Essay Seven Part One
Engels's Three 'Laws' Of Dialectics
Readers need to make note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
If you are viewing this with Mozilla Firefox you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used.
This Essay is over 78,000 words long; a summary of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections:
(a) Not Everything Changes In 'Leaps'?
(c) Awkward Facts Dialecticians Prefer To Ignore
(e) Counterexamples Just Keep Stacking-Up
(2) Interpenetration Of Opposites
(a) Breaking News: Dialectics Cannot Explain Change
(b) Suicidal Cats
(c) Not Just Bad News For Cats
(d) Lenin Maxes Out
(e) Plastic Laws
(f) According to Lenin, You Are About To Change Into Jupiter
(g) Single-celled Reactionaries?
(h) Every Confirmation Is Also A Refutation
(i) The Dialecticians' Dilemma
(j) The Revenge Of The Petty-Bourgeois Cell
(k) Engels, Marx And Mathematics
(l) Dialectical -- Or Just Dotty?
(m) Dialectics Meets The Calculus -- And Comes To Nought
(n) Incompatible With The First 'Law'
(3) The Negation Of The Negation
(b) Terminator Four: The Rise Of Monsanto
(c) Socialism Introduced From Without -- Perhaps By Aliens
(4) Notes
(5) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
For many dialecticians, "Three Laws Of Dialectics" encapsulate the core ideas of classical DM. Others regard these 'Laws' as far too crude and formulaic. TAR, however, takes a middle line, and downplays their significance somewhat, preferring to define dialectical materialism in terms of mediated Totality, and change through internal contradiction, etc. [p.5.] Nevertheless, John Rees noted that:
"The 'three laws' are...useful reminders of forms in which dialectical contradictions sometimes work themselves out.... The three laws are not, even in Hegel, the only way in which dialectical development can take place. They cannot be understood without the broader definition of the dialectic discussed above [pp.3-8]. They are not, as Marx and Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult, empirical task of tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical master key whose only advantage is to turn up where no real historical knowledge is available." [Rees (1998), pp.8-9.]
[DM = Dialectical Materialism; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution; i.e., Rees (1998).]
However, as Essay Two has shown, this is precisely how these 'Laws' (and other dialectical principles) have been interpreted by dialecticians for over a century: as just such a key.
Nevertheless, this Essay is aimed at showing that these 'Laws' are at best false, at worst terminally vague, and in the case of at last two, far too confused even to be assessed for their truth or falsehood.
They are certainly of no use at all in helping revolutionaries understand, and therefore change the world.
The Three 'Laws'
Engels summarised these 'Laws' in the following way:
"The law of the transformation of quantity into quality, and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites; The law of the negation of the negation." [Engels (1954), p.62.]
Earlier, he had characterised them thus:
"Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation -- spiral form of development." [Engels (1954), p.17.]
Engels outlined this 'Law' as follows:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added.]
But, exactly how Engels knew that it was impossible to "alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion" he annoyingly kept to himself. It can't have been based on the limited evidence available in his day, for that could not have show that it was "impossible" to do what he says. Even the vast quantity of data extant today can't show that this is an "impossibility".
Perhaps he was simply careless in his choice of words in these private notebooks? Maybe so, but no dialectician since has pointed this out: that it is not possible to derive an impossibility from contingent data, no matter how much of it has been collected.
This puzzle is made all the more acute when we recall that for Engels, matter itself is an abstraction [cf., Engels (1954), p.255]; in that case, it seems energy must be, too. If so, how can anything be altered by the addition (or subtraction) of an abstraction?
Even so, Engels did at least try to deny that these:
"...laws [have been] foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them." [Ibid., p.62.]
But, this precipitous deduction of a necessary law (i.e., one that uses the word "impossible") from only a handful of cases -- largely drawn from certain parts of chemistry, and buttressed merely by a handful of quirky, anecdotal examples from everyday life and/or from the popular science of Engels's day -- is a neat trick dialecticians (and, of course, traditional philosophers) alone seem capable of performing.
Less partisan observers might be forgiven for concluding that Engels either did not know what the word "foisted" meant, or he hoped no one would notice when he actually indulged in a little of it himself.
Despite this, Engels already had an answer to this objection (one he derived from Hegel):
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory. The form of universality is the form of completeness, hence of the infinite. We know that chlorine and hydrogen, within certain limits of temperature and pressure and under the influence of light, combine with an explosion to form hydrochloric acid gas, and as soon as we know this, we know also that this takes place everywhere and at all times where the above conditions are present....The form of universality in nature is law, and no one talks of the eternal character of the laws of nature than the natural scientists.... All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and hence the essentially absolute.
"...[This] can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.234-35. Italic emphases in the original.]
However, since the scientists in Engels's day were Christians, you'd expect them to talk in this way. Even so, their own conclusions (about these alleged "laws") do not follow from the evidence, any more than the existence of God does. As we will see in a later Essay, in their attempt to explain the import of their work, scientists often indulge in amateur Metaphysics (which was, in that part of the nineteenth century, coloured by widely held religious beliefs), but this should no more influence us than their political opinions do. And, since scientists are constantly changing their minds over what these 'eternal' laws are, only the unwise would base their philosophy on shifting sands such as these.
As I argue in Essay Eight Part Two:
"How is it possible to translate the word 'infinite' as 'law-governed process'? Now Engels tries to equate the two, but an 'always' and 'at all times' are not an 'infinite'.
"[In a later Essay, we will see that this view of scientific law is a carry-over from ancient animistic ideas about nature, and so it is no surprise to see this idea re-surface here in such Hermetically-compromised company. On this see here, and here; the first is Swartz (2006), the second Swartz (2003).]" [This is quoted from here, as part of my demolition of this aspect of Hegel's Super-Science.]
Nevertheless, Engels's first 'Law' is at best only partially true; as we shall see, many processes in nature 'disobey' it, so it cannot be a law (in any sense of that word). Even where it seems to work, it does so only because Engels left several key terms undefined -- in which indeterminate state they remain to this day.
Engels's first 'Law' is supposed to work discontinuously (i.e., "nodally"), allowing nature and society to develop by making "leaps" (a term all DM-fans like to use, but, as we are about to see, they clearly do not look before they appeal to "leaps").
This is how Plekhanov explained things:
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphases alone added.]
Unfortunately, many things in nature change qualitatively without passing through a "nodal point" -- and not even so much as a tiny "leap". [Engels (1976), p.160.]
These include the following: melting or solidifying plastic, metal, rock, sulphur, tar, toffee, sugar, chocolate, wax, butter, cheese, and glass. As these are heated or cooled, they gradually change (from liquid to solid, or vice versa). There isn't even a "nodal point" with respect to balding heads! In fact, it is difficult to think of many state of matter transformations (from solid to liquid (or vice versa)) that exhibit just such "nodal points" -- and these include the transition from ice to water (and arguably also the condensation of steam). Even the albumen of fried or boiled eggs changes slowly (but non-"nodally") from clear to opaque white while they are being cooked.1
Naturally, all this depends on how the duration of a "nodal" point is defined. Unfortunately DM-fans have to this day failed to define it (nor have they even so much as mentioned their duration -- indeed, in discussions on the Internet, this objection wrong foots most DM-fans, so they either ignore it, or call it "pedantic"). Because of this, dialecticians can safely indulge in some sloppy, off-the-cuff, a priori Super-Science here (as they all seem to do -- nary a one fails to come up with their own favourite/idiosyncratic example, tested, of course, only in the laboratory of the mind, and studiously un-peer reviewed; remember this is Mickey Mouse Science!).
[Since writing the above, I have discovered that this is not strictly true. The very first book I have read in over 25 years trawling through the wastelands of DM-literature, which actually tries to deal this 'difficulty', is Kuusinen (1961) -- a book I have only just obtained. Several comments on this can be found here.]
Another recent favourite example is Steven Jay Gould's theory of "Punctuated Equilibria". Unfortunately, amateur dialectical palaeontologists have failed to notice that the alleged "nodal" points here last tens of thousands of years, at least. This is a pretty unimpressive "leap" -- it's more like a painfully slow crawl. Snails on downers move faster!
Moreover, since no individual organism actually changes into a new species, there is no obvious object that alters in quality either, as quantitative variations mount up. This contradicts Engels once more:
"Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added.]
Once more, we seem neither to have an Hegelian nor yet an Aristotelian "substance" in which qualities can inhere and hence change. Worse still, it is not easy to see what even the alleged quantities are supposed to be in this case.
It could be objected that these "quantities" are quite clearly the many minor variations that accumulate in organisms, which lead at some point to a qualitative species-change. But, many small variations are qualitative already, and many of those occur in different organisms, not cumulatively in just one organism. And novel qualitative changes introduced by mutation cannot arise slowly (and then make a DM-"leap" after they have been accumulated), since they appear suddenly. In other words, there is no slow gradual change here leading to a mutational "leap", the mutation itself is sudden, and qualitative.
So, at least here, we would have a change in quality caused by no changes in quantity.
In that case, what precisely is being quantitatively accumulated slowly here? And in what is all this occurring? No one supposes that if, for example, several hundred thousand Canada Geese all change colour slightly (for instance, if they all become slightly pinker), that these will all additively combine somehow into one big qualitative change (i.e., very deep pink in one of them) --, or if, say, several thousand Red Deer can all run a little faster, that all these extra cm/sec increases in each animal will add to make an extra km/sec (in one specific deer).
Natural selection, of course, will filter out those populations of organisms that produce less offspring, so that certain characteristics are preserved and proliferated in the descendants of those who produce the most (and which survive the most). But, speciation is the result of much more complex processes than mere additive increase (even if we knew what was being 'added' here, DM-style). [On this, see Coyne and Orr (2004).]
On the other hand, if a species is to be regarded as an object in its own right -- perhaps stretched out in time, as some taxonomists picture things --,1a then that 'object' will only seem to alter as 'changes' accumulate. This is because, if a species is defined in this way (as a temporally-extended 'object'), then it can't actually change in any straight-forward sense. To be sure, that depends on how we define the object in question and how we depict change.
[It is no surprise therefore to find both these notions are left impressively vague by those comrades who quote this example in support of the first 'Law', which is probably why they think they can get away with it. For example, here.]
Hence, if a species is characterised in this way (as a sort of four-dimensional 'sausage' -- i.e., as a manifold in 4-space), then even if the first 'Law' applied to it, that 'species' won't have changed as a result of its 'internal contradictions'. This is because such manifolds do not change; four-dimensional objects do not 'exist' in time to change -- time is one of their 'in-built' dimensions, as it were. Indeed, and on the contrary, 'time' exists in them, they neither perdure nor endure in it. Since everything temporally-true of this manifold is true of the whole of it (because it is a single four-dimensional 'object'), it cannot lose or gain properties or qualities --, unless, of course, we embed it in a fifth-dimension and (confusingly) call this new context "Time", too. [But then, of course, this five-dimensional 'object' could not change, and for the same reason. More on this in Essay Eleven Part One.]
Without this extra-dimension, any predicates true of the four-dimensional manifold will stay true of it for good, for there is no past, present or future as far as this 'object' is concerned. In that case, 'change' would perhaps amount to no more than our subjective mis-perception of a 'succession' of orthogonal hyper-plane 'slices' through this manifold.
[This forms part of the so-called "Block view of time". On this, see the PDF article here.]
As should now seem obvious, dialecticians can only afford to view the universe in this way if they are prepared to abandon their belief in change -- or consign the latter merely to our 'subjective' view of reality.
Alternatively, if a species is not defined as a four-dimensional 'object', then because no single organism actually evolves, change to any species would not be the result of its 'internal contradictions', once more -- since such a species would be a certain sort of collection, not an object, given this view. Moreover, in populations, individual animals/plants do not change by "contradicting" one another, howsoever that word is understood. There are no 'internal contradictions' in such populations here to cause change (or, if there are, DM-theorists have yet to point them out). Indeed, no single thing actually changes in an evolutionary sense -- on this view --, only whole populations, and they manifestly do so non-dialectically.1b
In that case, not only is Gould's theory not an example of this 'Law' at work, not even Darwin's is.1c
Recently, dialecticians have appealed to Chaos and Catastrophe Theory. in their endeavour to show that this nineteenth century 'Law' is bang up-to-date. Processes in nature studied in this branch of science clearly change rapidly; however, it is important to note that rapid change is neither being denied or asserted in this Essay. What is being challenged is the thesis that all change is at some point "nodal". Some are, but many are not. Moreover, as we will see, the term "quality" is defined in DM-circles in terms that would rule-out many of these catastrophic changes as 'dialectical'. This is because no new DM-qualities emerge in many such transitions.
For example, in the famous "three body" problem, whatever the outcome, the planetary bodies involved are still planets and they are still satellites of one another; their orbits are still orbits. What new DM-"quality" has "emerged" here? [Here is a JavaScript simulation. Indeed, the transitions here appear to be non-"nodal" -- you can alter the parameter in the top left hand corner of the page.]
Chaotic (turbulent) flows, either side of the alleged "node", are still flows, and the liquids/gases involved are still the same substance. No new Aristotelian/Hegelian "quality" has "emerged" here either.
To be sure, some chaotic systems certainly seem to conform to this 'Law' -- but, this is only because the phrase "nodal change" has been left conveniently vague, and only because few dialecticians are prepared to ask awkward (but obvious) questions about what a DM-"quality" is supposed to be. [On that, see here and here.]
However, alternative scientific/mathematical models of reality explain chaotic systems (and they do so with far more clarity) --, but they do not fall foul of the other examples listed in this Essay that refute this 'Law'.
Facts Dialecticians Usually Ignore
Now, the difficulties the first 'Law' faces do not stop there. For example, when heated, objects change in quality from cold to warm and then to hot, with no "nodal" point separating these particular qualitative stages. The same happens in reverse when they cool. Moving bodies similarly speed up from slow to fast (and vice versa) without any "nodal" punctuation marks affecting the transition. In like manner, the change from one colour to the next in the normal colour spectrum is continuous, with no "nodal" points evident at all -- and this is also the case with the colour changes that bodies experience when they are heated to red or white heat. Sounds, too, change smoothly from soft to loud, and back, in a "node"-free environment. In fact, with respect to wave-governed phenomena in general, change seems to be continuous rather than discrete, which means that since the majority of particles/objects in nature move in such a manner, most things in reality seem to disobey this aspect of Engels's unimpressive 'Law' -- at least at the macroscopic level.
To be sure, some wave-like changes are said to occur discontinuously (indeed, the word "node" is used precisely here by Physicists), but this is not the result of continuous background changes. For example, quantum phenomena are notoriously discontinuous, but such changes are not normally preceded by continual quantitative increases. They occur suddenly with no build-up. So, discontinuous quantum phenomena cannot be made to fit this 'Law' unless it is altered so that they can. Of course, that done, this 'Law' would no longer be 'objective'.
Several more comments on the application of this 'Law' to microscopic and/or quantum phenomena will be considered in detail here at a later date.
In that case, at best, the 'nodal' aspect of this 'Law' is either only partially true (of certain phenomena), or it fails to be true (of others).
Unfortunately for DM-apologists, if we now mischievously apply this non-"nodal" aspect of the first 'Law' to Capitalism -- as dialecticians themselves do, but only with respect to the liquid/gas phase or state of matter transformation, in a bid to illustrate by analogy the revolutionary change from one Mode of Production to another, as quantity allegedly builds into quality, at some point initiating a sudden revolutionary 'leap' (an excellent example of this can be found here) into a new form of society --, then since Capitalism is clearly not a liquid, but a solid of sorts, the transition to socialism should, on this analogy, go rather smoothly (as is the case with phase or state of matter changes experienced by most solids -- on this see Note 9).
Interpreted that way, it looks as if the first 'Law' is of little use to revolutionaries since it clearly suggests that they are not needed, and that Capitalism can be reformed away non-discontinuously -- a bit like the way metal, say, can slowly melt, or in the way that heads can slowly turn bald as they lose hair. But, if dialectical revolutionaries are not needed, their antiquated theory won't be either.
In that case, this aspect of dialectics seems to be responsible for issuing its own auto-redundancy notice.2
But, this 'Law' is in difficulties in other respects, too. Clearly not every change in quantity "passes over" into a change in quality. And yet, one way of reading the "vice versa" codicil attached to this law suggests that they should:
"The first law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
If this is so, then we should expect all changes in quantity to "pass over" into changes in quality (or there would seem to be no point to the vice versa codicil).
However, I have not been able to find a single DM-theorist who interprets this 'Law' in this way, so perhaps I am the only one who has ever noticed this loop-hole (but it's more like a Grand Canyon) in this 'Law'. But, even if this were not so, it would still be difficult to explain why only some changes in quantity "pass over" into changes in quality. One will look in vain for any attempt to address this problem in the highly clichéd and repetitive writings of DM-fans (where quantity definitely does not morph into quality) -- or for some sort of vague recognition that such a difficulty even exists.
As we devote more thought to this 'Law' problems mount up: for example, the same number of molecules at the same energy level can exhibit widely differing properties/qualities depending on circumstances. Think of how the same amount of water can act as a lubricant, or have the opposite effect, say, on wet clothes; the same amount of sand can help some things slide, but prevent others from doing so; the same amount of poison given over a short space of time will kill, but given over a longer period (in small doses) it could benefit the recipient -- Strychnine comes to mind here.
To be sure, the effects of quantitative stasis of this sort (supervenient on qualitative change) are sensitive both to temporal constraints and to levels of concentration (of the substances in question); but this extremely vague first 'Law' said nothing of these. And, try as one might, it is not easy to see how these eminently material aspects of nature can be accommodated to the Ideal dialectical universe Engels uncritically inherited from Hegel.
But, what sort of scientific 'Law' leaves details like this out? In fact, if a Mickey Mouse 'Law' like this were to appear in any of the genuine sciences, it would be treated with derision -- even if it had been aired in an undergraduate paper!
However, other recalcitrant examples rapidly spring to mind: if the same colour is stared at for several minutes it can undergo a qualitative change into another colour (several optical illusions are based on this fact). Something similar can happen with regard to many two-dimensional patterns and shapes (for example the Necker Cube and other optical illusions); these undergo considerable qualitative change when no obvious quantitative differences are involved. There thus seem to be numerous examples where quantity and quality do not appear to be connected in the way that DM-theorists would have us believe.3
In fact, there are so many exceptions to this 'Law' that it would be wise to demote it and consign it to a more appropriate category, perhaps along with the trite rules of thumb that sometimes work -- a bit like "An apple a day keeps the doctor away", or even "A watched kettle never boils".
Indeed, given the fact that this 'Law' has no discernible mathematical content it is rather surprising it was ever called a "law" to begin with.
Nevertheless, the situation is even worse than the above might suggest; there are countless examples where significant qualitative change can result from no obvious quantitative difference. These include the qualitative dissimilarities that exist between different chemicals for the same quantity of matter/energy involved.
For instance, Isomeric molecules (studied in stereochemistry) are a particularly good example of this phenomenon. This is especially true of those that have so-called "chiral" centres (i.e., centres of asymmetry). In such cases, the spatial ordering of the constituent atoms, not their quantity, affects the overall quality of the resulting molecule (something Engels said could not happen); here, a change in molecular orientation, not quantity, effects a change in quality.
To take one example of many: (R)-Carvone (spearmint) and (S)-Carvone (caraway); these molecules have the same number of atoms (of the same elements), and the same bond energies, but they are nonetheless qualitatively distinct because of the different spatial arrangement of the atoms involved. Change in geometry --, change in quality.
This un-dialectical aspect of matter is especially true of the so-called "Enantiomers" (i.e., symmetrical molecules that are mirror images of each other). These include compounds like (R)-2-clorobutane and (S)-2-chlorobutane, and the so-called L- and D-molecules, which rotate the plane of polarised light the left (laevo) or the right (dextro)) -- such as, L- and D-Tartaric acid. What might at first appear to be small energy-neutral differences like these have profound biochemical implications; a protein with D-amino acids instead of L- will not work in most living cells since the overwhelming majority of organisms metabolise L-organic molecules. These compounds not only have the same number of atoms in each molecule, there are no apparent energy differences between them; even so, they have easily distinguishable physical qualities.
Change in quality -- identical quantity.4
In response, it could be argued that Engels had already anticipated the above:
"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser quantities of motion communicated to the bodies.
"But what is the position in regard to change of form of motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same? Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion...; anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid., pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
However, Engels slides between two different senses of "motion" here: (1) change of place, and (2) energy. In this way, he is able to argue that any change in the relation between bodies always amounts to a change in energy. But, this depends on the nature of the field in which these bodies are embedded (on this, see below, and in Note 4a); Engels's profound lack of mathematical knowledge clearly let him down here.
Independently of that, Engels also confused the expenditure of energy with energy added to a system. The difference between the two is easy to see. Imagine someone pushing a heavy packing case along a level floor. In order to overcome friction, the one doing the pushing will have to expend energy. But that energy has not been put into the packing case (as it were). Now, if the same case is pushed up a hill, Physicists tell us that recoverable energy has been put into the case in the form of Potential Energy.
Now, in the examples of interest to dialecticians, it is the latter form of energy (but not necessarily always Potential Energy) that is relevant, not the former. The former sort does not really change the quality of any bodies concerned; the latter does. If that is so, then the above counter-examples (e.g., the Enantiomers) still apply, for the energy expended in order to change one isomer into another is generally the first sort, not the second.
Despite this, a few die-hard dialecticians might want to argue that any expenditure of energy is relevant here. That would be an unfortunate move since it would make this 'Law' trivial, for in that case it would amount to the belief that any change at all (no matter how remote), since it involves the expenditure of some form of energy (and energy not always put 'into' the bodies concerned), is the cause of qualitative change to other bodies. This would make a mockery of Engels's claim that only energy added to bodies is relevant to this 'Law'.
"Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition)." [Ibid. Bold emphasis added.]
Several examples of this sort of change are given below. The problems these create are discussed at length in Note 5 and Note 6a, where attempts to specify the boundaries of the local energy budget involved (which would be necessary to prevent remote objects causing proximate change) are all shown to fail.
Finally, Engels seems to think it is always clear what a single body actually is:
"Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid.]
However, nature is not quite so accommodating. In fact, when we look at the material world, and refuse to impose an a priori schema on it, we see that the picture is not as straightforward as Engels would have us believe. Indeed, as we will also see, it is easy "to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." The reader is again directed to Note 5 and Note 6a for more details.
Counter-Examples Just Keep Stacking-Up
Moving into Physics: if two or more forces are aligned differently, the qualitative results will invariably be altered (even when the overall magnitude of each force is held constant).
Consider just one example: let forces F1 and F2 be situated in parallel (but not along the same line of action), but diametrically opposed to one another. Here these two forces can exercise a turning effect on a suitably placed body. Now, arrange the same two forces in like manner so that they are still parallel, but act diametrically along the same line. In this case, as seems clear, these forces will have no turning effect on the same body. Change in quality with no change in quantity, once more. Since there are many ways to align forces (as there are with other vector quantities, like velocities and accelerations, etc.), there are countless counter-examples to this rather pathetic first 'Law' here alone.4a
Perhaps more significantly, this 'Law' takes no account of qualitative changes that result from (energetically-neutral) ordering relations in nature and society. Here, identical physical structures and processes can be ordered differently to create significant qualitative changes. One example is the different ordering principles found in music, where an alteration to a sequence of the same notes in a chord or in a melody can have a major qualitative impact on harmony, with no quantitative change anywhere apparent. So, the same seven notes (i.e., tones and semi-tones) arranged in different modes (Ionian, Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Mixolydian, Aolean and Locrian) sound totally different to the human ear. Of course, there are other ways of altering the quality of music in an energetically neutral environment over and above this (such as timing).
Another example along the same lines concerns the ordering principles found in language, where significant qualitative changes can result from the re-arrangement of the same parts of speech. For instance, the same number of letters jumbled up can either make sense or no sense -- as in "dialectics" and "csdileati" (which is "dialectics" scrambled up; but, which one of these two makes the more sense I will leave to the reader to decide).
Perhaps more radically, the same words can mean something qualitatively new if sequenced differently, as in, say: "The cat is on the mat" and "The mat is on the cat". Or, even worse: "It is impossible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic", compared with "It is impossible to understand Hegel's Logic, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Marx's Capital." Here there is considerable qualitative difference with no quantitative change at all.
[What are the odds that Engels would have tried to alter his first 'Law' to counter that awkward fact?]
There are many other examples of this phenomenon, but a few more should suffice for the purposes of this web site: a successful strike (one that is, say, planned first then actioned second) could turn into its opposite (if it is actioned first and planned second). Now even though the total energy input here would be ordered differently in each case, the overall energy budget of the system (howsoever that is characterised) need not be any different. So, the addition of no extra matter or energy here can turn successful action into disaster if the order of events is reversed. Of course, we can all imagine situations where this particular example could involve different energy budgets, but this is not necessarily or even always the case, which is all I need.
There are literally thousands of everyday examples of such qualitative changes (where there are no obvious associated quantitative differences), so many in fact that Engels's first 'Law' begins to look even more pathetic in comparison. Who for example would put food on the table then a plate on top of it? A change in the order here would constitute a qualitatively different (and more normal) act: plate first, food second. Which of us would jump out of an aeroplane first and put their parachute on second -- or cross a road first, look second? And is there a sane person on the planet who goes to the toilet first and gets out of bed second? Moreover, only an idiot would pour 500 ml of water slowly into 1000 ml of concentrated Sulphuric Acid, whereas, someone who knew what they were doing would readily do the reverse. But all of these have profound qualitative differences if performed in the wrong order (for the same energy budget).5
How could Engels have missed examples like these? Is dialectical myopia so crippling that it prevents dialecticians using their common sense?
Pushing these ideas further: context, too, can affect quality in a quantitatively neutral environment. So, a dead body in a living room has a different qualitative significance compared to that same body in the morgue (for the same energy input). A million pounds in my bank account has a different qualitative feel to it if compared to the same money in your account (and vice versa). "Ceci nest pa une pipe" has a different qualitative aspect if appended to a picture of a pipe, compared to being attached to a picture of, say, a cigarette.
Indeed, "Ceci nest pa une pipe" itself can change from qualitatively false to true depending on how it is interpreted. Hence, as a depiction of what the painting by Magritte is about (i.e., a pipe) it is false. But, despite this, it is also literally true, since manifestly a picture of a pipe is not a pipe! Change in quality here, but no change in quantity.6
Figure One: Gallic Refutation
Furthermore, qualitative change can be induced by other qualitative changes, contrary to Engels's claim:
"...[Q]ualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion...." [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added]
For example, in a 1:1 mixture of paint, one litre of brown can be made by mixing two half litres each of red and green, but the same qualitative effect can be achieved by using less or more of both (say, 2 litres of each), but in the same ratio. Here a change in the quantity of mixed paints has no effect on the qualitative properties of the mixture (i.e., its colour), while the qualities mixed do. In this case, two qualities (two colours) will have changed into a new quality (a new colour) when mixed. Not only do the same amounts (and proportions) of red and green paint exist before and after mixing, for any fixed amount of each, the two former qualities will have merged into a single one. Qualitative change produced by qualitative change.
Of course, it could be argued that the mixture contains more paint than before (which means that there actually has been a quantitative change), but this is not so. In general, prior to mixing there were n litres of each colour (and 2n litres of both) preserving the 1:1 ratio; after mixing the same amount of paint still exists, namely n litres of each (and 2n litres of both, for any n), still preserving the 1:1 proportion. The qualitative change in colour has nothing to do with the quantities involved, but everything to do with the mixing of the two previous qualities in the same ratio.
To be sure, if the ratio of the mixed paints were changed, a different qualitative outcome would emerge, but as noted above, even this does not happen "nodally", and so it seems to be of little relevance to the first 'Law'. But, if the ratio is kept the same, we would have here a change in quality created by qualities only, and not by an increase in quantity.6a
Something similar can be achieved with the mixing of most chemicals, as it can with light, sound and taste.7
Matter in general is thus reassuringly non-dialectical.
Other instances of qualitative change where there is no implied change in quantity include the following: the "Big Bang" (if it actually happened) led to the formation of a whole universe of qualitative changes, with no overall increase in energy or matter (in the universe). Now, here we have a massive change in quality (with Galaxies and planets, and all the rest, emerging out of the original debris) with no overall change in the quantity of energy (in the universe) --, unless, of course, we think to alter energy conservation laws just to save DM's neck.
On the other hand, if the 'Big Bang' is rejected, and an infinite universe is postulated, since there can be no increase in energy in the entire universe, any qualitative changes in nature will occur with no increase in universal energy.
More counter-examples rapidly stack up: a child living in, say, Paris can become an orphan (qualitative change) if both of its parents die in South Africa (meaning that no quantitative change will have happened to that child -- unless, of course, we are meant to re-interpret a change in a distant geographical/familial relation as a quantitative change).
The largest cut diamond on earth (in a safe, say, in New York) could change into the second biggest if another bigger diamond is cut in, say, Amsterdam. This example also applies to other remote changes. For example, the biggest star in a galaxy could become the second biggest if another star hundreds of millions of light years away (but in the same galaxy) grows in size (perhaps over millions of years) through accretion of matter. So, in both cases, there would be a qualitative change to the first object with no relevant matter or energy added or subtracted from/to that object. There are countless examples of remote change like this.
A cheque drawn, say, in New York will become instantaneously worthless (qualitative change) if the issuing bank in Tokyo goes bust (meaning that no quantitative change will have happened to that cheque).
A Silver Medallist in, say, the Olympics can become the Gold Medal winner in an event (qualitative change) if the former Gold medallist is disqualified because of drug-taking (meaning that no quantitative change will have occurred to that Silver Medallist).
Two identical "Keep off the Grass" signs can mean something different (qualitative change) if one of them is posted on a garden lawn and the other is positioned near a stand of Marijuana plants, at the same height above sea level (thus with no change in energy).
A circle looks like an ellipse (qualitative change) when viewed from certain angles for no change in energy.
The same three mathematical (or physical) points can undergo a qualitative change if, say, from being arranged linearly they are then re-arranged as the corners of a triangle. Here, there would be a qualitative change with no quantitative change, once again. There are, of course, a potentially infinite number of examples of that sort of change imaginable for 2-, or 3-dimensional shapes, for n points (be they mathematical or physical -- so this is not necessarily an abstract set of counter-instances).8
In The Soup, And Vice Versa
Worse still, the aforementioned "vice versa" codicil attached by Engels to this 'Law' renders it totally useless -- if not completely crazy --, for it suggests, for instance, that qualitative change can effect quantitative material change. Consider this example of Trotsky's:
"A housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into quality…." [Trotsky (1971), p.106.]
Now, this is not an unsympathetic interpretation on my part, for Engels himself signed up to it:
"Yet the 'mechanical' conception amounts to nothing else. It explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones, and overlooks that the relation of quality and quantity is reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place." [Ibid., p.253. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
And so did Novack:
"The dialectical process of development does not end with the transformation of quantity into quality…. The process continues in the opposite direction and converts new quality into new quantity." [Novack (1971), p.92.]
This suggest that changes in quality should induce quantitative changes, that is, that new matter should be created merely by qualitative change!
Hence, if this vice versa codicil is to work here, a qualitative change from, say, unpalatable soup to tasty-soup would in effect produce a quantitative pay-off: it must cause soup to have more salt in it! Clearly this magic trick will be of interest to those who still (foolishly) think that matter and energy cannot be created ex nihilo. And yet, there seems to be no other way of reading the vice versa codicil except as just such a 'metaphysical blank cheque'.
Nevertheless, it is worth examining Trotsky's example more closely, since it will help expose the many serious errors and confusions that afflict even the few examples dialecticians have scraped-together to illustrate this 'Law.'
"Every individual is a dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into quality…. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox are equipped with Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All this demonstrates, in passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic and the dialectic, are not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather expressions of the actual inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense the universe is permeated with ‘unconscious’ dialectics." [Ibid., pp.106-07.]
But, what exactly did Trotsky imagine the change of quantity into quality to be, here?
Does an increase in the quantity of salt alter its own quality? Presumably not.
Does the quantity of soup change? Perhaps only marginally; but even so, the quantity of soup is not what allegedly changed its own quality -- that is supposed to have resulted from the quantity of salt added.
In fact, the quantity of the original soup has not actually changed -- merely the quantity of the salt/soup mixture --; and neither has the quality of the salt altered (just its alleged quantity).
What appears to have happened (in this less than half-formed 'thought experiment') is that the addition of too much salt to the soup is supposed to change the taste of the resulting salt/soup mixture as it is experienced by the taster (perhaps the woman in this case). Hence, at a certain ("nodal") point, an increase in the quantity of salt alters the quality (i.e., the taste) of the soup, so that its acceptability changes either side of that point.
But, even here the increased quantity of the salt has not passed over into any change in its own quality. What has occurred is that one quality (a palatable taste) has morphed into another quality (an unpalatable taste), as a result of a quantitative change made to one ingredient added to the salt/soup mixture. So, a certain quality of the soup has changed from being acceptable to being unacceptable as a result of the increased quantity of salt the mixture contains.
However, the relevant quality of the added salt remains the same no matter how much is added. Salt is Sodium Chloride (largely), and it tastes salty whether it is delivered by the spoon, the bucket or the train-load. In that case, neither the quantity nor the quality of the salt has "passed over" into anything; there does not therefore seem to be anything in the first part of this story for that particular aspect of the salt to "pass over" into.
Consequently, the first half of this 'Law' is either mis-stated or it does not apply in this case.
As far as the second half is concerned (i.e., the alleged alteration in quality), the postulated change relates to the taste of the soup. But manifestly, the soup remains salty no matter how much salt is poured in, as we saw. What we have here is a batch of soup that becomes increasingly salty as more salt is added.
What qualitative change then is meant to have taken place? Again, it seems that this change relates to the acceptability of the taste of the soup as perceived by the taster. Hence, at -- or slightly beyond -- the alleged "nodal" point, the taste of the soup will become objectionable to this taster. But if so, this particular change is surely confined to the one doing the tasting. It is not the soup that alters in this respect. On one side of the "nodal" point the soup is objectively salty (i.e., it contains dissolved salt); on the other side it is still objectively salty, but with more salt in it. The difference is that on one side, the taster tolerated the taste and continued to like it, but on the other side the taste became intolerable and she ceased to enjoy what she was eating. So, this means that the soup itself has not actually changed in this respect, merely the taster's appreciation of it that has.
So, it now seems that a change in the quantity (of salt) does not actually affect the soup –- except, perhaps, its volume (very slightly), and its composition as a salt/soup mixture. No matter how much salt is dumped into the soup it remains just that, a salt/soup mixture, only with higher proportions of the former ingredient -– and, at the limit perhaps turning it into sludge or a semi-solid lump, or whatever. A trillion tons of salt can't change that.8a
Consequently, even with respect to the relevant quality (interpreting the latter as this salt/soup mixture, if it can be so described), the concoction does not change (or, at least, not in a way that is relevant to Trotsky's purposes). Hence, a change in the quantity of salt has not "passed over" into a change in the quality of the soup (as soup), which means that the second part of this 'Law' seems to be defective, too.
If there is a qualitative change anywhere here at all (that is relevant to the point Trotsky is making) it seems to occur in the third party -– that is, in the taster. We are forced to interpret things this way unless, of course, we are to suppose that 'tastes' actually reside 'objectively' in soups, as one of their allegedly 'primary' qualities. If that were so, qualities like this (that reside in soups, and not solely in tasters) would have to be able to alter 'objectively', even when they are not being tasted! But, it can't mean that; no sane dialectician (one imagines!) believes that tastes reside in the objects we eat. Hence, if this 'Law' is to work in this case, the qualitative change must be said to reside in the soup-taster, not the soup.8b
If so, that aspect of the change here must have been induced by a quantitative change in the taster, if the 'Law' is to apply to her. But, what quantitative change could have taken place in this taster that might have prompted a corresponding change in (her) quality, or in her changed perception of a quality? Apparently none at all -- or, none that Trotsky mentioned, and none that is obvious.
Manifestly here, it was a quantitative change in the salt/soup mixture that altered its quality as it was apparent to that taster, but it had no effect on a quality actually in the soup (as previous comments sought to show -- tastes do not reside in soups!). But, once again, there would now seem to be no quantitative change in the taster that initiated a corresponding qualitative change in her.
In that case, the best that can be made of this half-baked example is that while quantitative change leads to no qualitative change in some things (i.e., soups), it can prompt certain 'qualitative' changes in other things (i.e., tasters), the latter of which were not caused by any quantitative changes in those things themselves, but by something altogether mysterious.
So, the second part of the 'Law' is now doubly defective.
Of course, it could be objected that there is indeed a quantitative change in the said taster, namely the quantitative increase in salt atoms hitting her tongue. But, this just pushes the problem one stage further back, for unless we are to suppose that tastes reside in salt molecules (or in Sodium and Chlorine ions), the qualitative change we seek will still have occurred in the taster, but not in the chemicals in her mouth -- and we are back where we were earlier. There seems to be no quantitative change to the taster apparent here; she does not grow another tongue or gain some more taste buds. To be sure, it is undeniable that there will have been an increase in salt molecules hitting her tongue, and that these will have a causal effect on the change of taste as she perceives it, but even given all that, no change in quantity to the taster herself will have occurred.
Again, it could be objected that there is a material/energetic change here; matter or energy will have been transferred to the taster (and/or her central nervous system) which causes her to experience a qualitative change in her appreciation of the soup.
In fact, what has happened is that the original salt has merged/interacted with the taster's tongue/nervous system upon being ingested. But, it is at precisely that point that the earlier problems associated with the salt/soup mixture now transfer to the salt/nervous system 'mixture'. Since tastes do not exist in nerves any more than they exist in soups, we are no further forward. And as far as changes to the quantity of the taster is concerned, this will depend on how we draw the boundaries between inorganic salt molecules and living cells. Since this is considered in more detail below, no more will be said about it here.
In any case, it seems rather odd to describe a change in taste as a qualitative change to a taster, whatever caused it. As the term "quality" is understood by dialecticians, this cannot actually be a qualitative change of the sort they require. Qualities, as characterised by dialecticians (or, rather, by those that bother to say what they mean by them), are those properties of bodies/processes that make them what they are, alteration to which will change that body/process into something else. [Cf., Hegel (1975), §85 p.124.] This is an Aristotelian notion (more on this in another Essay). As Kuusinen notes:
"The totality of essential features that make a particular thing or phenomenon what it is and distinguishes it from others, is called its quality.... It is...concept that denotes the inseparable distinguishing features, the inner structure, constituting the definiteness of a phenomenon and without which it cease to be what it is." [Kuusinen (1961), pp.83-84. Italic emphasis in the original.]
But, it is not at all clear that someone's liking/not liking soup defines them as a person -- or as a being of a particular sort. While scientists might decide to classify certain aspects of nature (placing them in whatever categories they see fit), none, as far as I am aware, has so far identified two different sorts of human beings: "soup-likers for n milligrams of salt per m litres of soup versus soup-dislikers for the same or different n or m". And even if they were to do this, that would save this part of DM by mere re-definition, since it is reasonably clear that these two different sorts of human beings do not actually exist -- , or, at least, they didn't until I just invented them. Once again, that would make this part of DM eminently subjective, since it indicates that changes in quality are now relative to an observer's choice of descriptive framework. Plainly, this introduces a fundamental element of arbitrariness into what dialecticians claim to be a scientific law.
If so, this particular change cannot apply to any of the qualities governed by DM/Hegelian principles (even if we knew what these were, and even if there were any). So, it now seems that this putative example of Q«Q [i.e., the change of Quantity into Quality] either undermines the meaning of a key DM-concept on which it was apparently based (i.e., "quality"), vitiating its applicability in this instance -- or it isn't even an example of the operation of this 'Law'!
Given this new twist, it now seems that quantitative changes to material bodies (such as salt/soup mixtures) actually cause changes to sensory systems (of a vague and perhaps non-quantitative -- or even non-qualitative -- kind); these in turn bring about some sort of qualitative change in the sensory modalities of some/any of the tasters involved. If this is so, the original 'Law' was woefully wide of the mark; it should have read something like the following:
E1: Change in quantity merely causes change in quantity to material bodies [no misprint!], but at a certain point this causes qualitative alterations (but these might not be Hegelian, or even neo-Aristotelian, qualities) to the way some human beings perceive the world, even though the latter have not undergone a quantitative change themselves.
Put like this, it is not at all certain that anyone would conclude this (or anything at all like it) from cooking soup (as Trotsky maintained)! And we can be pretty sure about this since not even Engels got close to this more accurate version of his own 'Law'. And neither did Trotsky! It is scarcely credible therefore that non-dialectical cooks, workers, or anyone else for that matter, would advance much further -- or even so far -– based only on their own experience.
Of course, this can only mean that peasant cooks are not "unconscious dialecticians", and neither is anyone else outside the DM-fraternity --, and this is probably because they are not quite so easily bamboozled.
'Hard' Science Vs Amateurish Anecdote
The other hackneyed examples DM-theorists regularly dredge up to illustrate this 'Law' (i.e., boiling water, balding heads, Mendeleyev's table, the alleged fighting qualities of Mamelukes, and, of late, Catastrophe and Chaos Theory), also only seem to work because of the way that the word "quality" has been 'defined' (or, rather, not defined) by dialecticians.9
For example, in the case of boiling water, the increase in quantity of one item (i.e., heat) is reputed to alter the quality of the second (i.e., water). As noted above, "quality" in DM-circles is defined in Aristotelian terms (i.e., as that property which is essential to a substance/process, without which it must change into some other --, or as "determinate being", to use the Hegelian jargon; on this, see Inwood (1992), pp.238-41). And yet, by no stretch of the imagination is liquidity an essential property of water (except, perhaps in an everyday or pre-scientific sort of sense). But, even if it were, increased amounts of water do not seem to change that particular quality (i.e., its liquidity) into anything else; it takes an increase in something other than water to alter its state (namely heat). So, this 'Law' should perhaps be re-written in the following way:
E1: An increase in the quantity of one item leads to a change in what is perhaps not one of the essential qualities of another.
Moreover, this is still not an example of the right kind of qualitative change, since water in a solid, liquid or gaseous form is still water (i.e., H2O). Quantitative addition or subtraction of energy does not result in a qualitative change of the required sort; nothing new emerges. This substance stays H2O throughout.
With that, much of the 'metaphysical bite' of this 'Law' disappears; in fact it becomes rather toothless.
In addition, it seems a little odd to describe an increase in heat as an increase in quantity when what happens is that the relevant water molecules just move about faster if energy is fed into the system. Of course, it could be objected that this is precisely Engels's point; since energy can be measured (here as an increase in heat, say), then that increase in heat is indeed an increase in quantity -- in this case "quantity of motion". But, the original idea appeared in Hegel at a time when heat was regarded as a substance, Caloric. We now know that what really happens is that molecules just move faster -- after having interacted with still other faster moving molecules. [This is something Engels admits anyway; see Engels (1954), pp.63-64.]
So, when Engels speaks here of an increase in energy, he was either using a façon de parler, or he had not quite abandoned the old idea that heat is a substance. Nowadays, we might want to call this phenomenon an increase in "energy" if we so wish, but if we do, that would merely plunge this part of the first 'Law' into complete darkness, since the word "energy" (if it is not a façon de parler) is not the name of an identifiable substance that can be qualified in this way.10
Furthermore, using "quantity" to depict the change in motion of molecules is somewhat dubious. Certainly, we can speak of an increase in velocity here, but there is no such thing as a quantity of velocity that could sensibly said to increase. Velocity is not a substance either, and although we certainly use numbers to depict it, we do not refer to anything called the "quantity of velocity" (except again, perhaps as a façon de parler). Since velocity is a vector, its magnitude is given by a scalar, but velocity itself is just that scalar operating in a that direction. To call the magnitude of a vector a "quantity" would be to confuse a vector (or indeed a direction) with a substance.
Nevertheless, even if it were appropriate to depict things in this way, neither the heat nor the faster molecules change in quality themselves. Any amount of heat still stays as heat; motion is still motion. Hence this 'Law' does not seem to apply to these 'phenomena'. In that case, the first 'Law' should now perhaps be re-written along the following lines:
E2: An increase in the quantity of one item (e.g., heat) leads to no qualitative change in that item, while it can cause an alteration in the quality of another item (e.g., water), which will in turn have changed in quality while undergoing no quantitative change itself -- but which qualitative change is inadmissible anyway since it is not a quality definitive of the latter (e.g., water as H2O).
This is not an impressive 'Law'; still less is this hackneyed example a convincing example of it.
As far as balding heads are concerned, it is not easy to see how this other over-worked example illustrates the first 'Law' either. This is because it is difficult to believe that someone with, say, n hairs on his or her head is hirsute, when the same person with n-1 hairs is objectively bald -- even if at some point or other (and not necessarily the same point) we all might subjectively change the words we use to depict either.
Now, if it could be shown that those with precisely n-1 hairs on their heads (for some specific n) are always objectively bald, and that this is an essential defining quality of baldness, or of bald people (in the Aristotelian/Hegelian sense just mentioned), so that a change from n to n-1 hairs always results in baldness, and which rule is true for all hirsute human beings, then this the first 'Law' might have some life left (in it in just this one instance). It could then be a dialectical 'Law' that applies only to balding parts of nature, but nothing else. [Which is longhand for saying that is cannot therefore be a law.]
Nevertheless, even this is not so. With respect to baldness, human anatomists (or even hairdressers) have yet to define hair loss in such Aristotelian terms. Hence, and unfortunately for DM-fans, they have so far failed to categorise all follically-challenged individuals this precisely, declaring that anyone with n-1 hairs is essentially bald, whereas anyone with n hairs is still essentially non-coot. Until they do, there are no "nodal" points here, just as there seem to be no particular (Aristotelian/Hegelian) qualities definitive of bald human beings for dialecticians to latch onto. So, in this case, it is impossible to see how an 'objective' example of this dialectical 'Law' could apply --, merely a 'subjective' impression, and one that has to rely on a quirky application of an already vague Aristotelian/Hegelian 'definition' of "quality".
So it seems that the change in quality, if it occurs, takes place not in the person going bald, but in the one describing him/her/it as bald. In that case, with respect to human balding, change in the quantity of hair on one person's head will merely change the quality of someone else's opinion of him/her, and even that occurs subjectively and (possibly even) non-"nodally".
There isn't much here on which to base a dialectical 'Law', at least nothing that would fail to brand this part of DM as a fringe science, at best.
As far as the other examples dialecticians use to illustrate this 'Law' are concerned: there are far too few in number that actually work (even if the above difficulties are ignored) to justify the epithet "Law" being attached to one and all. If in comparison, say, Newton's Second Law of motion worked as fitfully as this 'Law' does (or was as vaguely-defined and/or as non-mathematical), physicists would be right to refuse to describe it as a law. Hence, if the rate of change of momentum was proportional to the applied force in only a few instances (and even then this was the case only if key terms were either ignored, ill-defined or twisted out of shape), no one would take it seriously.
But, this is Mickey Mouse Science, after all.
[The other examples dialecticians use are discussed in more detail in Note 9.]
In general, however, the examples usually given by DM-fans to illustrate this 'Law' are almost without exception either anecdotal or impressionistic. If someone were to submit a paper to a science journal purporting to establish the veracity of a new law with the same level of vagueness, imprecision, triteness, lack of detail/mathematics, and overall theoretical naivety, it would be rejected at the first stage. Indeed, dialecticians would themselves treat with derision any attempt to establish, say, either the truth of classical economic theory or the falsity of Marx's own work with an evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as this --, to say nothing of the contempt they would show for theoretical wooliness of this sort. In such circumstances, those who might be quick to cry "pedantry" at the issues raised in this and other Essays published at this site would become devoted pedants, and nit-pick with the best.
Now, anyone who has studied or practiced real science will know this to be true. It is only in books on DM (and internet discussion boards) that Mickey Mouse material of this sort seems acceptable (here is an excellent recent example).10a
Hence, this 'Law' can be made to work in a few selected instances if we bend things enough (and if we fail to define either "quality", "node", or "leap" -- and if we ignore Hegel's own 'definition' of a quality into the bargain). In contrast there are countless examples where this 'Law' does not apply, no matter how we try to twist things.10b
Why Engels's first 'Law' was ever called a law is therefore something of a Dialectical Mystery.
[2] The Interpenetration Of Opposites
The second 'Law' of dialectics -- unsurprisingly -- fares no better.
We saw above how Engels depicted it:
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]
Here, in a published work, he says more or less the same:
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Engels (1976) p.179. Bold emphasis added.]
Lenin added a few extra details:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58. Emphases in the original.]
It is worth noting at the outset that the doctrine that nature and all it contains is a UO, and that change is powered by their 'contradictory' interaction, is found in all known mystical systems. [More on this In Essay Fourteen (summary here). Until that Essay is published, the reader is also directed here.]
Breaking News: Dialectics Cannot Explain Change
Surprisingly, DM-theorists (like Lenin and Engels, quoted above) are decidedly unclear as to whether objects/processes change because of (1) a contradictory relationship between their internal opposites, or because (2) they change into these opposites, or even whether (3) change itself creates such opposites.
[FL = Formal Logic; NON = Negation of the Negation: UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Lenin's words merely illustrate this confusion in an acute form: he speaks, for instance, of the "transitions of every</