Change Through "Internal Contradiction"
Readers will need to make note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
If you are viewing this with Mozilla Firefox you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used.
This Essay is just under 34,000 words long; a summary of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections:
(1) Have Dialecticians Refuted Newton?
(a) How Many Dialecticians Does It Take To Change A Light Bulb?
(2) Unfair To Lenin?
(a) There Must Be Some Explanation
(b) Systematic Or Objectual Change?
(i) Causation: Internal Or External -- The Problem Stated
(ii) Contradictions Begin 'Who Knows Where?'
(3) Contradictions And Causation: Internal Or External?
(a) Yet More Dialectical Equivocation
(b) Atomism Returns To Haunt Dialectics
(c) Nixoned
(e) Retreat Into The Concrete Bunker
(4) The Total Confidence Trick
(5) Decision Time
(6) Everything You Wanted To Know About HEX
(b) Any The Wiser?
(7) Idealism Rears Its Ugly Head
(9) Notes
(10) References
Abbreviations Used At This
Site
Have Dialecticians Refuted Newton?
In this Essay, the claim that change is the result of "internal contradictions" will be critically examined.
How Many Dialecticians Does It Take To Change A Light-Bulb?
First, consider a question that is well worth asking: Do objects move one another, themselves, or a bit of both?
Dialecticians have a revolutionary answer. But you might not like it.
Lenin put things this way:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).
"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.
"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.
"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Italic emphases in the original. Bold emphases added.]
This is a rather odd passage since it seems to suggest that things can move themselves. If so, much of modern mechanics will need to be re-written. On this view, presumably, when someone throws a ball, the action of throwing does not in fact move the ball. On the contrary, the ball moves itself, and it knows exactly where it is going and how to get there, traversing its path independently of gravity. Intelligent projectiles like this, it seems, need no guidance systems -- they happily 'self-develop' from A to B like unerring homing pigeons. [If this seems unfair to Lenin, then please read Note 1 before proceeding -- or skip forward to here.].1
To make matters worse, Lenin did not assert this innovative piece of mechanics just the once:
"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis ('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest, indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914), pp.12-13. Bold emphases added.]
Now, these comments come from a published essay (on Marx), so the loose phraseology associated with this new theory of motion cannot be put down to the fact that Lenin's earlier words appeared in unpublished notebooks.
Perhaps then this is the point of that old anti-dialectical joke:
Q: How many dialecticians does it take to change a light bulb?
A: None at all, the light bulb changes itself.
A touch unfair? Maybe so, but could this scientific regression on Lenin's part (where he seems to want to return to Aristotelian theories of motion and change) be the result of a mere slip of the dialectical pen? Perhaps Lenin was using language non-literally or metaphorically. Indeed, this is what one or two bemused DM-fans tried to claim when confronted with this example of pre-Galilean mechanics -- which is a get-out that is worryingly reminiscent of the way that theologians used to try to rescue the Book of Genesis when faced with the discoveries of modern science.
Is it possible then that Lenin did not really mean what he said? Or is there a suggestion in what he did say that he thought change in fact has more complex, external causes, too?
Well, as if to disappoint his fans, and provide no help at all for those who still think that dialectics has anything of worth to teach modern science, Lenin not only repeated this odd claim, he "demanded" that all DL-fans see things this way:
"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original. Italic emphasis added.]
Here, not only are objects said to be capable of moving themselves, but Lenin even says that DL "requires" us to view motion in no other way.
[DL = Dialectical Logic.]
It looks, therefore, like Lenin was committed to the belief that not only can light bulbs change themselves, but also that books on dialectics write themselves -- and that DM-fans similarly fool themselves into believing far too much of what they found in Hegel.2
Well, perhaps Lenin was merely referring to the development of certain systems, and not the movement of objects from place to place? If so, the impertinent 'counter-example' from earlier (i.e., the one about light bulbs) would neither be valid nor sensible.
But Lenin's words were pretty clear; he asserted that DL demands and/or requires that "objects" (not processes, nor yet systems, but objects) be taken in "development, in 'self-movement'", so he included both -- development and self-movement -- in this caveat. And, all this is quite apart from the fact that, as we have seen, Lenin counterposed this view of reality to that of mechanical materialists, who hold that objects move because of the action of external forces:
"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.
"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Bold emphasis alone added.]
There would be no contrast here if objects did not move themselves in the DM-scheme-of-things, both developmentally and as they move from place to place. As we will see, this is indeed how Lenin has since been interpreted by his epigones: holding to the view that things self-develop and self-locomote. [On this, see Note 3.]
Anyway, as we will also see, whatever Lenin intended, his 'innovative' mechanics cannot apply to nature. This is not so much because he was mistaken, but because it is entirely unclear what he could possibly have meant by what he said.
And Lenin was not alone in wanting to return modern science to this ancient 'theory' of change and motion, i.e., one that views nature as a living, self-developing organism, or as a Whole that contains nothing but organisms of this sort --, which, like animals, propel themselves about the place. On this view, nature is en-souled, enchanted, and all things are alive or are governed by some form of intelligence/will. [More on this in Essay Fourteen (summary here).]
Other DM-worthies have made similar claims. Here is Bukharin:
"The basis of all things is therefore the law of change, the law of constant motion. Two philosophers particularly (the ancient Heraclitus and the modern Hegel…) formulated this law of change, but they did not stop there. They also set up the question of the manner in which the process operates. The answer they discovered was that changes are produced by constant internal contradictions, internal struggle. Thus, Heraclitus declared: 'Conflict is the mother of all happenings,' while Hegel said: 'Contradiction is the power that moves things.'" [Bukharin (1925), pp.72-73. Bold emphases added.]
Not to be outdone, Plekhanov joined this backward-facing stampede, too:
"'All is flux, nothing is stationary,' said the ancient thinker from Ephesus. The combinations we call objects are in a state of constant and more or less rapid change…. In as much as they change and cease to exist as such, we must address ourselves to the logic of contradiction….
"…[M]otion does not only make objects…, it is constantly changing them. It is for this reason that the logic of motion (the 'logic of contradiction') never relinquishes its rights over the objects created by motion….
"With Hegel, thinking progresses in consequence of the uncovering and resolution of the contradictions inclosed (sic) in concepts. According to our doctrine…the contradictions embodied in concepts are merely reflections, translations into the language of thought, of those contradictions that are embodied in phenomena owing to the contradictory nature of their common basis, i.e., motion….
"…[T]he overwhelming majority of phenomena that come within the compass of the natural and the social sciences are among 'objects' of this kind…[:ones in which there is a coincidence of opposites]. Diametrically opposite phenomena are united in the simplest globule of protoplasm, and the life of the most undeveloped society…." [Plekhanov (1908), pp.92-96. Bold emphases alone added.]
Countless secondary DM-figures say more or less the same sort of thing.3
Unfortunately, Lenin and his co-dialecticians failed to take any real note of the origin of these ancient ideas: Hermetic Philosophy is based on the belief that the universe is alive; indeed it is a cosmic egg -- later transmogrified by Hegel into a Cosmic Ego.
Since eggs appear to develop all of their own, and because Hegel's immaterial and immanent cosmic Ego self-develops, it clearly seemed 'natural' for Lenin and his epigones to think this of nature, too.
Nevertheless, not even eggs develop of their own; in fact, it is hard to think of a single thing in the entire universe (of which we have any knowledge) that develops of its own, or which moves itself. Not even Capitalism does. Switch off the Sun and watch American Imperialism fold a whole lot quicker than Enron.4
And yet, if Lenin were correct, no object in the universe could possibly interact with any other (since that would amount to external causation, and objects would not be self-motivated). Self-motivated beings must, it seems, be causally isolated from their surroundings, or they would not be self-motivated. This in turn must mean that, despite appearances to the contrary, nothing in reality interacts with anything else. That would, of course, make a mockery of the other DM-claim that everything in reality is interconnected.
So, based on the bird-brained doctrines of ancient mystics, and no evidence at all, we find Lenin once again propounding cosmic ideas that do not make sense even in DM-terms -- and ones that not even chickens observe.
Hold Your Horses -- Unfair To Lenin?
There Must Be Some Explanation
But, perhaps all this is a bit too quick?
Maybe there is a way of interpreting Lenin (and those other DM-stalwarts) which prevents this self-destructing theory from moving itself even closer to the edge of the trash can of history?
Is there any way of preventing the contradictions that seem to lie at the heart of the DM-theory of change from tipping it over the edge, lemming-like, and into oblivion?
As this Essay will show, there isn't; by the end of Part Two it will be abundantly clear that the self-destruction of at least this part of DM is assured. Moreover, and ironically too, this sad denouement will not have been externally caused by me; it will have been entirely internally self-generated -- thanks to Hegel, his Hermetic forebears, and their Cosmic Egg.
Systematic -- Or Objectual Change?
So, is it possible that the above objections are a little too hasty? Is there a perfectly reasonable explanation that not only exonerates Lenin and other dialecticians, but also shows that they did not believe such crazy things?
In what follows I propose to examine a number of ways in which a case for the defence could be mounted -- however, that task has not been helped by the thoroughly confused way this doctrine has so far been presented by dialecticians. In fact, as we will see, they have simply recapitulated all the errors of traditional Ontology, but, in this case, in an entirely amateurish manner.
Or, to put this another way: if this were a trial, I'd be tempted to advise DM-fans to plead guilty and throw themselves on the mercy of the court.
TAR opened its discussion of DM with a consideration of CAR -- to which I earlier counter-posed its far more pernicious DM-opposite: HEX. We have already encountered several core HEX-type ideas: Totality, interconnectedness, mediation -- but here we meet change through 'internal contradiction'.5
[DM = Dialectical Materialism; HEX = Hegelian Expansionism; CAR = Cartesian Reductionism; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998)); DB = Dialectical Biologist (i.e., Levins and Lewontin (1985)).]
However, there is an initial but no less important problem that requires resolution up front: i.e., the question whether causation is "internal" or "external" to an object, process or system. The contrast between these two different accounts of change, or at least the 'dialectical' relation between them, might allow defenders of Lenin to squirm their way out of the difficulties noted above.
Well, we shall see.
Causation: Internal Or External?
According to John Rees (quoting DB), CAR-theorists hold that:
"Causes are separate from effects, causes being properties of subjects and effects the properties of objects." [Rees (1998), p.4]
Rees went on to argue that one of the problems with this approach to causation is that it appeals to something Hegel called a "bad infinity", one involving endless 'external' causes. This avenue is to be deprecated, it seems, because:
"…it postulates an endless series of causes and effects regressing to 'who knows where?'" [Ibid., p.7.]
One implication of such 'externalist' theories of causation is that they:
"…leave the ultimate cause of events outside the events they describe. The cause is external to the system." [Ibid., p.7.]
On this account, CAR seems to imply (overtly or covertly) that, for instance, the universe has an external cause/origin --, something that clearly has unacceptable theistic implications (to which Lenin alluded, as we saw earlier):
"[N]ature forms a totality, which it must unless we depart from materialism completely and become believers in the supernatural…." [Ibid., p.78.]
However, with respect to other theorists who adopt various forms of 'externalism', Rees asserts that they:
"…often find themselves courting semi-mystical explanations of original cause." [Ibid., p.78.]
Indeed, Trotsky went even further, arguing that:
"Whoever denies the dialectical law of the transition of quantity into quality…must, in the last analysis, turn back to the biblical act of creation." [Trotsky (1986), p.113.]6
Rees's solution to this problem is to counterpose his own brand of 'internalism' as a fully adequate explanation of causation and change (but clearly not of the origin of the universe).7 This is because ''internalism' is based on the idea that:
"…the cause of change [lies] within the system…and it cannot be conceived on the model of linear cause and effect…. If change is internally generated, it must be a result of contradiction, of instability and development as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998), p.7.]
Furthermore, a system that appeals to a linear series of causes is inferior to one that does not; this is because:
"[It offers a] mere description, not explanation; the what, but not the how or the why." [Ibid., p.7.]8
Despite this, Rees never really explains how an 'internalist' account of the Universe side-steps the need for a deistic or theistic explanation of origins. If, as some like Spinoza believe, there is only one (immanent) substance constitutive of nature (which is 'God'), then 'internalism' cannot be an effective bulwark against theism.
Moreover, Rees and other dialecticians have done nothing to show that an external cause of the universe cannot also be a natural cause. Of course, if the following (suppressed?) premisses were added to the account:
P1: Nature is co-extensive with the universe.
P2: Anything external to the universe is supernatural.
that possibility would indeed be excluded. But, since there is no empirical way of establishing the truth of P1 or P2, their veracity may only be justified definitionally -- perhaps even stipulatively. However, once accepted, either or both of these would, of course, brand DM as a conventionalist (or perhaps even a subjectivist) theory.9
Anyway, even if the cause of the development of nature were internal, it would still be possible to ask whether the whole system had a cause -- as, for example, Thomist theologians do. And, whatever other fatal weaknesses their 'theories' have, Thomists do not appeal to "bad infinities".10
Furthermore, since DM-theorists themselves have inherited their theory of development from Hegel (albeit re-worked and then allegedly given a materialist 'flip') -- who was openly offering both an 'internalist' and a non-standard theistic account of reality -- it is a little rich of such comrades pointing the finger at other theorists, accusing them of the very thing that their own theory had originally been predicated upon, before 'inversion'.
So, it rather looks like 'internalism' is itself compatible with AIDS, and hence with mystical versions of Christianity (and, of course, with Hermetic Philosophy in general), after all.
[Hegel's Hermetic intellectual influences/roots are outlined here).]
[AIDS = Absolute Idealism.]
Contradictions Begin 'Who Knows Where?'
In addition, Rees left it entirely unclear how 'internalism' could provide the sort of explanation that CAR's linear externalism supposedly failed to deliver. Non-linear 'internalist' causal chains seem to be just as incapable of answering "how" and "why" questions as linear 'externalist' ones.
Of course, in the final analysis, that all depends on what is to be counted as an explanation. In Hegel's case, an 'explanation' had to be 'ultimate', or "rational", in order for it to count as genuinely 'philosophical'. That is partly why he took such a dislike to "bad infinities"; they seemed to him to be entirely 'irrational'.
But, if "bad" infinities are all that nature has on offer (that is, if there are no ultimate explanations to be had for anything, even if we knew what one of these could possibly look like), clearly materialists will just have to get used to it. It would be foolish of them to copy Hegel's mystical approach to knowledge and expect an ultimate account where none is to be had. We certainly cannot rule "bad infinities" out in such an a priori way, and just because they ruin Hegel's neat, 'rationalist' picture of reality -- one that Hegel himself inherited from his Hermetic predecessors anyway.
And, why should anything (let alone everything) have an ultimate explanation? Where did the expectation that there ought to be one such itself come from? In fact, did it not arise from the very same misapprehension and projection that Feuerbach located in Christianity (and religion in general) -- in alienated thought?
[In Essay Twelve and Fourteen, these perplexing questions will be answered in a way that sink dialectics even quicker than that iceberg sank the Titanic. Summaries here and here.]
If so, this entire issue needs to be approached by Marxists with a little more circumspection -- if not materialist consistency -- than has hitherto been the case. Rather than simply up-ending Hegel (in order to put his theory 'on its feet', or otherwise), revolutionaries should long ago have given him the material boot.
Moreover, if "explanation" here means giving a HEX-like account of everything then DM fails even in this regard. As we have already seen, HEX-type theories are impossible to construct -- being infinitary at both ends.11 In which case, it rather looks like dialectics cannot answer "how" or "why" questions, either.
Indeed, as we shall see throughout this site, beyond trivialities, DM cannot answer any questions at all.
So, there appears to be a serious problem with Lenin's claim that change is internally-motivated, and that things can move themselves.
But, on the other hand there also seem to be several ways this problem could be defused, and in favour of Lenin. Consider the following options:
(1) Lenin and other DM-theorists were speaking non-literally.
(2) They did not mean what they said.
(3) 'Internalism' does not rule out external causation; the two are 'dialectically' interconnected. The important point is to concentrate on the system within which things change.
(4) Lenin's words can be re-interpreted so that they apply only to self-moving objects (if there are any), but to nothing else.
I will not consider options (1) and (2); anyone desperate enough to opt for these two should find reconciling Genesis with modern science relatively easy in comparison.
The most promising line of defence seems to be that offered by (3) -- with (4) held in reserve, just in case.
Indeed, Rees himself seems to have opted for (3). Hence, on the one hand he argued that:
"The cause of change [lies] within the system…and it cannot be conceived on the model of linear cause and effect…. If change is internally generated, it must be a result of contradiction, of instability and development as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998), p.7.]
"[T]he natural and social world [form] a single totality developing over time as a result of its internal contradictions." [Ibid., p.285.]
But, on the other, he reminded us of Lenin's claim that:
"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Ibid., p.186; quoting Lenin (1962), p.358.]
At first sight it looks like the apparent disparity here (between the claim that change is internally-generated and the idea that change is induced by opposites external to a system, process or body) can be reconciled by noting that the Totality is a "mediated" whole in which the parts mutually condition one another as UOs -- with these interpreted, perhaps, as "antagonistic forces".12
In that case, such opposites would not in fact simply be 'external' (to a particular system), since the relation between them would be 'internal' to the wider system of which they formed a part. Or so the argument might go.
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
Nevertheless, this response still fails to resolve a number of serious difficulties.
From what Rees says, all change is internally-driven. But if that were so, no object could have any effect on any other. Conversely, if objects did have an effect on each other, all change could not be internally-driven.
In fact, if Lenin were correct, and all change were the result of a "struggle of opposites", then those opposites would have to be internal to bodies or processes, and not external to either. We met this very problem in Essay Seven (here).
But, if such opposites are external to the relevant bodies and/or processes, then, clearly, it would not be correct to say that all change is internally-driven. On the other hand, if these opposites are internal to systems, then, plainly, different systems could have no effect on one another -- unless these systems were both internal and external to each other at the same time (but how?) -- and perhaps also internal to some other (third) system, which also contained everything relevant.13
[At this point, it is worth pointing out that when Hegelians speak of "internal relations", they are not talking about spatial relations, but dialectical-logic ones. Hence, it could be objected that the discussion above seems to ignore this. However, that is because dialecticians do the same -- or, at least, they appear to. That is, of course, what lies behind all that dialectical talk about "external pushes", which dialecticians locate in mechanical materialism, and which doctrine they say implies there must be an external cause of the universe. That certainly looks spatial.
Nevertheless, this serious defect will be rectified as this Essay proceeds (particularly here), and also in Essay Eight Part Two, Essay Eleven Parts One and Two -- but more fully in Essay Four Part Two (when it is written).]
Now, this overall problem seems to have arisen because of the stark, un-dialectical contrast drawn above between what is internal to an object, process or system, and what is external to it. And yet, according to DM, objects, processes and systems in nature are all part of a mediated Totality; in this set-up, mediation seems to blur the distinction between what is internal and what is external to any or all of these. [That is the point of the reference to "misperception" in D4, a few paragraphs below.]
But even so, and once again, there would seem to be little point making such a fuss about the internal cause of change if in the end causes dialectically-external to a given system also mediate it, and contribute to its development. In that case, Rees might just as well have said:
"The cause of change [lies] both within the system and without…and it can and it can't be conceived on the model of linear cause and effect…. If change is internally and externally generated, it must be a result of contradiction, of instability and development of internal and external properties of the system itself." [Edited misquotation of Rees (1998), p.7. Italic emphases added.]
And Lenin should have said:
"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' and in movement by external forces (as Hegel nowhere puts it)…." [Edited misquotation of Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original.]
Which rather ruins the point, one feels.
Worse still, if change is externally-driven, that would leave the universe open to external influence, too, allowing 'God' to sneak back in through a side door. What is there now to stop a non-Marxist 'Dialectical Mystic' from claiming that 'God' created all the UOs in nature, and started the whole thing off with a Big 'outside' push/Bang?14
On the other hand, and once more, if objects and processes, systems and sub-systems are all internally-driven, then they can have no effect on each other. And if that is so, equally, there seems to be no point in stressing the mediated nature of the Totality.
Whichever way we turn here, we seem to hit a dialectically unfriendly brick wall.
But, once again, perhaps even this is too quick?
To begin afresh: the DM-Totality seems to be a Mega-system that contains many sub-systems. I say "seems" here because, as we will find out in Essay Eleven Part One and Part Two, it is far from easy to decide what dialecticians themselves think their 'Totality' either is or contains.15
If so, and as we are about to see, DM-theorists face a serious dilemma: either everything in the universe is made of simple but eternally changeless objects, or it is composed of sub-systems that cannot interact.
However, before I substantiate the above, a couple of preliminary points need making first:
(1) I shall count a system as any object or process that is made of simpler interconnected parts itself. For example, an atom is made of a nucleus and 'orbiting' electrons; the solar system, of a centrally-placed sun and orbiting planets, and so on.
(2) A simple object is one that has no parts, and hence is not a system. Apparently, electrons and photons are elementary particles, but whether they are metaphysically simple is unclear. [On this, see Castellani (1998).]
This means that nature is composed of at most two sorts of 'entities': systems and simple objects (or, to use the jargon: complexes and simples). We need not assume that these are mutually exclusive categories, nor that there actually are any simple objects (which are not further divisible), only that there might be. [The reader should also note that I am not expressing my own opinions here, merely trying to make sense of DM.]
Now, the reasons for saying this (i.e., that either everything in the universe is made of simple but eternally changeless objects, or it is composed of sub-systems that cannot interact) can be summarised in the following series of connected propositions (which list all the available relevant possibilities appertaining to systems, objects, change and interaction):
D1: Change is internal to a system. Objects and processes in each system mutually condition one another (as UOs).
D2: Change to objects and processes is internally-driven -- not externally-motivated.
D3: Objects within systems change because of their internal relations/contradictions.
D4: Objects in a particular system do not have external relations with one another. What appear to be external links are in fact misperceived or misidentified internal relations.16
D5: Systems themselves cannot affect each other except by their own internal inter-systemic relations of the above (D4) sort.
D6: On the other hand, individual and separate systems cannot have such an effect on one another, otherwise change would not be wholly internal to a particular system.
D7: Hence, single objects and/or processes cannot be systems, otherwise they could not influence each other (by D6).
D8: On the other hand, once more, objects and processes must be sub-systems (and hence systems in their own right), since they are composed of an indefinite (possibly infinite) number of their own sub-units (molecules, atoms, sub-atomic particles, etc.). But even then, as systems themselves, objects and processes could not influence one another (again, by D6).
D9: This means that at some point there must be simple units of 'matter' that are not themselves systems; otherwise, if everything were system-like (or if all that exists are sub-sub-sub-…systems, to infinity) nothing could have any effect on anything else (by D6) -- that is, if all change is internally-motivated.
D10: But, if there were such simple units (i.e., if they had no 'parts', and were thus not systems themselves) they would be changeless. If that weren't the case, these simple units would be UOs themselves (and thus not simple, after all), subject to their own internally-driven development. Indeed,, if they are changeless they can have no effect on one another (or they would not be changeless).
D11: Hence, reality is either composed of a (possibly) infinite hierarchy of systems that have no influence on each other, or it is made out of fundamental (non-system-like) particles that are changeless and have no effect on anything.
Clearly, both horns of this dilemma contradict all we know about nature. Is there any way to avoid this fatal conclusion? Could there be a 'dialectical' way out of this Hermetic hole?
Perhaps we should start again with a consideration of the following propositions (wherein "T" stands for the Totality):
D12: Change is a result of "internal contradictions".
D13: Objects within T change only because of this internal dynamic.
D14: Reality is a mediated T; change is a consequence of a 'struggle' between opposites.
D15: No element of reality can be considered in isolation; all mutually condition one another.
However, D12 is ambiguous, The word "change" could mean:
(1) "Systematic change" (that is, it could mean "change internal to a particular system"); or it could mean:
(2) "Change internal to an object" -- as it does in D13 -– leaving it unclear whether or not this sort of change is wider-ranging, involving inter-objective or trans-systematic change.
Nevertheless, D13 seems clear enough, though:
D13: Objects within T change only because of this internal dynamic.
This states that change arises only as a result of a dynamic internal to objects.
But if that were so, it would once again be difficult to see what influence objects could have on each other. If change is internal to an object, then the relations it supposedly enjoyed with other objects would be irrelevant in this respect -- ex hypothesi, they could have no impact on the changes the latter undergo. This seems to imply that objects must be self-caused/motivated beings (as Lenin alleged).
Once more however, whatever changes an object undergoes -- since these are exclusively internally-generated -- they can't be a function of the relations which that object enjoys with other objects, otherwise the cause of change would not be internal to the said object, but external, after all -- and thus not the least bit 'rational' (since this would imply a "bad infinity").17
On the other hand, if change is internal to a system of mediated objects or processes, then it would not be the sole result of a dynamic internal to the objects in that system, but would be a function both of the intra-systematic relations between systems and bodies and of the 'internal contradictions' within those systems or bodies themselves.
Furthermore, if change is system-specific (that is, if it is internal, and solely confined to systems), then the relations between those systems would become problematic, once more. Clearly, change cannot be exclusively system-specific if different systems have an actual effect on one another.
The question is, which of these is the correct account? Is change (A) the result of a dynamic internal to systems, or (B) is it internal to objects, or (C) is it a consequence of the external effects bodies have on each other? [Option (C) in fact allows change to be internal to systems even while it remains external to the bodies forming that system.]
Is therefore change body-specific, system-specific, or is it inter-systematic? Or, is it (D) a complex combination of all three of these?
But, yet again: if (D) were the case, what would be the point of saying that change is motivated internally (in bodies, processes or systems) -- if it is also externally-driven?
On the other hand, why say that everything is interconnected if change is exclusively internally-generated, and the alleged interconnections between systems or bodies have no part to play in this respect?
Up until now, DM-theorists appear not to have noticed these serious difficulties implied by their 'theory' of change. Since DM is supposed to be the philosophy of change, clearly this is not a minor flaw, one that can easily be ignored.18
It could be argued that it is possible to resolve these problems by referring to the 'dialectical' interplay between objects and processes (i.e., between 'internal' and 'external' contradictions'), or that within or between systems.
But, this vastly overworked response does not actually provide any clear answers to the above questions -- not, that is, unless it turns out that objects themselves are in fact disguised systems. This would mean that objects are not really simple, but are composed of their own interconnected parts.
But, as noted above, if that were so, the contrast between external and internal causation would disappear, and DM-'internalism' would become either an empty notion or a meaningless mantra.
There seems to be little point in emphasising that change is internally-generated if it is externally-motivated, too (no matter how much this is fluffed-up with the usual 'dialectical' jargon) -- still less any point in arguing for the internal development of objects if they are in fact systems themselves and subject to external constraints.
One might just as well try to defend theism by claiming on the one hand that the universe is self-caused and needs no creator, but, on the other, that Divine Logic "insists" that it does indeed possess its own external cause, and that 'He/She/It' (i.e., 'God') is 'dialectically related' to the world (with that particular phrase left conveniently obscure). If such a theist then played the "Nixon" card,19 and claimed that Divine Logic enables its adepts to "grasp" this 'explanation' as a 'dialectical solution' to the "Mystery of creation", we would rightly be unimpressed.
Well, what is sauce for the Deist, is surely sauce for the DM-ist, too. If we would not be inclined to accept the word of a theological mystic who claimed he/she could 'solve' the 'contradiction' between the universe having an internal (but no external) cause, and it actually having an external cause, then we should be no less reluctant to do so when DM-theorists concoct a similarly obscure 'explanation' couched in dialectical jargon.
However, there is another obvious way of responding to the above: i.e., interpret one particular strand of this DM-conundrum as committing believers to the view that only systematic change is driven by "internal contradictions".
But, that would immediately prompt the question: Of what are these systems composed? If they are composed of objects then plainly the above dilemma would simply reappear.
Alternatively, if objects are going to be edited out on the grounds that they are really systems themselves (i.e., that they are composed of (possibly) infinite sets of further sub-systems -- meaning that there is nothing fundamentally simple or object-like in reality), the entire edifice would collapse for want of bricks. If there are no objects, only systems, then there would seem to be nothing 'deep down' to condition anything else internal to any given system.20
D6: On the other hand, individual and separate systems cannot have such an effect on one another, otherwise change would not be wholly internal to a particular system.
But, if change is system-specific, according to D6 -- i.e., if it is internal (and confined) to each sub-system --, then, once more: none of these sub-systems could interact, otherwise change would not be system-specific.
Conversely, if there are fundamental objects internal to systems, but which are not themselves sub-systems (that is, if they are simple), even if they condition each other externally, they would have no inner contradictory lives themselves (since, ex hypothesi, they would have no parts). But, as we have seen, this would then imply that these objects were eternally changeless.21
On the other hand, again, if these supposedly fundamental objects conditioned each other externally, that would imply they had parts and were not fundamental after all.22
So, unless the existence of simple objects -- which aren't systems themselves -- is countenanced, systems as such would have no 'bricks'. Alternatively, if they are comprised of such 'bricks', reality would be fundamentally discrete. In which case, change would be externally-motivated since such 'objects' would possess no internal contradictions of their own (although, as Note 22 established, simple objects cannot interact externally, either!). So, if objects aren't systems, they wouldn't have an internal structure and wouldn't UOs. Unfortunately, once more, this option would rule out interaction, for reasons outlined earlier (and in Notes 17, 21, 22, and 23).
Alternatively again, if there are no such 'bricks', and nature is system-like 'all the way down', as it were, then these systems could not interact, unless change were externally-motivated, after all.
This means that the dilemma that faced classical Ontology now confronts DM; the fundamental constituents of reality must be either:
(1) Extensionally significant intervals of matter (or energy); this option preserves the systematic nature of reality (since it allows for the indefinite divisibility of parts, treating them as infinitary systems themselves subject to endless sub-division). Or:
(2) Fundamentally changeless atoms (or extensionless points); this alternative safeguards the objects at the expense of the 'unity of nature'.
In the second case, reality would be composed of finitely (or 'infinitely'?) small but eternal 'billiard balls'; in the first instance, everything would be made of an infinitely thin/abstract sort of 'gas'/'plasma' (not itself made out of anything else). Either way, causation would disappear for nothing could have an effect on anything else in either set-up.23
Of course, as noted above, the DM-'solution' to this (Kantian) antinomy -- following Hegel -- is to "grasp" this 'paradox' as a contradiction. This handy logical trick clearly 'solves' everything by Nixoning it, which is a handy escape route that DM-advocates reserve for their own exclusive use; no one else is permitted to employ this convenient dodge.
However, this dishonest approach to philosophical problems does not succeed in achieving what it was set up to evade (i.e., the glaring contradictions in DM itself). This is because it is still unclear how anything can be fundamentally atomic -- and hence maximally causally isolated from the rest of nature -- while at the same time being thoroughly systematic and interconnected with everything in existence. The DM-account of causation seems to imply both!
Instead of wanting to 'grasp' serious confusion of this order of magnitude, DM-theorists should perhaps want to disown it.