Essay Eleven Part One -- The Totality: A Complete Mystery
This Essay, as with all the others at this site, does not represent my final views on any of the issues it raises, and is merely 'work in progress'.
Apart from Essay Three Part Two, this has been the most difficult Essay to write so far. This is because so little has been published in the 'dialectical' literature over the last 200 years to help the bemused critic understand what dialecticians are referring to when they talk about the "Totality" -- as will soon become apparent to those who might think otherwise.
Hence, attacking this notion is like punching a blancmange; but even then, one would at least have something to aim at.
Finally, it is worth pointing out up-front that in what follows I will not be discussing holist ideas applied to the understanding of human social and economic development (unless, of course, these involve the use of Hegelian concepts), since that would involve issues arising in Historical Materialism, a theory I fully accept.
Hence, both Parts of Essay Eleven are concerned solely with Dialectical Materialism -- i.e., with holist ideas applied to the natural world.
This Essay is just over 53,000 words long; a summary of some of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections:
(1) The Mystery Of The Totality
(b) 'God', The "Totality", And Negative Theology
(c) The "It's Everything" Gambit
(2) What Do The Dialectical Prophets Say?
(3) Where The Shoe Originally Pinched -- John Rees's Theory
(a) TAR Bottles It
(b) Putting The Part Before The Horse
(4) It's An Awful Job, But Someone Has To Do It
(d) A Fit-Up?
(f) The Elusive Membership List
(g) Ontological Blank Cheque For Scientists?
(h) 'Objectively' On, Then Off The Cosmic List
(5) Universal Interconnection -- Fact Or Fancy?
(a) Precisely What Is interconnected With What?
(b) Interconnectionism Comes Apart At The Seams
(c) Maximal Interconnectionism
(d) Non-Maximal Interconnectionism
(6) The Epistemological Definition
(a) What Do We Know?
(b) Kant's Noumenon By Any Other Name
(7) The "Totality" -- Universal And A Priori
(a) Surely Not
(b) What Else Could A Totality Be?
(c) Is Dialectical Materialism A Conventionalist Theory?
(d) Is Dialectical Materialism A Metaphysical Theory, Then?
(e) Is Dialectical Materialism A Scientific Theory?
(f) Guilty As Charged -- Not A Scientific Theory
(a) Dialectics Collapses Yet Again
(b) Just A Method?
(9) Pick Your Mystic
(10) Dialectical Contradictions -- Different?
(11) The Dialecticians' Dilemma -- Again
(12) The 'Heraclitean Flux' -- Fact Or Fancy?
(13) Notes
(14) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
Hamlet Without The Prince
Imagine, if you will, Hamlet without the Prince, or at least without a single description of 'him' -- such as, whether 'he' is indeed a Prince, male or female, or even whether 'he' is a human being. Questions would rightly be asked about what that character's role could possibly be in a play supposedly about 'him', just as they would be asked about the competence of its author, William Shakespeare.
Fortunately, we need not so indulge our fancies.
But, imagine now, if you can, a theory that tells us, among other things: (1) that it is the "world-view" of the proletariat, (2) that it is the general theory of all that exists and how it changes, (3) that everything is interconnected in something called the "Totality", and (4) that this notion is a centrally-important concept of that theory, to such an extent that nothing can be understood without it.
Imagine, too, the unlikely event that every one of its theorists studiously refused to say what this "Totality" actually is, or what those interconnections are --, or even how they know so much about such a perennially empty notion.
Imagine no more! For that theory is DIM, and those theorists are dialecticians --, and they are world champion prevaricators.
[DIM = Dialectical Marxism; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
If you still have doubts, I invite you to search through their writings (and for my sins, I have) -- even if you are the slightest bit interested, you will find precious little to help you decide what DIM is actually about, for its most avid supporters have yet to tell anyone (least of all one another) what their mysterious "Totality" actually is.
So, this is not so much Hamlet without the Prince, as it is Hamlet without the, er...well, what?
Indeed, over the last twenty years or, I have made it a point of asking the many DM-fans I know, or have met, what they think the "Totality" is. Most were either slightly puzzled or somewhat miffed that I even dared to ask such an impertinent question. Some responded with "Nature, what else?", but refused to say anymore (perhaps because, as we will soon discover, there is no more to be said). Others gestured airily toward the heavens and said "All that!", rather like parents who try to explain to little children where 'God' is with an "He's up there, in heaven", wafting their hands vaguely upwards. Still others confessed they did not know, but declared that they still believed in it, just like those tiny children with hand-waving parents.
Some, of a scientific frame-of-mind, referred me to the "Big Bang", forgetting that this is a theory of origins; it tells us nothing about "everything", as we will also soon find out.
Now, readers of a more kindly disposition might be tempted to respond thus: "This cannot be so. Surely someone has specified clearly what the DM-"Totality" is. After all, dialecticians have had at least 150 years to come up with something!"
To be sure, a few of the DM-faithful have offered the world a handful of vague ideas, casually linking them to that mysterious being, the "Totality" --, but beyond that, they have sat on their hands or looked the other way.
I suspect these guys could prevaricate for their country.
In fact, dialecticians are remarkably coy about the "Totality", and it is not difficult to see why: there isn't one.
Or rather: there is in fact no way of referring to whatever it is they think they want to refer to.
"God", The "Totality", And The Via Negativa
Just as it is impossible to say what 'God' is, it is impossible to say what the "Totality" is. This is not so much because of what either word might seem to mean, but because both are in fact meaningless (and this is so for remarkably similar reasons).
For believers, 'God' is unlike anything you or I or anyone else could possibly imagine or conceive. Anyone who thinks differently has simply latched onto an inferior sort of 'being', in whose praise is not worth persecuting a single heretic.
Naturally, this means that the faithful have found it impossible to speak of 'God' except by using inappropriate metaphors.
[In that case, is "God" really a father? With sexual organs, and all that goes with this idea? What's that, you say? 'He' has none at all! In what sense therefore is 'He' a he...?
You get the picture.]
More sophisticated theologians use analogies to help us understand. Unfortunately, even though some of the mediating terms they employ are well understood (again, such as "father", and "son"), the intentional target of all this analogising isn't. What precisely is being analogised?
Failing both, believers fall back on a via negativa; so, 'God' is not this, not that, not...
As that lapsed right wing atheist Anthony Flew once observed: in this way 'God' slowly dies "the death of a thousand qualifications"; in the end 'He' is really different from nothing at all.
[On this, see Flew (1963), p.97. Flew's 'sort-of conversion' (but see here) was based on flawed science, anyway.]
But, if we know nothing of 'God', how is the use of that word any different from employing, say, "slithy tove"? Save an appeal being made to a not very appealing tradition --, where the word "God" has been used to depict all manner of things -- from money, to the powers of nature, to various Roman Emperors, to.., yes, Eric Clapton --, what can the faithful point to, to explain this word to those who simply see before them three letters ("G", "o", and "d"), congealed on the page into an inky sort of Trinity?
Figure One: Is Clapton 'God'? Figure Two: This Album Says 'Maybe'
In like manner, to what can the DM-faithful appeal in order to help us materialist non-believers comprehend their invisible Being?
As we will soon find out, this inverted Deity -- the "Totality" -- will also die the death of a thousand qualifications; or perhaps better: the death of a thousand prevarications.
At this point, some might be tempted to respond with the "Everything" ploy (as in "Sod it, it is perfectly clear what that the "Totality" is: it is everything!").
Unfortunately, that reply would be of no use either since it would simply prompt this further annoying question: "And what does that include?" And as we will also discover, there is no way to answer that query that does not sink DM one millimetre per second slower than it did Theology.
Does this this "everything" include everything that exists now, has once existed, will one day exist, could exist, or might have existed? Is it everything that has been thought about, not thought about, discovered, not discovered, found then lost (like Phlogiston), lost then found, then lost again (like Democritus and then Dalton's indivisible atoms)? Does it include the 'Gods' of the entire Apache Nation (surely they are part of 'everything'..., or are they?) and the mythical beasts of yore?
[Who knows, scientists might unearth one or more of these some day? Look at the Coelacanth, glypheoid lobsters, jurodid beetles...]
Does it include, or exclude, the edge of the universe? Indeed, does 'everything' have a boundary? If not, how can it be a totality (as opposed to being an open-ended infinite sort of ontological smear)? On the other hand, if it has a boundary, then is that boundary itself part of everything? If it isn't, it cannot be the boundary of everything, can it? [Otherwise it would have to be the boundary of itself!] Alternatively once more, if it is the boundary of everything, then does this new ensemble (i.e., 'everything' plus its boundary) have a boundary, too, and does that, and that, and...?
Once more, you get the picture.
[TOR = Theory of Relativity.]
Some might now seek leave to appeal to ideas drawn from the TOR, pointing out that the universe is in fact finite and unbounded, this being the "Totality". The former I do not wish to deny, but since we do not as yet know if the picture painted by TOR applies to our universe, it can hardly feature in a rebuttal of the above. Anyway, as we will also see, the TOR itself is no friend of DM.
And to cap it all, there actually have been, and there still are DM-theorists who deny the universe is finite. [More on that below, too.]
At this point it is worth noticing that we seem to be encountered the same sort of problems we met earlier in relation to the obscure metaphors the faithful use to depict 'God'.
Keep that worrying thought in mind as this Essay develops.
As I aim to show, even if it were possible to find answers to the above perplexing questions, our problems would only just be starting, for as Russell's Paradox has taught us, unless we define "everything" very carefully, and eminently arbitrarily, we will end up with a "Totality" that contains things it does not contain!
[A recent criticism of so-called "universally unrestricted quantification" can be found in Hellman (2006).]
Down this road, one suspects, lies our very own dialectical via negativa.
On the other hand, even if we manage to define it carefully, such a "Totality" would plainly be a creature of convention --, and like "God", a purely human invention.
No wonder DM-fans go quiet when asked about their 'God'..., er, their "Totality".
In their unenviable position, I think I would too.
Well, What Do The Dialectical Prophets Say?
The short answer is "Not a lot"; the long answer is "Not a lot."
Engels, as usual, writes much, but manages to say little:
"When we consider and reflect upon Nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away....
"We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather than the things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away....
"[The] new German philosophy culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great merit -- for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change, transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development." [Engels (1892), pp.405-08.]
"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms, indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the last named. In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels (1954), p.70.]
So, no clearer then.
Is 'comrade' Stalin of any assistance?
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard Nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things…are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.
"The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in Nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena….
"The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being….
"Speaking of the materialist views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all is one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the rudiments of dialectical materialism.' [Lenin (1961), p.347.]" [Stalin (1941), pp.837-38, 845. I have used a different edition of Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks here.]
Unfortunately not.
What about Bukharin?
"I am now writing on paper with a pen. I thus impart pressures to the table; the table presses on the earth, calling forth a number of further changes. I move my hand, vibrate as I breathe, and these motions pass on in slight impulses ending Lord knows where. The fact that these may be but small changes does not change the essential nature of the matter. All things in the universe are connected with an indissoluble bond…." [Bukharin (1925), p.66.]
We need not labour the point.1 A few years ago, Martin Jay published an excellent book (called Marxism And Totality. The Adventures Of A Concept From Lukács To Habermas [Jay (1984)]), but in over 500 pages he managed to avoid telling us what the title of his book was actually about.
To be sure, in Chapter One, Jay very usefully summarised classic and early modern Holist theories of nature and society, but those theories were themselves equally vague. And despite the fact that he found little material in the DM-classics (or in the writings of 'systematic' and other academic dialecticians) to help him, Jay simply ducked the question whether Greek and early modern ideas of nature, or of 'the Whole', were the same as, or were different from each other --, or, indeed, were the same as, or were different from the DM-"Totality".
In fact, how would we be able to tell?
How would it be possible for anyone to decide whether Hegel's ideas in this area were the same as, say, Plato's? Or those of Plotinus? Or, those of the "Wholes" that feature in most mystical systems -- in fact, in all of them -- that use similar-looking language?
Now, if the use of certain words, which boast similar letters, were enough to identify the items so depicted, we would be able to conclude that, for example, Plato's "Forms" were the same as those complicated sheets of paper you have to fill in to get a driving licence.
And, does anyone have an identikit picture of the "Totality", which allows them to pick this mysterious object out in a Cosmic line-up? Has anyone seen its likeness in the sand, in the clouds, or on Mars --, as some claim to have of Jesus or Mary?
Indeed, what is the criterion of identity for mystical Totalities?
Of course, this puzzle is not helped at all by the fact that none of the ancients were all that specific -- and neither were the mystics, for obvious reasons. After all, a crystal clear mystic would lose his/her licence to confuse!
But, of the lot, the Dialectical Mystics are the most vague. Prevarication taken way beyond the call of duty.
So, this is not so much a line-up as a Dialectical-Mystery tour.
The rest of Jay's book is devoted to expounding what various prolix and eminently incomprehensible DM-authors thought about history, society, and the economy as sub-totalities. But, as far as can be determined, the "Totality" itself is conspicuous by its universal absence from Jay's book. Now that in itself is quite remarkable; in fact it is decidedly odd -- just as odd in fact as if Darwin had forgotten to mention natural selection, or had omitted all talk of species in his masterpiece, Origin.
This is not to pick on Jay, since his book is an excellent guide in this area -- a sort of Dialectician's Alice, as it were. To be sure, if anyone wants to know what modern day DIMs think of social wholes (albeit, expressed in what looks like an obscure Venusian dialect), this is the book to consult.
However, we still missing the Prince of Denmark.
Some in the audience are getting restless.
They want their money back...
Where The Shoe Originally Pinched
Now, this project began years back as a lengthy review of John Rees's book The Algebra Of Revolution [Rees (1998a), or TAR], which, for all its faults, is widely influential in one of the most geographically-extensive Trotskyist tendencies on the planet (the IST). In that case, it is well-placed to do real harm. Moreover, since Rees is one of the most recent DM-authors to put the "Totality" at the centre of his thought --, it seems reasonable to start with his account.
In view of the foregoing, it is no surprise therefore to find that even though Rees clearly believes that the "Totality" is a centrally-important DM-concept [Rees (1998a), pp.5-8], and apart from a few rather vague gestures at defining this term, he never really tells us what it is!
One of the only attempts made in TAR to explain this notion is the following:
"Totality refers to the insistence that the various seemingly separate elements of which the world is composed are in fact related to each other." [Rees (1998a), p.5.]
This passage does not appear to be worded correctly, for it tells us that the "Totality" is in fact an "insistence".
Can this be what "everything" is: an "insistence"?
Is this what the Big Bang ushered forth? An ever-expanding "insistence"?
This seems to suggest that Rees intends the word "Totality" to be understood methodologically, which would in turn appear to indicate that the idea that nature is a unified whole is either a useful fiction or it merely serves as a statement of intent.
Who can say?
Unfortunately, there are few other clues in TAR that help the bemused reader understand the nature of this supposedly key DM-concept.
One of these is a passage that also endeavours to link the "Totality" with "universal interconnectedness", which is something we saw other DM-theorists (above) claim to be able to see in nature:
"[The] natural and social world [form] a single totality developing over time as a result of…internal contradictions….
"[N]ature is an interconnected system that developed for millions of years before humans." [Ibid., pp.285-86.]2
This appears to equate the "Totality" with nature, but as we shall soon see this is far too vague to be of much use to anyone other than a child.
Worse: this does not really distinguish DM from Hermeticism:
"Another parallel between Hermeticism and Hegel is the doctrine of internal relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines 'As above, so below.' This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is reflected.
"...The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies." [Magee (2001), p.13. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. More on this topic here.]
[HM = Historical Materialism.]
Now, with respect to the alleged social aspects of the "Totality", they are clearly connected with issues that arise in HM, discussion of which will largely be omitted from this Essay. Since I do not deny that HM relies on factors governing the whole of human history, there is nothing much for me to question in this regard.3
Nevertheless, one important aspect of Rees's use of this (as yet unexplained) concept is the relationship that he and other dialecticians claim exists between parts and wholes:
"In a dialectical system, the entire nature of the part is determined by its relationship with the other parts and so with the whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts…. In this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of the parts but also that the parts become more than they are individually by being part of the whole…." [Ibid., p.5.]4
The problem with this is that it still does not tell us what the "Totality" is --, nor is it clear what the "parts" are, either.
As far as I can ascertain, this is practically all that Rees has to say about this allegedly important topic.5 Clearly, this creates serious problems from the start; the uninformed reader has as yet no idea what Rees (or any other DM-theorist) is referring to. As we have seen, one will look in vain in other DM-texts for further clarification.6
Putting The Part Before The Horse
Anyway, if, according to Rees, "the part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts", it would in fact be impossible for anyone to say exactly what this mysterious "whole" amounted to before they were clear about the nature of every single part.
In turn, it would be impossible to determine the nature of a single one of these parts before the entire whole was comprehended.
As seems clear, that would mean it would be impossible for anyone to grasp a single rudimentary fact about part or whole since no one would know anything about either before they knew everything about both.
As is well-known, this was just one of the epistemological holes into which Hegelian Idealism dropped itself.7
But, whatever steps Hegelians finally took (or still take) to haul themselves out of this bottomless pit -- whether successful or not --, they do not appear to be available to DM-theorists. This is because the latter must base their comments on evidence, not on conceptual chicanery. But, what sort of evidence could they appeal to that was not similarly compromised? Manifestly, since relevant evidence itself relates to --, and is comprised of --, such 'parts', then the nature of each 'part' that is constitutive of this evidence could not, on this view, be ascertained until the whole had been, and vice versa.
There thus seems to be no way of breaking into this Idealist circle: the status of any and all evidence would not be known until the whole had been, and the nature of the whole could not be grasped as a material whole if there is no determinate physical evidence to delineate it.8
In that case, the part undermines the whole just as the whole undermines the part.
This might explain why Rees was so cagey about the "Totality", and why his 'definition' was little more than a gesture: there is nothing that could have been said about this nebulous concept and its ghostly parts that would be consonant with a believable form of materialism.9
Nevertheless, even though it seems clear that nothing could be said about the "Totality", or its parts, before everything was known about both, it is worth remembering that even an attempt to try to say something about either could not itself be done, since, ex hypothesi, nothing would be known about the parts (and hence the whole) until the end of an infinite epistemological journey:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35. Bold emphasis added.]
"…[T]he concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Conrad Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), p.457. Bold emphasis added.]
"But there are more than these two properties and qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Lenin (1921), pp.92-93. Bold emphasis added.]
This, of course, is one of the least appreciated consequences of 'inverting' Hegelian Idealism: material reality may only be comprehended by beginning at the end!
Not even the Owl of Minerva would be identifiable until Epistemological Judgement Day, by which time who would there be left to care whether it flew or not? [More on this here.]
It's An Awful Job, But Someone Has to Do It
Consequently, in the absence of anything even remotely resembling a loose sort of characterisation (let alone a definition), we are forced to press the question DM-theorists consistently avoid: What exactly is the DM-"Totality"?
I propose to examine two possible approaches to this problem. The first introduces what I shall call the "Ontological Definition" of the "Totality" (because it involves a consideration of a likely contents list); the second I propose to call the "Epistemological Definition" (because it links this mysterious 'being' to the current extent of human knowledge, experience and practice).
Since the next few sections are somewhat explorative, less committed readers might want to skip them and begin again here.
In response to the above, it could be objected that it is perfectly clear that the "Totality" includes everything in the Universe --, or everything in existence.
End of story.
But, not so fast: does this "everything" include "Possible Worlds", which some philosophers and scientists believe to be actual? [Cf., Lewis (1986). See also Divers (2002).]
Maybe not; but how do we know?
[In fact, I give a novel solution to this 'problem' in another Essay, to be posted later.]
Be this at it may, the problem with this revealingly quick response is that it is at once too vague and too generous.
Why this is so will now be explored.
The Polo Mint Totality: A Whole With A Hole In It
If the "Totality" includes everything that exists, several other questions automatically arise. For instance: Does the "Totality" comprise all that exists in the present, or does it include all that 'exists' in the past? Since DM-theorists seek an historical explanation of the development of class society (etc.), and because they think everything in nature and society is interconnected, it seems they must view both the past and present as parts of their "Totality".
But, if, as seems to be the case, the past is no more, how can it be part of anything, let alone the "Totality"?10
On the other hand, if the "Totality" does include the past, that can only mean the "Totality" contains things that do and things that do not exist --, unless, that is, we are to suppose that things in the past still exist.
However, if the latter do not still exist, that further implies that the "Totality" contains some things that 'exist' only as ideas about the past, entertained in the mind of someone stuck in the ephemeral present. If that is so, does this not mean that the "Totality" is part material (the present), and part Ideal?
But, how is it possible for ideas of the past to be interconnected with everything that currently exists in the universe? Worse, what was the past interconnected with before any ideas were formed about it --, i.e., before conscious life evolved?11
Furthermore, but more worryingly, any ideas we have of the past plainly correspond with nothing at all, since the past does not exist for anything to correspond with 'it'. In that case, the "Totality" cannot even be objectively Ideal -- at least, not with respect to the past -- let alone material.
In that case, one half of the supposed correspondence relation between our ideas of the past and the past itself would not, on this interpretation of the DM-'Totality', exist, which must in turn mean there could be no 'objective' relationship between our ideas of the past and the past itself --, certainly not one of correspondence.
In order to avoid these insoluble problems, we might be tempted to restrict the "Totality" to things that exist only in the present, to objects and processes that enjoy contemporary material existence.
But, this option creates several serious problems of its own. For example, the "Totality" would then contain no historically significant events (or worse, no historical events at all), without which nothing that happens in the present would have taken place. Depicted this way, the "Totality" would surely become explanatorily useless, since an appeal would now have to be made to 'things' outside the "Totality" to account for things inside it!
Indeed, if the "Totality" were circumscribed in this way, it would become precariously ephemeral. This is because the present is of extremely limited duration. Thus, a very slender (if not terminally anorexic) "Totality" would be implied, if this option were correct.
Is the DM-Totality therefore a Whole with a huge Hole in it -- or, is there no substance to it at all?
Figure Three: The Totality? All Hole, Little Substance?
Now some readers might be forgiven their impatience at this point, for it might seem to them that the present author is putting words in the mouths of these comrades. Unfortunately, speculation has been forced upon us because of the extremely limited information to be found in DM-writings about the "Totality".
Others might think that all this is hyper-pedantic. On that, see here.
To continue: If the past, which now exists only as an idea (or better still, which now only 'exists' conceptually), is to be included as part of the Whole, then the vast bulk of the "Totality" must be Ideal. This is because, of course, the past is far longer than the present.
Several other rather surprising conclusions follow from this, and from the CTT --, a theory of truth widely accepted in DM-circles. [More on this in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two.]
If propositions about the past are true just in case they correspond with events in the past, then it would be impossible ever to declare them true. This is because there exists nothing with which they could correspond, since the past is no more.
[CTT = Correspondence Theory of Truth.]
To be sure, we may draw true or false conclusions about the past from the evidence before us, but such evidence (of necessity) exists only in the present. Not only that, but whatever this evidence once related to plainly no longer exists, so it is difficult to see how such non-existents could form part of a correspondence relation with anything else, or in any obvious sense of that phrase -- over and above an obvious retreat into Idealism, that is.
In response to this it could be argued that the past is an objective feature of reality, hence the above conclusions are completely misguided.
And yet, the meaning of the term "objective" is itself highly unclear (as will be demonstrated in a later Essay), but whatever it does mean, it would be of little use here, anyway. This is because it would still be unclear how anything (such as the past) could be "objective" if it does not exist. 'Objectivity', seemingly, has something to do with existence independent of the human mind, and yet we appear to have something here (the past) that does not exist except we form ideas of it; in which case, it is not independent of the mind, and so cannot be "objective".
Again, it could be argued that our beliefs about the past are true just in case they correspond with past events. The existence of the latter might in turn be confirmed or refuted by an appeal to evidence (in the form of documents, artefacts and assorted remains, etc.).
But, this does not alter the fact that the past no longer is, nor does it change the fact that the confirmation of claims made about the past requires the use of contemporary objects and events -- that is, it necessitates the use of evidence situated in the present, consideration of which is albeit augmented by the use of past tense verbs. Naturally, this is because extant evidence (i.e., in the shape of the aforementioned documents, artefacts and assorted remains) clearly exists in the present. Without the help of a working time machine, we would have no access to evidence from the past that is still located there --, i.e., in the past.
Even then, and supposing for the moment we could 'visit' it, it would still be evidence that exists in the then present (to us), as it was being examined --, in the past!
Truths about the present are quite unlike those about the past -- whatever we finally conclude about the nature of supporting evidence. This can be seen by the way we form sentences relevant to each: plainly, we use expressions with differentially tensed verbs. This is partly where the attempted rebuttal recorded above itself went wrong; it failed to explain -- as similar ones must always do without just such a use of suitably tensed verbs -- precisely what it is that contemporary propositions about the past are supposed to correspond with, if one half of the alleged relation does not exist.12
To be sure, this serious difficulty does not just plague the CTT when it is applied to past events; the CTT collapses into some form of Idealism whatever time period is chosen for it (as will be demonstrated in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two).
Philosophical 'problems' like this (concerning past, present and future) often arise out of an inappropriate interpretation of phrases like "the past", "the present" and "the future". It has thus seemed to some that if such expressions resemble names (or if they appear to be referring expressions), then they must designate, or name, something, which 'something' must therefore exist, and it must do so somewhere. A philosophical search is then initiated to locate these pseudo-entities, which, alas, were the sole creation of an over-active mind, compounded by a crass misuse of language.13
But, plainly, if the past exists, we seem forced to use the present tense to refer to it -- as has just been done in this very sentence. Naturally, if we interpret those words just as crassly, it would mean that the past was no longer in the past, but in the present(!) -- implying that the past had in fact been mis-'named'.14
The depiction of the past in this way is thoroughly inappropriate, for it makes it look as if its existence were an empirical issue, resembling that of, say, Bigfoot -- only far more difficult to pin down.
If something exists we should at least (in theory) be able to hunt it down, even if we can't do so at present (no pun intended). Unless we believe in time travel (a notion that arises precisely out of confusions like this, anyway -- more on that in a later Essay), this is not possible.
Clearly, these terminological difficulties have arisen because of an inappropriate and misleading analogy, that drawn between space and time. This imagery suggests (clearly to some) that just as objects in space can be located somewhere, those 'in time' can be located 'somewhen', with the latter being given a new slant by making it resemble spatial location, perhaps by means of a fourth axis tacked onto the Cartesian (or some other) co-ordinate system.15
Clearly, an analogy of this sort ought to sanction the following parallel argument: since some future-tense indicative sentences are true now, they must correspond with events which have yet to occur, but which must also now exist (present tense!) in a shadowy form in 'the Future'. Unfortunately, that would place these future events in the present too!
Naturally, this would mean that all events -- past, present and future -- must co-exist!
As may readily be appreciated, this would 'solve' the problem by destroying time altogether.16 This sort of metaphysical scorched earth policy, of course, has no viable future -- or none worth mentioning in present company.17
The Elusive Membership List
In order to neutralise/side-step awkward questions like these, perhaps we should simply declare that the "Totality" incorporates everything that exists --, but a-temporally? However, that particular descriptor is of little help since it is unclear what could exist in such a way, except, perhaps, a 'Deity'.
[That, of course, would link the "Totality" even more closely to those earlier ruminations about "God".]
More specifically, we need a membership list; if we knew what we were talking about, the nature of this elusive "Totality" might become clearer.
To that end, it's worth asking whether the "Totality" includes all material objects, but excludes non-material abstractions -- like courage, generosity, justice and equality (etc.). But, as we saw in Essay Two and Essay Three Parts One and Two, DM-theorists have yet to tell us with what exactly such abstractions correspond.
So, it might be wise to throw these bogus creations of Greek grammar overboard now. And yet, that would scupper the 'dialectical' theory of knowledge; in that case, the DM-"Totality" must contain abstractions.
Please do not ask me where such abstractions reside. [In 'heaven' with 'God'?] May I suggest to puzzled readers, therefore, that they contact they local DM-soothsayer, who, in response to such an impertinent enquiry, will wave his/her arms vaguely heavenward --, if you are lucky.
And if you are a child, you will of course believe all you see and hear.
Moving on: what about scientific/theoretical entities, such as Quarks, Superstrings, Wormholes, energy, force, genes, species and genera? Do these belong to the "Totality" --, or not? Are mathematical concepts and objects -- such as, π, e, Matrices, Complex Numbers, Partial Derivatives, Banach Space, Hermite Polynomials, the Kronecker delta, Abelian Groups, Transfinite Cardinals (etc.) to be excluded or included?
Well then, what about the properties of objects that depend either on their disposition or on their relation to other bodies, such as size, velocity, weight, and hardness? Do these make the list? Should we then not also add in the apparent properties of matter, such as solidity, liquidity, colour, smell, taste, and sound? But, according to some, these depend solely on their being perceived by sentient beings, which would mean that they are not 'objective' (even if they do seem to exercise some sort of causal influence on material bodies). Is that sufficient reason to strike them from the cosmic record, or not?
What then should we decide about genuine oddities such as corners, surfaces and shapes? These strange beings seem to disappear at the micro-level, and several even depend on the point of view of the observer. In that case, can they be part of the 'objective' "Totality"?18
But, what are we to conclude about those aspects of reality whose natures are even more obscure? For example, what are we to make of mathematical fictions like the average worker, the mean square velocity of gas molecules (in the Kinetic Theory of Gases), the probability of an event, Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient, the centre of mass of the Solar System and the moment of a force? Despite the fact that these are human constructs, some of them appear to exercise a significant causal influence on material objects. In that case, are they 'objective', 'subjective', both or neither?
What, though, are we to say of things whose status is far more problematic, such as vacua, mirages, illusions, holes, shadows, the 'Unconscious', mirror and lens images, para-reflections, the perspectival properties of bodies, phantom limbs, dreams, rainbows, fogbows, The Brocken Spectre, Heilgenschein, The Glory, The Bishop's Ring, Ice Halos, refractions, pains, hallucinations, memories and emotions? And what about things whose nature or existence is either dubious or highly problematic: Phlogiston, Caloric, the Ether, the mysterious powers of the echeneis fish (one widely believed by scientists to be able to halt the passage of ships) N Rays, Orgone, Bio-Energy and Polywater?19
If we disallow some or all of these, how can we consistently admit others that are themselves merely theoretical or are of a highly speculative nature (such as Superstrings, Spacetime, n-dimensional space, branched time zones, Axions, Branes and Black Holes), but which are -- even in comparison with several of the items listed above -- decidedly weird?
Are we to be catholic or exclusive in the way we draw up the membership list -- Bolshevik or Menshevik?
It could be argued that we should admit into the "Totality" all and only those entities that scientists acknowledge -- either now or in the future --, supported by the weight of evidence.
[This is, indeed, what John Somerville, for example, argued here. This comes from Somerville (1967), pp.3-32.]
But, the problem with that response is that it would present scientists with far too generous an ontological 'blank cheque', as it were. In fact, if this were the adopted policy, far too many things in the "Totality" would in fact possess a precarious, or even a fleeting, 'existence'. In that case, just as soon as scientists changed their minds over the nature and existence of any of these ephemeral 'entities' (as they regularly do), their 'temporary residence permits' would have to be revoked.
In addition to several of the items already mentioned (which we might describe as 'virtual', or even 'honorary' members of the "Totality"), the following would possess (or would have possessed) only transient squatters' rights: indivisible atoms, the four forms of matter, entelechies, the fifth element, homunculi, the music of the spheres, the spheres themselves, mermaids, humours, cosmic vortices, substantial forms, effluvia, witches and demons.
As is well-known, scientists used to entertain the existence of some or all of these at one time.
Not only that, we can add to the list several items whose status is at present somewhat dubious, highly questionable, or which might become so soon: the Higgs Boson, 'selfish' genes, I.Q., race, Morphogenic Fields, so-called "homeopathic" phenomena, the "Placebo effect", the graviton, gravitational waves, tachyons, and Gaia.
Does the "Totality" have a sort of 'metaphysical revolving door' to cater for items such as these?20
Finally, what are we to say of the following theoretical entities/processes (whose material nature is problematic, or whose physical existence is decidedly questionable): singularities, elementary particles, electrons travelling backward in time, tetraneutrons, phase space, dark matter, dark energy, energy itself, "the Field", strange attractors, the magnetic monopole, gluinos, photinos, winos, binos, zinos, Cold Fusion, MACHOs and WIMPs?21
Either the existence of all of these should be entertained, or the ones that supposedly do not enjoy 'objectivity' should be filtered out, the rest left alone. But which ones are to be discarded and which retained -- and on what basis?
More importantly: which unfortunate comrade is going to chair the selection panel?22
Objectively On -- Then Off -- The Cosmic List
Worse still, what should we decide when scientists revise their ideas (as they continually do)? Would this mean that (1) the "Totality" itself changes whenever the scientific community ceases to acknowledge the existence of certain formerly 'objective' objects? Or, would this not (2) show that scientists' beliefs about 'objectivity' have altered? In that case, would this not suggest that these formerly 'objective' ideas are really 'subjective', and would that not cast a shadow over the 'objectivity' of science in general?
If the latter were correct, would it still be possible to maintain the superior 'objectivity' of the new universal contents list if another 'ontological re-edit' is due to take place a few years down the line (once again, as invariably happens in science)?22aa
Conversely, if the former option were the case, wouldn't it mean that the actual content of the Totality depended on decisions made by fallible human beings?
So, did the "Totality" change, for example, when early modern scientists decided that the "fifth element" no longer made it onto the bench?
But, if the decisions of scientists determine what constitutes the 'objective' members list, then the "Totality" itself must change with scientific fashion. Did it change again, therefore, when astronomers concluded that the planet Vulcan was imaginary? Or, was that 'planet' suspended in a sort of 'objective/subjective limbo' world (subsisting away perhaps in a sort of Meinongian ante-chamber somewhere?), while researchers finally make up their minds? Will the "Totality" alter once more if Superstrings are granted (or denied) 'objective existence' some day? They have already been partially transmogrified into Branes!
Is, therefore, the "Totality" an artefact of whim? Is it 'objective' in a 'subjective' sort of sense? Does it depend on who is on the Metaphysical Review Board? Is it selection-panel sensitive?
This is not a very promising start -- but, mercifully, it gets worse.
If we can't decide on what basis to include or exclude things from this avowedly contradictory "Totality", then perhaps it includes things that not only do not exist, but things that cannot exist?22a
This latest possibility now poses far more serious problems for any attempt to construct an Ontological Definition of the "Totality". This is because several DM-theses indicate that the 'perimeter fence' (as it were) encircling the "Totality" is full of holes.
In fact, the DM-Totality looks more like a colander than it does a wok.
Figure Four: Is This The "Totality"?
While rival ontological systems operate with some sort of closed-border policy -- admitting the existence of certain things, but disallowing others -- it turns out that DM-theorists may not reject anything at all, since they openly admit (if not adamantly insist upon) the existence of contradictions -- and countless trillions of them (indeed, possibly hundreds, if not thousands, in each atom in the entire universe)!
Hence, the 'DM-boundary-fence' is not so much porous as non-existent. The "Totality", it seems, could contain anything, including impossible objects -- not just contradictory objects and processes, but mythical and imaginary ones, too. Maybe it includes four-edged hexagons, the round square, the golden mountain, unicorns, all the Olympian Gods, the end of the rainbow and the Adhedral Triangle?
Anyone tempted to respond here that the above list is absurd since it contains contradictory items, which can be ruled out in advance, should once more consult their local dialectical oracle before they jump to such hasty conclusions. In fact, given well-known DM-principles, it is not easy to see how any of the above (and more) may be rejected on such a convenient, a priori basis.
Thus, if the DM-"Totality" is to be rescued from oblivion, some way must be found to stop these and countless other absurdities before they cross its irresponsibly porous boundary.
It could be objected here that this is just ridiculous; dialecticians only acknowledge the existence of contradictions that can be empirically verified. Hence, they do not countenance the actuality of such 'theoretical' contradictions, nor do they admit the mere existence of all 'contradictory', imaginary, and impossible objects.
But, this counter-claim is demonstrably incorrect, as we will soon see. And, even if DM-theorists do not admit that these entities exist, there is nothing in their 'logic' to rule them out.
Again, it could be argued that 'contradictory objects' are easily excluded because they are not material, and do not represent verifiable material forces.
But who says? How do we know that scientists might not one day discover weird things like these? They already have a few of their own to contend with; several of those were listed above.
[UO = Unity of Opposites; DL = Dialectical Logic; FL = Formal Logic.]
Worse still, as noted above: such possibilities cannot be ruled out by anyone wielding the wishy-washy and terminally woolly notions found in DL. Because of those, DM-theorists openly admit the existence of countless billion contradictions, and other assorted impossibilities, right throughout the universe. [On this, see below.]
In fact, if everything in existence is a UO (as Lenin claimed) then there should be as many contradictions in reality as there are elementary particles (possibly more). In that case, the above 'impossibilities' cannot be ruled out in advance of all the evidence having been considered, certainly not on 'principles' exclusive to DL.
Indeed, DM-theorists already acknowledge the actual existence of contradictory objects, processes and assorted impossibilities prior to all (or even most) of the evidence having been collected (and, in many cases, in abeyance of any evidence at all), since those among them who agree with Lenin and Hegel insist that everything, and every process, is, or contains, a UO.
If this is so, then for all even they know, the "Totality" could contain countless as-yet-undiscovered absurdities.
Furthermore, if, according to Engels and Lenin, an infinite amount of knowledge still awaits discovery, then at any point in history (such as the present), humanity must be infinitely ignorant of the final contents of -- and of the principles governing -- the universe, or the "Totality" (if there is such a 'thing'). That being so, those who rely on DL are in no position to rule such absurdities out with anything other than almost infinite uncertainty. The only way these could be excluded would be on the back of an a priori appeal to principles exclusive to FL -- or indeed, to ordinary language --, and thus on the basis of rules that are incompatible with those found in DL. [On this, see Essay Four.]
As we have already seen (in connection with Engels's analysis of motion, and several other core DM-theses, here, here and here), DM-theorists already admit the existence of contradictory objects and events. Examples of these include the unity of opposite poles in a magnet, 'contradictory' opposing forces throughout nature, contradictory moving objects, contradictory numbers and mathematical concepts, seeds which negate themselves, the existence of actual infinities (that is, the existence of something which both terminates (so that it is a determinate existent) and which does not), the fundamentally contradictory nature of matter (in that it is both wave and particle, continuous and discontinuous, all at once), and contradictory cells (in that they are both alive and dead at the same time), and so on.
Once again, if Lenin is to be believed, reality is fundamentally contradictory; according to him everything is a UO. And, Lenin asserted this in the absence of any evidence.23
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"In mathematics: + and -. Differential and integral. In mechanics: action and reaction. In physics: positive and negative electricity. In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58. Original emphases removed, bold added.]
This means that DM-theorists cannot consistently exclude any of the contradictory and unlikely entities listed earlier solely on the basis of their contradictory natures. Theorists who postulate contradictions everywhere, but who suddenly become arbitrarily fastidious just when it suits their 'theory', should not be expected to be taken seriously.
But, what could be more contradictory than a "Totality" that admits among its denizens things that not only do not exist (like the past), but also those that cannot exist (like DM-abstractions, since if they exist they must be concrete)?
Unfortunately, once this metaphysical roller-coaster starts moving it takes something a little more substantial than DL to stop it.
If DM is not to be imposed on the world, but read from it -- as its supporters constantly intone -- then, as it now turns out, DM-advocates cannot consistently stipulate what their "Totality" does or does not contain ahead of an empirical investigation to that end.23a
Others might be able to do this, but they cannot.
This is their millstone; they should wear it with pride.
Hence any attempt to rule out of existence one or more of the contradictory/absurd objects listed above would trap DM-theorist between that millstone and yet another hard place: FL.
Now, those of us who are not wedded to such a crazy system of logic -- i.e., DL -- not only can, but do rule out of existence certain things because of principles expressed in FL and/or in ordinary language. And we are right to do so.
[In fact, it is better to say that it makes no sense to suppose such things exist. More on that here.]
On similar grounds, therefore, we may legitimately and consistently deny the veracity of the many DM-propositions that report the existence of 'contradictions' in nature.
However, this defence is unavailable to DM-theorists, who claim that humanity has to wait upon the deliverances of their infinite meander through epistemological space (and along the yellow brick road toward 'Absolute Knowledge'), before anyone could be in a position to decide whether such propositions are fully true (or, as it turns out, true at all).
If so, dialecticians may not now complain about the allegation that their "Totality" might contain some or all of the odd things listed above -- the possible existence of which is predicated on the cavalier rejection of the protocols of FL and ordinary language.
The dilemma that DM-theorists now face is quite stark: either they continue to disdain FL -- the repudiation of which partially created this problem --, thus admitting the possible existence of all manner of contradictory objects, events and processes; or they reject the existence of such things (and abandon the idea that contradictions exist in nature) because of rules codified in FL and expressed discursively in ordinary language.24
What seems certain, however, is that the unwise rejection of certain principles of FL has left the DM-"Totality" wide open to infestation by countless weird and wonderful 'entities', the elimination of which requires rapid inoculation with a belated dose of those very same FL-tenets, and the adoption of a believable/workable theory of knowledge.
Hence, as a result of yet another dialectical inversion, FL would be required to rescue DM-theorists from the contradictory "Totality" they rashly summoned into existence; a Whole that could include, for all we know -- or for all they know -- characters from Alice in Wonderland.
Interconnection -- Fact Or Fancy?
Precisely What Is Interconnected With What?
In addition to, and compounding the difficulties outlined above, there remains the unresolved problem concerning the exact nature and extent of the relations that are said to exist between the items in this nebulous DM-Whole --, should we ever find out what either of these are.
From what little we 'know', the "Totality" is interconnected, contradictory and constantly changing (because of its countless UO's). Earlier we saw Lenin declare that:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc...." [Lenin (1961), pp.221, 359-60. Emphases in the original.]
And how:
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Emphases in the original.]25
But, the nature, intent and extent of these universal interconnections are still entirely unclear.
Does, therefore, every element in the "Totality" influence every other element instantaneously across vast expanses of space and time -- and all the time -- equally or differentially? But how is either of these possible?
More importantly, how could anyone ever tell?
Inter-connectionism Comes Apart At The Seams
Nevertheless, the DM-idea that everything in the universe is interconnected (what little we are told about it, that is) soon unravels upon closer examination.
To that end, it is worth asking exactly which parts of the Universe are inter-related, to what extent, and in what way?
Do these interconnections extend across all regions and temporal zones instantaneously, or is this true of only some? Is there a time-delay affecting these links? Does this delay mean that the past is in fact currently interconnected with the present (as light travels across these vast distances, for example), or do these interconnections operate only between contemporaneous states of affairs (thereby ruling out such significant delays)?
On the other hand, does this imply that past events are (now) interconnected with other events belonging to the same or to different time periods? In that case, is, for example, the election of Tony Blair in 1997 still interconnected with the sinking of the Bismarck, the discovery of Gold in the Klondike, and the loss of the Crown Jewels in 1216? If not, which time zones are inter-linked and which not, and on what basis?
But we know from certain theorems of Relativity that some parts of reality cannot be physically connected, let alone interconnected.
Conversely, in view of the fact that the past does not exist, shouldn't such connections across time zones be disallowed, anyway? This is plainly because it is impossible for anything to be connected (let alone be interconnected) with something that does not exist. But, in that case, if the past is not connected (or interconnected) with the present, how would it be possible for an historical account to be given, say, of the origin of class society?
Of course, it is always possible to argue that there is in fact a causal chain connecting the past with the present. But, even if this were so, this cannot interconnect the two. Moreover, as we saw earlier, no single element in this causal chain, except perhaps the last, now exists. If so, how can such an insubstantial chain connect something that does exist (the present) with something that does not (the past)? At best, this would make this chain and its links Ideal, and thus not the least bit "objective" (whatever that word means).
Hence, if the past (which is non-existent) is connected to the present (which is) by an Ideal sort of causal link, then the "Totality" (so depicted) would be an Ideally connected 'Whole', but still not an interconnected 'Whole', and still less a materially-connected whole.
In order to assist our enquiry, and perhaps help resolve such problems, let us called the following "maximal-interconnectedness" (i.e., MIC): DM commits its supporters to the belief that all events and processes are always interconnected, and instantaneously, across every time zone.
Conversely, let us stipulate that a reduced form of the latter be called "non-maximal-interconnectedness" (i.e., NMIC).
Taking The MIC
Considering MIC first. It is difficult to see how this option could possibly be true. If it were, then it would imply that every object and event in the entire history of the universe (and perhaps beyond?) is now and always will be interconnected to every other object and event across every epoch, all the time and instantaneously!
Taking three such events at random: this would mean that, say, the median price of coffee grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2003, the mean number of grains of sand on Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd of July 1742, the modal oscillation frequency of a few atoms of Helium in a small pocket of gas in The Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly 25.3565678609844433453312 million years ago, are all interconnected with one another, and always will be.
Indeed, if everything in reality is interconnected, then the above seemingly insignificant items would have to be taken into account in the scientific explanation of what might seem (to those without the necessary MIC-savvy) to be unrelated events. [Issues of relevance will be considered shortly.]
For example, if MIC were true then the taste of sugar, say, would have to have something to do with the angular velocity of both neighbouring and distant galaxies (at all times), and with the other three items mentioned above -- and with the smell of diesel, and with the mean weight of all Fiddler Crabs in the Southern Hemisphere eaten by predators on or before 17:02, June 15th 1247 (Julian Calendar), and the effect of Selenium Sulphide on the dandruff of Chelsea FC supporters who own Heritage Cherry Sunburst Gibson Les Paul guitars (2006 issue).
In fact, all of these (and gazillions more like them) would have to be taken into account by scientists trying to explain the demise of, say, the dinosaurs or the properties of Tungsten (and vice versa), if MIC were the case.
Figure Five: Is Bondi Beach Still Interconnected
With Napoleon's Left Foot?
Figure Six: Are Ageing Coffee Grinders Still In Touch With
The End Of The Last Ice Age, And Vice Versa?
Figure Seven: Is The Cartwheel Galaxy Still Interlinked
To Attila The Hun's Favourite Sword?
Figure Eight: Owned By A Chelsea FC Fan? But Is This Gibson Les Paul
Cherry Sunburst Guitar Still Interconnected With Julius Caesar's
Last Ever Glass Of wine?
Figure Nine: Still Interlinked With The Origin
Of The Crab Nebula?
Some might interject at this point and argue that dialecticians do not hold such simple-minded and ridiculous views, and that the above ignores relative connectedness (and thus relevance). This appropriately vague notion will be examined presently.
In advance of that it is worth reminding ourselves that this sub-section is dealing with MIC, and that all this speculation has been forced upon us because DM-fans have consistently failed/refused to say what their theory implies. In which case, this particular complaint is itself misguided. And since MIC specifically postulates instantaneous influences, all the time, and across every region of space and time, inverse square law drop-off rates do not seem to apply (that is, if this is what "relative connectedness" implies -- but once more, who can say?).
[One is tempted to respond to hard-core DM-fans (who might at this point be heard to mutter through clenched teeth: "Of course these things are interconnected!") along the following lines: "And which minor deity informed you of that alleged fact?" --, a few seconds before reminding them that only Idealists impose such 'truths' on nature, something they themselves have sworn never to do.]
Moreover, since dialecticians suppose there to be such a link, even if relativised, it is still a link (albeit one that will supposedly have insignificant effects on much that is distantly implicated), and it is that link that is still unclear.
But, even if such things are relativised, how is everything interconnected? How are objects and processes in the past interlinked with those in the present, and with those in the future?
[The idea that "internal relations" can decrease with distance (so that such 'remote effects' can be ignored as irrelevant) is subjected to close examination in Part Two of this Essay.]
To be sure, according to current theory, it takes many light years for the vanishingly small gravitational effects of distant objects to reach earth, but when they do reach us, manifestly they are now in the present. So, what is the influence on earth now of, say, extremely remote objects, some 10-12 billion light years away, which objects might no longer exist --, as opposed to the effect of any light (etc.) that might just be reaching us from them? For MIC to be true, these objects must influence us instantaneously across such immense distances, and for this to be true in reverse.
Of course, it is quite clear that if DM-theorists were to suppose all of the above -- even assuming that MIC were correct -- it would be impossible to confirm their suppositions.
Where would anyone even begin?
More incredible still: whatever interconnections are imagined to exist between these events and those processes, they themselves could not change, and neither could the elements so linked. To see this, consider that earlier sentence:
M1: The median price of coffee grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2033, the mean number of grains of sand on Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd of July 1742, the modal oscillation of a few atoms of Helium in a small pocket of gas in The Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years away, but exactly 25.3565678609844433453312 million years ago.
If it is now true that there is such an inter-link between the three items mentioned here -- call this MICA --, then since MICA has been relativised to and identified by means of the times so specified, it must always remain the same.
On the other hand, if it were incorrect to say this -- and MICA were changeable -- then at any point in time it would be false to say that the said relation in M1 was MICA, and the items mentioned would not be so interconnected. But, if it is now true to say this of them, it must be true to say the same tomorrow (or at any time) about that relation today.
Recall, MIC connects everything to everything else throughout all of time, irrespective of whether it now exists, including the very words used to make this very point.
It could be argued that this implausible conclusion cannot apply here since dialecticians are committed to universal change. Hence, the above relation must change as the events it connects themselves alter.
But, is this a safe assumption to make given this view of MIC? In fact, MIC would actually exclude DM-change. This is because, of course, the items in this triple relation do not now exist, and so cannot alter. Hence, MICA cannot change either.
So, since the events in question were time stamped to make them determinate, that means MICA cannot change, and neither can these events -- for that stamp identified one and all.
It is possible now to generalise the above analysis to take in every event and process in the universe, including those not now in existence (or otherwise, which thus clearly comprises all of 'reality'). Hence, if MIC were true, DM-change could not occur. If every event in the past is now related to every event in the present and the future (MIC-style), none of them could alter -- or we lose all contact with our capacity to refer to them, and so to link them.
Of course, it is possible to argue that nature takes no heed of our capacity to refer to things, so the above suggests that the present author is an Idealist.
In response, it is worth reminding the reader once more that all this speculation has been forced upon us because dialecticians refuse to say what the "Totality" is, or be specific about the interconnections they say exist throughout nature. Now, if the universe is changeable (and who can doubt that), then one implication of the above argument is that not only would we not be able to describe it, we could not describe its DM-interconnections either. Hence that argument is in effect a compressed dilemma: either (1) if the DM-universe is describable, then no change can occur, or (2) if the DM-universe can change, it cannot be described.
In that case, for example, future events could not become present events, and so forth -- or, we could not say whether they had. [More on this here.]
Now, the first option is in fact the Block View of Time, only rather badly expressed.
A somewhat similar problem afflicts relativistic Physics: hence, if the universe is a four-dimensional 'object' (manifold) in Spacetime, then each 'event' would in effect be a proper part of an orthogonal three-dimensional 'slice' (i.e., a hyperplane) through that 'object' as it 'exists' in 4-space. In that case, change would not be possible -- or, rather: at its very best, change would merely represent our subjective view of things and there would be no such process as 'objective' change.
Of course, this just means that Relativity is no friend of DM; indeed the Big Bang (which is based on this theory) is its mortal enemy. So, when dialecticians refer us to the Big Bang to account for the "Totality" and for interconnectedness, they are in fact drawing a viper to their breast. As was noted here, this is one reason why earlier generations of Marxists opposed, as some still oppose, the revolutionary new Physics that emerged in the early 20th century.
However, let us suppose not only that there is some way of avoiding all of the paradoxical conclusions listed above (if we but knew it), and that MIC is compatible with change -- even then MIC would still face formidable problems. For example, MIC would appear to imply the existence of instantaneous effects across vast expanses of space and time -- and all the time -- and not least those between things that do not now exist and those that do. This in turn would require the existence of non-relativistic effects 'travelling' back and forth between such regions at unimaginably large superluminal velocities (leaving the 'warp' speeds of Star Trek standing). Either that, or MIC would have to involve (in most cases) inordinate time-delays for all relevant reciprocal influences to work -- none of which would be verifiable, of course.
So, it looks like MIC presents DM with far too many intractable problems; hence, if DM is to be taken seriously, its theorists would be well-advised to avoid MIC like the plague.
In that case, I will consider it no more in this Essay; any dialecticians still enamoured of it are welcome to make of it what they can.
[Even so, if such DM-theorists want to retain a commitment to MIC, they will have to abandon the idea that their theses are only acceptable if they have been confirmed in some practical way or other. This is because MIC is as impossible to verify as it is to believe.]
Let us, therefore, assume that some form of NMIC is more acceptable to DM-theorists. In this case, we still suppose that the "Totality" is interconnected, but not everything that has, or will, or now exits is always inter-linked with everything else, and not all are connected instantaneously.
However, NMIC is itself rather vague (the above characterisation is clearly my own offering -- once more forced on me because the meagre and threadbare details offered so far by DM-fans have been about as useful as a chocolate fire-engine). The extent and nature of the alleged interconnections are entirely unclear, and it is not easy to see how this defect might be rectified, except on an a priori basis.
Even if the opposite were the case, and NMIC was entirely perspicuous, it would still face serious problems of its own. For example, some of the aforementioned Helium atoms in the distant Galaxy (mentioned in M1) could have decayed by the time their vanishingly small effects had travelled very far -- in which case, they, at least, would no longer exist for them to be interconnected with anything. And the energy they released could fail to reach certain parts of the Universe because of absorption elsewhere. And what is true of them, must be true of countless other things.
In addition, this option also faces the Light Cone problem (which was alluded to earlier): there are parts of nature that cannot now interact (if Special Relativity is to be believed).
Further questions force themselves upon us: do such 'travelling effects' influence each other (even if they happen to be moving in opposite directions), and at all times? Does the energy from distant Galaxies travelling away from the Earth (never to interact with our planet -- that is, if we assume the universe is infinite and unbounded) have an effect on energy radiating from the Earth and similarly flowing in the opposite direction, away from those Galaxies? If not, how are these aspects of reality interconnected?
Is there some sort of hierarchy of levels within these interconnections, with some things affecting others more than they do the rest? Does an inverse square law operate here?
If so, has a single DM-theorist attempted to work out the mathematics of any of this?
Worse still, is there any evidence supporting the idea that most/every sub-atomic particle in the Universe is interconnected with most/every other, for most/all of time?
One possible response to the above would be to point out that all of nature is subject to the same laws since it originated in the "Big Bang" billions of years ago. That would seem to mean that everything in the universe is related "by birth and by law", as it were. Indeed, there are well-known theories in modern Physics that appear to support the idea that the entire Universe is interconnected because of its unique origin (etc.). But, even if they were correct (and if we suppose for a moment that scientists never change their minds -- but see below), that would still fail to imply that everything is now interconnected, or will always remain so. For that surmise itself to be correct, we should need argument and evidence. Certainly more than we have at present.
However, despite the fact that the aforementioned modern theories seem to lend support to the idea that certain aspects of nature are interconnected, the evidence in their favour is alarmingly thin.26
Incidentally, the above response would fail to explain precisely which laws actually connect the aforementioned price of coffee grinders in Brazil to distant Helium atoms, let alone the number of grains of sand on beaches in the antipodes -- to say nothing of every other trivial event in the history of the universe --, or, worse, how such links might be verified, or confirmed in any meaningful way.
Nevertheless, and despite this, there are at least two comrades -- whose ideas will be examined elsewhere in this work -- who actually question the standard account of the origin of the universe: cf., Woods and Grant (1995).27
According to them, the Universe is infinite in size (both macroscopically and microscopically) and duration. But, if that were so, it would mean that most of reality could not be interconnected, because nothing would have a common origin -- although oddly enough these two comrades failed to spot that corollary -- and hence the Universe could not be a "Totality", and possibly not even a "Totality".
Anyway, how Woods and Grant both know that the universe is infinite in extent and had no origin they forgot to say. In fact, they omitted the "careful empirical" work which substantiates their belief that the universe is infinite, as opposed to its being merely finite but very large, and very old. Indeed, like so many of the other things Woods and Grant say about nature, and as is the case with so many other DM-fans, they were quite happy to impose these semi-theological doctrines on reality.
Another possible reaction to the above might be to claim that while we are at present ignorant of these interconnections, that does not imply there are none. The history of science has demonstrated that explanations of the Universe have always been couched in increasingly general terms, and that over time the laws scientists uncover reveal that countless objects, processes and events in nature are indeed interconnected in the way DM-theorists surmise. In fact, the development of knowledge shows that the more we find out about nature the more interconnections we discover.
However, this response does not even begin to tackle most of the problems raised above. For example, if interconnections within the Totality involve instantaneous effects across vast expanses, measured in billions of light years, several of the aforementioned scientific laws and principles would plainly be incorrect (namely, those that depend on Special Relativity). Worse still, as has already been noted, the universal existence of such effects could never be verified. So, based on the sort of principles mentioned earlier (relating to the allegedly non-negotiable pre-requisite that theories have to have empirical support), DM-theorists cannot consistently accept this view of things since (as has been pointed out several times) it could never be confirmed.
Indeed, Einstein called such an idea "spooky". Not only did it appear to violate certain tenets of Special Relativity, but it also seemed impossible to believe because of the absence of any conceivable causal explanation or intervening media.28
More worrying still, this latest reply is itself based on a metaphysical view of science. There are, of course, deep issues at stake here, for example, those connected with how Scientific Realism itself should be interpreted, and those arising from the attempt to translate highly technical scientific theories into ordinary language, or, indeed, render them compatible with 'commonsense'. Some of these issues were discussed in Essay Eight Part Two, others will be dealt with in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
Quite apart from all this, even if a plausible version of interconnectedness were forthcoming, it would it seems be inconsistent with other DM-theses. If, according to dialecticians, change is internally-generated, and based on an inner conflict created by the UOs mentioned above, then it can't be externally-motivated, too. But, what else does the doctrine of universal interconnectedness amount to except an appeal to the existence of more complex and remote external causes/'mediations'? Hence, if universal interconnections exist, change could not be wholly internal to an object or system. On the other hand, if change were entirely the result of the conflict within a objects, processes and systems, interconnectedness would only be local, at best -- it certainly would not be universal.
[This topic is fully discussed in Essay Eight Part One, and in Part Two of this Essay.]
In that case, if dialecticians are determined to cling on to their belief in this still-to-be-defined "Totality", and its universal interconnections, the doctrine that change is exclusively generated by 'internal contradictions' will have to be abandoned. Conversely, vice versa.
Either way, DM would suffer yet another body blow.
The Epistemological Definition
If any aspect of this maximally-interconnected "Totality" is to be rejected (along with the idea that every atom (past present and future) has a direct effect on every other, equally, instantaneously, and for all of time), then what interpretation can be put on 'interconnectedness' that does not require an act of faith?
Unless we can fill in these details, faith seems to be the only option left for members of the Church of Dialectics that supports their Wholist view of reality (which, unsurprisingly, makes acceptance of the DM-"Totality" even more like belief in 'God').
That is because, as has already been pointed out, universal and omni-temporal interconnections are incapable of being empirically confirmed.
Now, this is where the "Epistemological Definition" could help beleaguered DM-fans find a solution that is conducive to a non-mystical view of the universe.
This alternative conception of the "Totality" re-directs attention away from speculation over ontologies and content lists, and re-focuses it on a consideration of what is known about the Whole as it is conceived at any point in history. Indeed, this seems to be the definition John Rees prefers; we saw him referring his readers to an "insistence" recorded above, and he later alluded to the "totality of human experience and knowledge", which might have something to do with the "Totality" itself. [Rees (1998a), pp.5, 236.] I will simply assume that it has.
Unfortunately, this switch of emphasis away from the object of knowledge onto our knowledge of 'it' only creates further serious problems for DM.
Kant's NOUMENON By Any Other Name...
As seems reasonably clear, outside of subjective Idealism, unless it is possible to say something (anything?) about the object of knowledge, claims about 'it' must be considered entirely empty. But, DM-theorists cannot (or will not) ante-up here; they have remained studiously unspecific about the supposed object of their claims for nigh on 150 years. And it looks like they intend to maintain this tight-lipped policy into the next 150. This Essay certainly won't budge them, even if they were to read it.
Why so reticent? Why do they refuse to tell the world the good news about their semi-divine "Totality"?
This they say is because they might be accused of imposing their ideas on nature. This is rather odd, since that is what they finally end up doing!
Beyond asserting that there is a vague sort of "dialectical unity" between the 'knower and the known', and apart from giving the whole shebang a quasi-religious title (viz., "the Totality"), it looks like there's little else they could say, and, as noted above, there is precious little they have said about their nebulous "Totality" -- even to one another!
An analogous predicament has plagued previous epistemologically-driven theories of nature -- whose advocates generally found they had to appeal (implicitly or explicitly) to an a priori or a posteriori ontology of some sort to bail them out. Without something like this to firm things up, still others have meandered off into a Phenomenalist swamp.
In fact, DM-classicists have merely gestured at a solution to this dilemma, half-opting for the first alternative by appealing to a vague and attenuated sort of ontology -- and one that is hopelessly compromised by Lenin's refusal to commit DM to any solid ideas even about the nature of matter -- the whole sorry mess then hived-off into the sciences. We saw earlier that this was not a wise move.
As we will see (in Essay Thirteen Part One, DM-fans are completely unspecific about the details. In the event, they opt for materialist-sounding theses that collapse alarmingly quickly into Idealism. In general, they certainly intend their ontology to be materialist, but the asymptotic road to dialectical 'heaven' is paved with intentional, but no less ideal bricks, upon which it is impossible to build anything even remotely secure.
Indeed, there does not appear to be a single DM-theorist on the planet (now or in the past) who is capable of saying what matter actually is, beyond its being an abstraction.
Unfortunately, this puts dialecticians in the same position as theologians who likewise cannot tell a mortal soul what 'God' actually is -- save they both offer us their own via negativa: i.e., 'God'(/matter) is not this, or not that, nor this, nor….
So, as noted above, without a clear idea what these faux materialists think matter is, their "Totality" is indeed like Hamlet without the…er, well what?
No surprise then to discover that this perennially equivocal approach to ontology means that the aforementioned dilemma -- involving a choice between an a priori or an a posteriori membership list -- re-surfaces in different forms elsewhere in DM.
On the one hand, DM-theorists maintain the pretence that they have not imposed their ideas on reality -- but have merely read them from it -- while on the other they phrase their ideas in terms that indicate that they have in fact done the exact opposite of this --, which plainly suggests that their ontology (if such it may be called) is a priori, after all.
[These allegations were substantiated in Essay Two; they will be examined in more detail in Essays Twelve (summary here) and Essay Thirteen Part One.]
Trapped inside a metaphysic that allows for the formulation of no clear conception of the "Totality" (or of what it contains), and possessing an ontology that reifies the products of social interaction (language) as if they were fundamental aspects of reality, DM-theorists find themselves saddled with their own version of Kant's Noumenon.
If language is never adequate to the task of capturing final truths about the world (as TAR itself admits on pp.110-11, quoting Engels, but echoing Hegel), and humanity is locked in an infinite/eternal "asymptotic" search for absolute truth (the nature of which must forever escape them), then 'knowledge' always remains 'infinitely incorrect'; 'infinitely' far from the truth, as it were.
In that case, and for all DM-theorists know, their quest for 'absolute' truth could be going in entirely the wrong direction! Given their theory, humanity is permanently infinitely ignorant at each and every stage in its history about everything and anything. Hence the probability that the search for knowledge is progressing in the 'right' direction will always be vanishingly small (indeed, it must be 'infinitely' small).
On this account, humanity will always be infinitely far away from Absolute Truth, and hence infinitely ignorant. If DM-epistemology were correct, human beings would find it impossible to build a secure platform from which even to launch a scientific search for knowledge, let alone approach truth 'asymptotically'. As we saw in Essay Three Part Six (yet to be published), the DM 'convergence' theory of knowledge readily collapses into scepticism. We also saw [in Essay Ten Part One] that an appeal to practice to shore-up the infinitely insubstantial sands upon which paper-thin DM-epistemology has been built (the same sand, incidentally, in which many a dialectical head is deeply buried), was equally ill-advised.
Hence, the Epistemological Definition fatally compromises DM-theorists' claim that their theory is capable of revealing any knowledge whatsoever. Worse still, given this definition, the "Totality" turns out to be a pale-reflection -- not of the world -- but of Hegel's Absolute. [More on this in Part Two of this Essay.]
Thus, "God" rears "His" nonexistent head once more.
If the above accusations appear to be rather wild (to those readers who have made it thus far), a consideration of Engels's own description of the "Totality" should give pause:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35.]29
While Engels does not actually use the term here, his words clearly relate to the "Totality", only now expressed in quasi-mystical terms. Admittedly, this passage comes from notebooks, but it does reveal how close Engels came to overt Idealism in private.30
These conclusions are further substantiated by what follows.
The "Totality" -- Universal And A Priori
The way that DM-theorists refer to their "Totality" clearly reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, they treat it as an a priori concept; indeed, as noted above, it is little more than a pale reflection of Hegel's Absolute.
The fact that this is not a baseless assertion can be seen from a consideration of the answers that might be given to the following questions:
(1) How do DM-theorists know that reality is restricted to just one "Totality"? Could there not be several? Leaving out of consideration sub-"Totalities" for now, might there not be countless intermingled or intercalated "Totalities"?31
(2) How do DM-theorists know that there aren't at least two "Totalities" (or even sub-"Totalities") which are completely unrelated to one another?
(3) If we confine our attention to the known Universe, how do dialecticians know that each and every part is interconnected with all the rest, all the time? Could there not be parts of nature that are totally unrelated to anything else, or connected to only relatively few other things? Why is either option so impossible?32
(4) What gives DM-theorists the confidence to "insist" in advance of all (or even most) of the evidence that what they say must be true of every last particle in the universe, and for all of time?
Beyond 'divine' revelation, there are only two approaches to 'knowledge' that would allow DM-theorists to answer the above in the way they do --, either: (A) DM is a metaphysical system, or (B) DM is a conventionalised (and hence 'subjectivist') theory, founded upon a standardised, definitional or stipulative use of certain words.
These allegations will strike the reader as somewhat controversial, so the rest of this section will be devoted to allaying their qualms.33
Well, What Else Could A "Totality" Be?
Question One: How do we even know that there is only one "Totality"?
One obvious response to this question -- indeed, it might even have occurred to the reader -- is: "Well, that's what the word "Totality" means. There can't be more than one Totality, by definition."
There are at least two ways of understanding this rejoinder, each of which corresponds to one or other of the two options (A or B) mentioned above:
(A) If the standard and loose DM-characterisation of the "Totality" means that this concept (if it is one) must be employed as a way of deciding what the contents of reality are (operating as a sort of metaphysical filter) --, or as a way of constituting a set of necessary or scientific truths about it --, then that would clearly make DM metaphysical. That is, it would confirm that well before most (or even before a vanishingly small fraction) of the evidence has been collected and assessed, the idea that 'everything' must be viewed along DM-lines --, as part of an interconnected unitary whole -- had already been decided upon, and that the remaining evidence must be fitted to this view. But, what else would that amount to except a crude way of imposing a favoured structure on reality, one based solely on the meaning of a word (i.e., "Totality"), the very thing DM-theorists have always effected to disavow?
The fact that this is what seems to have happened -- and that it is not just a prejudice of the present author -- can be seen from the way that the above response alone would suggest that any DM-supporters who adopt it will only be able to do so by deriving these all-embracing facts about the world from a loose definition of one word: "Totality" -- or, to be more honest, and given all that has gone before, derived from a highly superficial gesture at a loose definition of it, inherited from previous generations of card-carrying mystics.
Even if it were the case that the "Totality" had been defined clearly, we would still require, at the very least, a convincing argument aimed at establishing the legitimacy of the derivation of this set of universal truths from a single word and/or its 'definition'.
Anyway, the provision of such an argument would automatically concede the point made earlier: that a particular view of nature had been imposed on it -- only now following upon a definition -- and not read from it, as had been advertised all along.
(B) On the other hand, if the word "Totality" is to be used as a "form of representation" (that is, as a formal way of interpreting experience and legitimating scientific-looking inferences) it would at least be clear that it was a conventionalist notion, after all.34
Of course, the first option would suggest that DM is just another form of LIE (which is itself based upon the systematic derivation of substantive truths about the world from the alleged meanings of a few words). The second alternative would indicate that DM more closely resembled science --, but only at a considerable cost.
This is because it would confirm the fact that DM was conventional.35
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism.]
As it turns out, DM-theorists adopt the second option when it suits them -- but in a way that collapses it back into the first. [That claim will be substantiated below, and throughout the rest of this site.]36
Is DM A Conventionalist Theory?
To be sure, there are many different types of Conventionalism. Less plausible versions are based on stipulation.37 Less implausible ones are more anthropological, and are founded on the many and varied material practices that have driven human social development.38
Perhaps DM is conventional in one of these senses? If so, the idea that reality forms a contradictory "Totality" would then be based on one of the following: (1) an agreement of some kind, (2) an implicit/explicit stipulation to some effect or other, or (3) norms derived from a material practice of some sort. Admittedly, the adoption of any one of these would simply confirm the fact that DM had not been read from the world (as had been claimed). On the other hand, it would account for the a priori nature of DM-theses, held true for all of reality, for all of time.
Unfortunately however, stipulative conventions are no more capable of being empirically true than are rules. A straightforward example of this sort of convention is the conversion rule: 1000kg = 1 tonne. Clearly, this type of convention is of little use to dialecticians, since, although it is correct to say that one tonne is one thousand kilograms (or rather that any object weighing 1000kg will automatically weigh 1 tonne, so that an empirical statement to that effect about some object or other would itself be true), this conventional fact does not derive from the 'nature' of the world (even though it is connected with it in other ways, via practice), nor has it been read from it. It is based on a series of agreements made a couple of centuries ago. Hence, if this conversion rule is 'true', it is not empirically true. [In fact it is better to call it "useful" rather than true.]
None but the radically confused would dream of checking this rule by measuring something; it cannot be tested in practice. Indeed, such rules tell us when a practical interface with the world has been carried out aright, according to the set/implicit criteria. [On this, see Polanyi (1962, 1983).]
Thus, if something is empirically true, stipulating it as true would be a waste of effort. On the other hand, if something is empirically false, a stipulation to that effect would be pointless.
Of course, in contrast to the above, social/anthropological conventions are more complex and they are not based on explicit agreement, but that does not affect the point being made.
Plainly, the truth-value of an empirical proposition depends on the way the world is. However, the fact that such propositions are capable of possessing truth-values (that is, the fact that they have truth-conditions) is a consequence of the conventionalised linguistic practices human beings have developed over the course of their history. How could it be otherwise?
As will be argued In Essay Twelve Part One, previous philosophical (and ideologically-motivated) attempts to give inappropriate linguistic expression to these conventions (alongside their subsequent misinterpretation as super-empirical truths about reality) are what gave birth Metaphysics. Because metaphysical propositions are based on just such an ancient misconstrual and misrepresentation of the linguistic products of the social relations among human beings (as if they pictured or represented the real relation among things, or as if they were those things themselves), they are incapable of being true or false.
Since they are incapable of being true or false (because they are based on misconstrued rules, and because they mistake a social from for reality itself), metaphysical theses are not just non-sensical, they are fetishised non-sense. In such a way, in traditional Philosophy, misconstrued language was then used to 'determine the nature and form of reality'.
DM-theorists bought into in this ancient confusion when they too began to misconstrue the nature of the theses they found in Hegel. Then as now, they indulge in metaphysical speculation whenever they misinterpret the products of the social relations among human beings as if they were the real relations among things, misidentifying the anthropological source of our linguistic practices as if they were 'natural', based on reflection and inner representation (etc.) --, reified into an object or process of some sort by an incautious use of the word "consciousness".39
All this was outlined in Essay Two and Essay Three Part One. It will be discussed in extensive detail in Essay Twelve -- Part One is here, the rest of that Essay is summarised here).
Nevertheless, this view of DM is clearly be unacceptable to its supporters since they claim that even though their theory may only be partially true, it is nonetheless an empirically valid theory about the world and how to transform it, verified in practice.
So, despite the fact that it carries all the hallmarks of conventionalism -- in that its adherents are quite happy to "insist" (as we found in TAR), or "demand" (as we saw with Lenin) that this or that DM-thesis is true of all of reality, based only on a set of idiosyncratic inferences drawn from a few specially-selected words -- DM, it seems, cannot be conventional.40
The only other way to explain DM-theorists' habit of making a priori and universal claims about reality is to acknowledge that DM is a metaphysical theory. Of course, this begs the question over what the correct definition of Metaphysics is --; this topic is discussed extensively in Essay Twelve Part One.
However, given Engels's own rather loose 'definition' of the term, dialecticians are clear that DM is not metaphysical. On the contrary, they regard DM as a scientific/materialist theory of the world and how to change it.41
IS DM A Scientific Theory, Then?
It could be argued that DM is in fact a science.
But, if DM is a science, what then are we to make of the numerous a priori and universal theses --, to say nothing of the many "insistences" and "demands" -- its adepts constantly impose on nature?
Are DM-theses perhaps hypothetical? This does not seem possible. Whatever else they are, DM-theses are not hypothetical; they are worded in ways that cannot, under any stretch of the imagination, be interpreted as hypothetical. Even leaving aside all the many "demands", "unthinkable's" and "insistences", the uses of "musts", "eternals" and "never anywhere's", DM-theses are described by dialecticians as "laws of cognition", "objective" and as the most "general laws" there are. [On this see Essay Two.]
DM-theorists often claim that their theory deals with "real material forces" and not "static, abstract" entities, which they say means that their main concern is with the inter-relationship between concretely developing and historically-conditioned objects and processes within the "Totality" (even if abstractions have to be employed dialectically to assist them to that end). Moreover, such theorising is undertaken as part of a their strategy to further the revolutionary transformation of society.
On this view, parts of the "Totality" are said to change as a result both of their contradictory natures and of their interconnections with other sub-systems -- i.e., because of the antagonistic forces at work within the whole.42 But, as DM-theorists themselves frequently insist, this does not spare them the difficult task of constantly checking their ideas against experience, and testing them in practice.
Unfortunately, the above characterisation simply catapults DM back into the metaphysical camp once more. This is because its theorists insist that everything in the Totality is related to (or mediated by) by something/everything else (depending on the emphasis), subject to change through 'internal contradictions' (because of the universal presence of UO's), and so on --, even before so much as a vanishingly small fraction of the evidence has been collected. This, of course, explains all the above DM-"insistences", "musts" and "demands" (etc.).
Naturally, if there were proof (and dialecticians were in possession it), such "insistences" would scarcely be needed.
In fact, if this were not so there would seem to be little point arguing, as TAR does:
"[W]hen we bring these terms [belonging to the Totality] into relation with each other their meaning is transformed…. In a dialectical system, the entire nature of the part is determined by its relationships with the other parts and so with the whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts.
"In this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of the parts but also that the parts become more that they are individually by being part of a whole….
"[F]or dialectical materialists the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts." [Rees (1998a), pp.5, 77.]
The reason for saying this is that if parts and wholes are in fact interdependent (in the manner suggested), then DM-theorists would have no choice but to regard their system as an a priori construct. This is because no amount of evidence could confirm the truth of the above passage (or of many others found throughout the DM-cannon).
If the entire nature of the part is determined by the whole (and vice versa) then that fact could itself only be confirmed when humanity knew everything about everything. Only when the whole was known would the nature of any part be known. Short of that -- according to what this passage says -- no one could know the full truth about any of the parts. But, until they know that (which blessed state we were told will never come to pass), they could assert nothing about the whole -- even, for instance, that it was indeed a whole, or even a whole. [On this, see here, and Part Two of this Essay.]
Hence, when DM-theorists assert things about parts and wholes (even if these assertions are just 'partial' or 'relative' truths), they would have to have access to knowledge that only the postulated epistemological end-state could supply (i.e., the state which constitutes complete or absolute knowledge).
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks; i.e., Lenin (1961).]
Even to assert that there are such things as parts and wholes (or that knowledge is merely partial, or relative -- or whatever) would require complete knowledge. If the entire nature of the part -- including at least this part of the total picture, that is, this part here in this Essay (or in TAR, or in PN -- or wherever), written in words on this page/screen (or on any page/screen) about partial knowledge itself -- were determined by the whole (and vice versa), then we would not be able to assert even this partial truth (if such it be) until 'epistemological judgement day' had arrived, and all was revealed to the assembled DM-Elect.
On the other hand, if the idea that there are parts and wholes that completely inter-condition one another (etc.) is not itself a partial truth (and hence not subject to the above strictures), it must be an absolute truth, and clearly one whose status had been decided upon before every genuine partial truth had been formulated and/or apprehended. But, this would then refute the content of that very notion itself (i.e., that there are parts and wholes and that they condition one another completely). This is because, on this view, at least one part (i.e., this view of the whole, or this view that is dependent on the whole being true) would not itself be conditioned by all other parts, since, plainly, they do not yet exist as items of knowledge. Hence, the entire nature of at least one part (i.e., this one) would not be dependent on all other parts.
Once more, if this is denied -- and that would itself have been done in abeyance of the infinite amount of evidence required to support that contrary view --, it would be clear that this denial will have been imposed on part and whole, but not derived from either. [More on this in Part Two of this Essay.]
In short, sweep-of-the-hand Wholism of this sort is just a dishonest form of apriorism.
Be this as it may, and despite what DM-theorists claim, it is possible to show that DM-theses have neither been checked against the available evidence in anything like the manner claimed, nor have they been derived from it.
Consider one for example -- taken from the opening sentence of TAR:
"The very possibility of human life is governed by contradictions." [Rees (1998a), p.1.]
Admittedly, John Rees listed several examples of contradictions that he thought supported this claim (which, as we have seen turn out not to be contradictions, after all; on this see here). However, the above general claim cannot be -- and in TAR certainly was not -- verified by a careful analysis of all of the (or even most, or even very much) evidence. Indeed, no matter how much evidence DM-theorists amassed it would still only represent a tiny fraction of all the facts necessary to justify such a generalisation about "the very possibility of human life" and what governs it. Moreover, as noted earlier, given DM-epistemology, the gap between any large finite body of knowledge and Absolute Knowledge is itself infinite.
And this is not just to pick on TAR, this epistemological gap is a universal feature of DM. This was established a posteriori here.
Nevertheless, the existence of such a yawning chasm of ignorance has not deterred dialecticians from advancing any number of "demands" and "insistences" about all of nature, for all of space and time: that is, that it is unified, susceptible to 'rational' explanation, 'contradictory', interconnected, "mediated", and that every last particle of it is constantly changing. Most of these claims go way beyond what could reasonably be justified by an appeal even to a large finite body of evidence. As we shall see, some of them cannot be verified -- let alone tested.
In fact, claims like these function in a different way, and to a specific end: they allow those who propound them to stipulate and lay-down theoretical criteria delineating the approach they intend to take over the interpretation of nature. They form part of a fetishised "form of representation". [More on the latter later; until then, cf., Glock (1996), pp.129-35.]
[The political and contingent psychological motivations for this set of DM-manoeuvres are analysed in Essay Nine Part Two and Essay Twelve (summary here).]
Verdict -- Guilty As Charged: DM Is Not A Science
It could still be maintained that DM is a science, and its supporters use the results of science to support the claims they make.
Despite this counterclaim, the fact that DM is conventional in form -- but metaphysical in both intent and content, all the while failing to be a science -- can be seen by examining the way DM-advocates themselves relate their ideas to the natural world.
DM-theorists take it as read that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it, but they are nevertheless quite happy to insist that they know in advance what its most general characteristics must be.
As a matter of historical record, these 'general features' were not derived by DM-theorists from a scientific examination of reality, nor were they a representative summary of the whole of human experience to date. They were copied from Hegel, who inherited them from previous generations of mystics, who invented these ideas at a time when there was hardly any evidence at all. [More on this in Essays Two and Fourteen (summary here).]
Granted that DM-theorists claim that these ideas have been given a materialist flip (which inversion turns out to be about as genuine as a nine bob note --, or a 99 cent coin, if you are reading this in the US).43 In spite of this, it is clear that because these general concepts supposedly relate to the "Totality" for all of space and time, they cannot have been obtained by anything other than a priori means, whoever dreamt them up, or through howsoever many degrees they had allegedly been rotated.
Of course, it could always be argued that wider theoretical considerations determine the validity of the conclusions drawn by DM-theorists. Indeed, it could also be maintained that this is exactly how scientists themselves make use of universal laws, which are likewise thought to operate across all of time and space. In that sense, if this approach to nature is based on centuries of experience, knowledge and increasing 'abstraction' -- and that this is not a problem for scientists -- then it can't be one for dialecticians. Or so it could be claimed.
However, leaving aside the obvious point (that this response undermines completely the claim that DM has not been imposed on nature (for it openly admits it!)), DM is not like any known or conceivable science. Although the criteria distinguishing science from pseudo-science are somewhat controversial, one thing is reasonably clear: scientists cannot claim that the world is contradictory -- in whole or in part.
This idea cannot be entertained -- not because of an assumed adherence to bourgeois ideology, nor as a result of an alleged excessive "tenderness" toward the world -- but because it would make scientific description and research impossible.44
A scientific theory that admitted reality was contradictory would lose its ability to explain the course of events in nature. This is because any theory that contemplated the existence of contradictions everywhere would make it impossible to distinguish confirmation from refutation. If an empirical proposition and its contradictory were both true then confirmation and refutation would become all of a piece.45
[The handful of options available to DM-fans seemingly capable of avoiding that fatal conclusion are closed-off in Note 45.]
To be sure, on its own this does not prove that DM is misconceived, but it does show that it is not a science. And as we will soon see, it is not even remotely like a science. In fact, if DM were correct, then scientific research would be impossible -- and for the reasons just aired.46
Dialectics In Hot Water
DM is not even remotely like a science because its theoretical/empirical propositions actually say nothing at all (if they are taken as they are intended by their authors), quite unlike scientific/empirical propositions. The latter present certain material possibilities, automatically excluding others. For instance, consider the following simple example:
S1: Water boils at 100°C.
[Of course, propositions like S1 are usually these days expressed as universally quantified conditionals.]
Given the usual ceteris paribus clauses, the truth of S1 makes the following sentence false (and vice versa):
S2: It is not the case that water boils at 100°C.
If the aforementioned ceteris paribus clauses (such as "under normal conditions of pressure and solvent purity", etc.) are ignored, S2 would itself become true under other circumstances -- e.g., if the water in question contained impurities, or if the ambient pressure changed (etc.). But even then, what S2 expresses would still rule out the truth of S1. Against the required background conditions -- or even without them -- when S1 is true, S2 is false, and vice versa.47
Compare this with a typical 'proposition' taken from DM (or at least from Trotsky):
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and it does not weigh 1 kg.
Whatever background is supplied for it, because S3 rules nothing out, it actually says nothing. [Why this is so will be explained presently.]
The import of the above would not change even if S1 were replaced by a more specific example:
S4: This particular mass/body/volume interval of water boils at 100°C.
In that case, based on S4, the temptation might be to think that further qualifications could allow both S1 and S2 to be true at once, as in the following:
S5: Parts of this body of water boil at 100°C, and parts do not.
S6: The same body of water may boil at 99.999°C on one occasion, and at 100.001°C on another, and parts of it might do both or neither, at the same time.
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and it does not weigh 1 kg.
Clearly, this is because the predicate "ξ boils at 100°C" is vague. However, whereas this is a fault of language -- which can be remedied to some extent by greater precision -- the status of S3 does not depend on such equivocation (i.e., as DM-theorists themselves see things). That explains why dialecticians would resist any attempt to correct S3 on linguistic grounds alone; they view what it says as a report of the objective features of a constantly changing world. But, this just means that the DM-inspired abrogation of certain linguistic conventions (in this case those expressed/formalised by the LOC and/or the LOI) denies S3 a sense; this is because whatever occurs, it will both refute and confirm S3. Even though in this case, this fatal DM-defect is self-inflicted, it would still not be one of vagueness.
[LOC = Law of Non-contradiction; LOI = Law of identity.]
It could be argued that, despite this, isn't it the case that S6 is true? And, isn't "ξ weighs 1 Kg" vague, too? Yes, but S6 can be resolved to some extent purely linguistically (as can this particular kg predicable; i.e., "ξ weighs 1 Kg"). No DM-fan would accept the same for S3.
And that is why anyone who sought to advance the above DM-response would no doubt also object to the way that most if not all of the alleged contradictions (that they claim exist in nature and society) have been analysed away on purely linguistic grounds in other Essays published at this site; for example, in Essays Four to Eight Part Two. For such potential objectors, these are not linguistic issues plain and simple. But, as we have also seen, dialecticians can only make such claims (if they do) because of their own sloppy use of language and logic -- indeed, rather like Hegel.
The Fetish Of The Word
The Regular Collapse Of DM-Theses
Nevertheless, this partly explains why several earlier attempts (here and here) to correct/improve Engels and Trotsky's formulations of DM-type 'propositions' failed whatever was done to them. They either collapsed into conventionalistic platitudes, or they fell apart as non-sense. This is not a fate that ordinary empirical/scientific propositions ever have to endure.
Consider another example: according to Trotsky (and with more apparent sophistication, according to Hegel) it is impossible to represent the LOI by means of true propositions concerning concrete reality; that is, he claimed it is never true that "A is equal to A". [Of course, this is a gross misrepresentation of Hegel. Nevertheless, his ideas fall apart for other reasons; more on this in Essay Twelve -- until then, see here.]
However, if Trotsky were right, it would in fact be impossible to deny the truth of this 'law', as he attempted to do. This is because if anyone knowingly denied that the LOI was true, they would first have to possess some understanding of what it states; they would have to know what would be the case if the LOI were true -- even if only so that they could then simply rule that possibility out.
Clearly, this is something that can be (and typically is) done with respect to empirical propositions (i.e., it is possible to specify in advance of knowing they are true what circumstances would make them true) But if the LOI never applies to anything concrete -- and could never so apply -- its denial would rule nothing out, for that 'law' would present no truth claims.
So, according to DM-theorists, the LOI can never be true. Paradoxically therefore anyone who denies the LOI rejects nothing substantive -- for plainly such a denial would have to rule out the truth of whatever it was that was being rejected. But, if it is impossible to say in true propositions what the LOI proposes, then its 'denial' will achieve nothing at all. The whole charade is just an empty ritual.48
An appeal to the alleged defects of language (as part of an explanation as to why the above is the case) would be to no avail here, either. Even if it were to be maintained that our words for identity are only 'approximately' true -- or true only within "certain limits" -- that would not help. That is because, for this to work, we would still have to have some comprehension of the words contained in an expression of the LOI (even an approximation). In turn, this is because we would need to recognise those words as an approximation to genuine identity, as opposed to being an approximation perhaps to something completely different --, such as, say, courage, fortitude or cowardice. Hence, even dialecticians will need to have some grasp of genuine identity statements to know whether or not they were indeed approximations to it, and not something else.48a
This much was at least clear to Plato 2500 years ago (even if he drew all the wrong conclusions from it).49
Hence, DM-type propositions say nothing because they rule nothing (material) out.50
Of course, in common with other linguistically competent human beings, DM-apologists understand perfectly well how to employ words for identity –- such as, "similar", "equal", "equivalent", "same" and "identical" --, along with their qualifiers (e.g., "exactly", "precisely", "very", "nearly", and "almost"). A grasp of such terms comes from their use in everyday life, not from a putative 'law'. Nor does this facility arise from the 'negation', nor yet the double negation, of the LOI. [More on this here.] In fact, it is this everyday skill with words for identity (etc.) that enables DM-theorists themselves to engage in the pretence that they think the LOI is false when it is applied to objects and events in concrete reality. They understand the LOI because they are language-users, and yet it is their subsequent misconstrual of this socially-conditioned rule (for the use of such words) as if it were an empirical truth that ultimately misleads them.
In short: dialecticians mistake a social norm for reality itself, and then make a fetish of the result.
How and why this occurs will be explained in Essay Nine Parts One and Two, and Essay Twelve. [There is a summary of the unpublished Parts of that Essay, here).]
It is also worth pointing out that DM-theorists are not alone in doing this. Because the LOI itself says nothing (i.e., it has no empirical content), and because of its status as a 'necessary truth' in traditional Philosophy, metaphysicians/theorists in general have mistaken this social norm for reality itself. When it is viewed in this way, the LOI is supposed to reveal an 'industrial-strength truth', as it were, which applies (as a matter of logic) to everything in existence, and in so far as each object or process is related to itself. It thus appears to tell us how things are and must be, and how they cannot be conceived of otherwise.
Thus, a misconstrued feature of the way we use words is transformed into a 'law' that 'allows' philosophers to uncover fundamental aspects nature by thought alone -- which is, of course, why the LOI could be declared true (a priori) independently of any state of the world.
Indeed, this is also why dialecticians pretend they can deny this 'law' is applicable to concrete reality by means of thought alone, -- that is, by an appeal to certain 'thought experiments' (a là Trotsky or Hegel) -- and in abeyance of sufficient supporting evidence (or any at all).
These are just two sides of the same metaphysical coin.
Interpreted like this, the LOI seems to rule certain things in as 'necessarily true', others out as 'necessarily false'. Unfortunately, it is impossible to deny the 'truth' of the LOI in any language whatsoever -- i.e., one that has the required vocabulary -- without also having to use that very same 'law' (as a linguistic rule) in the very act of attempting to do so!
We saw this in Essay Six, when Trotsky had to rely on the identity of temporal instants in order to deny the absolute identity of certain bags of sugar --, i.e., so that he could refer to the same moment during which an object or process was not self-identical.
As should seem obvious, it is impossible to say what (1) the LOI rules out as 'false' -- and hence, (2) what it rules in as 'true'. As we have seen, to try to do either would be to misinterpret this rule as a super-empirical proposition that purported to tell us about fundamental features of reality. If (2) above cannot be attempted without falling into just such confusion, then neither can (1) -- at least, not by means of an empirical proposition. [More on this here.]
Now, it was argued in Essay Three Part One that this sort of 'problem' arose (long ago) out of an attempt made by early Greek thinkers to conjure into existence abstruse concepts by means of a process of 'abstraction' from ordinary expressions ('ideas' or 'concepts'). In this particular case, a universal and super-empirical 'law' (that is, one that is supposedly 'true' of every object in reality, and in 'relation' to itself) has been abstracted from the linguistic expression of several rather mundane social practices (listed in detail in Essay Six).50aa
It is this move that sets-up the 'necessary truth' this 'law' supposedly expresses. In this way, therefore, the ordinary application of everyday words for identity was transformed into a general thesis about the ultimate and abstract structure of reality -- or rather, the socialised rules governing the use of words were reified in written form. In turn, it was this physical form which was then misconstrued as an expression of a super-empirical "truth of reason" which 'revealed' fundamental aspects of reality, valid for all of space and time.
Dialecticians have bought into this fetishisation of the written word, making the opposite error of supposing this reified social norm is a 'law' (of logic) that is only 'partially true' (or 'both true and not true', or completely false (depending on which DM-fan is telling the tale)) of everything concrete in nature.
Again, these are just two sides of the same metaphysical coin.
However, in order to achieve either result (i.e., that appertaining to the 'truth' of the traditional 'law', and that which encapsulates its DM-repudiation), one specific semantic feature of language has to be promoted at the expense of another -- that is, truth has to be promoted at the expense of its logical twin, falsehood.
Traditionally, the LOI was allegedly aimed at accounting for the truth of identity statements -- and only for their truth, since it was a law of reason. However, this move only succeeds in undermining the paired semantic foundations of empirical propositions. In the end, by emphasizing truth and ignoring falsehood, neither is accommodated (and this is so for reasons noted above --, which are examined in more detail here).
In this way, therefore, the 'necessary truth' the LOI supposedly expresses undermines itself -- and by this means it fails even to be an empirical truth (nor yet an empirical falsehood). Just like the other pseudo-propositions of Metaphysics, the above logical contortions deprive both this 'law' and its denial of all content. The original rule of language (fetishised now into the LOI) asserted noting true or false of reality (for it was a socialised rule that encapsulated how we use words, and, plainly, rules can neither be true nor false), and even though this 'law' masquerades as a super-empirical proposition, it too asserts nothing of the world because it is merely a fetishised rule.
Moreover, the LOI lacks an empirical sense (i.e., it is empty of content) because it presents no truth conditions -- that is, it expresses no conditions that must obtain for it to be true or for it to be false. Of course, that is why its 'truth' can be ascertained independently of any evidence, and why this whole rigmarole is purely conceptual/linguistic.50a
Empirical propositions are different in this respect: the semantic status of such propositions is sensitive to evidence -- truth and falsehood cannot simply be read-off from the words they contain. The latter have to face material reality to be declared one way or the other.
Misconstrued rules, like the LOI, thus become metaphysical by misconstruing them in the above way: their 'truth' can be read from the words they contain -- or so it seemed to the vast majority of traditional theorists.
Thus, metaphysicians throughout history have concentrated their efforts on devising theories about reality that could only be true, and never false. Unfortunately, by doing this, these theorists have in fact prevented their theories from being either.
In everyday life, the use of ordinary words for identity is not defective in the above respects. The employment of such words is not based on super-empirical 'truths' about the world (i.e., those misconstrued and fetishised rules), but is based on socially-conditioned practices (which cannot be either true or false).
Another specialised feature of language (i.e., one that also expresses no truth-conditions) also underlies the LOC. As with the LOI, the LOC does not depict a deep metaphysical truth about the world since it is not a truth to begin with. It expresses a rule of language/logic that encapsulates a convention (based once more on social practices), which is impossible to abrogate without discourse degenerating into non-sense (or, as Aristotle himself noted, without communication breaking down).
Of course, DM-theorists have simply compounded this traditional error by construing the LOC, not as a 'rule', but as an abstraction that is always (or often) concretely false. Small wonder then that they have found it impossible to communicate their ideas clearly to anyone --, least of all to one another -- in over 120 years, as indeed Aristotle warned us 2400 years ago. [On this see Essays Four through Eight Part Two.]
In short, metaphysical theses masquerade as empirical propositions; by aping the latter, they purport to reveal truths about the world. However, they are promulgated by their inventors as if they expressed deeper and more profound universal verities, posing as super-empirical, necessary or industrial-strength truths. But, this is precisely what denies them any sense: in so far as they are based on a misconstrual of the rules we use to make sense of our surroundings, and one another, they soon descend into non-sense, and are thus incapable of being either true or false.
And this is why DM cannot be a science: its 'propositions' do not just say nothing about the world, they say nothing at all about anything whatsoever. Because dialecticians misconstrue socialised linguistic rules -- which enable genuinely substantive truths about the world to be stated in empirical propositions --, for super-empirical truths themselves, an error they then compound by employing impenetrable jargon derived from the mystical pseudo-knowledge found in Hegel's Logic, their theses are not just senseless they are non-sensical.
DM: Just A Method?
If DM is neither conventional nor metaphysical -- and it's not a science -- then perhaps it is simply a method? However, few DM-theorists appear willing to accept such a deflationary conclusion.51
Pick Your Mystic
I began this Essay with some impertinent remarks about the obvious similarities that exist between the DM-"Totality" and 'God'. Now that we are nearing the end, we are in a better position to re-assert the same remarks, but without that initial and peremptory impertinence. Indeed, we can now see why they were fully justified.
Every mystical system of which we have any knowledge appealed to some form of Whole, or "Totality",52 -- often identified with 'God' --, to account for reality. [See, for example, here and here, but a complete list of examples would be seemingly endless.]
Traditionally, theorists soon found that it was impossible to relate each 'mortal soul' caught up in this metaphysical mangle to the 'infinite cause' of their existence (and thus to the 'Totality') without either destroying the limited nature of the former (turning them into infinite beings too, or 'aspects' of 'God') -- or 'blaspheming' the latter (equating 'Him' with finite beings).
This artificially-induced 'difficulty' re-surfaced later in a different form as the "central problematic of German Idealism" (i.e., as part of the infamous "subject-object identity" quandary),53 which in turn reappeared in Engels and later in Lenin's work as the following:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35. Bold emphasis added.]
"…[T]he concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Conrad Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), p.457. Bold emphasis added.]
"But there are more than these two properties and qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Lenin (1921), pp.92-93. Bold emphasis added.]
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with (sic) any proposition…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical; the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or aspect, or the essence of) an individual." [Lenin (1961), p.359.]
And again as part of the following:
"The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being." [Engels (1888), p.593.]
Here, this same problematic re-appears as an epistemological question, but formulated in a way that sent the DM-'theory of knowledge' off on a 'wild-concept-chase' (analysed in more detail in Essay Three, Parts One to Six). Largely in MEC, Lenin tried to bridge the artificial gap that this ancient dichotomy had created in DM-epistemology, but it is obvious by the way he thrashed about aimlessly (these random moves are exposed in Essay Thirteen Part One) that he hadn't a clue how to go about it. Nor has anyone else since.
This unresolved 'problem' still dogs DM-epistemology, which is one reason why the writings of HCD's are impenetrably obscure, and those of LCD's are impressively sophomoric.
[MEC = Materialism And Empirio-Criticism (i.e., Lenin (1972); HCD = High Church Dialectician; LCD = Low Church Dialectician.]
In a mystical system, not only is it impossible to comprehend either side of the ontological Grand Canyon that separates 'Being' from 'you-or-me-ing', it is even more difficult to re-connect them.
So, it seems that this smashed Cosmic Egg cannot be put back together again.
Figure Ten: The Central Problematic
Of German Idealism?
No wonder then that DM-theorists are so vague, confused and repetitive.
This whole motif is indeed one of the "ruling ideas" that have dominated human thought, East and West, North and South, for thousands of years; and it is one that Mystical Marxists have yet even to recognise, let alone cast aside.
This is how Marx depicted things:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.' [Marx and Engels (1974), pp.64-65. Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]
Be this as it may, dialecticians reject the accusation that their system is mystical, in fact they become quite offended by such allegations. This is partly because it is thrown at them so many times, partly because they claim to have neutralised the mystical influence of Hegel's system by up-ending it -- thus leaving behind only its "rational core" --, and partly because they see their theory as quintessentially scientific.
As these Essays show, the last two of the above are so monumentally wide of the mark that the resulting gap makes the Grand Canyon look like a crack in a cosmic egg in comparison.
The first, of course, is their problem.
However, Rees does at least try to punch his way out of this mystical paper bag, as follows:
"Totality alone is not, however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation.... 'The Taoist tradition in China shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole being maintained by the balance of opposites such as yin and yang.' [Quoting Levins and Lewontin (1985), pp.274-75.]
"...What unites all these explanations is that they see the totality as static. Beneath all the superficial bustle of the world lies an enduring eternal truth, the unchanging face of God, the ceaseless search for balance between yin and yang.... What they lack is any notion of totality as a process of change. And even where such system grant the possibility of instability, it is considered merely a prelude to he restored equilibrium....
"But, even taken together, change and totality are not sufficient to define a dialectical system. In addition we have to provide some general indication of how such change originates....
"A dialectical approach seeks to find the cause of change within the system.... If change is internally generated it must be a result of contradiction, of instability and development as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998a), pp.6-7.]
But as we will see, there are countless mystical systems that appeal to the sorts of things Rees denies of them to account for change (Hegel's being the most obvious!), and that see the world as a process. A full list will be given in Essay Fourteen (summary here); until that is published, some of this material can be found here.
However, the opposite view to that presented by Rees is well summed up in this passage:
"The ancient Egyptians believed that a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A similar premise, that the interaction between yin (the female principle) and yang (the male principle) underlies the workings of the universe, is at the heart of much Chinese thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy from the fourth century B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many Chinese who are not Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the Chinese. Peoples all over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas, have come to the conclusion that the cosmos is a combining of opposites and that one of the most important aspects of this dualism is the opposition between male and female." [Maybury-Lewis (1992), p.125. Bold emphasis added.]
So, still in the paper bag, then...
Via Negativa -- Or Viagra?
We have now reached the bottom of the DM-barrel, but still no Hamlet.
Nevertheless, we do know a little more about what the "Totality" isn't -- chief among which is that it isn't at all clear what it is.
At best, this DM-non-hero has wilted under this relentless via negativa, and seemingly in need of some Viagra to revive his flagging fortunes.
Indeed, I rather think there is something rotten in the state of Dialectics.
----------oOo----------
But wait! Perhaps this is too quick? Maybe the above negative conclusions are a direct result of the present author trying to analyse dialectical theses, while ignoring the holistic and "mediated" nature of reality --, wherein all things are conditioned by everything else?
Indeed, there is some truth in this counter-allegation --, but fortunately not much.
By the end of the next Part of this Essay, even this slender ray of dialectical hope will have been extinguished.
For in Part Two the DM-'non-Hamlet' (the "Totality") will be put out of its mediated misery, and executed.
May the non-existent deity have no mercy on 'its' insubstantial soul.
1. The comments of other DM-luminaries on this topic are recorded below in Note 25. Of course, several of the latter declare that they cannot actually tell us what their core ideas are in this area since that would pin reality down, and make DM formalistic -- this coming from comrades who repeat endlessly the 'Three Laws' of dialectics, along with the other dialectical-mantras from their Holy Books, and who will not tolerate 'Revisionism'! --, even though they end up doing just that, as we have seen.
So, this excuse is as bogus as much else found in DIM.
[DIM = Dialectical Marxism/Marxist; HM = Historical Materialism.]
Georg Novack, for example, waxed indignant in his heroic struggle with the 'forces of unreason', who apparently (and unfairly) required him to tell them exactly what he believed. And yet, he was quite happy to demand of them the sorts things he denied that they could require of him in return: concrete details and clarity. [On this, see Novack (1971), pp.69-83. More comments on this topic will be added at a later date.]
A few of those who have read this far into this Essay (and apparently no further) have complained that I haven't quoted more recent dialecticians on this topic. The reason for that is quite plain (indeed, I covered this very point in the main body of this Essay, here): search as I might, I could find no one more recent to quote who did not say more-or-less exactly what the DM-classicists had to say. Sure, many had much to say about social wholes, but as this form of holism is not being questioned here (since it is plainly part of HM, which I fully accept), it is irrelevant to the aims of this Essay.
Now, since there are few books and articles on this nebulous theory that I haven't read, the mystery deepens.
2. Rees also had this to say:
"[N]ature forms a totality, which it must unless we depart from materialism completely and become believers in the supernatural…." [Rees (1998a), p.78.]
This doesn't add much to our knowledge of the "Totality", but it does confirm that Rees probably identified it with nature. Or, rather, since he says that nature forms a totality, it is reasonable to assume he intended this to be the DM-"Totality". I cannot say whether nature forms the whole of the "Totality", according to Rees, since he does not.
3. This means that much of what appears in Jay (1984) is not relevant to this enquiry.
4. Of course, Rees is not the only one who makes such claims; on this, see Note 25. It could be argued that this is unfair, since Rees points out that these mystical systems do not appeal to "internal contradictions" to account for change, but this is not so. Rarely does a mystic fail to appeal to unities of opposites to account for change and stability.
5. Rees does however make several other comments about the "Totality" in later parts of TAR, but most of these relate either to the Epistemological Definition (discussed later), or to the social and historical ramifications of DM-Holism (which aspects I largely ignore in this work). Even so, these additional comments add little or nothing to our knowledge of the "Totality" in so far as it applies to the natural world.
Are Dialectical Contradictions Different?
However, even though dialecticians depict the "Totality" as internally contradictory, they do not in general regard flatly self-contradictory theories (or propositions) as true (or "fully true") -- as TAR itself acknowledges (e.g., p.235). In fact, DM-apologists are quite happy to regale us with the many internal/absurd contradictions they find in rival theories, which are sufficient to condemn them in their eyes.
For example, on p.84 of TAR, the Young Hegelians are criticized for being "self-contradictory", as are bourgeois ideologues in general (p.238). Even Kant himself is not spared (p.47). Similarly, Engels was not averse to rejecting certain theories on the same basis: cf., Engels (1976), pp.26, 63-65, 171, 247 and 324-25. Lenin also used this tactic: cf., Lenin (1972), pp.76, 94, 95, 97, 195, 256, 274, and 281. More recently, Tony Cliff, for instance, found he was able to dismiss the ideas put about by certain OTTs on the grounds that they were "contradictory"; cf., Cliff (1999), pp.28-30.
Similarly, Ted Grant latched onto the many "contradictions" he claimed could be found in Cliff's State Capitalist Theory:
"Any analysis of Russian society must start from that basis. Once Cliff admits that while capitalism is declining and decaying on a world scale, yet preserving a progressive role in Russia in relation to the development of the productive forces, then logically he would have to say that state capitalism is the next stage forward for society, or at least for the backward countries. Contradictorily, he shows that the Russian bourgeoisie was not capable of carrying through the role which was fulfilled by the bourgeoisie in the West and consequently the proletarian revolution took place....
"We have seen that if the law of value only applies because of the existence of capitalism in world economy, then it would only apply to those products exchanged on the world market. But Cliff argues two contradictory theses in relation to the Russian economy....
"Cliff gives two contradictory answers to these questions. On the one hand he agrees that it is the law of value on which all calculations and the movement of Russian society develops. On the other, he finds the law of value only operating as the result of pressure from the outside world although how he does not explain in any serious way....
"If one takes into account the fact that this follows the previously quoted passage in the same section where Engels defines capitalist mode of production (as social production, individual appropriation), we must conclude that Engels hopelessly contradicts himself, if we accept Cliff's conclusions." [Grant (1949), quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]
In contrast, the very same comrades are remarkably forgiving of -- if not blind to -- the many contradictions that riddle DM. [There are in fact countless examples of this dialectical double standard; more will be added later.] [Cf., Schaff (1960).]
[TAR = The Algebra Of Revolution, or Rees (1998a); OTT = Orthodox Trotskyist Theorist.]
In fact, this is not quite right; as we discovered in Essay Nine Part Two, DM-contradictions are deployed whenever a dialectician wants to derive/justify a counter-intuitive (if not overtly counter-revolutionary) conclusion. In such cases, self-contradiction becomes something to be praised, if not gloried in. Witness Stalin:
"It may be said that such a presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same 'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27,1930. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
Many more examples are given here.
Nevertheless, DM-theorists often distinguish between "absurd" or "insoluble" contradictions [e.g., Engels (1976), pp.154, 26, respectively] and their own superior, but mutant, "dialectical" strain.
And yet the only way to tell these apart seems to be that the former are to be found in rival theories, while the latter are integral to DM. Moreover, DM-contradictions and are not only there to be used to rationalise political expediency, but they also serve as a handy way of distinguishing those who "understand" dialectics from those who do not, thus separating the sheep from the goats.
Of course, such DM-contractions have simply to be "grasped", or Nixoned, and the problems they create are meant to be quietly ignored. Not so with those of their rivals! They must trumpeted from the rooftops.
[OTG = Orthodox Trotskyist Group.]
However, DM-advocates have yet to provide us with non-question-begging criteria (or any at all!) that distinguish theories that postulate the existence of contradictions everywhere from those that are flatly self-contradictory, and are thus to be rejected.
Indeed, Rees, for example, goes on to argue that superior theories are those that are "less internally contradictory" and "more internally coherent" than their inferior rivals [TAR, pp.235, 237], among other things. But this claim is made without any attempt to explain why it must be a defect for a rival theory to be self-contradictory when it is not a defect for DM-theorists to claim that reality itself is contradictory, with every object and process therein internally self-contradictory. If reality is contradictory then any (even partially) true theory that reflected this state of affairs accurately should reproduce those contradictions in its theoretical and empirical content --, surely?
This predicament we might call the Dialectician's Dilemma. [DD]
In order to explain this let us call those theories that are self-contradictory "defective theories" (DTs, for short). Also, let us say (for the sake of argument) that DTs include all and only DIM's rivals. Conversely, let all and only those theories that adequately reflect the contradictory nature of reality (such as DM) be called "non-defective theories" (NDTs, henceforth). So, on this basis, DM is the one and only NDT; all the rest are DTs.
But paradoxically, an NDT must also be a DT! This is because, by accurately capturing the contradictory nature of the universe, an NDT must be self-contradictory at some point, or to some extent -- otherwise, it would not be able to mirror reality in all its contradictory glory -- and hence, it must be a DT.
In that case, there would be no good reason to reject any particular DT in favour of an NDT (on the basis, at least, that it was self-contradictory), since both must contain such contradictions. Hence, because of their commitment to DM, dialecticians would have no good reason to reject an alternative theory on grounds that it was a DT, since DM is itself a DT by being an NDT!
This is how Rees poses the problem:
"In a certain sense, of course, all truth is relative -- it is just that some theorists do not acknowledge this elementary fact. There is no final, faultless, criterion for truth which hovers, like god, outside the historical process. Neither is there any privileged scientific method which is not shaped by the contours of the society of which it is a part. All that exists are some theories which are less internally contradictory and have a greater explanatory power…. [I]f the truth is the totality, then it is the totality of working class experience, internationally and historically which gives access to the truth…. [A theory's] validity must be proven by its superior explanatory power -- [which means it is] more internally coherent, more widely applicable, capable of greater empirical verification -- in comparison with its competitors. Indeed, this is a condition of it entering the chain of historical forces as an effective power. It is a condition of it being 'proved in practice.' If it is not superior to other theories in this sense, it will not 'seize the masses,' will not become a material force, will not be realized in practice." [Rees (1998), pp.235-37. Bold emphasis added.]
Clearly, Rees holds that the more accurate the theory, the fewer internal-contradictions it should contain. Thus, the 'more true' DM becomes the fewer contradictions it should either envisage or encompass -- hence the fewer it should picture as existing in nature, one imagines. But, in doing that -- according to the DM-view of reality -- 'Materialist Dialectics' would become decreasingly true since it would less faithfully reflect the 'objective contradictions' that allegedly litter the natural world.
This means that when fully true, an NDT like DM ought to depict no contradictions at all in reality! And yet in doing so, by its own lights, it would become completely false. Hence, such an NDT would become a DT once more (and in another sense): by failing to reflect the contradictions that dialecticians claim exist!
On the other hand, if this were not so, and dialecticians should not eliminate any or all of the contradictions that exist in their theory, then DM would become/remain a DT, and thus ought to be rejected accordingly. Indeed, in that case, 'Materialist Dialectics' would have been killed-off by its own internal contradictions!
[This is, of course, an ironically-fitting end to a theory that declares that change can only come about through 'internal contradiction' -- including the suicide of a theory that says just that!]
On the other hand, if it is indeed a fact that reality is contradictory then no true theory should fail to reflect that fact. But, if a theory (and an NDT to boot) faithfully reflects the contradictions that exist in reality it would automatically become a DT; thus, in doing what it was 'designed' to do, an NDT (like DM) would become a DT for its pains, once more.
[Of course, it could always be argued that dialecticians do not hold that all the contradictions in a given theory should be eliminated -- although I have yet actually to read this particular counter-claim in a DIM-text --, but if that were the case, as I noted here, the advancement of science would grind to a halt as a result.]
Conversely, once more, DTs would become NDTs, in yet another sense, if their supporters removed the internal contradictions they contained.
In either case, the DM-thesis that reality is contradictory sends NDTs one way (into oblivion) and DTs the other!
This, then, is the DD.
[DD = Dialecticians' Dilemma; DT = Defective Theory; NDT = Non-Defective Theory.]
[The DD is outlined in more detail, but from a different angle, here. As we will see in a later Essay (where DM-theorists' ideas about scientific change will be examined at length), a corollary of this dilemma is that the DM-account of scientific change is also fatally compromised.]
In fact, the full consequences of this dilemma (for dialecticians) are really quite disastrous -- as we are now about to find out.
DM-theorists claim that all true theories are converging on a final Absolute Truth (on this, see Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published), even if this end point will never actually be attained. If this is true, then, as things presently stand, it is possible to show that DM is actually moving away from the goal of giving even a minimally-true picture of reality. In fact, given TAR's criterion for theoretical correctness, we are in a position to declare right now that reality is a 'contradiction-free zone'. This is because the truer the theory, the more it must conform with the claim that reality contains no contradictions. If it did not do this, it would be a DT, since it would contain contradictions which its supporters would have no good reason to remove. And, as TAR's criterion indicates, such a theory should be rejected as defective.
Alternatively, if we reject TAR's criterion, the result would be little different: if DM is supposed to retain its contradictions, it would be a DT, and must be rejected. In that case, the picture of reality it paints would be incorrect, and DM cannot be progressing toward 'the truth'.
In order to make these general points more concrete, consider an example: assume for the purposes of argument that motion is in fact contradictory. If so, no fully true theory could afford to admit this 'fact' for fear of becoming a DT. Indeed, in order to avoid such an outcome, DM-theorists would have to abandon the idea that motion is contradictory, or risk their theory being classified as just such a DT. Hence, no NDT can afford to countenance the contradictory nature of motion.
Naturally, that just means that those who already reject Engels's analysis of motion are at this moment closer to the truth than he was -- or than his epigones are, or than Hegel was --, for such opponents already declare that motion is not contradictory (or in my case: already declare that such a supposition makes no sense).
Of course, anyone who does not like this contradiction should substitute for it the one that Stalin found in the nature of the 'workers' state, or, indeed, an almost identical contradiction Ted Grant found there too:
"The whole contradiction, a contradiction within the society itself and not imposed arbitrarily -- is in the very concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If one considers the problem in the abstract, one can see that this is a contradictory phenomenon: the abolition of capitalism yet the continuation of classes. The proletariat does not disappear. It raises itself to the position of ruling class and abolishes the capitalist class. But in the intervening period it remains the working class. Therefore, surplus product in the form of surplus value is produced. It is the case today as it was under Lenin and Trotsky. We have only to pose the problem: what was the surplus value produced when Russia was still a workers' state -- though even then with bureaucratic deformations? What was the process by means of which surplus product before 1928 mysteriously became surplus value after 1928?..." [Grant (1949), pp.212-13. Bold Emphasis added.]
And supporters of Cliff's theory can substitute for it the following:
"Dialectical historical development, full of contradictions and surprises, brought it about that the first step the bureaucracy took with the subjective intention of hastening the building of 'socialism in one country' became the foundation of the building of state capitalism." [Cliff (1988), p.166.]
"State capitalism and a workers' state are two stages in the transition period from capitalism to socialism. State capitalism is the extreme opposite of socialism -- they are symmetrically opposed, and they are dialectically united with one another." [Ibid., p.174.]
A theory like this that justifies anything at all -- no matter how contradictory it might otherwise seem --, and its opposite, is, naturally, of great use to opportunists and counter-revolutionaries of every stripe; which is, of course, one reason why they defend it to the death (of countless workers).
The only apparent way of avoiding these fatal defects would be to argue that no theory that truly reflects the contradictions in reality would be self-contradictory, and hence become a DT as a result.
Fortunately, it is possible to show that this counter-claim is itself incorrect.
The argument substantiating that allegation begins with the following innocuous-looking observations:
D1: (a) If DM were correct then reality would contain contradictions. (b) DM postulates the existence of just such contradictions.
Just in case this appears to get things the wrong way round (in that it begins with theory and not with reality), we need only reflect on the fact that since we do not have direct access to reality, only an indirect route by way of increasingly less inadequate theories about it -- even according to DM-theorists --, this is a move dialecticians would have to make themselves. [Indeed, TAR itself appears to concede this point -- on page 63, paragraph 2.]
Anyway, even if an attempt were made to 'begin from reality' (whatever that means) -- presumably with the unmediated observation of a least one material contradiction in nature (as part of a sort of languageless, concept-free 'apperception'/'intuition'(!??)) --, the conclusion would still follow, only perhaps even more quickly, as we will soon see.
From D1(b), we can obtain this:
D2: At least one of DM's postulates must contain -- or must imply -- a contradiction.
Consider the following schematic representation of one such:
D3: For at least one x, and at least one y, and for the relation R, for some time t, Rxy at t and ~Rxy at t.
[Here, "~" stands for negation.]
One interpretation of D3 (suitably colloquialised) could be the following:
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least one mat, and for the relation R (i.e., "ξ is on ζ"), for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on the mat at t.
Of course, D4 would normally be -- i.e., by us dialectical infidels, aka: "genuine materialists" -- disambiguated to remove this apparent contradiction. And for good reason: no theory can live with contradictions.
We are about to see why.
If DM-theorists were correct (about the contradictory nature of reality), it would be possible to derive the following fatal conclusion:
D5: No DT is true and all DTs should be rejected. [Assumption.]
D6: A theory that contains a self-contradiction is a DT. [Definition.]
D7: TAR's theoretical structure holds D5 and D6 to be true.
D8: Assume that D5 and D6 are true.
D9: TAR also says that DM is true. Assume that TAR contains DM as part of its theoretical structure.
D10: Assume DM is true.
D11: DM contains postulates like D3.
D12: D3 is a self-contradiction.
D13: Therefore, DM contains at least one self-contradiction.
D14: Therefore, DM is a DT (by D6).
D15: Hence, DM is not true (by D5, D13 and D14).
D16: Therefore TAR contains a DT (by D9 and D14).
D17: TAR's theoretical structure holds a DT to be true, namely DM (by D9, D6, D7 and D16).
D18: Therefore, TAR holds true a DT which is both true and not true (by D5, D6, D7 and D17).
D19: Thus, TAR's theoretical structure contains a self-contradiction.
D20: Therefore, TAR's theoretical structure is defective, and hence its version of DM is a DT.
D21: TAR's version of DM should be rejected (by D5).
Admittedly, D5-D21 contain one or two vagaries, which can be cleared up by the addition of a few extra lines, or by the adoption of more precise wording (etc.). However, the outcome seems reasonably clear: TAR is correct to argue the case for DM just in case it is incorrect to do so. In fact, TAR became defective upon adopting DM.
The fact that TAR is a non-standard DM-text, does not affect the argument; the author of TAR only has to hold true one DM-contradiction, for the above to apply to him.
Of course, what goes for TAR, goes for any other DM-text that argues along similar lines: i.e., that reality is contradictory and that flatly contradictory theories are defective, and should be rejected.
Now, there are several ways of avoiding this fatal conclusion. One of these is to deny the validity of FL (used informally above). But, that would be a rather desperate move -- somewhat akin to a boss attacking the validity of arithmetic just because a strike vote went the 'wrong' way.
Another avoiding tactic would be to claim that the above considerations apply only to formal contradictions, and that since DM-theorists postulate only those contradictions that can be shown to exist 'objectively' -- i.e., 'material contradictions' -- DM is unaffected by the above criticism.
However, this counter-response will not work, either. Consider the following additional argument:
D22: DM postulates only material contradictions.
D23: D3, when true, is a material contradiction.
D24: DM postulates the truth of D3, when instances of it can be shown to be true.
D25: But, even when instances of D3 are found to be true they all remain self-contradictions.
Naturally, this means that the rest of D5-D21 still follow.
Another obvious avoiding tactic could be to argue that DM-theorists hold that no theory/proposition is either fully true or completely false; all are closer approximations to the truth. Quite apart from the fact that no DM-theorist really assents to this crazy idea (on this, see below), the term "partial truth" is hopelessly vague, anyway (as will be demonstrated in a later Essay).
But, even if this were not so, the fact that less 'partially true' theories aim at removing contradictions (so that they become even less 'partially true') means that the above result still applies. This is because those who propound progressively less 'partially true' theories certainly aim to remove contradictions from them. Hence, a maximally true theory would contain fewer -- perhaps no -- contradictions.
Incidentally, whatever they might say, few revolutionaries accept in practice the doctrine that there are no completely false theories/propositions. The following claims are completely false: Gallons of concentrated Nitric Acid applied directly to unprotected skin dramatically improve the complexion; Jews are an inferior race; capitalism is a genuine expression of human nature; all women are happy with their oppression and are eager to be reminded of it constantly; imperialism is 100% progressive everywhere and at all times; the Ku Klux Klan are leading the fight for Black Liberation; Iraq contained more WMD than any other country in the history of the planet; the earth is supported in empty space by a tortoise; hysteria is caused by a wandering womb; Karl Marx was a Martian who copied all his best ideas from George W Bush, etc., etc.
I suspect that anyone who questioned the truth the first sentence of the previous paragraph would be hard pressed to find a single revolutionary who disagreed with the second. Naturally, that makes the latter absolutely true for all revolutionaries.
On the other hand, if they disagreed with both sentences, they would thereby confirm the point at issue: if either of these sentences is completely wrong, then there is at least one sentence (namely that one) that is completely wrong. QED.
And, just in case this Essay attracts the attention of a concrete-headed, brass-necked, hardcore Hegel fan who wants to claim one or more of the above are 'partially true', 'partially false', then they should consider this:
H1: There are absolutely no partial truths.
Now, is that partially true/false?
A retreat into the concrete bunker here (on the lines that the above claims are 'abstract', whereas "all truth is concrete", would be to no avail, either. This is because it would merely prompt the question: "Is the claim that all truth is concrete itself absolutely true?" If it is, then the point is lost; if it isn't then we can ignore it as an effective reply. [This quite apart from the fact that this Hegelian thesis is itself abstract!]
It could be argued that D22-D25 can be disassociated from D5-D21 by rejecting D23 or D25; that is, it could be claimed that DL-style contradictions are different from those found in FL.
But, this view could only be maintained by repudiating another DM-claim: that the superiority of DL over FL arises partly out of the former's capacity to account for change through contradiction. This idea would lose all its force if it were to become obvious that the contradictions countenanced in DL were of a completely different nature to those found in FL. In such an eventuality, there would be nothing common between the two systems for a comparison to latch onto. The much-touted superiority of DL over FL (with respect to contradictions) would then be about as accurate as would be an analogous claim that, say, Barclays Bank was a better bank than the Dogger Bank. [On this, see here.]
For sure, there are DM-theorists who say that neither they, nor Hegel, reject the LOC (but, on this see Essay Four, and here), and this is because they actually use FL-contradictions in their endeavour to show that there are real 'dialectical' contradictions in nature and society (thereby transcending the former in order to derive the latter). So the two sorts are organically-, or, perhaps, dialectically-connected. DM-contradictions are, indeed, merely 'concrete' versions of the abstractions found in FL.
Anyway, as we saw here, Hegel derived his 'contradictions' by confusing objects with predicates, propositions and a host of other things. So, the allegation that Hegel knew what he was talking about in this area would be about as accurate as a similar claim made about George W Bush on any randomly-chosen topic. Nevertheless, from what he actually wrote, Hegel certainly wanted to link his 'contradictions' with the misbegotten ones he thought he had found in the bowdlerised version of AFL he had been taught.
[AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction.]
Clearly, what DM-theorists need to be able to show is that at least some of the contradictions countenanced by FL are derivable from, or depict, real material contradictions -- otherwise there would be no good reason to call their own contradictions, "contradictions" (as opposed to calling them, say, "bananas") -- or for claiming that the former are just static or 'abstract' versions of the latter.
If so, the rejection of one or more of D1-D25 (on the grounds that they refer to/use totally different senses of the word "contradiction") would be to deny DM-theorists an important conceptual innovation they inherited from Hegel (who does not claim his 'contradictions' are of a new type, just a more 'scientific' (or 'concrete') sort): which is that contradictions in thought (FL-style) mirror real ones in the world (DL-fashion), when verified, or given a 'concrete' make-over. And since FL-contradictions are the formal equivalent of every conceivable contradiction (real or imagined), DM-theorists cannot afford to drive a wedge between these and their own 'material contradictions'. If they were to do this then they could not continue to claim that thought mirrored the world, and a central plank in DM-epistemology would disappear. As Lenin noted, commenting on an idea he found in Hegel:
"Hegel actually proved that the logical forms and laws are not an empty shell, but the reflection of the objective world…. The laws of logic are the reflections of objective and subjective consciousness of man." [Lenin (1961), pp.180-81, 183.]
Anyway, D3 is just a formal version of the sorts of material contradictions found in DM (i.e., D4). Since D20 and D21 follow from D4, this latest counter-argument fails.
D3: For at least one x, and at least one y, and for the relation R, for some time t, Rxy at t and ~Rxy at t.
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least one mat, and for the relation R (i.e., "ξ is on ζ"), for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on the mat at t.
At this point, it is worth re-calling that the idea that nature is contradictory is not just a peripheral feature of DM, it's a core idea. It is a consequence both of the thesis that everything is a UO and of the part-whole relation. This is certainly how Rees sees things (see for example, on pp.4-10 of TAR) -- but compare that with this. [See also the comments made here.]
And, that is certainly how DM-classicists see things. [On that, see here.]
Hence, if DM is defective here, it is defective to the core. Indeed, this is the rotten core of Hegel's nutty logic. No amount of spin can change that material fact.
The only other conceivable way to avoid this fatal result would be to find fault with one or more of the assumptions used in the argument above. However, a further examination of these here would be tantamount to the present author doing DM-theorists' work for them; it's their corner, they can paint their own way out of it.
[Other factors plausibly associated with this topic were examined in Essay Seven, here, here and here.]
6. Several other DM-'characterisations' of the "Totality" have been posted in Note 25, below.
7. On this, see Rosen (1982), Chapter Two. Rosen's arguments will be developed in more detail in Part Two of this Essay.
8. It is worth recalling here that the eminently reasonable requirement that evidence should be presented in support of each and every DM-thesis is not my invention. Dialecticians themselves tell us that this is essential to prevent their theory from sliding into Idealism. [On this, see here.]
9. As should no doubt now be apparent, the "Totality" is none other than Hegel's Absolute in disguise. And a rather poor disguise it is, too --; in fact, it's little better than Clark Kent's.
Figure Eleven: Is Hegel's Absolute As
Well-Disguised As Superman?
10. Of course, this just scratches the surface of the 'problems' created by our attempt to understand time; those outlined here, for example, were first broached (as far as I know) by St Augustine in his Confessions [Book 11, 14:17-31:41; i.e., Augustine of Hippo (2004)]. On this, see Suter (1989b); the background can be found in Sorabji (1983).
Unfortunately, in this section, as in many other Essays, I am forced to use the 'metaphysical mode of speech'. This does not imply that I accept it makes any sense; in fact, it is being employed precisely to assist in its own demise.
Sentences like: "The past does not exist", "The present does exist", or "The past is no more" appear to use phrases like "the past" or "the present" almost as if they were proper names or labels, which they are not. If they were proper names, it would be possible for someone, somewhere, somewhen, to pick out their bearers --, either with a demonstrative (like "this" or "that"), by ostension, or with an identifying description -- or possibly by tracing back to some sort of baptismal ceremony (the word "baptismal" being used here in a non-religious sense, of course). On this see, Hanna and Harrison (2004); however, this should be read in conjunction with Baker and Hacker (2005), pp.227-49.
And they cannot be definite descriptions, since they are not definite.
It is important to note here that the last sentence mentions descriptions, not definitions. This, of course, does not mean that ostensive definitions of named objects cannot be given, only that the stage-setting for such rituals is rather complex. Anyway, it is difficult to see how such a 'definition' of the past (etc.) would be possible without the automatic use of the present tense (as in, for example: "This is the past"). In cases like these, such identifying descriptions might perhaps gain a sense in conjunction with the use of pictures and photographs, or by means of stories that illustrate how things once were -- as one might teach a child, for example. [On Ostensive Definitions, see Baker and Hacker (2005), pp.81-106.]
Even then, if anyone took such depictions to be literally true (i.e., for them to be the past), they will either be deluding themselves or will have been misled in some way. In such circumstances, they might then mistakenly imagine that the past was a drawing, a series of black and white images on glossy paper, or a set of amusing tales of yore. Either that or they might entertain the idea that the past exists somewhere now -- in the present(?) -- in a similar way to the items they were shown, or the tales they were told, or the 'definition' they were given, all of which featured the present tense in their alleged 'definition'. And the use of any other tense in such 'definitions' would, of course, be self-defeating. What sense, for example, could one make of: "The past was this…."?
To be sure, one can say things like: "This is how things were in the past", but even then, a present tense of the verb "to be" (namely "is") would still have to be used.
Other well-known problems afflict attempts to 'define' the past in similar ways, since such definitions are forced to employ various forms of the present tense.
[The objection that the verb "to be" here is tenseless will be considered in Note 14 below.]
11. Notice the use of the prefix "inter-" here; while the past might be connected with the present, it plainly cannot be "interconnected" with it.
But, if different time-zones are not interconnected, and if the "Totality" contains only interconnected items, then plainly the past cannot be part of the "Totality"!
12. That is, not unless the word "correspond" is given a new sense, perhaps making it analogous to the correspondence between characters and events in certain novels with the 'same' individuals/events in the real world, or the other way round.
[In that sense, these things do not literally correspond, or the said work would not be fictional!]
13. Ordinarily, we have no difficulty with using words related to time. This we often do using differently tensed verbs. However, certain nominalisations (like "Time", "The past", "The future" --, or even "The present") merely encourage the creation of spurious problems connected with 'the nature of time' (already now hopelessly nominalised into existence). And this happens if certain phrases like this are used without due sensitivity, as is usually the case in this area.
[A classic statement of this approach to the analysis of such 'problems' can be found in the opening sections of Wittgenstein's Blue and Brown Books and Philosophical Investigations: see Wittgenstein (1958, 1969).
On this in general, cf., Cook (1979), Read (2002, 2003, 2007), Suter (1989), pp.157-70, and Westphal (1996, 2002). See also Anscombe (1950).]
14. Notice that employing even this locution requires the use of the present tense, which, if crudely interpreted, might suggest that the past is really just a part of the present -- only remarkably well hidden!
It could be objected that the verbs used in such circumstances are tenseless, which would clearly mean that their use carries no implication that the past somehow exists in the present. But, even if this were so (and in such contexts the verbs themselves cannot tell us what sense they have), it would be even less clear what a tenseless depiction of the past itself amounts to. Indeed, how this might work with "This is the past", for instance, is far from obvious. This particular use of the verb "to be" does not look the least bit tenseless.
Of course, as we saw in Essay Three Part One, in predicative propositions, where the word "is" functions as a mere copula, it can be paraphrased away, even if this results in some awkwardness. So:
P1: The past is F
might become (a là Aristotle):
P2: F applies to the past,
which, while still apparently in the present tense, does not seem to possess the same untoward implications.
On the other hand, if, according to DL, the "is" in P1 is really an "is" of identity then the above sideways move would not longer be available:
P3: The past is identical with F.
P4: The past = F.
P3 and P4 thus seem to be super-glued in the present!
I will not speculate how DL-fans might cope with this awkward example; they dropped themselves in particular hole by listening to the logical advice of rather too many mystics.
[It is also important to note that the views expressed here are not linked in any way with the metaphysical doctrine that currently goes under the name "Presentism" (no pun intended!). In fact, my views here represent no theory at all. There is no one way to depict time; indeed, the vernacular allows us to speak of time in countless ways.]
15. The mis-analogy between space and time will be considered in a later Essay. [The analogy drawn between time and the structure of Real Numbers has already been criticised -- here.]
16. Aristotle himself considered this 'problem' in his famous Sea Battle Paradox. On this, see Anscombe (1956).
17. In order to prevent possible misunderstanding, it needs emphasising here that the Ideal nature of the past is neither being asserted nor denied in this work. This is because both options represent a metaphysical view of time, and as such they are non-sensical. 'Propositions' expressing either of these alternatives result from a misconstrual of ordinary forms of speech, so that while they appear to reveal fundamental aspects of reality, they are in fact incapable of being empirically true or false, and so cannot picture the world. [On this see Essay Twelve Part One.]
However, what is being maintained in this Essay is that DM-theorists themselves cannot consistently deny that the past is Ideal given their commitment to the CTT and to the 'objectivity' of the claims they make about it.
[CTT = Correspondence Theory of Truth.]
[Why that is so will be postponed until the CTT is discussed in more detail in Essay Ten Part Two, alongside other relevant classical definitions of truth.]
At this point, it is worth pointing out that the argument in this Essay bears no relation to recent, and fashionable post-modernist (henceforth, PM) 'deconstructions' of historical truth. In fact, the account presented here does not deny there are historical truths, nor does it question the occurrence of events in the past. What is questioned is the Metaphysical-Realist slant put on both.
However, recent attempts made by certain revolutionaries to underline the misguided nature of PM are themselves far from convincing. For example, Chris Harman's article [Harman (1998)] reveals him to be overly impressed with Richard Evans's use of the "Holocaust Argument" to refute PM-theories of history. But, Harman's reliance on Evans's book is ill-advised on philosophical grounds alone, if for no other reason. While Evans is rightly critical of any account of the past that falls short of the highest academic standards, he was only too happy to base his own philosophical objections to PM on the most superficial refutation of it available to him. Thus, the only relevant philosophical argument in his book was in fact lifted from Paul Boghossian's review of the by now infamous "Sokal Hoax". Boghossian's 'demolition' is itself a rehash of the hackneyed "self-refutation" argument (briefly examined in a later Essay).
[Cf., Boghossian (1996), re-worked in Boghossian (1998) and in more detail in Boghossian (2006); cf., Evans (1997), pp.220-21. On this, see an extended response to the above 'hoax', here.]
Now, whatever weaknesses PM-views of history possess, they are not susceptible to the hackneyed, superficial and often misguided criticisms levelled at them by revolutionaries, whether or not these are backed-up by references to Lenin's philosophically-challenged missive, MEC -- which is itself examined in detail in Essay Thirteen Part One.
[MEC = Materialism And Empirio-Criticism; i.e., Lenin (1972).]
Alex Callinicos, on the other hand, has produced several extensive criticisms of PM; cf., for example, Callinicos (1989, 1995, 1998). [Some of the issues Callinicos raises will be considered in more detail in a later Essay.]
In addition, Callinicos has written a summary of his objections to PM and to what he calls "textualism" [i.e., in Callinicos (1998); these are similar to ones found in Callinicos (1987), pp.126-28.], a view he claims is associated with certain PM-accounts of history. According to Callinicos, "textualism" involves the bizarre thesis that there is "nothing outside the text" (henceforth, NOTT). Against this, he argues that while it is trivially true that all representations of things in the world are mediated by language, it does not follow that they are "constituted by language". Unfortunately, Callinicos forgot to tell us what the latter phrase could possibly mean. What would it be for something to be "constituted by language"? We would need to know so that we can say what Callinicos's claim ruled in or ruled out. The problem is, we would have to do this without the use of language! Otherwise, we would not know what it was that language was operating on independently of any use of it.
Now, Callinicos might have had in mind the idea that such objects and processes in the world are 'pre-linguistic', or 'extra-linguistic', but, once more, he will find it rather difficult to say what that amounts to without a liberal use of language.
It could be argued that that is precisely the point; while our representation of such things has to be linguistic (by-and-large), that trivial fact surely has no effect on the nature of those objects and processes themselves, which exist independently of language. However, quite apart from the fact that even that point has to be made linguistically, it amounts to little more than a flat denial of NOTT. It certainly does not show that PM is misguided/incorrect in this regard -- plainly: because it begs the question.
In order to show that PM is misconceived from beginning to end, one would have to have recourse to conceptual tools that have not been borrowed from the same ideologically-biased source as have those that PM-theorists themselves use: i.e., traditional Philosophy. In the present case, clearly, these are those involved in any attempt to erect a superior philosophical 'theory' to replace PM. There is no way that non-sensical theories can be refuted by the use of more of the same. An entirely different approach is required; one such will be aired in a later Essay.
Nevertheless, Callinicos advanced three counter-arguments (or counter-claims) to show that NOTT-type theses were indeed misguided:
(1) Human beings gain information about the world by their physical interaction with it.
(2) Discourse is not autonomous, it is a social phenomenon integrated into other aspects of human interaction with the world.
(3) Human beings do not automatically and uncritically accept the deliverances of language; they sort them into categories using criteria that help decide which are the "most accurate" depictions of the world. Historians, for example, would not check sources, artefacts, archaeological data, and so on, if texts were hermetically sealed from reality. [Callinicos (1998), p.178.]
It could be argued that the above points might well be aimed at certain ideas advanced in these Essays, and not just at PM. That would be a serious mistake.
Callinicos himself acknowledged that (1) allows for the fact that "information [has to be] articulated linguistically" to make it accessible, but he failed to notice that this concession seriously undermines his overall position. I hasten to add, however, that the exact extent of that criticism really depends on what Callinicos meant by "information". If he meant "the content of a proposition", then (1) would not count against anything contained in any of these Essays. If, on the other hand, he meant "pre-linguistic data", it would in fact be impossible to assess his argument until that phrase itself had been explained. Exactly what "pre-linguistic data" amounts to, I haven't a clue -- and I rather suspect Alex hasn't either. [The phrase "pre-linguistic data" is, of course, mine, not Callinicos's.]
However, there is a way of understanding this contentious phrase that undermines the Marxist claim that language is a social product --, a topic which will be discussed at more length in Essay Twelve Part One, and elsewhere.
Moreover, (1) appears to be about as "trivially true" as the idea that knowledge is mediated by language. [On this topic, see Hacker (1987).]
Point (2) is unexceptionable and is completely consistent with the ideas presented in these Essays. Having said that, if (2) were interpreted in a way that made it consistent with the above allusion to "pre-linguistic data", then that would render it inimical to HM, and not just to PM -- as well as to the views expressed here. This is because it would then represent a genuine challenge to the idea that language is a social phenomenon, which belief is integral to HM. [Again, why this is so will be explained in Essay Twelve Part One, and elsewhere.] Since Callinicos did not elaborate on what he meant here, it's not easy to say much more.
Finally, (3) is not inconsistent with any of the claims made in these Essays, either. However, Callinicos might like to reflect on the nature of the criteria he says we employ in order to correct our use of language. If these criteria are themselves socially-, and linguistically-conditioned, then we are back where we started. But, if they aren't, it is difficult to see how social beings like ourselves could ever have created them, let alone have learnt to use them.
18. On surfaces, see Stroll (1988). Parts and Wholes will be considered in more detail in the second half of this Essay.
19. N rays were 'discovered' by René Blondlot at the turn of the century. Popular accounts of the rise and fall of this once formerly 'objective entity' can be found in Dewdney (1997), and in Friedlander (1998). A more wide-ranging study of similar scientific oddities can be found in Gratzer (2000). See also Gardner (1957, 1989, 2000), and Shermer (1997).
Details of the mysterious powers of the echeneis fish cab be found here; this fable was accepted by philosophers and scientists well into the early modern period. On this, see Easlea (1980).
The, shall we say, 'darker' side of science --, where frauds, deceptions and hoaxes -- coupled both with an almost ubiquitously Whiggish post hoc re-writing of history, and with the social control and censorship of new ideas --, are to be taken into account, is only of tangential interest here. However, dialecticians cannot afford to ignore this important historical aspect of science for fear that fraudulent and/or class-compromised items might creep into their "Totality", even if they knew what the latter was.
On this see: Barnes (1974, 1982, 1985, 1990), Barnes and Bloor (1982), Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996), Biagioli (1993), Bloor (1991), Broad and Wade (1982), Collins (1975, 1992, 1994, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2004), Collins and Pinch (1998, 2002), Conner (2005), Cooter (1984), Crewdson (2003), Desmond (1989), Desmond and Moore (1992), Feyerabend (1975, 1978, 1987, 1991, 1993), Forman (1971), Galison (1987, 2003), Geison (1995), Gieryn (1999), Golinski (1992, 1998), Goliszek, (2003), Gooding (1990), Gooding and Pinch (1989), Greenberg (2001), Judson (2004), Kohn (1986), Latour (1987, 1988), Latour and Woolgar (1986), Lenoir (1997), Longino (1990), MacKenzie (1981, 1993), Newton (1977), Park (2000), Pickering (1984), Porter (1995), Principe, (1998), Redondi (1987), Restivo (1983, 1992), Rudwick (1985), Shapin (1979a, 1979b, 1981, 1982, 1994, 1996), Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Waller (2002, 2004), and Wallis (1979).
See also here and here. And weaknesses of the 'peer review' system and its failure to find/prevent fraud (etc.), see Judson (2004), pp.244-86. See also Broad and Wade (1982), and here and here.
Other oddities from the scientific lumber room include: Phrenology, animal magnetism, and 'water memory' (reported in Guardian Science, p.3, 15/03/01; even the New Scientist picked up on this), and Mesmerism (Waterfield (2002).
Are these now, or have they even been, members of the "Totality"?
On holes, shadows and the like, see Casati (2000), Casati and Varzi (1995, 1996, 1999), and Varzi (1997). On Polywater, see Ball (1999). On para-reflections, cf., Sorensen (2003). On this topic in general, see Williams (2000), and here.
It is worth remembering that Lenin himself believed in the existence of the Ether. This was unfortunate in view of the fact that this admission was somewhat ill-timed, situated as it was when this 'objective' entity was about to fall through a hole in the Whole, and in view of that fact that he placed this declaration incautiously in his exposition of the "objectivity" of dialectics, in MEC. [Cf., Lenin (1972), pp.50, 312, 314, 329-31, etc.]
"That is why Engels gave the example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised mechanical materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is, from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, ether and so on exist as objective realities outside the human mind or not? The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and they do invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Lenin (1972), p.312. Bold emphases added.]
And, Lenin was still referring to the Ether several years later in PN! [Cf., Lenin (1961), p.250.] So: Is the Ether an 'objective' or a 'subjective' aspect of the "Totality"? Since the above scientists almost "invariably" answer the first half of this question in the negative these days, the "Totality" must be sensitive to their many whims, it seems.
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks, or Lenin (1961); MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, or Lenin (1972).]
Incidentally, Engels also accepted the Ether's existence (for example, here); on this, see McGarr (1994), p.156. And so did Plekhanov (for example, here).
But, does all this mean that Lenin's "Totality" is different from, say, Rees's "Totality", but is the 'same' as Engels and Plekhanov's? Or that the Totality itself has changed over the last 80 years, divesting itself of the Ether and countless other formerly 'objective' entities? In short, has the "Totality" changed since Lenin's Ex Cathedra pronouncement?
Even more oddly: at one time Marx showed great interest in the work of Pierre Trémaux, who thought he could advance human knowledge by denying important principles of Darwinian evolution, alleging that the nature of the soil in a specific region influenced speciation. Well, is this process part of the "Totality", even though Marx later abandoned it (probably under the influence of a rare flash of good sense from Engels)? Or did this un-Darwinian process only show its face for a few months while Marx chewed things over? [On this see Weikart (1998).]
A more vexing question for STDs and MISTs is: Are Lysenko's ideas (or, at least, what they supposedly related to) part of the Totality, or not? For the best part of thirty years, Soviet (and later Chinese) scientists said they did. Is the "Totality" sensitive to the splits in Marxism, now? [On this, see Joravsky (1970), Medvedev (1969), and Soyfer (1994).]
[STD = Stalinist Dialectician; MIST = Maoist Dialectician.]
But wait! It now seems that the Ether might one day make a come-back. According to Cantor and Hodge:
"By 1951, however, we find an eminent physicist, P. A. M. Dirac, having to argue in the journal Nature (168:906-7) that although Einstein's 1905 principle of relativity led, reasonably enough, to the ether's generally being abandoned, with the new quantum electrodynamics we may be, after all, 'rather forced to have an aether'" [Cantor and Hodge (1981), p.ix.]
Even the New Scientist is getting in on the act; speaking about research into 'Dark Energy', it had this to say:
"Unfortunately, physicists are having trouble finding a way to fit a cosmological constant into their best existing theories. 'A small non-zero dark energy is more difficult to explain than zero,' says Sean Carroll, a cosmologist from the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena. 'So we are driven to wilder ideas.'
"One of those wild ideas is quintessence, which postulates the existence of a hitherto unsuspected quantum field permeating the universe.... Because this implies that there would also be a new fundamental force of nature, the idea set some physicists thinking: instead of adding a new force, why not modify an old one? Perhaps there are unexpected properties of gravity that appear over gargantuan distances that Einstein's general relativity does not predict....
"By giving us detailed measurements of the acceleration of different parts of the universe, the next generation of surveys could reveal the nature of the dominant component of the universe. Whatever it turns out to be, it will be big news. 'Dark energy could be the ether of the 21st century,' says Carroll. Even if we explain it away, we will learn something profound about the universe.
"It is a viewpoint shared by cosmologists everywhere. 'We are definitely seeing something extra in the universe, we just do not know how to interpret it yet,' says [Ofer Lahav of University College London]. And that has given cosmologists a new sense of purpose. A seismic shift in our understanding of the universe is coming. How soon it will arrive and from what direction it will come -- that's still anyone's guess." [Clark (2007), pp.31-33. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
Is the Ether, therefore, queuing up somewhere in 'subsistence space', waiting for rehabilitation, as if it were a member of some sort of ethereal version of the Chinese Communist Party?
Perhaps it is, for an earlier New Scientist reported the following: