Essay Eleven Part Two: DM-Wholism -- Full Of Holes
Readers need to make note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
If you are viewing this with Mozilla Firefox you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used.
This Essay is over 44,000 words long; a summary of some of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections:
(a) Part And Whole
(2) Thought Determines 'Being'?
(3) Flights Of Fancy
(4) Some Parts Are Bigger Than Wholes
(a) The Whole Truth
(b) Dialectical Medicine And Spare Part Surgery
(7) A Total Mystery?
(9) Notes
(10) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
In Part One of this Essay, it was argued that not only has no attempt made by dialecticians to tell us precisely (or even vaguely) what the "Totality" is (so that we might know what their theory is actually about), none could in fact be initiated. This is not just because such an attempt would be riddled with paradox and confusion itself, it is also because the defective tools dialecticians have inherited from Hegel -- based as these were on a series of logical blunders and mystical ideas -- have crippled their capacity to account for anything at all. In the end, and in this respect, the DM-"Totality" is no different from Nirvana, about which logically nothing could be said. [That explains the many references to the via negativa of mystical Theology in Part One.]
In this Part of Essay Eleven, the above fatal incapacity will further be demonstrated with respect to DM-Wholism, the idea that the mysterious "Totality" forms a cosmic unity, where part and whole are interconnected by "internal relations", so that the nature of each is determined by all, and the nature of all is determined by each. [The doctrine of "internal relations" will be dissected in Essay Three Part Three.]
Needless to say, and as was pointed out at the end of Part One, the belief that everything is part of an interconnected Whole is shared by most forms of ancient and modern Idealism, and all known forms of mysticism. This is particularly true of that strain of mysticism which greatly influenced Hegel, Hermeticism:
"Another parallel between Hermeticism and Hegel is the doctrine of internal relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines "As above, so below." This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is reflected.
"...The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies." [Magee (2001), p.13.]
However, that particular topic will be addressed in more detail in Essay Fourteen (summary here); this Part of Essay Eleven will be concerned more with the details of this obscure doctrine -- whether any sense can be made of it --, and not so much with where this idea came from.
Finally, since this entire project began as a critique of Rees (1998), I will start with his account.
Integral to John Rees's less than half-hearted 'definition' of the "Totality" is the following analysis of the relationship between parts and wholes:
"[W]hen we bring these terms [belonging to the totality] into relation with each other their meaning is transformed…. In a dialectical system, the entire nature of the part is determined by its relationships with the other parts and so with the whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts.
"In this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of the parts but also that the parts become more than they are individually by being part of a whole….
"[F]or dialectical materialists the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts." [Rees (1998), pp.5, 77.]1
Naturally, no evidence is given to support these universal theses. Instead, a few trite examples are paraded about that supposedly illustrate their validity (these will be examined below), but, as is the case in other areas of Dialectical Metaphysics, the mere assertion of a bold thesis is supposed to command our respect, if not our acceptance. Anyone who thinks otherwise has not got the point, and clearly does not "understand" dialectics.
Nevertheless, there appear to be several related claims being advanced here:
G1: The entire nature of a part is determined by its relation with the other parts and with the whole.
G2: The part makes the whole and the whole makes the parts.
G3: The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
G4: Each part becomes more when it is part of a whole than it would otherwise have been (individually) apart from that whole.
But, given the nature of the "Totality", G4 cannot surely be correct. If all parts are already situated somewhere inside this mysterious 'container' (the "Totality"), how is it possible for them to "become more than they [were] individually" on their own? Surely, the whole point of this analysis was to establish that parts cannot exist as individuals separate from the whole? Universal interconnectedness was supposed to have established an intimate connection between part and whole, here. If so, how can parts become "more" than they were individually if they never were isolated individuals, and never were totally alone? Surely, parts are like those who were once said to smoke Strand cigarettes, aren't they?
Greater Before Or After?
It could be argued in response to this that as parts enter into new relations with other parts or with other wholes they become more than they would have been (or had once been) otherwise.
However, if everything is already part of some whole-or-other, and all sub-wholes are parts of the Mega-Whole -- the "Totality" --, and everything is ("internally") inter-linked all the time with everything else, how is this possible?
All parts are parts of some whole-or-other, and hence, all parts are parts of the entire ensemble, and they are always and everywhere essentially conditioned by everything else.1a
Of course, some DM-apologists might want to argue that not all things are "internally" related. But, this cannot be so. G1 tells us that the entire nature of a part is determined by its relation to all other parts, and to the whole -- external relations cannot do this. This can only come about if the interconnections any part has with all the others are "internal". If this were not so, then any agglomeration of matter would constitute an organised whole, and an organism, say, would be no different from a heap of body parts. More on this later.
G1: The entire nature of a part is determined by its relation with the other parts and with the whole.
G2: The part makes the whole and the whole makes the parts.
Nevertheless, parts do not enter the universe from the 'outside'; they are not stored away in a sort of 'metaphysical ante-chamber', hermetically sealed-off from the rest of nature until they join in the cosmic action.
Note what Levins and Lewontin had to say:
"The first principle of a dialectical view, then, is that a whole is a relation of heterogeneous parts that have no prior independent existence as parts. The second principle, which flows from the first, is that, in general, the properties of parts have no prior alienated existence but are acquired by being parts of a particular whole. [Levins and Lewontin (1985), p.273. Bold emphasis added.]
If so, how could these parts become "more" than they had been before? They stay part of the "Totality" either side of any subsequent manoeuvre; so, they should stay the same whatever happens -- if their entire nature is determined by their relation to the whole, the mega-conglomerate called the "Totality", as indicated above. Since they are interconnected at all times with everything else, where does this semi-miraculous novelty come from? How can they become "more" than they once were? Surely, the only way that they could become "more" would be if their entire nature was not determined by the Whole, by the "Totality"?
An appeal to Engels's first 'Law' at this point (i.e., the one that asserts that quantity passes over into quality, etc.) would be to no avail. As we saw in Essay Seven, this 'Law' is far too fragile to bear this sort of weight, but even if this were not the case, what constitutes a quantity and what a 'quality' here would still be unlcear.2
Anyway, if this 'Law' could have this sort of effect here, so that the mere quantitative local increase of parts could at some point "pass over" into a local "qualitative" change, introducing localised novelty, then the entire nature of the part cannot have been determined by its "internal" relations with the Whole, but would be determined by its relations with other local parts of the Whole. How the latter can alter the logical properties of a body (so that its qualitative nature changes as a result) is, therefore, something of a mystery.
In short, it is not easy to see how novelty can emerge in a dialectical universe.
[This particular topic has been discussed at length in Essay Seven, and will be explored in detail In Essay Three Part Three.]
Despite this, if we are not careful in our endeavour to identify the parts, we might end up dividing the whole -- or even confounding the parts (in our aim to identify that whole) --, as we saw had been the case with general terms and particulars (as they feature in traditional Philosophy), in Essay Three Part Two.
Again, one will look in vain in the writings of DM-theorists for any guidance on this issue --, which means that this is not just Mickey Mouse Science, it's Minnie Mouse Metaphysics. Because of this, I am forced once more to consider the options available to DM-theorists that might enable them to give an account of these 'dialectical' parts as and when they are incorporated into their respective 'dialectical' wholes.
Now, in order to keep track of the parts involved, they will be 'time-stamped', so to speak --, as will the relevant wholes, too.
[In what follows, "T" will be used to refer to various different "Totalities", "t" to designated temporal intervals of arbitrary duration, and "p" for a part at a specific time. In addition, a subscript "i" will be used to refer to any randomly chosen element of the set indicated; hence, "ti" refers to any such interval. Also, "pt,r" will be used to designate the different members of the set of parts which exist at a given moment -- so that "p1,1" is "part one at t1", "p1,2" is "part two at t1", "p2,1" is "part one at t2", and so on.]
In that case, consider part p1,1, the entire nature of which at t1 is determined by its relation to whole T1. Now, let the 'same' part be p2,1, which exists at a later time t2, such that its nature is either different from, or perhaps even the same as it had been before. But let either of these now be in relation to T2, the new whole that would emerge as a result. Further, let any "Totality", Ti, be the sum of all its time-stamped parts at each ti.
In that case, T1 will be the mereological sum of all such time-stamped parts, p1,r, at t1 (i.e., Σp1,r), and the 'new' "Totality", T2, will be those at t2 (i.e., Σp2,r), and so on.
["Σ" is a summation sign, and here stands for "the sum of...".]
In view of this, it's worth asking: What precisely is the "Totality" meant to be here?
There are three distinct possibilities:
(1) The "Totality" is one of T1, T2,..., or Tn; or,
(2) The "Totality" is the sum of all these time-stamped "sub-Totalities", i.e., T1 + T2 +...+ Tn (i.e., ΣTr); or
(3) The "Totality" is something else.
If (2) is correct, then each Ti would not really be a whole simpliciter, but plainly a sub-whole since each would be part of the bigger whole (i.e., ΣTi).
If, on the other hand, (1) is correct, that would mean that each "Totality" must have been misnamed, since, plainly, none of them would be the "Totality". Clearly this is because, for any Ti, there would be n-1 other Tis it would exclude.
Either way, this obscure 'entity' should now perhaps be demoted, and broken to the ranks, as it were, since it too would be part of a bigger Whole -- or at best it would merely be a sub-"Totality".
Plainly, option (3) takes us back to where we were in Essay Eleven Part One.
In addition, (1) would seem to imply that the duration of these sub-"Totalities" could be, and probably is, exceedingly short -- each being ephemeral in the extreme, reduced as they now are to time-sliced collections of such time-stamped parts, all of which would 'exist' for less than a nanosecond (if all things are constantly changing).
But, as we have seen here, this would also mean that in order to account for objects and events 'inside' any particular "Totality", Ti, an appeal would have to be made to events and processes that were either non-existent or were not parts of that "Totality" at that time. Naturally, this would make the original introduction of this mysterious entity pointless, in view of the fact that the "Totality" was meant to help DM-theorists account for just such objects and processes.
Furthermore, (2) implies that as ΣTi grows in size (with the incorporation of each new Tk) it would either (2a) be subject to change, or (2b) become the four-dimensional manifold discussed in Part One of this Essay.
But, (2a) would imply that there was no such thing as the "Totality" (since it would be ever-expanding) --, but far worse, it would mean that it was 'composed' mostly of non-existent parts (i.e., those that now 'exist' only in the past). (2b), of course, would imply that nothing could change. [Why that is so was also discussed in Part One of this Essay.]
Despite the above, an attempt might be made to account for the 'dialectical' passage through time of these time-specific "Totalities", as each brings into existence the next in line (because, one presumes, of their own "internal contradictions"). But this response itself faces the many serious difficulties noted in Essay Seven, where it was pointed out that in relation to development, DM-theorists are decidedly unclear as to whether (1) such "internal opposites" bring about change, (2) they are created by change, or (3) things actually change into their opposites.
Generalising this, it would now be unclear whether or not the entire "Totality" changes because of (1) its own internal opposites, or whether (2) it creates these as it changes, or whether (3) it turns into its opposite. [But what is the 'opposite' of a "Totality"? A Nullity? A Nothing?]2a
Again, in the first case, the origin of these 'opposites' would themselves be obscure, just as it would be unclear how they could cause change (especially if it is recalled that change actually produces them, not them it; we saw this in Essays Five and Eight Part One and Part Two).
[At a later date, I will try to explore the internal logic of this assumed process of dialectical-change, in order to show that not only is it inimical to change itself, it is inconsistent with other core DM-theses.]
If this is rejected for some reason, and it is argued that opposites are not in fact produced by anything else (that is, if change does not produce opposites), then they must either be eternal or self-created beings.
Once more, it could be objected that objects and processes can and do have many opposites; some cause change, and some are produced by it. Either or both of these are subsequently altered in turn by their own new dialectical opposites, as the NON unfolds.
However, we saw here that Hegel postulated for each object or process its own internally-linked, unique 'other'. He had to do this to forestall the disastrous consequences of his adoption of Spinoza's 'Greedy Principle' [SGP] -- that is, that "every determination is also a negation". The problem here is that if an object or process merely turns into "what-it-is-not" (where this "what-it-is-not" is required by Hegel's 'logic' to make the nature of an object or process "determinate"), then it could in fact develop into anything whatsoever.
On that basis, but without this caveat, since Tony Blair, for example, is not Mt Everest, not Jupiter, not a Slime Mold (as far as we know), and not a socialist, he could turn into one or more of these opposites, and countless others, as well. So, if this Hegelian 'safety feature' is removed (i.e., that each object or process has a unique "other" it turns into), anything could turn into anything else as a result of such a profligate use of negation. [We found that Hegel himself slipped up in this regard too, since the SGP is in fact unworkable.]
[NON = Negation of the Negation.]
Of course, it could be argued in response that the processes involved stretch back into the mists of time. Here, not only are the many states of nature connected 'dialectically' (which means that it is in fact inadmissible to separate them, one from another, as has been done in this Essay), one state of the universe is caused (or perhaps better, 'mediated') by an earlier one, and so on indefinitely.
But, this just reproduces all the problems usually associated with Theism, specifically those connected with the question, "Who created 'God'?" In this case, if all things need a prior cause (or 'mediation'), and that itself is one of these 'internal opposites' (or is itself part of a relation with one such), the question would naturally arise: "Precisely what created/'mediated' that opposite?" Now, pushing this back into the indefinite (or 'infinite'?) past is no solution at all; we certainly do not accept such cop outs from theists. Either it is the case that opposites cause change (and so must be self-caused beings themselves -- minor deities, as it were), or they are brought into existence by change, and so cannot cause it.
Flowering this up with dialectical jargon would no more be acceptable here than it would be if Theists tried to do the same with respect to 'God', and 'His' assorted mysterious goings-on.2b
So, it will not do to appeal to a 'dialectical' interplay between causes and effects (dragging in that even more obscure notion "mediation") -- on the lines that the comments above separate them out, when they are in fact 'internally'-connected --, since the origin of that dialectical interplay would be subject to the same unanswerable query.
This is, of course, why theists in the end had to appeal to 'logical' principles to account for the uncreated nature of 'God' -- burying 'His' existence, say, in 'His' nature, a là St Anselm -- or admitting to the fact that this is all just big a 'mystery', and should simply be "grasped".
[Of course, dialecticians will have to do something similar -- indeed, they do.]
To be sure, Hegel had a 'solution' to this quandary that ran along similar 'logical' lines. This was based on the Hermetic goings-on between 'Being', 'Nothing' and 'Becoming' –- which 'argument' will be destructively analysed in Essay Twelve (summary here). However, unless we can find physical evidence that these mysterious entities kicked off the Big Bang (or whatever it is that scientists finally conclude about origins), neither science nor consistent materialism will have any use for them.
Naturally, only Idealists will cavil at this point.
If, on the other hand, such opposites are produced by something else (inside the "Totality"?), that would collapse (1) into (2): these opposites would be produced by change, and not be causative of it. The adoption of (3), of course, would amount to the abandonment of any account of development, for it would then be unclear what makes anything change into its opposite (if anything does).
It could be objected once more that the "Totality" is in fact a dynamic whole, changing over time as a result of its 'internal contradictions'. The above comments seem to want to 'freeze-frame it', and then not only bemoan its lack of internal cohesion, but complain about the absence of change! Or so it could be argued.
But, quite apart from the problems this faces (analysed in great detail in Essay Eight Part One and Part Two), the first sentence of the last paragraph is of indeterminate meaning itself since we have yet to be told what this nebulous entity (i.e., the "Totality") actually is. As it stands, that sentence is no clearer than this one is: "It could be objected that God is a dynamic Being...."
Hence, the word "dynamic" cannot provide this 'theory' with a secure life-line since we have as yet no idea precisely what is being called dynamic --, or no more than we would if someone called 'God' "dynamic".
In short: just as soon as the "Totality" is fragmented by the introduction of temporal constraints, it proves impossible to restore to it any sort of unity. On the other hand, if no temporal constraints are imposed on it, then either the "Totality" can't change, or the whole notion fails to relate to anything in the real world.
So, either (a) we are confronted by a new "Totality" at each instant in time, comprised of all the time-stamped parts at that moment, or (b) the 'same' "Totality" must encompass every time zone and sub-"Totality" in its domain.
However, in the latter case, the "Totality" would once again contain things that do not now exist (namely those time-stamped parts from the past (and the future?)). On the other hand, in the former there would be a potentially infinite number of "Totalities" with no links between them, explanatory of nothing at all.
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
Independently of this, it could be argued that since relations among the parts change, their nature must change, too. [This was in fact discussed in Note 1a.]
In answer to that (and putting aside for the moment the serious problems this attempted rebuttal faces when confronted with the other DM-thesis that change is internally-generated, not externally-motivated), let us suppose the following:
P1: Part p1 is an element that enters into a relation with whole W1, and W1 is itself part of the "Totality", T.
[For ease of reference, I have dropped the complicated labelling system introduced earlier. In that case, "p1" now merely refers to the first randomly chosen part of W1, leaving reference to time out of the equation.]
Here, p1 is clearly also part of T -- as is W1. But, by becoming part of W1, p1 does not cease to be part of T, and neither does W1. In its relation to T, neither p1 nor W1 could become "more" than they once were, since they are both still parts of T, and not part of, say, T1, some other "Totality".
Recall that G1 and G2 assert that the entire nature of a part (like p1, or W1) is determined by its relation with other parts and with the whole. Now, unless we add a rider to the theses listed above -- for example, that parts can become "more" than they were by remaining parts of the same whole (and hence that the entire nature of the part is not determined by its relation to the whole (i.e., with the "Totality"), but by its relation to a 'sub-whole' of the latter, say W1), or that a whole can alter even though it retains the same parts -- neither p1 nor W1 can change. Of course, if W1 cannot change, then p1 can't either, since p1 fluctuates in line with W1, according to G1 and G2.
G1: The entire nature of a part is determined by its relation with the other parts and with the whole.
G2: The part makes the whole and the whole makes the parts.
Perhaps this set of serious initial problems can be circumvented in some way, perhaps not. I will leave that time-bomb in the lap of DM-fans to defuse.3
Independently of all this, there is an obverse difficulty concerning the "more" alluded to in G3 and G4, if it is taken at face value. This can be seen if these two are supplemented in the following way:
G3: The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
G4: Each part becomes more when it is part of a whole than it would otherwise have been (individually) apart from that whole.
G5: Let whole W1 have parts pw1-pwn, and let pw1-pwn form a set, Pw.
G6: Let the 'same' parts when not parts of W1 be p1-pn, and let p1-pn form a set of parts, P.
G7: For any pwi, and any pi, let pwi > pi (where pwi and pi are the ith members of Pw and P, respectively).
G8: Let the sum of the parts that are elements of Pw be Σpwn, and the sum of the parts that are elements of P be Σpn.
G9: Either: W1 > Σpwn.
G10: Or: W1 > Σpn.
[">" means "greater than".]
In ordinary language, G9 and G10 translate out as the following:
G9a: The Whole is greater than the sum of the parts it already has.
G10a: The Whole is greater than the sum of the parts before they became its parts.
Now, there are several difficulties with this attempt to make DM-Wholism clear. The first centres on G7, and its ordinary translation, G7a:
G7: For any pwi, and any pi, let pwi > pi (where pwi and pi are the ith members of Pw and P, respectively).
G7a: Any part of a whole is greater than that part was before it was incorporated into that whole.
[G4: Each part becomes more when it is part of a whole than it would otherwise have been (individually) apart from that whole.]
At first sight it looks like G7 (or G7a) might capture the thought intended by G4, but that cannot be correct; this is because the wording of G7 (and G7a) actually permits the following (which is not what was intended by G4):
G11: pw1 > p2.
G11a: pw1 > p1.
The problem here is that G11 says that a certain part of a whole is greater than some other part, not necessarily the 'same' part it was before it became incorporated into that whole.
Now, what G4 appears to imply is G11a, where comparisons are drawn between the 'same' part either side of incorporation into the relevant whole. This, of course, assumes that a one-one relation can be set up (even in theory) between the parts before and after their absorption into W1. But, the difficulty here is that if a part becomes more when it enters into an subsequent ensemble than it had been on its own, it might not be possible to specify of any part that it was the same part before and after just such an integration into some whole-or-other, and thus that it was more after incorporation than it was before. G11 brings this difficulty out by changing the subscripts.
Unfortunately, DM-Wholism appears to mean that after assimilation a part might not be the same part it had been before incorporation, because of the "greater than" descriptor it gained upon amalgamation. In fact, this comparative is much more that a mere "greater than", since the entire nature of a part is determined by its relation to the other parts and to the whole of which it is a part. So, the entire nature of the part is transformed by incorporation into a new whole.
It could be argued that it would surely be possible to identify these parts either side of incorporation/separation, despite such changes. Consider an example here: a human heart outside the body is physically the same as it would be inside the same body, even though a functioning heart is more than just a material object when incorporated into its host. As such, it would be operating as an integrated organ which allows it to fulfil a certain role in relation to the entire organism.
This alleged counter-example will be considered in more detail later, but for present purposes it suffices to say only that a heart outside the body is not the same physical object it had been inside. Not only does it lose some matter (blood, etc.) when extracted, the electrical, hormonal and other chemical inputs cease. Moreover, the body too is not the same without a heart. So, the above description is not only inaccurate, it is prejudicial, for neither heart nor body are the same either side of removal.
Furthermore, hearts are not added to bodies as a sort of after-thought, so that it would be possible confirm or confute the above comparisons. Hearts develop alongside the rest of the organism. This means that, an animal without a heart would not be identical with one that had a heart; indeed, it would be defective in the extreme, and non-viable. The same goes for hearts themselves if they are outside the body.
So, it is not too clear what can be concluded from such an inaccurate description. Certainly, a heart is not physically the same, and it is not even 'dialectically' the same, given such radical surgery. In that case, we still lack a perspicuous account of what the DM-alternatives before us really are.
The dilemma that confronts dialecticians is thus quite stark:
(1) No part could be the same before and after assimilation (since each part is not just "more" than it was before, but completely different, because its entire nature will have been changed as a result of the "internal relations" operating inside that whole); or,
(2) If each part is the same after incorporation, that would mean there can't have been any change to those parts as they entered into this new whole, since they would not now be "more" that they were before, and their entire nature won't have changed.
In the first case, it would be impossible to say of some part whether it was greater before, later, or at any time -- or not -- since, ex hypothesi, it will have entirely changed in the process, given G1, and G2.
G1: The entire nature of a part is determined by its relation with the other parts and with the whole.
G2: The part makes the whole and the whole makes the parts.
The assumed change here is so radical that it would be rather like asserting that a stadium was greater than a symphony, or perhaps, that a leg was greater than a science fiction novel -- since, according to DM-theorists, in such circumstances there will have been a logical change to the 'objects' in question (in view of the new "internal relations" enjoyed by part and whole).
Of course, it could be argued that these latest comparisons are bogus, since the parts that are of interest to dialecticians are far more similar either side of incorporation than these distantly related objects are.
But, if that is so, then the entire nature of the part cannot be determined by the new whole it enters into -- and if that too is so, an important strand of DM-Wholism must go out of the window. In short, G1 and G4 cannot be held true together.
G1: The entire nature of a part is determined by its relation with the other parts and with the whole.
G4: Each part becomes more when it is part of a whole than it would otherwise have been (individually) apart from that whole.
G2: The part makes the whole and the whole makes the parts.
In fact, the situation is far worse: before incorporation an individual part would plainly not be a part of the new whole (since it has not yet joined it!), but even this new whole would not be the same whole (for the reasons given in G1 and G2) for it to join. This is because, before and after amalgamation parts and wholes must become different from what they once were.
Simple comparisons like this cannot, therefore, be made for part or whole either side of their union. Hence, without serious distortion, no aspect of this metaphysical fantasy is describable by anyone who seriously believes it. This is because nothing is either comparable or contrastable before or after amalgamation. In any such development, entire natures of parts and wholes must change, if G1 and G2 are to be believed. G4, therefore, is not defensible as it stands, and it is not at all clear how it might be rescued without abandoning G1, or other fundamentally important DM-theses.4
In the second case, clearly, G1 and G2 would have to be revised or abandoned. G3 is similarly ambiguous:
G3: The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
G9: Either: W1 > Σpwn.
G10: Or: W1 > Σpn.
G9a: The Whole is greater than the sum of the parts it already has.
G10a: The Whole is greater than the sum of the parts before they became its parts.
As indicated above, G3 could imply either G9 or G10 (or their ordinary language counterparts, G9a and G10a).
In that case, the following question suggests itself: Is the whole greater than the sum of the parts before amalgamation (i.e., G10/10a), or after (i.e., G9/9a)?
But, G10/G10a can't be correct. This is because, before incorporation the (same) whole plainly would not exist for a comparison to be made with any new whole that might arise subsequently. This is in turn because (according to G2) the nature of the whole is determined by its relation to its parts, including this new one. Hence, before this particular part became a part of some whole or other, that whole could not have been the same as it subsequently became, for it did not exist. In which case, it would seem that G3 must imply G9/G9a (which option(s) I will return to consider in more detail later).
As we shall see, the problem with Metaphysical Holism (or even with DM-Wholism) is that it is not possible to identify parts separately from wholes at any time during any transaction between them, for to do so would be to sunder the organic unity supposedly governing everything, and from which both part and whole derive their entire natures.
Furthermore, it is impossible to do so even in thought, and for the same reason -- as was outlined above. Perhaps it would be better to say here that to separate the parts from the whole (even in thought) is to change their nature (in thought), and hence to misidentify or misconstrue them (according to G1). If so, this type of Holism/Wholism cannot even be described. And as we will see in Note 5, the situation is even worse if we throw in the infinitary nature of DM-epistemology.5
No wonder this 'theory' falls apart so quickly. [No pun intended.]
Returning to an earlier passage from TAR:
"[W]hen we bring these terms [belonging to the totality] into relation with each other their meaning is transformed…. In a dialectical system, the entire nature of the part is determined by its relationships with the other parts and so with the whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts.
"In this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of the parts but also that the parts become more than they are individually by being part of a whole….
"[F]or dialectical materialists the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts." [Rees (1998), pp.5, 77.]
The opening sentence of this quotation seems to suggest that this entire exercise is merely methodological, that it need not imply anything about reality itself. Otherwise, what would be the point of saying: "when we bring these terms into relation with each other their meaning is transformed"? [Emphasis added.]
But, if the world is dialectically-structured before we investigate it, then whatever we do would not affect the nature of the part/whole relation in reality, surely? Of course, Rees could just be making a point about our comprehension of the part/whole relation as it features in "subjective dialectics".6
Even so, there is a further problem that Rees and others have clearly missed: if it is true that we humans are parts of the Whole ourselves, any change we initiate -- even in thought -- must have an affect on the rest of the "Totality"!
This new twist now raises alarming possibilities dialecticians have plainly not noticed.
Indeed, at first sight it looks like DM-Wholism implies that thought in fact determines "Being" (just as "Being" determines thought), as Hegel maintained -- that is, DM-Wholism means that the nature of reality depends on our thoughts about it (and vice versa)!
How else are we to interpret G1 and G2?7
G1: The entire nature of a part is determined by its relation with the other parts and with the whole.
G2: The part makes the whole and the whole makes the parts.
The only apparent interpretation of G1 and G2 that could forestall the above conclusion would be one that declared that it is only our understanding of the parts that is altered when we adopt this viewpoint, as Rees maintained -- but nothing else.
But, if that is correct, how could G1 or G2 remain true? If our thoughts are in fact part of the 'Totality', and are determined by their own "internal relations" with it, and all parts inter-determine one another likewise -- as indeed they do, too, to the entire nature of the whole according to G2 --, then not only must it be true that reality determines our thoughts about it, our thoughts about reality must determine reality in return. If this were not so, G1 or G2 would have to be revised or abandoned, once more. If the part makes the whole (and vice versa), then even the most insignificant thought about reality must be altered by -- and must alter in return -- all of nature, on this view. [The 'relative importance/remoteness' defence is defused here.]
The Idealist implications of DM have been reasonably clear up to now in the Essays published so far at this site; here, we find them totally confirmed by DM-Wholism.8
Theoretical considerations like these are unlikely to cut much ice with DM-fans. Hence, a discussion of the more concrete claims advanced in TAR and other DM-texts on this issue is clearly called for.
[DB = Dialectical Biologist, i.e., Levins and Lewontin (1985).]
The first problem here is that Rees and other DM-theorists provide us with few examples of what they mean -- i.e., those that purport to illustrate the rule they claim operates between parts and wholes (throughout the universe), and which suggests that everything is 'dialectically' linked in the intended manner. However, Rees does mention one particular example --, one that had in fact been lifted from DB. Unfortunately, even this turns out to have been a rather unhappy choice.
As we saw above, this particular explication of the part/whole relation is itself connected to the following (hackneyed) formula that Holists incant from generation to generation:
"For dialectical materialists the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts." [Rees (1998), p.77.]
To this the authors of DB added:
"The fact is that the parts have properties that are characteristic of them only as they are parts of wholes; the properties come into existence in the interactions that makes the whole. A person cannot fly by flapping her arms simultaneously. But people do fly, as a consequence of the social organisation that has created airplanes, pilots and fuel. It is not that society flies, however, but individuals in society, who have acquired a property they do not have outside society. The limitations of individual physical beings are negated by social interactions. The whole, thus, is not simply the object of interaction of the parts but is the subject of action of the parts." [Levins and Lewontin (1985), p.273.]
The general idea appears to be that novel properties "emerge" (out of nowhere, it seems; they certainly cannot be reduced to the microstructures of each part -- according to Rees (1998), pp.5-8, and the other dialecticians we will meet in Essay Three Part Three), because of the new relationships that parts enter into when they become incorporated into wholes.9
The above passage seems to be claiming that when human beings act as individuals (or, is it in less developed social wholes?) they lack certain properties --, in this case, that of flight. Nevertheless, as a result of their social organization, human beings apparently gain this new 'property' collectively -- even though as individuals they still cannot fly. The conclusion (if there is one) seems to be that because of economic and social development (etc.) people acquire characteristics that they would not have had without it --, which appears to indicate that when they are appropriately socially-organised, human beings become "more" than they would have been otherwise.
But, once again, in what sense are human beings "more" than they were before flight became possible? Manifestly, they still cannot fly. They do not sprout wings, develop engines or grow sophisticated landing gear.10
Furthermore, whatever meaning can be given to the "more" that human beings become, this can't be that which supposedly resulted from the part/whole relation. This is because immediately before or after flight finally became possible no new wholes or parts actually came into existence -- nor did these new parts and allegedly novel wholes become newly related.11
Hence, even if these hackneyed sayings (i.e., G3 and G4) were true, flight would not be one of their exemplars.
G3: The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
G4: Each part becomes more when it is part of a whole than it would otherwise have been (individually) apart from that whole.
It could be objected here that the above is incorrect. The point is that as the forces and relations of production develop human beings enter into new and more complex social and material links with one another, which generate novel capacities and possibilities that were unavailable to them in earlier modes of production.