. [190]**

Every principal cause exerts more influence over the thing it caused than the second universal cause. Therefore, when the second universal cause withdraws its power from that thing, the first universal cause does not withdraw its power from it.

But it has already been shown in Chapter XVIII that the persistence of accidents without their subjects is problematic, even admitting divine power, and thus has been questioned the fourth point; and likewise the fifth point concerning the corruption of the species, which I shall discuss below. Yet it is certain that the third point must stand, for the accidents manifestly remain after the conversion. Therefore it is necessary further to examine the nature of transubstantiation.

Turning to the second point above, S. Thomas wrote of “the change of all being, so that, to wit, the whole substance of one thing be changed into the whole substance of another.” “Hence this is not a formal, but a substantial conversion.” [168] That is, in transubstantiation, conversion (*conversio*) is more than a mere change (*mutatio*): conversion of this sort involves two entities related as positive extremes, such that the first extreme, the *terminus a quo*, ceases to be at the instant the last extreme, the *terminus ad quem*, begins to be.

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189 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book V, Part 11, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

190 ‘Liber De Causis’, Part I, lines 1-2, (c.1170); Latin translation of the ‘Kalam fi mahd al-khair’, (c.950), author unknown, edited by Adriaan Pattin; my translation.

Now, as Aristotle indicated: “there must be a substrate underlying all processes of becoming and changing” [191]; that is, “an underlying something, namely that which becomes” [77]; and this must be a potentiality, such as primary substratum. S. Thomas perhaps implies that the accidents are the substrate, but accidents are not primary but secondary, as stated above, so this may be rejected. Instead, it would be necessary to posit God himself as the potentiality, for he who created everything from nothing can surely convert the whole being of an entity.

As the *Angelicus Doctor* wrote: “because of the relationship of the extremes ... we can use the preposition ‘*ex*’, which denotes order; for we can truly and properly say that ‘being is made out of non-being,’ and ‘out of bread, the body of Christ.’” [169] But in ordinary transformation there is a formal change, whereof the substrate is the matter, whereas S. Thomas stated that in transubstantiation the matter of the *terminus a quo* is not the matter of the *terminus ad quem*. Yet he appears to offer no strong evidence for this; he seems to assume the conversion of the whole being almost axiomatically: therefore I suggest that the first point in Chapter XVII is not proven.

S. Thomas considered the conjecture that “the substance of the bread and wine is either dissolved into the original matter, or that it is annihilated” [192] but rejected only the possibilities that “the elements into which the substance of the bread and wine is dissolved, depart from thence by local motion, which would be perceived by the senses” or “that (the substance) may be annihilated” [192]. And in several other places he has relied upon his interpretation that ‘conversion’ requires that there be no subject common to either extreme, even though he admitted: “In this change there are many more difficulties than in creation, in which there is but this one difficulty, that something is made out of nothing; yet this belongs to the proper mode of production of the first cause, which presupposes nothing else. But in this conversion not only is it difficult for this whole to be changed into that whole, so that nothing of the former may remain (which does not belong to the common mode of production of a cause), but furthermore it has this difficulty that the accidents remain while the substance is destroyed, and many other difficulties”. [169]

So, let us consider an alternative, to determine whether this resolves the difficulties. Let us hypothesize that, as with other changes, the substrate in transubstantiation is matter. Under this hypothesis the alteration is formal, but nevertheless one substance is converted into another, for the substantial form of the *terminus a quo* is replaced by the substantial form of the *terminus ad quem*. What is common to the extremes is then not only the accidents but also the matter.

I contend that this hypothesis is not contrary to the arguments of the Angelic Doctor, whose arguments speak principally of a conversion of substance, provided it is allowed that in this ‘conversion’ the form is supplanted without commutation of the matter.

To consider an example, S. Thomas argued as follows that the change is wrought instantaneously. “A change may be instantaneous from a threefold reason. First on the part of the form, which is the terminus of the change. For, if it be a form that receives more and less, it is acquired by its subject successively, such as health; and therefore because a substantial form does not receive more and less, it follows that its introduction into matter is instantaneous. Secondly on the part of the subject, which sometimes is prepared successively for receiving the form; thus water is heated successively. When, however, the subject itself is in the ultimate disposition for receiving the form, it receives it suddenly, as a transparent body is illuminated suddenly. Thirdly on the part of the agent, which possesses infinite power: wherefore it can instantly dispose the matter for the form.” “For these three reasons this conversion is instantaneous. First, because the substance of Christ’s body which is the term of this conversion, does not receive more or less. Secondly, because in this conversion there is no subject to be disposed successively. Thirdly, because it is

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191 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book V Part 2, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.

192 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 75, Article 3, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

effected by God's infinite power." [193] Now the first point is certain, while the second and third may be amended without falsifying the argument, for if the action of an infinite power can alter both the matter and form together immediately, it can surely effect a formal change instantly, provided the transformation is possible.

And it is easy to show that bread and wine can be transformed into body and blood, for this is done by the natural faculties, as described in Chapter XI. Moreover, it is in no way unfitting for the matter of bread and wine to become the earthly body and blood of Christ, for he partook of such aliment and was nourished by it while incarnated in his passible body before his Passion. Nor, if it be true, does it detract from the mystery of the Sacrament to impute that the power of Christ miraculously effects in an instant an alteration that requires much time and toil in Nature, as demonstrated by Galen, who wrote [101]: "it is quite clear that bread, and, more particularly lettuce, beet, and the like, require a great deal of alteration, in order to become blood. This, then, is one reason why there are so many organs concerned in the alteration of food." And although, once digested and altered, "it is quite easy for blood to become flesh", nevertheless time is required in which to "thicken it to such an extent that it acquires a certain consistency and ceases to be fluid, [so] it thus becomes original newly-formed flesh".

Now let us re-examine the premise *accidentia sine subjecto subsistent*. S. Thomas showed [154] that the accidents of the bread and wine cannot inhere in Christ's eucharistic body and blood, nor in the atmosphere, yet my hypothesis admits of a further alternative: that they are subjected in the matter of the sacramental species. I have already demonstrated in Chapter XIV that certain accidents may inhere in matter; yet against this two arguments may be raised. Firstly, that in the process of conversion the matter must be reduced to primary substratum, or into the four elements, or at the very least into some primitive disposition common to both the extremes, whose form is therefore so imperfect as to preclude the inherence of the accidents of the bread and wine. Secondly, even if some accidents naturally inhere in the matter of their subject, it is not proven that all accidents do so.

To counter these reasonable objections I propose two solutions. Firstly, Christ's miraculous power may cause the matter to become the subject of all the accidents, whether this is natural to them or not; and this surely better conforms with philosophy than for them to be without any subject. Or, secondly, we may agree with S. Thomas that "it is necessary to say that the other accidents which remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains" [180]; and "because the first disposition of matter is dimensive quantity" [180] we may deduce that the matter, even if it be reduced to a primitive form, is the subject of the quantity, which itself is then the subject of the other accidents.

Here I may cite a further example. To explain how "what remains in this sacrament, nourishes, and performs every operation which bread would do were it present," [194] the Angelic Doctor wrote: "Some of the operations of bread follow it by reason of the accidents, such as to affect the senses, and such operations are found in the species of the bread after the consecration on account of the accidents which remain. But some other operations follow the bread either by reason of the matter, such as that it is changed into something else, or else by reason of the substantial form, such as an operation consequent upon its species, for instance, that it 'strengthens man's heart' (*Ps. 103:15*); and such operations are found in this sacrament, not on account of the form or matter remaining, but because they are bestowed miraculously upon the accidents themselves." [194] Yet we perceive the answer becomes simplified if we admit the persistence of both the matter and the accidents.

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193 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Part III, Q. 75, Article 7, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

194 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Part III, Q. 75, Article 6, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

Moreover, S. John Damascene described the sacramental conversion thusly: “just as in nature the bread by the eating and the wine and the water by the drinking are changed into the body and blood of the eater and drinker, and do not become a different body from the former one, so the bread of the table and the wine and water are supernaturally changed by the invocation and presence of the Holy Spirit into the body and blood of Christ, and are not two but one and the same.” [88] And bread becomes part of the body by the transformation and incorporation of its matter, as shown in Chapter XI.

But now let us turn to the fifth point above, wherein it was noted that it is a property of bread that it is corruptible, but the impassible body of our Lord is not so; wherefore “it seems that the sacramental species cannot be corrupted, because corruption comes of the separation of the form from the matter. But the matter of the bread does not remain in this sacrament.” [171]

S. Thomas answered: “Since ‘the corruption of one thing is the generation of another’ (*De Gener. i*), something must be generated necessarily from the sacramental species if they be corrupted, as stated above; for they are not corrupted in such a way that they disappear altogether, as if reduced to nothing; on the contrary, something sensible manifestly succeeds to them. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how anything can be generated from them. For it is quite evident that nothing is generated out of the body and blood of Christ which are truly there, because these are incorruptible. But if the substance, or even the matter, of the bread and wine were to remain in this sacrament, then, as some have maintained, it would be easy to account for this sensible object which succeeds to them.” [103] He rejected this solution, but by admitting it under my hypothesis the difficulty is resolved.

And this conforms with the teachings of Aristotle, who wrote: “It is also hard to say why wine is not said to be the matter of vinegar nor potentially vinegar (though vinegar is produced from it), and why a living man is not said to be potentially dead. In fact they are not, but the corruptions in question are accidental, and it is the matter of the animal that is itself in virtue of its corruption the potency and matter of a corpse, and it is water that is the matter of vinegar.” [195] Just so, if the matter and accidents of the wine persist after the consecration, it follows that an accidental alteration may cause the species to become those of sour wine; and whereas Christ’s body informs the matter of the host, the accidental corruption of that matter leads to the departure of his spirit. For, since Christ is the incorruptible bread of eternal life, is it incongruous for him to remain associated with matter which is no longer that of wholesome bread, wherefore it is proper that he should remove his presence therefrom; whereupon the material component, having lost its substantial form, remains as putrefied bread.

Thus I have considered the difficulties mentioned before. Whereas the Council of Trent followed S. Thomas Aquinas in declaring that *per consecrationem panis et vini conversionem fieri totius substantiae*, wherein is understood the conversion of the whole being of the sacramental bread and wine, both matter and form, the accidents persisting without their subject, I have hypothesized that the matter remains as the substrate to transubstantiation. I have shown that such a transformation nevertheless causes a change of substance, for substance is compounded of both matter and form. Moreover, I have demonstrated that this proposal removes the difficulty concerning the accidents, for these may be subjected in the matter, and also the difficulty concerning the corruption of the consecrated species, for this is explained as an accidental motion in which the matter is the potentiality of that which remains after the corruption.

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195 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Book VIII, Part 5, (c. 350BC); translated by W. D. Ross.

## Chapter XX

### *In which is appended further speculation regarding Christ's Presence in the Eucharist.*

In the previous chapter I suggested that certain problems concerning the persistence of the species may be resolved if we allow that the matter of the Eucharistic elements also remains in the sacrament. I also briefly touched upon the question as to how the Holy Sacrament may become corrupted, since Christ's risen body is not susceptible to decay.

Now it is certain that the Eucharistic elements can become corrupt, as was discussed in the fifth point of Chapter XVII. S. Thomas indicated: "The body of Christ remains in this sacrament ... so long as the sacramental species remain: and when they cease, Christ's body ceases to be under them, not because it depends on them, but because the relationship of Christ's body to those species is taken away" "And in this way, since Christ has unfailing and incorruptible being, He ceases to be under this sacrament, not because He ceases to be, nor yet by local movement of His own ... but only by the fact that the sacramental species cease to exist." [196]

However, the difficulty remains: when Christ removes his Presence from the Sacrament, what remains? Even if we allow that the matter may persist, and admit that the accidents may inhere therein, nevertheless these would have no substantial form, without which they would literally be 'no thing', as shown in Chapter XIV. Thus, Plotinus stated "Matter has not even existence... Being is attributed to it by an accident of words: the truth would be that it has Non-Being." [197] And the *Angelicus Doctor* affirmed: "*Ex materia autem sub quantitate existente, et forma substantiali adveniente, corpus physicum constituitur.*" (Instead, a natural body is constituted from matter manifesting under a quantity and attaching to a substantial form.) [198] Wherefore it is necessary to investigate this point further.

To explain the corruptibility of the Eucharistic species, S. Thomas found it necessary to argue that their status becomes altered from that of '*ens in alio*' to that of '*ens per se*': "Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently, the definition of substance is not 'a being of itself without a subject,' nor is the definition of accident 'a being in a subject'; but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance 'to have existence not in a subject'; while it belongs to the quiddity or essence of accident 'to have existence in a subject.' But in this sacrament it is not in virtue of their essence that accidents are not in a subject, but through the Divine power sustaining them; and consequently they do not cease to be accidents, because neither is the definition of accident withdrawn from them, nor does the definition of substance apply to them." [154]

The manner in which accidents have 'being' was discussed in Chapter XVIII. Yet, if it be the case that the entirety of the bread and wine, both form and matter, are transubstantiated, then what is enclosed by their dimensional quantities? Initially we may say they are filled with the substance of Christ, although his body and blood are not said to be circumscribed by the dimensions, as explained in Chapter X. But what, then, is contained within the dimensions when the species become corrupt and his Presence ceases? Even if we admit that the dimensions have miraculously acquired the status of an *ens per se*, yet they contain literally 'no-thing', and hence must constitute a void, which is contrary to the teaching of many learned philosophers.

Roger Bacon, in considering the possibility of the void as a space separated from any body but having dimensions, wrote: "a dimension is an accident, and an accident cannot exist without a subject. Making an accident without a subject is an act that is not in the order of things. This separate dimension can exist in virtue of the absolute power of the First Being, for thus

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196 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Part III, Q. 76, Article 5, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

197 Plotinus, 'The Six Enneads', 1st Ennead, 8th Tractate, (250); translated by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page.

198 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'De Mixtione Elementorum', (1273); my translation.

understood this power surpasses any finite act. But if we are speaking about what the power does, about the ordered power, then the power of the First Being does not surpass any act; it is equivalent to acts and effects in the order, which are possible according to the possibility of things.” [199] And thus he suggested that God could create an accident without a subject, but would not, for such a act would be outside the divinely ordained order of Nature; but elsewhere Bacon was less equivocal, declaring “*accidens non potest per se stare*” (an accident cannot stand on it own) and “*accidens non potest esse sine subjecto*” (an accident cannot exist without a subject) [200].

Now even if, as I have proposed, the dimensions are filled by matter, it has already been shown that this requires a form to give it existence. S. Thomas asserted: “The place in which Christ’s body is, is not empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the substance of Christ’s body, which is not there locally, as stated above; but it is filled with the sacramental species, which have to fill the place either because of the nature of dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they also subsist miraculously after the fashion of substance.” [196] Moreover, “the sacramental species, although they are forms existing without matter, still retain the same being which they had before in matter, and therefore as to their being they are like forms which are in matter.” [201]

Applying this to the hypothesis of the persistence of the matter, it could be argued that here the compound of the species (meaning the accidents) and the matter constitute an *ens per se* in which ‘form’ and ‘species’ are equivalent; and indeed we usually identify the species of an entity (meaning what type of thing it is) according to how our senses perceive it. And this conception of accident-as-form may be compared to what the Angelic Doctor wrote in *On the Principles of Nature*: “The form of statue, however, is not the substantial form, because the bronze before the coming-to-be of this form has being in act, and its being does not depend upon this shape which is an accidental form (*forma accidentalis*). All artificial forms are accidental forms. For art only operates upon those things already constituted in being by nature (*in esse perfecto a natura*).” [202]

Yet against this concept it must be stated that *accidens neque rationem completae essentiae habet neque pars essentiae completae est*, as S. Thomas declared: “although considered in itself the form does not have the complete aspect of an essence, nevertheless it is part of a complete essence. But that to which an accident comes is in itself a complete being subsisting in its own existence, and this existence naturally precedes the accident that supervenes. Therefore, the supervening accident, from its conjunction with the thing to which it comes, does not cause that existence in which the thing subsists, the existence through which the thing is a being per se; it causes, rather, a certain secondary existence without which the subsisting being can be understood to exist, as what is first can be understood without what is second. Hence, from the accident and the subject there is made something that is one accidentally, not essentially; and so from the conjunction of these two there does not result an essence, as there does from the conjunction of form and matter. And so an accident has neither the aspect of a complete essence nor is it a part of an essence; rather, just as an accident is a being only in a certain sense, so too does it have an essence only in a certain sense.” [142]

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199 Roger Bacon, ‘Questiones super librum Phisicorum a magistro dicto Bacuun’, ‘Dubitatur utrum sit ponere vacuum infra celum’, fol. 47, col. c [pp.224-225], (c.1270?); quoted in ‘Medieval Cosmology’ by Pierre Duhem.

200 Roger Bacon, ‘Opus tertium’, cap. XLIII, p.154, (1267) and ‘Liber primus communium naturalium Fratris Rogeri’, pars III, ‘De existencia vacui secundum se’, p.217, (c.1270); quoted in ‘Medieval Cosmology’ by Pierre Duhem; my translation.

201 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica’, Part III, Q. 77, Article 3, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

202 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘De principiis naturae, ad fratrem Sylvestrum’ (‘On the Principles of Nature’), Cap. 1, (c.1255); translated by Prof. Gerry Campbell. I have inserted the Latin terms where I believe these are helpful.

Wherefore, although it might be supposed that certain accidents are of the essence of a thing, in that they denote the differentiae in the formula of the species or of some genus from which the species is derived, for instance it might be said that the perfect roundness of a particular sphere is part of the essence of that sphere – indeed, its specific differentia, for an ovoid or other rounded form that is not a sphere does not exhibit equal curvature over its whole surface – it must be replied this is not so, for it reverses the proper order of causation. The accidents follow the form; they are not the form itself, as S. Thomas explained: “In sensible things even the essential differences are unknown to us, and so they are signified through accidental differences that arise from the essential ones, just as a cause is signified through its effect.” [156] Thus, the perfect roundness and smoothness of a sphere are simply consequent upon its essential sphericity, albeit we observe that such accidents are always associated with the form, at least in the usual course of nature.

To the contrary, however, I noted in Chapter XV that a wooden beam is a lintel if placed above the door, but a threshold if placed below, wherefore ‘above’ and ‘below’ must be included in the formulae of ‘lintel’ and ‘threshold’, notwithstanding that these are predicates of position, which is in the category of accident.

But now let us return to the question concerning corruption. Aristotle pronounced: “‘perishing’ is change to not-being ... and ‘becoming’ is change to being” [203]; and he identified these as ‘change’, not ‘motion’, for in each case one of the extremes is non-being, and motion cannot be ascribed to that which does not exist. And here we are seeking a description of ‘passing-away without qualification’ – that is, the destruction of substance absolutely. In *On Generation and Corruption* the Philosopher explained: “Now we often divide terms into those which signify a ‘this somewhat’ and those which do not. And (the first form of) the distinction, which we are investigating, results from a similar division of terms: for it makes a difference into what the changing thing changes... For we are trying to discover not what undergoes these changes, but what is their characteristic manner. The passage, then, into what ‘is not’ except with a qualification is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into what ‘is’ without qualification is unqualified coming-to-be. Hence whatever the contrasted ‘poles’ of the changes may be ... the one of them will be ‘a being’ and the other ‘a not-being’.” [204] That is, absolute passing-away is a change from substance, which has being without qualification, to non-substance or matter, which ‘is’ only with qualification, in that it is potentially ‘some thing’; for “‘Matter’, in the most proper sense of the term, is to be identified with the substratum which is receptive of coming-to-be and passing-away” [205].

The Angelic Doctor expounded upon this as follows: “just as everything which is in potency can be called ‘matter’, in the same way everything by which something has being (either substantially or accidentally), can be called ‘form’... And because it is the form which makes something to be in act, accordingly the form is called ‘act’. Moreover, that which brings about substantial being in act is called ‘substantial form’, and that which brings about accidental being in act is called ‘accidental form’. Now since generation is a movement towards form, there are two kinds of generation which correspond to these two kinds of forms: absolute coming-to-be (*generatio simpliciter*) corresponds to substantial form; relative coming-to-be (*generatio secundum quid*) corresponds to accidental form. For whenever substantial form is introduced, we say that something absolutely becomes (*fieri simpliciter*). However, when accidental form is introduced, we do not say that something becomes absolutely, but rather that it becomes this (*fieri hoc*); for example, when a man becomes white we do not say that he becomes a man or that a man has come-to-be but rather that the man becomes white or comes-to-be white. And there is a two-fold

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203 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book V Part 1, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.

204 Aristotle, ‘On Generation and Corruption’, Book I Part 3, (c. 350BC); translated by H. H. Joachim.

205 Aristotle, ‘On Generation and Corruption’, Book I Part 4, (c. 350BC); translated by H. H. Joachim.

notion of corruption which is opposed to this two-fold notion of generation, namely *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*. Absolute coming-to-be and absolute passing-away exist only within the genus of substance. On the other hand relative generation and relative corruption are found in all of the other genera. And because generation is a kind of movement from non-being to being and, conversely, corruption from being to non-being, it is not from just any kind of non-being that generation comes but from non-being which is being in potency: just as, for example, the statue comes from bronze which is statue in potency, not in act.” [202]

Now, bread is said to be ‘made from’ flour, but we do not say it is ‘made of’ flour: thus we see that the matter is transformed by the action of the baker in manufacturing the bread. Likewise we observe that putrefied bread is some kind of matter that resembles neither flour nor bread; and thereby we deduce that corruption is not precisely the reverse of generation, for while flour is the *materia ex qua* of bread, it is not the material that results from the decay of bread, nor from what remains can bread be made again.

It has already been shown, and S. Thomas reiterated: “it is clear that there are four kinds of causes, namely material, efficient, formal and final.” [206] In the making of bread these are easy to distinguish, but in its corruption the causes are not so easily discerned, for it is an act of Nature and not of man. Concerning the natural Aristotle wrote in Book II of *Physics*: “Of things that exist, some exist by nature... Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration).” [207] Likewise, the *Angelicus Doctor* observed: “it should be noted that although every agent whether natural or voluntary intends an end, nevertheless it does not follow that every agent knows the end or deliberates about the end. For to know the end is necessary only in those things whose actions are not determined but which can move towards opposites, as is the case with voluntary agents... In natural agents, however, their actions are determined, hence it is not necessary to choose those things (means) which are for the end.” “It is therefore possible for a natural agent to intend an end without deliberation and this intending is nothing other than having a natural inclination towards something.” [206] Thus corruption occurs according to the nature of that which is corruptible, as ordained by the First Cause. And in the case of food and drink, the spoiling of which causes great detriment to mankind, we may also consider the judgement of God upon Adam, when he decreed: “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread” [208].

So it is clear that in the natural decay of bread and wine, that which has absolute being, namely the substance, becomes that which ‘is’ only with qualification, which is matter; alternatively we may say that the perfect form passes away and is succeeded by an imperfect form, which is that of base matter. And we observe that this occurs gradually, so that at first the stale bread retains many of the properties of the original substance, but as decay proceeds these pass away progressively.

Let us then apply this science to the corruption of the Sacramental Elements. S. Thomas stated that “if the change be so great that the substance of the bread or wine would have been corrupted, then Christ’s body and blood do not remain under this sacrament;” whereupon “although the subject does not remain, still the being which they had in the subject does remain, which being is proper, and suited to the subject. And therefore such being can be corrupted by a contrary agent, as the substance of the bread or wine was subject to corruption.” [171] But this requires “that the sacramental species retain the same being as they had before when the substance of the bread was present,” [171] which premise I have already questioned at length.

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206 Saint Thomas Aquinas, ‘De principiis naturae, ad fratrem Sylvestrum’ (‘On the Principles of Nature’), Cap. 3, (c.1255); translated by Gyula Klima.

207 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, Book II Part 1, (c. 350BC); translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye.

208 Gen 3:19.

Moreover, it should be emphasised that the decaying substances cannot be restored by a second miracle, as the Angelic Doctor declared in *Summa Theologica*: “it does not seem reasonable to say that anything takes place miraculously in this sacrament, except in virtue of the consecration itself, which does not imply either creation or return of matter; it seems better to say that in the actual consecration it is miraculously bestowed on the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine to be the subject of subsequent forms.” [103]

And this argument – that exceptional power is miraculously conferred upon the species – he used to counter the following objections: (1) “It seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental species: because, whatever is generated, is generated out of some matter: for nothing is generated out of nothing”; (2) “since the sacramental species are accidents, it seems that no substance can be generated from them”; (3) “if any corporeal substance be generated from the sacramental species, then substance and accident would be generated from accident, namely, two things from one, which is impossible. Consequently, it is impossible for any corporeal substance to be generated out of the sacramental species.” To these he replied: (1) “dimensive quantity supplies the place of matter”; (2) the “sacramental species are indeed accidents, yet they have the act and power of substance”; (3) “the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine retains its own nature, and receives miraculously the power and property of substance; and therefore it can pass to both, that is, into substance and dimension.” [103] But matter is potentially substance whereas accident is not, nor can accidents exert the power of substance; yet perhaps these things are indeed made possible by a miracle of divine power, although I attempted in Chapter XVIII to argue why this may not be so.

Wherefore, if I may be permitted to wax yet more speculative, I shall propose an alternative hypothesis, to investigate whether these difficulties may be circumvented: just as God imparts the rational soul to the flesh and blood of the embryo, which before then has a form but not intellect, perhaps Christ imparts his Presence to the bread and wine in a similar fashion, wherein it subsists and acts *per se*, and not on account of the matter or the sensible form; yet when it departs, what remains is decaying bread and wine, just as when the soul departs from the body, what remains is a corpse.

Under this hypothesis the original form of the bread and wine constitute a kind of *forma corporeitatis*, and their matter supplies a body – not, of course, like Christ’s proper impassible body which is in Heaven, but instead an earthly substrate through which his power is manifested. Thus, in mortal life the human soul requires a body to enable it to act, and the animal body is condign for this purpose, as explained in Chapter XVI, for “a body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body,” as S. Thomas explained [164]. But for Christ’s purpose in the Eucharist, which I described in Chapter III, the elements of bread and wine are most fitting.

Now this proposition has been termed ‘consubstantiation’, for the bread and wine are not transubstantiated, but instead the superior form of Christ’s body and blood supervenes over the inferior forms. It is also termed ‘impanation’ and ‘invination’, by analogy with the incarnation of Christ in a human body; and in the early days of the Church the similarity was often noted, until the doctrine of S. Cyril caused it to fall from favour. Yet even his teachings are not unambiguous, for while he declared: “with full assurance let us partake as of the Body and Blood of Christ: for in the figure (*tupos*: form or shape) of Bread is given to thee His Body, and in the figure of Wine His Blood; that thou by partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ, mayest be made of the same body and the same blood with Him,” [42] he also wrote: “in the New Testament there is Bread of heaven, and a Cup of salvation, sanctifying soul and body; for as the Bread corresponds to our body, so is the Word (*Logos*) appropriate to our soul.” [42] And from the latter we might derive a correlation between, on the one hand, our body and soul, and on the other hand the bread and the Word, meaning the second Person of the Holy Trinity.

It was noted in Chapter VI that Berengarius denied any change of the substance of the bread and wine, asserting that “the consecrated Bread, retaining its substance, is the Body of Christ, that is, not losing anything which it was, but assuming something which it was not.” [49] I would not wish to follow his precise formulation, the Church having taken great pains to correct his mistakes; instead I suggest that under my hypothesis the consecrated elements indeed become a new substance, just as a living man is not the same thing as his corpse.

To explain further, consider a house built of stone blocks and wooden beams. It may truly be said that the house is made of stone and wood, or that it is made from blocks and beams, but yet it is specifically a house. If the house be destroyed, as in an earthquake, we find it falls apart into blocks and beams, rather than into raw stone and unshapen wood; thus the perfect form of the house passes away, but the intermediate forms of the blocks and beams remain. Afterwards, the stone weathers and the wood rots, just as the bread and wine decay after the Presence of Christ has departed.

Or we may consider whether the Eucharist may be a kind of compound, partly in the sense that the house is made from blocks and beams, but also as the matter of an entity is compounded of elements. In *On Generation and Corruption* Aristotle wrote: “Since, however, some things are-potentially while others are-actually, the constituents combined in a compound can ‘be’ in a sense and yet ‘not-be’. The compound may be-actually other than the constituents from which it has resulted; nevertheless each of them may still be-potentially what it was before they were combined, and both of them may survive undestroyed. (For ... it is evident that the combining constituents not only coalesce, having formerly existed in separation, but also can again be separated out from the compound.) The constituents, therefore, neither (a) persist actually, as ‘body’ and ‘white’ persist: nor (b) are they destroyed (either one of them or both), for their ‘power of action’ is preserved.” [209]

Likewise, in *De Mixtione Elementorum* S. Thomas proposed:

**Sicut igitur extrema inveniuntur in medio, quod participat naturam utriusque, sic qualitates simplicium corporum inveniuntur in propria qualitate corporis mixti. Qualitas autem simplicis corporis est quidem aliud a forma substantiali ipsius, agit tamen in virtute formae substantialis, alioquin calor calefaceret tantum, non autem per eius actionem forma substantialis educeretur in actum; cum nihil agat ultra suam speciem. Sic igitur virtutes formarum substantialium simplicium corporum in corporibus mixtis salvantur. Sunt igitur formae elementorum in corporibus mixtis non quidem actu, sed virtute: [198]**

Therefore just as the extremes are discovered in the middle point, which partakes of the nature of both, so the qualities of the simple bodies are found in the particular quality of the compound body. Nevertheless, the quality of a simple body is certainly a different thing from its substantial form, yet it acts in virtue of the substantial form, otherwise heat would [always] heat to a certain degree, on the contrary it would not be brought into act through the action of its substantial form; since nothing acts outside its species. Therefore in this manner the virtues of the substantial forms of the simple bodies are preserved in compound bodies. So the forms of the elements exist in compound bodies, not indeed in act, but in virtue.

That is to say, in a compound the elements persist *in virtute*, inasmuch as their properties are present in the compound to a greater or lesser degree, but their substantial forms do not remain; the extent to which the elemental qualities are exhibited is determined by the substantial form of the compound, for the actions of a substance are determined by its species rather than by its component elements. When compounded the elements undergo a real substantial change, such that their original substance is not actually, but only virtually, present in the compound. Nevertheless, certain powers of the compound correspond to its elements: thus, an animal is

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209 Aristotle, ‘On Generation and Corruption’, Book I Part 10, (c. 350BC); translated by H. H. Joachim.

warm because fire is one of its elements, but fire is not said to exist within the animal, because the element is not present substantially.

Thus, the Sacramental Elements are observed to have the actions proper to their original substance: for example, they nourish, as the *Angelicus Doctor* affirmed [104]; yet they also have actions proper to Christ's power: "since Christ and His Passion are the cause of grace, and since spiritual refreshment and charity cannot be without grace, it is clear from all that has been set forth that this sacrament bestows grace." [210] And these actions are proper to his Logos rather than to his body, for his body is that of a man, which has no such actions: wherefore I infer that it imports little whether the matter of the species be converted into that of Christ's body as it is in heaven, for matter of whatever kind is potentiality and not act.

Now it must be understood that, by the *communicatio idiomatum*, there is in Christ one person with two natures, humanity and Divinity: the Word is his divine nature, while his body and soul belong to his human nature. The properties of his two natures must be predicated of his one person, since they have only one subject of predication, but they are different terms: wherefore it is false to state that, because Christ did not die according to his divine nature, therefore Christ did not die. Thus it was that the Word assumed a human body and soul, which were created entire in the womb of the Blessed Virgin Mary, *et Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis* [211], the two natures being united as parts comprising the whole, which was nevertheless the same one person. For, as stated by the Council of Chalcedon and recapitulated by the Second Council of Constantinople: "of the divine and human nature there was made an hypostatic union, whereof is one Christ; but ... we do not mean to say that there was made a mutual confusion of natures, but rather each [nature] remaining what it was, we understand that the Word was united to the flesh. Wherefore there is one Christ, both God and man, consubstantial with the Father as touching his Godhead, and consubstantial with us as touching his manhood." [212]

So, just as Christ's Person, comprising his human body and soul, was assumed by the Word, whereby the two natures were permanently united, I hypothesize that the risen Christ may assume the substance of the bread and wine to form a new being in which the natures are united temporarily. And to show that in this compound of the God-Man and the Sacramental Elements a substance is generated which is nonetheless the true Christ, I propose an analogy with the hypostatic union, described in the words of S. Thomas thusly: "every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created." [213] Just so, were Christ united with the bread, the resulting substance would no longer be bread, for that suppositum would be changed, yet in no way would Christ himself be altered, wherefore it could verily be said "that, in the sacrament of the most holy Eucharist, are contained truly, really, and substantially ... the whole Christ" in accordance with the pronouncement of the Council of Trent [6].

Finally, I shall set forth certain quotations that might be said to support this hypothesis, although it must be stated that there are many other passages which would deny it.

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210 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Part III, Q. 79, Article 1, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

211 John 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us."

212 The Fifth Ecumenical Council: The Second Council of Constantinople, Capitulum VIII, (553); translator unknown. Compare the Fourth Ecumenical Council: the Council of Chalcedon, 'The Definition of Faith of the Council of Chalcedon', (451).

213 Saint Thomas Aquinas, 'Summa Theologica', Part III, Q. 2, Article 7, (1266-1273); translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

As noted in Chapter VI, S. Irenaeus wrote: “the bread, which is produced from the earth, when it receives the invocation of God, is no longer common bread, but the Eucharist, consisting of two realities, earthly and heavenly;” [41] which two realities are perhaps the earthly bread and the heavenly Logos. Against this, it could be said that the ‘earthly reality’ refers to the species, which remain after the substance has been converted.

In *De Fide Orthodoxa* S. John Damascene expounded: “coal is not plain wood but wood united with fire: in like manner also the bread of the communion is not plain bread but bread united with divinity. But a body which is united with divinity is not one nature, but has one nature belonging to the body and another belonging to the divinity that is united to it, so that the compound is not one nature but two.” [88] And this brings to mind the explanation above of how two natures can exist in one substance.

In his *Catechetical Lectures* S. Cyril recorded: “Moreover, the things which are hung up at idol festivals, either meat or bread, or other such things polluted by the invocation of the unclean spirits, are reckoned in the pomp of the devil. For as the Bread and Wine of the Eucharist before the invocation of the Holy and Adorable Trinity were simple bread and wine, while after the invocation the Bread becomes the Body of Christ, and the Wine the Blood of Christ, so in like manner such meats belonging to the pomp of Satan, though in their own nature simple, become profane by the invocation of the evil spirit.” [214] But if the bread and wine of the Eucharist are transubstantiated by the divine power, then the phrase ‘in like manner’ implies the profane meats must similarly be converted into the flesh of the Devil. Now this is surely false, for it is scarcely credible that S. Cyril should attribute such power to Satan; rather it seems more fitting to suggest that the Devil could send an unclean spirit to dwell in the polluted substance, in mockery of the Lord’s Supper.

In conclusion, I have discussed the nature of corruption and the difficulties concerning the decay of the Sacramental Elements, and have set forth a hypothesis to resolve them, which perhaps is not directly contrary to Scripture, and may possibly avoid the heresy for which Berengarius and others were rebuked. Nevertheless I adjure the reader not to regard these my hypotheses as truth, for fear of falling into error.

## Declaration

I, Ifor of Gwent, ordained monk of the Religious Household of Barwell-in-the-Fens, affirm that this is my own work, save those divers passages which are extracts from source texts. And if it be thought that I have employed quotation overmuch, where instead I might have used paraphrasis, I should answer that the words would thereby lose their authority, for who would not rather trust what those famous authors actually wrote, than what I – a humble monk – might say they wrote.

As S. Augustine indicated: “if such men take what has been written with wisdom and eloquence by others ... they cannot be blamed, supposing them to do it without deception.” [215]

Thus I present my discourse, without seeking to promulgate any heresy or false teaching, but ever mindful of how imperfect is my understanding, *ut video per speculum in enigmate*; and if aught I have set forth be false and contrary to the infallible magisterium of the Church, I pray that I be not condemned for it, but that my errors may be corrected, *in nomine Domini nostri Iesu Christi, Amen*.

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214 Saint Cyril of Jerusalem, ‘Catecheses’, Lecture XIX, (347 or 348); translated by Edwin Hamilton Gifford.

215 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘De Doctrina Christiana’, Book IV, Ch. 29, (426); translated by Rev. Prof. J. F. Shaw.

## Notes

Biblical quotations are taken from the Vulgate (Latin) and King James Version (English). I have compared the King James Version with the Vulgate and have made some amendments where the former appears faulty: modified text is indicated in italics.

I have followed the example of the King James Version and Ælfric's translator in not capitalising pronouns referring to the Divinity: for example, "his" instead of "His". However, I have generally left capitalisation unchanged within quotations.

I have provided references in footnotes, locating as accurately as practicable my sources. Further information about the sources is given in the Bibliography below. References are written in full in each footnote, rather than using abbreviations (eg "Ibid."), as their ordering could have become scrambled during the editing of this work.

Where I have included brief quotes in the text, I have omitted a reference and translation where these have already been provided in a source text quotation. Longer quotations I have supplied as an English translation. Extracts from Ælfric and principal evidential passages, such as Biblical quotes, are provided in a second language also; and where I have translated a source myself, I have included the original text so the reader may check the correctness of my rendition.

On occasion I have referred to certain eminent authors by their honorific 'surnames' or epithets. Thus, S. Thomas Aquinas is the Angelic Doctor (*Angelicus Doctor*), and John Duns Scotus is the Subtle Doctor (*Doctor Subtilis*). Likewise, Aristotle is also known as the Philosopher.

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### *Supplementary Material*

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