Essay Eight Part Two: Conflicting View Of Forces
Readers need to make note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
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This Essay is over 86,000 words long; a summary of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections:
(a) Gravity Is Annoyingly Undialectical
(a) Are Forces Merely 'Dialectical Figures Of Speech'?
(b) Are 'Contradictions' Merely Mathematical Models?
(c) Are They Properties Of Totalities?
(3) What Exactly Do Forces 'Contradict'?
(a) Different Types Of Force Couples
(c) A First Attempt At Clarification
(d) AR-Forces
(a) Literal Forces In Opposition
(b) The Revenge Of The Non-Existent
(c) Prevention And Its Discontents
(d) A Balanced Account Of Prevention?
(e) S&M?
(f) Hole To Let
(g) Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth
(5) Real Material Contradictions -- Or Are They?
(b) John Rees And Concrete Forces
(c) The Impertinent Explanation
(f) Not What The System Ordered
(g) An Apparent Contradiction At Last!
(6) Last Rites
(a) Dialectics In ER
(c) Dialectics And The Revival Of Teleology
(d) Coup De Grace
(e) For Dialectics, Truth Is The Hole, And It's Six Feet Deep
(8) Well, What Are 'Dialectical Contradictions' Anyway?
(a) The Best Article I Have Read
(b) Yet Another Syntactic Mess
(c) Rosa's Pedantry?
(e) Law Of Identity Mis-Identified
(f) More Dark Sayings From Hegel's Dungeon
(g) 'Difference' Made Unrecognisable
(h) The Fog Thickens
(k) The Magical Use Of 'Negation'
(l) Hegel's Hermetic House Of Horrors
(m) Acid Corrodes Hegel's 'Logic'
(n) Two Senses Of "Independent" Confused
(o) Threadbare
(p) What A Dialectical Dog's Dinner!
(9) Contradictions In Das Kapital?
(10) Notes
(11) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
In Part Two of this Essay, I intend to substantiate a claim made in Part One, which was that it is not possible to equate 'contradictions' with 'opposing forces', either literally or figuratively.
DM-theorists frequently assert that "contradictions" (in nature or society) may be understood as the inter-relationship between "opposing forces". These forces condition one another, and, according to some, they operate either in equilibrium or in disequilibrium, depending on circumstances -- but, only as revealed by careful scientific analysis, tested in practice.1
Citations like those listed in Note 1 -- that make the same point -- can be multiplied almost indefinitely. To be sure, such passages are often accompanied by extensive qualifications, depending on context, but the overall message is reasonably clear.2
Nevertheless, my concern here is not so much with whether these passages are consistent with one another, or even whether any attempt has (ever) been made to substantiate the sweeping statements they contain with adequate evidence -- or any at all --, but with whether the idea that forces can model contradictions itself makes any sense.3
Gravity Is Annoyingly Undialectical
As we will see, the identification of forces with contradictions is highly dubious, at best.4 There are several obvious initial difficulties with the whole idea. For example, if the forces in a system are in 'conflict' -- and are hence 'contradictory' -- there would clearly have to be at least two forces present, operational and oppositional for that to be the case. But when we consider one of the most important and general types of motion found in the universe -- the orbital trajectory of bodies in a gravitational field -- we find that in classical Physics, at least, this sort of motion is governed by the operation of at most one force, which deflects the otherwise (assumed) rectilinear path of the body in question toward the centre of mass of the system. So, if classical Physics is correct, it is not easy to see how such forces could be viewed as 'contradictions'.5
Even post-classical Physics offers little comfort for DM-theorists; here such motion is either a function of the topology of Spacetime (gravitational 'force' having been edited out of the picture), or it is the result of a body being situated in a tensor, vector and/or scalar field, in as many dimensions of phase space as are deemed necessary.6
And this is not just true of gravity; as Max Jammer notes:
"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....
"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]6a
Even comrades Woods and Grant acknowledge this fact:
"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]
However, and despite what these two say, a mere "relation" between two bodies would be incapable of making one or both of them move, unless there was a force there (or something else consequent on that relation -- such as a time-based trajectory along a "world-line", perhaps?) to bring this about.
Unfortunately, this now means that most (if not all) of the bulk motion in the universe cannot be accounted for by DM (that is, if it is viewed as the result of 'contradictions', which are then interpreted as opposing forces). Plainly, if there is only one force present (or perhaps none at all), there could be no dialectical 'contradictions'. Hence, it would seem that DM can't explain much -- if any -- of the movement found in nature.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Admittedly, Engels made a weak attempt to solve the orbital 'problem' by inventing a repulsive force, which he implausibly identified with "heat"; this fanciful notion is discussed in Note 7.7
Is This An Apt Analogy?
Are Forces Merely 'Dialectical Figures Of Speech'?
In view of the above, it might be wise to interpret "opposing forces" as figurative 'contradictions' -- or, maybe, the other way round, interpreting 'contradictions' as figurative "forces". Either or both of these could then form part of an analogical or perhaps metaphorical (but non-literal) depiction of nature. Alternatively, forces could be described as 'contradictions' as a part of a sort of shorthand, which would then enable the modelling of different types of accelerated motion. Naturally, that approach would allow the word "force" to be edited out of the picture as a physical entity in its own right. Indeed, Engels seems to have had this in mind in the quotation below, where he argues that attraction and repulsion should not be regarded as forces, but as simple forms of motion. This retreat was perhaps recommended to him by his admission that the concept "force" was derived from ancient animistic/mystical views of nature, hence its use in DM could smack of anthropomorphism:8
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion.... [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Ibid., p.82. Bold emphasis added.]
However, this revision has two untoward consequences Engels appears not to have noticed:
(1) It makes his version of DM look even more positivistic that it already seems (at least in DN). If the appeal to forces in nature is no more than a shorthand for the relative motion of bodies, then forces will have no real counterparts in nature. The whole idea would then be little more than a "useful fiction", invented to account for the phenomena instrumentally. This would make the identification of forces with contradictions even more problematic (as will be demonstrated below); plainly, and once again: if there are no forces, there can be no DM-'contradictions'.
[DN = Dialectics of Nature, i.e., Engels (1954); UO = Unity of Opposites.]
(2) Given this re-write of the word "force", the contradictory relationship between bodies would become little more than a re-description of their relative motion. [Woods and Grant seem to be thinking along these lines, as we saw earlier.]
Unfortunately, in that case, there would be no interconnection between such bodies -- which is an essential factor, required by other DM-theses. This seems to mean that causal interactions of this sort would now be externally-motivated, and not mediated by forces, or be internally-driven. On this account, the 'unity-in-opposition' between antagonistic elements in the Totality would have been sundered; the thesis that change is the result of 'internal contradictions' would then be left without any sort of internal or mediating source.
Even the relative motion between bodies travelling in opposite directions could not supply a credible dialectical connection here, should such bodies interact, Clearly, this would fail to capture the "internal relations" that DM-theorists claim exist between such bodies. Objects behaving like this would not be internally interrelated (as part/parts of a UO), since the connection (mediation) between bodies in motion would be missing. Hence, any subsequent interaction would be difficult to account for philosophically, which would not be good news for dialecticians.9
As already noted, with events and processes sealed-off from each other in this way DM would begin to resemble CAR and/or 'crude materialism' all the more. Of course, even if Engels's version of DM could account for motion occurring along a certain line of action -- but in diametrically opposed directions --, it would be of little help because most of the bulk motion in the universe is not of this sort; it is either orbital or motion along a geodesic (depending on which version of modern Physics one attends to). In fact, as we will see, matter in general moves in complex ways which are difficult if not impossible to depict in oppositional terms.
[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]
Like it or not, DM-theorists need real material forces to act between bodies so that their Totality has the holistic/mediated integrity it requires; a theoretical fiction would be no use at all. Forces must exist, and reference to them as 'contradictions', 'internally-related' to one another, must be literal.10
Anyway, the figurative reading of forces as 'contradictions' runs counter to the claim advanced by dialecticians that they are offering a literal and 'objective' account of nature. It is not at all easy to see how figurative language can fill in the physical gaps in an explanation, any more than, say, the following can account for Juliet's beauty:
"But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun."
[Romeo and Juliet, Act Two, Scene Two.]
Or, at least, any more than would describing a man as a "pig" imply he has a curly tail and is a potential source of bacon.
Despite this, in view of the above difficulties -- in addition to those retailed below --, interpreting forces figuratively might prove to be the only viable way that contradictions could be regarded as 'forces', even if this compromises DM's avowedly 'objective' picture of reality.11
Of course, if this view of the nature of forces were adopted by dialecticians, it would be difficult to distinguish their theory either from Instrumentalism or from Conventionalism.
However, and once again, it is not easy to see how 'figurative forces' could account for anything; what sort of explanation would it be to say that contradictions -- already themselves suspiciously figurative -- were modelled by forces, which were figures of speech, too? Describing a man as, say, a "pig" might perhaps account for his crude behaviour (but not on the basis of his anatomy or physiology as a literal pig), but the utility of this metaphor would be virtually nil if it were now admitted that the word "man" was figurative too. Unlike iterated negations, multiple tropes do not cancel.
Nevertheless, even if this proves to be an acceptable resolution of Engels's problem, it would still not provide DM-theorists with a viable way out of their difficulties. Taken literally or figuratively, the equation of DM-'contradictions' with forces cannot work -- whether this applies to events in nature or society. This is so for several reasons.
Contradictions As Mathematical Models?
The first of these is connected with the way that forces are already represented in mathematics, for example --, which does not appear to be even remotely appropriate for exportation and use in depicting contradictions as literal forces. Consider the following:
(A) Forces often operate according to an inverse square law. It is not easy to see how the same could be true of contradictions. Presumably, two objects, states of affairs or processes contradict each other in nature or society or they do not.12 Not much sense can be made, one presumes(!), of the idea that a contradiction could operate with, say, only 25% of its former intensity (or whatever the appropriate descriptor is here) if the distance between its oppositional elements is doubled. Do bosses really become more conciliatory if workers walk away from them? Does wealth cause less conflict if the rich move their money to the Cayman Islands? Do appearances contradict reality any the more if someone uses a microscope, or presses his/her face against a desk?13
Indeed, little sense could be given to the idea that there is a literal separation distance between such elements -- for instance, that there is, or could be, one such between Capital and Labour, or that there might be one between the "forces and relations of production", or that there is another between a body and itself as it moved along in a 'contradictory' sort of way. What could it possibly mean to suggest, for example, that the "contradiction between use value and exchange value" changes if the two are further apart? Clearly, these two 'entities' cannot be separated (except perhaps in thought), but even if they could, they would still be just as contradictory as they were before (one presumes?). And yet, no force in nature has its local or remote strength unaffected by such changes.
Sure, dialecticians speak about the "contradictions" in the capitalist system "intensifying", but this is not because the 'separation distance' between the classes has decreased. Whatever DM-theorists in fact mean by "intensification" here (which seems be that the alleged "contradictions" become more obvious, intractable or crisis-ridden), they certainly do not mean it in the same way that physicists mean it when they talk about, say, the strength of a force field intensifying. Nor is there any mathematics involved. Indeed, while a technician might be dispatched to measure the intensity of a force field in genuine scientific research, no one ever seems to have been asked to do the same with these "intensifying" 'dialectical contradictions'. They (or at least their 'strength') appear to be permanently locked in subjective space, stubbornly impervious to scientific investigation.
Odd that...
(B) Forces in nature can be represented by vectors, the use of which is governed by well-understood rules. As such, for example, they may be inclined at various angles to one another, added, subtracted and multiplied (to give inner, vector or scalar triple products, and the like) -- and by means of which, diverse quantities, such as areas, volumes, field densities, boundary flux (etc.), may be calculated. In addition, vectors may be parallel or orthogonal, to one another, or to previously defined axes, just as they may be decomposed into their components and projected onto a given direction, plane or surface. They can be used to identify and classify the mathematical properties of manifolds. Unit vectors can be defined in a given vector space, providing it with a base and spanning set. Modulii can be ascertained for any given vector, and so-called "Eigenvectors" can be calculated. Furthermore, matrices can be employed to represent vectors more efficiently, their determinants and inverses thus calculated. The ordinary and partial derivatives of vectors may be derived -- and, finally, they can be integrated (as part of line, surface or volume integrals), and so on.
It is difficult to see how any of the above (and a many others) could be true of a single DM-'contradiction' interpreted (literally or metaphorically) as a force. What, for example, is the angle between the 'contradictions' mentioned on the opening pages of TAR:
"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction….
"Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line?
"The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2.]
And what is the cross product between these found in Socialist Worker:
"Elvis's career illuminated a contradiction at the heart of capitalism. Capitalism needs to generate profits in order to survive. But to suck profit out of workers it also needs an ideology to ensure that workers know their place in society...." [Ian Birchall, Socialist Worker, 14/08/07.]
"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers.
"It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting "you're breaking the law" to the strikers....
"Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence.
"Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, "Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out."
"Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest." [Simon Basketter, Socialist Worker, 30/08/07.]13a
Is it possible to find the inner product of the 'contradiction' between freedom and necessity? Is there an eigenvector applicable to the 'contradiction' between appearance and underlying essence? Is there any way of specifying the extent to which bosses and workers -- Capital and Labour -- contradict one another, individually or as classes? If so, what is the modulus of the 'contradiction' between boss NN and worker MM (or that between the classes to which they belong)? Is the 'contradiction' between ice and water orthogonal to…, well what?
But, what of the div, curl and grad of the 'contradiction' between a grain of barley and the plant that grows from it? Can we ascertain the Jacobian for the contradictory relationship between wealth and poverty? Is the 'contradiction', between "John" and his "manhood" normal to a given direction or manifold?
In her otherwise excellent book, Lindsey German says the following:
"The Working class has to have a party to overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle by an organised minority…." [German (1996), p.87.]
But, if contradictions were literal forces, we would be able to ascertain, say, the i, j and k components of "the contradiction between [the] potential revolutionary role [of the working-class] and its actual situation", differentiate them, and find out how quickly the said link was changing, and in what direction.14 The fact that we can't do this -- and no sane Marxist has ever even so much as attempted to do it (nor yet even theorised about doing this) -- suggests perhaps that in practice not even DM-fans think this analogy is at all apt, or, indeed, all that literal.
Hence, if 'contradictions' could be interpreted literally as forces, it would be possible to construct a vector algebra depicting them in nature and as part of the class struggle. Do we possess such a 'Vector Algebra of Revolution'? Has anyone ever bothered to construct one? Given the title of his book, the author of TAR was strangely silent on this issue.
The second reason why this is an inappropriate way to depict 'contradictions' arises from a consideration of the sort of response that could be made to the objections outlined above; it could be claimed that it's the inter-relationship between contradictory forces that explains change, and hence that it is only within a network of forces situated in a Totality of some sort that the contradictory inter-play between them becomes clear. Indeed, it could be argued that the above interpretation of contradictions (which pictures them as seemingly isolated entities) completely misconstrues both their role in DM and their operation in nature and society.
This volunteered objection was in fact considered in Part One of this Essay -- but from a slightly different angle -- where it was pointed out that there is a serious ambiguity in DM/'Materialist Dialectics' on this issue. That is because DM-theorists are hopelessly unclear whether 'contradictions' are (1) internal to objects and processes (causing them to change as a result of an internal dynamic), or whether they (2) merely arise externally between objects (as they form part of a mediated system, group of systems or processes), or (3) if it is just our description of objects and processes which is 'contradictory' (this resulting from our partial knowledge of reality, etc.), or (4) if it is a combination of all three -- or indeed whether something else is true of these elusive DM-'contradictions'.
And as we also saw in Part One of this Essay, while each of these options faces serious difficulties of its own, they all fail to explain change since they merely re-describe it in an inappropriate and obscure form. Worse still, they become incoherent when examined closely (as we will soon see is also the case with respect to forces and 'contradictions').
In response to this, it could be argued that the problem with the sort of analysis of dialectical systems presented here is that it attempts to 'objectify' contradictions (i.e., make objects out of them). Hence, it could be pointed out that in Materialist Dialectics it is not 'objects' that are subject to contradictions -- or contain them, or which are them --, but systems/totalities in change that reveal their inner contradictions, the latter of which in turn drive change along. In that case, it could be maintained that contradictions are properties of systems/totalities in the process of change and development, but not of objects as such.
In reply to these volunteered DM-responses it is worth asking where this leaves forces if contradictions are no longer to be viewed as objects or as object-like. Forces presumably have a physical form of some sort; they are not just relations, are they?
But, even if they were, it is far from easy to see what it is that could possibly physically relate objects and processes in nature and society, that is, over and above a few Hegelian 'concepts' of dubious provenance and even more dubious content.
Indeed, in all this it seems that the idea that objects change because of an 'inner dynamic' has been lost again. If objects change only because of a set of external forces -- albeit internal to a "Totality", mediated or not by the obscure 'influence' of that "Totality" --, this can only mean that "external" has now become the new "internal". In that case, "internal contradictions" are in effect those which an object merely experiences in its external relations with other objects and processes in a given "Totality". But, once more: what is the point of arguing that change is "internally-motivated" if external mediation is the only show in town, and forces are merely "relations"?
[As we will see in Essay Three Part Three, these "relations" are 'logical' anyway, and no less bogus for all that.]
In addition, the proffered DM-response outlined a few paragraphs back fails to resolve the problems mentioned earlier. First of all, as we will also see in Essay Eleven Part One, there is good reason to question the nature of the nebulous DM-"Totality" -- or, to be more honest, there would be if we knew what 'it' was (and there was some sign that dialecticians themselves knew what 'it' was!). Its re-appearance here can only cloud the issues, therefore.
Secondly, even if a clear account of the "Totality" were forthcoming, this way of depicting forces would still not work. If contradictions are properties of totalities -- and not of their parts -- then the parts could not change, since, on this account, contradictions would not belong to them, but to the whole, taken as a whole. In that case, while the whole might change, it would do so only as a result of the rearrangement of its changeless parts. [This was argued in detail in Part One of this Essay.] Given this way of thinking, the "Totality" (or, indeed, any sub-totality) would be composed of infinitely small changeless elementary particles, or it (they) would be composed of infinitely complex further sub-systems, themselves enjoying no interconnections. [The reader is referred back to Part One for more details.]
Again, it could be objected that a Totality is constituted by its own internal contradictory processes; that is precisely what a Totality is -- a contradictory, differentiated unity. The account given above seems to want to separate the parts from the whole.
However, this reply will still not do, for on that account it would now seem that it is both part and whole which is contradictory (and in a manner that is still unclear). And yet, such parts can't be contradictory in the same way that wholes are. This is because, on this account, parts mutually condition one another; this, presumably, is the nature of their mediated unity in contradiction. However, the "Totality" is related to nothing else that could condition it (since the 'it' is not separable from its parts). So, if the "Totality" is a contradictory whole, then it would have to be such in a new and as yet unspecified sense.
In fact, as seems obvious from what little DM-theorists themselves have told anyone about their "Totality", it looks like 'it' must be an unconditioned Absolute. It certainly cannot be conditioned from the 'outside', otherwise it would not be the Whole. Of course, if on the other hand, it were conditioned from the 'outside', an infinite 'exgress' (inflation) would be implied, for, plainly, we should want to know how this 'other thing' (about which we know even less) was conditioned, and by what -- and so on. But we have been here already.
It seems that these observations must apply otherwise, for the "Totality" to be contradictory, it would have to 'contradict' its parts. Ex hypothesi it would have to do this anyway, since there is nothing else for it to condition. Moreover these parts must then contradict each other in turn in the same way, after all. [The opposite supposition will be considered presently.]
And yet, if the "Totality" is composed solely of its parts (unless it is more than its parts -- that particular dead end is revealed for what it is in Essay Eleven Part Two), the contradiction between the "Totality" and its parts must (1) be the same as the contradiction between each of the aforementioned parts. In that case, it seems that the "Totality" could drop out of the picture as a shorthand for the sum total of parts in contradictory change. It, too, would become a mere fiction -- only this time a useless one.15
On the other hand, (2) if the "Totality" were more than the sum of its parts (as all dialecticians seem to believe),16 we would then be owed an explanation of the alleged 'contradiction' between this 'more' and that 'less' -- that is, between this 'more-of-a-"Totality"' and its lesser parts. But, as things stand, we have no idea whether this new 'contradictory' relation between whole and part is the same as that which operates between the parts, or if it is different.
[Anyone impatient with this nit-picking should re-direct their complaints to their local Dialectical Magus; this enforced pedantry is necessary because, even now, after 140+ years, dialecticians have yet to tell us what these 'forces' are, how they can possibly 'contradict' one another, and what their mysterious "Totality" actually is.]
However, independently of a resolution to the last series of problems ever being attempted, this 'theory' still faces other serious difficulties. If the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts is the same as (and no more than) that which exists between the parts, then manifestly the whole would not then be more than the sum of the parts (in at least this respect), since the whole would in that case be the entire 'contradictory' whole, all of whose elements (whole and part) operate alike. But, this would be contrary to the DM-hypothesis that wholes (whether these are wholes made of 'contradictory' parts or not) are more than the sum of their parts, whose natures (including the nature of their "internal contradictions") are said to be determined entirely by (while not reducible to) the nature of their parts, and their interconnections. Conversely, if the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts were not the same as that between the parts themselves, then we would still have an unexplained type of 'contradiction': that which exists between a whole that is more than the sum of the parts and those parts.17
Anyway, the idea that the whole 'contradicts' the parts in the same way that the parts do one another does not appear to be a viable option for DM-theorists. The parts relate to each other by "mediation, apparently; but how can the part-whole relation be one of mediation? The mutually 'contradictory' nature of the parts in development constitutes the whole; if now the whole has its own 'contradictory' relation with the parts over and above this (if it is more than the sum of the parts), then this new 'contradictory' relation cannot be one of part on part. But, if it is not this, then what is it?
Hence, as noted in Part One of this Essay, it seems that a literal interpretation of 'contradictions' as forces lapses either into some form of CAR, or expands into HEX/AIDS. Conversely, if the identification of forces with contradictions is figurative, then DM would be indistinguishable from, say, metaphysical poetry; and a rather prolix version, at that.
[HEX = Hegelian Expansionism; AIDS = Absolute Idealism; CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]
However, in order to examine this issue more thoroughly, let us assume that the above objections are totally misguided in some as yet unspecified way. In addition, let us further suppose that some sort of solution to all the above 'difficulties' can be found -- by someone at some point, somehow.
Even then the analogy between forces and contradictions would not work
The substantiation of this latest claim brings this discussion to the third reason for questioning the connection between forces and 'contradictions'.
Different Types Of Force Couples
In a physical system there may be several different combinations of interacting attractive and/or repulsive forces. If we abbreviate "attractive" and "repulsive" to "A" and "R", respectively, there appear to be only three types of combinations of just two of these: "AA-", "AR-" and "RR-forces".18
Many of the quotations given in Note 1 seem to imply that only AR-forces are 'contradictory'. This sort of combination will be examined later. However, AA- and RR-forces were not explicitly ruled out, and in a thoroughgoing analysis of every conceivable option available to DM-theorists, these clearly need to be considered. Hence, it is to these that we now turn.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how AA-forces could be interpreted as unities of opposites -- let alone as 'contradictory'. They are the same, so they can hardly be opposites. But, such forces abound in nature. For example, as noted earlier, the centre of gravity of any conglomeration of matter in the universe is the result of countless such AA-forces; in systems like this, kinematic (or rather dynamic) changes are caused by non-opposites. So, when, say, a planet is in the process of formation, particles begin to gravitate together under the operation of forces of mutual attraction --, i.e., these aforementioned non-opposites.19
Similarly, it is not easy to see how RR-forces could be interpreted as 'contradictory' -- or even as opposites -- and yet these are also found throughout nature. For example, intra-atomic forces of repulsion prevent nuclei from approaching one another.20
One objection to above immediately springs to mind: this analysis ignores the fact that such forces operate as they do because they work in opposition to one another -- that is, they do so in ways that bring them into, or out of equilibrium. However, this response clearly pictures forces as AR-couples, which option will be examined later. It cannot therefore assist us in our attempt to analyse AA- and RR-forces.
Despite this, even on that interpretation a problem still persists. If it were true that A-forces are the opposites of each other, then in order for them still to be regarded as 'contradictory' they could not also be regarded as the opposite of R-forces, unless, that is, A-forces are now permitted to have two sorts of "opposites": other A- and other R-forces. But, in that case, this would make a mockery of the notion that there are "polar opposites" at work in natural systems of forces (implicated in change, equilibria and in 'contradictions'):
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
It is difficult to see how a particular A-force could be the "polar opposite" of another A-force while at the same time being the polar opposite of an R-force -- i.e., how A- and R-forces could have two "polar opposites" without altering the meaning of the phrase "polar opposite". Even then, if the meaning of "polar opposite" were adapted to neutralise this 'difficulty', it would succeed in doing that only because of an ad hoc subjective and conventionalised linguistic adjustment. In that case, any 'truths' that sprang into existence as a result would plainly be a by-product of yet another piece of terminological juggling, not because of the way the world happened to be (and which would mean that dialectics had been read into nature).21
However, there are dialecticians who claim that objects and processes possess many "opposites"; for example Gollobin (1986), p.122 (but even he says these are "paired").
Of course, this whole metaphysic originated in the twisted 'logic' that one finds in Hegel, who posited a unique opposite (an "other") for each and every changing item, in order to forestall the criticism that if anything could change into 'what-it-is-not' (its 'opposite'), then since everything else in the universe is 'what-it-is-not' to any given object or process, any object or process could and would change into that anything-else-whatsoever.
In which case, instead of growing into barley plants, seeds, for example, would turn into volcanoes, unexploded bombs, Stalin's moustache or your left buttock -- and much else besides.
[In Note 67 we will see that even Hegel had to abandon the odd idea that objects and processes were somehow linked to a logical(?) and unique 'opposite'/"other".
As Essay Seven also showed, this is just one of the fatal consequences of the sloppy use of language found in DM/'Materialist Dialectics', as dialecticians try to depict the changes they tell us are initiated by UOs (as part of Engels's second 'Law').]
But, if objects and processes are allowed to have many (and possibly an infinite number of) 'opposites' -- all of which they could change into --, that would demolish even this crumbling Hegelian wall (i.e., that each object/process has its own unique "other"). Naturally, if true, that would mean that any minute now you could expect to change into, say, a T Rex, and the Pacific Ocean could morph into you (and a host of other things, into the bargain). Since this sort of thing does not happen, so far as we know, then we must conclude:
(1) Hegel was right that objects and processes really do have only one unique 'other', which is either (a) (logically?) internal to that object or process (meaning that that object or process cannot turn into this 'other', since it already exists!), or, (b) external to that object or process (meaning that the cause of change cannot be internal to that object or process), or (c) external to that object or process, which object or process turns into that 'other', and thus creates it the process of change (meaning that change cannot have been caused by that 'other', which means that the whole point of this 'logical' exercise would disappear); and thus that:
(2) Forces can have only one opposite, not many.21a
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the word "opposite" really means "oppositional" in this context. This change of emphasis now underlines the active inter-relation that exists between forces rather than their passive connection, which is something the above discussion seems to have ignored. Hence, it might be natural to speak of RR- or AA-forces as contradictory in this sense --, i.e., in the sense that all and only those forces that are oppositional (which engage in, or are part of, some sort of "struggle") should be classed as contradictory.
However, this latest revision seems to be inconsistent with the claims made in several of the passages quoted in Note 1. These appear to suggest that only certain forces were to be regarded as inseparable from matter; others indicated that forces were merely the consequence of the complex inter-play between quanta of energy (or of motion). For example, Engels claimed that:
"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
Once again, this qualification seems to lose sight of internally-connected oppositionality. In this passage, Engels appears to edit out of the picture the dialectical interrelation between forces, replacing it/them with mere "forms of motion".
Now, "forms of motion" are not in any obvious way interconnected if the relevant forces are left out. But, DM requires bodies in motion to be inter-related; that is why intermediary forces seem to be essential. 'Contradictions' were clearly supposed to assume just such a role --, i.e., as part of the 'connective tissue' of reality (as it were). If they are now to be re-classified as little more than 'useful fictions' -- as relative "forms of motion" --, there would seem to be nothing physical left in nature to act as either the bearer, or the mediator, of such DM-interconnections. Without a material substrate, 'contradictions' could only operate on bodies or processes magically, or, perhaps supernaturally, it would seem.
Ignoring for the present this serious difficulty, perhaps DM-theorists mean something like the following:
F1: All and only those forces that are oppositional -- or are implicated in struggle -- are contradictory.
But, if F1 were true, motion itself could not be regarded as a product of 'contradictory forces' -- unless we confine our attention solely to accelerated motion -- since, ex hypothesi, no net forces operate in cases where there is no acceleration (in post-Aristotelian Physics, that is). Even then, accelerated motion (under gravity, say) is subject to only one force (or, rather, one resultant force) in classical Physics, and none at all in relativistic Physics.
At best, therefore, taking a classical view, most of the accelerated motion in the universe (which covers, as far as we know, all of the bulk, non-rectilinear movement in nature) is the product of only one force. Given F1, it is not easy to see how such motion could be viewed as part of a 'contradictory' Totality, if the 'classical view' is correct. If it is correct, most (perhaps all) of the motion in nature could not have been induced, caused, changed or sustained by 'contradictions'. With that observation, much of classical DM collapses.22
It could be objected to this that as a matter of fact all motion in the universe is the result of a disequilibrium between oppositional forces; that is precisely what a resultant force is. In that case, therefore, bodies would move (or their state of motion would change) because of just such an imbalance between forces. Hence, for example, the planets -- which move in apparently steady orbits around the Sun -- actually have their trajectories determined by resultant forces internal to the Solar System, the Galaxy and beyond, all of which are induced by complex inter-relating systems of forces. Or so it could be argued.
This objection will be considered in more detail later, but for now it suffices to point out that it is difficult to see how such forces could be regarded as oppositional. Presumably, these forces do not affect each other; they simply change whatever motion is present in the system, or in certain bodies. At best, such forces could only oppose the impressed motion already present -- which motion would itself have been the result of still other forces in the system. This can be seen from the fact that if the moving bodies in question had not been in the said 'force field', the said forces would have had nothing on which they could act; hence, in 'empty space', we would see no new motion, clearly.23 Forces without bodies to operate on do not interfere with each other, as far as we know -- unless they are themselves regarded as particulate (or are carried by particles), and would then, of course, not be forces but bodies, to begin with.24
Classically, forces seem to work only on bodies by altering their motion. In which case, the supposed opposition is not between bodies, nor is it between bodies and forces, nor even between forces and forces -- it is between forces and the already impressed motion of bodies. But, this picture is difficult to square with the idea that there is a UO at work in such systems -- nor does it seem to tally with the claim that dialectically polar opposites ultimately induce all motion and change. This is because (once more) forces do not oppose each other; they oppose or augment whatever motion is already present in the system, however that was caused.
In short, on this 'revised' view, the term "contradiction" would not apply to opposing forces (i.e., to forces that oppose one another), nor to bodies; on the contrary, 'contradictions' would connect forces with movement. But, as yet, no DM-theorist has given any clear sense to the idea that a force could 'contradict' the impressed motion in a system. And quite right too; there are no opposites here for a DM-'contradiction' to latch onto. How could a force be the 'opposite' of a change of place?
It could be objected that as a matter of fact forces in nature oppose (in the sense of change) motion. Indeed, it could be argued that dialecticians examine forces as they actually operate in nature (as opposed to those abstracted from it); such opposites objectively exist and cannot be analysed away. Or, so it could be maintained, once more.
This much will not be disputed here (even if its wording might). But, in what way can this set-up be said to involve the interconnection of opposites? And, what sense can be given to the idea that motion in one direction is the opposite of a force that affects it? Certainly they are not unified opposites (i.e., opposites on the same type, so they are not logically connected, in the Hegelian sense of this word).
At best, the force concerned might tend to produce an opposite motion (or change in movement perhaps) to that which has already been impressed (or none at all). But to describe force and motion as "opposites" would appear to make about as much sense as claiming that "left" was the opposite of "television set", even if as a matter of fact someone moved a television to the left. Their actual linkage in reality has nothing to do with whether it is sensible to describe such items as unified opposites, or even as oppositional. These terms are categorically different -- as are "force" and "motion". Hence, it is not a question of whether DM-theorists are dealing with 'objective' facts, or not; it is one of asking why this proffered objection can only be made to work by mis-describing things.25
Only those who feel confident that they can provide a clear sense to the idea that forces and motion are opposites may reject the above objection with anything more than a wave of the hand.26
However, even if this could be done, it would still be bad news for DM. This is because any other allegedly oppositional force in the system could not then also be the opposite of the original duet between this force and that motion. And that would then mean that systems of opposing forces could not function in DM as is currently supposed. In that case, it would not be forces that opposed one another (as had originally been claimed); in such a set-up, forces would oppose impressed motion (not other forces), and the idea that change was the result of systematically inter-related forces would have to be abandoned.
Indeed, each item in a complex ensemble of this sort would have to be viewed as the opposite of every other. Given such an arrangement, any moving body would have countless 'opposites' (i.e., any other forces and/or moving bodies in the system).27 This would put a strain on the meaning of the word "opposite", once more, which would remain until the meaning of that word had been altered accordingly, so that several things could be regarded as the "opposite" of any one or more items. Under such circumstances, as we have already seen, the notion of a polar opposite would lose its key role in DM; indeed, it would clearly become meaningless if everything possessed innumerable "polar opposites". Not only that, as we have also seen several times, given such ad hoc linguistic tinkering, dialectics would apply to nature and society only because of a new and subjectively applied linguistic convention.
Unfortunately, this jellyfish-of-a-theory cannot be squeezed anywhere without some of it slipping through our fingers somewhere else. What had been touted all along as a grand theory that could explain change as a consequence of the 'contradictory' nature of reality -- or, as the result of the connection between opposite forces -- now seems to amount to little more than a few vague ideas about the relation between a force and the impressed motion in a system, fatally linked to the admission that the DM-Totality is a mediated system of forces only if the definition of a "polar opposite" is 'adjusted' to order. If this is what DM-theorists mean when they asserted their impressive sounding 'dialectical' theses then it seems that their theory can only be rescued by making reality Ideal -- i.e., making its 'truth' sensitive to ad hoc linguistic 'enhancement'.
However, even if the above is misguided in some way, in DM-terms, none of it makes any sense, for such opposites (force and motion) would not turn into one another, as the DM-classics say they should:
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62. Bold emphasis added.]
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Engels (1976) p.179. Bold emphasis added.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Bold emphasis added.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]…. [Ibid., pp.221-22. Last set of parentheses in the original; bold emphasis added.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead,
rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one
another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is
that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or
rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given
conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are
referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete
transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves
into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the
mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is
absolute." [Mao (1937), pp.340-42. Bold emphases added.]
Force does not change into movement, nor does movement change into force.
Someone could object that indeed they do change into one another (perhaps via an exchange of energy, or as part of an equal and opposite reaction, etc.). But, if that were so, another problem would immediately assert itself. If force F were to turn into new movement M, then the one would follow upon the other: F would create M at a later instant in time, otherwise it could not turn into it. Plainly, if M already exists, F could not turn into it. Unfortunately, in that case, F and M cannot 'struggle' with one another, for the two would not exist simultaneously in order for that to happen. If, on the other hand, F were to change as a result of some as yet unspecified factor, say F*, then F* would have to be the opposite of F, and F would turn into F*, not into M. Howsoever we try to re-package this badly wrapped 'theory', none of it makes any sense.
[This is just a particular example of a general, but fatal defect that lies right at the heart of the DM-'theory' of change, described in much more detail here. Nevertheless, this point can be generalised, as it will be below, to show that no two (or more) forces could 'contradict' one another in the way that dialecticians imagine.]
A First Attempt At Clarification
Perhaps, then the following re-write might succeed in repairing this part of DM, which re-write also, in the event, tries to avoid undermining the thesis that UOs operate everywhere in nature:
F2: A UO involves the opposition between a force P1 and the impressed motion that another set of forces Q has produced (or would have produced) in a body B (had P1 never existed). The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this struggle.
F2 appears to link the operation of one force (P1) with that of another set of forces (Q). However, it is difficult to distinguish what F2 says about these two from the vector resultant of two forces if we subjected this system to the usual mathematical analysis. If so, the word "struggle" would amount to little more than an anthropomorphic re-write of the functional relations that exist within the vector calculus, only now applied to just one force, the resultant. In that case, if and when P1 and Q interact, they will produce just one resultant force R, which would alone induce the recorded change in motion.28
But, if this is so, a contradiction between forces cannot arise: if there is only one force operating in the system, no contradiction seems possible. In that case, F2 threatens to introduce another fatal implication for the entire 'theory', by killing it for want of forces.29
This failure suggests we should reconsider an option left unexplored earlier; i.e., the one which argued that forces are the only legitimate candidates to be placed in such oppositional matrices, not the motion they change/induce -- contrary to what Engels seems to have believed (when he tried to replace forces with relative motion).
On this view, forces are 'contradictory' only of other forces, and not of bodies or of impressed motion. The following might, therefore, bring out this new slant slightly better:
F3: Given a body B, and a system of forces P, comprising n vectors p1-pn operating on B, a resultant force vector R represents the outcome of the struggle between these n contradictory vectors. In this, R itself need not be fixed, but could itself be subject to countless changes as body B moves under the influence of P, which would also change accordingly.
One immediate problem with this is that the specification of the forces belonging to P depends on the choice of co-ordinate system and inertial frame.30 This indicates that the representation of forces as 'contradictions' is perhaps more convention-sensitive that it is reality-driven -- making such 'contradictions' no more 'objective' than, say, latitude and longitude are.
However, even if this latest problem is put to one side, it is still worth asking whether any sense can be made of F3.
As noted above, F3 seems to bring us back full circle to the idea that forces -- not bodies, or the motion of bodies -- are 'contradictory' of each other. And yet, as we have just seen, it is not possible to depict AA- and RR-forces as 'contradictory', unless their effects are involved in some way.
Unfortunately, and once again, if "force" is just a convenient shorthand for relative motion, it would mean that at least this part of DM was consistent with a CAR-like account of reality -- in that elements of the "Totality" would now be seen as externally- (not internally-) related to one another.
[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]
To repeat: it is not easy to see how the motion of one body could be internally-related to that of others without re-introducing the idea that bodies exercise an effect on one another independently of how they are moving (which, to be sure, may subsequently affect their motion, but which would not itself internally-link such bodies in motion). But this issue is precisely the difficulty that exercised traditional Philosophers, as part of the classical metaphysical problem of the nature of forces; DM has merely reproduced it in an obscure form.31
Perhaps the slide into CAR may be prevented by the following re-wording of F3:
F4: Given a system of forces P, comprising n vectors p1-pn, a resultant force vector R represents the outcome of the struggle between these n vectors.
F5: This ensemble is only contradictory within a Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.
F5 is clearly dependent on the idea that the whole determines the nature of its parts, the latter of which in turn feed back into, and determine the nature of the whole. Hence, F4 and F5 appear to restore the dialectical unity that earlier paragraphs seem to have ignored.
Unfortunately, this brings us back in yet another full circle to a consideration of the relationship between the "Totality" and its parts. This is because F5 introduces its own pernicious version of HEX, for it seems impossible (on this account) to determine whether anything is 'contradictory' (or not) unless we ascertained the nature of the whole. But, since the latter is always changing, no element in this 'cosmic wild-goose chase' will ever be hunted down and trapped. We encountered this dilemma in several forms in other Essays at this site; on this see, for example, here and here.32
The most relevant aspect of this latest quandary centres on the idea (voiced by some dialecticians) that as scientific understanding grows, the 'contradictions' that now plague our knowledge of the world ought to diminish. Presumably, this must mean that at the limit (i.e., in an ideal state where human beings possess (in theory) the Absolute Truth about everything), there would be no contradictions anywhere. In its turn, this appears to mean that even if humanity never actually reaches this blessed state, we can in the here-and-now make that very inference: the Absolute truth is that not only is the world not contradictory, the motion of bodies and the operation of forces isn't either. In fact, this proposition must be true now, for if it were not now true that there were no 'contradictions' in the ultimate future state of our knowledge of the "Totality" then either the DM-view of the limit of knowledge (as ideally contradiction-free) must be wrong, or the DM-belief that humanity is converging on that limit is incorrect, since there is no such limit.33
Again, if this is what dialecticians mean by 'contradictory forces',34 then nothing may be so described until everything has been so described. But, this reverses the dialectical picture, for, as we have just seen, some DM-theorists appear to believe that things only look 'contradictory' because we do not possess the 'Big Picture', and that if ever we were to attain to such a universal overview of things, 'contradictions' would disappear (or largely disappear -- the story gets a little vague on this point). Here, in contrast, the idea seems to be that we may only depict forces in nature as 'contradictory' after the dialectical bell on judgement day has finally tolled -- that is, we may do so only at the end of time, when all (or most) 'contradictions' will have been resolved, meaning that 'objectively' they do exist and 'objectively' that they do not (or we do not know whether either of both are the case)!
So, one horn of this dilemma suggests 'dialectical contradictions' do not exist, and if they don't, they cannot induce change. The other suggests we cannot now assert that they do exist (since we are not in possession of Absolute Knowledge), so we cannot know whether they cause change.35
At any rate, if AA-, and RR-forces are oppositional to each other, or even to themselves, change would still be caused by a resultant force, which it is just as easy to interpret as 'tautological', rather than as 'contradictory' -- that is, if we insist on viewing nature in such anthropological/animistic terms.
Of course, if we resist primitivism of this sort, then both descriptors (i.e., "contradictory" and "tautological") should be fed effortlessly into the bogus concept-shredder of history. [More on that here.]
Perhaps, then, it would be wise to draw a veil over this self-imposed dialectical impasse, and turn to a more likely source of 'contradictions': AR-forces.
In the previous section, it became clear that little sense could be made of AA- or RR-forces serving as models for 'contradictions', and this turned out to have nothing to do with the difficulty of seeing whether such 'dynamic duos' contained opposites or not -- which they manifestly don't. An A-force is not the opposite of another A-force; the same can be said for R-forces.
However, a prima facie case could be made for regarding AR-force couples as apt exemplars of the polar opposites DM-theorists require (in order to depict 'contradictions' in DM and HM).
Unfortunately, as we will see, this slender straw once clutched soon turns into a millstone, drowning this already sinking 'theory'. Quite apart from the considerations outlined above, no clear sense can be made of the idea that AR-forces can model 'contradictions', anywhere, anyhow.36
An initial serious difficulty with this whole idea is that AR-couples do not appear to operate in nature in quite the manner this handy prefix seems to suggest: i.e., as AR-forces.
Consider a straightforward case involving, say, the accumulation of matter that formed the stars, planets and their moons (etc.). Here, R-forces (operating at the nuclear level) apparently prevent (for a time) the catastrophic collapse of these growing masses into 'singularities' by balancing-out the A-forces that presumably set the whole thing in motion. The problem with these R-forces is that, while they look as though they oppose any other A-forces in the system, they are not their polar opposites (in the way that, say, the North and South poles of a magnet are said to be) -- that is, they are not opposite manifestations of the same force type. So, the inter-atomic forces preventing this collapse are not of the same type of force as the gravitational forces that initiated the process.37 While a case might be made for depicting North and South poles of a magnet as polar opposite magnetic forces (or as 'creating' them -- but on this see below), gravitational and nuclear forces are not opposites of the same type, and so cannot, it seems, 'contradict' each other.
However, even that description is prejudicial, for, as noted above, these forces change the motion of bodies; they do not directly confront each other as opposing forces. Admittedly, they can be represented in a vector calculus, but we have already seen that this translation is of little assistance to DM -- this is because the relevant forces would disappear, to be replaced by a single resultant force, which causes all the action.
Perhaps these initial difficulties could be defused if emphasis were once more placed on the oppositional nature of AR-forces as a way of explaining change?
Unfortunately, this detour is no more successful here than it was when it was considered above in relation to AA- and RR-forces.
Even if this further difficulty is shelved, it would still be difficult to see how AR-forces could be interpreted literally (or figuratively) as 'contradictions' (especially in HM). This is because of they way in which they can combine and augment one another.
For example, consider, two forces operating in diametrically opposite directions tangentially placed around a rotating body. These two forces -- although 'opposites' at their point of action -- exercise a combined and augmented effect on the angular acceleration of that body, thus ceasing to be oppositional.38
This is a familiar feature of force vectors. In some instances, they seem to 'oppose' -- in others they appear to 'augment' -- one another, while in still others they look like they do both at once.39
Cases like these illustrate that forces are not rigidly fixed as permanent opposites, nor are they always oppositional, even when they are supposedly opposites. Hence, it is difficult to see how a DM-picture of forces operating (in nature) only as polar oppositional pairs could accommodate this property of natural forces.40 But in that case this is unwelcome news, for little sense can be given in DM to the idea that opposites can switch in this way.41
It could be objected here is a gross distortion since the above phenomena are actually consistent with DM. Dialecticians themselves reject the idea that there are fixed and unchanging forces in nature. Hence, the recognition that forces can change and operate in 'opposite directions' is one of DM's strengths, not one of its weaknesses. Or so it could be maintained.
However, this volunteered reply does achieve one thing: it helps focus on what has been a recurring problem throughout these Essays: DM is so vague and equivocal that it is impossible to say what its consequences are, or even if it has any. The claim that 'contradictions' in nature must be understood as opposing forces has under close examination turned out to mean that such forces might not actually oppose each other -- indeed, according to Engels, the concept of a force could simply be a convenient shorthand for the complex relative motion of bodies. Now, it seems that even this is incorrect, for oppositional forces may actually augment one another, but only if they are not now viewed as shorthand for the relative motion of bodies.
It is thus impossible to decide which DM-type forces are or were genuine opposites (or, indeed, which are or were polar opposites, if any are or were), or distinguish those that are from those that aren't. But, if all forces can work in any manner whatsoever, then it becomes deeply mysterious why only some are depicted as opposites. And anyway, what has become of the AR-typology Engels regarded as fundamental?
Given such slippery terminology, little meaning may be given to a single DM-concept in this area; still less to the idea that DM force 'laws' operate anywhere in nature.
Imagine a Chemist, say, who identified an element as having just so many protons in its nucleus, except it didn't really have this number, and these alleged protons weren't really protons, and the element rarely if ever had a nucleus, and anyway it wasn't an element in the first place. Suppose further that this chemist claimed that he knew what he was talking about (even if no one else did) because he was an expert player of the 'Nixon Card', and skilled in the art of "grasping contradictions", which unfortunate lack of 'flexibility' prevented his critics from seeing the truth as he saw it.
Few, I think, would take him seriously.
Naturally, such discursive and theoretical 'contradictions' are grist to the DM-mill, but this is not something about which dialecticians should feel the least bit proud. For if Capitalists, say, (as a social force) can indeed operate in such a contradictory manner, who is to say whether a revolution is necessary to overthrow them? Perhaps -- as result of a 'dialectical inversion' -- the class enemy could become the strongest ally of the working class? In such a topsy-turvy world anything might happen. Capitalism might end by being reformed away, Imperialists could assist in the abolition of injustice, the Nazi's might one day help create 'racial' harmony, and the Ku Klux Klan could advance the struggle for Black Liberation. Who knows? The Bosses might even overthrow themselves!42
If it is a central postulate of the theory that 'contradictions' are oppositional forces, and that these can change in 'contradictory' ways to become 'non-oppositional', then reformism, centrism, class collaboration (and the prospect of having the Fascists (etc.) as allies) cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, if these possibilities are to be rejected (as surely they must), then the importation of such 'contradictory' DM-ideas into HM contexts must be resisted equally forcefully.
Of course, it could be pointed out that forces operate in history in more complex ways than those that work in nature, so the analogy with natural forces (and the KKK, etc.) is inapt -- especially if it is applied in the "crude" manner illustrated above. Unfortunately, if this attempted rebuttal were itself correct then it would be misleading to describe natural and social forces as 'contradictory', for if the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' is inapt, it is inapt. Of course, that admission would amount to the abandonment of this unhelpful analogy in its entirety: that 'contradictions' may be depicted as oppositional forces.43
Nevertheless, even if all of the above points turn out to be incorrect in some way, there are other, more fundamental reasons for ruling-out the identification of opposing forces with 'contradictions'.
'Literal Forces' In Opposition
Many of the above remarks were aimed at demonstrating that the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' might not be at all apt. However, it could be argued that this does not affect the view that the identification of forces with 'contradictions' is in fact literal, not figurative.
However, the truly remarkable thing is that despite its centrally-important role in DM, as far as can be ascertained, the precise details of the literal connection between forces and 'contradictions' have never been worked-out by dialecticians. One reason for this might be that they consider this identification to be so obvious that the specifics either do not matter or they are deemed trivial.
On the other hand, it could turn out that nothing could have been said in this direction by anyone desirous of defending this aspect of DM, which would more obviously explain the deafening silence. As seems apparent, and as will presently be advanced beyond the mere 'seeming' stage, the latter option is indeed correct: this omission is not the least bit surprising, for the imagined connection between forces and 'contradictions' turns out to be entirely illusory.
In order to substantiate this claim, it might help if we back-track a little. Part of the argument in favour of the identification of forces and contradictions appears to depend on an initial analogy: that drawn between literal contradictions and conflict (which, as we will see in Essay Twelve, is a throw-back to an animistic confusion -- a conflation of various forms of social conflict with the imputed activities of ancient 'gods'/personified forces at work in nature -- perpetrated by (Greek) ruling-class theorists; summary here).
Mere contradictions are ostensively verbal wrangles, which themselves look oppositional; when one person asserts "p" and another person denies it (or asserts "not p", where "p" stands for a proposition token), at the level of discourse at least some sort of opposition seems to be implied (but on that, see here). So, analogously, a 'contradiction' in nature might appear to signify the existence of a real material opposition (but, alas, only to those who are happy to fetishise social relations as if they were, or which represented, real relations in the non-social world).
Clearly, DM-theorists view material 'contradictions' as their primary concern, compared to the secondary instances found in merely verbal wrangles --, since matter precedes mind (etc.). Even so, the argument in general is clearly analogical, for we were certainly aware of the latter well before the former. In that case, the argument must have proceeded from the human case to the natural -- which is indeed what the history of the subject reveals: materialist dialecticians did not exist in pre-historic times, but people have been arguing for tens of thousands of years.
Hence, DM-theorists must (at least initially) have relied on an analogy drawn between the way human beings argue (and/or fight) and the way conflict appears in the natural world. Unfortunately, this makes the literal interpretation of forces as 'contradictions' still dependent on the use of analogical and figurative language, but, with no clue as to what that literal meaning could possibly be; we still lack the material grounding that DM-theorists require.
Now we certainly have a very clear way of explicating contradictions in language and logic, but we have none at all for those that allegedly occur in nature -- save we continually use a typographically identical word (i.e., "contradiction") and equate it (in the absence of any justification, save perhaps on Hegel's say-so) with forces.
Nevertheless, this would at least account for the figurative way that contradictions are continually used in DM (and overused in HM), and why dialecticians regularly conflate social with material forms.44
Even if we ignore this latest problem, one thing is clear: for DM-theorists verbal contradictions represent perhaps the least significant type of opposition. Changes in nature and society are (for them) the result of much more fundamental 'contradictions' than those occasioned by the mere gainsaying of another person's words. As noted above, in many cases anyway, discursive contradictions might turn out be the 'reflection' of more basic conflicts in the real world, and it is the latter that are of interest to DM-theorists.
However, once this superficially 'neat picture' is examined a little more closely much of it disintegrates.
The Revenge Of The Non-Existent
As has already been noted, DM-theorists have as yet failed to provide a clear account of the precise nature of the connection between 'contradictions' and opposing forces. In that case, once again, one will have to be supplied for them.45
Presumably, when DM-theorists claim that 'contradictions' are represented in nature by opposing forces they have something like the following in mind (if they but knew it):
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites.46
[Here, the content of C1 could include any other ambient forces and processes operating in the system; alternatively, the forces themselves may even be 'edited out' on the lines envisaged by Engels (as a sort of shorthand for relative motion, etc.). In addition, all the internal mediations between these forces and/or events in the Totality (T) may also be incorporated into the picture. Other 'dialectical' caveats could, of course, be stirred into the mix, as seems necessary and/or appropriate.]
It is worth emphasising at this point that P1 or P2 must operate 'independently' in C1.47 This seems to be an essential assumption to make so that sets E1 and E2 may be determinate themselves.
[Anyway, this 'independence' need not suggest a CAR-like scenario since it could form part of the 'dialectical development' of new forces and processes as C1 and the rest of T develop. Naturally, this simplifying assumption could be modified at a later stage, as the need arises.]
The first problem with the above account centres on the term "opposites", in F9. Something a little more precise than merely an "opposite" seems to be required here in order for DL to surpass FL in its ability to account for change, etc.48
Unfortunately, the difficulty here is seeing whether even this minimal condition is actually implied by F6-F9, and whether the rather weak concept of an "opposite" is capable of bearing all the weight that is usually put on it.
However, quite independently of these annoying opening niggles, far more problematic is the fact that given F6-F9, it would be impossible to say what the 'contradictory' state-of-affairs here is meant to be.
This is because F6-F9 imply that E1 and E2 do not in fact obtain together, for if just one of P1 or P2 is in fact operative, then just one of E1 or E2 will be instantiated.
Clearly, in such circumstances there could be no 'contradiction' -- even given the loose DM-notion of one -- since, at least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction would not actually exist for it to contradict anything else, it having been prevented from occurring by the operation of either one of P1 or P2!49
Anyway, I shall examine later the question whether E1 and E2, even though 'opposites', can legitimately be said to be 'contradictory'. In what follows, I shall simply assume that they are.50
Prevention And Its Discontents
Despite this, it could be claimed that the following propositions are all that DM really requires:
F10: P1 prevents E2, and P2 prevents E1.
F11: Anything that prevents something else happening contradicts it.
F12: Therefore, P1 and P2 contradict each other's effects.
If this is so, then plainly P1 and P2 do not actually contradict each other, just each other's effects. In that case, it is not too clear whether or not DM-theorists -- keen to maintain the orthodox view that forces contradict each other -- will want to embrace F10-F12.
In addition, it has already been conceded (for the purposes of the argument) that E1 and E2 are 'contradictories'. But, it now appears from the above, and from F10-F12, that not only does E1 'contradict' E2, but also that P1 'contradicts' E2, and P2 'contradicts' E1, as well. I shall return to consider these added complications, later.
However, there appears to be no good reason for accepting F11, and every reason for rejecting it. Consider the following scenario -- aimed at illustrating why F11 is unacceptable (even given the truth of other DM-theses):
F13: NN saved child MM from drowning.
F14: NN prevented the drowning.
F15: So, NN contradicted the drowning (by F11).
[F11: Anything that prevents something else happening contradicts it.]
The problem here lies not so much with the non-standard use of language these sentences contain, but with the fact that if a drowning (or if anything) is prevented from happening then it never actually took place. In that case, if the said incident did not happen it could not have been 'contradicted' by any of the forces or events doing the preventing, since there would be no 'it' for anything to contradict. Unless we are prepared to envisage forces 'contradicting' things that do not exist, or we allow them to 'contradict' unrealised possibilities -- or even ideas (perhaps those in the mind of NN above) --, the word "contradiction" can gain no grip here, even in DM-terms.
Of course, it could be objected that this hypothetical action did indeed contradict the said drowning by stopping it from happening. But, to repeat, since the said drowning had been prevented, it did not take place, so it never existed to be contradicted.
One obvious fall-back position for dialecticians to occupy would be to argue that the actions mentioned above halted a series of events that would have led to the said drowning. In that sense, those actions contradicted that series of events. This objection will be looked at more closely later, and below.
However, just in case this latest counter-example is considered prejudicial, or contentious (in that it does not deal with real forces, or with the sort of forces DM-theorists are interested in), then perhaps the following considerations might prove more acceptable. Let us begin with this obvious sentence:
F16: Any process that is prevented from occurring does not exist (or take place).51
It is clear that while F16 is a truism, it seems to ignore events and processes that have an extended life, so it might not in fact be acceptable as a clarification of the processes that are of interest to DM-theorists. Consider, then, the following emendations:
F17: Event E consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events E1-En.
F18: Events E1-En form complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T, if ever they occur.
F19: Let P2 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.
F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will never exist), or do not take place.
It is quite plain from this that because of the operation of P2, certain events failed to manifest themselves. But that simply generalises the point made in the drowning example above. Even if it is assumed that the vague notion of a 'contradiction' employed by DM-theorists is viable, it is difficult to see how something could 'contradict' something else if the latter does not exist/take place (and perhaps never will).
This objection appears to be fatal to DM; if forces are genuinely oppositional then they actually prevent 'contradictions' from arising, and so cannot be equated with what they thwart. So, far from being DM-friendly, forces/'contradictions' seem to be its worst enemies.
In that case, if this serious difficulty is to be neutralised, a new and more conducive account of the relationship between 'contradictions' and forces must be found.52
A Balanced Account Of Prevention?
In order to construct a more viable account, we need to return to a difficulty we met earlier, which was put to one side temporarily: the claim that it's forces (not forces and effects, or simply effects) that are directly contradictory to one another. Consider then the following:
F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and vice versa.
Again, this perhaps puts too much weight on the term "prevent"; it could prompt F21 to self-destruct just as fast as F17-20 did, for if one of these forces fails to operate, no 'contradiction' would ensue.
However, perhaps this conclusion is a little too hasty. For example, both of the above forces could still exist even if one ceased to operate in an F21-style scenario, and no problem need arise because no appeal would have been made to the non-existent effects of one of them in this case.
This means that even though either one of P1 or P2 might have been prevented from acting, they could both still exist in some form or other. If so, F21 might appear to be the viable option that dialecticians require. One further advantage would be that F21 connects forces directly with 'contradictions', rather than linking 'contradictions' to the effects of forces. Could this be the lifeline that DM requires?
Alas, upon closer examination, this lifeline soon turns into a noose.
The fatal consequences this option creates for DM become apparent when we attempt to unravel what it means for a force to be 'prevented' from operating.
Despite disclaimers, it seems that if a force no longer operates, it no longer exists. Perhaps the problem lies not so much with the precise physical form that forces take (which is mysterious in itself, even to this day), but with the fact that the word "operate" is ambiguous. Consider the following examples of forces that are capable of being rendered inoperative:
F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate once worker NN threw the switch.
F23: An aerofoil produces the lift necessary to keep an aeroplane in the air provided that there is sufficient relative velocity between that aerofoil and the ambient medium to prevent the force of gravity from operating normally, pulling the aircraft to the ground.
In F22, the relevant force simply ceased to exist (or it was converted back into another force, 'potential' force, or form of energy, etc.) once the switch had been thrown. But, in F23, a second force (lift) 'cancels out' the effects of the first force (gravity) -- which, of course, still exists (perhaps as part of the resultant force in this system).
Could F21 now be interpreted along lines similar to those suggested in F23? This way of viewing the relation between P1 and P2 would see them both as still existing, even while they counterbalanced each other. In which case, it might prove helpful to re-write F21 in the following manner:
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.53
[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and vice versa.]
Now, F24 does not seem to face any of the existential problems that F21 encountered since the relevant forces actually co-exist, counterbalancing each other. Perhaps, at last, we have a clear statement of what DM-theorists require?
Alas not.
A new difficulty arises once we ask why only counterbalancing forces should be considered 'contradictory'. This is relevant since F24 simply restricts our attention to situations where there is an equilibrium between forces, and ignores dis-equilibria.54 But surely, it is largely as a result of the latter that change occurs -- meaning that 'contradictions' should be connected with these rather than with equilibria. If so, F24 must be re-written in the following way:
F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether it counterbalances P2 or not.
Unfortunately, F25 cannot now provide the clarity that was missing from previous attempts to explicate this part of DM. This is because F25 fails to distinguish between equilibria and disequilibria. F24 seemed to express a clear definition of 'contradictory' forces, but in order to make it applicable to the real world, F25 had to be recruited in support, completely undermining F24. This is because F25 informs us that forces are 'contradictory' whether F24 is true or not. Worse still, F25 could be true even when F24 is false:
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether it counterbalances P2 or not.
Hence, if the following were true:
F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it does not counterbalance P2.
[F25 would be true, but F24 would be false (or vice versa).]
Now, anyone reading these three sentences (and taking them for an accurate exposition of this part of DM) would rightly complain that nothing had actually been explained, since there is nothing about the relationship between the forces mentioned that indicates what the overall theory is committed to.
In response, others could argue that this latest problem is spurious and is solely the result of the phrase "only if" occurring in F24. Perhaps its removal would eliminate the difficulty? Unfortunately, the removal of the "only if" in F24 would plunge the theory back into all the existential problems it had been introduced to eradicate. This can be seen if we try to re-word F24 in the following manner:
F27: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.
Although F27 might look acceptable, it is merely a sufficient condition; hence, it does not rule out the following:
F28: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and vice versa.54a
[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and vice versa.]
But, F28 is just a resurrected version of F21, which we found did not rule out F22, and non-existent forces. What was required here instead was a description of 'contradictory' forces that does not imply that one of the forces operating ceased to exist as a result of the action of any other forces in the system. And we also required an account that does not rely on forces merely 'contradicting' effects -- because of the serious difficulties that alternative encountered earlier.
This is why an appeal had to be made to forces that counterbalance each other, since (clearly) they must exist to do this -- hence the introduction of the "only if", making this a necessary condition. But, as we then discovered, this more restricted version ruled out forces that did not counterbalance one another, which DM seems to need; reintroducing these at a later stage ruined this neat picture.
Unfortunately, F24 and F26 seem to divorce 'contradictions' from equilibria, since the presence or absence of the latter is in no way affected by the former.
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it does not counterbalance P2.
This means that if F24 and F26 reflect the real nature of things, then 'contradictions' are in fact unrelated to the balancing effects of forces. As paradoxical as this might seem, DM-theorists must deny the truth of the conjunction of F24 and F26 if they want to maintain their belief that there is a connection between forces, equilibria and disequilibria. But, alas, in order to account for the 'contradictory' nature of reality, DM-theorists can't afford to do this. For, as soon as F24 and F26 are adopted, DM ceases to be explanatory; but the minute these two are rejected, this attempt to understand the nature of DM-forces collapses.
Nevertheless, this annoying conclusion might appear to some to be a little too hasty -- or, for that matter, contrived. And yet, with so little in the writings of DM-theorists to guide us, how would it be possible for anyone to decide if this is the case? Indeed, how could dialecticians themselves arrive at a decision here, without some form of theoretical (shock, horror!) innovation, an option that has so far been complete anathema to the 'orthodox'?
Nevertheless, if we adhere to the requirement that 'contradictions' explain change -- when pictured as opposing forces (that is, if we give 'contradictions' some sort of material bite) --, then the theory must self-destruct, by the above argument. This is because the theory maintains that forces are 'contradictory' whether what its theorists claim about them is true or not (if this is indeed what they might claim!).
Naturally, all this is independent of the far more fundamental worry whether the idea that contradictory forces are capable of counterbalancing each other can itself be explicated without referring to those 'prevented'/non-existent effects we met earlier. If it can't then this latest detour would prove to be another dead end, since 'prevented' effects do not exist to be contradicted. On the other hand, if this can be explained without referring to such effects, then it would be difficult to say what material impact such a scenario might have on the physical world. How could such forces be described as "material" if they had no effect on anything material --, that is, except on those seemingly insubstantial 'non-existent' effects?
Well, this is another dialectical hole DM-fans can dig themselves out of. I am merely content to remind them that it is a hole, and not part of a viable theory, as they fondly imagine.
Perhaps even this is too hasty? Maybe we should begin again?
To that end, it might help to re-examine a passage from Cornforth, quoted in Part One of this Essay:
"The unity of opposites in a contradiction is characterised by a definite relation of superiority-inferiority, or of domination, between the opposites. For example, in a physical unity of attraction and repulsion, certain elements of attraction or repulsion may be dominant in relation to others. The unity is such that one side dominates the other -- or, in certain cases, they may be equal.
"Any qualitative state of a process corresponds to a definite relation of domination. Thus, the solid, liquid and gaseous states of bodies correspond to different domination-relationships in the unity of attraction and repulsion characteristic of the molecules of bodies....
"Domination relationships are obviously, by their very nature, impermanent and apt to change, even though in some cases they remain unchanged for a long time. If the relationship takes the form of equality or balance, such balance is by nature unstable, for their is a struggle of opposites within it which is apt to lead to the domination of one over the other....
"The outcome of the working out of contradictions is, then, a change in the domination relation characteristic of the initial unity of opposites. Such a change constitutes a change in the nature of a thing, a change from one state to another, a change from one thing to another, a change entailing not merely some external alteration but a change in the internal character and laws of motion of a thing." [Cornforth (1976), pp.97-98.]
Now, the above argument might appear to work when applied to human social systems, where agents (individually or in groups) can 'upset' any number of 'balanced' situations, and which do not need too much in the way of external motivation to do so (although, in order to be able to say even this much with any clarity, the reader will note that Cornforth found he did not need to use any of the obscure jargon invented by Hegel). However, when it is applied to nature as a whole it cannot work. Consider the following:
F29: Let FD be a set of force 'elements' in a 'dominant' relation to FS, which is 'submissive' accordingly (i.e., FD > FS), and let both operate in system S, however defined.
F30: Now, for this relation to change so that a qualitative transformation occurs in the overall system S, one or both of FD and FS will have to change first.
F31: If the change occurs in FD it will have to do so because of the latter's own 'internal contradictions', otherwise the theory must fail at least here. [The same applies to FS, or indeed to both taken severally or together.]
F32: But, if that is so, then the same analysis will apply one more level down, as it were: whatever causes FD to change will have to be the result of further dominance/submissive relations inside/internal to FD itself. In turn, the pre-conditions noted in F31 will also apply at, or to, these lower level relations; they must change because of their own 'internal contradictions'.
F33: This must continue forever, or it will halt at some point.
F34: If it halts at some point, then there must be fundamental units that do not change through 'internal contradictions', and so the theory fails. [These fundamental units can have no effect on each other, for reasons spelt-out in detail in Part One of this Essay.]
F35: If this process continues forever, then there would be nothing to condition anything internal to anything else, just more and more layers, tailing off to infinity (i.e., to "who knows where?"). DM would thus have its own "bad infinity". [We saw that this was a non-viable option in Part One, too.]
F36: All this is independent of whether or not an external cause (or causes) initiated these internal changes in FD or FS. While the latter may be influenced by external causes (according to Cornforth), external causes cannot bring about the internal qualitative changes required (again, according to Cornforth). The latter must be internally-generated in the last analysis.
It looks, therefore, like there is no way of rescuing this 'theory' along these particular lines.
Hole To Let -- Previous Occupant Self-Destructed
Howsoever we try, there seems to be no way out for this self-destructing theory -- killed-off by its own internal obscurities.
In short: if a force prevents something from happening it cannot contradict it; once prevented, the latter does not exist.55
On the other hand, if forces affect one another externally (as they seem to do), then change cannot be the result of 'internal contradictions'. Alternatively, if they have internal effects on one another (in some as yet unspecified way), and they change as a result of their own 'internal contradictions', then either they are composed of simple units that do not change, or they are infinitely complex, and nothing internal to them can condition anything else internally, for there would be no such things.
Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth -- Or Is It Too Few?
It could be objected that the above results have been deliberately tailored to fit the desired end -- by the choice of, say, F24. A much better way, therefore, of representing this aspect of oppositional forces might be the following:
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.
[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.]
This means that the 'contradictory' relation between two or more forces would operate along a sort of continuum -- as it were -- with no fixed relation between them. The account given earlier clearly makes the link between 'contradictory' forces an "either-or", all-or-nothing, sort of affair -- or so the counter-argument could go.56
At this point, an example from mechanics might help illustrate the complex relationship that is intended here: un-damped simple harmonic motion. [This particular link requires JAVA -- or try here if you have no JAVA installed.]
Consider a particle set in motion under the operation of two forces, such that its acceleration is proportional to its displacement from the point of equilibrium, and directed toward that point. Since the acceleration of such a particle changes in proportion to its position, the net force operating on it must also change accordingly. This is due to the fact that the resultant force in this system is the vector sum of these two distinct but changing forces, which at the equilibrium point counterbalance one another, but at other points they either augment or partially cancel each other out, depending on the physics of the situation. Because these two forces work in opposite directions and cause the impressed acceleration (achieving this by their 'dialectical interaction', let us say for now) we appear to have here an example of F37-type motion.
In this highly simplified picture of just one type of motion, the forces present in the system appear to 'contradict' one another in complex but changing ways, as DM seems to require. But, if this scenario actually does illustrate F24- (or F37-) type 'contradictions' then several untoward consequences follow:
(1) This analogy would mean that 'contradictions' (like forces) operate on a continuum. Hence, at any point along the path of the above particle the net force operating is unequal to that at another point (in one cycle). This means that given a certain displacement, the modulus of the net force might be, say, only 1% of its maximum, at another it would be, say, 99% of it -- while at a symmetrical location past the point of equilibrium, the same would be true but in an opposite sense. However, it is not easy to see how such a picture may be fitted seamlessly into the DM-view of 'contradictions', and as we saw above, such a model would have unacceptable consequences in HM (involving, for example, the Nazis fighting racism!).
(2) This trope depends on forces being viewed as basic units of reality, as opposed to the product of the relations between bodies in motion.
[Recall that the latter option appears to have been one that Engels himself preferred when he spoke of relative velocities replacing forces. However, if the term "force" is just a shorthand for relative motion (or if it depends on the presence of a "field"), then, as we have also seen above, the 'dialectical' unity of nature would be thrown into question. On that basis, the links between bodies and processes would be external, whereas DM seems to require the existence of forces to provide the 'connective tissue' of reality. If now forces themselves depend on bodies in relative motion, then reality must be discrete, not continuous.]
But, DM-theorists have yet to say what the physical nature of a force is. Physicists themselves have ceased to use this word (except as a sort of shorthand, as noted above). If forces have no physical nature, can they be part of material reality?
(3) This neat picture, tailor-made for F37, obscures the complexity that occurs in nature. Even so, it is not easy to see how such a tidy model could cope with systems of forces, which, given this view, indicate that several things must be 'contradicted' all at once by countless others, or, indeed, which suggest that bodies and/or processes could have innumerable 'contradictories'. That would, of course, divorce DM-type 'contradictions' completely from FL-contradictions and from Hegelian 'contradictions'. While this might not be a totally unacceptable outcome, it would mean that the former would be even more tenuously linked to the latter (or even with contradictions that appear in everyday discourse), and in that case the meaning of the word "contradiction" used in DM would be even more indeterminate than it already is. In addition, it would imply that any object or process in nature had more than one opposite at any point in time. The word "opposite" would cease to have any clear meaning. But, we have been here already.
Despite these niggling problems, it might be felt that F37 suitably modified could still capture essential features of the 'contradictory' nature of forces.
In order to investigate this alternative more closely, let us imagine that the two forces operating in the above scenario are aligned so that the angle between them is 180°, once more.57
F38: Let the first force be F1, and the second, F2.
F39: At t1, let F1 + F2 < 0.
F40: At t2, let F1 + F2 = 0.
F41: At t3, let F1 + F2 > 0.
[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.]
F39 and F41 imply that there is a net force operating in the system in either direction; F40 expresses the background condition to F24, where no net force exists.
But, as we saw earlier, we face immediate problems with this way of depicting forces -- difficulties encountered above in relation to the inappropriate analogy drawn between 'contradictions' and mathematical objects -- such as, forces represented by vectors.
Ignoring this 'problem' too, it is worth pointing out again that F40 in fact implies that there are no forces operating in the system (unless we regard the zero vector as a force by default), and F39 and F41 both mean that there is only one force -- the resultant -- at work. On that basis, F37 would collapse for want of forces. No contradiction seems possible if only one (resultant) force is present; still less if no forces are (as in F40).
It could be objected here that in the above, both of the original forces (F1 and F2) still exist, since it is they that create the zero vector and/or any resultant force(s) in the system (as they do in F39 and F41).
The problem with this reply is that it is not easy to see how the two original forces may also be said to exist alongside this third force -- the resultant --, whether the latter is zero or not. If they do exist in this way, we would plainly have three forces in the system, not one, or two.
This would, of course, create energy out of nowhere.58
To be sure, as part of our way of calculating resultants, we apply some mathematics to the relevant components, but that does not mean that nature does the same -- if it did, that would clearly imply nature was mind! No one, it is to be hoped, thinks that in nature there are three forces where once there were only two. And yet, it is this third force that does all the work.
Now, if an F37-type model is in fact applicable in HM, we ought to conclude that the 'contradiction' between Capital and Labour (or that between the forces and relations of production), say, produces a resultant third social force, the nature of which has to this day remained completely obscure. Since, on this model, all motion in the Capitalist system is produced by this "third force", its identification by revolutionaries is, to say the least, of the utmost urgency!59
Moreover, on this view, forces are 'contradictory' when and only when they produce a third resultant force. This might provide DM-fans with a certain amount of aesthetic satisfaction (in that this picture is triadic), but it would in fact sink the theory faster than a lead-lined diving suit sinks a diver. This is because change would then be a result not of contradictory forces, but of resultant forces.
And, as we have seem already, it is just as easy to depict this set-up as 'tautologious' as it is to describe it as 'contradictory' -- even though both descriptors rightly belong in the mystical concept-crusher as hopelessly anthropomorphic.
Howsoever we twist and turn, the equation of forces with 'contradictions' seems to be as misconceived as anything could be. When interpreted metaphorically it turns out to be inappropriate (if not paradoxical and animistic); when interpreted literally it crumbles into incoherence and inconsistency.
So, in order to avoid all these difficulties, we need to return to an alternative that was considered briefly, earlier -- one that could provide DM-theorists with a successful way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions'. However, before this alternative is aired, it is necessary to counter an objection that should by now have occurred to the reader: this whole analysis is abstract and fails to consider "real material forces".59a
'Real' Contradictions
As noted above, considerations like these would stretch the patience of most dialecticians; indeed, they would probably be the first to point out that this Essay fails to consider real material and empirically verifiable contradictions. When they say things like this they generally (but not exclusively) mean those 'contradictions' that appear in HM, and which help account for the dynamic we see in class society.
However, and in response, it is worth pointing out that many of the examples considered earlier were eminently concrete, and undeniably material!
Nevertheless, if no sense can be made of 'contradictory forces' in nature (as we have seen), then that automatically throws into question their appearance in HM.
Now, as is easy to demonstrate, revolutionaries seriously overuse the word "contradiction" in their endeavour to depict not just capitalism, but the class war in general. In fact, comrades seldom bother to justify their almost neurotically profligate application of this word to everything and anything they attempt to analyse.59b Indeed, it seems to operate almost as a sort of code word that serves merely to identify them to others as one of like mind, or as belonging to the same 'speech community' (with its own jargon, which defines an 'in-group' and excludes those of the 'out-group'), rather than acting as a concept which genuinely applies in every case, or in any case -- or, indeed, which actually means anything at all.
[We shall see why they do this in Essay Nine Part Two and Essay Fourteen part Two.]
But, perhaps this is unfair? In order to substantiate the above allegations, it would be wise, therefore, to consider examples of the "real material contradictions" which supposedly underpin and drive social development.60
[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998); HM = Historical Materialism.]
TAR, for example, opens with several apposite and well-observed illustrations of the irrational and destructive nature of Capitalism. As John Rees correctly points out, while life expectancy, for instance, has increased dramatically over the last century or so (even in the poorest regions of the planet), forces have grown alongside this that tend to cancel such advances:
"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction….
"Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line?
"The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2.]
First of all it needs emphasising that in what follows the validity of the above comparisons will not be questioned -- nor will the explanation given by Rees for these and other intolerable features of Capitalism. The sole aim here is to ascertain what if anything he (or any one else, for that matter) means by calling these irrationalities "contradictions", and why he and other dialecticians insist on linking the latter term with material forces in nature and society.
Of course, the trite and impertinent answer would be that DM-theorists do this simply because it is part of the 'Marxist tradition' to do so (and hence it helps define an 'in group', noted earlier). As seems plain from the record, the use of this word is part of Materialist Dialectics solely because of contingent events in the lives of Marx and Engels (i.e., those that are related to when and where they were born, in which class they found themselves, and how they were educated). And, as fate would have it, their view of the world would likewise have been conditioned by their own "social being" -- to use Marx's term.
In fact, had Hegel died of Cholera 45 years earlier than he did, does anyone think we would be using this term?
[The effect on dialecticians in general of this sort of background will be examined in more detail in Essay Nine Part Two.]
However, because of the towering authority of Marx and Engels, all subsequent dialecticians have been constrained to think and reason along similar lines. They have to use the same vocabulary or risk being be accused of 'Revisionism', branded 'anti-Marxist', and perhaps suffer expulsion, political isolation, or worse. [Or, of course, the sort of ignorant abuse I constantly receive.]
In short, it is quite clear that revolutionaries like Rees use such obscure Hegelian terms derived because prominent comrades did so, and they are merely aping them.
Naturally, the impertinent nature of this 'trite' explanation will not win over many dialecticians (but since a less impertinent one stands no chance either, there is little to lose from advancing one such here).
In that case, there is a pressing need to try to find a better reason why hard-headed materialists should want to anthropomorphise nature and society in this manner, using terms drawn from mystical theology.
Unfortunately, as we will soon find out, there isn't in fact a better explanation as to why such hard-boiled materialists allowed themselves to be conned into accepting and using Hermetic jargon like this (and then employing it quite indiscriminately).
We have already seen how every attempt to render viable the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' fail, hence, it should come as no surprise to see the very same thing happen in HM.
To spoil the ending: the result of all this will be that the impertinent reason is the only one left standing.
[The ideological background to all this will, of course, be elaborated upon and extended considerably in Essay Nine Part Two, and more generally in Essay Twelve.]
The underlying cause of the many absurdities found in Capitalism is -- as TAR rightly points out -- the complex and changing interplay between the "material productive forces of society" and the ambient "relations of production". [Ibid., p.2, quoting Marx.]
That account of the driving force of capitalism (but, interpreted humanistically in terms of the class struggle), I fully accept.
However, this brings us no closer to understanding what it is about opposing (social) forces that merits calling them "contradictions". Why turn a clear deployment of an ordinary word, drawn from the vernacular (with a few easily explained technical terms thrown in) into an obscure doctrine peppered with impenetrable jargon lifted from mystical Idealism (i.e., in this case, "determinate negation", "identity of opposites", "negation of the negation", "mediate", and the like)?
In HM, we can certainly make sense of the term "force" -- and even of "opposing" and "struggle" --; but what is there to gain by calling one and all "contradictory"?61
Some might regard it as a harmless use of this word, but, as we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here), in this instance there is no such thing, just as there is no such thing as a neutral use of the word "oppression". And, as we will also see in Essay Nine Part Two, this particular word allows, and has allowed, assorted Dialectical Gurus to impose contradictory policies, strategies and theses on the faithful, and to 'justify' class collaboration, murder, splits and expulsions (and more) on this basis: if reality is contradictory, the Party must be so too. [An excellent example of which is the way that Trotsky used dialectics to justify the revolutionary defence of the former USSR (on the basis of its contradictory nature), and thus also the heinous invasion of Finland. Another, is the way that Ted Grant, for instance, used 'Materialist Dialectics' to construct his confused theory of 'Proletarian Bonapartism' (sic), which allowed him to rationalise the substitution of the Maoist ruling-class for the Chinese working class -- a topic I have debated here.]
So, these mystical concepts are not simply 'innocent bystanders'; they have helped turn Marxism into a murderously unsuccessful disaster area.
Nevertheless, part of the argument in TAR appears to be the following:
F42: Capitalism seems to offer unprecedented possibilities for human development.
F43: But, in reality Capitalism delivers only partial or faltering advancement.
F44: Alongside this progress we have witnessed major regression.
F45: Hence, Capitalism actually delivers a mixture of development and retreat.
For Rees, the "contradiction" appears to be based on the fact that Capitalism holds out certain possibilities, which it either cannot fully deliver, or cannot provide at all; almost invariably the opposite of what it promises actually unfolds.
Rees clearly believes that the involvement of opposites is important here: instead of peace we find war; in the place of prosperity we find poverty (where it need not be); the growth in human need is not catered for by the incessant search for profit; the waste of human potential conflicts with the increased capacity society has for augmenting and satisfying its members needs, and so on. "Contradictions" seem to arise either from the incongruity that exists between what might be expected of Capitalism (by those who do not understand its nature, presumably) and what it actually delivers --, or from the yawning gap that exists between its potential to satisfy human need and its obvious inability to do so. In that case, forces that seem capable of freeing humanity from want seem to be inextricable combined with others that merely intensify it.
However, these by now familiar observations leave the import of the alleged equation between forces and 'contradictions' still rather vague. In order to clarify Rees's point we perhaps need to consider various plausible interpretations of what he might have meant.
There appear to be several distinct possibilities here:
F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.
F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.
F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A as well as B and C.
Doubtless there are many other combinations that could be imagined along similar lines, but they would, I think, be elaborations on these six possibilities. I propose, therefore, to examine each of these in turn, beginning, naturally, with the first.
The first option was:
F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.
But, F46 presents us with a scenario we have seen before; it resembles several earlier unsuccessful attempts to solve this overall problem. As we discovered above, whatever forces there are in the system that actually produce "not A", no contradiction can arise between "A" and "not A" because "A" itself does not exist, since only "not A" will have been actualised in place of "A". Nor can any forces which are at work in the system contradict what they themselves actually produce (viz., "not A" in this case) --, especially if whatever they 'offer' does not exist.
F46 is of no use, therefore, in our search to find a viable way of equating forces and 'contradictions' in HM.
An Apparent Contradiction -- At Last!
The second alternative went as follows:
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.
This seems to be a little more promising since "A and not A" certainly looks like a genuine contradiction. However, because F48 appears to depict contradictory outcomes it cannot illuminate the alleged contradictory connection between forces in society and nature that exist prior to their emergence. This is because F48 is manifestly not about the forces themselves, but about their results.
So, even here, we do not seem to have contradictory forces.
Nevertheless, this section is aimed at considering the last few remaining options left open to DM-theorists to make their ideas comprehensible, so F48 will not be abandoned just yet.
In fact, F48 corresponds to a relation depicted abstractly in an earlier section (i.e., that between E1 and E2, in F6 to F9, above, reproduced below) -- but interpreted here concretely (if schematically). Hence, it looks like we might at last have found a genuine interpretation of E1 and E2 that is undeniably 'contradictory'.
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites.
Unfortunately, this appearance is illusory since the conjunction of "A" and "not A" cannot be considered contradictory until it is clear what interpretation is to be given to each schematic letter "A".
It is worth recalling that we are looking for a literal interpretation of the term "contradiction" which will allow DM to surpass FL -- not a metaphorical or analogical sense of the word -- still less one that possesses a secondary or derivative sense (or even the 'special' DM-sense that has yet to be explained). As should be obvious, this search is of the utmost importance if we are to rescue from oblivion the idea that forces and 'contradictions' may be equated objectively -- and not poetically.
Clearly, there are several different ways of reading the expression "A and not A"; some of these will be contradictions, others not.
In what follows, I shall employ a further example taken from TAR (quoted above), which seems to many DM-theorists to be a genuine contradiction (i.e., between wealth and poverty). In that case, this involves interpreting "A" as "wealth", and "not A" as "not wealth" (it clearly cannot be "not poverty"!). In that case, "A and not A" would cash out as "wealth and not wealth".62
Unfortunately, the problem with this way of taking "A and not A" is that it actually creates a phrase and not a clause, indicative sentence or proposition.63 As such, it cannot be a literal contradiction.
[Most DM-fans miss this point since their knowledge of logic rivals that of George W Bush. That, of course, does not stop them pontificating on the subject.]
The only apparent way to situate this phrasal conjunction in a propositional context would be to interpret it a little more loosely -- perhaps along the following lines:
F52: Capitalism produces wealth and not wealth.64
As such, F52 is a paraphrase of:
F52a: Capitalism produces wealth and Capitalism produces not wealth.
Or perhaps even:
F53: Capitalism produces wealth for some and not wealth for others.65
Again, F53 itself is short for:
F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism produces not wealth for others.
None of these look at all promising; they are not just stylistic monstrosities, their import is rather unclear. Anyway, F53 and F53a are not contradictory -- that is, no more than, say, a bottle would be contradictory if it supplied drink for some but not for others, or any more than the claim that "forces are contradictory" would itself be 'contradictory' if it convinced some but not others. No one would think they had been contradicted if they asserted that a certain factory, say, produced a few batches of defective Widgets, and someone else clamed it also produced some that were non-defective.66
Anyway, F52a is far too vague as it stands -- it is certainly no more of a 'contradiction' than F53 and F53a are, and probably for the same reason. If sentences like these have no clear meaning they cannot possibly assist in a clarification of DM. Hence, a further widening of the interpretation of "A and not A" is called for if we are to gain a clear view of the implications of F47.
F54: Capitalism produces Capitalists who are wealthy and workers who are not wealthy.
As was the case with F53 and F53a, F54 is not even a contradiction. Again, anyone asserting the first clause of F54 who was then confronted with the second would not feel that they had been contradicted -- this is because the first clause is about Capitalists, while the second is about workers. To be contradictory F55 would have to be written as:
F55: Capitalism produces worker W1 (or Capitalist C1), who is both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.
But, quite apart from the fact that no one would assent to, or even think to assert F55, it possesses no clear sense. The situation would be no better if it were re-written as:
F55a: Capitalism produces a set of workers W (or Capitalists C), who are both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.
It is reasonably certain that Rees meant neither F55 nor F55a. On the other hand, if he had intended either, it would be unclear what he could possibly have meant by one or both. At best, F55 and F55a might be re-interpreted in a comparative sort of way, as follows:
F55b: Capitalism produces a set of workers W that is both wealthy (in comparison to a set of peasants P) and not wealthy (in comparison to a set of Capitalists C), at the same time and in the same respect.
But, F55b is no more contradictory than, say, a proposition about the length of a copy of TAR would be if it were compared with another proposition about the length of a copy of The New York Times (i.e., that the first is longer than the second) and then with another proposition about the length of a copy of Das Kapital (i.e., that the first is shorter than the third). Hence, the observation that TAR is both long compared to The New York Times and short compared to Das Kapital is not, one imagines, what most DM-theorists mean by "contradiction". If it were, their theory would be based on linguistic naivety, and little else. That, of course, is the whole point of the phrase "and in the same respect", tacked on the end of several of the above propositions. Consequently, it rather looks like F47 cannot be squeezed into this particular dialectical boot after all.
More problematic: is either of these options going to turn into the other?
In the above example, is W going to turn into C, and C into W? Indeed, is wealth going to turn into poverty? But, if these were 'genuine' 'dialectical opposites/contradictions', they most surely should.
Further attempts to interpret "A and not A" can be extended almost indefinitely. DM-enthusiasts are welcome to play around with them as much as they like, the end result will be no different. There are no literally true contradictions that can be manufactured out of "A and not A" in this context. This is because, if a contradiction were true, it would cease to be a literal contradiction. As indicated in Essay Five, if and when such 'contradictions' were encountered, they would normally be viewed as either figurative or the result of an ambiguity of some sort. There is no way around this convention this side of altering the meaning of the word "contradiction". And, even this would be a little help to DM-enthusiasts since that would 'solve' the problem by means of yet more subjective ad hoc linguistic reform.67
In that case, perhaps F48 is the reading we are searching for?
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.
Unfortunately, as we have seen several times already, since A does not exist -- Capitalism not having delivered it --, it cannot 'contradict' B. This means that F48 is not a viable reading of TAR's intentions, either. Even if B 'contradicted' forces and/or processes which were already present, that would just return us to where we were when we considered several examples earlier, such as this:
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites.
Another dialectical dead-end, I fear, for here we have yet more non-existents being 'contradicted' by existents.
Does, therefore, F49 provide DM with a lifeline?
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.
If we now read "A" as "wealth" and "B" as "poverty" once more, we would have the following:
F63: Capitalism offers wealth, but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.68
However, there are several problems with this paraphrase. One of these concerns the supposition that capitalism actually does offer wealth. Admittedly, for propaganda purposes, its ideologues often claim that it does -- but who believes them? Certainly, blatant lies like this cannot serve as part of a socialist analysis of capitalism.69
Perhaps then we should re-interpret F56 in the following manner?
F57: Capitalism develops productive forces capable of delivering wealth to all, but it actually delivers wealth to a minority, and poverty to most of the rest, where wealth and poverty are opposites.
However, in F57 we are confronted with a subtle change in the way that the "A" of F49 has been interpreted in the opening clause: it now stands for something like the system's capacity to "develop productive forces capable of delivering wealth". But in the last clause it simply stands for "wealth", as before. Hence, F57 is actually equivalent to the following:
F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.
Or perhaps:
F49b: Capitalism develops D (which has the potential to produce B), but actually delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.
Here, the 'contradiction' would seem to be that between either (1) Capitalism's capacity to deliver wealth and its actual deliverance of poverty, or (2) the wealth it delivers to some and the poverty it delivers to the rest.
In the first case, clearly we don't have a contradiction. This is because, a capacity is an unrealised potentiality, and as such it cannot contradict something which does exist -- no more than, say, a woman's un-actualised capacity to play the flute contradicts her actualised skill with the piano, or even her actualised state of living without a flute -- or, indeed, of not being able to play the flute while she has to make do with that piano.
The second option is no contradiction either, however much it offends our sensibilities. It is no more a contradiction than, say, £10,000 ($20,000) in one pocket contradicts £0.01 ($0.02) in another, or no more than a £5 ($10) note in a millionaire's wallet (assuming this is all she has on her at the time) contradicts the £1000 ($2000) in a worker's pocket (who has just won a compensation claim, say) -- even if these two are sat next to each other at a UK New Labour rally. To call these "contradictions" would be bizarre -- even on DM-terms. [Are they struggling? Do these turn into one another?]70
As we saw earlier, anyone who thought otherwise would be openly advertising their own linguistic naivety, if not perversity, but not advancing the cause of science.
In any case, there can be no literal contradiction between something that does not exist (i.e., the prospect of wealth under Capitalism, where this is meant to be wealth for all) and something that does exist (i.e., the mixed fortunes of the people who have to endure conditions as they are).
Despite this, it might still be felt that the situation is not as bad as the above makes out; the emphasis in F49 is on what Capitalism actually delivers, not on what it genuinely (or otherwise) offers. If "wealth" and "poverty" are real opposites, F49 could still serve in the way DM-theorists intend -- or so it might seem.
Again, this desperate alternative diverts attention once more away from allegedly contradictory forces and onto their effects. In that case, the nature of the direct relation between whatever forces produced these effects is still obscure, and not the least bit contradictory.
Nevertheless, even when we consider these effects, a nagging question remains: just what is so contradictory about wealth and poverty existing side by side? Admittedly, to any socialist, this state of affairs is as intolerable as it is indefensible, but there still does not seem to be a literal contradiction involved here. True, this state of affairs may be paradoxical (but not to a Marxist); however, the presence of one of these alleged opposites does not entail that an assertion that the other opposite also obtains is false, as it would have to do if a literal contradiction were intended.71
If, on the other hand, we wish to re-define the word "contradiction" so that it becomes the equivalent of "paradox", "unjust", "something contrary to expectations", "deplorable" (and so on), all well and good. But then that would concede the point being made here that social reality is only 'contradictory' because of linguistic tinkering to that effect, and the claim that DM-'contradictions' (in HM) are literal would have to be abandoned. Seen in this way, DM-'contradictions' would either be figurative, or they would depend on the use of a word ("contradiction") that has been 'redefined' in order to produce the right result.72
On the other hand, if the word "contradiction" possesses a special, literal DM-sense, which allows for its legitimate use here, then DM-theorists have yet to say what that is.
It might be volunteered here that one such sense is that "contradiction" implies opposition and tension. But, even though "wealth" and "poverty" are opposites in the ordinary sense, they do not seem to oppose each other in an active way, as one would expect they should if they genuinely illustrated the validity of the equation of 'contradictions' with forces. Admittedly, poverty acts as brake on development of the productive forces at certain points in history (warping the development of those who have to endure it, etc.), it stokes up resentment, class hatred and foments struggle. But, over and above the influence these states of affairs have on human agents, these lifeless concepts appear to have no active connection with one another. Sure enough, the material situations they express might indeed create tension in those who have to endure them, but none of the latter would describe what they feel by using the word "contradiction", unless, of course, a fast-talking and allegedly materialist disciple of Hegel had sold them on the idea. In ordinary language, the word cannot be given such a meaning without altering the sense it already has.73
Furthermore, if this set of consequences is meant to be taken as a new gloss on F56 (by way of illustrating the alleged 'contradiction' between E1- and E2-type events discussed earlier) then it would soon collapse into the claim that it is the effects of effects that are 'contradictory', and not the original effects themselves. Down this road there lies, I fear, yet another "bad infinity" --, which ends "who knows where?"
The second difficulty with this reading is that although wealth and poverty are genuine opposites (again, in the ordinary sense), they do not appear to be classic examples of dialectical-UOs (even if we knew what those were!). To be sure, under Capitalism the wealth of one class is connected with the poverty of others, but this is a familiar causal connection. They are not internally-, or logically-, related in reality, despite claims to the contrary. That this is so can be seen from that fact that were this not the case, we would find we could not agree (with Engels) that under Capitalism poverty exists "where it need not be".
If there were a 'dialectical' (or "internal") "unity in difference" connecting poverty and wealth (like that which dialecticians allege between, say, the north and south poles of a magnet, or that between Capitalist and Worker (as classes), then we would not be able to argue that socialism will eliminate one without abolishing the other. But, the whole point of a socialist society is that all should become as wealthy as the productive forces will allow. If there were a logical link between these two states (poverty and wealth) then they would be inseparable in all modes of production and we would have to temper our slogans somewhat. We might then have to point out that in eradicating poverty, workers would be eradicating wealth, too. That we do not so argue -- we actually claim the opposite that socialism can produce wealth for all -- indicates that the relation between wealth and poverty is not a logical (or internal) connection, but is causal.
Of course, it could be argued that there is an internal/logical link between "wealth and poverty under capitalism" and "wealth under socialism"? This objection will be dealt with below, and in Note 74.74
The basic problem here, of course, derives from the anthropomorphism implicit in the idea that concepts can enter into struggle with one another. This mystification appears as part of the belief that because wealth and poverty are opposites they are actively oppositional and cause struggles, of themselves. On this account, it is the opposite nature of concepts that creates struggle, whereas in reality it is clearly material conditions that cause it. Only by confusing a causal connection with a conceptual one does DM get off the ground here, as elsewhere (if this is what dialecticians mean, of course!). But, as we have seen, this is just one more consequence of LIE and the RRT (defined in Essay Twelve -- and which was a conclusion of Part One of this Essay).75
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory.]
The animated DM-contrast that is imagined to exist between dead concepts like these seems plausible only because they are viewed as the idealised equivalents of the real relations between human beings, reified in an inappropriate metaphysical/linguistic form. Human beings give life to the concepts they use, but under circumstances not always of their own choosing, and they do so as a result of their practical activity, modified by ambient class relations. The reverse does not happen; 'concepts' do not give life to human relations, although their use by human agents might affect the roles that such concepts can play in material life (and they certainly could modify the ideas that individuals from antagonistic classes form of their oppositional connections and their own material interests, etc.). Unless we suppose concepts to be agents (in a sort of inverted Hegelian form, wherein perhaps they walk the earth in place of human beings), they cannot 'reflect' things that human beings haven't sanctioned for them, by means of the above constraints. History is after all the result of the class war, not a consequence of the struggle between concepts.
As should seem obvious, the above comments are based on theoretical considerations drawn from HM, but this is precisely where that scientific theory can provide the interpretative sophistication that DM and/or 'Materialist Dialectics' lack, obscure and invert in an idealised/fetishised form.76
This shows, once again, that the inversion DM-theorists say they have inflicted on Hegel was merely formal; their system can only 'work' in his Ideal universe.
In that case, the only options left open are F50 and F51. They were:
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.
F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A, as well as B and C.
However, since these two are clearly variations upon F48 and F49, they do not appear to be viable alternatives. DM-apologists are welcome to make of them what they can.
Dialectics In ER
We have thus seen that concepts drawn from Hermetic Philosophy (and deployed in DM) fail badly when an attempt is made to apply them to, or connect them with, the forces operating in nature and society. In that case, the impertinent answer (to the question why hard-boiled revolutionaries use such mystical terms in HM) offered above is the only one left in the ring: dialecticians use mystical jargon like this simply because it is traditional to do so.
This means that this part of DM (already under intensive care in the Emergency Resuscitation ward) is ready to be measured for its pine overcoat and lowered 6 feet closer to the Earth's core.
A Last Desperate Attempt
However, before we call for a Hermetic High Priest to read DM its last mystical rites, we should make one last desperate bid to resuscitate this moribund 'theory'. In fact, we are now in a position to return to several earlier abandoned alternatives in a vain attempt to rescue this part of DM from its long overdue burial.
Here, I present an interpretation based upon the one expressed in F6-F9, above:
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of E2. For the purposes of simplicity, let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites.
To these we need to add the following:
F58: Force P1 contradicts P2 in so far as some or all of E1 and E2 are contradictory (internally, or to one another).
Unfortunately, this latest re-interpretation cannot work, either. This is because if one or both of E1 and E2 do not exist (as a result of the operation of P1 and P2) there can be no contradiction; as we have seen several times already, F58 would imply a 'contradiction' between sets of events that do not co-exist.77
It looks, therefore, like this particular interpretative seam has been thoroughly worked-out. There is no gold left, only slag -- indeed what little gold there was that had been mined by Hegel & Co., unfortunately turned out to be nothing but Iron Pyrites.
We need to find a new approach to save this rapidly fading 'theory' from being sent to the morgue.
DM And The Revival Of Teleology
The only avenue of escape for DM-theorists seems to rely on yet another interpretation which was postponed from earlier, wherein 'contradictions' were said to exist between the effects of forces (or between forces and the effects of other forces), rather than between forces themselves. One alternative involved Engels's suggestion that forces should be edited out of the picture, leaving behind just the relative motion between bodies to give some content to the idea that 'contradictions' cause change.
However, the first of these options had to be abandoned because it meant that forces 'contradicted' prevented effects, implicating this part of the theory with the idea that forces could 'contradict' non-existent entities. The second option appeared to undermine the dialectical unity of nature.
Nevertheless, I now propose to examine a re-vamped version of the first of these alternatives, one aimed at circumventing the difficulties noted above. The good news is that this new interpretation solves the problem created by the second option; the bad news is that it introduces far worse difficulties of its own.
This earlier attempt was based on the following:
F17: Event E consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events E1-En.
F18: Events E1-En form complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T, if ever they occur.
F19: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.
F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will never exist), or take place.
As we saw above, an existing force P1 appears to 'contradict' a non-existent event (or series of events), which rendered this interpretation useless. The following re-vamped version of these sentences now aims to fix this bug:
F59: Event E consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events E1-En.
F60: Events E1-En form complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T, if ever they occur.
F61: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.
F62: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will never exist), or take place.
F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En have been prevented from taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.
Since, an expectation can exist alongside a realisation that it has been thwarted (in some cases), this might appear to solve the problem.
However, F63 is clearly of little assistance since, not only would be inapplicable throughout the Universe at all times, it does not even record a contradiction. [The propositions it expresses to are of the form 'p and q', not 'p and not p', as required.]
Perhaps F63 could be altered to circumvent this difficulty?77a
F64: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that depict the dispositional properties of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En, but for the presence of P1.
One immediate problem with F64 is that it is not at all clear what the "dispositional properties" of forces are. Objects certainly have dispositional properties as a result of their microstructure and of their relationship with other bodies -- if, that is, the term "dispositional" is not read anthropomorphically, as it usually is.
Even so, since forces are not obviously bodies (although they can apparently be carried by them -- if we accept certain parts of modern Physics --, but even then this is apparently cashed out in terms of transferred momentum, i.e., along neo-Engelsian lines),78 the ascription of dispositions to forces themselves amounts perhaps to a disguised reference to the affect forces have on such bodies. In that case, we would have here an explanation of contradictions that appealed to the effect of effects, yet again.
[Anyway, F64 does not even record a contradiction since the propositions it expresses to are of the form 'p and q', not 'p and not p', once more.]
Nevertheless, perhaps F64 can be re-jigged -- maybe along the following lines:
F65: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that depict the normal operation of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En, but for the presence of P1.
Unfortunately, not only does F65 fail to record a contradiction (since, yet again, the propositions it expresses to are of the form 'p and q', not 'p and not p'), what it says brings us back once more to a consideration of the inter-relationship between forces as a way of understanding 'contradictions', as opposed to the present model, which sought to interpret 'contradictions' as the relationship between forces and the effects of other forces.
Anyway, F65 is of little use: if the normal operation of Pn is disturbed (so that it does not take place) there would be nothing for P1 to 'contradict'. This annoying but recurring fact is precisely what required the current consideration of the actual effects of forces, since they do exist -- as opposed to the prevented effects of forces, or even forces which cease to operate, which don't.
It now seems that unless we can specify how the effects of forces can 'contradict' other forces (or other effects), this part of DM will be as good as dead, but not yet buried. Maybe the following option will help revive it:
F66: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that express the operation of Pn, in that the presence of E1 (the effect of P1) excludes some or all of E2-En.
However, this is no use, either, since it matters not how effectively some or all of E2-En are excluded; E1 may only 'contradict' that which exists, and, ex hypothesi, once excluded, effects E2-En would no longer be around to be 'contradicted'.
The next suggestion constitutes, in my view, the only way to keep this critically ill part of DM alive:
F67: The prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En but for the presence of P1.
[F67 will need to be re-written in a 'propositional' form, but since that would make this example even more unwieldy than it already is, that has not been attempted here.]
Since aims can exist where results and effects do not, we seem at last to have a genuine 'contradiction' (even if it is still figurative!).
The bad news is that this apparent tonic soon turns into yet another dose of strychnine. This is because, of course, not only does F67 not record a contradiction (for reasons given several times already), we cannot attribute aims to forces unless we wish to introduce teleology back into nature. F67 can only therefore apply to forces under the control of human agents, or to their animistically projected counterparts in reality --, that is, if we genuinely want to go down the latter route and regard nature in this ancient/mystical manner.
It is no coincidence then that the only interpretation that appears to render this part of DM viable is one that reveals the anthropomorphism implicit in its concepts.
Alternatively, it is equally unsurprising that this is the one option that underlines the only reading that works in HM, one that puts forces under human control (all the while clearly distinguishing them from literal contradictions).79
Unfortunately, this now means that F67 cannot help revive the DM-corpse.
It was noted earlier that there is a general problem afflicting the identification of forces with 'contradictions' -- i.e., if these are viewed as dialectically-united 'opposites'. In connection with that, we also saw that DM-classicists argued that such opposites all turn into one another. But is it even plausible to suppose forces can do this? Is it credible that a gravitational force, say, can turn into a magnetic force, or into an electrical force? Do all R-type forces turn into A-type forces? Where in Physics is it postulated that gravity can become a repulsive force?
Undoubtedly, electricity and magnetism are inter-linked on modern Physics (and are in fact manifestations of one of the four fundamental forces in nature, in electromagnetism), but they do not struggle with one another, and neither do the particles on which they depend. Such forces, so we are told, are created by exchange particles, but they are not an expression of a 'struggle' between particles.
To be sure, magnetic fields are reversible, as are electrical fields, but this is not true of all fields (even though all four forces can change in many different ways), but it is far from clear that this is because of any 'struggle' going on between them, either. For example, the origin of the reversal of the Earth's magnetic field may lie deep inside the core, or, perhaps, inside the crust --, or it may even be external (with one set of theories blaming meteor impact); scientists are not sure. But not one geophysicist, to my knowledge, is investigating the 'contradiction' between North and South to find its cause.
If that is so, then even if all of the objections voiced in this Essay are misguided in some way, the 'dialectical' equation of forces and contradictions does not work even in its own terms!
Do the Relations of Production really turn into the Forces of Production?
For Dialectics, Truth Is A Hole --, And it's Six foot Deep
Since there appears to be no way that DM-'contradictions' can be given a literal or figurative interpretation as forces which survives a moment's scrutiny -- when applied in nature or society, in abstract or concrete form --, this part of DM can at last be given a decent burial. Indeed, we can even call its time of death: August 27th, 1770.
It won't be missed -- well, not by us materialists.
Please..., send no flowers.80
1. For example, Engels declared:
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter…. All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or another form of motion…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter…. Each separate movement strives toward equilibrium, and the total motion puts an end to the equilibrium.... [Engels (1976), pp.74-77.]
"So long as we consider things at rest and lifeless, each one by itself…we do not run up against any contradictions in them…. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction…. [T]here is a contradiction objectively present in things and processes themselves, a contradiction is moreover an actual force.... [Ibid., pp.152-53.]
"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…. [This is] the negation of the negation…. [which is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Ibid., pp.179-80.]
"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable…go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away…. [T]he transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic nature -- mechanical force and its complement, so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical energy -- are different forms of manifestation of universal motion…. [W]e have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate the interconnection between the processes in nature not only in particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres on the whole…by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself." [Engels (1888), pp.609-11.]
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion.... [Engels (1954), pp.70-71.]
"All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else…. Hence, all attraction and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another…. Dialectics has proved from the results of our experience of nature so far that all polar opposites in general are determined by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on each other, that the separation and opposition of these poles exist only within their mutual connection and union.... [Ibid., p.72.]
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance.... [Ibid., p.82.]
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature.... [Ibid., p.211.]
"[A]ttraction is a necessary property of matter, but not repulsion. But attraction and repulsion are as inseparable as positive and negative, and hence from dialectics itself it can already be predicted that the true theory of matter must assign a place to repulsion as to attraction, and that a theory of matter based on mere attraction is false…. Equilibrium is inseparable from motion…. All equilibrium is only relative and temporary…. Motion of the heavenly bodies [is an] approximate equilibrium of attraction and repulsion in motion." [Ibid., pp.243-46.]
This is how Bukharin put things:
"[T]he world consists of forces, acting many ways, opposing each other. These forces are balanced for a moment in exceptional cases only. We then have a state of 'rest', i.e., their actual 'conflict' is concealed. But if we change only one of these forces, immediately the ‘internal contradictions’ will be revealed, equilibrium will be disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again established, it will be on a new basis, i.e., with a new combination of forces, etc. It follows that the 'conflict,' the 'contradiction,' i.e., the antagonism of forces acting in various directions, determines the motion of the system…." [Bukharin (1925), p.74.]
And here are Lenin's thoughts:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.]
Comrade Cornforth argued as follows:
"If we consider the real, complex movements and interconnections of real complex things, then we find that contradictory tendencies can and do exist in them. For example, if the forces operating in a body combine tendencies of attraction and of repulsion, that is a real contradiction…. [C]ontradiction is the driving force of change…. [O]nly the presence of contradictions in a process…provides the internal conditions making change necessary…. The real universe is…full of contradictions –- the contradictions of attraction and repulsion studied by physics…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-95.]
The author of TAR had this to say:
"The conservatism of Hegel's system is thus buried in his notion of contradiction. Contradictions in Hegel are merely intellectual contradictions to be resolved by merely intellectual methods…. The dialectic is therefore only a pseudo-dialectic; its contradictions are never those of opposed material forces capable of doing real damage or of effecting real progress…. Marx was, however, obliged to transform completely the terms of the dialectic when he altered its starting point from abstract concepts to real material forces…. The contradictions are no longer simply between concepts but between real, material forces…. Marx and Engels's dialectic is utterly different from Hegel's. It starts from real, material, empirically verifiable contradictions." [Rees (1998), pp.67-69, 83.]
Woods and Grant put things thus:
"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction....
"So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....
"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites....
"The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....
"The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and the whole thing falls.
"Attraction and Repulsion
"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest. At the base of the atom are immense forces of attraction and repulsion....
"Engels points out the universal role of attraction and repulsion:
"'All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else. Otherwise in time one side would get the preponderance over the other and then motion would finally cease. Hence all attractions and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another. Thus the law of the indestructibility and uncreatability of motion is expressed in the form that each movement of attraction in the universe must have as its complement an equivalent movement of repulsion and vice versa; or, as ancient philosophy—long before the natural-scientific formulation of the law of conservation of force or energy—expressed it: the sum of all attractions in the universe is equal to the sum of all repulsions.'
"In Engels' day, the prevailing idea of motion was derived from classical mechanics, where motion is imparted from an external force which overcomes the force of inertia. Engels was quite scathing about the very expression 'force,' which he considered one-sided and insufficient to describe the real processes of nature. 'All natural processes,' he wrote, 'are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world, and further from terrestrial mechanics, implies that only one part is active, operative, the other part being passive, receptive.' (38)
Engels was far in advance of his time in being highly critical of this notion, which had already been attacked by Hegel. In his History of Philosophy, Hegel remarks that 'It is better (to say) that a magnet has a soul (as Thales expresses it) than that it has an attractive force; force is a kind of property that, separate from matter, is put forward as a kind of predicate -- while soul, on the other hand, is this movement itself, identical with the nature of matter.' This remark of Hegel, approvingly quoted by Engels, contains a profound idea -- that motion and energy are inherent to matter. Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 71-72. Their reference (38) is to Engels (1955), pp.95-96, 110. Formatting altered to conform to the conventions adopted here. Bold emphases added.]
It is interesting to note that Woods and Grant blithely record Engels's approving reference to Hegel's depiction of magnets as having 'souls' while failing to notice its mystical implications. How could this notion -- i.e., 'having a soul' -- be given a 'materialist spin', aimed at putting it back on its feet/'the right way up'? Presumably a soul is a soul, upside down or not.
In addition, we have already noted that an on-line dictionary 'defines' contradiction in somewhat similar terms, but since that is has already been commented upon, no more will be said about it here.
However, several comrades have tried to argue that there are indeed 'true contradictions' in reality. By far and away the most sophisticated of these is Graham Priest. But, it is far from clear whether the contradictions he considers are dialectical, that is, should we ever be told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is. Priest's work will be considered in more detail in an Additional Essay, to be posted at this site in the next year or so.
Despite this, Cornforth himself made an attempt in this direction when he aired an argument intended to show that contradictions actually 'exist' in the world -- contrary to the view endorsed here that a contradiction (in logic, and in its simplest form) is merely a certain sort of truth-functional relation between a proposition and its negation:
"The contradiction in things is a very familiar state of affairs. There is nothing in the least abstruse about it, and it is often referred to in everyday conversations. For example, we speak of a man as having a 'contradictory' character, or as being 'a mass of contradictions'…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-93.]
In which case, presumably, when we describe someone as a "bit of a puzzle" Cornforth thinks we mean that he or she (or parts of them, at least) may be purchased in a magic shop or toy store, and then solved with some difficulty -- or that when we read this:
"All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances." [William Shakespeare, As You Like It, 2/7.]
we should all try and remember our lines, and make sure the audience (what?) can hear us.
Clearly, Cornforth has never heard of metaphor. [Why this is not a literal use of "contradiction"/"contradictory" is considered below.]
Now, even Cornforth admits that describing people as "contradictory" in fact involves a reference to their dispositions (or "tendencies"):
"This means that [they evince] opposed tendencies in [their] behaviour, such as gentleness and brutality, recklessness and cowardice, selfishness and self-sacrifice." [Ibid., p.93.]
If this concession is meant to commit his theory to a dispositional account of contradictions, then much of classic DM would become obsolete. The fact that someone might have a disposition to be, say, brave in certain circumstances, and cowardly in others, in no way suggests they are both at once. What is in doubt is whether the joint actualisation of these dispositions (in certain states or performances) may be expressed by means of true propositions (without ambiguity), and in the same respect.
Hence, the fact that an iron bar could be red hot at one end and icy cold at the other is not a contradiction (even though an iron bar is at any time disposed to be both). Asserting that the entire bar is both of these (at the same time) might be thought by some to be contradictory (but, that will depend on the circumstances); and yet even that would merely be an inconsistency (for both descriptions could be false if the said bar was merely warm).
[It is worth recalling here that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true, and cannot both be false, at once. Dialecticians in general appear not to be aware of the latter condition (possibly because Hegel appears not to have been, either!).]
Anyway, as noted above, such contrary ascriptions would merely be inconsistencies. For example, if NN is said to be both angry and calm (i.e., not angry) all at once, that would only be a contradiction if it could not be false to assert NN was both. But, it could be false to assert this if NN were slightly agitated (in which state NN would neither be angry nor not angry), say. Now, if NN could be described (without ambiguity) as follows:
N1: NN is both angry and not angry in the same respect and at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger,
we might have a genuine contradiction here. But, it is unlikely that Cornforth meant what he said to be taken in this way --, and it is even more doubtful whether he would have been able to say under what conditions he or anyone else would/could hold N1 true -- or attribute to NN such an odd disposition/actualisation.
For example:
N2: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her, and not angry with MM for lying to her.
Someone could object and argue that it is possible to have mixed emotions at one and the same time. Perhaps, then, they would mean this:
N3: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her (because it is a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her (because she understands the pressures on MM at the time he lied).
In that case, N3 is really this:
N4: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for φ-ing, and not angry with MM for ψ-ing.
Here we in effect have two different objects of NN's emotions: anger at MM lying because it is a violation of trust (i.e., "φ-ing"), and lack of anger at MM lying because of extenuating circumstances (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was included earlier:
N1: NN is both angry and not angry in the same respect and at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger.
To be sure, some might still object, but they will (like Cornforth) find it hard to say what the content of that objection amounts to without editing out of the picture some object or other of the said anger.
In fact, by his use of the word "tendencies", Cornforth himself seems half ready to concede this point, anyway. But, not even he would want to describe the same action (performed by the same person) as, say, literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (and without equivocation). While it is possible to ascribe contrary properties to the same object (e.g., one part of the aforementioned iron bar being hot while another part is cold), a 'contradiction' may only be extracted from such familiar facts by someone who has never heard of ambiguity.
And once more, any description saying of the same action that it was literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (and without equivocation) would merely be an inconsistency -- since both alternatives could be false if the said act was neutral (i.e., if it was neither gentle nor brutal).
[Just as both parts of the assertion that NN as angry and not angry could be false at once, and in the same respect, if NN was only slightly miffed.]
However, in the end, the concrete Communist Block finally caught up with Cornforth; in one of his last works [Cornforth (1980)] he systematically retracted most of the theses he had declared were cornerstones of the "world view of the proletariat".
[To be sure, the entire proletariat sent him billions of cards expressing their thanks for his changing their minds for them. (More on 'contradictory' emotions below.)]
Another benighted comrade tried to argue along similar lines in 'debate' with me over the recent UK Prison Workers' Strike:
"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also
have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's
behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in
relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted
yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some
enquiry we have about it.
Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
Of course, contraries are not contradictions. As indicated earlier, concerning two contrary propositions, both cannot be true (i.e., in this case, they are merely inconsistent with one another), but they could both be false.
For example, these contraries, "All swans are white" and "No swan is white", cannot both be true (in a non-empty domain), but they could both be false -- for instance, if 'Some swan is not white' or "Some swan is white", respectively, were themselves true. But, two contradictory propositions cannot both be true and they cannot both be false, at once. Dialecticians invariably ignore such "pedantic" details.
Now, the above comrade vainly tried to defend the employment of this obscure notion (i.e., "dialectical contradiction") by appealing to an everyday use of "contradiction": in connection with contradictory behaviour. But, what does he mean by this? Perhaps someone who stands and sits all at once? Or maybe someone who strikes and refuses to strike at the same time?
In relation to the August 2007 UK Prison Officers' strike, he seems to have meant workers who support the state one minute, but act against it the next (or who hold odd beliefs about one or both). In fact, there is a rather good example of this sort of confusion in Simon Basketter's recent article in Socialist Worker:
"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers.
"It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting 'you're breaking the law' to the strikers....
"Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence.
"Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.'
"Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest."
Once more, what is the 'contradiction' here? Maybe, it has something to do with the following:
P1: Prison officers uphold the law.
P2: This either results from, or leads them into, holding right-wing ideas.
P3: But, this strike has forced some to defy and/or disrespect the law.
P4: However, later, when some prisoners protested, the same officers rushed back to work to control them.
Now, I have already commented on the loose and indeterminate way that dialecticians like to use the offending word (i.e., "contradiction"), but even given this conceptual morass what precisely is the contradiction here?
Let us try again (using "NN" this time to stand for the name of any randomly chosen prison guard who thinks and acts along the above lines):
P5: NN upholds the law.
P6: NN has adopted a number of right-wing ideas.
P7: One day, as a result of the strike, NN says "Screw law L1!"
P8: Later that day he acts in support of a totally different law.
Once more, where is the contradiction?
Now, if NN had said, "Screw all laws!" we might be able to cobble-together an inconsistency here (such as "Screw all laws!" and "No laws ought to be screwed!"), but not even that is implied by the above story.
In fact, a contradiction in this case would be something like: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should not be screwed." Or, perhaps: "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed."
To be sure, people say all manner of odd things, and it is relatively easy to utter contradictions. Who has ever denied that! Look, I have just posted two in the previous paragraph. The question is, can both be held true, or false (or in this case, advocated and repudiated as a moral or political code), at the same time? Well, did anyone from Socialist Worker try to ascertain from the aforementioned prison guards if any of them would have assented to and rejected either of these at the same time: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should not be screwed", "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed"? Apparently not.
Indeed, if NN in fact assented to "No laws should be screwed", then we could safely infer from his later strike action that he no longer held it true, for by his actions he must have advocated this in its place: "There is at least one law (namely, law L1) that should be screwed". [And this could be the case even if tomorrow NN went back to believing the former again. Dialecticians, least of all, should need reminding that people and things change!]
Unless, that is, we actually think NN holds to this odd idea: "I do not believe that there is at least one law that should be screwed and I also believe there is at least one law that should be screwed." Or, perhaps "Screw law L1 and do not screw it!" Even so, it is reasonably clear that we could only attribute schizoid beliefs like this to NN if he were about to go insane. We certainly could not rely on such a confused character to help win a strike -- nor report his genuine beliefs to us with any accuracy.
But, let us examine what the above benighted comrade had to say, to see if anything useful can be extracted from it. Is it possible, therefore, for an individual to have contradictory interests in a relationship, say? Perhaps this comrade meant the following:
B1: NN has interest (A in relationship R).
B2: It is not the case that NN has interest (A in relationship R).
[The brackets have been inserted to ensure the same scope is operating here for the negative particle -- another "pedantic" detail our superfine 'dialectical logicians' also ignore.]
Now, this seems to be is a genuine contradiction (if the two are conjoined). Did he mean this?
Apparently not. Well, what about this?
B3: NN has interest (A in relationship R).
B4: NN has interest (B in relationship R).
B5: Interest (A in relationship R) contradicts interest (B in relationship R).
But, if we are talking about literal contradictions here (and not those unexplained 'dialectical contradictions') then A and B (in relationship R) can only contradict one another if they are expressed in propositions (or, at the very least, in clauses), as B5-B7 below indicate.
Hence, A and B (in relationship R) would contradict each other if they were expressed in something like this form (if, in B5a, we ignore for the moment the "pedantic" detail included above):
B5a: Interest A contradicts interest B.
B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".
B7: "B stands for "It is not the case that I must love my partner".
Can anyone assent to such beliefs all at once? Well, as we saw with NN above, people can hold all manner of odd ideas in their heads, so there is nothing to suggest that B6 and B7 could not form the content of someone's overall belief system/emotional make-up. But, and unfortunately, this just tells us that contradictions in ordinary language and in logic are built around the content of propositions, and the logical links we hold between them -- thus, destroying this particular comrade's point.
The question now is, has anyone ever held the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true and both false at the same time? Or anything like them? Perhaps they have (who can say?), but how that shows that there are in fact 'true contradictions' in nature and society is still somewhat unclear. [As should seem obvious, the fact that some individuals believe something does not make it true!]
However, it could be argued that the fact that NN holds, say, the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true, when coupled with the fact that NN is an individual who exists in the real world (should we actually find a genuine NN-type person somewhere), shows that it is at least possible to assert the existence of true contradictions. Once such a possibility has been admitted, the objections set out in this Essay can be seen for what they are: empty rhetoric. Or, so it might be claimed.
An argument somewhat like this was indeed put forward by Roy Edgley a few years back:
"Since thought and theory are also part of reality and thus real objects that can be thought about, contradictions in thought, thought not true of reality, certainly exist in reality; and it is only because they do exist in reality that they can be the object of criticism -- criticism for failing to be true of reality. Moreover, it is because two contradictory theories cannot both be true that each bears a critical relation to the other: instantiated in actual thought this relation of logical opposition is in fact a critical relation of real opposition, Kant notwithstanding. It is no less logical opposition and no more simply natural 'conflict of forces' for taking the form of real historical and social struggle." [Edgley (1979), pp.24-25. Italic emphases in the original.]
The following would presumably be one such contradiction (although Edgley himself was interested in more overtly scientific propositions), and one such existential claim:
B8: Let "p" be "I must love my partner and it is not the case that I must love my partner".
B9: In so far as "p" exists, contradictions exist in reality.
As Edgley admits, while a proposition like "p" could not actually be true, but it would still exist, and hence contradictions certainly exist (at this minimal level). Now, it is an entirely different matter whether "p" is true; I will return to this later. But, what about the claim that the above shows that contradictions at least exist? Well certainly those words exit, but this is no more illuminating than the following would be:
B10: Let "G" = "God"
B11 In so far as "G" exists, "God" exists in reality.
The question would still remain as to whether there is a 'God' or not.
[As those who know their logic will also know, Edgley has confused a propositional sign with a proposition. B10 and B11 partially bring this out.]
Furthermore, no one has questioned the existence of inscriptions of contradictions (indeed, these Essays contain scores of them), but that sheds no light at all on the DM-claim that there are 'real contradictions' in nature and society. If the mere thought of a contradiction, or its actual inscription on the page (or screen), were enough to show that DM-contradictions exist in the real world, then we should have to admit that there were 'real tautologies', too. But worse, we should have to accept LIE, that is, the doctrine that from thought alone, or from words, ontological conclusions may be drawn. [More on that in Essay Twelve.]
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; FL = Formal Logic.]
But signs and inscriptions do not have such existential implications; plainly, if they did we should all have to believe in Bigfoot.
Edgley goes on to argue:
"Though a system of thought that is contradictory cannot be true of its real object, this isomorphic relation between the structure of a society's thought and the structure of its material life thus gives sense to the idea that such thought is true to that material life: in being contradictory it 'reflects', and so discloses, though its content does not explicitly assert, the contradictory structure of the material life of that society." [Ibid., p.25. Italic emphasis in the original.]
But, one may wonder how Edgley knows this is indeed an "isomorphism" if none of his contradictions are true of capitalism. And his claim that this theory is "true to" capitalism is far from clear; how something can be "true to", but not "true of", a social system is something Edgley failed to explain.
Now, Edgley asserts that these linguistic contradictions (or at least the more theoretical examples to which he refers) are a "reflection" of "real oppositions" in society. That claim is partly defused below, and will be further laid to rest throughout this Essay, and in an Additional Essay on the nature of science to be published at this site in the next few years. [See also here.]
Independently of all that, Edgley makes a serious mistake (one that seems to be as endemic in, as it is ubiquitous among, dialecticians): that of confusing contradictions in FL with what might or might not exist. FL makes no existential claims. To be sure, logicians as individuals may make such claims, but logic itself is neutral in this regard. Moreover, certain logical systems might need an ontology (or even a model) in order to work, but that is not so in general. Anyway, even there, contradictions do not make existential claims. The 'ontology' does that.
To repeat: in its simplest form, a contradiction in logic is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, such that they cannot both be true and cannot both be false, at once. So, the fact that inscriptions of contradictions exist has no bearing on that logical principle. Furthermore, FL does not rule out the existence of contradictions (for it is not a science), it is merely concerned with the truth-functional connection between a proposition and its negation. [The fact that there are many different and varied definitions of "contradiction" in logic will be discussed in a later Essay. In the meantime, one need only reflect on the fact that none of these alternative definitions of contradiction make existential claims, either.]
In that case, contradictions cannot "reflect" anything, for they represent one form of the disintegration of the expressive power of language.
[More on this here, here and in Essay Twelve Part One.]
But, wait! The earlier comrade has a powerful ally: none other than that outright charlatan Freud:
"Perhaps someone is in the midst of an unhappy love affair and says
'I love him
but I also hate him'. Its not just the statement but the feeling which is a
contradiction surely? If Freud is held to describe the human individual not as a
unified subject but a bundle of contradictory drives and desires, might one not
imagine contradictory drives (if not desires) in a particular social system?
"Can I not have contradictory emotions about a subject, situation or person (I
know I do about all sorts of things!)."
Thus, on the back of some egregious pseudo-science, this comrade has built his 'case'.
But, is there anything in such fraudulent Freudian fancies anyway (even if we put to one side all the lies, deceit, client abuse, intellectual bullying, cocaine addiction, paranoia, and fabrication of evidence that marked Freud's career)?
Well, once more, can people have contradictory emotions? Perhaps these examples will suffice:
B12: NN hates Blair.
B13: It is not the case that NN hates Blair.
However, I rather think that the aforementioned comrade did not mean a contradiction like this. Perhaps he intended then the following?
B14: NN both hates and loves Blair.
This is entirely possible, if unusual. However, it is worth noting that love and hate are not contradictory (when put in a propositional context) unless, say, hating someone implies not loving them; but, as the above quotation concedes, it does not imply this here.
Nevertheless, (1) the reader will need to re-read the caveats posted earlier, and (2) note that in order to give content to this idea (if it is what was meant, or if these ideas mean anything at all), we had to use a proposition once more. This rather makes a mess then of the following rash assertion:
I'm just very puzzled about what it means to restrict the meaning of the term contradiction to a rule of formal logic. Its always been the least compelling of your arguments it seems to me. I don't understand the linguistic scandal that is supposed to be involved in talking about the human subject as a 'bundle of contradictory drives and desires' or talking about the capitalist system as encompassing contradictory tendencies (how TRPF [the tendency of the rate of profit to fall -- RL] is held to operate inside a concrete capitalist social formation for example)....
"I don't see how there can be anything ipso facto absurd or meaningless about such statements to anyone familiar with ordinary language." [Bold emphasis added.]
No "scandal"; this comrade's badly thought-out examples themselves imply the above conclusions -- that is, if we are to make sense of them.
[The alleged 'contradictions' in capitalism will be dealt with here, and here.]
Now, it could be argued that certain brain states and/or underlying psychological or social forces are what lie behind these contradictory emotions, and it is here that the contradiction lies.
Unfortunately, the thesis that there are such things as 'contradictory forces' has been laid to rest in this Essay, but the overall idea is susceptible to the next series of objections, anyway.
[The argument below also applies to the claim that there might be certain brain states/process and/or psychological and social forces at work, of which we are as yet unaware, that constitute such 'material contradictions'.]
Let us, therefore, call "F*" the brain state/process and/or psychological and social force that results in, or from which "emerges", the following:
B15: NN loves Tony Blair,
and label that which 'opposes' or "mediates" the following "F**":
B16: NN hates Tony Blair.
So "F*" stands for the social force (etc.) that mediates, or from which "emerges", "NN loves Tony Blair" and "F**" stands for that which mediates (etc.) "NN hates Tony Blair".
Let us further assume that F* 'contradicts' F**, i.e., that they are 'dialectically-united opposites'. Now, given these assumptions, even this will not work.
[Of course, if they are not 'dialectically-united opposites', then the above comrade's objection falls by default.]
According to the DM-classics, where we are told that all things change into their opposites, and because of their opposites, F* must change into F**. But, F* cannot itself change into F** since F** already exists! If it didn't already exist, according to this theory, F* could not change, for there would be no opposite to make it do so!
And, once more, it is no good propelling F** into the future so that it now becomes what F* will change into, since F* will do no such thing unless F** is already there to make it happen!
Now, it could be objected that love can turn into hate, and vice versa; sure enough, but the whole point of introducing F* and F** was to show that if and when this happens, dialectics cannot account for it!
[For those interested, this argument is developed in greater detail here (where 'social contradictions' are also considered).]
Finally, at least here, the following section contains an exchange between myself and a far more reasonable comrade (whose name has been omitted):
Comrade M (commenting on the dialectical use of the word "contradiction"):
"I mean what most people mean -- conflict, inner tension..."
Rosa:
Do they really? Give me one sentence drawn from ordinary language (the vehicle most people do in fact use, so what you say should appear there, somewhere) where such an interpretation could be put on the word "contradiction" -- i.e., one not infected with the sort of idealist guff you read in Hegel. An idealist will have no problem with asserting such things; if reality is mind it can argue with itself. Not so a materialist who bases his science on the material language of ordinary workers (ordinary language).
But, even so, why call such things "contradictions"? What link does this use have with the "gain-saying" of someone, which is what the word usually means? How is a conflict in society a contradiction?
Sure, you can re-define the word to mean what you like, but if we all did that we could re-define anything to mean anything, and we'd lose touch with meaning altogether.
Apart from that, you'd be forcing a view onto reality (contrary to what 'dialecticians' always claim they do) not reading one from it. Linguistic Idealism -- as I asserted in those parts of my work I sent you -- would then automatically have raised its ideal head. Society would be 'contradictory', not because it really was so, but because we merely re-defined it to be so. A linguistic dodge would have created a few empirical 'truths'; science on the cheap...
Comrade M:
Rosa said:
"Give me one sentence..."
Okay, what about "don't you contradict me you little bastard!" Or "that's a contradiction in terms".
Suppose someone says 'military intelligence' is a contradiction in terms. What they mean is that there is a conflict or a tension between the first and the second word, thus conjugated.
At any rate, you are berating a new convert. I can't be expected to know everything at once, much less know it as wisely as the central committee (you).
Rosa:
First, the phrase "contradiction in terms" is either a misnomer or a rhetorical device (i.e., it is, say, metaphorical). Why? Well, since contradiction has to do with truth and falsehood as much as it has to do with "gain-saying", and since one term on its own cannot be true or false (only sentences and clauses can be), no term can contradict another.
In that case, "contradiction in terms" means something like "incompatible phrase(s)", as in "round square". However, "AB is round and it is square" would be a contradiction if "AB is round" were taken to mean "AB is not square", but then you would not now have a contradiction in terms, just a plain contradiction with no "conflict (or) inner tension". [There can be no "conflict" here, since words cannot "conflict" (they are not agents -- except, of course, to idealists they are), and there can be no "tension", for the same reason.]
And, if the above were rejected (for some reason), you still would not have a 'contradiction in terms' that was itself indicative of "conflict (or) inner tension", since, once more, words cannot conflict (or be tense, or be in tension), because they are not agents. Moreover, anyone who uttered a 'contradiction in terms' would not necessarily be in "conflict (or) inner tension", just confused. And even if they weren't confused, the 'contradiction in terms' they uttered would not of itself indicate "conflict (or) inner tension"; it could be a sign of all manner of things (ranging from lack of clarity to playfulness).
As to the idea that such a phrase could indicate the presence of "conflict (or) inner tension" I have no doubt, but if a 'contradiction in terms' meant that a "conflict (or) inner tension" had to be present, it would mean this, not merely could mean this, just as the truth of "not p" would mean the falsehood of "p" (as opposed to merely "not p" could mean the falsehood of "p"). So they cannot be synonymous, as you allege.
[Apologies for the prolixity of this paragraph, but logic is a pain in the dictionary!]
But even if this were not so, "contradiction" here would not mean "conflict (or) inner tension", merely "gainsaying oneself", which could be true without an inner conflict being implied. It might be a joke, an attempt to puzzle, a game, a mistake… The possibilities are endless. The attempt to squeeze this into an idealist mould can only succeed if the almost endless possibilities allowed for by ordinary language are ignored.
As to "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!", the term "contradiction" in this command (it's not in fact a proposition, so it cannot itself be a contradiction, literally speaking -- not that you suggested it was) clearly means "gain-say". No quibble. But, if it meant "conflict, inner tension", you would have:
"Don't you conflict/inner tension me you little bastard!", which is meaningless.
Even if we were to edit this to: "Don't you conflict with me you little bastard!" it would not mean the same as "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!"
One can conflict with someone without contradicting them, and vice versa (e.g., two friends could contradict each other (out of fun) without conflicting with each other, say). Hence these cannot mean the same.
However "Don't you inner tension with me you little bastard!" cannot be beaten into shape at all.
2. Engels, for example, went to great lengths to qualify what he meant by "force". Cf., Engels (1954), pp.69-86.
3. This was established in Essay Two.
Nevertheless, as we saw there, assertions like those given in Note 1 function as "forms of representation", not as summaries of the available evidence. In many cases, such broad generalisations are made on the basis of little or no evidence at all. For example:
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954). p.211.]
"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…[is] the negation of the negation…. [This is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976) pp.179-80.]
Now, Engels is quite happy to call this sketchy, half-formed sub-hypothesis, a "law" even though it was based solely on a superficial examination of a limited range of examples -- all specially selected and highly simplified --, drawn from the science of his day. And, even then, they are often badly-described or misconstrued.
Their role as a "form of representation" is outlined in the section dealing with the RRT, in Essay Twelve.
[RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory.]
[The phrase "form of representation" is taken from Wittgenstein; a brief outline of its meaning can be found in Glock, pp.129-35. We will see Engels use one such in Note 7 below.
Also follow the link to "norm of representation" given in Note 25.]
4. However, in one of these quotations, Engels seems to qualify this identification away:
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
[Engels elaborated on this theme in the succeeding pages of DN.]
[DN = Dialectics of Nature; i.e., Engels (1954).]
Nevertheless, this re-interpretation of the term "force" as a sort of shorthand for "simple forms of motion" has serious consequences for DM that Engels appears not to have noticed. Several of these are examined in the main body of this Essay, and below in Note 25. I consider some of his other, more important comments, in greater detail in Essay Seven.
5. Admittedly, this is a highly simplified picture, for even in such circumstances there could be several forces operating on an orbiting body -- the resultant motion will therefore be a function of the vector sum of all the forces acting in the system. The point at issue here is that relative to the centre of mass of the orbiting body, motion is not the result of two different sorts of forces -- those of attraction and repulsion -- but the consequence of just one resultant force. In that case, orbital motion is produced by the action of one force only (i.e., in Classical Physics).
Furthermore, any secondary motion (resulting from the effect of other forces operating in the system), which happens to be superimposed on the primary action, only complicates the picture, it does not alter it. This extra activity might also be the result of other attractive -- but, not repulsive -- forces (in Classical Physics, once more), which admittedly affect the said resultant; while they might change it, they do not turn it into two or more resultants. [This topic and these and several other options are examined again in more detail here.]
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the motion of such a body around another is determined by the operation of the two forces of attraction that pass between them: body A attracts body B, and vice versa.
Even so, it is difficult to see how two attractive forces could be regarded as opposites or as 'contradictories'. Anyway, Engels himself argues that oppositional forces are those of attraction and repulsion, despite the fact that with respect to the vast amount of the bulk motion in nature these seem to have little or no part to play. Not only that, but the motion of, say, planet A around, say, star B, is caused by forces originating in B, not A. While, the forces originating in A may affect B, they do not affect A itself, or its motion around B.
It could be argued once more that the interconnected and reciprocal 'effect chain', as it were, in play between A and B shows that such forces are dialectically-linked. Hence, on this view, B would affect A's motion while A reciprocates; this in turn alters B's own motion which must then affect A's and so on. But even here, these attractive forces do not confront each other as oppositional or as contradictory. At best, such forces affect the motion of the two bodies in tandem, which motion in turn then affects any forces in play, and so on. In fact they appear to augment each other. On that basis, should we not (and with more justification) say that such forces are --, not contradictory --, but tautological? [On this see Note 38, below.]
And, once more, these forces do not turn into one another, which either means that they are not opposites, or the DM-classics were wrong.
6. Again this simplifies the picture considerably, but the point is still valid. Even if it could be shown that gravity is a property either of matter (as a result, perhaps, of the activities of the by now legendary "graviton"), of Spacetime, or of something else, 'motion' through that latter would still not be a function of attractive and repulsive forces. [On this, see Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi. This has been challenged in Wilson (2007). More on that below.]
[In the previous paragraph, the word "motion" is in 'scare' quotes, since it is a moot point whether anything actually moves in four-dimensional Spacetime.]
6a. This, of course, is not how things are pictured in school or college Physics, where "force" is still used for heuristic purposes. But, as Jammer notes, in higher Physics, "force" has been edited out, replaced by exchange particles.
This is re-iterated by Nobel Laureate, Professor Wilczek (of MIT):
"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.
"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote
"'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'" [Quoted from here.]
[The above now appears in Wilczek (2006), pp.37-38.]
This view has been criticised quite effectively in Wilson (2007). More details on this will be added here at a future date.
7. For example, see Engels (1954), pp.73-80.
Nevertheless, it is not at all clear what Engels was driving at in these passages. If he meant to say that heat operates as a repulsive force then that would have been a desperate and unconvincing move. Not only do cold bodies have satellites (e.g., Neptune), hot bodies swallow matter up all the time. It is possible that Engels simply copied this idea from theorists of the previous century. [Hesse (1961), Williams (1980).]
Admittedly, Engels did consider other repulsive forces that could operate in a planetary system, but his ideas were speculative, fanciful and clearly ad hoc. I can find no evidence that anyone else (DM-fan or otherwise) has followed-up on -- or developed -- any of these ideas in any way in the intervening years.
For example, Engels appeals to the original repulsive properties of the "individual particles of the gaseous sphere" from which the Solar System was formed (as a result of "contraction"), to account for its origin by means of an "interplay of attraction and repulsion." [Engels (1954), pp.73-74.]
It would be difficult to find a better example than this of how the dialectical method has been imposed on nature -- and not deduced from the phenomena. And we can say this with some confidence; even if this 'theory' weren't so obviously fanciful, it certainly could not have been deduced from the phenomena since the alleged incidents took place billions of years ago. Admittedly, there were theoretical considerations that recommended this 'hypothesis' to Engels as a tentative 'explanation' of how the solar system might have been formed -- although even that is questionable since Engels explicitly based his ideas on the old Kant-Laplace model, itself nearly 100 years old at the time --, but even granted all this, Engels's account is superficial, impressionistic and lacks both mathematical and evidential support. It was clearly motivated by his desire to find some force -- any force -- to counterbalance gravity just because DM requires it, not because the phenomena dictate it. This is a classic example of Engels using the ideas he inherited from Hegel as a "form of representation".
To be sure, such formal devices are used all the time in science; Engels however turned this one into a metaphysical thesis.
[The difference between Metaphysics and science will be outlined in a later Essay. On Metaphysics and DM, see Essay Twelve Part One.]
Indeed, Einstein himself was not above inventing forces to suit his needs (as, indeed, was Newton), introducing "the cosmological constant" to account for the fact that the Universe has not collapsed in on itself. Cf., Lerner (1992), pp.131-32. There are countless examples of this sort of move in the history of science. Kuhn calls these "paradigms" (a none-too-happy term). On this see Kuhn (1970, 1996), and Sharrock and Read (2002).
Incidentally, an appeal to so-called 'centrifugal forces' (a bogus notion found in Classical Physics) will not save Engels's theory either -- such forces do not 'exist'. If anything they are the result of a misleading shorthand for the way that rectilinear motion would tend to be re-asserted if forces responsible for centripetal acceleration cease to operate, subjectively experienced in certain rotating systems.
8. In that case, for once, Engels's views would seem to be consistent with modern Physics (as indicated by Jammer)!
Engels also noted the anthropomorphic origin of this concept (something Woods and Grant, for example, failed to spot -- even though they quoted this passage!):
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Engels (1954), p.82. Bold emphasis added.]
On the animistic/anthropomorphic origin of the concept of force, see Hesse (1961), Jammer (1999), and Agassi (1968), who references Bacon's Novum Organum (Book One: Aphorisms; Aphorisms XXXVII-LXVIII) as a locus classicus of this avenue of criticism.
DM-theorists are not alone in finding their theses embarrassed by the use of anthropomorphic concepts; the ideas of metaphysically-motivated Philosophers and scientists have been similarly compromised. The material and ideological source of this phenomenon is discussed in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here, and here).
9. Classical problems associated with the ontology of interaction will be posted here at a future date. However, there is an outline of these issues in Note 24. See also Note 6a.
10. It could be argued that forces are 'abstractions' constructed to assist in the scientific study of nature. However, once again, when viewed this way, the concept "force" becomes little more than a "useful fiction", only now situated in a metaphorical universe of its own, located somewhere between genuine fictions (such as apparitions) and mathematical fictions (like the centre of mass of the huge galactic system to which our galaxy belongs, the Virgo Supercluster). In that case, naturally, the 'objective' status of forces would be fatally compromised. They would have no physical counterpart, and the real material correlates of DM-'contradictions' (which was the whole point of this Part of Essay Eight to investigate and perhaps locate) would be non-existent.
11. Once more, this is not a problem confined to DM-circles; scientific theories are shot-through with metaphor, and scientists use analogical reasoning all the time. On the nature and use of metaphor and analogy in the sciences, cf., Baake (2003), Brown (2003), Benjamin, et al (1987), Guttenplan (2005), Hesse (1966), Ortony (1993), and White (1996). [Several of these base their ideas on those of Max Black, whose theory is destructively criticised in White (1996).]
However, there is as yet no satisfactory treatment of the import, role and significance of the use of figurative language in science anywhere in the literature. Naturally, given the ubiquity of such language, the precise nature of scientific knowledge is poorly understood. [I hope to say more on this in an Essay on science to be published in 2008 or 2009.]
12. This might be one particular use of the LEM that DM-fans would be wise not to question. If objects, states of affairs and processes were held to be both non-contradictory and contradictory at the same time, little sense could be made of the theory even before it was examined.
[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
Nevertheless, as with any application of the 'laws' of FL to complex situations, some sensitivity is required. In that case, it could be argued that DM is only committed to the view that parts of one system/process 'contradict' parts of another, while still others do not.
To be perfectly honest, it is impossible to give a clear answer to this volunteered response since DM is far too imprecise and sketchy for anyone (supporter or opponent) to decide whether or not this is a legitimate reading. Perhaps it is both and neither at the same time?
However, dialecticians do in fact speak about contradictions growing and intensifying, or even lessening and being "resolved"; but this is clearly qualitative speech since they supply us with no units by which they can be measured, and no data to support their contention; nor do they attempt to quantify them in any way (which, on its own, is a rather odd thing for an alleged science to omit).
If DM-apologists decided to invent a unit here, we might make some progress. May I suggest, therefore, the 'Neg'?
So, one Neg could be defined as that strength/level/intensity of contradiction necessary to make either a stick (of arbitrary size) look bent in water, an object (again of arbitrary dimensions) look smaller as it recedes from the viewer, or maybe even that required to make at least one capitalist/employer look fair.
In that case, a Nanoneg would be enough to make an electron move, and a Piconeg would allow it to be a wave and a particle all at once. Further: a Millineg would be strong enough to move a millipede. [The reader can decide for herself what a Centineg would be capable of setting in motion.] A Decineg would be sufficient to depict a formal contradiction in logic, while a Decaneg (colloquially, "A Blair") would be enough to spin a pack of capitalist lies (about the affordability of, say, pensions) or write at least one 'dodgy' Iraq dossier.
Perhaps then, a Hecto(r)neg would set off a factional dispute in yet another dialectically-distracted Trotskyist sect, while the class war itself would need a Kiloneg to initiate a strike, a Meganeg to motivate a huge anti-war movement, and a Giganeg to prompt an insurrection. Moving up the scale, a Teraneg would be needed to keep the Earth in orbit around the Sun, and, of course, a Yottaneg to kick-start the 'Big Bang' (if the latter actually happened).
We could even introduce a special unit to measure the contradictory stench created in the nostrils of most working-class people by the sectarian in-fighting, oppression, mass murder and counter-revolutionary activity this misbegotten theory has helped inflict on Marxism: the Rottaneg.
All we would need then is an intrepid dialectician (i.e., one of those who claim to be able to discover fundamental scientific truths in thought alone, by simply juggling with obscure Hegelian jargon) to invent a Negometer (and they could do this if they saved time by not writing yet another identical version of DM/'Materialist Dialectics' by just cutting and pasting large sections from the 'classics') to measure these super-scientific 'dialectical contradictions'. That done, and Mystical Marxism might at least begin to look precise for a change.
[To be honest, I would have suggested the 'Con' here as a suitable unit with which to measure the strength of DM-'contradictions', but when I typed "Megacon" into an earlier version of the above, that seemed to me to be a little too obvious -- and a mite too facetious.
Compare the above comments with the suggestions made about dialectical "nodes"/"leaps", here.]
13. This, of course, assumes that 'contradictions' have metaphorical 'geometric centres' and possess figurative 'separation radii'. Well, maybe they can be photographed, weighed and given new paint job?
Cheap debating points? Perhaps so; but if all parts of nature (animate and inanimate, macroscopic or microscopic) behave as if they can argue over the metaphysical garden fence, as it were -- which is how things are depicted in DM, picturing them as 'contradicting' themselves and one another, bickering all the time (that is, if the word "contradict" is taken literally) --, the cheap shot above is hardly worth mentioning in comparison. DM takes the piss out of itself; it needs little help from me.
13a. Indeed, when asked to explain why this is a 'contradiction', Ian Birchall failed to respond. However, in a later thread, he tried again unsuccessfully to do so, as did a few other confused comrades. [The reader is encouraged to read this lengthy exchange on this topic; my thoughts on the 'arguments' of one of the egregious participants in this 'debate' can be found here and here, and now in a revised form above, in Note One.]
Unfortunately, the same always seems to happen whenever I ask other dialecticians to explain why these are 'contradictions'. [On the best response ever given to this question, but not as asked by me, see here.]
Several more examples of this DM-tendency to label anything and everything as "contradictory" can be found here, and in Note 14.
14. We might also want to know how something actually existing (i.e., the current state of the working class) can 'contradict', in a dialectical sense (involving forces), something that does not (i.e., the latter's potential revolutionary role). As we have seen, dialecticians are won't to use the word "contradiction" in inappropriate circumstances to depict things that are quirky, odd, contrary to expectations, and so on -- as the mood takes them, it seems. [See, for instance, here.]
However, what Lindsey might have had in mind in the quoted passage is that there is a seeming contradiction in revolutionary theory, which on the one hand depicts the proletariat as the revolutionary class, while on the other, they are often quiescent (or relatively so) for long periods. But this is no more a contradiction here than it would be in Physics if, say, an unsupported heavy object near to the surface of the earth does not actually fall toward the ground. As soon as we learn that the heavy object is maintained in place by magnets, for example, the phenomenon puzzles us no more. To be sure, this stretches the meaning of "unsupported" almost to breaking point, but as that word has no strict definition, it will probably survive that particular semantic trauma.
The moral here (if there is one) seems to be that no law in physics is 'true' on its own, and all are hedged about by all manner of ceteris paribus (i.e., "all things being equal") clauses. On this, see Cartwright (1983). [However, there is a forceful rebuttal to this way of seeing things here. Naturally, it would be out of place to pursue this topic in this Essay. See also, Earman et al (2002). ]
Hence, as soon we know what is holding the working class back, this puzzle also disappears.
In that case, Lindsey's worry about overcoming this 'contradiction' can now be shelved: there isn't one to overcome.
That does not mean that socialists must just let things drift, and fail to intervene, or wait for workers to organise themselves, but since this is to stray into areas covered by HM, no more will be said about this topic here.
15. It may be felt that this completely misconstrues the relation between parts and wholes as it is interpreted in DM-circles (wherein "the whole is more than the sum of the parts", etc.). However, this dialectical doctrine is examined in extensive detail in Essay Eleven Part Two, where it is exposed as no less confused than other DM-theses are.
16. E.g., Rees (1998), pp.5-8.
17. Of course, it could be argued that this objectifies the Totality, once more, thereby distorting it. But, if the Totality is not a kind of object (even if it is a changing 'object'), how can 'it' have any relation to 'its' parts, and how could 'contradictions' be properties of 'it'?
It could be objected that the Totality is a process, and hence it could be an 'it' (or a sort of 'it') in that sense. Naturally, the answer to these (and other) questions about this mysterious entity/process (the "Totality") will have to be put to one side until DM-advocates tell us (if ever) what (if anything) they think 'it' is.
[They might find a few useful ideas (consistent with much else in DM) here.]
Despite this, it could be further objected that abstract reasoning like this demonstrates nothing since DM is concerned with verifiable, concrete material contradictions, which occur in the real world. That option is examined here, and here.
18. Naturally, this assumes that these relations are symmetrical -- that is, that AR = RA, which seems reasonable enough. Another simplifying assumption is that these forces are part of binary systems -- that is, the discussion in the text concentrates exclusively on force-couples. It is clear, I take it, that this contraction does not materially affect the conclusions drawn. Anyway, further complications will be introduced and examined later.
In addition, most of the comments in this part of the Essay have been deliberately restricted to the use of DM-terminology, the employment of which does not imply I either accept its validity or that it makes any sort of sense.
Naturally, a comprehensive scientific account of the concept of force would have to include modern ideas about gravity, the strong nuclear, weak and electroweak forces, etc. [As I noted earlier, this concept is now explicated by the use of exchange particles.]
However, it is possible that as science develops reference to forces (even in school Physics) will progressively disappear; cf., Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi (quoted earlier). In that eventuality, if DM-theorists maintain their adherence to the doctrine that forces give 'contradictions' a material grounding of some sort, their theory would become 'unscientific' by default. Either that, or they will have to abandon talk about the 'objective' nature of forces and join with Engels in regarding them as shorthand for relative motion. Of course, forces would then not just be "useful fictions", they'd be entirely fictitious.
Should this scientific development fail to materialise (i.e., the editing out of all forces from nature), it would be interesting to see how DM-theorists would try to harmonise their 'attraction-repulsion' scenario with successful attempts to unify the four fundamental forces in a Grand Unification Theory (or even in Superstring/M Theory, etc.). It might finally kill-off informed talk in DM-circles about the existence of 'contradictory' forces in nature. Clearly, if there is only one force, it can hardly 'contradict' itself, one supposes.
19. This is, of course, to adopt the vocabulary of Classical Physics.
[However, no inference should be drawn from this to the present author's views concerning the 'ontological' status of forces. As noted elsewhere, this terminology is only being used here as a way of exposing the confusions that abound in DM. It is up to scientists to tell us what the world contains, not Philosophers --, and definitely not RL.]
Nevertheless, with respect to the comments in the text, it is assumed that R-forces prevent the collapse of accumulated matter into 'singularities' under the action of ambient AA-force couples. Clearly, this simply complicates the point, without altering it, once again. In such a scenario, we would have an ARA-system-of-forces, which would be even more difficult to interpret as 'contradictory'. As pointed out in the text, the meaning of the word "opposite" would have to be altered so that systems of three or more forces could then have any number of their constituent parts considered as 'opposites' of any (or all) the rest. If so, such 'contradictions' would be artefacts of an arbitrary choice of words, not 'objective' realities.
Moreover, and once again, given the classical picture, motion itself is altered by the operation of a single resultant force. This is even more difficult to square with the idea that forces are 'contradictions'. [More on this later, too.]
20. This simple picture is, of course, ruined by the complexities found in nature. However, the more complications there are, the less applicable DM-concepts seem to be. In this case, we find that we would have an RARA-system-of-forces. Again, a choice would now have to be made whether we should widen the meaning of the word "opposite" to accommodate DM, or change DM in order to accommodate reality. [To date, DM-theorists have generally preferred the former over the latter alternative.]
Since AR-forces are discussed below, I will postpone comment on them until then.
21. This need not be as serious a problem as is indicated in the text. As pointed out elsewhere in this Essay, scientists do this sort of thing all the time. Unfortunately, this is bad news for DM since it confirms the view that science is a conventionalised social practice, and further substantiates the claim made here that metaphysical theses merely result from a misconstrual of conventionalised grammatical forms (the latter of which gain their sense from material practices), as if they represent fundamental aspects of reality. In short, the conventions we use to represent the world are confused with material truths about it.
This is as crass an error as, say, assuming that reality itself must have an edge to it simply because every photograph has one.
This topic is examined in detail In Essay Twelve Part One.
21a. Or perhaps even:
(3) This way of looking at the world is really quite as loopy as it looks.
[This topic is examined more thoroughly later on in the present Essay.]
22. It might be felt that this Essay is so heavily biased against any way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions' that scientific facts and theories have constantly been prejudicially twisted/slanted -- this latest allegation being an excellent example of this tactic. Surely -- it could be argued -- accelerated motion in the real world is the result of several forces operating on a body; the ensuing motion simply follows as their oppositional effect.
However, this volunteered response will be examined presently in the main body of the Essay.
23. Once more, it could be objected that there is no such thing as "empty space". But even if this were so, and the bodies referred to in the text were not in the said force field, any forces present would not operate on each other, but only on the bodies in that system (if there were any). Hence, forces seem to affect bodies not each other.
24. It could be pointed out here that force fields do in fact interact, and they certainly alter one another. This will be examined presently.
This, of course, is the source of the classical ontological problem concerning the exact nature of forces, and it is partly why it is so difficult to understand their nature. Indeed, their detection seems to depend only on the effects they have on bodies, or on instruments (or, rather, a 'force' seems to be little more than the way scientists depict certain relationships between bodies, as Engels, in a more sober mood, actually put it; on this, see Note 4), or on other fields.
However, if forces are viewed as particulate (that is, if certain particles are viewed as the 'bearers' of forces), the problem would simply reappear at a new level, and we would be no further forward -- a fact Leibniz was, I think, among the first to point out.
Hence, this sort of confrontation between forces could only take place if they were particulate in some way -- that is, if they registered some sort of resistance to one another. If, on the other hand, they were not particulate, it would be hard to see how they could interact in any way, let alone 'contradict' each other. Continuous media have no rigidity and no impenetrability to exert forces of any sort (except, of course, as part of a figurative extension to particulate interaction). [This has been questioned in Smith (2007). More on that presently.]
But, there are well-known classical problems associated with the idea that forces are particulate (referenced here) -- not the least of which is the observation that if forces were particulate then they could only interact if they exerted still other forces (contact forces, cohesive forces, forces of reaction, and so on, which held them together), so that they could act on other particulates (and thus not disintegrate), initiating an infinite regress. That is, in order to account for the ability of particles to resist one another, we would need to appeal to forces internal to bodies to stop, say, one body penetrating the other, or to prevent distortions tearing that body apart, etc. But, if the forces internal to bodies are particulate too (as it seems they must be), we would thus need further forces to account for the internal coherence of these new (and smaller) 'force-particles', and so on. Alternatively, if these 'internal forces' are continuous (or non-particulate), they would not be able to generate inner coherence (since they have no rigidity).
In the end nothing would be accounted for since at each level there would be nothing to provide the required resistance/coherence.
So, reducing the interaction between forces to that between bodies means that particles could not 'contradict' one another without exerting non-particulate forces on their operands -- which would once again mean that such entities were incapable of exerting forces, having no rigidity to do so, etc., etc.
Unfortunately, even the exchange of particles (in QM) would succeed in exerting forces only if there were reaction forces internal to bodies, which were themselves the result of rigidity, cohesion, contact, etc, to stop the force carrier particle passing right through the target particle. Of course, Physicists these days appeal to fields, energy gradients and the like (and reject such mechanistic notions), but if these are continuous, too, the above problems will simply re-emerge at a new level. On the other hand, if they are particulate, after all, this merry-go-round would merely take another spin around the metaphysical dance floor.
[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]
Of course, it could be objected that the above adopts an out-dated mechanistic view of interaction, and hence is completely misguided. However, the 'modern' mathematical approach surrenders the possibility of giving a causal, or physical account of forces -- or, at least, one that does not itself depend on a figurative use of the sorts of verbs we employ in everyday life to give a material account of why things happen in the macro-world.
So, if a particle is seen as a 'carrier' of a force, and that 'force' can be given no physical content, but is still regarded as being capable of 'making' things happen, 'forcing' particles to 'divert' from their line of action (etc.), then those very words must themselves lose contact with seemingly identical everyday words like "make", "force", "divert", as and when the latter are used to depict macro-phenomena.
Now there is no problem with this; but then such an account would thereby become merely descriptive (or even metaphorical), not explanatory. Differential equations and vectors cannot make things move, or alter the path of a single particle. To be sure, we can describe such things with these mathematical forms, and guarantee thereby that the 'books' of nature balance; but the downside to this is that such models cannot explain why anything actually happens in the physical world. [For more recent qualms on this, see Note 30.]
Perhaps, this helps explain Engels's own suspicion of forces; ontologically, they appear to be deeply mysterious, if not animistic. He is not alone. [Other relevant aspects of the nature of forces are discussed here.]
Clued-in physicists seem already to be aware of this (i.e., that it is a problem of language). Here is David Peat:
"IT HASN'T been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as Lee Smolin's The Trouble with Physics and Peter Woit's Not Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that string theory, the brightest hope for formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation, has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s, when a grand unified theory seemed just around the corner and physicists believed they would soon, to use Stephen Hawking's words, 'know the mind of God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'.
"So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.'
"At first sight that seems strange. What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the nature of the result.
"Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of 1925, when the young Werner Heisenberg worked out the basic equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values.
"Heisenberg needed an explanation for this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position, then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic properties.
"However, when Heisenberg showed his results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level. The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts.
"This is where language comes in. While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality -- assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'. Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox.
"Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist Michael Green a few years after he and John Schwartz published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory mainstream. Green remarked that when Einstein was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply in philosophy.
"In contrast, Green felt, string theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done.
"The American quantum theorist David Bohm embraced Bohr's views on language, believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of Newtonian physics. When we say 'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns), which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields. But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably hindered.
"Bohm pointed out that quantum effects are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary role....
"Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter. In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places on how we can think about the world...." [Peat (2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
Now, I do not want to suggest for one moment that I agree with the above comments about the nature of language (or even of scientific language), but they certainly indicate that scientists themselves are aware of the problem.
[To be sure, Peat follows Bohm and suggests we need to learn from native American languages, which seem to have rather odd grammars; but it is to be doubted whether a culture that has produced no science or technology of any note has anything to teach one that has.]
25. Admittedly, when viewed as vectors, velocities, accelerations and forces can, in some circumstances, be represented as 'opposites', but this is given within vector algebra and follows from certain definitions. However, unless we are prepared to admit all the absurdities outlined earlier, this approach cannot lend any support to DM. In addition, it is argued below that mathematics can in no way be regarded as an abstraction from reality.
[Issues related to this will be examined in Essay Thirteen, and in an Additional Essay. However, this topic is intimately connected with the idea that motion is caused by resultant forces, which is discussed in more detail here.]
To be sure, when forces are represented as vectors they can produce accelerations that appear to 'oppose' impressed motion in the system. Ignoring for the present the fact that the use of such language is arguably anthropomorphic, in such cases we would be linking items drawn from the same category (i.e., vectors connected with movement), which clearly makes sense. In this way, any force could be replaced by relative acceleration (by means of Newton's Second Law, etc.). But, even here, an acceleration in an opposite direction does not oppose the original velocity; an acceleration (in vector algebra, which is what we are speaking of here!) just is a description of that changing velocity. Even in reality, accelerations are not disembodied beings that haunt the material world, throwing their weight about, bullying velocities to do their bidding. They are just changing velocities --, no more, no less.
However, in vector algebra no sense can be made of the addition (or subtraction) of force and velocity vectors unless this is mediated by the Second Law (etc.), once more. Even then, the relation between acceleration and velocity vectors has to be established by well-known equations. The various physical quantities represented by these equations can only be linked by means of translations like these, which set up analogies between categorically different items (but in a dimensionally consistent fashion). That is one reason why no sense can be given to 'equations' such as the following:
(1) F = -v
(2) a = kv
Equations like these would be regarded as dimensionally incoherent (unless further dimensions were built into the constant "k", for example). Compare these with the next batch:
(3) s = ut + ½at2
(4) a = -w2s
(5) F = -mw2s
By means of translational/analogical equations like these (or, to make the same point more clearly, by the use of algebraic rules that sanction the inferences we make about physical quantities, in which forces appear as part of a "norm of representation"), we can convert forces into accelerations, compare physical quantities, and account for the motion of bodies (etc.).
Unfortunately, this is of little help to DM-theorists since the translation of forces into relative accelerations would mean that forces are indeed "useful fictions" once more, which would re-introduce all the difficulties noted earlier.
[This is not a problem for the account presented here, for reasons hinted at in the previous paragraph but one.]
However, even if the above were rejected for some reason, this would still lend no support to DM, for such representations are not oppositional; they do not slug it out on the page or the blackboard. And, manifestly, they do not turn into one another (as we are told they should by DM-classicists).
Hence, if two ('opposite') forces in equilibrium (inclined at θo to the x axis, say) are resolved (into their i components), and then equated as follows:
F cosθ - G cosθ = 0
no one would suppose that these symbols are locked in a life-or-death conflict, and will one day change into each other.
Naturally, the above conclusions are not affected in any way of these forces are not in equilibrium:
F cosθ - G cosθ > 0
F cosθ - G cosθ < 0
And it would be little use arguing that while it is true that the above representations may be lifeless (and thus incapable of struggling, and turning into one another), what they actually represent in the real world most certainly can, and does. This is because, the above considerations were expressly aimed at forestalling the claim that the vector calculus is 'dialectical' (and no more). The allegedly dialectical nature of forces in reality is an entirely separate issue, which is demolished throughout the rest of this Part of Essay Eight (and here). [However, on the Calculus in general, see here.]
Readers may be puzzled by the use of the word "analogical" in an earlier paragraph. The use of this word is connected with the history of the development of mathematical terminology in this area, and with the way we make sense of such equations. More particularly, it originated in the reservations expressed by ancient Greek mathematicians over the relationship between so-called "incommensurables" (physical quantities from different qualitative categories, which could find no common noun/predicate to 'co-measure' them) and how these reservations were resolved by European mathematicians in the High Middle Ages. Conceptual barriers between disparate categories were beginning to be broken down by the introduction of concepts (and thus new grammars) at this time, which followed (and were based) on the development of market economies in Feudal society.
So, in earlier times, categorical differences were believed to hold between certain physical terms, which meant they could not be linked mathematically. In that case, whole new grammars had to be introduced by the above mathematicians before incommensurable quantities could be compared analogically (so their exchange values could be calculated). Innovations like these permitted theorists to move beyond earlier 'commonsense' approaches to motion encapsulated in Aristotelian Physics, enabling them to lay the foundations of modern kinematics.
This emphasis on the analogical nature of modern algebraic forms depicting motion follows from an approach to mathematical development that sees the latter as dependent on contingent Historico-economic factors, and which thus bases it firmly and exclusively on human practice and thus on material relations. This view of mathematical development also helps undermine the idea that mathematics is concerned with the study of 'abstractions', and is thus about the Ideal. Hence, it also neutralises yet another core DM-thesis: that scientific development is predicated on the ability of theorists to abstract concepts into existence. [This doctrine has already been picked apart here.]
There is a detailed discussion of these issues in Hadden (1988, 1994), upon which many of the above comments are based. Hadden's pioneering work is only prevented from being Marxist classic by the absence of a clear account of the nature and role of language and of the logic of analogical reasoning.
[However, in view of the fact that the logic of analogy has not advanced much since Aristotle's day, this is hardly Hadden's fault.]
Hadden's conclusions are themselves a development of ideas found in Borkenau (1987), Fleck (1979) and Grossmann (1987). Cf., also Sohn-Rethel (1978).
Clagett (1959) contains many of the original medieval sources. See also Zilsel (2000), and Kaye (1998).
[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism; UO = Unity of Opposites.]
In that case, the admission that forces can be edited out of the picture (so that relative acceleration and motion may be regarded as opposites) might succeed in winning this particular battle, but only at the cost of losing the war. Once again, this is because it would imply that the universe was much more CAR-like than DM-theorists are prepared to admit. On this account, any reference to a DM-UO would be little more than a confusing way of referring to relative acceleration/velocity. The connection between events could then only be explicated in one of two ways:
(1) By an appeal to the topology of Spacetime, or:
(2) By means of a detailed analysis of the vector and scalar fields in which the said processes were taking place.
In either case, the connection between natural events would not be governed by any sort of physical mediation between elements of the Totality in the process of change -- as DM requires -- since, on this view, moving bodies (with or without opposite velocities (or accelerations)) would have no internal connection with other bodies in motion.
At least an appeal to forces has the merit of appearing to supply a vaguely mediational link between bodies in motion/change, which DM requires; forces seem to connect the latter in dialectical union -- but only because a literalist interpretation of forces like this depends on a prior endorsement of an animistic view of nature.
So, any attempt to edit forces out of the picture would result in the disappearance of the dialectical 'connective-tissue' of reality (as it were); and with that DM would become indistinguishable from the mechanical materialism (i.e., CAR) it sought to replace.
[AIDS = Absolute Idealism; DN = Dialectics of Nature.]
As noted in the text, DM-theorists require forces to be part of the ontological fabric of the universe (which is why they become rather defensive, if not emotive, when the existence of forces is questioned -- except they tend to ignore Engels when he did just this!). Their theory needs a world suffused with anthropomorphic concepts like these -- those that are themselves the result of the fetishisation of the products of social interaction as if they were real objects/processes in nature; which is just another poisonous spin-off of the much touted 'inversion' of Hegelian AIDS.
Hence, whether DM-fans like it or not, the language of dialectics suggests that objects/processes in nature are quasi-intelligent, and engaged in what can only be described as some sort of mystical conversation/shouting match with other objects/processes, as they 'contradict' and 'negate' one another.
As has already been pointed out, in parts of DN, Engels pictured motion in dynamic terms, portraying it as simply the transfer of energy. [Engels (1954), pp.69-102.] This seems to connect his comments with more recent theories of motion, depicted by the use of vector and/or scalar fields, or with the laws of Thermodynamics -- or even with concepts derived from non-Euclidean Spacetime (where talk is no longer of forces) --, constructed a generation or so after he died. But, once again, such a re-write of DM would mean that familiar DM-concepts (such as "contradiction", "polar opposite", "UO" etc.) would become just as obsolete as "natural place", "substantial form", "accident" and "substance" are now --, notions that were once used in ancient scientific theories.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how, say, an energy gradient (depicted as a scalar field) could be interpreted as 'contradictory', even though these often feature in modern accounts of motion. Well, no more perhaps than, say, a ladder should be regarded as contradictory if someone fell off of it.
Far worse: it is even more difficult to regard states of affairs involving vector and scalar fields, the geodesics of Spacetime -- or even the strings of Superstring Theory -- as part of a material universe. If everything in nature is just a complex array of energy gradients, vector fields and differential curvatures in Spacetime -- spruced up with a few probability density functions -- there would seem to be no place left for anything that even looks remotely material. Given this 'modern' mathematical account of reality, matter itself would simply become a "useless fiction", explanatory of nothing at all. Small wonder then that Lenin was highly suspicious of the Idealism implicit in the Physics of his day (even if he had no answer to it). [On this, see Essay Thirteen Part One (summary here).]
Quite apart from all this, the 'ontological status' of 'energy' itself is highly obscure -- and this situation is unlikely ever to change. Energetics is thus no friend of 'Materialist Dialectics'.
Of course, in DM-writings, a clear definition of "matter" is about as easy to find as is an honest UK Prime Minister (as we will also see in Essay Thirteen Part One).
26. Those who still think that forces can oppose motion, and therefore, contradict it, should consult the arguments constructed in Note 25 above, and presently in the main body of this Essay, where this idea is finally laid to rest.
However, it is worth pointing out to such individuals that if they were correct, then the idea that forces are oppositional to one another will have gone out of the non-dialectical window, for if forces oppose motion, they cannot oppose each other.
27. In which case, it might be wondered whether only those bodies that approach each other along the same line of action (wherein the angle between their trajectories is 180°), or which operate in a force field (where the lines of action of that field are similarly orientated at 180°) are to be counted as opposites.
If not, will any angle (other than 90°) do? In that case, clearly, since forces and velocities are vectors, they can be resolved to get around this difficulty.
Even so, any solution sought along these lines would clearly be conventional, since the components of vectors do not exist in nature in any meaningful sense; they are just calculating devices that help make sense of motion. On this see Notes 24 and 25 above, and Note 30, below.
28. Anyone who thinks that the vector calculus is a description of reality would be suffering from the same sort of confusion as someone who thought that the weather, say, is just the wavy lines and/or tangent fields on a map because the weather forecast on TV uses them. [On this see Notes 25, above and 40, below.]
29. This section of the Essay might be dismissed as just one more unsympathetic reading of yet another artificially-manufactured set of DM-theses. Perhaps so, but the reader will find that dialecticians themselves consistently fail to examine their own theory in anything like the detail attempted here, despite the fact that DM/'Materialist Dialectics' is supposed to represent the best, if not the very epitome of scientific thought. The present Essay, in contrast, has endeavoured to set-out in more detail than has ever been attempted before the implications of this particular DM-thesis; as such, it ventures into entirely unexplored territory. Hence, it is impossible to say whether it misrepresents DM or not -- indeed, DM-theorists would be hard-pressed to decide among themselves whether this is so. For one thing, they cannot even decide what matter is! [As Essay Thirteen seeks to show, their 'materialism' is a rather like, say, Hamlet without the Prince.]
In addition, it is worth pointing out yet again that F2 was motivated by the idea that forces contradict impressed motion. Unfortunately, since change in motion is the consequence of just one resultant force (if considered classically), the alleged 'contradiction' between two forces disappears.
F2: A UO involves the opposition between a force P1 and the impressed motion that another set of forces Q has produced (or would have produced) in a body B (had P1 never existed). The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this struggle.
It would take an especially alert and eagle-eyed dialectician, therefore, to spot 'contradictory' forces when there is only one force responsible for the said change in motion!
Worse still, F2 postulates a 'contradiction' between a force and the motion that is (or might be) produced as the counterfactual result of the action of other forces, but since some or all of the latter's effects won't have been actualised (having been prevented from occurring by P1), the alleged 'contradiction' here contains only one real term.
Even the most avid DM-fan might find it difficult to visualise (let alone explain) a 'contradiction' between something that is real and something that is unreal (in that it never existed): i.e., the motion that would have occurred if the impeding force P1 above had not acted.
30. Admittedly, some vectors are invariant under certain transformations, but the physical interpretation of the operation of forces is not a given; it is set by convention.
On this topic, cf., Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976).
[Ellis (1976) was written in response to Hunt and Suchting (1969). See also Hanson (1965a, 1965b), and Jammer (1999).]
Mysteriously, however, Ellis has backtracked on his earlier views (for what appear to be instrumentalist reasons); cf., Bigelow, Ellis and Pargetter (1988), and the response to this in Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi.
The difficulty with finding a physical analogue for a vector space (worse: for any tensor extension to it) is examined in Cartwright (1983), pp.54-73; see also Hesse (1961). A recent challenge has been mounted to this way of seeing forces, in Jones (2007); on this see Note 6a.
31. On this, see Notes 24, 25 and 30 above.
32. This was discussed in more detail in the sections devoted to something I have called the Dialecticians' Dilemma. See also here.
33. On this, see, for example, here.
Either this (i.e., that there is no limit toward which knowledge is converging), or it must be the case that as knowledge advances, external reality alters accordingly!
However, that can't be so. We are not to suppose that our knowledge of the world alters the 'objective contradictions' that allegedly power it along, so that as the former grows the latter slowly disappears. But if not, it must now be true that absolute knowledge of the world (even if we never attain to it) implies that nature is not contradictory. [However, on this see here.]
Of course, it may be incorrect to assume that dialecticians believe that as science advances all contradictions will be resolved, but it is not easy to see how they can deny this. Faced with yet another contradiction -- and committed to the view that science can only advance if it overcomes/resolves contradictions in knowledge --, with respect to this new contradiction, dialecticians must believe it can be resolved. Otherwise they will have to admit that science cannot advance beyond a certain point. But this they deny, too. So unless they hold both of these true (that is, they believe that there is no limit to scientific advance, and that there is a limit (i.e., because there are irresolvable contradictions in nature) --, which in itself would represent a contradiction in their own theory, so DM can only advance if this is resolved!), they must hold that all contradictions are resolvable, and hence none are 'objectively' true.
Thus, in terms of DM's own theses, it would seem that nature cannot be fundamentally contradictory.
Again, the only apparent way of avoiding this dilemma (that is, in the form in which it appears here, at least) is to deny either that (1) science advances by resolving all contradictions, or that (2) Absolute Truth 'exists'.
(1) The denial of this option would mean that there is a non-Absolute limit to knowledge, after all; in which case the DM-thesis that human knowledge is unlimited would have to be abandoned. It would also leave dialecticians with no way of knowing which of the allegedly irresolvable contradictions their theory throws up is an 'objective' feature of reality or merely a by-product of their own imperfect theory.
(2) Unfortunately, this tactic would introduce other intractable problems for dialecticians since it would remove the limit toward which they suppose human knowledge is progressing, and with that would go the idea that there is an 'objective' reality (out there) for us to know (even if we never fully attain to it).
Naturally, these observations take into account the fact that the universe might be 'infinite' (a view held true by only some DM-theorists) and constantly changing. None of these factors affect the idea that there must now be a set of truths (possibly infinite) about reality toward which human knowledge is asymptotically converging (even if that set itself somehow grows over time), if Engels were correct when he said:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.234-35.]
"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them (sic), the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept (sic) and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975b), p.457.]
Of course, if there is no such set, then Engels's metaphor is defective.
However, in this regard, Woods and Grant quote a revealing passage from Engels's DN:
"The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and that consequently too in the final analysis they cannot be in contradiction to one another in their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.349; quoting this source.]
To be sure, the above passage was not included in the 'official' version of AD, but it certainly shows that Engels believed that the 'objective' world should be free from contradictions (or at least free from contradiction with/in subjective thought --, which view, it must be admitted, is impossible to distinguish from the former).
So, if any randomly-selected dialectician were to think that, say, motion is 'contradictory' then that subjective thought cannot be in contradiction with 'objective' reality (and thus with 'objective' thought, one presumes, even if this blesses state is never attained).
Naturally, that does not commit Engels to the view that reality is in the limit a contradiction-free zone, but if science can only advance by resolving contradictions in subjective theory (so that it becomes progressively more 'objective'), the conclusion (given above) seems inescapable: that in the limit, human knowledge of the world must see nature as totally free from contradictions.
However, in the absence of any clear indication from Engels that he believed this, little more can be asserted here with any confidence.
One suspects that because the DM-classics are silent on this, modern-day dialecticians themselves would not be able to decide anything here without being called 'Revisionists', sparking perhaps yet another dialectical split.
[In the limit, perhaps, this might mean that future dialectically-knobbled Marxist parties should have a maximum of one member each. At that ideal point, the splits and expulsions will stop, one supposes -- unless, of course, that other DM-thesis (that everything is a UO) induces each lonely comrade to expel herself! Maybe this is the real cunning of reason?]
[AD = Anti-Dühring; UO = Unity of Opposites.]
34. As noted above, it is entirely possible that this is not what DM-fans really mean by "contradictory" forces; but then again it is equally doubtful whether they have ever subjected their own theory to this level of scrutiny, so that they could confirm or deny this fact. Hence, it would probably be pointless asking a DM-adept for an answer to this question, as things now stand.
35. It is worth repeating here that these assertions are aimed neither at affirming nor denying the truth of DM-theorists' claims about the Totality, or its supposedly 'contradictory' parts, since both options are metaphysical. [The reasons for saying this will take up most of Essay Twelve Part One, Essay Eleven Part One and Two.] As was pointed out earlier, the intention here is simply to make patent the latent non-sense they contain.
Moreover, an appeal to 'relative knowledge' would be of little help, either; surprising as this might seem, that notion was torpedoed by Lenin. On this, see here.
36. As we saw earlier, these relate to questions about whether it's a force's effects, or the relative motion between objects, or the interrelationship between bodies, which are 'contradictory'.
37. This is so on Hegelian/Aristotelian grounds (although, here, as with other things, one would be well-advised to stick to the latter's account, since the former seems to have committed his 'thoughts' to paper in a dialect not of this planet -, or while permanently drunk).
So, even though male and female, hot and cold are 'opposites', a male dog is not the opposite of a female flower, and a hot forehead is not the opposite of a cold furnace (indeed, they could both be at 39oC). Such contrasts can only work as opposites if they have the same substantival term to back them up. Hence, a male dog is the opposite of a female dog, a hot furnace the opposite of a cold one, and so on. On substantivals, see here.
Naturally, this undermines much of what dialecticians themselves say about UOs; but since this ground was covered in Essay Seven, no more will be said about it here.
38. Here we appear to have another ironic "dialectical inversion"; in this case, the said forces would not 'contradict', they'd augment, one another -- even though they are still 'opposites'. Perhaps then we should call such ensembles "dialectical tautologies"?
On this basis, therefore, we might be able to construct a whole (and it must be said, wholly insincere) theory of universal harmony, using the fact that forces naturally combine to form resultants and opposites more often than not attract (on this, see Note 40), both of which in turn 'encourage' motion and change. As a result of such an 'inversion' -- putting DM back on its heels, as it were -- change could then be seen as an expression of cooperation, not conflict. And we could even re-introduce the idea of an 'imminent deity' (a suitable -- but equally obscure -- analogue of the DM-'Totality') to give this novel theory the unity it needs, claiming all the while that these ideas have not been imposed on nature, merely read from it.
Since this 'theory' is based on a more realistic appraisal of the interplay between forces, who could object? We could even call this 'theory' "Anihalectics" (since it eliminates dialectics). Subsequent 'contradictions' implied by this 'theory' could, of course, be Nixoned away, in classic DM-fashion.
[We could even declare, with equal pomposity, that anyone who disagrees does not "understand" Anihalectics, ending all discussion.]
On the positive side, this 'theory' enjoys much more evidential support than the average DM-thesis does (given that resultant forces govern every example of change in motion in nature).
On the negative side, however, this 'theory' means that class collaboration/harmony will usher in the 'revolution' (we saw that that was an implication of DM, anyway; here and here), since it is not needed anyway (in such a harmonious world...).
Anyone critical of the above (wholly insincere and fancifully) dotty 'theory', should now take an equally sceptical view of the consistent (but less scientifically-accurate) dottiness of 'Materialist Dialectics'.
39. Even so, and once again, howsoever it is that forces actually do manage to combine, change is not initiated by contradictory forces, but by those annoyingly 'harmonious' resultants.
40. Engels himself regarded the two poles of a magnet as an example of the unity of AR-opposites in nature (something else he lifted from Hegel, and which has been parroted down the ages by countless uninventive DM-authors). [Cf., Engels (1954), p.72. Hegel for example, here.]
The alleged 'unity' in this case appears to revolve around the fact that the north and south poles of a magnet cannot exist independently of each other, and their 'opposite' nature is shown by the effect they have on bodies and upon each other.
However, upon closer examination it is clear that the poles of a magnet are in fact examples of AA- or RR-, and not AR-opposites. This is because in this case it is non-opposites that repel each other (i.e., two norths or two souths); hence, like poles repel. On the other hand, opposites attract (i.e., a north and a south). Consequently, in the way that their poles inter-relate, magnets are in fact AA- or RR-forces. A moment's thought will further confirm this -- since when do magnets attract and repel one another, at the same time?
So, it now turns out that the magnet is hardly a paradigm example of an AR-force -- united in opposition --, as DM-lore would have us believe.
Mysteriously, DM-theorists en masse have failed to notice this serious flaw in one of their key examples. So much for the claim that DM-theses have been read from -- but not projected onto -- the facts.
[Incidentally, the same comments apply to electrical and thus sub-atomic phenomena. This means that much of the dialectical guff in, say, Woods and Grant (1995) is gloriously wrong. More on this in Essay Seven, Part Two (when it is published).]
It could be objected to this that, while it might be true that two unlike poles are examples of an AA-force type, their continued motion toward one another will be prevented at some point by structural forces within the magnets themselves, and these force couples would operate in an AR-manner. In that case, R-forces operating between approaching nuclei of the material from which the magnets are made will prevent opposite poles closing in on one another, counteracting the A-forces that had brought them together. This therefore implies that the relation between the poles of a magnet is indeed that of an AR-couple -- or so an objector might claim.
Even so, this means that, as magnetic opposites, these poles would still not be AR-UOs. To be sure, other forces might come into play, but that does not affect that salient point. In that case, they would not be opposites of the same Aristotelian/Hegelian type (as noted above).
Despite this, the above objection would reduce the oppositional relationship between the forces originating in these magnets to the effect that these poles had on motion (since the latter manifestly do not affect each other, only the relative motion of the matter in each magnet). Hence, the two poles would not be inter-related directly to each other as opposite AR-forces; they would just oppose any motion that either or both of them had induced in the system. We have already had occasion to dismiss this view as inimical to DM.
In which case, the inter-atomic forces governing the operation of AA-, RR-, or even AR-couples, actually oppose or limit whatever motion is already present in the system -- or they restrict the freedom of bodies to move once set in motion. But, they still do not seem to oppose each other as force upon force. Again, this is probably one reason why Engels toyed with a positivistic re-interpretation of forces (in DN, as pointed out above in Note 4), since no physical sense can be given to any such relation between forces (as also noted earlier) -- that is, over and above seeing it as an obscure way of depicting relative motion between bodies.
Of course, it could be argued that the force field of each pole does in fact affect that of the other; so the above claims are incorrect. But these force fields are merely the expression of the motion of, or that induced in, instruments (or, indeed, in scattered iron filings) placed near the said poles, so the above claims are not incorrect. Such forces are, as Engels said, a shorthand for relative motion.
On the other hand, if by "force fields" we mean the mathematical objects of theory, they cannot affect one another, for they are not material. [This was discussed in more detail in Note 25, and will be in even more, below.]
Anyway, the nature of the UO here clearly depends on what is meant by the terms "opposite" and "unity". North and South poles are not united in the sense that they are one (as DM-theorists would be the first to point out), they are connected in the sense that they 'depend' on each other. But, this 'dependence' is causal not logical; magnetic properties are the result of the vector configuration of the 'motion' and 'spin' of certain electrons. There is nothing in nature that logically forces this interrelation on these poles. Indeed, the idea that such a configuration represents a UO is empty, since the 'forces' involved are the consequence of a vector field. And, as we have already seen, it is not easy to