Essay Twelve: Metaphysics -- A Ruling-Class Thought-Form
Readers need to take note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
If you are viewing this using Mozilla Firefox, you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used.
This has been one of the most difficult Essay to write, since (1) it tackles issues that have sailed right over the heads of some of the greatest minds in history, and (2) it is not easy to expose the weaknesses of traditional philosophy in everyday language -- even though, after well over fifty re-writes (in fact, this Essay was first written in August 1998), I think I have managed to do this.
Nevertheless, the ideas presented here in no way affect the negative case I have constructed against dialectics, but they do help form the basis of my positive account of the origin of the doctrines found both in DM and traditional Metaphysics.
I claim no particular originality for what follows (except, perhaps the highly simplified mode of presentation and political slant I have placed upon these ideas); much of it has in fact been derived from Wittgenstein's work -- and less importantly, from that of several others.
Nevertheless, I have tried as far as possible to keep this Essay free of academic complexities since it is aimed at revolutionaries, not scholars. In that case, anyone who wants to read more substantial accounts of the approach to language and traditional Philosophy I have adopted here should consult the many works I have referenced in the End Notes and in later Essays on language to be published here over the coming years.
Apologies are therefore due in advance to those who know enough of Wittgenstein's work to make these ideas seem rather trite and banal -- but many Marxists are not well-versed in this area of Analytic Philosophy, and they do not find these concepts at all easy to grasp. So I have worded this Essay with them in mind, which means that I have tried to make things as simple and straight-forward as possible.
However, to save me having repeatedly to say that many of the ideas mentioned here will be developed in more detail in Essays on the nature of science, 'cognition' and language (to be published at this site over the next year or so), I will just highlight this fact with a red asterisk: *
Connected with the last point is the following word of warning: this Essay is more repetitive than most of the others published so far at this site. Experience has taught me that if the difficult ideas it contains are not repeated often they either tend not to sink in or their significance is lost -- this is especially so with regard to the Marxist readers mentioned above.
Finally, it is worth pointing out at the start that in this Essay, although I refer to the sense of a proposition as those conditions under which it is deemed true or false, this is merely a shorthand for the requirement of (true/false) bi-polarity, and has only been adopted to save on needless pedantry, in what is not meant to be an academic paper.
The subtle differences between these two ways of characterising the sense of propositions is explained in Palmer (1996).01
This Essay is over 72,000 words long; a summary of some of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections:
(b) Indicative Sentences Are Not What They Seem
(ii) Contradictory -- Or Just Unthinkable?
(3) Metaphysics And Language: 1
(a) The Conventional Nature Of Discourse
(i) Camera Obscura
(ii) Atomism Among Dialecticians
(iii) The Conventional Response From Dialecticians
(v) Avoiding An Infinite Regress
(b) The Inevitable Collapse Into Non-Sense
(i) Private Ownership In the Means Of 'Mental' Production
(ii) Semantic Suicide
(iii) Metaphysical Fiat -- Dogma On Stilts
(iv) The Evidential Pantomime -- Mickey Mouse Science Strikes Back
(v) The Descent Into Non-Sense
(ii) Dialectics Does Not
(e) Atomised Humanity Versus Socialised Language
(5) Metaphysics And Language: 2
(a) On The Impossibility Of Any Future Metaphysics
(6) Marx Anticipates Wittgenstein
(8) Notes
(9) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
Among the aims of Essay Twelve are the following:
(1) To substantiate the claim that DM is a metaphysical theory (Part One);
(2) To show that Metaphysics and Traditional Philosophy are ruling-class forms-of-thought (Parts Two and Three);
(3) To trace their birth back to the origins of certain forms of class society, link this in with the world-view of various ruling elites, and connect both with the servile ideology displayed in the work of ruling-class thinkers -- and now DM-theorists (Parts Two, Three and Four);
(4) To expose the sub-logical, Hermetic ideas found in Hegel's work for what they are: incoherent babble (Parts Five and Six);
(5) To show that the defence of the vernacular is a class issue (Part Seven); and,
(6) To expose DM as a form of LIE (Part Four).
This will make Essay Twelve the longest so far published, hence its partitioning into seven Parts.
However, many of my ideas in this area are still in the formative stage, so this Essay will be revised continuously and extensively (especially as more historical material comes to light).
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; DM = Dialectical Materialism; MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, i.e., Lenin (1972); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]
As indicated above, each of the listed issues will be tackled in various Parts of this Essay, but to address the first we need to examine a rather odd statement made by Lenin.
Part One: Lenin And The 'Unthinkable'
In MEC, Lenin quoted the following words (from Engels):
M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable." [Lenin (1972), p.318. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Here, Lenin was making a typically metaphysical statement. Naturally, dialecticians will repudiate that assertion; nevertheless, it is possible to show that such a rejection would be as hasty as it is mistaken. [More on this below.]
It is worth noting at the outset that theses like M1 purport to inform us of fundamental aspects of nature, albeit in this case disguised as part of Lenin's admission of his own incredulity.
But, we are not to conclude from M1 that Lenin was merely recording his own personal views. On the contrary, he certainly believed that matter and motion were fundamental aspects of "objective reality"; that they were inseparable and that this was a scientific (or even a philosophical) fact. Moreover, like Engels, he held the view that motion was the mode of the existence of matter -– that is, he believed that matter could not exist without motion, nor vice versa. Motion was thus one of the principal ways that matter expressed itself exterior to the mind.
The metaphysical nature of Lenin's declaration can be seen by the way that it bypassed the need for any supporting evidence. It seemed to Lenin to be such an obvious 'fact' about matter and motion that to deny it was "unthinkable".1
However, if humanity had access to information about motion and matter many orders of magnitude greater than is available today, it would still not be enough to show that the separation of matter from motion is unthinkable. No amount of data could substantiate that.
Now, these assertions might strike some readers as rather difficult to swallow. Because of that, much of the rest of this Part of Essay Twelve will be aimed at undermining such reticence.
Indicative Of What?
The seemingly profound nature of theses like M1 is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed: that is, to the fact that the main verb they use is often in the indicative mood.
Sometimes, the latter is beefed-up with subjunctive and/or modal qualifying terms -- which, incidentally, help create even more of a false impression.
For example, we find Engels saying things like this:
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases added.]
"The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa…[operates] in nature, in a manner fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion….
"Hence, it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion. [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphases added.]2
Now, this apparently superficial grammatical facade hides a deeper logical form -- several in fact. This is something which only becomes plain when such sentences are examined more closely.
As noted above, expressions like these look as if they reveal deep truths about reality since they certainly resemble empirical propositions (i.e., propositions about matters of fact). In the event, they turn out to be nothing at all like them.
This can be seen if we examine the following similar-looking indicative sentences:
M2: Two is a number.
M3: Two is greater than one.
M4: Green is a colour.
M5: "Green" is a word.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of TAR.
M7: A material body is extended in space.
M8: Time is a relation between events.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.3
M2-M9 appear to share the same form: "x is F" (or sometimes, "z is a f-er", or more accurately "z f-ies"). Despite this, there are profound differences between them.
[The use of such gap markers (i.e., "x" and "z") was explained in Essay Three Part One. "F(...)" is a predicate variable; "f(...)" is more general predicate variable, standing for clauses like "...owns copy of TAR", "...fibs more often than not", or "...thinks something is unthinkable", etc.]
However, the difference between, say, M6 and M2 lies largely in the fact to know that M2 is true goes hand-in-hand with understanding it -- these two conditions being inextricably linked. On the other hand, it is not necessary to know whether M6 is true or false in order to grasp its content. In other words, to understand M6 is not the same as knowing it is true. But it is essential to understanding M6 to know what would make it true or false -- even if both of these have not yet been ascertained. [The significance of this will be explored at greater length in a later section.]
In that case, it is not necessary to know whether Blair in fact owns a copy of TAR to be able to understand someone who says that he does; in contrast, comprehending that two is a number is ipso facto to know that it is true (except in trivial cases; on that see below).
M2: Two is a number.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of TAR.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
Now, M9 (which is a more 'objective' version of M1a) is somewhat similar to M2; comprehending it also involves automatically acknowledging its veracity, even if that is not quite as clear-cut in this case. The veracity of such propositions seems to follow from the 'concepts' they express, and that is why their truth-status can be ascertained without examining any evidence at all. That seems to follow from thought alone.4
Hence, with respect to M2 and M9, meaning and 'truth' appear to go hand in hand -- so much so that as soon as their constituent words have been inspected, the 'truth' of both should become obvious. The source of their veracity is 'internally'-generated, as it were. Indeed, that is why the negation (or rejection) of M9, for example, was so "unthinkable" to both Engels and Lenin --; all this follows from the definition that motion is the form of the existence of matter. This particular thought governed the core of what these two had to say about matter and motion.5
Conversely, once more, it is possible to understand every word of M6 without knowing whether it is true or false. In fact, it is quite easy to suppose M6 to be false (which it probably is). But, even if M6 were true, and known to be true, it would still be possible to imagine it as false (and vice versa). Nevertheless, in order to establish its actual truth or actual falsehood, evidence would be essential; an examination of the concepts involved would not be enough. The veracity of M6 cannot be ascertained from thought alone; its truth-status is not 'internally'-generated, but 'externally'-confirmed/disconfirmed.
But, it is not possible for anyone who agrees with Lenin to regard, say, M9 as false. This clearly indicates that there is a fundamental difference between these two sorts of sentences -- one that their apparently identical grammatical outer facade conceals. As it turns out, the pseudo-scientific status and much of the 'plausibility' of metaphysical/essential 'truths' like M9 derive from just this sort of masquerade.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
So, it looks like the obviousness of M9 is what motivated the incredulity Lenin reported in M1a, for it certainly seemed to him that as soon as the expressions it contains (or their DM-equivalents) are inspected, the truth of M9 should be easy to see.
As noted above, for Lenin, the first half of M1a was "unthinkable" (i.e., the "Motion without matter..." part) -- its denial (and that of M9) would surely undermine the meaning of its terms (or the import of its concepts, given the definition that motion is the form of the existence of matter). This is why the rejection of M1a and M9 could be ruled out without the need to examine any evidence. What these two sentences say appears to gain our assent on linguistic (or conceptual) grounds alone. Hence, it seems impossible to deny the truth of M1a; such a denial would be inconceivable -- or, as Lenin himself said, it would be "unthinkable". That is why theses like M1a (and M9) require no evidence in support, and why none is ever given -- and why it is hard even to imagine the sort of evidence that could possibly begin to substantiate them.5a
In this case, the actual state of the world drops out of the picture; when assessing such theses for their accuracy, or even veracity, no experiments need be carried out, no data collected, no surveys undertaken.5b
Now, that fact alone should have given someone like Lenin (who was not ignorant of the scientific method) pause for thought. Unfortunately, like so many others before him -- indeed, like the vast majority of theorists since ancient Greek times -- he failed to notice the significance of this seemingly trivial fact.6
The certainty M1a seems to induce in all who accept it as true plainly derives from what its constituent terms appear to mean; the subsequent projection onto the world of its 'content' is thus a reflection of the conviction induced in all those who assent to it. If such theses express indubitable truths, who could possibly deny that they apply to all regions of space and time?
But, the alleged truth of M1a bears no relation to the possibilities that material reality itself presents; this can be seen from that fact that if this were not so (if the truth of M1a were related to conditions might or might not obtain in nature), evidential support would have been both appropriate and imaginable. But, in this case, no such evidence is even conceivable. What fact or facts could possibly show that motion is inseparable from matter? Or that motion without matter is "unthinkable"?6a
This clearly indicates that M1a and M9 are not about the material world; they are (indirectly) about (or rather arise from) the use of certain words -- or they concern the alleged relation between the concepts they express.
Compare these two with the following:
M7: A material body is extended in space.
M8: Time is a relation between events.
Now, in connection with the theses we find in Metaphysics (like M7 and M8), this helps explain why traditional Philosophers were only too ready to project their ideas onto the world. The content of such cosmic verities seemed to them to be based on something much deeper than anything that mere empirical evidence could provide. Indeed, they appeared to express truths about "essences", features of "Being" that were prior to, but not dependent on, the deliverances of the senses. In fact, such theses looked as if they determined (or were determined by) the logical boundaries that defined reality itself -- that is, on concepts and categories that constituted not just human judgement and thought, but the logical form of the world.
In later versions of the same guiding myth, it was held that such theses depicted things that must be instantiated in -- or were based upon those that determined the structure of -- any possible world.
In short, they appeared to picture not just the logical form of any and every conceivable world, but governed every 'philosophically true' thought about them.
In previous centuries, it was believed that such theses expressed 'God's' own thoughts about reality -- or his 'laws' -- which meant that the job of Metaphysics was widely seen as an intellectual pursuit aimed at replicating in human thought such divine verities.7 Naturally, this immediately linked Metaphysics to the rationalisation of the status quo and the class structures that fed off it. [More on this in Parts Two and Three (summary here).]
This meant that such theses could safely be projected onto nature because no world was imaginable without them -- or none conceivable where such 'conceptual truths' were not applicable. If no configuration of matter and energy could fail to conform to universal truths like these, supporting evidence would naturally become irrelevant; the material world would in that case simply drop out of consideration (at least, in so far as confirmation was concerned).
To be sure, appeals to nature could be and were made in order to illustrate such truths (as we find, for example, dialecticians themselves doing with respect to Engels's Three 'Laws'), but that would be the only use to which the material world could be put.
Metaphysical 'truths' appeared to be so obvious (to those propounding them) that few were at all concerned by the fact that they had been imposed on reality. Quite the contrary; the important role each philosophical thesis was supposed to play (i.e., as a sort of "master key" capable of unlocking the inner secrets of 'Being') seemed to justify the whole sordid affair.
Of course, super-verities like these had to be distinguished from ordinary, contingent everyday material truths. Hence, because they looked as if they were part of the 'essence' underlying any and every possible world, they were later called (among other things), "necessary truths".8
However, this meant that theses like these were and are reliant on the use of a deliberately restricted set of words, and thus on a disguised or aberrant application of linguistic rules. Indeed, the projection of such theses onto any possible world is evidence enough of that. Since the veracity of such 'truths' was 'known' prior to the examination of any evidence (how, for example, could one examine the 'evidence' available in a possible world?), their alleged ('necessary') truth-values couldn't have been derived from anything other than the meanings of the words they contained, and hence on the linguistic rules supposedly governing the use of such words in these special contexts.9
In Essay Two (and in many other Essays), numerous examples were given of a priori assertions about reality of this sort, advanced by dialecticians. As we saw, these are said to be true for all of time and space, but they are in fact supported by little or no evidence --, that is, over and above a superficial analysis of a few specially chosen examples, sketchy "thought experiments", and the use of obscure terms-of-art derived from Hegel and his mystical forebears.
We are now in a position to see why this is so: DM-theses possess an a priori and universal validity because they are disguised or misconstrued rules of language.
To state the obvious: DM-theorists will not be content to view things this way -- but their opinion of what they do with their own words is at odds with how they themselves actually use them.
Once more, as noted in Essay Two, while DM-theorists constantly reassure their readers that they have not foisted their ideas on reality -- they have simply 'read them' from it, which indicates that they at least view them as empirical truths of some sort --, their practice belies this. Hence, it is clear that dialecticians en masse regard their doctrines as universal theses, true for all of space and time, and which lie way beyond confirmation by any conceivable body of evidence. So, in practice dialecticians do the opposite of what they say they do; they are quite happy to impose their ideas on the world, declaring them true prior to, and independent of, sufficient (or, in some cases, any) material evidence.
Now, M1a is just the latest example of this aprioristic trait. In common with other metaphysicians, the projection by dialecticians of DM-theses like this onto any and all possible worlds is evidence enough that they have been derived from linguistic (or conceptual) resources alone. Since these super-theses are 'known' to be valid well in advance of the examination of an adequate body of supporting evidence, their truth can't have been derived from anything other than the meanings of the words used, and thus on the linguistic rules allegedly governing this.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Moreover, the historical provenance of all DM-theses (in mystical Hegelian and Hermetic thought) lends support to the above claims. These doctrines date back to a time when there was very little or no scientific evidence at all.
Thus, the class-compromised origin of DM-theses has meant that aprioristic ruling-class ideas and patterns-of-thought have been smuggled into revolutionary theory by DM-classicists -- "from the outside".10
Unfortunately for Lenin and other DM-apologists, a priori theses are in fact incapable of reflecting reality. As we will soon see, reality cannot be as metaphysical or DM-theses supposedly depict it.11 There are features of language that prevent theorists like Lenin and Engels from saying the sorts of things they want to say about the world, which linguistic features will not allow them to 'depict' nature in ways they imagine they can.
This observation is connected with the origin of metaphysical theory. At the linguistic level (as will be shown in later parts of Essay Twelve), the latter arose out of, and because of, a determination by Greek theorists to employ certain expressions idiosyncratically (that is, in ways they would not normally be used). In its train, this involved a failure on the part of such 'innovators' to notice that it is only the misuse of language that licences the derivation of universal and necessary 'truths' of the sort found both in traditional Philosophy, and later in DM. [This was illustrated in detail, for example, in Essay Three Part One.]
As the analysis below demonstrates (once more), such a misuse of language results in the production, not of 'necessary' truths, but of unvarnished non-sense.
To see this, we need to examine Lenin's words more closely.
Now, with regard to Lenin's avowal reported in M1a, it's worth asking the following question: What is it about these five words that made their content seem so "unthinkable"?
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Curiously, however, in Lenin's case at least it is obvious that he must have thought the above words in order to declare that they were unthinkable!
In that case, the phrase "motion without matter" must have gone through his head at some point. Even if Lenin went on to think the additional words tacked on at the end (i.e., "…is unthinkable"), he must have rattled past the three offending words first (i.e., "motion without matter"). No one imagines that his brain switched his thoughts on just as they reached the relative safety of the last two terms in that sentence!
In that case, Lenin must have done what he declared could not be done; he must have thought the "unthinkable" in the act of declaring that no one could do what he himself had just done.
Naturally, this means that in practice Lenin contradicted himself, for he managed to do what he said could not be done. That is why in practice Lenin's thesis becomes impossible either to comprehend or even to state. If he accomplished what he said no one could do in the act of telling us just that, why can't anyone else do it? What is so special about Lenin?11a
Worse still, if the rest of us can think the three offending words ("motion without matter") whenever we read Lenin telling us that we can't do the very thing we must have done to grasp his point, we too must contradict Lenin in practice. Indeed, the very act of telling us we cannot think these words prompts us to do just that!
Even those who agree with Lenin that "motion without matter is unthinkable" must think these three illicit words. Hence, even the most slavishly obedient Lenin-groupie cannot avoid disobeying the master every time he/she reads this controversial phrase.
Have such characters not noticed that to read Lenin is to disobey him?
But, if Lenin is right, what on earth could he possibly have meant by what he said if everyone (including himself) could so easily disprove in practice this allegedly self-evident truth?
Precisely what is so unthinkable here that is also so easily thought? What is it about M1a that is supposed to command our assent, but only in the very act of undermining it?
Perhaps this is too hasty? Maybe Lenin merely meant that the truth of an indicative sentence like M1a (containing the unqualified words "motion without matter") is unthinkable?
But, is even that a viable option?
Maybe not, for when Lenin's words are examined, it actually becomes impossible to understand what it was he was trying to say, or precisely what 'truth' he was attempting to communicate to his readers. Or even if what he appears to be saying is in any way 'true'.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
Consider the following as a possible variant of M1a and M9:
M10: Motion without matter can never be thought of as true.
This looks a little awkward -- and it is not obviously correct. Indeed, it is possible to think of many examples of motion that do not involve the movement of matter as such. Several dozen were given in Essay Five. Here is another -- a few more can be found in Note 12:
M11: NN's thoughts moved to a new topic.
Now, this could be true even if no matter was relocated in the process.12
It might be objected here that this sense of "move" was not at all what Lenin had in mind. Perhaps, then, he meant the following?
M12: The occurrence of literal motion in the real world without matter can never be thought of as true.
Which appears to imply, or be implied by, the following:12a
M13: Literal motion in the real world without matter can never take place.
This seems to be closer to what Lenin might have meant, even if it still looks a little stilted. Despite that, this sentence presents problems of its own. Consider this apparent counter-example:
M14: NM moved the date of the strike from Monday to Tuesday.13
Now, this seems to depict literal movement in the real world, and yet it is not easy to see whether any matter has to be re-located as a result. Perhaps we might appeal to the movement of atoms in NM's brain, or to the re-arrangement of ink molecules in a diary or wall planner -- as the new date is committed to paper -- as examples of matter in motion here? But, at best, this would simply mean that motion was indirectly associated with matter, since even in a real life situation the supposed strike itself would not actually exist to be moved anywhere -- even though it has still been moved.
Again, it could be objected that in this example what has actually changed is the date -- it is this that has been moved not the strike itself. But again, if it's only a date that has been moved, it would still be unclear whether matter has to be relocated as a consequence. Once more, this date is in the future, and does not exist yet, even though it has been moved.
Now, it would be little use referring to the altered marks in a diary or on a wall-planner (or anywhere else, for that matter) as indicative of the material changes witnessed here. Certainly, such things may alter, but if anyone were to imagine that the dates of strikes, or even strikes themselves, are just marks on paper, then bosses could easily put a stop to union militancy -- by simply tippexing-out the relevant marks (or by destroying the wall-planner/diary), and be done with it. The class struggle, surely, cannot be so easily erased --, can it?
At best, therefore, the movement reported in M14 is indirectly associated with matter. Nevertheless, M14 seems to show that we can at least understand sentences where the connection between motion and matter is not obvious or clear-cut. So, perhaps we can think the unthinkable, despite what Lenin said?
This still leaves the status of M12 and M13 unresolved. Now, if we ignore awkward cases like M14 and concentrate on examples of movement situated only in the present, we might perhaps be able to ascertain Lenin's intentions.
[Unfortunately, this restriction would make the temporal quantifier (i.e., "never") in M12 and M13 seem rather superfluous. I will ignore that awkward niggle here.]
M12: The occurrence of literal motion in the real world without matter can never be thought of as true.
M13: Literal motion in the real world without matter can never take place.
However, if we are careful to stipulate that "literal motion" involves change of place then maybe the following re-write of M12 and M13 might work?
M15: Literal motion in the real world without matter is unthinkable.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Of course, M15 is just a variant of M1a. But, is it true?
Maybe not.
One obvious example of literal movement in the real world that takes place without matter -- which is not only thinkable, it is actual -- is the motion of the Centre of Mass of the Galaxy [CMG]. The CMG is located in empty space, but it exerts a decisive causal influence on everything in the Galaxy while not being material itself. In its turn, it moves under the influence of something else that is not material either -- the centre of mass of the cluster of galaxies of which ours is a part, and so on.14
Perhaps we should adapt M15 to accommodate or neutralise this annoying counterexample, in the following way:
M16: Literal motion in the real world without some matter somewhere causing it is unthinkable.
Alas, M16 now concedes the point that motion can take place while spatially- (or, perhaps even temporally-) divorced from matter, since M16 is not specific about contiguous or concurrent causation (which, of course, may not be what Lenin meant by M1a anyway --; who can say?). And, as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part One, Lenin's idea of matter is so vague that little sense can be made of it.15
Nevertheless, despite these apparent problems, M15 and M16 face far more serious difficulties than the inconvenient astronomical and/or ordinary facts noted above.
As pointed out earlier, Lenin must have thought the words "motion without matter" in order to deny they were thinkable. If so, it is difficult to see what he was driving at if the very act of saying what he said undermined the point he wished to make.
Perhaps then Lenin meant the following?
M17: The sentence: "Literal motion in the real world without matter is unthinkable" is true.
[M15: Literal motion in the real world without matter is unthinkable.]
However, this won't do either. Just as soon as the quoted sentence in M17 (i.e., M15) is entertained, that cognitive act would make M17 itself false!
This is because the embedded sentence in M17 (i.e., M15) is untrue whenever anyone thinks it. M17 becomes false as M15 is thought, and yet by thinking M17, M15 must be entertained; the only way anyone could agree with M17 is by thinking M15. Unfortunately, this just means that we may only agree with M17 by doing what M15 says cannot be done -- we have to think the unthinkable, thus making M17 false. In that case, M17 is true just in case it is false; we may assent to it only if we never allow its content to cross our minds.
It could be argued that this shows that M17 is true since it is indeed the case that matter without motion is unthinkable. And yet, that is precisely the point: even to assert this requires the allegedly forbidden words "matter without motion" to pass through the mind, so it is not the case that these words cannot be thought.15a
It could be objected that it is perfectly clear what Lenin meant: it is impossible to think about matter without conceiving of it as moving in some way, and vice versa.
In that case, perhaps Lenin was merely making a psychological point? Maybe he was saying that given what we know about the world (and about ourselves), we are psychologically/physically incapable of forming the thought that motion is possible without matter (and vice versa).
But, if he was saying this, he offered no evidence to substantiate what would now be a scientific claim about what human beings are capable of thinking. And, if this was his line-of-thought, it pretty clear why he would not have been able to produce such data (even had he tried), for to pose this very question is not only to think the forbidden words, it prompts others to think them too!
Moreover, there is abundant evidence to the contrary. As we know, previous generations managed to think this very thought, and for centuries; the passivity of matter is a basic principle of Aristotelian Physics.16
If this alternative interpretation of Lenin's claim is to remain viable (i.e., that which holds that his claims relate to our psychological limitations), then (at best) we would have to interpret it as a confession of Lenin's own limited powers of imagination -- even though he too was able to rise to the occasion, and think the forbidden words while casting them into outer psychological darkness in the very act of bring us this good news!
Furthermore, Lenin offered no supporting evidence concerning the relevant limits of credibility, or otherwise, of anyone else, and he mentioned only one other DM supporter who thought as he did: Engels. That being so, his confession merely records the limits of his (and Engels's) own incredulity (which, as we have seen, undermined itself in the very act of its own confession). Clearly, such asseverations (no matter how sincere -- or confused) are out of place in what purports to be a scientific or philosophical analysis of matter and motion.
In any case, what could Lenin have said to someone who claimed that they could imagine motion without matter, or vice versa? Several examples were given earlier (where it was quite natural to speak about motion without matter, or motion with no change of place, and so on). These may only be ruled out if it could be shown that they are either metaphorical or irrelevant. But, who is to say that Lenin's use of such words is literal, or that it is their only correct employment -- or even that it is the most natural? In fact, a rejection of those counter-examples could only ever be based on Lenin's own lack of imagination (or on that of his modern day epigones) -- or, perhaps, on other criteria which Lenin kept to himself.
However, as the above indicates, it is possible to form the thought that motion is possible without matter. Nothing is easier. Not only does the last sentence itself prompt such a cognitive infringement, so do the sentences Lenin himself wrote. If these sentences are objectionable, it cannot be for psychological reasons -- for, manifestly, they are easy to think. If either of M18 or M19, for instance, is to be ruled out as an example of a thought, that would have to be done on logical/linguistic grounds, not psychological ones -- especially if to read Lenin each time is to disprove him, as we have seen.
But that, of course, just takes us right back to the beginning. We are still no clearer what Lenin could possibly have meant by what he said.
M18: This particular example of motion is separated from matter.
M19: This lump of matter is motionless.
Contradictory -- Or Just Unthinkable?
At this point it is worth wondering why Lenin concluded that motion without matter was "unthinkable", as opposed to claiming it was merely contradictory. Apart from saving him the trouble of having to think the very thought he wanted to convince the rest of us was "unthinkable", it would have allowed him to make his point much more succinctly. Indeed, it would seem to be the obvious thing to say about matter and motion: that immobile matter (or mobile non-matter) was contradictory -- or, rather, that propositions asserting these things implied contradictions, given other DM-principles. They would certainly contradict the thesis that motion is the form of the existence of matter.
On the other hand, it seems pretty clear what the answer to that particular puzzle is: if Lenin had done this, it would have given the dialectical game away. This is because, if he had ruled certain things out on the basis that they were contradictory then much of DM would have gone down the tubes with it. In that event, the next question would have been: Why is it just this contradictory state of affairs that is considered so objectionable in contradistinction to all the other contradictions that DM-theorists tell us litter the entire universe?
In fact, the existence of matter without motion ought to make perfectly good 'dialectical' sense, if only because it is contradictory. The Hegelian roots of DM seem to imply that matter moves because of its inherently contradictory nature (even though the precise details are somewhat hazy).
As Hegel himself declared:
"[B]ut contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Hegel (1999), p.439. Bold emphasis added.]
Indeed, it would seem from this doctrine that bodies must move because mobility and passivity are a product of the internal struggle in all objects --, since they are UOs: a unity of motion and non-motion, perhaps? Anyone inclined to believe cracked logic like this should not find it too great a "leap" of imagination to derive motion from the contradictory nature of matter; the mobility of matter could thus be predicated on its lack of motion. Hence, far from immobile matter being unthinkable, the theory seems to require it! [As this suggests, too.]
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
It could be objected here that this is ridiculous; dialecticians do not believe that motion is a UO of itself and its opposite, lack of motion. Furthermore, it could be pointed out that the above caricature is not the contradiction Hegel was referring to with respect to motion --, as was pointed out by Engels:
"[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence…[t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]
Naturally, these proffered DM-responses merely highlight the serious confusions lying at the heart of this theory of change, underlined here, here and here. The problem is that, according to what DM-theorists themselves tell us, it is unclear whether things change because of (1) their internal contradictions (and/or opposites), or (2) whether they change into these opposites, or, indeed, (3) whether they create such opposites when they change.
Hence, if all things are UOs, and can only change because of that fact, it seems that a moving body must be a dialectical union of motion and rest, otherwise it could never change.
In that case, if the above objection is ridiculous, it is only because it makes plain the incoherencies inherent in the DM-account of change.
Moreover, as we saw in Essay Five, the alleged contradiction to which Engels refers (that a moving body is "both in one place and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same place and also not in it") cannot be what makes that object move; it is what becomes apparent as it moves.
So, if Hegel is right, and objects move because of their inherently contradictory nature, then they must be a UO of some sort. And what else could that be but a union of motion and rest; nothing else seems remotely relevant.
Alternatively, other objectors might be tempted to argue that this is precisely the point: because matter is contradictory, it is incessantly mobile.
But, once more, if matter is truly contradictory, if we accept no half measures, no "excessive tenderness" toward moving things, matter must be mobile and at rest all at once. So, resolute Hegelians must think the illegitimate words, that matter is motionless (in part).
In fact, the good news is that there is no need to speculate any further on this Hermetic conundrum, for this is precisely what we observe in reality. The seemingly 'contradictory' nature of matter (i.e., that it both moves and does not move) is not only an everyday occurrence, it is a scientific fact --, for it is true that with respect to one inertial frame matter can be at rest, but with respect to another it can be in motion, and these can both be true at the same time, and of the same collection of matter.
Unfortunately, however, for beleaguered dialecticians, this familiar fact does not actually imply that motion is fundamentally contradictory 'in itself' (whatever that means!), but that given diverse reference frames we can picture it in no other way: as mobile with respect one frame, at rest with respect to another, all at once. There is nothing deeply metaphysical about this; it is a spin-off of the conventions we now use to depict the world. This socially-motivated fact, though, does give sense to propositions about the mobility of matter (for we would have no other way of conceiving of movement scientifically except by this means), even if it does not actually make anything move (or sustain locomotion), as a DM/Hegelian 'contradiction' should.
Of course, the force of unhelpful conclusions like that can only be resisted on linguistic (or perhaps conventionalist) grounds. That is, they may only be defused by clarifying what words like "motion", "immobile", "inertial frame", "same time", and "contradiction" should be taken to mean. Naturally, anyone tempted to go down that route would merely underline the fact that Lenin's own ideas are at best creatures of convention, and are thus not the least bit "objective".
Moreover, given the fact that Lenin's ideas in this area fall apart so readily, his 'convention' is unlikely ever to be accepted by the scientific community. In fact, we should feign no surprise if they do not even make the bottom of the list of viable candidates that they might be inclined to accept.
The Conventional Nature Of Discourse
As we have seen above, and as we will see as the rest of Essay Twelve unfolds, the problems Lenin and other metaphysicians face are connected with the peculiar nature of the language they use. But, there are other aspects of language that are less well appreciated (or, rather, they are not appreciated at all) which mean that this slide into metaphysical incoherence does not just afflict DM. With respect to Metaphysics in general, this slide is universally unavoidable.
While it is true that Marxists in general hold that language is a social product, few seem to have thought through the full implications of that idea.17 On the contrary, one of its least recognised consequences is that language is in fact conventional. Indeed, if language is social, how could it be other than conventional? Human beings invented language; it wasn't bestowed on them from on high. This means that at some point in their history, they must have accepted or put into practice certain linguistic conventions.
Furthermore, an even less obvious corollary of this view of discourse is the fact that language is primarily a vehicle of communication, not of representation.18
It is undeniable that some Marxists have acknowledged the limited applicability of the former corollary (that language is conventional), but hardly any (perhaps none) have considered the full implications of the second (that language is not primarily representational). Certainly Marx and Engels did not, nor have later Marxists. Indeed, much of what they have written (especially about abstraction, 'cognition' and knowledge) suggests the opposite is the case.
In this regard, again, dialecticians are not alone. Throughout the history of Philosophy, little serious attention has been paid to the traditional philosophical theory that language is primarily representational, i.e., that it is an artefact that enables human beings re-present the world in "thought", in the "head", the "mind", "consciousness", or in "cognition" first, before communication can begin.
Hence, rarely questioned is the underlying assumption that it is only after language users have learnt to picture reality to themselves that they are then able to communicate their thoughts to others -- and this observation applies even to those who at least say they accept the idea that language is primarily communicational. Naturally, this means that the social nature of language is seen by the vast majority of Marxists as a consequence of the isolated (but later pooled) cognitive powers of individuals, an expression of their attempt to share the 'contents' of their 'minds' with others, but not the other way round.19
To many -- even on the far left --, it seems that here at least we have an example of private (mental) production linked to public gain, for on this view, the isolated activities of lone abstractors generates cognition, which helps drives the social advancement of knowledge, after it has subsequently been pooled.
This approach thus relegates meaning to the private domain of the 'mind', something that each individual brings to language --, perhaps as an expression of their biography and/or the ideological parameters that constrain us all. Alternatively, it's a consequence of the 'objective rules' that nature has supposedly hard-wired into each brain, put there perhaps by the same "invisible hand" that coincidentally also runs the market.
Whatever its aetiology, this is one idea that has ruled in one form or another since ancient times.
As we saw in Essay Three Part Two, post-Renaissance thinkers took the public domain where meaning is created, inverted it, and then projected the result back into each individual head, re-configured there as the social relations among ideas/'concepts'. The outer social world was thus re-modelled in each head, and thus seen as primary. In this way, the social was privatised, internalised, and thus neutralised.
More recently, this dominant thought-form re-surfaced in a new disguise: as the inter-relation between neurons (as they 'communicate' with one another), controlled more recently still by the oppressive power of the gene -- which now seems to operate as a sort of surrogate inner Bourgeois Legislative/Executive Authority.
Thus, on this view, human beings are born free of language, but everywhere are soon in linguistic chains to their own surrogate 'inner state machinery'.20
This inversion (whose political and social roots will be analysed briefly below, and more fully in Parts Two and Three of this Essay*) completely undermines the Marxist claim that language is a social phenomenon. And no wonder; it perfectly captures a bourgeois view of language and mind.
In fact, this is one ideological inversion that has remained upside down (but in different forms) now not just for hundreds, but for thousands of years, and it is largely the cause of the other inverted ideas concocted by traditional philosophers and dialecticians alike.
Inverted as in a camera obscura, these rotated notions cloud the thoughts of all those whose brains have been colonised by ruling ideas such as these.
Nevertheless, there seems little point arguing that language is a social phenomenon -- its main role to be found in communication -- if it is in fact primarily representational. If the latter were true, the social function of language would be anterior to -- if not parasitic upon --, its supposedly primary, private nature. No surprise either then that this view of discourse introduced its own notorious Robinsonades, analogous to the ones that Marx railed against in politics and economics --, except, in this case, these Robinsonades apply to the origin of language, and not just to the 'social contract' and to production.
As noted above, if there is a point to be made here, it is perhaps as ideological as it is anything else. If language is primarily representational then human beings must acquire language, meaning and knowledge first (as social atoms) before they can enter the linguistic community.
But, this presents anyone adopting this stance with intractable problems. How could anyone be socialised into representing the world to themselves first as an individual, and then later use language to communicate? On this view, as far as language is concerned, each human being would first be a semantic individual, second a communicating social being. In fact, as is easy to show, given this view of language, communication would be impossible. Indeed, were this the case, we would find ourselves incapable of communicating, and humanity would be universally autistic.*
Given the representational approach, the role that communal, historically-conditioned material life plays in the shaping of language drops out as irrelevant.
Atomistic implications like these should not be lost on those cognisant of the History of Philosophy and its relation to ruling-class forms-of-thought (particularly those forms that have been dominant since the Seventeenth Century) -- even though the record shows that, among Marxists, they invariably have been.
The Conventional Response From DM-Theorists
Revolutionaries have generally resisted the idea that language is conventional because it would seem to imply that science is conventional, too, which would in turn threaten to undermine its 'objectivity'.21
In fact, as is demonstrable, revolutionaries have rejected the connection between the conventional nature of language and science with arguments that have only succeeded in undermining both. Either that, or they have simply assumed that conventionalism must always collapse into relativism or into some form of Idealism.22 However, the truth is the exact opposite: it is the rejection of the conventional nature of language and science that compromises both. How and why this is so will be explained briefly below, and elsewhere in more detail.*
Nevertheless, in this Essay I propose only to examine the connection between the above considerations and Metaphysics.
Meaning Precedes Truth
If language is a social phenomenon, then, clearly, what human beings write or say must be guided by the normative conventions that govern discourse. That is why it is not possible to utter absolutely anything and hope to make sense. Naturally, scientific language will have its own special protocols layered on top of these, over and above the ordinary conventions underlying the vernacular. Moreover, this entire ensemble will change and develop in accord with wider social and historical forces.
But one thing is reasonably clear: if language is to be a means of communication then whatever lends sense to its empirical propositions must be independent of (and prior to) any truths they express.23
If this were not so, then in order to understand an empirical proposition language users would first have to know whether it was true or false.
Now that option is plainly incoherent, for no one could assent to the truth or falsehood of a proposition before they had comprehended it. Indeed, as seems obvious, they would not be able to ascertain whether such a proposition was true or false if they failed to grasp it.24
This, naturally, connects the social nature of language with the earlier discussion of propositions like M1-M9. There, we saw that in the case of an ordinary empirical proposition like:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of TAR
it is possible to understand it before its truth-status is known. In contrast, it was argued that with regard to metaphysical/DM-propositions things were radically different. Hence, to accept a proposition like
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter
as true is ipso facto to understand it.
We are now in a position to understand why all this is so.
If the sense of an empirical proposition were dependent on truth, or on still other truths (which would themselves have to be expressed in further propositions), those truths themselves would likewise have to be understood first. If not, then their truth could not be ascertained. Once again: it is not possible to ascertain the truth of a proposition before it is comprehended.
Now this cannot go on indefinitely; indeed, there appear to be only two ways that an infinite regress can be avoided here:
(1) Language users must have (programmed?) in their minds/brains a set of truths (possibly rules) not themselves expressed in, or expressible by, empirical propositions; that is, they must have direct access to 'non-linguistic' truths or rules -- perhaps written in a 'code' of some sort (which is paradoxically not a code, or the above regress would simply begin again!).25
Or:
(2) The truths on which the sense of empirical propositions depends must be 'necessary' truths whose own truth cannot be questioned, and which must follow from the meaning of the words/concepts they contain/express, and not from still further truths. But even here, truth would still be parasitic on meaning.
Unfortunately, as we will soon see, 'necessary truths' have no sense and are thus incapable of being true or false. That will, of course, rule out option (2).
But worse, as noted, option (2) concedes that meaning precedes truth anyway, for the truth of such 'necessarily true' propositions follows from the meanings of their constituent terms. In that case, there would clearly be no good reason to postulate the existence of such necessary truths in order to avoid the initial idea that meaning depends on truth, since in the end this option relies on the assumption that at some point meaning is sui generis, and not dependent on truth.
Moreover, with respect to the first alternative, the idea that there could be sets of 'non-linguistic' truths in nature that govern the sense of propositions is manifestly (and is, as we will see, surreptitiously) based on the ancient idea that nature is Mind or Thought (or that it is constituted by one or both). In this particular case, it trades on the additional belief that language is governed by nature's own 'pre-linguistic ideas', or 'laws', and that it is the allegedly intelligent/rational universe that lends to human discourse the meaning it has. As will, I hope, seem obvious, this view naturally meshes with representationalism, for given this approach we represent to ourselves meaning naturally (or 'lawfully'), and this is induced in each of us as bourgeois social atoms. In this way, meaning is a 'natural', not a social phenomenon.
[This was explored at length in Essay Three Part Two.]
In fact, the same comment could be made about the idea that language is governed by rules that are genetically programmed into the central nervous system (which would, of course, make these part of the 'rational universe' -- but, in this case, only by anthropomorphising the brain, etc.). This view would imply that language (or the rules underlying it) is an agent itself, and that in turn would be to reify and fetishise the products of social interaction (language/words) as if they were the real relation among things (or, indeed, between neurons), or were those things themselves (to paraphrase Marx).
[The liberal use of metaphor and neologisms in theories that give expression to this most recent ideological inversion, rather give the game away, one feels.]26
Naturally, philosophers of a more 'robust' theoretical temperament have rejected this sort of response (for all manner of reasons), arguing perhaps that there must be physical/causal laws governing the way human beings form true propositions, or which give meaning to the words they use --, and that our understanding of language should be 'naturalised' accordingly.
There are however several major difficulties with this approach.
[The above is a link to a PDF.]
First, we have as yet no idea what such 'laws' would even look like -- let alone what they are.
Second, this account of the origin and nature of language would in fact reduplicate the 'problem' it was meant to solve. There is and could be no conceivable 'law' (or set of 'laws') capable of doing all that is claimed for it which does not in the event anthropomorphise nature or read into it the very linguistic categories it was supposed to explain.27
Thirdly, if language is a product of causal law -- if discourse is fundamentally representational -- then reference to its social nature would be an empty gesture. As noted above, Marxists who have been all too easily seduced into accepting one or other version of this 'robust view' (as a result perhaps of their unwise adherence to concepts derived from DM, and/or from either Chomsky or Quine) have universally failed to appreciate this as one of its corollaries.28
Finally, but most importantly, another implication of the idea that understanding language is parasitic on truth (at some point) is that if this were so, paradoxically, it could not be so. This is because this way of viewing discourse gets things the wrong way round (i.e., it has once more been inverted): the establishment of the truth-value of a proposition is consequent on its already having been understood. Humans do not first appropriate truths and then proceed to comprehend them. Communication and thus representation would be impossible if that were the case.29
On the contrary, as was also noted earlier, if the sense of a proposition were not independent of the truth it expressed, then plainly the mere fact that a proposition had been understood would entail it was true. Naturally, if that were the case, linguistic or psychological factors would determine the veracity of empirical propositions, and science would become little more than a branch of hermeneutics.
Hence, given the above 'inverted' approach, as soon as a proposition had been understood its truth could be inferred automatically. Clearly, this would destroy the distinction between empirical and non-empirical propositions, for, on that basis, as soon as anyone understood M6, for example, they would know it was true.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of TAR.
In this way, we can see how representationalism requires all indicative propositions to be of the same logical form (whether or not this is immediately apparent). At some point, on this view, all indicative propositions must be, or must depend on necessary truths which reflect in our minds how things must be, and cannot be thought otherwise (i.e., their opposite is "unthinkable").
And that is why this view of language, knowledge and mind so naturally fits in with apriorism, and with the idea that fundamental truths about nature are accessible to thought alone, and can be derived by thought alone --, and can thus be imposed on reality.
Hence, if in the end M6 depends on a necessary truth of some sort (or if it is a disguised necessary truth itself -- that is, in this case, Blair had no choice, his ownership of TAR was determined by the operation of a necessary law of some sort (a là DM), or by the unfolding of his 'concept' (a là Hegel), or by his implicit predicates (a là Leibniz)), then ultimately its truth can be ascertained without the need for material evidence. All one would have to do is to comprehend this sentence for it to be true.
[Naturally, that would make falsehood impossible to explain; more on that in Essay Three Part Three.]
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism.]
As now seems plain, this would imply that scientific knowledge is itself based on yet another form of LIE: truths about the world follow from thought/linguistic principles alone. The mind, in reflecting the world, merely reflects itself in self-development, because the world is Mind.
Apriorism and LIE thus go hand-in-hand.
[Fortunately, this whole way of looking at language and knowledge is undermined by the approach adopted here.]30
In that case, whatever lends sense to empirical propositions (i.e., whatever sets the conditions under which they are true or false) cannot itself be a set of antecedent truths. Neither could it be a set of ex post facto truths.31
In contrast, since the socially-sanctioned rules governing the use of language are incapable of being either true or false, they are not subject to the above strictures.32
These considerations also apply to scientific language if it is to function as a means of communication (and derivatively of representation).33
Hence, whatever else lends sense to empirical scientific propositions, it cannot be a set of truths. If the sense of scientific propositions were dependent on such a set, scientists would only be able to understand each other after they had learnt those truths. In which case, of course, they could not be learnt. Clearly, there are no propositions by means of which this could be done that are exempt from the very same constraints.
Furthermore, if the sense of an empirical scientific proposition was dependent on certain truths about the world -- so that, for example, the comprehension of that proposition implied it was automatically true --, that would mean that scientists could abandon experimentation and simply take up linguistic analysis. Science would then become indistinguishable from Metaphysics, or from LIE, for in that case to understand a proposition would be to know it was true.34
Naturally, all this just confirms the claim that scientific language is, like the vernacular, conventional.
Admittedly, these claims are controversial.35 They appear to imply that science is not based on facts, but on conventions. However, that belief is itself based on a serious misconception.*