Essay Thirteen Part One
Lenin And The Disappearing Definition Of Matter
Readers need to make note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
Indeed, much of this particular Essay still exits only in note form; what you see here are those parts I deem fit to publish. At a later stage, when other Essays have been published, I will re-post this Essay with these notes written up for publication.
If you are viewing this with Mozilla Firefox you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used.
The aim of this Essay is to examine in greater detail the responses that Lenin (and to a lesser extent other comrades) have made to the problem of the nature of matter. In addition, several other issues arising from Lenin's much-maligned book (MEC) will also be tackled.
[MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism; i.e., Lenin (1972).]
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections:
(a) Lenin And 'Vanishing' Matter
(a) Is Matter Dependent On Mind?
(b) Hasty Repairs
(3) Some Things Are Not Material
(a) Externalism And Its Discontents
(b) Colour
(c) Other Contentious Examples
(a) At Last -- Lenin Constructs An Argument!
(b) Bluster Central
(c) Image Conscious
(d) Shock -- Lenin Believes In Santa Claus!
(e) Images Fail To Make The Grade
(5) 'Objectivity'
(a) WTF Is It?
(b) 'Subjective' No Less Defective
(d) Lenin, Objectivity And Existence
(6) What Exactly Is Dialectical Materialism?
(b) Is Matter Just An Abstraction?
(c) Cherry Picking
(d) Prevarication -- One Thing Dialecticians Do Well
(e) Lenin 'Advances' By Going Backwards
(7) Notes
(8) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
In MEC, Lenin attempted to confront and then refute contemporary physical theories that appeared to question the reality of matter. Time and again, he asserted things like the following:
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin (1972), p.311.]
"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Ibid., p.312.]
"[I]t is the sole categorical, this sole unconditional recognition of nature’s existence outside the mind and perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist agnosticism and idealism." [Ibid., p.314.]
"The fundamental characteristic of materialism is that it starts from the objectivity of science, from the recognition of objective reality reflected by science." [Ibid., pp.354-55.]1
Lenin insisted on maintaining this view in the face of the revolutionary new concepts that were being introduced into the Physics of his day, which seemed to indicate that matter did not exist -- at least not as it had previously been understood. Lenin was fully aware of these changes; however he argued that those who think this refutes materialism ignore:
"…[the] basis of philosophical materialism and the distinction between metaphysical materialism and dialectical materialism. The recognition of immutable elements…and so forth, is not materialism, but metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, materialism…. Dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another." [Ibid., p.312.]
Again, about those who claimed that these new developments made the idea of matter redundant he had this to say:
"[T]he expression 'matter disappears', 'matter is reduced to electricity', etc., is only an epistemologically helpless expression of the truth that science is able to discover new forms of matter, new forms of material motion, to reduce the old forms to the new forms, and so on." [Ibid., p.378.]
In addition, Lenin would have nothing to do with the idea that matter was just energy:
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place outside the mind, independently of man…or are these only ideas?… Energeticist physics is a source of new idealist attempts to conceive motion without matter." [Ibid., pp.324, 328.]
In these passages, Lenin's views were consistent with those he expressed elsewhere (even if his ideas developed considerably over the next ten to fifteen years). It is also worth noting that Lenin clearly saw no problem with running together epistemological and ontological issues, just as it is equally obvious that he failed to appreciate the extent to which this undermined his entire view of the world, destroying several core DM-ideas along the way.2
[Why that is so will form one of the main topics of this Essay.]
In fact, despite repeated protestations to the contrary, what Lenin wrote in MEC amounted to the abandonment of belief in anything recognizably material. Small wonder then that he went on to take detailed philosophical advice from that notorious Idealist, Hegel.
As any reader of MEC can easily confirm, Lenin did not actually say what he thought matter was; indeed he refused to do so.4 In common with other DM-theorists, he confined his comments about the nature of matter to a few vague statements, ones which fatally compromised its ontological status, and thus the status of DM as a materialist theory.
Turning to what Lenin did say, he appeared to believe that it was a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be material that it should exist "outside the mind" as an "objective reality". Remarkably, apart from a few statements about matter and physical reality, that is all he had to say about this core DM-concept! While he pointedly brushed aside familiar, traditional definitions of matter -- i.e., its impenetrability, composition, inertia, location in space and time, causal interaction, extension, etc. (cf., p.311) --, he continually referred to it as that which exists as an "objective" reality "external" to, and "independent" of human consciousness.
As already noted, he clearly considered this criterion to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for something to count as material. This can be seen from the way he posed the following question:
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question is energy material? Does the transformation take place outside the mind…?" [Ibid., p.324.]
Presumably, the background reasoning here was the following:
L1: Any transformation that takes place (objectively) outside the mind is material.
L2: This particular transformation takes place (objectively) outside the mind.
L3: Therefore it is material.
Hence, any affirmative answers to the following questions:
"...does matter move? into the question is energy material? Does the transformation take place outside the mind…?" [Ibid., p.324.]
would provide sufficient grounds for the conclusion to follow (i.e., L3). If Lenin's criterion had merely been necessary, his question would have been pointless, since the conclusion (L3) would not have followed (this is because a necessary condition on its own is not sufficient).
Moreover, if Lenin's strictures had merely been sufficient (but not necessary), they would not have ruled out the possibility that material and mental entities/processes were coterminous. Indeed, if it was not essential (i.e., necessary) that material processes take place extra-mentally, his criterion would have been useless.
Hence, Lenin's criterion was both necessary and sufficient. I propose to call this requirement (when augmented with additional DM-theses outlined below), "Externalism".
Externalism appears to be committed to one or more of the following theses:
T1: There exists a world that is both external to and independent of the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T3: The world is composed of objects, processes, relations and events in continual change.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
T5: Scientific knowledge of the world (coupled with practice) is our most reliable guide to its nature and laws.
T6: Our knowledge of the world is continually changing as our understanding grows and develops.
T7: There are no a priori limits to what we can know about the world, and our knowledge is subject to continual revision.
T8: Knowledge is historically-conditioned, but is not reducible to such conditioning (otherwise T1 and T2 would be compromised).5
Earlier on (in Essay Three Parts One to Six), the tensions that exist between this view of the world and those aspects of DM-epistemology that underpin it were examined in detail. It was argued there that DM-theses -- like those above --, when coupled with DM-epistemology, collapse into Idealism.
Notwithstanding that, it might be possible to challenge this conclusion if, say, theses T1 and T2 above were in fact correct, and could be shown to be correct.
Despite this, there are serious problems with all of the above theses -- not least with T1, T2 and T4:
T1: There exists a world that is both external to and independent of the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
If certain parts of nature are independent of each other (as T1 and T2 assert) then not all of reality is interconnected, contrary to T4. T1 and T2 claim that while matter is not dependent on mind, mind is dependent on matter. In that case, clearly, matter and mind cannot be interdependent. Although they might be connected, they cannot be interconnected (in this sense).
Even if we grant for the present that the human mind is dependent on all the matter in the universe (i.e., on the "Totality", full-blown -- if, that is, the universe is the "Totality"; on that, see here), it is a pretty safe bet that no 'Materialist Dialectician' would want to argue that the converse is true: that all matter in the universe is dependent on mind. Naturally, that idea would not have bothered Hegel too much, but DM-theorists themselves can only accept it as true if they are prepared to abandon materialism.
Nevertheless, it is surely an empirical matter whether or not any of the above conditions obtain (including the alleged fact that certain parts of reality are dependent on each other). Or rather, it is to those who say they do not want to impose DM on nature, as dialecticians constantly claim.
Despite this, we have seen that DM-theorists appear to regard T4 as an a priori truth of some sort, since they believe that everything in reality is interconnected, and they do this in advance of an adequate body of supporting evidence to that effect. In that case, and to be consistent, they should perhaps acknowledge that their belief in universal interconnectedness commits them to the equally a priori view that every atom in the universe does in fact depend on the human mind. Either that, or they should jettison the idea that everything in reality is interconnected.
Well, perhaps this is too hasty. Maybe the above difficulty has been created by the emphasis DM-theorists place on the unity of knowledge and the identity (in difference) of knowledge and 'Being'. Admittedly, these ideas are often qualified with the extra claim that this identity does not deny the primacy of matter over mind, nor does it imply that knowledge is not relative and approximate. Indeed, or so the idea goes, the 'knower' and the 'known' are not the same; they are merely dialectically inter-related.6
Could this help solve the problem raised above and show how mind can be dependent on matter, but not the other way round?
Unfortunately, even if all of this is either relevant or true, the status of T1 and T2 would still fatally compromise T4. This is because if T1 and T2 were true, it would mean that while our knowledge of nature (at least) was in fact dependent on the physical universe (mediated perhaps by social development and practice, etc.), the opposite would not be the case -- the world as a whole is not dependent on our knowledge of it. Plainly, that would imply that there is something in existence (i.e., the 'content' of our minds) which, while it is connected with, it is not interconnected with the rest of the universe. In that case, the alleged link would be one-way, not two-way, undermining T4.
T1: There exists a world that is both external to and independent of the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
On this view then, even if human activity had a (limited and local) affect on nature, this would still mean most of the universe was unaffected by what is known about it, or with what humanity is capable of thinking and of manipulating in practice. Hence, given this slant on DM, the configuration of matter inside our heads -- which is supposedly responsible for our 'consciousness' of the world --, might very well be causally linked to nature in one direction, it would not be back-related, as it were, to most of the universe.6a
There would thus be a connection here, but not an interconnection.
The introduction of practice into the picture at this point would not diminish the difficulties the above comments present: most of the world is too far away for human beings to affect it in any way. So, while distant parts of the universe might influence our knowledge of them and our practical affairs, the human mind has no back-effect on the vast bulk of nature on the return journey, as it were. And, even if a 'sort of link' could be shown to exist (in that it involves human 'consciousness' to arrive at such conclusions), remote parts of nature would clearly not be dependent on our mental activity. In short, most of reality, past, present and future is unaffected by, or is not dependent on, our thoughts about it.
Now, that is sufficient to remove the "inter" from "inter-related", fragmenting the Totality by making T4 false.7
Some might be tempted to think this is no big deal, and that the DM-Totality is unaffected by such quibbles. However, as we will see, this fall-back excuse merely postpones the evil day.
[Of course, the DM-Totality faces far more serious problems than these; on that, see Essay Eleven Parts One and Two.]
One way to avoid this untoward conclusion would be to re-write T4 in the following manner:
T4a: Some elements of reality are independent of each other; others are interconnected.8
However, given the size and longevity of the universe, that just means that T4a needs to be replaced with this far more honest alternative:
T4b: Some elements of reality are independent of each other; some are not interconnected with most of the rest of the universe.
Indeed, since the present is entirely ephemeral (while the past is either finite and extensive, or infinite) most events are, or have taken place, in the past, not the present. Now, unless we subscribe to the view that past events are influenced by present events (i.e., unless we were to admit that the latter are not just connected, but are interconnected with events in the present) --, T4b must be correct. But, T4b completely undermines T4, turning an important DM-thesis into a rather bland statement -- one over which few would want to get their metaphysical knickers in a twist.9
On the other hand, if T4 is still accepted as true (and if T4b is rejected), a potentially fatal flaw will emerge right at the heart of DM-epistemology. That is because this would imply that all of reality (past, present (and future?)) depends on our knowledge of it --, since T4 declares that everything is interconnected within the "Totality".
The only way this Idealist conclusion can be avoided, it would seem, is if T4 is replaced with T4b. Unfortunately, as already noted, such a theoretical retreat would turn this DM-thesis (T4) into an uninteresting platitude (T4b).
Now, T1 and T2 emphasise the fact that the link between the world and our knowledge of it -- or that between the human mind and reality -- is (largely) unidirectional. But, that is precisely what sinks T4. Hence, it looks like the only way to rescue these core DM theses (i.e., T1 and T2) is to abandon T4 altogether and replace it with the rather innocuous T4b.10
On the other hand, if T4 is still held true, that would imply that matter is dependent on mind.
Clearly, while it might seem appealing to try to avoid this Idealist impasse by abandoning T4 along the lines suggested above, the thesis that the "Totality" conditions everything by means of universal interrelationships would collapse as a result. Along with this would go the doctrine that the entire nature of the part is determined by its relation to the whole, and thus that "truth is the whole". Hence, if some parts of the Totality are not interconnected, then their natures cannot be determined either by the whole or by each and every other part. As seems obvious, if one small hole is drilled into this Whole, it would soon make a colander look rather leak-proof in comparison.10a
Alternatively, we could acknowledge the implicit Idealism in DM and admit that the world (including the past) is in fact conditioned by our knowledge of it, and that matter depends on mind --, holding on to T4 but abandoning T1 and T2.
This would at least have the advantage of bringing the DM-closet Idealists out, loud and proud, into the open.11
Externalism And Its Discontents
Ignoring the above problems for the present, and returning to Lenin's thoughts, he certainly regarded 'externality' as a criterion that distinguished rival Idealist theories from DM. This is obvious from the way he repeatedly castigated any opponent who denied, half-denied, or only half-heartedly accepted this condition.12
However, this raises another awkward question: if 'externality' is Lenin's sole criterion for materiality -- and a necessary and sufficient condition, at that --, what are we to say of the many non-material things there are that seem to possess 'externality', too? What about colours, smells, tastes, sounds, shapes, shadows, holes, surfaces, 'empty' space, relations, the Centre of Mass of the Galaxy (henceforth, the CMG), averages (such as the average lager drinker), the past, the present and the future?
Now, some readers might consider most (if not all) of the above items highly contentious. For example, it could be pointed out that colours are certainly material. However, that would be a mistake. Colour perception may have causal/material concomitants, but colours cannot be material. This is because if they were, it would make sense to ask of what they are composed. Of course, colour is not made out of anything not already coloured, and it has no constituent parts (which aren't already coloured). So such a question would have no answer that wasn't viciously circular (i.e., it would be a bit like saying matter is made of matter).13
Again, it could be objected that colour is actually made out of photons of different energies, or of light of different wavelengths. However, this response simply confuses the causal agent responsible for our colour perception with colour itself.
Once more, it might be objected that colour is caused by the interplay between light rays and the microstructure of atoms, or that colour is a dispositional property of material objects/perceivers. Whether these claims are true (or not) will not be entered into here; but, once again, these responses confuse the causal agents responsible for colour perception with colour itself.14
At this point, some might claim that colours are 'mental' phenomena and exist only in conscious minds, not in the external world. But, this too is an ancient mistake. Colours do not exist merely in the mind since (plainly!) they exist in the outside world; any theory that located colours exclusively in the minds of perceivers would clearly have misidentified them. So, when, for instance, a scientist describes Copper Sulphate as blue, she is referring neither to the contents nor to the state of her mind/central nervous system. Anyone who thought otherwise would simply display a serious incapacity with language.15
Of course, Lenin would have been the first to point out that scientific materialism must incorporate into its view of the world all the properties of matter that scientists determine for it, including colour. But, this policy of waiting for scientists to tell us what reality contains is not without its problems (as we have already seen in Essay Eleven Part One).
Hence, if scientists tell us that matter is little more than a convenient shorthand for the effect of scalar and vector fields (or Superstrings -- or anything else, for that matter) on measuring instruments, or on perceivers, it might well be wondered what there is left of the material world that could possibly act as the bearer of any properties at all. Indeed, given such an austere view of the world -- which pictures it as nothing more than a complex array of vectors, tensors, scalars, geodesics, differential equations, and the like --, the relationship between 'nature' and the 'mind' would amount to nothing more than a set of complex 'interactions' between one set of scalar/vector/tensor fields (i.e., "the world") and another (the "brain/mind"). Not only would matter more than appear to disappear (on this account), so would perceptions, thoughts and properties. In that case, both matter and 'mind' would seem to vanish; the entire universe would thus become sets of…, well, what?16
To be sure, the serious problems DM-theorists face began much earlier than this; by contracting-out to scientists the right to tell us what matter is, or what the world contains, Lenin and other DM-theorists should feign no surprise when everything disintegrates in front of them, and the Idealism implicit in every aspect of class society (including that which influences certain areas of modern science) forces itself upon us.17
Nevertheless, we all already know what, say, colour is (or, at least, competent speakers of the language already know) -- we learnt what it is when we were taught how to speak about it and how to interact with coloured objects. In fact, we must already understand what colour terms mean if we are to be informed by scientists what its physical concomitants and properties are. We certainly could not be educated about the physical nature of colour if no one understood what "colour" meant.
This non-negotiable logical constraint applies with equal force to scientists themselves; they too must grasp what these ordinary terms mean (and they must do so just as the rest of us do) if they are to study the physical properties of the correct phenomenon successfully. Scientists can only undermine the ordinary use of the word "colour" (if that is what they do) at the cost of making all they say about 'it' entirely vacuous. If colour is not what we/they suppose it to be when we/they use ordinary language, then we/they would lose the solid ground upon which we/they sought to build a scientific explanation of 'it'.18
This means that while we may not disagree with the claim that colour is a property of material objects, we may only refrain from doing so if we acknowledge that that's not all that it is. And this "all" cannot be accommodated to any theory without recourse to the ordinary language of colour. And, this has nothing to do with Lenin's "externalism", since, plainly, our perception of colour is not independent of the existence of sensate life -- in this case, our own.19
Of course, it could be objected that the nature of colour is a scientific not a linguistic issue --, but this would be equally misguided. As we saw earlier (in relation to the word "change"), it is not up to scientists, Philosophers or dialecticians to tell us what our colour words mean. Any endeavour to do so would undermine the language used in that very attempt.20
Again, it could be objected that this is not something that can be settled (or, indeed, brushed aside) by an appeal to the ordinary meaning of words. This is a scientific and/or philosophical issue.
However, scientists, Philosophers and/or dialecticians will have to use language in order to tell us what they take colour to be (i.e., if they are to address the right subject), and, plainly, in order to make a start they will have to begin with terms drawn from the vernacular (otherwise they would be addressing their comments at some other target, and not colour).
Now, it is precisely here that any attempt to revise (or even tinker with) the colour vocabulary we already have will back-fire. Since the details underlying this observation have been worked-out in detail elsewhere, and since further discussion will take us too far away from the main theme of this Essay, I will leave the reader to re-familiarise herself with that discussion (in the course of which, she will also have to replace the word "change" with the colour terminology of her choice).
Naturally, this is a contentious topic, and not one around which I want this Essay to revolve. So, let us consider some of the other items mentioned above. Lenin's criteria would have holes and shadows, for instance, categorised as 'material' -- but they are in no way material.
Not, that is, unless the word "material" is re-defined to make them so -- in which case this part of Lenin's theory would become true simply because of yet another piece of terminological tinkering, and this area of DM will have thus been imposed nature, not 'read from it'.21
And what is so material about the relations between bodies and/or processes? But such relations are external to the mind. In that case, given Lenin's criteria, the distance between you and the planet Jupiter, say, is material! And so is the fact that you are smaller than Jupiter (if you are).
Indeed, several of the other items in the above list of allegedly non-material entities appear to be equally if not more problematic than the nature of colour, relations, holes and shadows. What, for example, are we to make of the CMG? It is clearly not material (in fact it does not physically exist in any meaningful sense -- it occupies no volume interval in space), and yet it exercises a decisive causal influence on every particle in the Galaxy. But, the CMG is manifestly 'external to the mind', so it must be 'objective'. But is there anything actually in reality that 'corresponds' with it?
Should a hard-nosed supporter of Lenin be tempted to argue that the CMG is material just because it is external to the mind, then we would be owed an explanation as to how something could possibly be material which has no physical correlate (like the CMG). This, of course, would be accompanied by yet another annoying reminder that such a brave conclusion could only have been imposed on nature.22
Again, it could be objected that the CMG is surely a consequence of all the matter in the Galaxy. But, the CMG is actually part of a mathematical model that we use to explain motion. Nothing actually exists in the outside world that answers to 'it', and yet 'it' is certainly not located inside our skulls (any more than the Prime Meridian is).
Moreover, the CMG cannot be a property of matter since it does not exist in the same way that material bodies do (it does not share any of the features of the properties of tables and chairs, atoms and galaxies, for example). In fact, the claim that the CMG is a property of all the matter in the Galaxy is about as accurate as the idea that the average lager drinker is a property of all lager drinkers. Of course, in this case, if 'he/she' -- i.e., the average lager drinker -- were a property, 'he/she' could not then be a 'he' or a 'she', and hence not be an average person to begin with.23
It is becoming obvious that Lenin's "externality" thesis permits (or could permit) the existence of several non-material things -- such as lines of force, mirages, optical illusions, the perspectival properties of bodies, vectors, tensors, scalars, co-ordinate systems, and so on -- all the while ruling out-of-court other seemingly material things (like, 'the mind' itself).24 In addition, the past, present and future seem to pose problems for Lenin in that these appear to possess "externality", but neither is obviously material -- nor are they the consequence of the properties of material objects.25
Worse still, empty space does not appear to be material, either.26 In fact, Lenin himself believed in the existence of the Ether:
"That is why Engels gave the example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised mechanical materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is, from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, ether and so on exist as objective realities outside the human mind or not? The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and they do invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Lenin (1972), p.312. Bold emphases added.]27
And, Lenin was still referring to the Ether several years later in PN! [Cf., Lenin (1961), p.250.]
Unfortunately, the Ether does not exist, and never did -- even though Lenin here describes it as an "objective" feature of reality simply because it passed his "externality" test. Unfortunately, if the existence of the Ether had ever been "objective", that would suggest that something could be "objective" even though it did not exist, and never did. This would in turn mean that although there is nothing in reality answering to it, the Ether, say, would nonetheless be material. "Objectivity" would, of course, then become synonymous with "completely fictional in some cases". Naturally, that would totally undermine Lenin's already shaky attempt to refute the ideas of the other fictionalists and Idealists he was criticising in MEC.
As we saw earlier, Lenin seriously over-used the word "objective"; if the latter term now allows for the 'objectivity' of fictional entities, it would make Lenin's arguments about as convincing as Tony Blair's case for war against Iraq.28
At any rate, and despite what he thought, Lenin's 'imaginability'/'image-ability' criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to count as 'objective'. This is because, as we have seen, there are countless things that exist outside the mind that are not 'objective' in any clear sense of that word (e.g., mirages, the perspectival properties of bodies, surfaces, rainbows, corners, the images in actual mirrors -- as well as averaged entities, like the average worker), and there are 'objective' things that are not external to the mind (for example, the human mind itself) -- just as there are 'objective' material entities that are dependent on the human mind, and which are constituted in and by social activity (such as money, theatre tickets and revolutionary newspapers).
And, as if to complicate matters further, there are non-existent things (such as the Ether), that Lenin imagined were "objective".
Indeed, what are we to make of the Ether? Was Lenin (or, has anyone ever been) able to form an image of it? If he (they) could, then according to the above passage it must exist. On the other hand, if he (they) couldn't form an image of it, why did Lenin think that it existed and was 'objective'?
More to the point, does the ability to form an image really matter? Who can form an image of four dimensional Spacetime? Or of a black hole? Or of a Superstring? Or of the CMG?
In fact, if imaginability/imagability implied existence, science would be pointless; in such an eventuality we would surely rely on Hans Christian Andersen and Enid Blyton to inform us of the contents of reality, and abandon scientific research.
As is well-known, scientists were forced to conclude that the Ether does not exist, even though had it done so it would have satisfied Lenin's criterion of 'externality' (and it would have been 'objective' in that it would have existed independently of the mind). Annoyingly, some scientists still believe it exists.29
Nevertheless, whatever else might be true of Lenin's thoughts about material existence, it looks like scientists themselves require there be more to something than the mere possibility of its external existence (and/or its imaginability/imagability) for it to be objective.
Unfortunately, Lenin himself failed to inform his readers exactly why his 'criterion' should be adopted as a definition of materiality (that is, if it was a definition; see Note 4) -- he just left it as a bald assertion that anything outside the mind must be material -- even when this clearly isn't a condition that only material objects satisfy. For Lenin, it seems that just because something is not inside the mind it must be material, otherwise it cannot be. On that basis, as noted above, that would mean that the mind itself is neither 'objective' nor material. Lenin's criterion, therefore, appears to commit him to the existence of a non-material mind, since it plainly cannot exist outside itself.
Paradoxically, therefore, it looks like Lenin's materialism is committed to the existence of non-material/immaterial minds!
If Lenin's 'criterion' is now watered-down, so as to allow the mind some sort of 'objective' existence (as part of the activity of the brain, or an "emergent" property matter, perhaps), then clearly 'externality' will have to be abandoned -- otherwise, there would be no point to Lenin's question (quoted earlier):
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place outside the mind, independently of man…or are these only ideas?...." [Ibid., p.324. Bold emphasis added.]
As we have seen, this passage indicates that material objectivity is definitionally connected to externality in Lenin's own mind (i.e., as a necessary and sufficient condition).
However, and even worse, this quotation seems to imply that the mind uses no energy, that it has no 'objective' existence, or that it does not move. But, plainly, any particular mind is 'external' to all other minds, which must mean that while every other mind is 'objective' in relation to any given mind (being external to each), it is not 'objective' with respect to itself, since it is not external to itself. Hence, when generalised, this indicates that for Lenin all minds must be both 'objective' and non-objective all at once, depending on from where they are viewed. And that seems to imply that from certain viewpoints, the mind does not use energy -- while from others it does --, if from some directions it is material, but from others it isn't!
It might be thought that the above difficulties could be avoided if all minds were lumped together and classified as non-objective (or non-material), as a sort of job lot. But, in that case, as a group mind, the human mind plainly would not be external to itself -- if Lenin's 'criterion' is applied literally. This brave conclusion would then mean that this 'collective mind' would not be 'objective', and psychologists, for example, should abandon their claim to study 'objective' features of reality embodied in the skulls of their subjects (now "clients"). If all human minds are 'non-objective', then it seems that their study cannot fail be tarred with the same 'subjectivist' brush; psychology would thus cease to be an 'objective' science -- or, at the very least, its concerns could only ever be 'subjective'.30
Far worse still, Lenin's thoughts about externalism, which existed inside his own mind, can't have been 'objective', either, by his own 'definition' (since they could not exist outside themselves), and neither could any other DM-thought (about anything whatsoever) be "objective". In fact, given Lenin's 'definition', in the entire history of Dialectical Marxism, not one of its theorists has ever (or could ever have) had an 'objective' thought.
And if Lenin is right about this, he would be non-objectively right -- which blessed mental state might be of interest to his biographers, but would be of no concern to 'objective' science (or to the rest of us) -- since his 'rightness' would, of course, be 'subjective' by its own 'definition', in that he thought it all.
Moreover, as soon as such thoughts entered the world as materially spoken or written tokens (etc.), they would plainly become "external" to the mind, and would therefore become 'objective' (given Lenin's 'definition').
Unfortunately, that means that while DM-thoughts cannot be, DM-sentences (etc.), when spoken or written, can be and are 'objective' -- including the false ones. Indeed, false sentences are just as external to the mind as those that are true. Furthermore, and by the same token, the negation of any and all DM-theses (when written down or spoken) must be 'objective', too!
This in turn means that just as soon as anyone reads or hears these formerly 'objective' sentences (etc.), they would become non-objective again, since they would now be part of the content of someone's mind (and hence no longer "external" to any such). But, that would mean that no one could read, interpret or regard a single DM-thesis as 'objective' unless they succeeded in keeping it 'out of their minds'. [This might be one contradiction that not even dialecticians will want to "grasp".] Hence, if anyone were to conclude that such an 'external' sentence was 'objective', they could only do so by means of a 'non-objective' thought to that effect -- or by not thinking it! In that case, they could conclude nothing about the meaning of any physical embodiment of a DM-sentence without compromising its 'objectivity' -- that is, as Lenin conceived things.
At this point, it would surely tax the patience of any reader who has made it this far if the above 'objective' sentences -- in that what they say is 'objective' just in case they are not read or understood by anyone -- were dwelt upon any further. However, odd as it might seem, the content of the above words will be 'objective' only for those who have not made it this far, who never read them, or did not understand them -- if Lenin is to be believed. And the same goes for anything written in MEC and other DM-works; their content is 'objective' only if no one, including the original author, ever reads it.
It is perhaps unnecessary to underline the confusion that would be introduced into epistemology if Lenin's non-objective thoughts about 'objectivity' were ever taken seriously. Fortunately, only those already "suffering from dialectics" (to quote Max Eastman) seem foolish enough to do so.
However, Lenin's 'criterion' faces even more serious problems than those outlined above.
Despite the above damaging conclusions, Lenin had other things to say about our knowledge of reality (as part of one of the few detectable arguments in the entire book!):
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imagined, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Ibid., p.69. Bold emphasis added.]
And this is even clearer:
"The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Ibid., p.279. Bold emphasis added.]
Both of these appear to commit Lenin to the idea that if it is possible to form an "image" of something it must exist, since "an image cannot exist without the thing imagined, and the latter must exist independently of that which imagines it", and an "image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images'.
Unfortunately, once more, Lenin forgot to say how he knew this to be the case.
In Lenin's defence, it could be argued that this fact (if fact it be) is tautological: "an image cannot exist without the thing imagined" -- if by this Lenin meant that "the thing imagined" exists in the mind of the one doing the imagining/imaging. In that case, Lenin would be pointing out the obvious but uninspiring fact that if an image exists (in the mind of the one doing the imaging) then manifestly it exists in that mind.
But, it certainly isn't tautological that whatever is imagined "exists independently of that which imagines it", that is, in 'extra-mental reality'. It may or may not be true that such imagined things do exist 'outside the mind', but it certainly isn't the obvious truth that Lenin seems to think it is (that is, if we go along with this traditional/crass way of depicting things for the moment), and it certainly does not follow that images imply the independent existence of the objects we take them to reflect (if we do).
It could be argued that the word "image" implies that an image is an image of something, which is all Lenin needs. However, whether or not this word does in fact imply this we will leave to one side for now, but one thing it does not imply is the independent existence of whatever that image is an image of. If that were so, scientists could abandon research and engage in day-dreaming.
Plainly, just because Lenin imagined what he said to be true that did not make it true.
In fact, Lenin's claim is far from true; as will be demonstrated presently (here and here); there are many things which actually exist that we can imagine not to exist -- indeed, we can even form images of them being destroyed. Just as there are many things that we can imagine (or form images of) that do not and never have existed -- and which could not in fact exist.
As is well-known, one of Lenin's conclusions in MEC was that scientific knowledge is based on a reflection of the 'objective' world in the mind of observers/inter-actors, suitably revised over time. However, as is equally well-known, representative theories of perception and knowledge (like Lenin's) have in fact only encouraged the unhelpful suspicion that what humans take to be 'objective' features of the world are merely 'subjective' inner shadows, of dubious provenance. Either that, or they foster the idea that 'reality' itself is just the play of "impressions", "sensations", or "qualia", in the 'mind'. Indeed, it could be argued that Lenin's "externalism" itself invites such untoward thoughts (even though he declared himself an implacable enemy of such theories).
In the present case, this worry is not helped by the realisation that despite Lenin's confidence in them, practically every scientific theory ever constructed has been wrong -- in many cases wildly wrong. [This claim will be substantiated in a later Essay; in the meantime, see here.] In fact, in traditional Philosophy, considerations like these have always stood in the way of the formation of convincing epistemological theories of the world that are not backed up by a sufficiently robust ontology. [Lenin's attempt to prevent DM sliding into Phenomenalism will be examined below.]
In view of the fact that MEC has been -- and still is -- widely regarded by revolutionaries as the definitive response to Phenomenalism (etc.) -- if, that is, it is beefed up with material from PN --, the naïve reader would be forgiven for thinking that it contained a series of devastating arguments, which severally or collectively consign every other rival theory to the philosophical dustbin.
However, as it turns out, MEC is largely an argument-free zone. Having picked through the countless pages of bombast, repetition and bluster that fill most of MEC, I have been able to locate and identify only a handful of clearly recognisable philosophical arguments which Lenin tried to utilise in order to substantiate his claims and present some sort of credible challenge to Phenomenalism, etc. In place of a considered, critical response, as already noted, Lenin almost invariably resorted to invention, invective, ridicule and abuse. Elsewhere, he clearly thought it enough to quote DM-classicists (mostly Engels) as authorities in epistemology to settle issues where even his own wafer-thin arguments could be stretched no further. In other places, Lenin limited himself merely to asking rhetorical questions -- many of which he would have been well-advised to aim at his own account --, all the while repeating the "externalist" mantra as if it were a magic spell.
Now, for those already convinced on other grounds that MEC is first-rate polemic, this is all good fun. However, for those not so easily amused (or fooled), a more pressing question suggests itself: Why have generations revolutionaries been so easily taken in by hundred's of pages of Lenin's repetitious and ignorant bluster? By any standards, MEC is easily one of the worst books ever to have been written on epistemology --, certainly by a revolutionary.
Fortunately, there is more to the above attempted refutation of Lenin than impertinent allegation.
As noted earlier, one of the few recognisably philosophical arguments to be found in MEC (aimed at countering the views of Phenomenalists) is the following:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imagined, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Ibid., p.69. Bold emphasis added.]
"The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Ibid., p.279. Bold emphasis added.]
That's it! On the basis of this half-formed, quasi-argument Lenin hoped to counter philosophical theses some still regard as definitive (at least when set against the half-baked, naïve realism Lenin initially defends in the above book).
Before we examine whether Lenin's argument is successful in its own right, it is worth pointing out to the many dialecticians who question the deliverances of 'commonsense' (which I take to be the same as "naïve realism", referred to by Lenin), and who also regale us with the 'appearance/reality' distinction, that 'commonsense' cannot be called into question if it is to act as a basis for the Lenin's theory of knowledge.
[Those who think this an unfair criticism should read on before they finally make up their minds.]
Despite this, and given the other complexities that DM introduces, Lenin's alleged foundation stone soon starts to look much less substantial. According to DM-epistemology, knowledge depends on the completion of an infinite process (the precise nature of which still awaits clear exposition) before the very first thing can be known about a single item in the DM-"Totality" with anything other than infinite uncertainty.
We have already seen that this approach to knowledge means that nobody would be in a position to say what even a simple tumbler is before everything about everything is known.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the above picture is just another unfair caricature of dialectical epistemology. In response, it is worth emphasising that any objector who raises this point would similarly be in no position to assert it successfully -- unless and until we are given a clear account of DM-epistemology. After over 150 years, we are still waiting...
Even so, it is worth reflecting on the sort of response that, say, a Phenomenalist might make to Lenin's claim that his theory begins with "naïve" beliefs of ordinary folk, and builds from there. She might wonder what, for instance, the word "image" is doing in such mundane surroundings. Indeed, she might even suggest that if we were to ask the average man/woman about what he/she knows of the world, the word "image" would appear nowhere in the reply.
Hence, not only is the aforementioned dialectical meander through infinite epistemological space counter-productive (since it implies infinite ignorance of everything and anything), it begins in the wrong place! 'Commonsense' -- whatever it is -- neither starts nor ends with images. [To be sure, certain forms of phenomenalist psychology might, but 'commonsense' does not.]
It is worth pressing this point home: there is no evidence that the "naïve" beliefs of anyone -- not even those of DM-fans -- are based on imagery of any sort; but there is much to suggest that they are not. Hence, there is no evidence that either ordinary people or sophisticated socialists believe the following:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world…." [Lenin (1972), p.69.]
"The gist of his theoretical mistake in this case is substitution of eclecticism for the dialectical interplay of politics and economics (which we find in Marxism). His theoretical attitude is: 'on the one hand, and on the other', 'the one and the other'. That is eclecticism. Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces. I have shown this to be so on the example of politics and economics....
"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world....
"Formal logic, which is as far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring, and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing more.
"Dialectical logic demands that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full 'definition' of an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly, dialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel...." [Lenin (1921), p.90-93. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
In order to see this, consider the following example; suppose worker NN asserted the following:
L1: "That policeman hit me over the head with a truncheon."
Now, only a rather desperate defender of the Police would respond with:
L2: "You are mistaken. What you experienced was in fact only the image of a policeman clubbing you."
We can be reasonably sure that this worker does not need to wait for the 'asymptotic-train-of-knowledge' to hit the 'absolute-buffers-of-eternal-certainty' before he/she can claim to know what happened on the picket line when the Police attacked it. Indeed, such a worker would be right to feel angry if told that his/her knowledge of the uniformed assailant was only relative and partial. In fact, we can be quite certain now (without the presence of an accompanying image -- and even before the epistemological train leaves the dialectical sidings on its endless meander to nowhere in particular) that this worker knows he/she was hit on the head and who was responsible for it.
Indeed, this would be the line Socialist Worker, for example, would take if one of its correspondents witnessed Police violence -- in cases like the Police riot in Chicago in 1968, or that in Red Lion Square London in 1974, or in relation to the death of Blair Peach in Southall 1979, the Miners' Strike, the picketing at Wapping, the march against the Nazis at Welling, the Police riots in Trafalgar Square in 1990, those in Genoa in 2001 and 2003, or even those in New York and San Francisco in 2003, etc., etc. In fact, its readers would know precisely when they could stop trusting Socialist Worker: just as soon as it began reporting events in the way that Lenin characterised "objectivity", and if it ever started referring to the "images" in people's heads as evidence supporting claims made about Police violence, as opposed to the incidents themselves, or to video footage, witness reports and medical data (etc.) --, and if it was foolish enough to insist that every "mediacy" had to be taken into consideration before anyone could decide what had happened on the picket line or demonstration, and what to do about it.
Not surprisingly then, in the Miner's Strike (etc.) the actual incidents were reported in Socialist Worker; it wisely omitted all reference to "images", and to "partial" or "relative knowledge", let alone to any obvious "asymptotes", that might otherwise be of genuine interest only to sundry Idealists.
In practice, not even Socialist Worker begins with "images" (nor does it bang on about concepts converging on reality, to eternity) -- not even the very worst Union bureaucrat would come out with that sort of excuse for further prevarication!
In fact, it is a little surprising that die-hard supporters of Lenin's theory never point out to the editors of Socialist Worker where they are going wrong in reporting events in the real world. Why hasn't a single admirer of MEC written to that paper to insist that reports of, say, BNP violence be replaced with descriptions of images in victim's heads? Whatever one thinks of the letters in Socialist Worker, unless they are censored, not a single one ever points out that that paper's reports are defective because they record the actual events in the world, recklessly ignoring images inside the skulls of observers.
Anyway, despite what he said, Lenin himself did not actually begin with the "naïve" beliefs of mankind. In fact, he did quite the opposite: he undermined them from the start (indeed he began with the theories of previous ruling-class hacks). This he did by reducing such ordinary beliefs to images. And the same could be said of any socialist (reporter or otherwise) who thought to do likewise by writing about the images of Police brutality inflicted on the images of miners, which occurred in their image of