Essay Seven Part One
Engels's Three 'Laws' Of Dialectics
Readers need to make note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
If you are viewing this with Mozilla Firefox you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used.
[A US comrade (Brian Jones) has attempted to respond to a letter I sent to the International Socialist Review about several of the issues raised in this Essay. You can read the original letter here, comrade Jones's reply here, and my response here. A UK comrade has also tried to respond to some of my criticisms. You can read the details here and here.]
This Essay is just under 95,000 words long; a summary of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections:
(1) Not Everything Changes In 'Leaps'
(3) Reciprocal?
(5) Awkward Facts Dialecticians Prefer To Ignore
(6) Isomers Refute First 'Law'
(7) Tautomers, Resonance And Mesomers -- More Nails In The Coffin?
(8) Counterexamples Just Keep Stacking-Up
(10) Trotsky In The Soup
(11) "Quality" Defined?
(12) Mickey Mouse Science
(B) The Interpenetration Of Opposites
(1) Why Dialectics Cannot Explain Change
(2) Is Everything Really A 'Unity Of Opposites'?
(3) Suicidal Cats
(4) Not Just Bad News For Cats
(5) Plastic Laws
(6) Lenin Maxes Out
(7) Single-celled Reactionaries?
(8) Every Confirmation Is Also A Refutation
(9) The Dialecticians' Dilemma
(10) The Revenge Of The Petty-Bourgeois Cell
(iii) Change Into What?
(iv) A New Theory?
(11) Engels, Marx And Mathematics
(12) Dialectics Meets The Calculus And Comes To Nought
(13) Dialectical -- Or Just Dotty?
(14) Second 'Law' Incompatible With The First?
(C) The Negation Of The Negation
(2) Terminator Four: The Rise Of Monsanto
(3) Socialism Introduced From Without -- Perhaps By Aliens
(D) Notes
(E) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
The Three 'Laws'
For many dialecticians, "Three Laws Of Dialectics" encapsulate the core ideas of classical DM. Others regard these 'Laws' as far too crude and formulaic. TAR, however, takes a middle line, and downplays their significance somewhat, preferring to define DM in terms of mediated Totality, and change through internal contradiction, etc. [p.5.] Nevertheless, its author noted that:
"The 'three laws' are...useful reminders of forms in which dialectical contradictions sometimes work themselves out.... The three laws are not, even in Hegel, the only way in which dialectical development can take place. They cannot be understood without the broader definition of the dialectic discussed above [pp.3-8]. They are not, as Marx and Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult, empirical task of tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical master key whose only advantage is to turn up where no real historical knowledge is available." [Rees (1998), pp.8-9.]
[DM = Dialectical Materialism; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution; i.e., Rees (1998).]
However, as Essay Two has shown, this is precisely how these 'Laws' (and other dialectical principles) have been interpreted by dialecticians for over a century: as just such a key.
Indeed, in a recent article in Socialist Review, John Rees endorsed this 'Law' unreservedly; on the basis of just one example (the hardy perennial, water freezing and/or boiling) he was happy to assert:
"Indeed this is a feature of many different sorts of change, even in the natural world. Water that rises in temperature by one degree at a time shows no dramatic change until it reaches boiling point when it "suddenly" becomes steam. At that point its whole nature is transformed from being a liquid into a vapour.
"Lower the temperature of water by a single degree at a time and again there is no dramatic change until it reaches freezing point, when it is transformed from a liquid into a solid -- ice.
"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality. Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is transformed into something new." [Rees (2008), p.24.]
From that, Rees "suddenly leaps" to this conclusion:
"This is why Marx described the dialectic as 'an abomination to the bourgeoisie' and why Lenin said of this method that it 'alone furnishes the key to "self-movement" of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to "leaps", to the "break in continuity"...to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new'". [Ibid. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
Yet more a priori dogmatism, based on little or no evidence -- as we will see, Rees ignores the many cases where "qualitative" change is not "sudden", just as he ignores the many examples where this 'Law' does not work.
Nevertheless, this Essay is aimed at showing that these 'Laws' are at best false, at worst terminally vague, and in the case of the last two, far too confused even to be assessed for their truth or falsehood.
They are certainly of no use at all in helping revolutionaries understand and therefore change the world.
Engels summarised these 'Laws' in the following way:
"The law of the transformation of quantity into quality, and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites; The law of the negation of the negation." [Engels (1954), p.62.]
Earlier, he had characterised them thus:
"Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation -- spiral form of development." [Ibid., p.17.]
Engels outlined his first 'Law' as follows:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Ibid., p.63. Emphasis added.]
But, exactly how Engels knew that it was impossible to "alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion" he annoyingly kept to himself. His certainty can't have been based on the limited evidence available in his day, for there is no way it could have confirmed that it was "impossible" to alter the "quality" of a body in the way he says. Even the vastly increased body of data extant today can't show that this is an "impossibility".
Perhaps he was simply careless in his choice of words in these private notebooks? Maybe so, but no dialectician since has pointed this out: that it is not possible to derive an impossibility from a set of contingent data items, no matter how large that set is.
This puzzle is made all the more acute when we recall that for Engels, matter itself is just an abstraction [cf., Engels (1954), p.255]; in that case, it seems energy must be, too. If so, how can anything be altered by the addition (or subtraction) of an abstraction?
Even so, Engels did at least try to deny that his:
"...laws [have been] foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them." [Ibid., p.62.]
He also declared:
"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976), p.13. Bold emphasis added.]
But, his precipitous deduction of a necessary law (i.e., one that uses the word "impossible") from only a handful of cases -- largely drawn from certain areas of nineteenth century chemistry, buttressed merely by a few quirky, anecdotal examples taken from everyday life and/or from the popular science of Engels's day -- is a neat trick dialecticians alone seem capable of performing. Even if Engels had access to evidence several orders of magnitude greater than we have today, that would still not justify his use of "impossible" here.
Less partisan observers might be forgiven for concluding that Engels either did not know what the word "foisted" meant, or he hoped no one would notice when he actually indulged in a little of it himself.
Despite this, Engels already had an answer to this objection (and one he derived from Hegel):
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory. The form of universality is the form of completeness, hence of the infinite. We know that chlorine and hydrogen, within certain limits of temperature and pressure and under the influence of light, combine with an explosion to form hydrochloric acid gas, and as soon as we know this, we know also that this takes place everywhere and at all times where the above conditions are present....The form of universality in nature is law, and no one talks of the eternal character of the laws of nature than the natural scientists.... All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and hence the essentially absolute.
"...[This] can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.234-35. Italic emphases in the original.]
However, since the scientists in Engels's day (from whose work he was generalising) were Christians, as was Hegel, you'd expect them to talk this way. But, their own conclusions (about these alleged "laws") do not follow from the evidence, any more than the existence of God does. As we will see in a later Essay, in their attempt to explain the content of their work to non-specialists, scientists often indulge in amateur Metaphysics, but this should no more influence us than their political opinions do. And, since scientists are constantly changing their minds over what these 'eternal' laws are, only the unwise would base their philosophy on shifting sands such as these.
As I argue in Essay Eight Part Two:
"How is it possible to translate the word 'infinite' as 'law-governed process'? Now Engels tries to equate the two, but an 'always' and 'at all times' are not an 'infinite'.
"In a later Essay, we will see that this view of scientific law is a carry-over from ancient animistic ideas about nature, and so it is no surprise to see this idea re-surface here in such Hermetically-compromised company. [On this see here, and here; the first is Swartz (2006), the second Swartz (2003).]" [This is quoted from here, as part of my demolition of this aspect of Hegel's a priori Superscience.]
Nevertheless, Engels's first 'Law' is at best only partially true; as we shall see, countless processes in nature in fact 'disobey' it, so it cannot be a law (in any sense of that word). Even where it seems to work, it does so only because Engels left several key terms undefined -- in which indeterminate state they remain to this day.
Engels's first 'Law' is supposed to work discontinuously (i.e., "nodally"), allowing nature and society to develop by making "leaps" (a term all DM-fans like to use, even while they leave it studiously vague).
Here is how Hegel depicted things:
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state." [Hegel (1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis added.]
And here is Engels:
"With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. -- Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels (1976), pp.82-83.I have used the online version here, but quoted the page numbers for the Foreign Languages edition. Bold emphasis added.]
"We have already seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water." [Ibid., p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
Here, too, is Plekhanov:
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphases alone added.]
And this is what Lenin had to say:
"The 'nodal line of measure relations' ... -- transitions of quantity into quality... Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing without leaps." [Lenin (1961), p.123. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity) of Being and not-Being." [Ibid., p.282.]
"The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).
"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self'-movement.
"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new." [Ibid., pp.357-58. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
Unfortunately for these dogmatists, many things in nature change qualitatively without passing through such "nodal points" -- and not even so much as a tiny "leap".
These include the following: melting or solidifying plastic, metal, rock, sulphur, tar, toffee, sugar, chocolate, wax, butter, cheese, and glass.01 As these are heated or cooled, they gradually change (from liquid to solid, or vice versa). There isn't even a "nodal point" with respect to balding heads! In fact, it is difficult to think of many state of matter transformations (from solid to liquid (or vice versa)) that exhibit just such "nodal points" -- and these include the transition from ice to water (and arguably also the condensation of steam). Even the albumen of fried or boiled eggs changes slowly (but non-"nodally") from clear to opaque white while they are being cooked.1
Naturally, all this depends on how the duration of a "nodal" point is defined. Unfortunately DM-fans have to this day failed to specify their length (nor have they even so much as mentioned their duration -- indeed, in discussions on the Internet, this objection wrong foots most DM-fans, so they either ignore it, or call it "pedantic"). Because of this dialecticians can safely indulge in some sloppy, off-the-cuff, a priori Superscience (as they all seem fond of doing -- hardly one fails to come up with his or her own favourite and/or idiosyncratic example, tested, of course, only in the laboratory of the mind, and studiously un-peer reviewed -- which is why I have called this part of DM: Mickey Mouse Science!).
[Since writing the above, I have discovered that this is not strictly true. The very first book I have encountered (in over 25 years of trawling through the wastelands of DM-literature) that actually tries to deal this 'difficulty' is Kuusinen (1961) -- which I first obtained in 2007. Several comments on this work can be found here.]
Another recent favourite example is Steven Jay Gould's theory of "Punctuated Equilibria". Unfortunately, amateur dialectical palaeontologists have failed to notice that the alleged "nodal" points here last tens of thousands of years, at least! This is a pretty unimpressive "leap" -- it's more like a painfully slow crawl. Snails on downers move faster!
Moreover, since no individual organism actually changes into a new species, there is no obvious object or body here which alters in quality, either, as quantitative variations accumulate. This contradicts Engels once more:
"Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added.]
Again, we seem to have neither an Hegelian nor yet an Aristotelian "substance" in which such "qualities" can inhere, and hence change. Worse still, it is not easy to see what the alleged quantities are supposed to be in this case.
It could be objected that these "quantities" are quite clearly the many minor variations that accumulate in populations of organisms, which lead at some point to a qualitative species-change. But, many small variations are qualitative already, and many of those occur in different organisms, not cumulatively in just one organism. And novel qualitative changes introduced by mutation cannot arise slowly (and then make a DM-"leap" after they have been accumulated), since they already appear suddenly. In other words, there is no slow gradual change here leading to a mutational "leap"; mutations themselves are sudden and qualitative.
So at least here we appear to have changes in quality caused by no changes in quantity!
In any case, what precisely is being slowly quantitatively accumulated here? And in what is all this occurring? No one supposes that if, for example, several hundred thousand Canada Geese all change colour slightly (for instance, if they all become slightly pinker), that these will all additively combine somehow into one big qualitative change (i.e., very deep pink in one of them!) --, or if, say, several thousand Red Deer can all run a little faster, that all these extra cm/sec increases in each animal will add to make an extra km/sec (in one specific deer).
Natural selection, of course, will filter out those populations of organisms that produce less (surviving) offspring, so that certain characteristics are preserved and then proliferate in the descendants of those who produce the most (or which survive the most). But, speciation is the result of much more complex processes than mere additive increase (even if we knew what was being 'added' here, DM-style). [On this, see Coyne and Orr (2004).]
On the other hand, if a species is to be regarded as an object in its own right -- perhaps stretched out in time, as some taxonomists picture things --,1a then that 'object' will only seem to alter as 'changes' accumulate. This is because, if a species is defined in this way (as a temporally-extended 'object'), then it can't actually change in any straight-forward sense. [To be sure, that depends on how we define the object in question and how we depict change.]
It is no surprise therefore to find both these notions are left impressively vague by those comrades who quote this example in support of the first 'Law', which is probably why they think they can get away with it. [For example, here.]
Hence, if a species is characterised in this way (as a sort of four-dimensional 'sausage' -- i.e., as a manifold in 4-space), then even if the first 'Law' actually applied to it, this 'species' won't have changed as a result of its 'internal contradictions', or as a result of anything else, for that matter. This is because such manifolds do not change; four-dimensional objects do not 'exist' in time to change -- time is one of their 'in-built' dimensions, as it were. Indeed, and on the contrary, 'time' exists in them, they neither perdure nor endure in it. Since everything temporally-true of this manifold is true of the whole of it 'all at once' (so to speak -- because it is a single four-dimensional 'object'), it cannot lose or gain properties or "qualities" --, unless, of course, we embed it in a fifth-dimension and (confusingly) call this new context "Time", too. [But then, of course, this five-dimensional 'object' would not change, and for the same reasons. More on this in Essay Eleven Part One.]
Without this extra-dimension, any predicates true of this four-dimensional manifold will stay true of it for good, for there is no past, present or future as far as this 'object' is concerned. In that case, 'change' would perhaps amount to no more than our subjective mis-perception of a 'succession' of orthogonal hyper-plane 'slices' through this manifold that we happen to experience.
[This forms part of the so-called "Block view of time". On this, see the PDF article here. Incidentally, I take no stance on this view of time here; I will, however, in a later Essay.]
As should now seem obvious, dialecticians can only afford to view the universe in this way if they are prepared to abandon their belief in change -- or consign the latter merely to our 'subjective' apprehension of reality.
Alternatively, if a species is not defined as a four-dimensional collective sort of 'object', then because no single organism actually evolves, change to a species would not be the result of its 'internal contradictions', once more -- since, on this view, such a species would be a certain sort of collection, not an object. Moreover, in populations, individual animals/plants do not change by "contradicting" one another, howsoever that word is understood. There are no 'internal contradictions' in such populations here to cause change (or, if there are any, dialecticians have yet to point them out). Indeed, no single thing actually changes in an evolutionary sense, only whole populations, and they manifestly do so non-dialectically.1b
In that case, not only is Gould's theory not an example of this 'Law' at work, not even Darwin's is.1c
Recently, dialecticians have appealed to Chaos and Catastrophe Theory in their endeavour to show that this nineteenth century 'Law' is bang up-to-date. Processes in nature studied in this branch of science clearly change rapidly. However, it is important to note that rapid change is neither being denied or asserted in this Essay. What is being challenged is the thesis that all change is "nodal". Some are, many are not. Moreover, as we will see, the term "quality" is defined in DM-circles in terms that would rule-out many of these catastrophic changes as 'dialectical'. This is because no new DM-"qualities" actually emerge in many such transitions.
For example, in the famous "three body" problem, whatever the outcome, the planetary bodies involved are still planets and they are still satellites; their orbits are still orbits. What new DM-"quality" has "emerged" in this case, then?
[Here is a JavaScript simulation. Indeed, the transitions here appear to be non-"nodal" -- you can alter the parameter in the top left hand corner of the page.]
Moreover, chaotic (turbulent) flows, either side of the alleged "node", are still flows, and the liquids/gases involved are still the same substance. No new Aristotelian/Hegelian "quality" has "emerged" here, either.
To be sure, some chaotic systems certainly seem to conform to this 'Law' -- but, this is only because the phrase "nodal change" has been left conveniently vague, and only because few dialecticians are prepared to ask awkward (but obvious) questions about what a DM-"quality" is supposed to be. [On that, see here and here.]
However, alternative scientific and/or mathematical models of reality explain chaotic systems (indeed, they do so with far more clarity) --, and they do not fall foul of the other examples listed in this Essay that refute this 'Law'.
Facts Dialecticians Usually Ignore
Now, the difficulties the first 'Law' faces do not stop here. For example, when heated, objects change in quality from cold to warm and then to hot, with no "nodal" point separating these particular qualitative stages. The same happens in reverse when they cool. Moving bodies similarly speed up from slow to fast (and vice versa) without any "nodal" punctuation marks affecting the transition. In like manner, the change from one colour to the next in the normal colour spectrum is continuous, with no "nodal" points evident at all -- and this is also the case with the colour changes that bodies experience when they are heated to red or white heat. Sounds, too, change smoothly from soft to loud, and back, in a "node"-free environment. In fact, with respect to wave-governed phenomena in general, change seems to be continuous rather than discrete, which means that since the majority of particles/objects in nature move in such a manner, most things in reality seem to disobey this aspect of Engels's unimpressive 'Law' -- at least, at the macroscopic level.
To be sure, some wave-like changes are said to occur discontinuously (indeed, the word "node" is used precisely here by Physicists), but this is not the result of continuous background changes. For example, quantum phenomena are notoriously discontinuous, but such changes are not normally preceded by continual quantitative increases. They occur suddenly with no build-up. So, discontinuous quantum phenomena cannot be made to fit this 'Law', unless it is altered just so that they can. Of course, that done, this 'Law' would no longer be 'objective'.
Several more comments on the application of this 'Law' to microscopic and/or quantum phenomena will be considered in detail here at a later date.
In that case, at best, the 'nodal' aspect of this 'Law' is either only partially true (of certain phenomena), while it fails to be true (of others).
Dialecticians often apply this "nodal" aspect of the first 'Law' to Capitalism -- in a bid to illustrate by analogy the revolutionary change from one Mode of Production to another, as quantity allegedly builds into quality, at some point initiating a sudden revolutionary 'leap'. [An excellent example of this can be found here, a more recent one is Rees (2008); another is located here.] But, how do we know that social changes like this are not like solid-to-liquid phase or state of matter transformation we witness in metals, glass and plastic; i.e., how do we know that they are not gradual? Since Capitalism is clearly not a liquid, but a solid of sorts, the transition to socialism should, on this analogy, go rather smoothly (on this see Note 9).
Interpreted that way, it looks as if the first 'Law' is of little use to revolutionaries since it clearly suggests that they are not needed, and that Capitalism can be reformed away non-discontinuously -- a bit like the way metal, say, can slowly melt, or in the way that heads can slowly turn bald as they lose their hair. But, if dialectical revolutionaries are not needed, their antiquated theory won't be either.
In that case, this aspect of dialectics seems to be responsible for issuing its own auto-redundancy notice.2
But, this 'Law' is in difficulties in other respects, too. Clearly not every change in quantity "passes over" into a change in quality. And yet, one way of reading the "vice versa" codicil attached to this law suggests that they should:
"The first law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
"Yet the 'mechanical' conception amounts to nothing else. It explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones, and overlooks that the relation of quality and quantity is reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place." [Ibid., p.253. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
If this is so, then we should expect all changes in quantity to "pass over" into changes in quality (or there would seem to be no point to the vice versa codicil).
However, I have not been able to find a single DM-theorist who interprets this 'Law' in this way (i.e., "reciprocally", as Engels calls it), so perhaps I am the only one who has ever noticed this loop-hole (but it's more like a Grand Canyon) in this 'Law'. But, even if this were not so, it would still be difficult to explain why only some changes in quantity "pass over" into changes in quality. One will look in vain for any attempt to address this problem in the highly clichéd and repetitive writings of DM-fans (where quantity definitely does not morph into quality) -- or for some sort of vague recognition that such a difficulty even exists.
But, the "reciprocal" action of this 'Law' is hard to understand. Is Engels saying that a "qualitative" change in matter passes over into "quantity", that is, that say, the change from, say, liquid water to steam, adds energy to the process? Or that, bald heads make them lose hair? If not, it is not easy to see what this "reciprocal" aspect implies. [More on this later.]
As we devote more thought to this 'Law' several problems arise: for example, the same number of molecules at the same energy level can exhibit widely differing properties/qualities depending on circumstances. Think of how the same amount of water can act as a lubricant, or have the opposite effect, say, on wet clothes; the same amount of sand can help some things slide, but prevent others from doing so; the same amount of poison given over a short space of time will kill, but given over a longer period (in small doses) it could benefit the recipient -- Strychnine comes to mind here.
To be sure, the effects of quantitative stasis of this sort (supervenient on qualitative change) are sensitive both to temporal constraints and to levels of concentration (of the substances involved); but this extremely vague first 'Law' said nothing of these. And, try as one might, it is not easy to see how these eminently material aspects of nature can be accommodated to the Ideal dialectical universe Engels (semi-)uncritically inherited from Hegel.
But, what sort of scientific 'Law' leaves details like this out? In fact, if a Mickey Mouse 'Law' like this were to appear in any of the genuine sciences, it would be treated with derision -- even if it had been aired in an undergraduate paper!
However, other recalcitrant examples rapidly spring to mind: if the same colour is stared at for several minutes it can undergo a qualitative change into another colour (several optical illusions are based on this fact). Something similar can happen with regard to many two-dimensional patterns and shapes (for example the Necker Cube and other optical illusions); these undergo considerable qualitative change when no obvious quantitative differences are involved. There thus seem to be numerous examples where quantity and quality do not appear to be connected in the way that DM-theorists would have us believe.3
In fact, there are so many exceptions to this 'Law' that it would be wise to demote it and consign it to a more appropriate category, perhaps along with the trite rules of thumb that sometimes work -- a bit like "An apple a day keeps the doctor away", or even "A watched kettle never boils".
Indeed, given the fact that this 'Law' has no discernible mathematical content it is rather surprising it was ever called a "law" to begin with.
Nevertheless, the situation is even worse than the above might suggest; there are countless examples where significant qualitative change can result from no obvious quantitative difference. These include the qualitative dissimilarities that exist between different chemicals for the same quantity of matter/energy involved.
For instance, Isomeric molecules (studied in stereochemistry) are a particularly good example of this phenomenon. This is especially true of those that have so-called "chiral" centres (i.e., centres of asymmetry). In such cases, the spatial ordering of the constituent atoms, not their quantity, affects the overall quality of the resulting molecule (something Engels said could not happen). Here, a change in molecular orientation, not quantity, effects a change in quality.
To take one example of many: (R)-Carvone (spearmint) and (S)-Carvone (caraway); these molecules have the same number of atoms (of the same elements), and the same bond energies, but they are nonetheless qualitatively distinct because of the different spatial arrangement of the atoms involved. Change in geometry -- change in quality.
This un-dialectical aspect of matter is especially true of the so-called "Enantiomers" (i.e., symmetrical molecules that are mirror images of each other). These include compounds like (R)-2-clorobutane and (S)-2-chlorobutane, and the so-called L- and D-molecules, which rotate the plane of polarised light the left (laevo) or the right (dextro)) -- such as, L- and D-Tartaric acid. What might at first sight appear to be small energy-neutral differences like these have profound biochemical implications; a protein with D-amino acids instead of L- will not work in most living cells since the overwhelming majority of organisms metabolise L-organic molecules. These compounds not only have the same number of atoms in each molecule, there are no apparent energy differences between them; even so, they have easily distinguishable physical qualities.
Change in quality -- identical quantity.4
In response, it could be argued that Engels had already anticipated the above:
"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser quantities of motion communicated to the bodies.
"But what is the position in regard to change of form of motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same? Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion...; anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid., pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
However, Engels slides between two different senses of "motion" here: (1) change of place, and (2) energy. In this way, he is able to argue that any change in the relation between bodies always amounts to a change in energy. But, this depends on the nature of the field in which these bodies are embedded (on this, see below, and in Note 4a); Engels's profound lack of mathematical knowledge clearly let him down here.
Independently of this, Engels also confused the expenditure of energy with energy added to a system. The difference between the two is easy to see. Imagine someone pushing a heavy packing case along a level floor. In order to overcome friction, the one doing the pushing will have to expend energy. But that energy has not been put into the packing case (as it were). Now, if the same case is pushed up a hill, Physicists tell us that recoverable energy has been put into the case in the form of Potential Energy.
Now, as far as can be ascertained (but again, they are not at all clear on this), in the examples of interest to dialecticians, it is the latter form of energy (but not necessarily always Potential Energy) that is relevant, not the former. The former sort does not really change the quality of any bodies concerned; the latter does. If that is so, then the above counter-examples (e.g., the Enantiomers) still apply, for the energy expended in order to change one isomer into another is generally the first sort, not the second.
To be sure, some of the energy in the packing case example will appear as heat (and/or perhaps sound), and will warm that case slightly. But that energy will not be stored in the case as chemically recoverable (i.e., structural, or new bond) energy.
Despite this, a few die-hard dialecticians might want to argue that any expenditure of energy is relevant here. That would be an unfortunate move since it would make this 'Law' trivial, for in that case it would amount to the belief that any change at all (no matter how remote), since it involves the expenditure of some form of energy somewhere (but not necessarily energy put 'into' the bodies concerned), is the cause of qualitative change to other bodies somewhere else. This would make a mockery of Engels's claim that only energy added to the bodies concerned is relevant to this 'Law'.
"Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition)." [Ibid. Bold emphasis added.]
Several examples of this sort of change are given below. The problems these create are discussed at length in Note 5 and Note 6a, where attempts to delineate the boundaries of the local energy budget involved (which would have to be specified in order to prevent remote objects/energy expenditure being allowed to cause proximate change) are all shown to fail.
Moreover, and more significantly, Engels himself considered isomers as an example of the 'Law', even though there is no "development" in this case! [On that, see here.]
Finally, Engels seems to think it is always clear what a single body actually is:
"Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid.]
However, nature is not quite so accommodating. In fact, when we look at the material world, and refuse to impose an a priori schema on it, we see that the picture is not as straightforward as Engels would have us believe. Indeed, as we will also see, it is easy "to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." The reader is again directed to Note 5 and Note 6a for more details.
Tautomers, Resonance And Mesomers
Even more embarrassing for this 'Law' are tautomers; these feature an:
"isomerism in which the isomers change into one another with great ease so that they ordinarily exist together in equilibrium." [Quoted from here.]
Wikipedia characterises them in the following way:
"Tautomers are organic compounds that are interconvertible by a chemical reaction called tautomerization. As most commonly encountered, this reaction results in the formal migration of a hydrogen atom or proton, accompanied by a switch of a single bond and adjacent double bond. In solutions where tautomerization is possible, a chemical equilibrium of the tautomers will be reached. The exact ratio of the tautomers depends on several factors, including temperature, solvent, and pH. The concept of tautomers that are interconvertible by tautomerizations is called tautomerism. Tautomerism is a special case of structural isomerism and can play an important role in non-canonical base pairing in DNA and especially RNA molecules.
"Tautomerizations are catalyzed by:
"1. base (a. deprotonation; b. formation of a delocalized anion (e.g. an enolate); c. protonation at a different position of the anion).
"2. acids (a. protonation; b. formation of a delocalized cation; c. deprotonation at a different position adjacent to the cation).
"Common tautomeric pairs are:
"3. ketone -- enol, e.g. for acetone (see: keto-enol tautomerism).
"4. amide -- imidic acid, e.g. during nitrile hydrolysis reactions.
"5. lactam -- lactim, an amide -- imidic acid tautomerism in heterocyclic rings, e.g. in the nucleobases guanine, thymine, and cytosine.
"7. enamine -- enamine, e.g. during pyridoxalphosphate catalyzed enzymatic reactions.
"Prototropic tautomerism refers to the relocation of a proton, as in the above examples, and may be considered a subset of acid-base behaviour. Prototropic tautomers are sets of isomeric protonation states with the same empirical formula and total charge.
"Annular tautomerism is a type of prototropic tautomerism where a proton can occupy two or more positions of a heterocyclic system. for example, 1H- and 3H-imidazole; 1H-, 2H- and 4H- 1,2,4-triazole; 1H- and 2H- isoindole.
"Ring-chain tautomerism occurs when the movement of the proton is accompanied by a change from an open structure to a ring, such as the aldehyde and pyran forms of glucose.
"Valence tautomerism is distinct from prototropic tautomerism, and involves processes with rapid reorganisation of bonding electrons. An example of this type of tautomerism can be found in bullvalene. Another example is open and closed forms of certain heterocycles, such as azide -- tetrazole. Valence tautomerism requires a change in molecular geometry and should not be confused with canonical resonance structures or mesomers." [Quoted from here; accessed 05/10/08. Paragraph numbering altered; spelling changed to conform to UK English.]
One standard Organic text defines tautomers as follows:
"Tautomers are isomers differing only in the position of hydrogen atoms and electrons. Otherwise the carbon skeleton is the same." [Clayden et al (2001), p.205.]
On enol tautomerism, it adds:
"In the case of dimedone, the enol must be formed by a transfer of a proton from the central CH2 group of the keto form to one of the OH groups.
"Notice that there is no change in pH -- a proton is lost from carbon and gained on oxygen. The reaction is known as enolization as it is the conversion of a carbonyl compound into an enol. It is a strange reaction in which little happens. The product is almost always the same as the starting material since the only change is the transfer of one proton and the shift of the double bond." [Ibid., pp.524-25.]
Even though many of these reactions require catalysts (which add no energy or matter to the original compounds), these are qualitatively different substances, refuting the first 'Law'. This is a particularly intractable series of counter-examples because it involves the "development" of one substance into another.
Resonance (mesomerism) is more controversial,4a0 but no less fatal to this 'Law':
"Though resonance is often introduced in such a diagrammatic form in elementary chemistry, it actually has a deeper significance in the mathematical formalism of valence bond theory (VB). When a molecule cannot be represented by the standard tools of valence bond theory (promotion, hybridisation, orbital overlap, sigma and pi bond formation) because no single structure predicted by VB can account for all the properties of the molecule, one invokes the concept of resonance.
"Valence bond theory gives us a model for benzene where each carbon atom makes two sigma bonds with its neighbouring carbon atoms and one with a hydrogen atom. But since carbon is tetravalent, it has the ability to form one more bond. In VB it can form this extra bond with either of the neighbouring carbon atoms, giving rise to the familiar Kekulé ring structure. But this cannot account for all carbon-carbon bond lengths being equal in benzene. A solution is to write the actual wavefunction of the molecule as a linear superposition of the two possible Kekulé structures (or rather the wavefunctions representing these structures), creating a wavefunction that is neither of its components but rather a superposition of them, just as in the vector analogy above (which is formally equivalent to this situation).
"In benzene both Kekulé structures have equal weight, but this need not be the case. In general, the superposition is written with undetermined constant coefficients, which are then variationally optimized to find the lowest possible energy for the given set of basis wavefunctions. This is taken to be the best approximation that can be made to the real structure, though a better one may be made with addition of more structures.
"In molecular orbital theory, the main alternative to VB, resonance often (but not always) translates to a delocalization of electrons in pi orbitals (which are a separate concept from pi bonds in VB). For example, in benzene, the MO model gives us 6 pi electrons completely delocalised over all 6 carbon atoms, thus contributing something like half-bonds. This MO interpretation has inspired the picture of the benzene ring as a hexagon with a circle inside. Often when describing benzene the VB picture and the MO picture are intermixed, talking both about localized sigma 'bonds' (strictly a concept from VB) and 'delocalized' pi electrons (strictly a concept from MO)." [Quoted from here; accessed 05/10/08.]
Figure One: Examples Of Resonance
In view of the fact that these are distinct qualitative variations on a common theme, created by no new energy or matter, it seems that this luckless first 'Law' is refuted once more.
Counter-Examples Just Keep Stacking-Up
Moving into Physics: if two or more forces are aligned differently, the qualitative results will invariably be altered (even when the overall magnitude of each force is held constant).
Consider just one example: let forces F1 and F2 be situated in parallel (but not along the same line of action), but diametrically opposed to one another. Here these two forces can exercise a turning effect on a suitably placed body. Now, arrange the same two forces in like manner so that they are still parallel, but act diametrically along the same line. In this case, as seems clear, these forces will have no turning effect on the same body. Change in quality with no change in quantity, once more. Since there are many ways to align forces (as there are with other vector quantities, like velocities and accelerations, etc.), there are countless counter-examples to this rather pathetic first 'Law' here alone.4a
Perhaps more significantly, this 'Law' takes no account of qualitative changes that result from (energetically-neutral) ordering relations in nature and society. Here, identical physical structures and processes can be ordered differently to create significant qualitative changes. One example is the different ordering principles found in music, where an alteration to a sequence of the same notes in a chord or in a melody can have a major qualitative impact on harmony, with no quantitative change anywhere apparent. So, the same seven notes (i.e., tones and semi-tones) arranged in different modes (Ionian, Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Mixolydian, Aolean and Locrian) sound totally different to the human ear. Of course, there are other ways of altering the quality of music in an energetically neutral environment over and above this (such as timing).
Another example along the same lines concerns the ordering principles found in language, where significant qualitative changes can result from the re-arrangement of the same parts of speech. For instance, the same number of letters jumbled up can either make sense or no sense -- as in "dialectics" and "csdileati" (which is "dialectics" scrambled up; but, which one of these two makes the more sense I will leave to the reader to decide).
Perhaps more radically, the same words can mean something qualitatively new if sequenced differently, as in, say: "The cat is on the mat" and "The mat is on the cat". Or, even worse: "It is impossible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic", compared with "It is impossible to understand Hegel's Logic, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Marx's Capital." Here there is considerable qualitative difference with no quantitative change at all.
[What are the odds that Engels would have tried to alter his first 'Law' to counter that awkward fact?]
There are many other examples of this phenomenon, but a few more should suffice for the purposes of this web site: a successful strike (one that is, say, planned first then actioned second) could turn into its opposite (if it is actioned first and planned second). Now even though the total energy input here would be ordered differently in each case, the overall energy budget of the system (howsoever that is characterised) need not be any different. So, the addition of no extra matter or energy here can turn successful action into disaster if the order of events is reversed. Of course, we can all imagine situations where this particular example could involve different energy budgets, but this is not necessarily the case, which is all I need.
There are literally thousands of everyday examples of such qualitative changes (where there are no obvious associated quantitative differences), so many in fact that Engels's first 'Law' begins to look even more pathetic in comparison. Who for example would put food on the table then a plate on top of it? A change in the order here would constitute a qualitatively different (and more normal) act: plate first, food second. Which of us would jump out of an aeroplane first and put their parachute on second -- or cross a road first, look second? And is there a sane person on the planet who goes to the toilet first and gets out of bed second? Moreover, only an idiot would pour 500 ml of water slowly into 1000 ml of concentrated Sulphuric Acid, whereas, someone who knew what they were doing would readily do the reverse. But all of these have profound qualitative differences if performed in the wrong order (for the same energy budget).5
How could Engels have missed examples like these? Is dialectical myopia so crippling that it prevents dialecticians using their common sense?
Pushing these ideas further: context, too, can affect quality in a quantitatively neutral environment. So, a dead body in a living room has a different qualitative significance compared to that same body in the morgue (for the same energy input). A million pounds in my bank account has a different qualitative feel to it if compared to the same money in your account (and vice versa). "Ceci nest pa une pipe" has a different qualitative aspect if appended to a picture of a pipe, compared to being attached to a picture of, say, a cigarette.
Indeed, "Ceci nest pa une pipe" itself can change from qualitatively false to true depending on how it is interpreted. Hence, as a depiction of what the painting by Magritte is about (i.e., a pipe) it is false. But, despite this, it is also literally true, since manifestly a picture of a pipe is not a pipe! Change in quality here, but no change in quantity.6
Figure Two: Gallic Refutation
Furthermore, qualitative change can be induced by other qualitative changes, contrary to Engels's claim:
"...[Q]ualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion...." [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added]
For example, in a 1:1 mixture of paint, one litre of brown can be made by mixing two half litres each of red and green, but the same qualitative effect can be achieved by using less or more of both (say, 2 litres of each), but in the same ratio. Here a change in the quantity of mixed paints has no effect on the qualitative properties of the mixture (i.e., its colour), while the qualities mixed do. In this case, two qualities (two colours) will have changed into a new quality (a new colour) when mixed. Not only do the same amounts (and proportions) of red and green paint exist before and after mixing, for any fixed amount of each, the two former qualities will have merged into a single one. Qualitative change produced by qualitative change.
Of course, it could be argued that the mixture contains more paint than before (which means that there actually has been a quantitative change), but this is not so. In general, prior to mixing there were n litres of each colour (and 2n litres of both) preserving the 1:1 ratio; after mixing the same amount of paint still exists, namely n litres of each (and 2n litres of both, for any n), still preserving the 1:1 proportion. The qualitative change in colour has nothing to do with the quantities involved, but everything to do with the mixing of the two previous qualities in the same ratio.
To be sure, if the ratio of the mixed paints were changed, a different qualitative outcome would emerge, but as noted above, even this does not happen "nodally", and so it seems to be of little relevance to the first 'Law'. But, if the ratio is kept the same, we would have here a change in quality created by qualities only, and not by an increase in quantity.6a
Something similar can be achieved with the mixing of most chemicals, as it can with light, sound and taste.7
Matter in general is thus reassuringly non-dialectical.
Other instances of qualitative change where there is no implied change in quantity include the following: the "Big Bang" (if it actually happened) led to the formation of a whole universe of qualitative changes, with no overall increase in energy or matter (in the universe). Now, here we have a massive change in quality (with Galaxies and planets, and all the rest, emerging out of the original debris) with no overall change in the quantity of energy (in the universe) --, unless, of course, we think to alter energy conservation laws just to save DM's neck.
On the other hand, if the 'Big Bang' is rejected, and an infinite universe is postulated, since there can be no increase in energy in the entire universe, any qualitative changes in nature will occur with no increase in universal energy.
More counter-examples rapidly stack up: a child living in, say, Paris can become an orphan (qualitative change) if both of its parents die in South Africa (meaning that no quantitative change will have happened to that child -- unless, of course, we are meant to re-interpret a change in a distant geographical/familial relation as a quantitative change).
The largest cut diamond on earth (in a safe, say, in New York) could change into the second biggest if another bigger diamond is cut in, say, Amsterdam. This example also applies to other remote changes. For example, the biggest star in a galaxy could become the second biggest if another star hundreds of millions of light years away (but in the same galaxy) grows in size (perhaps over millions of years) through accretion of matter. So, in both cases, there would be a qualitative change to the first object with no relevant matter or energy added or subtracted from/to that object. There are countless examples of remote change like this.
A cheque drawn, say, in New York will become instantaneously worthless (qualitative change) if the issuing bank in Tokyo goes bust (meaning that no quantitative change will have happened to that cheque).
A Silver Medallist in, say, the Olympics can become the Gold Medal winner in an event (qualitative change) if the former Gold medallist is disqualified because of drug-taking (meaning that no quantitative change will have occurred to that Silver Medallist).
Two identical "Keep off the Grass" signs can mean something different (qualitative change) if one of them is posted on a garden lawn and the other is positioned near a stand of Marijuana plants, at the same height above sea level (thus with no difference in energy).
A circle looks like an ellipse (qualitative change) when viewed from certain angles for no change in energy.
The same three mathematical (or physical) points can undergo a qualitative change if, say, from being arranged linearly they are then re-arranged as the corners of a triangle (with no energy added to these points). Here, there would be a qualitative change with no quantitative change, once again. There are, of course, a potentially infinite number of examples of that sort of change imaginable for 2-, or 3-dimensional shapes, for n points (be they mathematical or physical -- so this is not necessarily an abstract set of counter-instances).8
In The Soup, And Vice Versa
Worse still, as we saw earlier, the aforementioned "reciprocal" "vice versa" codicil attached by Engels to this 'Law' renders it totally useless -- if not completely crazy --, for it suggests, for instance, that qualitative change can effect quantitative material change. Consider this example of Trotsky's:
"A housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into quality…." [Trotsky (1971), p.106.]
Now, this is not an unsympathetic interpretation on my part, for, as we have already seen, Engels himself signed up to it:
"Yet the 'mechanical' conception amounts to nothing else. It explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from quantitative ones, and overlooks that the relation of quality and quantity is reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place." [Engels (1954) p.253. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
And so did Novack:
"The dialectical process of development does not end with the transformation of quantity into quality…. The process continues in the opposite direction and converts new quality into new quantity." [Novack (1971), p.92.]
This suggest that changes in quality should induce quantitative changes, that is, that new matter or energy should be created merely by qualitative change!
Hence, if this vice versa codicil is to work here, a qualitative change from, say, unpalatable soup to tasty-soup would in effect produce a quantitative pay-off: it must cause soup to have more salt in it! Clearly this magic trick will be of interest to those who still (foolishly) think that matter and energy cannot be created ex nihilo. And yet there seems to be no other way of reading the vice versa codicil except as just such a 'metaphysical blank cheque'.
Nevertheless, it is worth examining Trotsky's anecdote more closely, since it will help expose the many serious errors and confusions that afflict even the few examples dialecticians have scraped-together to illustrate their 'Law.'
"Every individual is a dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into quality…. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox are equipped with Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All this demonstrates, in passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic and the dialectic, are not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather expressions of the actual inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense the universe is permeated with ‘unconscious’ dialectics." [Trotsky (1971), pp.106-07.]
But, what exactly did Trotsky imagine the change of quantity into quality to be, here?
Does an increase in the quantity of salt alter its own quality? Presumably not. Does the quantity of soup change? Perhaps only marginally; but even so, the quantity of soup is not what allegedly changed its own quality -- that is supposed to have resulted from the quantity of salt added.
In fact, the quantity of the original soup has not actually changed -- merely the quantity of the salt/soup mixture --; and neither has the quality of the salt altered (just its alleged quantity).
What appears to have happened (in this less than half-formed 'thought experiment') is that the addition of too much salt to the soup is supposed to change the taste of the resulting salt/soup mixture as it is experienced by the taster (perhaps the woman in this case). Hence, at a certain ("nodal") point, an increase in the quantity of salt alters the quality (i.e., the taste) of the soup, so that its acceptability changes either side of that point.
But once more, even here the increased quantity of the salt has not passed over into any change in its own quality. What has occurred is that one quality (a palatable taste) has morphed into another quality (an unpalatable taste) as a result of a quantitative change made to one ingredient (salt) added to the salt/soup mixture. So, a certain quality of the soup has changed from being acceptable to being unacceptable as a result of the increased quantity of salt the mixture contains.
However, the relevant quality of the added salt remains the same no matter how much is added. Salt is Sodium Chloride (largely), and it tastes salty whether it is delivered by the spoon, the bucket or the train-load. In that case, neither the quantity nor the quality of the salt has "passed over" into anything; there does not therefore seem to be anything in the initial part of this story for that particular aspect of the salt to "pass over" into.
Consequently, the first half of this 'Law' is either mis-stated or it does not apply in this case.
As far as the second half is concerned (i.e., the alleged alteration in quality), the postulated change relates to the taste of the soup. But manifestly, the soup remains salty no matter how much salt is poured in, as we saw. What we have here is a batch of soup that becomes increasingly salty as more salt is added.
What qualitative change then is meant to have taken place? Again, it seems that this change relates to the acceptability of the taste of the soup as perceived by the taster. Hence, at -- or slightly beyond -- the alleged "nodal" point, the taste of the soup will become objectionable to this taster. But if so, this particular change is surely confined to the one doing the tasting. Manifestly, it is not the soup that alters in this respect. On one side of the "nodal" point the soup is objectively salty (i.e., it contains dissolved salt); on the other side it is still objectively salty, but with more salt in it. The difference is that on one side, the taster tolerated the taste and continued to like it, but on the other side the taste became intolerable and she ceased to enjoy what she was eating. So, this means that the soup itself has not actually changed in this respect, merely the taster's appreciation of it that has.
So, it now seems that a change in the quantity (of salt) does not actually affect the soup –- except, perhaps, its volume (very slightly), and its composition as a salt/soup mixture. No matter how much salt is dumped into the soup it remains just that, a salt/soup mixture, only with higher proportions of the former ingredient -– and this is so even at the limit where it perhaps turns into sludge or a semi-solid lump, or whatever. A trillion tons of salt can't change that.8a
Consequently, even with respect to the relevant quality (interpreting the latter as this salt/soup mixture, if it can be so described), the concoction does not change (or, at least, not in a way that is relevant to Trotsky's purposes). Hence, a change in the quantity of salt has not "passed over" into a change in the quality of the soup (as soup), which means that the second part of this 'Law' seems to be defective, too.
If there is a qualitative change anywhere here at all (that is relevant to the point Trotsky is making) it seems to occur in the third party -– that is, in the taster. We are forced to interpret things this way unless, of course, we are to suppose that tastes actually reside 'objectively' in soups, as one of their alleged 'primary' qualities. If that were so, qualities like this (that reside in soups, and not solely in tasters) would have to be able to alter 'objectively', even when they are not being tasted! But, it can't mean that; no sane dialectician (one imagines!) believes that tastes reside in the objects we eat. Hence, if this 'Law' is to work in this case, the qualitative change must be said to reside in the soup-taster, not the soup.8b
If so, that aspect of the change here must have been induced by a quantitative change in the taster, if the 'Law' is to apply to her. But, what quantitative change could have taken place in this taster that might have prompted a corresponding change in (her) quality, or in her changed perception of a quality? Apparently none at all -- or, none that Trotsky mentioned, and none that is obvious.
Plainly here, it was a quantitative change in the salt/soup mixture that altered its quality as it was apparent to that taster, but it had no effect on a quality actually in the soup (as previous comments sought to show -- tastes do not reside in soups!). But, once again, there would now seem to be no quantitative change in the taster that initiated a corresponding qualitative change in her.
In that case, the best that can be made of this half-baked example is that while quantitative change leads to no qualitative change in some things (i.e., soups), it can prompt certain 'qualitative' changes in other things (i.e., tasters), the latter of which were not caused by any quantitative changes in those things themselves, but by something altogether mysterious.
So, the second part of the 'Law' is now doubly defective.
Of course, it could be objected that there is indeed a quantitative change in the said taster, namely the quantitative increase in salt atoms hitting her tongue. But, this just pushes the problem one stage further back, for unless we are to suppose that tastes reside in salt molecules (or in Sodium and Chlorine ions), the qualitative change we seek will still have occurred in the taster and not in the chemicals in her mouth -- and we are back where we were earlier. There seems to be no quantitative change to the taster apparent here; she does not grow another tongue or gain some more taste buds. It is undeniable that there will have been an increase in salt molecules hitting her tongue, and that these will have a causal effect on the change of taste as she perceives it, but even given all that, no change in quantity to the taster herself will have occurred.
Again, it could be objected that there is a material/energetic change here; matter or energy will have been transferred to the taster (and/or her central nervous system) which causes her to experience a qualitative change in her appreciation of the soup.
In fact, what has happened is that the original salt has merged/interacted with the taster's tongue/nervous system upon being ingested. But, it is at precisely that point that the earlier problems associated with the salt/soup mixture now transfer to the salt/nervous system 'mixture'. Since tastes do not exist in nerves any more than they exist in soups, we are no further forward. And as far as changes to the quantity of the taster is concerned, this will depend on how we draw the boundaries between inorganic salt molecules and living cells. Since this is considered in more detail below, no more will be said about it here.
In any case, it seems rather odd to describe a change in taste (or in the appreciation of taste) as a qualitative change to a taster, whatever caused it. As the term "quality" is understood by dialecticians, this cannot actually be a qualitative change of the sort they require. Qualities, as characterised by dialecticians (or, rather, by those that bother to say what they mean by this word), are those properties of bodies/processes that make them what they are, alteration to which will change that body/process into something else:
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity and measure.
"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124, §85.]
As the Glossary at the Marx Internet Archive notes:
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else.
"Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative change'.
"In Hegel's Logic, Quality is the first division of Being, when the world is just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from here.]
This is an Aristotelian notion (more on this in another Essay). As Kuusinen points out:
"The totality of essential features that make a particular thing or phenomenon what it is and distinguishes it from others, is called its quality.... It is...[a] concept that denotes the inseparable distinguishing features, the inner structure, constituting the definiteness of a phenomenon and without which it cease to be what it is." [Kuusinen (1961), pp.83-84. Italic emphasis in the original.]
But, it is not at all clear that someone's liking/not liking soup defines them as a person -- or as a being of a particular sort. While scientists might decide to classify certain aspects of nature (placing them in whatever categories they see fit), none, as far as I am aware, has so far identified two different sorts of human beings: "soup-likers for n milligrams of salt per m litres of soup versus soup-dislikers for the same or different n or m". And even if they were to do this, that would save this part of DM by mere re-definition, since it is reasonably clear that these two different sorts of human beings do not actually exist -- , or, at least, they didn't until I just invented them. Once again, that would make this part of DM eminently subjective, since it indicates that changes in quality are now relative to an observer's choice of descriptive framework. Plainly, this introduces a fundamental element of arbitrariness into what dialecticians claim to be a scientific law.
If so, this particular change cannot apply to any of the qualities governed by DM/Hegelian principles (even if we knew what these were, and even if there were any). So, it now seems that this putative example of Q«Q [i.e., the change of Quantity into Quality] either undermines the meaning of a key DM-concept on which it was apparently based (i.e., "quality"), vitiating its applicability in this instance -- or it isn't even an example of the operation of this 'Law'!
Given this new twist, it now seems that quantitative changes to material bodies (such as salt/soup mixtures) actually cause changes to sensory systems (of a vague and perhaps non-quantitative -- or even non-qualitative -- kind); these in turn bring about some sort of qualitative change in the sensory modalities of some/any of the tasters involved. If this is so, the original 'Law' was woefully wide of the mark; it should have read something like the following:
E1: Change in quantity merely causes change in quantity to material bodies [no misprint!], but at a certain point this causes qualitative alterations (but these might not be Hegelian, or even neo-Aristotelian, qualities) to the way some human beings perceive the world, even though the latter have not undergone a quantitative change themselves.
Put like this, it is not at all certain that anyone would conclude this (or anything at all like it) from cooking soup (as Trotsky maintained)! And we can be pretty sure about this since not even Engels got close to this more accurate version of his own 'Law'. And neither did Trotsky! It is scarcely credible therefore that non-dialectical cooks, workers, or anyone else for that matter, would advance much further -- or even so far -– based only on their own experience.
Of course, this can only mean that peasant cooks are not "unconscious dialecticians", and neither is anyone else outside the DM-fraternity --, and this is probably because they are not quite so easily conned by Idealists.
Nevertheless, the above 'definitions' of "quantity" and "quality" are not without their own problems.
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being, containing the three grades of quality, quantity and measure.
"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124, §85.]
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else.
"Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative change'.
"In Hegel's Logic, Quality is the first division of Being, when the world is just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from here.]
First of all, it is not too clear if there is a real distinction between "quantity" and "quality" here" if we rely on what Hegel says:
"[A] house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124, §85.]
For Hegel, house size seems to be the "quantity", here, but beyond a certain size, houses are no longer houses. Hence, a 'house' the size of a grain of sand is not a house. Isn't this a "qualitative" change? And, extremely dark red is no longer red (since it is indistinguishable from black). Another "qualitative" change? In that case, there seems to be no clear distinction between what is "quantitative" and "what is "qualitative" change here. And it is no use appealing to the 'get-out-of-a-hole-free-dialectics-card', saying that quantity has "passed over" into quality in these instances, since this slide affects the definition of these two terms. If we have no clear idea what we are talking about, then it is not possible to say what has "passed over" into what.
Secondly, as we have seen the phrases "something new" and "ceasing to be what it is" are also somewhat vague. We are not told what constitutes novelty or "ceasing to be" here. As we have seen, dialecticians including Hegel regard ice, water and steam as "something new" when we now know they are not. But this allows dialecticians to apply this 'Law' when and where they like, just as it allows them to refuse to accept certain counter-examples to it when and where they like. Several of the ones listed above will be rejected out-of-hand by dialecticians as bogus counter-examples on just such lines. For example, the heating of water from cold to very hot is a "qualitative" non-"nodal" change by ordinary standards, but it produces nothing "new" -- if by "new" we mean "new substance". But, if we mean that, then ice and steam are not "new" either.
What is finally decided upon here will, of course, depend on how we view the status of Aristotelian "essences" (or "essential properties"). However, further discussion will take us too far away form the main topic of this Essay, so no more will be said about it here.8c
'Hard' Science Vs Amateurish Anecdote
The other hackneyed examples DM-theorists regularly dredge up to illustrate this 'Law' (i.e., boiling water, balding heads, Mendeleyev's table, the alleged fighting qualities of Mamelukes, and, of late, Catastrophe and Chaos Theory), in fact only seem to work because of the way that the word "quality" has been 'defined' (or, rather, not clearly defined) by dialecticians.9
For example, in the case of boiling water, the increase in quantity of one item (i.e., heat) is alleged to alter the quality of the second (i.e., water). As noted above, "quality" is characterised in Hegel's work in Aristotelian terms (i.e., as that property which is essential to a substance/process, without which it must change into some other --, or as "determinate being", to use the Hegelian jargon; on this, see Inwood (1992), pp.238-41). And yet, by no stretch of the imagination is liquidity an essential property of water. Either side of the alleged 'qualitative' change, this substance remains H2O. Boling or freezing does not change it into another substance; water in a solid, liquid or gaseous form is still H2O. Quantitative addition or subtraction of energy does not result in a qualitative change of the required sort; no new Hegelian or Aristotelian "quality" emerges here. [On this, also see Note 9.]
Unfortunately, this means that the most widely- and over-used example in the DM-book-of-tricks that supposedly illustrates this 'Law' does not in fact do so!
In that case, this 'Law' should perhaps be re-written in the following way:
E1: An increase in the quantity of one item leads to a change in what is perhaps not one of the qualities of another.
With that, much of the 'metaphysical bite' of this 'Law' disappears; in fact it becomes rather toothless.
In addition, it seems a little odd to describe an increase in heat as an increase in quantity when what happens is that the relevant water molecules just move about faster if energy is fed into the system. Of course, it could be objected that this is precisely Engels's point; since energy can be measured (here, as an increase in heat, say), then that increase in heat is indeed an increase in quantity -- in this case "quantity of motion". But, the original idea appeared in Hegel at a time when heat was regarded as a substance, Caloric. [For Hegel's view, see here.] We now know that what really happens is that molecules just move faster -- after having interacted with still other faster moving molecules. [This is something Engels admits anyway; see Engels (1954), pp.63-64.]
So, when Engels speaks here of an increase in energy and a quantitative increase, he was either using a façon de parler, or he had not quite abandoned the old idea that heat is a substance. Of course, we might still want to call this phenomenon an increase in "energy" if we so wish, but if we do, that would merely plunge this part of the first 'Law' into complete darkness, since the word "energy" (if it is not a façon de parler) is not the name of an identifiable substance that can be qualified in this way.10
Furthermore, using "quantity" to depict the change in motion of molecules is somewhat dubious, too. Certainly, we can speak of an increase in velocity here, but there is no such thing as a quantity of velocity that could sensibly said to increase. Velocity is not a substance either, and although we certainly use numbers to depict it, we do not refer to anything called the "quantity of velocity" (except again, perhaps as a façon de parler). Since velocity is a vector, its magnitude is given by a scalar, but velocity itself is just that scalar operating in a that direction. To call the magnitude of a vector a "quantity" would be to confuse a vector (or indeed a direction) with a substance.
And this is not mere pedantry. As we saw above, this is in line with Hegel's own definition of the word:
"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124, §85.]
This too is underlined by the Glossary at the Marx Internet Archive:
"Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else.
"Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative change'.
"In Hegel's Logic, Quality is the first division of Being, when the world is just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from here.]
Hence, if we adhere to this definition strictly, there can be no "quantity" of energy, because it is not a "thing", or an "aspect" of a thing in any meaningful sense of these words.
Nevertheless, even if it were appropriate to depict things in this way, neither the heat nor the faster molecules change in quality themselves. Any amount of heat still stays as heat; motion is still motion. Hence, this aspect of the 'Law' does not seem to apply to these 'phenomena'. In that case, the first 'Law' should now perhaps be re-written along the following lines:
E2: An increase in the quantity of one item (e.g., heat) leads to no qualitative change in that item, while it can cause an alteration in the quality of another item (e.g., water), which will in turn have changed in quality while undergoing no quantitative change itself -- but which qualitative change is inadmissible anyway since it is not a quality definitive of the latter (e.g., water as H2O).
This is not an impressive 'Law'; still less is this hackneyed example a convincing instance of it.
As far as balding heads are concerned, it is not easy to see how this over-worked example illustrates the first 'Law' either. This is because it is difficult to believe that someone with, say, n hairs on his or her head is hirsute, when the same person with n-1 hairs is objectively bald -- even if at some point or other (and not necessarily the same point) we all might subjectively change the words we use to depict either.
Now, if it could be shown that those with precisely n-1 hairs on their heads (for some specific n) are always objectively bald, and that this is an essential defining quality of baldness, or of bald people (in the Aristotelian/Hegelian sense just mentioned), so that a change from n to n-1 hairs always results in baldness, and which rule is true for all hirsute human beings, then the first 'Law' might have some life left in it in just this one instance. It could then be a dialectical 'Law' that applies only to balding parts of nature, but nothing else. [Which is longhand for saying it cannot therefore be a law.]
Nevertheless, even this is not so. With respect to baldness, human anatomists (or even hairdressers) have yet to define hair loss in such Aristotelian terms. Hence, and unfortunately for DM-fans, they have so far failed to categorise all follically-challenged individuals this precisely, declaring that anyone with n-1 hairs is essentially bald, whereas anyone with n hairs is still essentially non-coot. Until they do, there are no "nodal" points here, just as there seem to be no particular (Aristotelian/Hegelian) qualities definitive of bald human beings for dialecticians to latch onto. So, in this case, it is impossible to see how an 'objective' example of this dialectical 'Law' could apply --, merely a 'subjective' impression, and one that has to rely on a quirky application of an already vague Aristotelian/Hegelian 'definition' of "quality".
So it seems that the change in quality, if it occurs, takes place not in the person going bald, but in the one describing him/her/it as bald. In that case, with respect to human balding, change in the quantity of hair on one person's head will merely change the quality of someone else's opinion of him/her, and even that occurs subjectively and (possibly even) non-"nodally".
There isn't much here on which to base a dialectical 'Law', at least nothing that would fail to brand this part of DM as a fringe science, at best.
As far as the other examples dialecticians use to illustrate this 'Law' are concerned: there are far too few in number that actually work (even if the above difficulties are ignored) to justify the epithet "Law" being attached to one and all. If in comparison, say, Newton's Second Law of motion worked as fitfully as this 'Law' does (or was as vaguely-defined and was as non-mathematical), physicists would be right to refuse to describe it as a law. Hence, if the rate of change of momentum were in fact proportional to the applied force in only a few instances (and even then this was the case only if key terms were either ignored, remained ill-defined or were twisted out of shape), no one would have taken Newton seriously.
But, this is Mickey Mouse Science, after all.
In general, however, the examples usually given by DM-fans to illustrate this 'Law' are almost without exception either anecdotal or impressionistic. If someone were to submit a paper to a science journal purporting to establish the veracity of a new law with the same level of vagueness, imprecision, triteness, lack of detail/mathematics, and overall theoretical naivety, it would be rejected out-of-hand at the first stage. Indeed, dialecticians would themselves treat with derision any attempt to establish, say, either the truth of classical economic theory or the falsity of Marx's own work with an evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as this --, to say nothing of the contempt they would show for theoretical wooliness of this sort. In such circumstances, those who might be quick to cry "pedantry" at the issues raised in this and other Essays published at this site would become devoted pedants, and nit-pick with the best at such inferior anti-Marxist work.
[Indeed, they do this to my work, too; in one breath they complain about "pedantry", in the next they home in on what they assume are minor errors. Here is just the latest example; concentrate on the comments of one "Gilhyle".]
Now, anyone who has studied or practiced real science will know this to be true. It is only in books on DM (and internet discussion boards) that Mickey Mouse material of this sort seems acceptable. [Once more, the above link is an excellent recent example of this trait.]10a
At this point we might wonder where Engels's predilection for Mickey Mouse Science came from. After all, he was familiar with the careful and detailed work of contemporary scientists (like Darwin). Why then was he prepared top assert his 'Laws' were indeed laws on the basis of very little primary data (or none at all), secondary or tertiary (but nonetheless selective) evidence and sloppy analysis? We need look no further than Hegel for a clue here, for Hegel was the original Mickey Mouse Scientist (making Engels merely the Sorcerer's Apprentice).
Figure Three: Researching For A PhD In Dialectics?
Here is Hegel's 'detailed proof':
"The system of natural numbers already shows a nodal line of qualitative moments which emerge in a merely external succession. It is on the one hand a merely quantitative progress and regress, a perpetual adding or subtracting, so that each number has the same arithmetical relation to the one before it and after it, as these have to their predecessors and successors, and so on. But the numbers so formed also have a specific relation to other numbers preceding and following them, being either an integral multiple of one of them or else a power or a root. In the musical scale which is built up on quantitative differences, a quantum gives rise to an harmonious relation without its own relation to those on either side of it in the scale differing from the relation between these again and their predecessors and successors. While successive notes seem to be at an ever-increasing distance from the keynote, or numbers in succeeding each other arithmetically seem only to become other numbers, the fact is that there suddenly emerges a return, a surprising accord, of which no hint was given by the quality of what immediately preceded it, but which appears as an actio in distans [action at distance -- RL], as a connection with something far removed. There is a sudden interruption of the succession of merely indifferent relations which do not alter the preceding specific reality or do not even form any such, and although the succession is continued quantitatively in the same manner, a specific relation breaks in per saltum [leaps -- RL].
"Such qualitative nodes and leaps occur in chemical combinations when the mixture proportions are progressively altered; at certain points in the scale of mixtures, two substances form products exhibiting particular qualities. These products are distinguished from one another not merely by a more or less, and they are not already present, or only perhaps in a weaker degree, in the proportions close to the nodal proportions, but are bound up with these nodes themselves. For example, different oxides of nitrogen and nitric acids having essentially different qualities are formed only when oxygen and nitrogen are combined in certain specific proportions, and no such specific compounds are formed by the intermediate proportions. Metal oxides, e.g. the lead oxides, are formed at certain quantitative points of oxidation and are distinguished by colours and other qualities. They do not pass gradually into one another; the proportions lying in between these nodes do not produce a neutral or a specific substance. Without having passed through the intervening stages, a specific compound appears which is based on a measure relation and possesses characteristic qualities. Again, water when its temperature is altered does not merely get more or less hot but passes through from the liquid into either the solid or gaseous states; these states do not appear gradually; on the contrary, each new state appears as a leap, suddenly interrupting and checking the gradual succession of temperature changes at these points. Every birth and death, far from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is the leap from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration.
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state.
"In thinking about the gradualness of the coming-to-be of something, it is ordinarily assumed that what comes to be is already sensibly or actually in existence; it is not yet perceptible only because of its smallness. Similarly with the gradual disappearance of something, the non-being or other which takes its place is likewise assumed to be really there, only not observable, and there, too, not in the sense of being implicitly or ideally contained in the first something, but really there, only not observable. In this way, the form of the in-itself, the inner being of something before it actually exists, is transformed into a smallness of an outer existence, and the essential difference, that of the Notion, is converted into an external difference of mere magnitude. The attempt to explain coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be on the basis of gradualness of the alteration is tedious like any tautology; what comes to be or ceases to be is assumed as already complete and in existence beforehand and the alteration is turned into a mere change of an external difference, with the result that the explanation is in fact a mere tautology. The intellectual difficulty attendant on such an attempted explanation comes from the qualitative transition from something into its other in general, and then into its opposite; but the identity and the alteration are misrepresented as the indifferent, external determinations of the quantitative sphere.
"In the moral sphere, in so far as it is considered under the categories of being, there occurs the same transition from quantity into quality and different qualities appear to be based in a difference of magnitude.
"It is through a more or less that the measure of frivolity or thoughtlessness is exceeded and something quite different comes about, namely crime, and thus right becomes wrong and virtue vice. Thus states, too, acquire through their quantitative difference, other things being assumed equal, a distinct qualitative character. With the expansion of the state and an increased number of citizens, the laws and the constitution acquire a different significance. The state has its own measure of magnitude and when this is exceeded this mere change of size renders it liable to instability and disruption under that same constitution which was its good fortune and its strength before its expansion." [Hegel (1999), pp.368-71, §§774-778. Emphases in the original.]
"The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words, these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent authority. On the one hand, the quantitative features of existence may be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other hand, this increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers change. Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no consequence in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase of diminution of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water is converted into steam or ice. A quantitative change takes place, apparently without any further significance: but there is something lurking behind, and a seemingly innocent change of quantity acts as a kind of snare, to catch hold of the quality. The antinomy of Measure which this implies was exemplified under more than one garb among the Greeks. It was asked, for example, whether a single grain makes a heap of wheat, or whether it makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair from the horse’s tail. At first, no doubt, looking at the nature of quantity as an indifferent and external character of being, we are disposed to answer these questions in the negative. And yet, as we must admit, this indifferent increase and diminution has its limit: a point is finally reached, where a single additional grain makes a heap of wheat; and the bald-tail is produced, if we continue plucking out single hairs. These examples find a parallel in the story of the peasant who, as his ass trudged cheerfully along, went on adding ounce after ounce to its load, till at length it sunk under the unendurable burden. It would be a mistake to treat these examples as pedantic futility; they really turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is of great importance in practical life, especially in ethics. Thus in the matter of expenditure, there is a certain latitude within which a more or less does not matter; but when the Measure, imposed by the individual circumstances of the special case, is exceeded on the one side or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure (as in the above examples of the different temperature of water) makes itself felt, and a course, which a moment before was held good economy, turns into avarice or prodigality. The same principles may be applied in politics, when the constitution of a state has to be looked at as independent of, no less than as dependent on, the extent of its territory, the number of its inhabitants, and other quantitative points of the same kind. If we look, e.g. at a state with a territory of ten thousand square miles and a population of four millions we should, without hesitation, admit that a few square miles of land or a few thousand inhabitants more or less could exercise no essential influence on the character of its constitution. But on the other hand, we must not forget that by the continual increase or diminishing of a state, we finally get to a point where, apart from all other circumstances, this quantitative alteration alone necessarily draws with it an alteration in the quality of the constitution. The constitution of a little Swiss canton does not suit a great kingdom; and, similarly, the constitution of the Roman republic was unsuitable when transferred to the small imperial towns of Germany." [Hegel (1975), pp.158-59.]
Readers will no doubt note that rank amateurism is not confined to Engels (or even Woods and Grant); Hegel could 'amateur' with the best of them.10a1
So, this 'Law' can be made to work in a few selected instances if we bend things enough (and if we fail to define either "quality", "node", "leap", "same body" and "addition of energy" -- or, if we ignore Hegel's own vague 'definition' of "quality" into the bargain). In contrast there are countless examples where this 'Law' does not apply, no matter how we try to twist and bend it.10b
Why Engels's first 'Law' was ever called a law is therefore something of a Dialectical Mystery.
[Other examples to which dialecticians appeal are discussed in more detail in Note 9.]
The Interpenetration Of Opposites
The second 'Law' of dialectics -- unsurprisingly -- fares no better.
We saw above how Engels depicted it:
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]
Here, in a published work, he says more or less the same:
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Engels (1976) p.179. Bold emphasis added.]
Lenin added a few extra details:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58. Emphases in the original.]
It is worth noting at the outset that the doctrine that nature and all it contains is a UO, and that change is powered by their 'contradictory' interaction, is also found in all known mystical religions/philosophies. [More on that in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here). Until that Essay is published, the reader is directed here.]
Dialectics Cannot Explain Change!
Surprisingly, DM-theorists (like Lenin and Engels, quoted above) are decidedly unclear as to whether objects/processes change because of (1) a contradictory relationship between their internal opposites, or because (2) they change into these opposites, or even whether (3) change itself creates such opposites.
[FL = Formal Logic; NON = Negation of the Negation: UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Lenin's words merely illustrate this confusion in an acute form: he speaks, for instance, of the "transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…."
Engels is equally unclear: "[M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other...." The same can be said of Plekhanov:
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77. Bold emphasis added.]
And here is Mao:
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here. Bold emphasis added.]
Once more, this seems to suggest that objects and processes not only change (1) because of their internal opposites, but also that (2) they change into these opposites (and, according to Lenin, they change into all of them!) as a result of their "struggle" with them, as well as (3) that they also produce these opposites while they change --, or they do so as a result of that change.10b1
As we are about to see, this idea -- that there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites" (etc.), which cause change -- presents DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along the lines expressed in the DM-classics (quoted above and at greater length in Note 10b1).
To see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites" O* and O**, and it thus changes as a result.
[The same problems arise if these are viewed as 'external' contradictions. However, as we will see in Essay Eight Part One, the latter option attracts serious difficulties of its own, anyway.]
But, O* cannot itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory, O* could not change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that about. As Gollobin notes:
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other...'" [Gollobin (1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891), p.414.]
Hence,
it is no good propelling O** into the future so that it is now
said to be what
O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless
O** is already there, in the present, to make that happen!
So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of
O* and
not-O*
(interpreting
O** now as not-O*),
how can
O* possibly change into not-O* when
not-O*
already exists?
Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this hermetic hole. Either:
(1) O* 'changes' into not-O*, meaning there would now be two not-O*s where once there was one (unless, of course, one of these not-O*s just vanishes into thin air -- see below); or:
(2) O* does not change, or it disappears. Plainly, O* cannot change into what already exists -- that is, O* cannot change into its opposite, not-O* without there being two of them (see above). But even then, one of these will not be not-O* just a copy of it. In that case, O* either disappears, does not change at all, or changes into something else; or:
(3) Not-O* itself disappears to allow a new (but copy) not-O* to emerge that O* can and does change into. If so, questions would naturally arise as to how the original not-O* could possibly cause O* to change if is has just vanished. Of course, this option merely postpones the evil day, for the same difficulties will afflict the new not-O* that afflicted the old. If it exists in order to allow O* to change, then we are back where we were to begin with.
Anyway, as should seem obvious, among other things already mentioned, alternative (2) plainly means that O* does not in fact change into not-O*, it is just replaced by it. Option (1), on the other hand, has the original not-O* remaining the same (when it was supposed to turn into its own opposite -- O* -- according to the DM-classics), and options (2) and (3) will only work if matter and/or energy can either be destroyed or created from nowhere!
Naturally, these problems will simply re-appear at the next stage as not-O* readies itself to change into whatever it changes into. But, in this case there is an added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O* in existence to make this happen. This means that the dialectical process will grind to a halt, unless a not-not-O* pops into existence to start things up again.
But what could possibly engineer that?
Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how
not-O* itself came about
in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too.
[Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising either his error
or the serious problems this creates.]
But, not-O* cannot have come from
O* itself, since
O* can only change because of the operation of
not-O*,
which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a
'reversed' version of the NON)
will merely reduplicate the above problems.
[However, on the NON, see below.]
Now, it could be objected that all this seems to place objects and/or processes in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of FL. Hence, on that basis, it could be maintained that the above argument is entirely misguided.
Fortunately, repairs are easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal/external opposites" O* and O**, (the latter once again interpreted as not-O*) and it thus develops as a result.
The rest still follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing dialectical union of O* and not-O*, and O* 'develops' into not-O* as a result, how is it possible for O* to change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?
Of course, it could be argued that not-O* 'develops' into O* while not-O* 'develops' into O*.
[This objection might even incorporate that eminently obscure Hegelian term-of-art: "sublation". More on that presently.]
But, if this were so, while it was happening these two would no longer be 'opposites' of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite" to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently 'subjective', once more.
But, if we ignore that 'difficulty' for now, and even supposing it were the case that not-O* 'developed' into O* while not-O* 'developed' into O*, and such process were governed by the obscure term "sublation", this alternative will still not work (as we are about to see).
Indeed, developing this option further before it is demolished, it could be argued that Engels had himself anticipated the above objections when he said:
"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels (1976), pp.172-73. Bold emphases added.]
"But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea....
"But it is clear that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid., pp.180-81. Bold emphases added.]
Engels's argument seems to be that "dialectical negation" is not the same as ordinary negation in that it is not simple destruction. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless, we have already seen here, that Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly suspect, and we will also see below that this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as did Engels).
Well, despite all this, is it the case that the above comments neutralise the argument presented in this part of the Essay? Is the argument here guilty of the following:
"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought." [Ibid.]
To answer this, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites" O* and not-O*, and thus develops as a result. On this scenario, O* would change/develop into a "sublated" intermediary, but not into not-O* -- incidentally, contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier. O* should, of course, change into not-O*, not into some intermediary.
Putting this minor quibble to one side, too, on this 'revised' view, let us suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter, "O*1" (which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation' which also 'preserves'/'sublates').
If so, then O*1 must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-O*1 in existence to make it develop any further.
[Recall that on this 'theory', everything (and that must include O*1) changes because of a 'struggle' with its opposite.]
So, there must be a not-O*1 to make O*1 change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt O*1 from this essential requirement on an ad hoc basis (arguing, perhaps, that O*1 changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that, there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events contained in the DM-classics, which tells us that every thing/process changes because of the operation of opposites (and O*1 is certainly a thing/process). Furthermore, if we make an exemption here, then the whole point of the exercise would be lost, for if some things do and some things do not change according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which changes were and which were not subject to it.
[This would also mean that the second 'Law' was not a 'law' either, just like the first.]
This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively applied exemption certificate (issued to O*1) would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe is in the process of change, and is thus already a 'sublated' version of whatever it used to be.
Ignoring this, too, even if O*1 were to change into not-O*1 (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down by the DM-prophets), then all the earlier problems simply reappear, for this could only take place if not-O*1 already existed to make it happen! But not-O*1 cannot already exist, for O*1 has not changed into it yet!
Once more, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of O* to produce not-O* is not ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.
In that case, let us say that O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite not-O*s, but if that is to happen, according to the Dialectical Gospels, not-O*s must already exist! If so, and yet again, O* cannot turn into not-O*s, for it already exists! On the other hand, if not-O*s does not already exist, then O* cannot change, for O* can only change if it struggles with what it changes into, i.e., not-O*s.
Once again, we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the point; in the real world things manifestly change. For example, it might be the case that John is a boy, but in a few years time it will be the case that John is a man. Now, the fact that other individuals are already men, does not stop John changing into a man (his opposite), as the above argues. So, John can change into his opposite even though that opposite already exists.
Or so it could be claimed.
But, this theory tells us that things/processes change because of a struggle with their opposites, and with what they become. Are we now to assume that John has to struggle with all the individuals that are already men if he is to become a man himself (if we now treat all these other men as John's opposites)? And are we to suppose that John struggles with what he is to become, even before it exists? If not, then the above response is beside the point. And, in view of the fact that John must turn into his opposite, does that mean he has to turn into these other men, or even into one of them? But he must do so if the Dialectical Holy Books are to be believed.
Anyway, according to the DM-worthies quoted above, John can only change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now. Are we now really supposed to believe that "John is a man" is struggling with "John is a boy" -- or that manhood is struggling with boyhood?
Some might be tempted to reply that this is precisely what adolescence is, and yet, in that case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would have to be locked in struggle in the present. [Of course, adolescence cannot struggle with anything, since it is an abstraction.] But, John-as-a-man does not yet exist, and so 'he' cannot struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if John-as-a-man does exist, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful self, then John-as-boy cannot change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already exists!
To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that opposite cannot now exist otherwise John would not need to become him!
Looking at this more concretely, in ten or fifteen years time, John will not become just any man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that John becomes "ManJ". But, once again, ManJ must exist now or John cannot change into him (if the DM-worthies quoted earlier are to be believed), for John can only become a man if he is locked in struggle with his own opposite, ManJ. But, if that is so, John cannot become ManJ since ManJ already exists!
Consider another concrete example: wood being fashioned into a
table. Once more, according to the dialectical classicists, all objects and
processes change because of a 'struggle' of opposites, and they all also change
into those opposites.
So, the wood that is used to make a table, according to this 'theory', has to
'struggle' with what it turns into, that is, this wood has to 'struggle' with
the table it turns into!
In that case, the table must already exist, or it could not 'struggle' with the
wood from which it is to be made.
But, if the table already exists, then the wood cannot be changed into it.
On the other hand, if the table does not already exist, then the wood cannot
'struggle' with its own opposite, that is, it cannot 'struggle' with the table
it has yet to become.
Either way, change could not happen, according to this 'theory'.
And it is little use introducing human agency here, for if a carpenter is required to make a table, then he/she has to 'struggle' with the wood to make it into that table (since we are told that every object and process in nature is governed by this 'Law'). But, according to the Dialectical Holy Books, objects and processes 'struggle' with their dialectical 'opposites', and they turn into those opposites. If so, wood must turn into the carpenter, not the table!
With a crazy theory like this at its core, is it any wonder
Dialectical Marxism is a by-word for failure?10b2
[These, of course, are simply more concrete versions of the argument outlined above.]
Consider another hackneyed example: water turning into steam at 100oC (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe that the opposite that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? This must be so if the Dialectical Saints are to be believed.
Hence, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water turn into steam!
In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!
In fact, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it. To identify it, we shall call it "W1", and the steam molecule it turns into "S1". But, if the DM-Worthies above are correct, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1 could not change into it! Again, if that is so, where does S1 disappear to if W1 changes into it?
In fact, according to the Dialectical Magi, since opposites turn into one another, S1 must change into W1 at the same time as W1 is turning into S1! So while you are boiling a kettle, according to this Superscientific 'theory', steam must be turning back into the water you are boiling, and it must do so at the same rate!
One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.
This must be so, otherwise when W1 turns into S1 -- which already exists, or W1 could not change into it -- there would have to be two S1s where there used to be one! Matter created from nowhere!
Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and to any and all other alleged examples of DM-change).
It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns into is a gas; so the dialectical classicists are correct. However, if we take them at their word, then that gas must 'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if water is to change. But that gas does not yet exist; in which case, water would never boil if this 'theory' were true. But even if it did, it is heat that causes the change not the gas! However we try and slice it, this 'theory' is totally useless -- that is, what little sense can be made of it.
This, of course, does not deny that change occurs, only that DM cannot account for it.
Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.
Whichever way we try to re-package this 'Law' we end up with insuperable problems, ones that cannot simply be Nixoned away.
[As far as social change is concerned, see here, here and here.]
However, all this is, of course, just an elaboration of the following example of a priori Superscience invented by the Mystery-Meister himself:
"Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Hegel (1975), p.174. Bold emphases added.]
As this quotation indicates, and as Essay Eight Part Three will show, Hegel made a quasi-logical attempt to delineate such opposites, but his reasoning was defective from beginning to end, and demonstrably so. The bottom line was that, far from specifying that each object was paired with its unique dialectical 'other', Hegel inadvertently conceded that objects and processes were confronted on all sides by countless 'others'.
Leaving that aside, and ignoring for the moment the question of how Hegel, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov knew this 'Law' was true of everything in the entire universe, for all of time (this topic was examined in more detail in Essay Two), it is worth pointing out that some things seem to have no internally-interconnected opposites. For example, electrons, which, while they appear to have several external opposites (but not only is it not clear what the opposite of an electron is -- is it a positron or is it a proton? --, it is clear electrons do not seem to turn into either of them), they seem to have no internal opposites as far as can be ascertained. In that case, they must be changeless beings -- or, if they do change, that cannot be as a result of their "internal contradictions". Moreover, they do not even change into their alleged external opposites (positrons or protons).10c Admittedly, electrons had only just been discovered in Lenin's day, but that just makes his dogmatism even more puzzling -- especially when it is recalled that it was he who insisted that all knowledge is provisional and relative.
Is Everything A 'Unity Of Opposites'?
[It is worth noting here that these comments depend on what dialecticians mean by an "internal opposite"; sometimes they seem to mean "topologically-internal", sometimes "logically-internal". This ambiguity is examined in more detail in Essay Eight Part One. However, much of this and subsequent sections depend on interpreting "internal opposites" in one way -- topologically. The other alternative (i.e., interpreting "internal opposites" logically) will also be considered presently.]
Despite this, once more, it is difficult to believe Lenin and the others were serious in claiming that everything is a UO -- just as it is impossible to give credence to the idea that "every determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every other…."
Are we really supposed to believe that, say, a domestic cat is a UO? But, what is the opposite of a cat? A dog? A tulip? A tin of beans?
Is it a 'non-cat'? And yet, if a 'non-cat' were the opposite of a cat, it would mean that if everything does indeed change into its opposite, cats must change into everything that they are not -- that is, they must change into any one or more of the following 'non-cats': oak trees, sandy beaches, cuff links, dog baskets, rift valleys, petrol stations and galaxies, to name but a few. [The 'obvious' dialectical response to this objection will be considered shortly.]
Not only that, but according to Lenin cats must contain all these things if they are indeed unities of their opposites (or, they must be "internally related" to them in some way) -- i.e., they must presumably be a unity of cat and 'non-cat' --, especially if the latter (i.e., this 'non-cat') is what causes a cat to change. Is, therefore, each unassuming domestic moggie a repository of all its myriad opposites, and do these opposites contain their own sets of opposites, ad infinitem, like glorified Russian dolls?
Well, it seems they must if, according to Lenin: "every determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every other…." If change is the result of an internal struggle between opposites (declared above to be an "absolute" by Lenin), and everything changes into everything else, then cats must both contain and change into (at some point) a host of things, which must in turn contain and change into even more (or, perhaps, back into cats).10d
It is little use complaining that these are ridiculous conclusions; if everything changes into its opposite, then they must follow. Those who still object should rather pick a fight with dialecticians -- not me -- for championing such a crazy view of reality.
[The obvious objection that this discussion ignores 'mediated essences' is fielded in Note 10e.]10e
Figure Four: Another Dialectical Catastrophe?
So, if cats do change, as they do, then they must change into their opposites. But where are these 'opposite cats'? And how do they feature in and cause the changes they allegedly produce in the original animal? On the other hand, if they do not do this, does this mean that feline parts of nature are not subject to dialectical law? Is this why cats have nine lives?
Now, Engels did try to answer these fatal objections by arguing that we must learn from nature what the actual properties of objects and processes are in each case, and hence, presumably, what each can legitimately change into. [To be sure, he made this point in relation to the first and third of his 'Laws', but there is no reason to believe he would have denied this of the second 'Law'.] Once more, he also pointed out that dialectical negation is not annihilation. [Engels (1954, p.63 and (1976), p.181.]
However, nature is annoyingly ambiguous on this score. For example, lumps of iron ore can turn, or be turned into many different things (with or without the addition of labour, etc.). These include: car parts, aeroplane components, ships, magnets, cutlery, pots and pans, anchors, scaffolding, chains, bollards, cranes, tubes, engines, ornaments, jewellery, girders, weapons, tools, instruments, wire, furniture, doors, gates, railings, railway tracks, wheels, zips, bars, handcuffs, bullets, iron filings, rivets, nails, screws, steel wool, and helmets, cytochrome nitrogenase, haemoglobin, hematite, magnetite, taconite, countless ferrous and ferric compounds (including rust, Ferrous and Ferric Sulphides, Fools Gold, etc., etc.), to name but a few.
Are we to believe that all of these reside inside each lump of iron? How can they all be 'logically-related' to iron ore? If not, what exactly is the point of this 'Law'? Again, if these items don't exist inside each lump of iron -- or even if they do not confront them as antagonistic external or 'logical' opposites --, how is it possible for human labour and/or natural forces to turn iron into such things while remaining in conformity with 'dialectical Law'? Does human labour counteract, or work with the 'Laws' of dialectics? If a lump of iron does not ('logically', or physically) 'contain', say, a carving knife, how is it possible for human beings to change iron into carving knives, and for them to do so dialectically? Are there changes in reality that are not governed by dialectics?
Are these iron 'Laws' not in fact applicable to iron itself?
In that case, exactly which opposites are ('logically'/physically) united in, or with iron ore?
Of course, it could be argued that the above considerations completely misconstrue the nature of this 'Law'. No one supposes that cats and nuggets of iron ore contain their opposites.
Indeed, this is how Woods and Grant explained things:
"Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the 'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion; north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and anti-matter; male and female in biology, odd and even in mathematics; even the concept of 'left and right handedness in relation to the spin of subatomic particles.... There are two kinds of matter, which can be called positive and negative. Like kinds repel and unlike attract." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.65.]11
However, if nature works in pairs (at least), what is the paired opposite of a cat that causes that animal to change? If cats have no opposites, then it must be the case that feline parts of nature (at least) do not work in pairs. But, what applies to cats must surely apply to countless other things. What then are the external and/or internal opposites of things like Giraffes, Snowy Owls, Mountain Gorillas, Daffodils, Oak trees, Chinese Puzzles, broom handles, craters on the Moon, copies of Anti-Dühring, and the question mark at the end of this sentence? All of these are subject to change, but not, it seems, as a result of any obvious oppositional pairing or tension. [Is a question mark, for example, really locked in a life-and-death struggle with other items of punctuation? Or with its Hegelian 'other'? But, what is the 'other' of a "?"? An "!"?]
It could be objected to this that in the case of cats (and many of the other objects listed above), the opposites concerned are plainly "male" and "female". But even if that were so, these are manifestly not "internal opposites" (and neither are they "internally related" to each other -- they are causally, historically and biologically related; sexual diversity is not a logical feature of reality -- if it were there would be no hermaphrodites or asexual organisms), so change here cannot be the result of 'internal contradictions'. But even if this were not so, is it really the case that males and females must always conflict? [Anyone who has, for example, seen Leopard Slugs mating might be forgiven for thinking that these fortunate creatures have had a dialectical exemption certificate encoded into their DNA at some point. They do not 'conflict'!]
To be sure, modern medicine is quite remarkable; a few snips of the surgeon's scissors and Bob's your aunty. Despite that -- and this should hardly need pointing out -- males do not change into females (nor vice versa) of their own accord!
Moreover, while it is true that cats are able to reproduce because of well known goings-on between males and females, cats themselves do not change because of the relationship between male and female cats. If they did, then a lone cat on a desert island would be capable of living forever (or, at least, of not changing). In that case, as long as this eternal (and miserably celibate) moggie stayed clear of members of the opposite sex, it would be able to look forward to becoming a sort of feline Super-Methuselah.
But, what are we to say of those organisms that do not reproduce sexually --, and worse, what are we to make of, say, hermaphrodites? Are the latter an expression of some sort of cosmic/natural bourgeois plot against DM?
And what should we conclude about things like broom handles and copies of Trotsky's IDM? Do they change because of the tension created by their own inner/outer or 'logical' opposites? But what could these possibly be? Is the opposite of IDM, Mein Kampf or Stalin's Problems of Leninism? Could it even be these Essays?!
Does this mean, therefore, that IDM will change into one of my Essays? Well, perhaps TAR will, since my work was originally aimed specifically in opposition to that book. In which case, had this work not been undertaken, would TAR and IDM have been eternally changeless books?
[IDM = In Defense of Marxism; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution; RIRE = Reason In Revolt.]
In that case, the above passage from RIRE does little to help resolve this problem.
On the other hand, if cats change not as a result of the machinations of their external or 'logical' opposites, but because of their 'internal contradictions', then factors internal to cats must surely be responsible for their development (if we interpret "internal" topologically, since we seem to have got nowhere interpreting it 'logically'). Should we now look inside cats for these illusive opposites? If so, do these appear at the level of its internal organs? But what is the opposite of, say, a cat's liver? Does it have one? If not, is it an everlasting liver? On the other hand, if it does, will a cat's liver one day turn into a cat's 'non-liver' (a bus stop, say)?
In order to discover what the 'internal contradictions' are in this case, perhaps we should delve even deeper into the inner workings of these awkward, feline aspects of 'Being'?
If cats' livers have no opposites, then perhaps their liver cells do? But once more, what is the opposite of a cat liver cell? A kidney cell? A blood cell? (An onion cell?)
As we ferret further into the nether regions of feline inner space, perhaps these elusive opposites will appear at the molecular or atomic level? Some dialecticians seem to think so -- but they have only been able to pull this dodge by ignoring their own claims that all of nature works in pairs. [In that case, we have yet to be told what, say, the River Amazon is twinned with, let alone what the Oort Cloud's dialectical alter ego, its 'other', could possibly be.]
Nevertheless, it could be argued that 'internal opposites' actually involve the relations that exist between sub-atomic and inter-atomic forces and processes at work inside lumps of iron, cats, and much else besides.12
But, if each thing (and not just each part of a thing), and each system/process in the Totality, is a UO (as we were assured they were by the above DM-luminaries), then cats and iron bars (and not just electrons, π-mesons (Pions) and positrons, etc.) must have their own internal and/or external opposites -- that is, if they are to change.
So, for a cat to become a 'non-cat' -- which is, presumably, the 'internal' or 'external' opposite it is supposed to turn into --, it must be in dialectical tension with that opposite in the here-and-now if the latter is to help cause it to change. [We saw this in an abstract form earlier.] If not, then we can only wonder what dialecticians imagine the forces are (and from whence they originate) that cause cats and lumps of iron to change into whatever their opposites are imagined to be.
And even if molecular, inter-atomic or sub-atomic forces actually power the development of cats, cats in general will still have to change because of their paired macro-level opposites (whose identities still remain a mystery). It is not as if each cat is struggling against all the protons, electrons and quarks that exist beneath its skin. Nor are we to suppose that cats are constantly conflicting with their internal organs, fur and whiskers. If they were, then according to DM-lore recorded earlier, cats would have to turn into their internal organs, fur and whiskers, and the latter would have to turn into cats!
And even if these sub-atomic particles were locked in a sort of quantum wrestling match, one with another, the changes they induced in the average dialectical moggie must find expression in macro-phenomena at some point, or cats would not alter at all. But what on earth could those macro-phenomena be?
Furthermore, if change is to be located ultimately at the quantum level, then what are all those sub-atomic particles changing into? Many are highly stable. But, even supposing they weren't, if the DM-classics are to be believed, then whatever they change into must exist right now if it is to cause them to change into it. And yet, if these opposites already exist, the original particles cannot change into them. The best that could happen here, assuming the truth of DM, is that these 'opposite particles' must replace the originals (which then magically disappear). But, that is where we came in.
In which case, given this view of nature, things do not actually change, they just vanish, and other things take their place -- and they do so undialectically, too, since their opposites will have just vanished. But, plainly, with no more opposites, they cannot change any further.
Moreover, if the forces that cause change to cats are solely internal to cats, then as far as the mutability of such mammals is concerned, they must be hermetically sealed-off from the rest of nature (as must everything else -– this dire dialectical difficulty is examined in more detail in Essay Eight Part One, and Essay Eleven Part One and Part Two), otherwise change would not be internal to cats.
If, on the other hand, the causes of feline change are external to cats, then 'internal contradictions' can't be responsible for changing them into 'non-cats', and we are back where we started.
Furthermore, if we now ignore this 'either-or', and claim that cats change because of 'internal' and 'external' contradictions, then we would be faced with the prospect of cats changing into their internal and external opposites, if the Dialectical Prophets are to be believed. But, and once more, if these opposites already exist (which they must do if they are to help bring about such changes), then cats could not change into them!
The same difficulties apply to sub-atomic particles: if the forces that cause change are solely internal to such particles, then as far as their mutability is concerned, they must be hermetically sealed-off from the outside world, otherwise change would not be internal to these particles. If, on the other hand, the causes of particulate change are external, then 'internal contradictions' can't be responsible for changing them into a 'non-whatever'.
Alternatively once more, if the opposites of such particles cause them to change into such opposites, then they need not bother, for those opposites already exist. On the other hand, if those opposites do not already exist, what could possibly cause these changes?
In the macro-world, the idea that change is the result of 'internal contradictions' would seem to mean that when, say, a cat gets run over, that cat actually self-destructs, and the car that hit it had nothing to do with flattening it. One might well wonder then why nature produced such suicidal beasts. [Is this perhaps an example of natural de-selection?]
Of course, it could be argued along Leibnizian lines that had the cat been internally strong enough it would have survived this unequal tussle with the car. So, the real cause of this cat's changed shape is in fact to be found inside that cat. [This argument is outlined here.] As we will see in Essay Eight Part One, some DM-theorists do indeed argue along similar lines.
There is something to be said for this argument, but fortunately not much. Whatever it is that causes a cat to alter when run over is clearly not whatever it is that maintains that cat's anatomical integrity from day to day. Something must have upset this regime in order to transform that cat's shape; cats do not spontaneously flatten themselves. Few of us would be happy to be told by a Leibnizian drunk driver that it is not his fault that the family pet is spread half-way across the road because the cat itself is the cause of its radically altered anatomy. In such cases, we clearly have an example of interacting causes for the demise of that cat, none of which can be put down solely to events internal to that unfortunate animal. Of course, dialecticians do not deny this, but as Essay Eight Part One will show, their 'theory' cannot account for it after all.
Someone could object that dialectics can account for such catastrophic reconfigurations of cats. A combination of internal and external forces is the cause of their new geometry. But even that will not work, for if a cat is to change into a flat cat, then according to the DM-worthies quoted here (where we are told that all objects and processes "inevitably" turn into their opposites), such a flat cat must already exist to flatten the non-flat cat into a flat cat. So the driver (unless we are desperate enough to describe her/him as a "non-flat cat", on the basis that he/she is the obvious cause of the flattened cat in question), given this new turn of events, did not flatten the cat, the non-existent non-flat cat did that.
[Or, of course, if we are even more desperate to find a cause to rescue this theory, we could suppose there to be ethereal flat cats (in a nether world somewhere) working some sort of evil on their less pancake-like counterparts this side of the veil -- and just in time, too, for lorries to run them over. Too stupid an explanation to contemplate? Well DM-theorists already postulate the existence of all manner of weird and wonderful 'abstractions', which are nowhere to be found in material reality, to account for events and processes in nature. So, perhaps this is an 'abstract' non-flat cat? (In fact, those who already "understand dialectics" should be able to get their heads around this conundrum with ease.)]
Furthermore, if we opt for that earlier get-out clause and describe the driver as a "non-flat cat", so that at least we would have here a dialectical sort of cause of flat cats, then that driver (this non-flat cat) must likewise turn into her/his opposite, too, if the Dialectical Gospels are to be believed. Alarmingly, that opposite must either be a non-driver (this option dialectically disqualifying her/himself in the act), or a flat cat! So, in this Hermetic pile-up, both driver and cat become flat cats!
A nice coincidence of opposites, this!
Despite this, and whatever their commitment to this 'Law' amounts to, one supposes(!) that no dialectician still in command of her/his senses would excuse, say, a policeman for inflicting on her/him actual bodily harm on the grounds that Leibnizian nature unwisely failed to incorporate into the heads of militants the ability to withstand Billy Clubs. Once again, dialectics would be disproved in practice; gashed heads on picket lines are not produced by "self-development".
Alternatively, if the causes of feline (or cranial!) mutability are both internal and external, then change cannot be the sole result of 'internal contradictions', and things would not be self-developing, as Lenin alleged.
Alas, there does not seem to be any way we can lever into this picture an 'opposite' that non-flat cats turn into so that that 'opposite' can help produce the required flattening.
So, even while unfortunate moggies turn into such pancake-like non-cats in traffic accidents, the opposite that they 'develop' into cannot have been part of the UO that ironed them into that novel shape.
In which case, it remains a mystery what the 'opposite' of a cat is (which a cat must turn into) which is part of the UO that brings about such topological re-configurations --, if the DM-worthies are to be believed. Is there a third causal item here (as we supposed above), yet to be discovered either by Zoology, forensic science, time travellers, or cat psychics -- over and above the non-flat cat and the flat cat -- that is part of this feline tragedy?
If not, can DM in fact help explain dead moggies?
This flat catastrophe is not just isolated to furry mammals; it applies to Materialist Dialectics, too --, for if all things change into their dialectically-paired opposites, and change is caused by the dialectical tension between such things and such opposites, and if Capitalism is to change into Socialism, then Socialism must now exist somewhere for this to happen!
The same must be said for the connection between, say, capitalism and communism
(or better, Capitalist Relations of Production [CRAP]), and Socialist
Relations of Production [SORP]) --, and indeed for the connection between the forces and
relations of production (where it is patently obvious that neither of these change into the other
(their opposites)).
For the purposes of argument, let us assume that SORP does not actually exist in the here-and-now. But, given
the above DM-theses, if CRAP is to change into SORP, SORP must already exist
in the here-and-now for CRAP to change into it, and for that change to
be produced by it.
But, if that opposite (SORP) already exists it cannot have come from CRAP
(its 'opposite') since CRAP can only change because of the action of its own
opposite (namely -- SORP!) -- unless SORP exists before it exists!
[The same comments would apply to "potential SORP" (or even to some sort of "tendency to produce SORP", be this a 'sublated' tendency or
indeed actuality, it
matters not), but the reader is left to
work the details out for herself.]
So, this opposite (SORP) must have popped into existence from nowhere --, or it must
always have been in existence, if DM is correct.
Once more, this is not to deny change, nor is it to suggest that the present author does not want to see the back of CRAP, and the establishment of SORP; but if DM were correct, this will never happen.
To be sure, in the real world very material workers struggle against equally material Capitalists, but neither of these turn into one another, and they cannot help change CRAP into SORP, since neither of these is the opposite of CRAP or SORP, nor vice versa, either.
[On the 'contradictions' Marx that speaks about in Das Kapital, see here. On 'real material contradictions', see here.]
If it is further complained that in many of the above examples it is human intervention that has changed things that already occur naturally, and because of that, different principles apply (since our activity will have interfered with the normal operation of the natural opposites of things like iron ore).
But, aren't we part of nature?
Putting this awkward reminder to one side for now, what about substances that did not exist (so far as we know) before human beings made them?
Is plastic, for instance, governed by dialectical 'Law'? What then is the natural opposite of polyethylene? Is it the same as that of Polypropylene, polybutylene terephthalate (PBT), polystyrene, polyvinyl chloride (PVC), and polymethylpentene (TPX)?
If not, has humanity made things that are above and outside the dialectical 'Law'? Again, if not, and if each of these plastics has an opposite (which they must have, or they would not change), how is it that human labour was able to make each of them at the same time as making their opposites? Was this done by default, as it were? But, if human labour turns these substances into all manner of things, do they not therefore have countless artificial (or is it natural?) opposites? [I.e., do they have as many opposites as the things we can change them into?] And were all these artificial opposites created the moment the original substances were manufactured? All of them?
On the other hand, and once again, if these opposites only pop into existence when these plastics are changed into them (meaning that human labour cannot have created these opposites in the act of inventing the original plastics), how is it possible for those non-existent opposites to 'contradict' the existent unchanged plastic so that the plastic could be changed into them?
But worse, if the opposite of, say, PVC causes it to change, how then does human labour feature anywhere in the transformation? What is the point of building factories and studying polymer chemistry if the opposite of PVC changes lumps of PVC into plastic buckets all by itself? When human beings work on PVC to change it into all the many things that they do (using complex techniques and expensive machinery), are they merely onlookers -- not part of the action, as it were --, but, just viewing things that would have happened anyway, naturally?
Or, have the capitalists discovered a way of by-passing dialectical 'Law' (perhaps as part of their hatred of Marxism)? Is all plastic therefore reactionary?
But, if human labour [HL] can change such things into their opposites, then that must mean that HL is the opposite of, say, PVC, otherwise it could not actually change it (according to the above DM-worthies). In that case, HL must change into PVC!
Of course, dialecticians can be found who will tell you that exchange value [EV] is "condensed labour power" [LP], and hence LP and EV are 'opposites'. But, if that is the case, according to the Dialectical Gospel, LP must struggle against EV. Has anyone ever witnessed this abstract wrestling match?
This is, of course, a serious problem, since use value [UV] is supposed to contradict EV, too -- but, UV and EV do not seem to struggle much either.
Again, even this cannot work, for if LP turns into EV, then they must both exist at the same time, as we have seen dozens of times already. Otherwise one of these opposites (EV) could not bring about a dialectical change in the other (LP). And whatever intermediaries we throw in here to rescue thus self-destructing 'theory' (be they very real workers, machines, banks, or CRAP itself), if such things are to cause a DM-style change, they must be opposites of one another or of EV and/or LP, and hence they must turn into one another (if the Dialectical Holy Books are to be believed). In that case we might well wonder where all those workers are who are changing into EVs? And where on this planet is CRAP morphing into, say, a hydro-electric dam (if the relations of production really do 'contradict' the forces of production)?
[CRAP = Capitalist Relations of Production.]
Once more, this is not to deny such changes, merely to underline the fact that DM cannot account for it.
Of course, in Marxist economics we have LP and Capital [C] cycles, and the like, but does LP actually struggle against C? Not obviously so, it would seem. As we have already noted, very material workers struggle against their equally material bosses, but how is it possible for LP to struggle against C?
Someone might object that this misrepresents DM; it is the inherent dialectical contradiction between capital and labour (or that between their relevant classes) that foments struggle.
Perhaps so, but until we are told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, that response itself is devoid of sense (since it contains a meaningless phrase: "dialectical contradiction". [More on that in Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three.]
Furthermore, is it really the case that everything turns into its 'opposite', made to do so by 'struggling' with its 'opposite', as Hegel, Engels, Lenin, Mao and Plekhanov said? To be sure, certain states of matter do change into what might conventionally be called their "opposites" (e.g., a hot object might change and become cold; something above might later be below, and so on -- but even here, these opposites do not cause these changes!), but this is certainly not true of everything. Do men, for instance, turn into women, fathers into sons, brothers into sisters, left- into a right-hands, the working class into the capitalist class, forces of production into relations of production, use values into exchange values, negative numbers/electrical charges into positive numbers/electrical charges, electrons into protons, and matter into 'anti-matter'? If not, what is the point of saying that everything does do this? And why claim that objects and processes have internal or external opposites if in most cases they feature nowhere in the action, or, again, if many things do not turn into them?12a
Furthermore, if Lenin were correct when he said that "every determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every other…", it would mean that everything (and every property) must change into every other property!
But, if that were so, heat, for example, must change into, say, colour, hardness and generosity (and much else besides); liquidity must transform itself into brittleness, circularity and inquisitiveness (and much else besides); gentleness must mutate into velocity, opacity and bitterness (and much else besides); squareness must turn into arrogance, honesty and duplicity (and much else besides), and so on.
Is there a single person on the planet not suffering from dialectics who believes any of this?
Once again, if these bizarre changes are not the case (as they plainly are not!), and if such things are not implied both by these terminally vague 'Laws' and by what Lenin said, what is the point of him asserting that this is precisely what everything does?
Indeed, that was the point of the observation made earlier about dialecticians vacillating between the idea that UOs cause change and the belief that things change into their opposites -- sometimes veering toward the doctrine that change produces these opposites (and perhaps all of them). The first of these alternatives is examined in Essay Eight Part One, but if the second alternative were the case, we would surely witness some bizarre transformations in nature and society as men changed into women, cats into dogs, banks into charities and the Capitalist Class into the Working Class -- and then back again!
However, as has been argued in detail above, if change merely creates these opposites then, plainly, that development could not have been the result of a tension between two opposites that actually co-existed -- clearly so, since at least one of them would not yet exist! Hence, with respect to objects in the latter category, change would create them, not them it.
This completely scuppers the DM-account of change for it is now clear that there is nothing in the DM-scheme-of-things that could cause the many different sorts of change we see in nature and society.
In which case, if change occurs then dialectics -- the much vaunted science of change -- cannot explain it. Indeed, if DM were true, change could not happen.
However, turning to specifics, Engels claimed that:
"…life consists precisely and primarily in this -- that a living thing is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly asserts and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to and end, and death steps in." [Engels (1976), p.153.]
But what is the 'contradiction' supposed to be here? Is it that: (1) living cells contain dead matter; (2) life is a constant struggle to avoid death; (3) life can only sustain itself by a constant struggle with dead matter; or is it that (4) the contrast and/or conflict between these two (processes), life and death, creates the dynamism we see in living things? And, what on earth is this (5) "something else" that each living thing is supposed to be, or to become, according to Engels?
As far as (1) is concerned, the contrast between living and dead matter seems to depend on the obsolete idea that there is an intrinsic difference between living and dead molecules -- that there is a 'life force' at work in nature. While it is unclear whether Engels believed this or not (in fact, in several places he seems to have rejected this notion, e.g., Engels (1954), p.282), it is reasonably clear that subsequent dialecticians do not. So, it seems reasonable to conclude that this cannot be what underlies the 'contradiction' in this case.
With respect to (2): while it is undeniable that most living things constantly strive to stay alive, it is still unclear what the alleged UO is supposed to be here. If a living cell is a UO, and the scene of a bitter struggle between life and death -- in the sense that each cell contains within itself both life and death, slugging it out, as it were --, what physical form do these mysterious processes/beings take? It is not as if we could easily identify either or both -- as we can with, say, with magnetic or electrical phenomena. There, the presence of apparently opposite poles and/or charges is verifiable and measurable. Here (with respect to life), there do not seem to be any easily identifiable opposing forces.
But, if dialecticians are correct, and everything is indeed a UO, each living cell should (it seems) contain death within itself, and not just have it confronting it externally. But what material form does 'death' take? Are we to imagine that a black, shrouded figure, sickle in hand, inhabits every living cell? If not, how is 'death' to be conceived in this case? Indeed, what form does 'life' itself take? Is it perhaps an incarnation of the Archangel Gabriel? Or, maybe Louis Pasteur?
On the other hand, if this particular UO is a set of opposing processes (or, indeed, if this is to be regarded as a special type of interaction between certain sorts of forces), as options (3) and (4) seem to suggest (these picturing living systems constantly battling against disintegration, the latter perhaps manifested in catabolic reactions), then we are surely on firmer ground.
But, why would anyone want to call such a set-up a UO? What exactly are the opposites that are struggling here? It is not as if inside each vibrant cell there is another older (or even a decaying) cell waiting to emerge, nor yet one that is fighting the embattled host cell all the time, stabbing it 'inside the back', as it were. Nor is it credible to believe that the products of catabolism and anabolism are themselves locked in constant struggle. Indeed, it is not easy to see catabolism as directly 'contradictory' even to anabolism (howsoever the word "contradiction" is understood). These processes do not oppose one another by preventing the other working, or by immediately picking apart what the other has produced; they just work in different ways, often in separate parts of the cell.
They certainly do not turn into one another (as we have been led to believe they should by the dialectical worthies). Nor do the inputs of one always turn into the outputs of the other. For example, the Krebs metabolic cycle produces water and carbon dioxide from carbohydrates, fats and proteins. But no cycle in animal cells does the reverse. Sure, these products are broken down, but not in a reverse Krebs cycle.
So, anabolic and catabolic processes do not typically confront one another in normal cells, opposing whatever the other does. To imagine such processes as 'contradictory' would be about as intelligent as, say, believing that a group of men digging a road up somewhere were 'contradicting' ("opposing" or "struggling against") another group mending or extending that same road a few hundred yards down the way. Or, that, say, the manufacture of aeroplanes 'contradicts' the scrapping of aluminium chairs.
And, even if it were accurate to describe catabolism as undoing the results of anabolism, that would still not amount to either of them 'contradicting' one another. Undoing is not 'contradicting' -- if it were, then doing would be tautologious!
Of course, if someone were to insist that despite the above such processes are contradictory, they would owe the rest of us an explanation of the literal nature of the contradiction allegedly involved here. In that case, it would be pertinent to ask how either process could possibly be "gainsaying" the other.12b
But even if this were to be rejected, too, DM would still not be out of the non-dialectical woods. While it could be argued that in this case we do have 'opposites' that are internal to cells, we do not as yet have opposites internal to anabolic or catabolic processes themselves. So, if either of these two cause the other to change, that would clearly be another example of an externally-motivated transformation. Moreover, anabolism would have to turn into catabolism, and vice versa, if the Dialectical Gospels are to be believed.
However, according to Lenin all change is internal, and everything develops of itself:
"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90.]
Even though anabolic processes certainly involve objects (i.e., molecules), if they undergo development, that cannot be the result of an interaction with catabolic process (because that would be an external influence once more). On the other hand, if they do alter each other (but how?), then Lenin's "demand" will have to be withdrawn.
Nevertheless, here, as elsewhere, DM-descriptors look decidedly figurative -- except, in this case it is not easy to see what the trope could possibly be. But, if they are merely figurative, that might be all to the good; it would at least allow the interpretation of the 'contradictions' uncovered in this 'Law' to be interpreted, say, poetically. No one minds if poets contradict themselves (e.g., Walt Whitman), or one another.
Even if the word "struggle" were substituted for "contradict", the situation would not change noticeably. Since literal struggles can only take place between agents, that would mean that this part of DM could work only if biochemical reactions in vivo were personified, or if they were under the control of an agent of some sort. In that case, this use of the word "struggle" would clearly be figurative, too. [More on this here, here, and here.]
Every Confirmation Is Also A Refutation
However, it could be objected that the above considerations are highly abstract, and are thus irrelevant (although it is not easy to see how the average cat is abstract when flat or otherwise). Hence, it could be argued that DM is in fact concerned with real material contradictions confirmed in practice.13
But, how could such things be checked to make sure they were genuine "material contradictions"? Fortunately, John Rees explained how (but in relation to concepts drawn from HM (i.e., Historical Materialism)):
"[O]nce we are sure that our concept of 'capital' is a true reflection of the actual existing capital –- then we can also be sure that any further categories that emerge as a result of contradictions which we find in our concepts will necessarily be matched by contradictions in the real capitalist world." [Rees (1998), p.110.]
However, Rees added the following proviso:
"This…is only a safe assumption on the basis of constant empirical verification…." [Ibid., p.110.]
The idea appears to be that any contradictions that remain (in a theory that has itself been thoroughly checked against reality at every stage) must "of necessity" be a genuine reflection of actual objects and processes in nature and society. This safeguard is necessary to rid 'materialist dialectics' of the Idealist 'excesses' of Hegel, as well as prevent any of its theories from being. or becoming. defective (in that defective theories are self-contradictory; more on this in Essay Eleven Part One). [Rees (1998), pp.52-53, 108-18.]
Nevertheless, as far as DM-contradictions are concerned, it is not at all clear how this process is supposed to work -- even when it is executed exactly as intended. Presumably, on this basis, 'incorrect' contradictions will be eliminated because: (1) they were self-contradictions, or (2) they are falsified by experience, or (3) they could not be verified (by appropriate methods).
But, with respect to any of the contradictions that might be retained (and thus seen to be correct 'reflections' of reality), how could investigators be sure that future contingencies will never arise (in the shape of further evidence) that require their elimination? [On this, see below.]
Even so, (1) cannot be right, otherwise we should have to reject Engels's analysis of motion, which pictures it as self-contradictory. [On this, see Essay Five.]
Moreover, in connection with option (2), what evidence could possibly refute a contradiction? How is it possible for a contradiction to be falsified by experience? Presumably, that would occur if propositions appertaining to experience contradicted something that was already contradictory to begin with. But, what sort of monstrosity would that be?
Consider again Engels's depiction of the contradictory nature of living cells:
"We saw above that life consists precisely and primarily in this –- that a living thing is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly asserts and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to and end, and death steps in." [Engels (1976), p.153.]
"Abstract identity (a = a; and negatively, a cannot be simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is likewise inapplicable in organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself, by absorption and excretion of substances…, in short, by a sum of incessant molecular changes which make up life….
"Life and death. Already no physiology is held to be scientific if it does not consider death as an essential element of life (note, Hegel, Enzyklopädie, I, pp.152-53), the negation of life itself, so that life is always thought of in relation to its necessary result, death, which is always contained in it in germ. The dialectical conception of life is nothing more than this…. Living means dying." [Engels (1954), pp.214, 295.]
[The problems connected with Hegel and Engels's egregious understanding of Identity will be tackled in Essays Six, Eight Part Two and Twelve.]
The new batch of difficulties Engels's view face can be brought out by the following argument:
L1: Cell C1 is both alive and not alive.
L2: Experimental evidence shows that C1 is alive.
L3: Experimental evidence also shows that C1 is also not alive.
L4: L2 falsifies L1.
L5: L3 falsifies L1.
L6: However, the conjunction of L2 and L3 verifies L1.
L7: Therefore, L1 has been falsified and verified.
[It is worth noting that this 'argument' is not valid, and is only reproduced here to try to make sense of what Rees and Engels could possibly have meant.]
As seems plain, a confirmation of a DM-contradiction is of a piece with its refutation.
Of course, it could be argued that observation could confirm that a cell is alive and not-alive all at once -- i.e., that contradictions can in fact be observed. This response will be considered below.
But, as noted above, if reality itself were contradictory, the 'falsification' of a contradiction would also amount to its automatic 'verification', and vice versa. So, it seems that option (2) above is closed-off as far as the investigation of DM-contradictions is concerned. This must mean that Rees's requirement that contradictions be tested against experience is an empty gesture, since, with respect to DM-contradictions, if reality were contradictory, it would both confirm and refute their presence. In which case, DM-theorists would have no reason whatsoever to reject any contradictions that appeared in their theory; but, at the same time, they would have eminently good reasons for rejecting all of them (at least to prevent their theory from becoming defective). [More on this in Essay Eleven Part One.]
The quandary now facing dialecticians we might call the "Dialecticians' Dilemma" [DD]. The DD arises from the uncontroversial observation that if reality is fundamentally contradictory then a true theory should reflect this supposed state of affairs. [Why this is so is explained here.] However, and this is the problem, in order to do this any such theory must contain contradictions itself, or it would not be an accurate reflection of nature. But, if the development of science is predicated either on the removal of contradictions from theories, or on the replacement of older theories with newer, less contradictory variants, as DM-theorists contend, then science could not advance toward a 'truer' account of reality. This is because scientific theories would then reflect the world less accurately, having had all (or most) of their contradictions removed.
[Of course, if the advancement of science is not dependent on the removal of all or most contradictions, then scientists would face intractable difficulties of their own -- for example: how to tell a defective theory (one that is shot through with contradiction) from a theory that is not so afflicted. Fortunately to date, scientists have not adopted these ill-advised dialectical tactics, and have remained annoyingly loyal to the protocols of FL.]
[FL = Formal Logic.]
Conversely, if a true theory aims to reflect more accurately the contradictions in nature (which it must do if reality is contradictory) then, in order to be consistent with such dialectical demands, scientists should not attempt to remove contradictions from -- or try to resolve them in or between -- theories. Clearly, on that score, science could not advance, since there would be no reason to replace a contradictory theory with a less contradictory one. Indeed, if DM were correct, scientific theories would become more contradictory -- not less -- as they approach more closely the truth about avowedly 'contradictory' reality. This, of course, would mean that scientific theory as a whole would become more defective with time!
On the other hand, if science advanced because of the elimination of contradictions then a fully true theory should have had all (or most) of these removed. Science ought then to reflect (in the limit) the fact that reality contains no contradictions!
[It is worth noting here that critics of DM have already arrived at that unhelpful conclusion, and they managed that without an ounce of dialectics to slow them down.]
However, according to DM, scientific theories should be replaced by ones that depict reality as fundamentally contradictory, this despite the fact that scientists will have removed every (or nearly every) contradiction in order reach that point. On the other hand, if scientists failed to remove contradictions (or, if they refused to replace an older theory with a newer, less contradictory one), so that their theories reflected the contradictory nature of reality more accurately, they would then have no good reason to reject any particular theory no matter how inconsistent it proved to be.
Whichever way this rusty old DM-banger is driven, the 'dialectical' view of scientific progress (and of 'contradictions') hits a very material brick wall in the shape of the DD each time.
Once more, it could be objected that dialecticians do not believe that scientific theories should have all or most of their contradictions removed if science is to advance, merely the ones that hold up progress.
However, dialecticians have so far failed to distinguish those contradictions which are the mere artefacts of a defective theory from those that supposedly reflect the 'objective' state of the world. But, how might these be distinguished in DM-terms? How is it be possible to decide whether a contradiction is an accurate reflection of reality or whether it's a result of a faulty theory, if all of reality (including scientific theory) is contradictory?
An appeal to practice here would be no help since that takes place in the phenomenal world, which is riddled with DM-contradictions and so must be contradictory itself! In that case, it is to be wondered how practice can help confirm (or refute) a theory if its deliverances are themselves part of the same contradictory reality on test. We saw above that confirmation and refutation are all of a piece, anyway, given DM. Moreover, as we will see in Essay Ten Part One, practice is no friend of dialectics, anyway.
For example, DM-theorists generally argue that the wave-particle duality of light confirms the thesis that nature is fundamentally dialectical; in this case, light is supposed to be a UO of wave and particle. Precisely how they are a unity (i.e., how it could be true that matter at this level is fundamentally particulate and fundamentally non-particulate all at once) is of course left eminently obscure. Exactly how this phenomenon helps account for the material world is even less clear.
Even though all dialecticians refer to this 'contradiction', not one has explained how and why it is a contradiction, nor less how and why it is a 'dialectical contradiction' (even if we knew what these were).
Consider these two propositions:
Q1: Light is a wave.
Q2: Light is particulate.
Now, Q1 would contradict Q2 if the following were the case:
Q3: No wave can be particulate.
Q4: Light must be one or the other, wave or particle.
[Q4 is required or Q1 and Q2 would merely be inconsistent.]
But is Q3 true? Surely not, for if physicists are correct, light is both! However, independently of that, there are plenty of examples of waves in nature which are particulate; e.g., sound waves, water waves and Mexican waves. So, Q3 is in fact false!
Moreover, Q4 could be false, too. Light could turn out to be something else about which we do not yet have a concept. That, of course, would make Q1 and Q2 merely inconsistent. Do 'dialectical logicians' know what to do with 'dialectical inconsistencies'?
But, even if in some way this were a contradiction it does nothing to explain change -- unless we are supposed to accept the idea that the fact that light is a particle changes it into a wave, and vice versa. Are we to conclude that these two states/processes are 'struggling' with each other? But what is the point of that? What role does this particular 'contradiction' play either in DM or in Physics? At best it seems to be merely ornamental.
[One benighted DM-fan, when confronted with this objection in a private correspondence, said that these were 'illustrative' contradictions (even though they do no dialectical work). This can only mean that dialecticians resemble fundamentalist Christians -- who think that, say, the three-dimensionality of space 'illustrates' the Trinity, God having left this and other clues littered across reality for us to find. [Don't believe me? Then check this out.] In a similar way, and with regard to dialectics, perhaps 'Being' Itself has sent this conundrum our way to inform DM-fans they are on the right path to Dialectical Nirvana: the 'illustrative', but useless, duality of wave and particle!]
At worst, of course, all the problems we met earlier in connection with the DM-'theory' of change would apply here too.
Now, if we put to one side the 'solution' to this puzzle offered by, say, Superstring Theory, there are in fact more than a handful of Physicists -- with, it seems, a more robust commitment to scientific realism than the average dialectician can muster -- who believe that this 'paradox' can be resolved within a realist picture of nature. [Evidence appears here, and here.] Whether or not they are correct need not detain us since DM-theorists (if consistent) ought to advise these rather rash realists not to bother trying to solve this riddle. This is because dialectics has already provided us with an a priori solution: since nature is fundamentally contradictory there is in fact no solution --, which paradoxical state of affairs should, of course, simply be "grasped", or "Nixoned".
However, in this case it is possible to see how practice cannot help; if experiments are conducted that allegedly show that light is both a particle and a wave, then DM-theorists would have no reason to question this supposedly contradictory data, nor to try to resolve this difficulty.
[However, so far experiments have merely shown that under certain conditions light is particulate, under others it is wave-like, but not both.]
Nevertheless, anyone not committed to such an obtuse view of reality would have good reason to question it, and this might, for all anyone knows, assist in the advancement of science.
Not so with DM-fans, whose advice could permanently hold things up.13a
In that case, practice alone cannot distinguish between these two views (the realist and the dialectical), even though one of these will seriously hold up progress. Moreover, since we know that practically any theory can be made to conform to observation if enough adjustments are made elsewhere, this criterion is doubly defective.
[This allegation will be substantiated in more detail in Essay Ten, and in a later Essay on the nature of science.]
[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]
Once more, in advance of any test, DM-theorists should (again, if they are consistent) advise scientists not to bother trying to refute the orthodox interpretation of QM, or resolve the paradox upon which it is based, since there is no point in view of their a priori theory, which sees nature as fundamentally contradictory.
Unfortunately, if physicists took this advice, science could not advance to a superior view of nature (if one exists) by eliminating this alleged contradiction. At best, this a priori DM-approach to knowledge would close available options down, forcing scientists to adopt a view of reality that might not be correct -- and, given what we already know about the history of Physics, probably isn't correct.13b
Fortunately, there is little evidence so far that Physicists have taken any note of this aspect of dialectics, even if any of them have ever heard of it.
Now, only those who disagree with Lenin about the incomplete nature of science (or, alternatively, who have a rather poor grasp of the history of Physics) would risk concluding that contemporary science has a final and complete picture of reality, at least in this particular area. If so, Physics could only advance by eliminating this paradox -- hence eliminating one of the best examples in the DM-Grimoire which allegedly show that nature is fundamentally contradictory.
Of course, only those who wish to foist their ideas on nature would object at this point.
On the other hand, if DM-theorists' advice to scientists is that they should in general try to replace contradictory theories (such as this part of QM as it is alleged to be) with less logically-challenged ones, then they will have to abandon the idea that nature is fundamentally contradictory -- at least here. This conclusion is all the more pressing in view of the fact that some scientists think they have already solved this problem -- David Bohm, for example, being one.14
But, this is just the DD once again: the DM-inspired belief in the 'contradictory' nature of reality, coupled with the claim that science can only advance by removing contradictions cannot, it seems, distinguish between contradictions that hold up the progress of science (and which are therefore artefacts of a defective or incomplete theory) from those that reveal the essentially 'contradictory' nature of reality.
Although some (like Plekhanov) have acknowledged the problem, it remains unresolved to this day.
The various ways there might be for DM-theorists to escape from the hole they have dug themselves into will be examined in a later Essay, and there shown to fail.
Dialecticians are therefore advised to stop digging.
In addition, it is unclear how option (3) above itself is supposed to work. How would it be possible for anyone even to try to verify a DM-contradiction? For example, does humanity possess technology sensitive enough to observe time intervals of the order of, say, 10-100 seconds, so that Engels's claims about motion can be checked? What then about intervals of 10-1000 seconds? And yet, observations of motion would have to be made using time intervals of this order of magnitude (and far better) in order to confirm whether they remain contradictory at this level of accuracy, at least. But, where do we stop?
Naturally, some might want to appeal to Planck time intervals (of the order of 5 x 10-44 seconds) to provide a natural place to halt, but this is no help at all. A single one of these Planck 'instants' is, so we are told, 1026 times shorter than the shortest time interval so far measured -- an alto-second (or 10-18 seconds). In that case, there is little prospect that these far shorter intervals will ever be measured. And since Planck intervals are theoretical entities, the chances are that they too will be revised away one day (in line no doubt with Lenin's claim that knowledge is never final).
Anyway, the answer to this particular 'difficulty' is irrelevant. That is because, no matter how slender the time frame, no measurement could conceivably test whether a moving object was in two places at once, only whether it is in two places in the same finite interval. [More on this in Essay Five.]
The Revenge Of The Petty-Bourgeois Cell
To resume the argument -- more specifically: with respect to the alleged contradiction outlined in L1, above (i.e., "Cell C1 is both alive and not alive"), how would it be possible to confirm the alleged fact that a cell was alive and dead at the same time? Certainly, just looking at cells won't help. Nor is it much use referring to the vagueness of the boundary between life and death. This is because Engels himself regarded living cells as a unity of living and dead processes while such cells were still alive, and this is the alleged contradiction that requires verification.
Now, it is worth reminding ourselves at this point that confirmation is required to prevent this theory being branded dogmatic, a priori and thus Idealist. This is in fact a demand that DM-theorists also insist upon:
""All three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels (1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976), p.13. Bold emphasis added.]
"The dialectic does not liberate the investigator from painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it." [Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added]
"Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master key. Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973), p.233. Bold emphasis added]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added]
"This…is only a safe assumption on the basis of constant empirical verification…." [Rees (1998), p.110.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they are…without disguises and without fantasy….
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphasis added.]
"Engels emphasises that it would be entirely wrong to crudely read the dialectic into nature. The dialectic has to be discovered in nature and evolving out of nature....
"Of course, that does not mean we should impose some a priori dialectical construct upon nature. The dialectic, as Engels explains time and again, has to be painstakingly discovered in nature....
"Engels did not make the laws of nature dialectical. He tried, on the contrary, to draw out the most general dialectical laws from nature. Not force artificial, preconceived, inappropriate notions onto nature." [Jack Conrad, Weekly Worker, 30/08/07. Bold emphasis added.]
Once more, then: how is it possible to confirm that cells are indeed as dialecticians say they are?
Perhaps a digression into the nature and application of vague predicates (such as "...is alive", or "...is dead") would be useful here --, at least as far as this DM-contradiction is concerned?
However, such a detour is unlikely to help. This can be seen from a consideration of another less fraught but equally vague distinction: the equally vague boundary between night and day.
In relation to this, few DM-theorists would want to argue (it is to be hoped!) that daylight is itself a contradictory combination of night and day at any specific point on earth not near the boundary of the Sun's moving shadow. Hence, at mid-day in high summer on the Tropic of Cancer in blazing sunlight, say, only a complete fool would want to argue that because the boundary between night and day is vague, and because day eventually turns into night, bright daylight is a contradictory combination of night and day (or of darkness and light). And even if it were possible to find a few maverick, hard-core DM-fans who were prepared to argue along these lines, even fewer would agree with them -- except they might both agree and disagree, just to wind them up.
Less supercilious critics would ask such confused comrades for the empirical evidence that backs up the odd idea that light itself (in the form of bright mid-day tropical sunshine) is a UO of light and darkness (or, perhaps of night and day 'dialectically' slugging it out). Indeed, they might also want to know what work this idea could possibly do in DM, even if it were correct. Are we to suppose that light 'struggles' with its opposite darkness at mid-day? Presumably not. Must we then argue that darkness makes light change into darkness, and vice versa (as the DM-classicists tell us that such 'opposites' must)? If so, this innovative piece of Physics will no doubt force scientists to re-write their theory of light, for up until now they had recklessly assumed that light was created by the way sub-atomic particles behaved, and that this was the result of a transformation of one form of matter/energy into another. They had certainly given no thought to the possibility that it was the result of the operation of a privation -- the lack of light -- on light itself, which made nightfall occur! The latter, of course, has more to do with the rotation of the Earth, and nothing at all to do with a battle between photons and/or a lack of one.
In that case, it seems that this 'dialectical union' of light and dark does no work at all, even if we were tempted to believe in it.
So, in places, and at times, even potentially vague predicates have clear applications -- or they can be paraphrased so that they mimic ones that do. In that case, in order to test Engels's claims about living things, we would need a way of deciding whether a certain cell was a UO while it was still unambiguously alive. That is why it was claimed above that a digression into the applicability of vague predicates would be of no assistance to dialecticians. No matter how vague the predicate, it would still not be possible to verify Engels's claim that a cell is alive and dead at the same time (or that it is a dialectical mix of the two) while it was still clearly alive.
Even at the boundary between the life and death, we do not possess equipment sensitive enough to verify Engels's a priori thesis, even if we knew how to go about doing it.
Of course, it would always be open to a DM-supporter to point out that a living cell is constantly exchanging dead matter with its environment, or that certain parts of the cell are not actually alive while the rest of that cell is, as noted earlier. Nevertheless, exactly how this confirms the claim that a cell is alive and dead all at once is still unclear. At best, it would simply demonstrate that living things contain dead matter. It would no more show that when a cell is alive it is also dead than would an analogous claim demonstrate that people are clothed and naked at the same time because we all have nothing on underneath our underwear, and were contradictory UOs for all that.
On the other hand, if anyone were foolish enough to so suppose, then they would have to suppose further that one of these opposites (being naked, say) was locked in 'dialectical' tension with the other (being clothed), which would perhaps 'explain' why we put clothes on and take them off at various times in the day!
Again it could be objected that the issue is actually this: living things are changing all the time; hence, they are a dialectical unity of living and dead matter/processes. Cells constantly absorb dead matter from their environment and turn it into living matter. Dialecticians certainly do not maintain that an organism (or a cell) is wholly alive and completely dead all at once, as the above foolishly suggests. Cells are a dialectical union of two contradictory processes, which process is slowly changing the host organism, or perhaps even killing it. Or so it could be argued.
Nevertheless, such a response will not do. This discussion is centred on the controversial idea that DM-'contradictions' can be verified or falsified in some way, nit that they can be re-jigged theoretically every time this theory encounters an objection. [That will be considered in other Essays.] This was required in order to silence claims that DM is just another form of Idealism. The introduction of more jargon here does not constitute confirmation. It does however increase suspicion that this is all that dialecticians can offer in order to 'substantiate' their theory: more words. And if that were so, the requirement that dialectics be confirmed (somehow) by checking it against material reality would be just an empty gesture.
It could, however, be objected that the above quotations clearly show that dialectics is also concerned with generalisation. Dialecticians try to deduce general laws from nature, and this is all that Engels has done here. Since that is what scientists also do, where is the problem?
The nature of science and what scientist actually do will be examined in another Essay, but in advance of that it is worth directing the reader to this section of Essay Eleven Part One, where this topic is dealt with in more detail.
However, to return to more pressing matters: how is even this generalisation to be confirmed? In view of the fact that scientists do not just make generalisations and then not test them, how might we test this DM-claim about life and death?
Manifestly, it is not possible to verify this particular DM-claim (i.e., that cells are a dialectical union of two contradictory processes). As it stands, this thesis is as a priori as anything else found in DM. Certainly, no one doubts that living things absorb dead matter from their environment, but how this verifies the claim that they are a dialectical unity of this or that still remains obscure. Still less does it support the claim that life is 'contradictory'.
Clearly we need to examine this more closely. Perhaps the intended contradiction is meant to be something like the following?
C1a: Cell C1 is a combination of living and dead matter/processes.
But, once again, in what way is a combination of living and dead matter a contradiction? If it were, then presumably any collection of alleged opposites would be contradictory. Thus, presumably, the human body would be contradictory simply because it comes equipped with a left and a right hand -– perhaps, meaning that those who have lost a limb in an accident are not quite as contradictory as their less orthopaedically-challenged friends. Indeed, in like manner one could argue that we contradict ourselves every time we look in a mirror, turn around, walk backwards, or shake hands. Apart from sounding enigmatic, what would such claims prove? Other than representing an appeal to yet another linguistic trick (i.e., that of combining a word with its alleged opposite, as in the schematic "C1 is A and non-A", or "C1 is A and B", where "A" and "B" are opposites), there is nothing to support this view.
[Indeed, quite the opposite, as we will see in Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three.]
Naturally, dialecticians might want to cling onto this way of describing things, but if empirical evidence is to decide on such issues (as Engels, Novack, Cornforth, TAR and RIRE (among others) maintain), a verbal artifice like this will hardly do. Otherwise why bother saying that DM requires verification (to avoid being labelled "Idealist") if it can only be 'confirmed' by yet more word-juggling? If such an approach were generalised, then scientists themselves would only ever need to concoct a few verbal tricks of their own, and count that as an adequate verification of any given pet theory. That would certainly mean that they could save time and money which is unwisely 'wasted' at present on 'pointless' experiments!
Once more it could be objected that this completely misses the point: left and right hands may be opposites, but they are not dialectically united in change, and neither are mirror images. The parts of a cell are united in this way as contradictory processes.
Even if this were so, it would still not show that this 'unity' amounted to a contradiction -– nor would it demonstrate that this aspect of DM had been verified, or even that it was verifiable (or capable of being confirmed by any sort of confrontation with reality, as opposed to being compared with a few more words wrenched from the dialectical phrasebook).
Presumably, the contradiction between living and dead matter only arises inside the cell; this alleged contradiction is not thought to exist between just any old aggregates of living and dead matter. For a dialectical unity to hold, the two types of matter must enter into some sort of close proximity with one another -- an organic union, perhaps? --, and some form of "mediation" must exist between them, or they must be connected by an "internal relation" of some sort. In that case, it would seem that dead matter must enter the cell and link up/interact with living matter, in a process of some kind -- but in an as yet unspecified manner.
However, what stops us from saying that when 'dead' matter does do this, when it enters the call, it becomes living matter? Clearly, in that case, there would no longer be anything for a DM-'contradiction' to latch onto, since there would only be one type of matter/process in the cell: the living sort.
Naturally, DM-theorists will want to challenge this latest move -– but they may only do so by advancing an opposite stipulation that dead matter remains dead when it enters the cell, to rebut my contrary stipulation above. This counter-proclamation would then allow them to continue to claim that the dead matter in question becomes part of a dialectical union/process with living matter when inside the cell.
Now, it is worth emphasising this: such a DM-move could only ever be based on a stipulation. This is because the mere inspection of cellular processes -- no matter how detailed or fine-grained this proves to be -- could not tell us which of these two alternatives is correct. It is not possible to see that dead matter remains dead/alive inside a cell, any more than it is possible to see when night becomes day (or confirm it in any other way that is not itself based on yet more stipulation). To be sure, the examination of living cells reveals all sorts of activity going on -– but observation alone cannot decide which aspects of this activity are living and which are not. This is, of course, part of the problem that scientists face trying to define life. [Are prions, for instance, alive? They are certainly active inside cells.]
It might be objected here that it is possible to confirm that when non-living matter enters a cell it remains in the same state for a while until it is metabolised by that cell. Hence the above contentions are wrong.
However, what we actually see and what we might want to say are two different things. To illustrate this, let us track, say, a single sugar molecule, S1, as it passes across a membrane into a cell. Naturally, in order to do this we will have to assume god-like powers of vision, but, ignoring this formidable obstacle for the present, we might want to say that while on the outside S1 is non-living, and -- in view of the objection just noted -- we might continue to maintain that it is still non-living soon after it enters the cell. Once inside, S1 will naturally mingle with other molecules that form part of the metabolic processes of that cell.
For the sake of clarity, let us call the latter set of molecules M, all the while allowing for that set to change its content. But, are any of molecules belonging to M actually alive themselves? If we are to derive a contradiction here we need to be in a position to say that some are alive in order to further maintain that both live and non-live molecules co-exist, side by side (as part of a 'contradictory' process). Otherwise, there would be no way to identify both halves of the 'contradiction' here.
But, would we be able to see (or would we be able to verify in any other way) that any of the elements of M are alive, whatever we finally decide to say? In order for us to verify (as opposed to having either to assume or to stipulate again) that a 'contradiction' exists here, we would have to register an instrumental/sensory impression of some sort that confirmed that certain cellular molecules belonging to M are indeed alive at the same time that S1, its latest recruit, isn't. But, to what could we appeal here? Unless we are to suppose that there is something special about living molecules, which makes them look alive, or that they exhibited, or were controlled by, a "vital force" of some description (that could also be observed in some way), any subsequent declaration that these molecules are alive could only ever be based on yet another stipulation.
Of course, the above analysis looks rather reductionist. Presumably, no dialectician would want to argue that molecules taken singly actually contradict one another in this way -- in the sense that while one or more of them is alive another nearby is not --, even if collections of them are still regarded as UOs in their own right. Although DM-theorists certainly talk about sub-atomic particles doing just this! Indeed, Hegel himself spoke of acids and bases as contradictory (i.e., that one was the "other" of the other), and they could hardly do that if their individual molecular structures failed to do likewise.
Even so, dialecticians might want say, as indeed they do, that life "emerges" at certain levels of molecular organisation, as quantity turns into quality (etc.).15 Hence, it is only at such higher levels of complexity that the contradiction arises, or becomes apparent. Naturally, that would mean the above criticisms are badly off target. Or so it could be argued.
However, to reiterate, this dispute came about because it was assumed that it is possible to see, verify, or confirm (in some way or other, by an appeal to something empirical) the existence of DM-'contradictions', which could then be used to describe them as "material contradictions". This is needed, it was claimed, in order to avoid DM sliding back into the Idealist quagmire from which it had emerged. Short of that, DM would be no different from Hegelian Idealism, in this respect at least.
In the present case the 'contradiction' was supposed to be the following: that inside a living cell certain types of living matter exist alongside others that aren't alive, in some sort of 'dialectical process/union/tension' with one another. Difficulties then arose over ascertaining what sense could be made of the claim that there was a dialectical 'contradiction' here, and over the question whether this 'dialectical' link could be confirmed by observation, or by some other empirical means, as DM-theorists themselves demand of their own theory.
It now turns out that this particular thesis can only be verified by an appeal to yet another rather shaky DM-'Law', but not by an appeal to anything empirical. If this is correct, it seems that the existence of DM-'contradictions' can only be confirmed by reference to Q«Q –- but not when compared with reality --, as we had been led to believe all along.
[RIRE = Reason in Revolt, i.e., Woods and Grant (1995); Q«Q = The Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality, and vice versa.]
As we saw earlier, Q«Q is either a conventionalised but badly-stated 'Law' (more accurately, it is at best a trite rule of thumb that often fails to work), or it is another example of metaphysical confusion. It certainly can't bear the weight that this latest challenge places upon it. But even if it could, we still await empirical confirmation of Engels's claims about living cells; an appeal to more theory is no help at all.
Once more, it could be objected that the above fails to comprehend the dialectical process underlying knowledge, the interplay between the abstract and the concrete. But, even if this process were relevant, reliable or comprehensible, in what way could it help us understand how it is possible to verify this allegedly dialectical process by observation, or by any other empirical means? Clearly, the above difficulties (concerning empirical confirmation) afflict dialectical processes just as much as they do alive/dead 'dialectical' molecules.15a
[DM-epistemology (including the alleged relation between the 'abstract' and the 'concrete') is examined in more detail in Essay Two, Essay Three Parts One, Two and Three, and Essay Ten Part One.]
Or, are we to suppose that DM-theorists can 'intuit' processes of this sort in nature and society non-empirically? Must we concede that they have a special way of confirming their Supertruths by methods non-dialectical-infidels do not possess -- one they cannot actually explain to anyone else? If so, how are they different from old-fashioned mystics?
Inside or outside the cell, then, we seem to be unable to confirm the presence of 'contradictions' -- except stipulatively --; certainly not by observation, or by experiments that are themselves observation-based (or that are free of yet more ad hoc stipulations), and which are not merely "thought experiments".
Incidentally, to return to an earlier difficulty, not even a god-like observer could see (or confirm in any other empirical way) whether certain molecules were alive or dead -- at any level of complexity or detail -- without recourse to a prior stipulation to guide 'Him/Her/It' in this regard. In that case, short of such a convention, not even an 'Ideal Observer' could verify the presence of 'contradictions'.
And, if that is so, the claim 'contradictions' exist in nature and society can't have been derived from experience (or even by a process of abstraction) -- it can only have been projected onto reality as an a priori metaphysical dogma.
Now, even though John Rees repeatedly refers his readers to the necessary empirical checks that must be made in order to verify the presence of DM-'contradictions', what we actually find in their place in TAR (and in other DM-texts, such as DN, AD, DMH, FPM, PN, IDM and RIRE) are a few superficial, conceptual, quasi-investigations into things like motion, identity, living and dead matter, matter in general, and the nature of the reality -- with little or no empirical evidence to back them up (that has not itself been slanted by yet more stipulations). [These allegations were thoroughly substantiated in Essay Two.]
[DN = Dialectics of Nature; AD = Anti-Dühring; DMH = The Development Of The Monist View Of History; FPM = Fundamental Problems Of Marxism; PN = Philosophical Notebooks; IDM = In Defence of Marxism.]
All this is not the least bit surprising; no empirical verification of a contradiction is possible -- even in theory -–, as was demonstrated earlier.
Now, DM-theorists might sincerely believe that there is a 'contradiction' between living and dead matter, life and death (or, indeed, that there are other 'contradictions' in society and nature) -- and, moreover, that there are 'dialectical' processes at work all over the place --, but until they inform us which particular set of observations or experiments (not themselves dependent on further stipulations) confirm these acts of faith, they cannot consistently maintain that their ideas have been continually checked against reality, and verified by experience. In fact, they have yet to provide so much as a vague description of how the existence of a single 'contradiction' can be confirmed in nature or in society.
[Graham Priest's allegations to the contrary will be examined in a later Essay.]
In fact, we have yet to be told what a "dialectical contradiction" actually is!
Of course, the above objections leave unchallenged the naive idea that DM-'contradictions' had originally been discovered, or were prompted by observation, or, indeed, that they had ever been based on empirical evidence of any sort. In fact, as is well-known, most of them were simply lifted from Hegel (and from earlier Idealists). Even those that were not borrowed in this way were based on principles found in Hegel's work. Subsequent observations to 'verify' these 'contradictions' were be otiose, anyway -– that is, if DM-theorists ever bothered to carry any such tests out. John Rees certainly mentions none of the experiments he performed in this regard, neither do Woods and Grant -- the same can be said of Engels, Dietzgen, Plekhanov, Lenin and Trotsky. Dialecticians have not gone down in history as great experimental scientists.
Self-appointed Superscientists, certainly.
Experiments would be otiose because it is not possible to see (or to experience) 'contradictions' in nature without a decision having already been made to call them such (the latter choice itself being based on an explicit or implicit Idealist convention borrowed from thinkers who were part of an ancient, mystical, philosophical tradition). This helps explain why so little evidence appears in DM-texts, and why there is none at all that substantiates the claim that 'contradictions' exist in nature and society, all the time.
Those who doubt this should compare the average DM text (even those that sincerely try to prove there is a dialectic of nature, such as RIRE, or Gollobin (1986)) with a bona fide scientific/technical paper that has been published in any random issue of, say, Nature. The difference between this version of Mickey Mouse Science and genuine science will immediately be apparent.
In the place of hard evidence, what we invariably find in DM-texts are the same hackneyed examples wheeled out year after year. These include the following hardy perennials: boiling or freezing water, cells that are alive and dead, grains of barley that 'negate' themselves, magnets that are UOs, Mamelukes ambiguous fighting ability when matched with French soldiers, Mendeleyev's Table, the sentence "John is a man", homilies about parts and wholes (e.g., "The whole is greater than the sum of the parts", etc., etc.), characters from Molière who discover they have been speaking prose all their lives, laughably poor attempts to depict the principles of FL (i.e., "Yay, Yay", and "Nay, Nay" -- anything more than this "comes of evil"), particle and wave 'duality', 'emergent' properties popping into existence all over the place, etc., etc. Even then, we are never given a scientific report on these phenomena; all we find in DM-texts are a few brief, impressionistic sentences/paragraphs on each. At its best (in, say, Woods and Grant (1995), or Gollobin (1986)), all we get is secondary evidence, specially-selected, and heavily slanted in the favoured direction.
In contrast, and in relation to, say, economics, Marxists are keen to provide masses of data and analysis; and they update this data regularly. But, when it comes to dialectics all we encounter is watery-thin 'evidence', and even thinner reasoning. Small wonder then that to its Marxist opponents, like myself, this area of our theory is regarded as laughably weak -- and treated with the contempt it deserves.
Nevertheless, even though the examples of 'contradictions' referred to by dialecticians are seen by them as instances of genuine DM-principles at work in nature and society, they are invariably mistakenly identified as such. Without exception these alleged 'contradictions' turn out to be anything but contradictions; they are invariably little other than badly described, paradoxical, quirky, and oppositional situations -–, or they are just plain contraries. Even then, little or no evidence is presented to substantiate the hyper-bold extrapolations DM-theorists regularly advance from even this impoverished evidential base to all of nature for all of time. In place of adequate evidence we are offered sketchy, half-baked analyses, derived from a few superficial "thought experiments" (and even these are badly worded) -- with a little homespun Stone Age Logic thrown in for good measure. Our intelligence is then insulted with the claim that this Dialectical Mishmash is the very epitome of the scientific method!
[Again, these serious allegations are thoroughly substantiated in the Essays posted at this site.]
There thus seems to be no way of interpreting living cells as UOs other than in a poetic or figurative sense -- as a sort of throwback to the romantic era in Biology, but otherwise of little relevance to modern science. And yet, once again, this is no real surprise given that the ideas found in DM originated in mystical Hermetic Theology (which occult belief system we know for a fact had a profound influence on the aforementioned Romantics and Natürphilosophers of Hegel's day, and thus on Hegel himself [On this see Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here).]
This part of dialectics, therefore, clearly depends on obsolete mysticism, not on modern science. It is no surprise then to find it cannot be confirmed in any way.
So, no literal sets of internal opposites are apparent here; DM-UOs are thus at best figurative. But, are these dialectical figures of speech of much use to DM-theorists keen to parade their scientific credentials? Indeed, are they of any assistance to revolutionaries in their endeavour to understand both the development of Capitalism and how it can be overthrown?
Well, once again, given the fact that dialectics has dominated revolutionary thought for over a hundred and forty years, and during that time Dialectical Marxism has enjoyed legendary lack of success, the only viable response to the above questions must be a resounding "No!". If practice is a test of truth, dialectics stands condemned out of its own contradictory mouth. In that case, this 'theory' is clearly of no use to revolutionaries either in their endeavour to understand Capitalism or their desire to end it.
In fact, these are not even good metaphors. For example, as we have already seen, workers do not contain capitalists (their alleged internal 'opposites') literally or metaphorically; the same is probably true vice versa. And, even though Capitalism contains both workers and capitalists, as entire classes they do not seem to change into one another. More or less the same can be said of the forces and relations of production and of the alleged 'contradiction' between use and exchange value. Do factories, power lines and transport systems literally 'struggle' against mill owners, bankers, unions and/or bourgeois politicians? Do they even seem do this figuratively? Does the hypothetical use value of, say, a sugar spoon 'struggle' against its monetary (or exchange) value? Does the actual use of an escalator in a shopping mall 'struggle' against…, well, what? Do any of these objects collectively or severally have the wits, brains or brawn to 'struggle' against anything at all? Does a single one turn into the other, as we were told they must?
[Certainly, these and other things cause capitalism to change all the time, but not by 'contradicting' anything, for the reasons given above, in Essays Five and Eight Parts One, Two, and Three, as well as for those summarised below.]
This is not to deny either the irrationalities found in Capitalism or the horrors we see every day, but since agent-orientated verbs like "contradict", "struggle", "oppose" (etc.) are clearly out of place in the study of inanimate matter (save we use them figuratively, or perhaps animistically -- but we have just seen that these metaphors are particularly ill-suited to the task) and social reality, these comments will strike those with a reasonably secure grasp of the vernacular (and who have an equal dislike of anthropomorphic language) as entirely uncontroversial.
Nor is this to claim that HM cannot account for such things either; indeed it can, but it needs no help from Hermetic mysticism in order to do so. In fact the reverse is the case: dialectics mystifies this otherwise scientific theory.
However, the fact that these assertions will sound controversial only to DM-fans suggests that linguistic naivety is their only conceivable defence.
Living Things Change Into...What?
As far as option (5) above is concerned -- the "something else" that each living thing is supposed to be, or to become, according to Engels, i.e., whatever it was he imagined living things were supposed to change into --, no obvious candidates come to mind. Engels was perhaps appealing to the alleged fact that the LOI does not apply to living matter, and that living things are constantly changing into "what they are not" -- that is, that at any moment a living thing is "A and not A", "itself and something other" (etc.). But, as we saw earlier, this can only mean that whatever it is that livings things "are not", it must already be present in or near (whatever it is) if this combination is to count as a UO, and all living things are to change into what they "are not".
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
In this instance, one suspects that Engels simply confused a logical principle with an empirical fact: since anything that changes must change into "what it is not" (as a mater of discursive logic, although there are exceptions even to this rule)15b -- either in whole or in part -- Engels clearly thought that this general (I would say grammatical) point applies to living things (indeed, to anything) as it changes.
Now, this brings us back to the problems we noted earlier about the confused way that DM-theorists picture change -- outlined above in general, but in particular in the case of domestic cats. These hapless animals, it seems, must undergo some sort of dialectical change into what they "are not" (or they would remain the same, clearly). And this is just the logico-verbal trick DM-theorists put to no good, having inherited more than their fair share of dubious ideas from Hegel's very own shaky 'logic'.
However, as with other examples of metaphysical word-juggling (found throughout traditional Philosophy), this one has a tendency to strike back, especially at those who use it unthinkingly. In that case, since living things are clearly not cars, not calculators, not mountains, not Quasars, not sewage systems, not volcanoes, not books on DM -- meaning, of course, that all of these (and more) are "what living things are not" --, Engels's formulation that living things are constantly changing into "what they are not" must imply that all living cells are constantly changing into cars, calculators, mountains, Quasars, sewage systems, volcanoes and books on DM. The fact that living things do not do this (to anyone's knowledge) suggests that they do not actually change into "what they are not", or anything remotely like it. Here, material reality once again refutes another dotty piece of dialectical chicanery.
And, it is no good complaining that this makes a mockery of Engels's claim, since his confusion of a logical principle with an empirically determinable fact invites such ridicule. Moreover, dialecticians have no way of neutralising the above objection, or, rather none that leaves this piece of quirky Hegelian word-magic intact. If it is logically true that everything changes into "what it is not", and what an object "is not" is everything that it logically is not, then it must change into everything in the universe that it logically is not.
[Hegel tried to deflect this untoward implication of his 'logic' by appealing to a unique dialectically-united "other" with which objects and processes are pared, so that when they change they do so in a determinate manner. But, Hegel inadvertently holed this idea of his well below the waterline, for it was obvious to him (and the rest of humanity!) that objects and processes can change in many ways -- more on that here. In that case, dialecticians cannot appeal to this defective "other" to neutralise the above objection.]
In which case, things do not change because of logical principles magicked into existence as a result of Hegel's tenuous grasp (even) of AFL.
[AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic.]
On the other hand, if Engels's formulation does not mean this (i.e., that things do not change into what they "are not"), what then does it mean? While this saying might look profound, no sane content can be attached to it.
Once again, it could be objected that this makes a nonsense of Engels's claims, not because they are confused, but because of the repeated refusal of the present author to interpret him in a sympathetic way. Well, quite apart from the fact that dialecticians are not known for their sympathetic reading of their opponents' writings (a quick leaf through Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism will amply confirm that accusation -- as should a five minute 'debate' with a dialectical clone on an internet discussion board), the above account actually takes Engels words seriously, and literally. When that is done, it is easy to see that no material sense can be made of them. Anyone who still disagrees is welcome to make of them what they can.
[They would then of course be the dialectical equivalent of those who still think sense can be made of the Christian Trinity.]
However, whatever sense can be made of Engels's enigmatic prose, it is quite clear that dialecticians have totally misconstrued the LOI. As will be argued in detail in Essays Six, and Eight Parts Two and Three, in relation to the LOI, if a living thing changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. That, of course, makes identity no enemy of change.
With that observation alone much of DM falls apart.
But, if we absolutely must view nature metaphorically/poetically/mystically -- as DM-theorists seem impelled to do, given their acceptance of many of the Hermetic ideas they found in Hegel -- it could now be argued against them that nature is not in fact driven by "contradictions"; it is actually powered by 'dialectical tautologies'.
As a result of the present author's own incautious (but temporary, and wholly insincere) dalliance with metaphysical Superscience/Poetry, and no little word-juggling to boot, this observation can easily be confirmed by the way that each living thing changes: Every single one that we know of changes identically quickly as it itself does, and each and every one of them alters into something which has changed just as much as each itself has, and which "something" is identical to the thing it has just changed into. Now, since this 'thesis' is apparently tautologious -- or it is at least poetically so -- we might be tempted into calling this new sort of word-juggled 'theory': Dialectricks.
Anyway, the words I have used can easily be 're-defined' on sound and 'consistent' dialectical lines so that the above 'thesis' becomes "tautologious" -- of course, with "tautologious" understood in a special and permanently unexplained sort of way, rather like the way that "contradiction" has its own special and permanently unexplained DM-sort of sense. Indeed, we could insist that just as "contradict" means "conflict", "tautologious" means "harmonious", and dig our heels in DM-style, 'Nixoning' away any and all quibbles on the grounds that erstwhile critics do not "understand" Dialectricks.
Once again, this (temporary) a priori 'theory' of mine has the advantage of being consistent with every conceivable observation -- unlike dialectics with its dubious DM-'contradictions'. Whether things stay the same, or change (fast or slow, it matters not), they do so no faster than they themselves manage to do it, and they all change into things that are identical with whatever they have just changed into. That, naturally, makes this tautologically-poetic 'theory' of mine far more 'scientific' than DM.
I have absolutely no doubt that Marxism will be no less unsuccessful if we adopt Dialectricks, too.
[As noted above, those still unconvinced by this sort of 'innovative logic' clearly do not "understand" Dialectricks, but that is probably because they suffer from too much lack of tenderness for the world.
Moreover, those impatient with crazy 'logic' like this perhaps need to turn an equally critical eye on the same sort of lunacy found in DM all the time.]
Diabolic Logic Confronts Mathematics
Engels rehearsed several rather odd ideas in AD and DN, which are so questionable that even some of his fans find them "unhelpful".
For example, Helena Sheehan claims that Engels's adherence to "inappropriate Hegelian terminology" lies behind some of his less defensible musings [Cf., Sheehan (1993), p.41.], even though she is highly sympathetic to his ideas in general. [Ibid., pp.25-48.] The authors of The Dialectical Biologist also reject some of Engels's ideas as "quaint". [Levins and Lewontin (1985), p.279.] Two other comrades (Paul McGarr and Phil Gasper) similarly distanced themselves from certain unspecified failings in Engels's work. [Cf., McGarr (1994), p.155, which accuses some of Engels's examples of being "trite", and Gasper (1998), p.144, which says several of them are "not very convincing".] This is even though both comrades are quite willing to accept many of Engels's other whacky ideas at face value, subjecting them to very little critical scrutiny.
But, who is to decide which of Engels's examples (illustrating the operation of the "laws of dialectics") are "inappropriate" and "unhelpful" (to use TAR's own words; cf., p.75), and which are not?
To assist the reader to decide for herself, here are a few of Engels's more 'interesting' ideas:
"[I]t is a contradiction that the root of A should be the power of A…[as it is] that a negative magnitude should be the square of anything…. The square root of minus one is therefore not only a contradiction, but even an absurd contradiction…. [Again, there is the] contradiction that in certain circumstances straight lines and curves may be identical…that lines that intersect…can nevertheless be shown to be parallel…." [Engels (1976), pp.153-54.]
Again, which of these is "unhelpful", "inappropriate", or just plain confused? Indeed, many of the above ideas are difficult to square with a materialist theory of any kind, let alone Engels's "dialectical" inversion of it.
If mathematical entities like the above are contradictory (as Engels says they are), then they should change. But which of them are changing? And what are they changing into? On the other hand, if they are changeless, what is the point of calling them contradictory? And yet, if they are contradictory, why do they remain in the same state forever? Indices will not one day turn into Matrices, neither will Affine Transformations change into Hermite Polynomials. Not even negative numbers turn into positives. Sure, we can multiply negative integers so that they yield positives, but no one supposes that the original numbers have changed, otherwise no one would be able to use them again. Indeed, multiply -2 by -1 to obtain 2 and both the -2 and -1 are still on the page/screen, unchanged. They certainly do not change through 'internal contradictions'. What, for example, is the 'internal contradiction' in -2? Is it -4/2, or 8/-4, or -8/-1 x -1/4...? [More on that, here.]
Or are we to suppose that when -2 'changes' into 2 when multiplied by -1, that -2 and 2 must have been locked in struggle? Well, it seems they must if they are 'opposites' (and their struggle turns the one into the other, as the Dialectical-classicists claim). But, what then of the -1? How does it feature in this quasi-Platonic drama? It is certainly not the 'opposite' of 2 or -2, and yet it seems capable of 'changing' both, and of mapping any number onto its 'opposite'. Indeed, if we multiply -2 serially by the entire set of negative integers we will obtain the set of positive even integers. Does this mean that -2 has an infinite number of 'opposites'?
More to the point, where are the real 'material forces' these 'contradictions' supposedly represent? And, where is the "careful empirical work" that substantiates odd claims such as these, evidence that DM-theorists, TAR's author and Engels in particular, insist must always be produced? [TAR, pp.108-12. On this, see Essay Two.]
Moreover, Engels's claims make little sense even in their own terms. For example, the iterative rule uk = (-a)k [where "k" and "a" are integers] alternately produces negative and positive values of a, depending on whether k is odd or even. But, where is the "development" in this process? Where is the "new content" arising from old conditions? In fact, and to spoil the party, when a = 0, the result of the iteration is always the same -– i.e., zero. Is this an example of a change that produces no change? Is this yet another 'contradiction'? Or, is this part of mathematics reactionary?
Engels also uses the rather strange term "absurd contradiction" ("The square root of minus one is therefore not only a contradiction, but even an absurd contradiction") without explaining the difference between this sort of contradiction and an ordinary one. This is especially puzzling since many of the 'contradictions' Engels regards as scientifically important look just as absurd.
Moreover, with respect to his comments about "the square root of minus one", what is so contradictory about Complex Numbers? What are they developing into? What are they locked in "struggle" against?
Is, for example, the expression "a + bi" the contradictory of "-a + bi", "a – bi", "-a – bi", "1/(a + bi)", "1/(a - bi)", "1/(-a - bi)", or "1/(-a + bi)"? If the answer is any particular one of these, then why is "a + bi" not changing into it, as we were assured that all contradictory opposites in the end do?
Perhaps then, each complex number is the contradictory only of its complex conjugate (in this case "a + bi" would supposedly 'contradict' "a – bi"), since the product of the two yields a Real Number, namely "a2-b2". But why does this make them contradictory? Once more: these two conjugates do not turn into one another.
And yet, 1/(a + bi) x a + bi = 1, so why aren't these two 'contradictory'? And, what development is there here?
Moreover, after any randomly chosen conjugate pair has been multiplied out on paper, there are countless trillion copies of the very same symbols awaiting multiplication queuing up in 'abstract space', all of which will yield identically the same results with no detectable development over the many thousands of years the human race will be dong this (if we survive that long!). Or, to put the same point materially: anyone can write out and then multiply -- in impeccably physical ink, on boringly material paper -- "1 + i" and "1 - i" but the result will not change: (1 + i)(1 - i) = 2. Once more, if the planet and/or humanity lasts that long, it will yield this result in one hundred million years time, and still on paper, still written in ink. [Hence, this is just as much a material example as it is an 'abstract' one.]
Of course, if you believe everything is contradictory from the start, mathematical objects and processes will naturally be classified accordingly, even where the indications are that they aren't the least bit dialectical -- having failed to notice perhaps that numbers do not 'struggle' amongst themselves (and neither do variables, lines, planes or manifolds), nor do they mirror any identifiably material developments in the real world.16
Even so, how is any of this different from imposing DM on the subject matter, something dialecticians continually protest they do not do?
Of course, Engels focussed part of his comments on "the square root of minus one", but this must have been a mistake, since minus one has two square roots: "i" and "-i" [since i2 = -1, and (-(i))2 = -1], which fact alone rather ruins Engels's point (unless, of course, we now introduce into mathematics the idea that certain of its structures dialectically dither, as it were). But, what he'd have said of the potentially infinite roots of unity there are in complex number theory, we will never know. For:
zn = 1, there are n roots (where z is a complex number, n = 1, 2, 3, ... )
Furthermore, Engels's comment about lines and curves is no less ill-considered. The fact that some things have a dual aspect (if this is indeed the case with lines and curves) in no way makes them contradictory. If it did, then we would have to say that the number seven, for instance, was potentially infinitely contradictory, because among other things it is the sum of countless odd and even numbers, it is also one of the square roots of forty-nine and is identical to the rational number 147/21 -– in addition to being the result of the application of innumerable other functions to arbitrary sets of numbers and expressions (such as "49x6/7x6", for x ¹ 0).
And yet, despite its infinitely 'contradictory' nature, 7 never actually changes. Are all the "material forces" in nature that 7 'reflects' in eternal equilibrium, therefore? Has this number been knobbled by the CIA?
And if lines and planes are contradictory, what are they 'struggling' with, and what are they 'developing' into?
Even in dialectical terms, none of this makes any sense.
Moreover, it is not at all clear why Engels regarded this as contradictory: the "the root of A" is also "the power of A". It might well be the case if roots and powers were themselves contradictory to one another, and this meant that one will turn into the other as a consequence. But, who apart from Engels and a few of his die-hard disciples would want to admit to that?
On a similar basis, one might just as well argue that because 10 is a square root of 100, and 102 = 100, and 10 = 100½, and log10102 = 2, and log10010 = ½ that the log function is deeply contradictory in that it 'contradicts' the relevant powers and roots of 10 and 100, which 'contradict' one another into the bargain. But, even given the recklessly profligate nature of DL, is it possible for four items to contradict one another all at once? If it is, should we not now abandon the idea that all concepts/objects/processes are paired UOs (their unique Hegelian "others") in favour of the more generous notion that they consist of countless UOs -- in the event dialectically adjusting the word "opposite" to accommodate this new development of the concepts involved -- now that we can see that each concept/object/process has a potentially infinite number of 'opposites'? But, tinkering with the meaning of the word "opposite" just to cater for this rapidly burgeoning theory would be no less of a conventionalist cop-out here than it would be anywhere else.
Once more: how would that be different from imposing DM on the facts?
It is worth recalling that Engels's comments on this topic did not appear in an obscure or minor DM-work, nor were they scribbled hastily on the back of an envelope. They were published in a widely recognized and accepted DM-classic, one that has inspired generations of DM-fans, and one that Engels rather oddly claims to have "read" to Marx. [That must have taken days. Can you imagine it! One wonders how often the ageing Marx must have nodded off, not fully realising the nature of what it was that some would later claim he accepted!]
Certainly, Lenin and Trotsky did not find these rather peculiar ideas at all "unhelpful", or "quaint" -- or, if they did, they remained diplomatically quiet about it.17
On the other hand, if we are now supposed to ignore these foibles -– in the way that scientists today disregard, say, Newton's alchemical and theological ramblings -–, then why not disregard the other equally strange claims Engels made? Why should we now accept Engels's assertion that ice "contradicts" water, that life is "contradictory", that grains of barley are "negated" to form mature plants?
But, how exactly does ice 'contradict' water? Does it oppose it? Do they exist together at the same time locked in struggle? Does one force the other to emerge from the shadows as the temperature changes? And, does something higher emerge as "new content arises from old conditions" if ice is melted and refrozen hundreds of times? [Engels (1976), pp.154-82.] Water has been freezing and thawing for billions of years. Has it morphed into something higher? Is it ever going to become H3O as a result?
[NON = Negation of the Negation.]
It could be argued that this is a spurious counter-example to the NON; as Cornforth points out:
"In many processes the working out of their contradictions results in a directed or forward movement, in which the process moves forward from stage to stage, each stage being an advance to something new, not a falling back to some stage already past.
"Other processes, however, are not characterised by such a forward movement.
"For instance, water when cooled or heated undergoes a qualitative change, passes into a new state (ice or steam), but the movement is without direction and cannot be called either progressive or retrogressive.
"...If some processes have direction and others have not, this depends solely on the particular character of the processes themselves and of the conditions under which they happen." [Cornforth (1976), pp.108-09.]
We will have occasion to look at Cornforth's account of change in Essay Eight Part One, where it will soon become apparent that he, along with other DM-theorists, is not too clear about what constitutes a process, an object or a system. So, the non-development of water is not a counter-example after all. But, what about a genuine development: the negation of feudalism to form Capitalism, and the negation of that in turn to form a socialist society? Certainly, Cornforth does not count this as non-progressive, but as a clear example of development via the NON:
"[C]apitalist private property arises only on the ruin and expropriation of the pre-capitalist individual producers.... But when capitalist private property is itself negated -- when 'the expropriators are expropriated' -- then the individual property of the producers is restored once more, but in a new form, on a higher level....
"When capitalism arose, the only way forward was through this negation of the negation....
"The principle of the negation of the negation is thus an expression of the simple truth that one cannot put the clock back and reconstitute the past. One can only move forward into the future through the working out of all the contradictions contained within the given stage of development and though the negations consequent on them." [Ibid., pp118-19. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Cornforth was not alive to see it, but one wonders what he'd have made of the events in the former USSR and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991 (and now, perhaps, in China). If history cannot go back, only forward, then the sort of free market capitalism that has swept through these countries (without a single worker lifting a finger to defend his/her state) must represent a higher stage of property relations: the negation of the negation of the negation. Either that, or the NON no longer works (and perhaps never did).
Of course, if this is denied, then the only response possible is that, contrary to what Cornforth said, DM-theorists do not in fact learn from history, they impose their abstract schemas on it:
"If some processes have direction and others have not, this depends solely on the particular character of the processes themselves and of the conditions under which they happen." [Cornforth (1976), pp.108-09.]
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them.... It does not invent a 'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it." [Ibid., p.15.]
And those who, like me, regard such regimes as State Capitalist, should avoid crowing too loudly at the refutation that history has happily visited upon Stalinism. If, for example, the 1917 revolution has been reversed (in 1921, 1929, 1989, or whenever), then the NON must have made a serious error, and should perhaps be tossed into the trash-can of history (along with the crystalline spheres, humoral theory and Caloric) -- as a bogus 'scientific' concept.
Hence, it is worth asking of the DM-theorists who tell us that the NON only applies to things that "develop": Why saddle DM with such a crazy set of examples (such as "ice contradicts water", and roots 'contradict' powers) if they play no part in understanding the world?
[More on the NON, below.]
Dialectics Meets The Calculus -- And Comes To Nought
Another topic often linked with these 'Laws' is the claim advanced by Engels that Descartes' use of variables introduced dialectics into mathematics.
Despite what Engels said about mathematics, variables had been in use in FL long before they were employed in Algebra. [Cf., Kneale and Kneale (1962), pp.23-297.]
[FL = Formal Logic; AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic; MFL = Modern Formal Logic.]
Indeed, this is what Professor Nidditch had to say about Aristotle's use of variables:
"One has to give Aristotle great credit for being fully conscious of this [i.e., of the need for a general account of inference -- RL] and for seeing that the way to general laws is by the use of variables, that is letters which are signs for every and any thing whatever in a certain range of things: a range of qualities, substances, relations, numbers or of any other sort or form of existence....
"If one keeps in mind that the Greeks were very uncertain about and very far from letting variables take the place of numbers or number words in algebra, which is why they made little headway in that branch of mathematics...then there will be less danger of Aristotle's invention of variables for use in Syllogistic being overlooked or undervalued. Because of this idea of his, logic was sent off from the very start on the right lines." [Nidditch (1998), pp.8-9. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Of course, that fact alone undermines the idea that traditional FL could not cope with change, and that it had used only "fixed concepts". Moreover, as is pointed out in Essay Four, variables are as widely used in MFL as they are in Mathematics -– in which case, MFL is even more 'change-friendly', as it were, than traditional AFL ever was. [These claims are substantiated in Essay Four.]
A word of warning needs to be interjected at this point: in view of the comments made here, the use of the word "variable" should to be treated with some caution. Indeed, as we will see, there can be no 'variable magnitudes'.
[However, throughout both this Essay and this site I have in general used "variable" in its traditional sense; the complications discussed at the above link would make these Essays more precise but needlessly recondite, for no real gain.]
However, what Engels actually said is worth examining on its own merits:
"The turning point in mathematics was Descartes' variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics, and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…." [Engels (1954), p.258.]
Several points need making about this passage and about Engels and Marx's ideas on Mathematics and the foundations of the Calculus in general.
(1) The claim that Descartes's invention of "variable magnitudes" introduced "motion" into Mathematics is as confused as it is inaccurate. A more balanced account from a Marxist perspective can be found in Hadden (1994). As Hadden points out, variables began to be used by mathematicians in the late Middle Ages as a result of the development of ideas connected with the nature of what were taken to be the commensurable values of commodities. For example, Nicholas Oresme had anticipated much of Descartes's analytic Geometry in the fourteenth century, and had already begun to use algebraic ideas to study motion. [On this, see Boyer (1959), pp.60-95, Boyer (1968), pp.288-95, Edwards (1979), pp.81-93, and Katz (1993), pp.292-99. Some of the original papers can be found in Clagett (1959).]
Also worthy of note is the fact that Muslim mathematicians had originally invented the use of algebraic variables long before Descartes. Engels cannot have been unaware of this.
Nevertheless, Engels's point stands or falls on its own merits, irrespective of who actually introduced variables into Mathematics, or when and why this was done.
However, as Frege noted, the idea that variables in mathematics refer to 'varying magnitudes' is confused in the extreme. [Frege (1904). His arguments have been summarised in Note 17a.]17a
(2) As far as Engels's own views on mathematics are concerned, they seem to oscillate between naïve versions of Abstractionism and confused forms of Platonism. Examples of both can be found in Engels (1976): pp.47-50 (naïve Abstractionism), pp.62-63 (naïve Platonism), p.154 (confused Platonism), pp.171-72 (inconsistent Platonism).
In addition, his ideas on the nature of zero are decidedly odd. [Engels (1954), p.261.] Engels fetishises this symbol, attributing to it what seem to be autonomous powers:
"...[Z]ero is richer in content than any other number. Hence, it is part of the nature of zero itself that it finds this application [i.e., that it equals zero] and that it alone can be applied in this way. Zero annihilates every other number with which it is multiplied...." [Engels (1954), p.261.]
Does this mean that if someone tried to calculate, say, "0 x 12", the number "12" would be "annihilated", never to be used by anyone ever again? Are we now to assume that the numeral itself will disappear from the page in a puff of smoke? If not, what precisely is the force of the word "annihilate" here?
As is argued in detail in Essays Two, Three Parts One and Two, and Essay Twelve (summary here), Abstractionism itself is a form of Idealism founded on a syntactically inept misinterpretation of general terms as if they were the names of abstract particulars, in effect conjuring these into existence by the 'power' of naming alone. On any interpretation, this relies on and supports the belief that the underlying structure of reality is abstract, hence rational and mind-like. That accounts for the confused Platonism in Engels's writings, witnessed above.
[In fact, comrades who are overly impressed with Engels's mathematical ideas should consult van Heijenoort (1948) in order to have that unfortunate condition corrected; a copy can be found here.]
(3) Unfortunately, the publication of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts [Marx (1983)] has revealed the spectacle of a first-rate mind vainly attempting to shoehorn an interpretation of the Calculus into a dialectical boot it will not fit.
As the editors of these manuscripts themselves admit, Marx's analysis of the Calculus was based on his reading of textbooks that were badly out-of-date even in his own day. Marx was clearly unaware of the important work done in Analysis by Cauchy, and of the definitive results obtained by Weierstrass and Riemann –- work that was in fact available in his lifetime (the former having been completed in the 1820s, the latter in the late 1850s).17b
Several of the authors writing in the Appendix to the above work make some attempt to explicate and defend Marx's ideas, as well as outline a few criticisms of their own of subsequent developments in Analysis. As these theorists correctly point out, mathematicians working after Weierstrass found that the development of his results required a much clearer understanding of the nature of real numbers, continuity and the logic of infinity than were apparent at the time. Unfortunately, early Logicist theories in this area foundered when alleged contradictions were uncovered in Frege's classic work. Subsequently, Hilbert's entire foundational program was dealt a severe (but, as it turns out, spurious) blow by Gödel's Theorem.18 Nevertheless, these comrades pointedly failed to show how dialectics could possibly help, or have helped in any way at all here; indeed, it is quite obvious (from considerations aired below) that the opposite is in fact the case.
Despite this several other points arise from the comments the above authors (i.e., Yanovskaya, Kol'man and Smith) make about Marx's unpublished writings on the Calculus.
(A) Smith himself admits that Marx's analysis is technically limited; for example, it only relates to certain types of analytic functions (Smith (1983), pp.265-66). In the intervening years, and to the best of my knowledge, no one has attempted to correct this defect or to extend Marx's method to cover a wider variety of functions.
Moreover, other types of derivatives were not considered by Marx -- for example: dT/dx (the rate of change of temperature with respect to position, where no 'motion' is implied by the variables mentioned); dA/dt or dV/dt (the rate of change of area/volume with respect to time). What sort of 'motion' could these possibly involve? Can an area or a volume be in two places at once, and in one of these and not in it at the same time? What about dr/dt -- the rate of change of a position vector with respect to time? In this particular case, it is even more difficult to see how a changing vector can be given a 'dialectical' make-over; can a magnitude and a direction occupy two places at once, but not be in one of them while being in another at the same moment -- especially if vectors themselves define locations?
Not only that, but higher-order derivatives were ignored by Marx, and it is not at all clear how these can be reconciled with a 'dialectical' account of change. Are we to suppose that, for instance, d2y/dx2 -- or d(dy/dx)/dx -- expresses how the first derivative itself changes, or how the variables themselves undergo more complex sorts of 'motion' -- or what? What then about dny/dxn? [To say nothing of (dy/dx)n.]
And what about several of the more complex (but still rather simple) ways that derivatives can inter-relate? For example, what sort of 'dialectical spin' can be put on the following?
If y = f(u), and u = g(x), then dy/dx = (dy/du).(du/dx).
If y = uv, and u = f(x), v = g(x), then dy/dx = (u.dv/dx) + (v.du/dx).
If y = u/v, and u = f(x), v = g(x), then dy/dx = [(v.du/dx) - (u.dv/dx)]/v2.
Are we to suppose that the 'movement' of all these variables is equal, inter-coordinated -- or even comparable?
[Marx did try to examine these, but as I will show in a later re-write of this Essay, his attempt fails rather badly.]
On top of this, Marx totally ignored partial derivatives. Perhaps this is because it would have involved him in having to consider variables 'changing' in three or more directions at once!
Finally, there seems to have been no consideration at all given to the whole of the Integral Calculus. It is impossible, anyway, to see how the latter can be accommodated within a dialectical framework -- and with that, out would go much of modern Mathematics and Science.
It could be argued that the Integral Calculus is a sort of 'reverse' Differentiation. But that is not so. Quite apart from their different proof structures, there are functions that cannot be differentiated which can be integrated, and vice versa.
(B) Independently of the above, Marx's approach is badly flawed. This is because it requires a variable, x (taking values in the domain of a function, f(x)), to 'change' into x1, and that this be represented as part of the factorisation of f(x), i.e., g(x)(x1 – x) -- where g(x) and (x1 – x) are both factors of f(x).
Now, in order to avoid well-known problems (notoriously outlined by Bishop Berkeley in The Analyst) that had plagued earlier attempts to make the Calculus rigorous, Marx set the value of x1 such that x1 = x (or, rather, he allowed it to 'move' back!) This manoeuvre was justified by an appeal to appropriately vague 'dialectical principles' (to be examined presently), the upshot of which is that unless the meanings of "=" and "–" have themselves changed, the factor (x1 – x) must equal zero! But, that just leaves the Calculus in the same state it had been in the 18th century, with all the problems that had bedevilled it since Newton and Leibniz's day.
[Several commentators have tried to blow away the chaff surrounding Marx's argument, leaving behind the 'rational core', so to speak. Their arguments will be examined in a later re-write of this Essay.]
Hence, despite the obvious genius he displayed in other areas, Marx's ideas on the Calculus are entirely worthless.
In fact, there is little evidence anyone has ever made any serious use of his ideas -- including mathematicians working in the old Stalinist USSR, where lip-service had at least to paid to them (for career and/or neck-saving reasons). Sure, Marx's ideas in this area were extensively studied [Dauben (2003)], but there is no evidence they were put to any use. And, as far as can be ascertained, no one since has bothered to develop Marx's ideas into a rigorous system, or ironed-out its fatal weaknesses. [However, on more recent attempts to rehabilitate Marx's re-interpretation of these symbols, see below.]
(C) Even if the above criticisms are misguided in some way -- and Engels's point about variables introducing dialectics into Mathematics was correct, and Marx's analysis was flawless -- it would still be of no use. This is because it is a serious mistake to redirect ones attention away from motion itself onto the symbols depicting it in an attempt to explain how the Calculus handles movement and change. Marx made just such an error when he confused the alleged 'motion' of variables with motion itself in the real world. This can be seen by his use of 'dialectical reasoning' to justify the 'change' of x into x1 (noted above).
In this regard, Aristotle's general comment on the rationale underlying Plato's Theory of Forms is apposite: in any attempt to solve a problem it is a bad idea to begin by doubling it. In this particular case, whatever difficulties there are with understanding the mathematics of motion, they are not helped by reduplicating the very same problems in the motion of symbols. Clearly, the latter would then need explaining, too.
But, how can symbols move? Do they dash about the page? Do they mutate before our eyes? They are supposed to 'take on new values', but beyond this obscure metaphor, what does that mean? Are such symbols magnetic? Do they attract these values? Do they adopt them, impersonate them..., fight them? But, what else can "take on" mean? Of course, as Wittgenstein argued, the solution here is to see these symbols as an expression of the rules we use to make sense of motion. [More on this later.]
To be sure, a clear account of the rate of change of, say, position with respect to time might not be easy to formulate, but the introduction of the rate of change of symbols with respect to time is doubly confused. [Would this not need second-order symbols, and so on?]
In fact, any attempt to depict motion by the behaviour of symbols -– in this case variables in supposed 'motion' -– would constitute another example of Linguistic Idealism [LIE]. On that basis, the 'dialectical motion' of variables (i.e., linguistic expressions) -- if interpreted as reflective of change in reality --, will plainly have been confused with real change in nature. Hence, instead of seeing mathematical variables as a means to an end (as an expression of the rules we use to makes sense of motion), they become an end in themselves: their 'motion' has now replaced the very thing they had been introduced all along to explain!
Inferences drawn with respect to such variables are then misidentified as a scientific analysis of real motion in the material world. Hence, from a consideration of 'moving' variables we somehow obtain super-dialectical truths about motion in nature.
[How and why this is an example of LIE is detailed in Essay Three Part One and Essay Twelve Part One.]
There have been several other attempts to defend Marx's account of the Calculus; cf., Blunden (1983), Carchedi (2008), Struik (1948), Kennedy (1977) -- republished as Kennedy (2006) --, and Gerdes (1983). [These will be considered in detail here at a later date.] Suffice it to say that these commentators similarly confuse real motion with 'moving variables' -- among other things --, and hence what they conclude is susceptible to the above comments and to Frege's criticisms.19
But, what about Engels's other "unhelpful" idea that parrots and domesticated animals understand what is said to them?
"Comparison with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the labour process is the only correct one. The little that even the most highly-developed animals need to communicate to each other does not require articulate speech. In a state of nature, no animal feels handicapped by its inability to speak or to understand human speech. It is quite different when it has been tamed by man. The dog and the horse, by association with man, have developed such a good ear for articulate speech that they easily understand any language within their range of concept (sic)…. Anyone who has had much to do with such animals will hardly be able to escape the conviction that in many cases they now feel their inability to speak as a defect…. Let no one object that the parrot does not understand what it says…. [W]ithin the limits of its range of concepts it can also learn to understand what it is saying. Teach a parrot swear words in such a way that it gets an idea of their meaning…; tease it and you will soon discover that it knows how to use its swear words just as correctly as a Berlin costermonger. The same is true of begging for titbits." [Engels (1876), pp.356-57.]
Here is an extract from Essay Thirteen Part Three dealing with this passage:
Contrary to what Engels asserts, we would not want to concede that animals understand our use of language (or, indeed, that they grasp the import of swear words, for instance) simply because parrots, for example, are capable of making certain sounds -- or just because some humans become overly sentimental and believe that their pet dog can "understand every word" they say. If understanding were attributable to animals solely on the basis of vocalisation, then we might have to admit that, for example, the ability most of us have of repeating foreign words upon hearing them means that we too understood the language from whence they came, when quite often we do not. [For example, although I can read Hebrew and Greek, I actually understand very few words of either tongue.]
But, even in such cases we would still be viewing other languages from our standpoint as sophisticated users of our own language, which means that the dice have already been heavily loaded (so to speak) in our favour. Because of this, we often make educated guesses about the meaning of new (foreign) words we might encounter, based on knowledge of our own language. Moreover, we do this against a background of shared behaviour and a common culture that links us with all other human beings. The same cannot be said of parrots, dogs and horses.
We should, I think, only want to count someone (or something) as having understood what is said (or what was said to it) if it possessed a sufficiently detailed verbal and behavioural repertoire, at the very least. If, for example, such a 'proto-linguist' could not form new sentences from his/her stock of 'words', if he/she/it were incapable of negating any of the latter, or could not cope with word-order change, if they were unable to refer to anything proximate to or remote from their immediate surroundings, if they could not identify or specify any of the implications of what they said, or of what was said to them, if they could not reason both with truths and falsehoods, appreciate stories or fiction, if they could not respond to humour, or engage in self-criticism, if they were regularly perplexed by new sentences they had never encountered before (even those that contained 'words' drawn from their own repertoire), if they could not follow or give instructions, and so on, then I think most of us would have serious doubts about such a 'proto-linguist's' capacity to understand the target language.
On the other hand, had Engels said the following to one of his parrots: "Swearing is not allowed here because it represents the language of oppression" (to paraphrase Trotsky) -- and the parrot had stopped swearing as a result, (or had deliberately sworn even more!) -- we might be a little more impressed with his claims.
Despite this, Engels's ideas do not seem to hang together even on their own terms. If language and understanding are the product of social development (augmented by co-operative labour -- indeed, Engels even says: "First labour, after it and then with it speech -- these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man...." [Engels (1876), p.357]), then how could an animal comprehend our speech without also having gone through the same social development and engaged in the same sort of collective labour?
Engels thus seems to think somewhat inconsistently that mere proximity to human beings is sufficient to engender (in certain animals) the "need to communicate". But, if this were so, then manifestly an ability to use language would not have been the result of collective labour for these animals. Surely, in humans (on Engels's own admission) the "need to communicate" arose out of collective labour, not from mere association. However, in the passage above, Engels seems to think that this "need to communicate" is a free-floating force when it comes to animal behaviour, which can somehow be divorced from its communitarian past and connection with cooperative human labour. That explains why he also appears to believe that mere association with human beings creates such a "need" in these animals. To be sure, the behaviour of domestic animals is different from that of individuals belonging to the same (or similar) species in the wild, but if mere proximity to human beings could account for language, then we should expect cats, cows, donkeys, camels, oxen, sheep, goats, rats, mice, gerbils, fleas, bacteria and lice to be able to communicate with us (to say nothing of viruses and prions). Conversely, if animals were able to talk and/or understand us then language can't be a social phenomenon, nor could it be the result of co-operative labour....
Brain size cannot be the determining factor here, nor can the length of time these animals have been in human company. As should seem obvious, cats and cows have bigger brains than parrots, and have enjoyed intensive human company for far longer (as have rats)....
Is this another example of Engels's prescience, or an indication that on some things his ideas were just a little dotty?
In his review of TAR, Alex Callinicos wondered why John Rees had not discussed these and similar ideas in his book. [Callinicos (1998), pp.99-100.] In view of the above, I think it is reasonably clear why that material was omitted: it represents a low point in the thinking of an otherwise great revolutionary, and thus best left tactfully ignored.
Is The Second 'Law' Incompatible With The First?
Despite this, it is quite clear that the '"nodal" aspect of the first 'Law' is incompatible with the Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites (UIO), or at least with the link between the UIO and the DM-rejection/criticism of the LEM.
[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]
To see this, consider object/process P which is just about to undergo a qualitative change ("leap") from, say, state PA to state PB. For there to be a "nodal" change here it would have to be the case that P is in state PA one instant/moment, and in state PB an instant/moment later (howsoever these "instants/moments" are defined). There is no other way of making sense of the abrupt nature of "nodal" change.
[To spare the reader, I will just refer to these as "instants" from now on.]
But, if that is so, then any state description of P would have to obey the LEM, for it would have to be the case that at one instant it would be true to say that P was in state PA at that instant but not in state PB at the same instant; that is, it would not be true to say that P was in both states at once (which is a core idea of the DM-account of "nodal" change). In that case, these two states would not interpenetrate one another, and the LEM would apply to this process at this instant, at least.
On the other hand, if these two states do in fact interpenetrate one another such that the "either-or" of the LEM does not apply, and it were the case that P was in both states at once, then the transition from PA to PB would be smooth and not "nodal", after all.
This dilemma is independent of the length of time a "node" is supposed to last (that is, if we are ever told). It is also worth noting that this inconsistency applies at just the point where dialecticians tell us DL is superior to FL --, that is, at the point of change.
So, once more, we see that not only can DL not explain change, at least two of Engels's three 'Laws' are inconsistent with one another (when applied to objects/process that undergo change).
DM And NON-Sense -- Or, No Grain Is An Island
The 'Negation of the Negation' [NON] fares no better than the first two 'Laws'. Indeed, since it is itself an elaboration of the previous 'Law', it suffers from all the latter's weakness, too.
However, as with other DM-theses, the NON is also based on a confusion of logico/linguistic categories with objects and processes in material reality, an ancient error Engels copied from Hegel, who in turn learnt it from earlier mystics. [More on this in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summary here, and here).]
Nevertheless, the few examples that DM-theorists have dredged-up over the last hundred years or so to try to illustrate this 'Law' fail to work even in the way they were apparently intended. For example, concerning grains of barley Engels argues that:
"[T]he grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place there appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain…. It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened, the stalk dies, is in its turn negated…." [Engels (1976), pp.172-73.]
Leaving aside the confusion noted earlier (about whether plants (or whatever) actually change because of an internal "struggle of opposites", or even whether they change into their opposites), if each grain is indeed a UO (i.e., a union of grain and 'non-grain', i.e., the plant it becomes -- where that plant is itself the negation of the grain), the grain must also contain the plant, not potentially, but actually. If this were not so, the grain would not itself be a union of these opposites -- and hence there would be nothing to cause it to change, and nothing for it to change into. [Objections to this way of reading Engels will be neutralised presently.]
However, this 'plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism must for the same reason contain its own opposite, yet another plant (i.e., a 'plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism, if, according to Lenin, the 'plant inside the grain' is itself a UO), which must likewise contain its own opposite, yet another grain (i.e., a 'grain-inside-the-plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism), and so on, forever.
This objection cannot be neutralised by arguing that the opposite of the 'plant-inside-the-gain' is in fact the grain itself, for if this were the case, the 'plant-inside-the-grain' would turn onto the grain, if all things turn into their opposites. For the 'plant-inside-the-gain' to develop into a plant it has to be in some sort of 'internal struggle' with its opposite, that is, with what it has to yet to become (i.e., a plant), which in turn has to be internal to that 'plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism, if, that is, the Dialectical Gospels quoted here are to be believed. Furthermore, this 'plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism is not itself changeless. Hence, if it is to change into its opposite (which I have surmised to be a 'grain-inside-plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism -- but, that is just my guess), that opposite must already exist for it to change into, or this would be a change with no DM-cause underlying it. The rest follows as before.
Now, this must be so if all things are UOs as Hegel, Engels and Lenin said they were. In that case, Engels's NON (at least as far as barley is concerned) seems to imply the actual existence of an infinite set of organic plant-and-seed 'boxes within boxes', as it were, which is about as believable a picture of reality as that painted by 18th century preformationist/ovist biologists. This is because it would mean that every grain that ever there was must contain, and must be contained by, every subsequent plant that ever there grew, with each of these organic mega-Russian Doll type organisms complete with its own grains and plants within grains and plants…, etc, to infinity.
Figure Five: The NON Dissected?
Of course, dialecticians (most likely those of the Low Church tendency) who accept Engels's seed analogy will reject the above analysis. According to them, the UO is precisely what we see (and understand) as barley seed, with all its law-governed inner processes which help change that seed into a plant, unfolding the aforementioned 'negation' -- the latter of which does not destroy the grain as such, but "sublates" the original negation/seed (it is not too clear which) from which the new plant emerges.
It could then be argued that none of this means that the original seed contains the subsequent plant in any way, as the above paragraphs rashly suppose. Whatever opposites this natural process requires for it make a plant grow from a seed can be ascertained from its development. [It is worth pointing out that this 'get-out-of-a-metaphysical-hole-free-card' is withdrawn from circulation here.]
But, what exactly are these "opposites"? And why do the Dialectical Prophets say that things change into their opposites, because of an internal struggle between those very opposites, which must already exist for this to happen?
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]…. The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58. Emphases in the original.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]
[Much more of the same can be found here.]
Now, this can only mean that barley grains contain the plants they subsequently become; so they are like Russian dolls. There does not seem to be any other way of reading this 'Law', as it is depicted by DM-classicists. This is because there do not appear to be any 'external' opposites that make a seed change into its 'opposite', as the Dialectical Prophets assure us is always the case.
However, even if we ignore this difficulty for the present, what NON-sense can be made of the claim that a plant is the negation of a seed? This idea seems to depend on the ancient belief that all words, including the negative particle, are names -- in this case, the name of a special sort of dialectical process.
Since no DM-theorist appears to have given this 'Law' much thought, it is not easy to follow the 'reasoning' here. Perhaps it goes something like this?
If we have a negative particle in language, and it corresponds to something in reality, then it must name that something. So, since negativity appears in language it reflects real negativity in nature. [Minus the Hegelian gobbledygook, I have yet to see anything more sophisticated than that in DM-writings. Lenin's feeble attempt in this regard will be examined in Essay Thirteen Part One.]
But if that is so, it would become rather difficult to rectify incorrect naming and/or identification (something that is easy to do in the vernacular).
If and when misidentification happens in every day life, we have reasonably clear ways of correcting it. If we mistake, say, George Bush for George W Bush it is easy to put that right; we simply use a definite description and a nominal qualifier (perhaps), such as: "I mean the former president of the USA, George Bush senior." But, if "not" were the name of some thing/some process and was incorrectly identified as the name of some other thing/process -- let us say that it was mistakenly viewed as the name of "or" --, then it would be impossible to point this out. One could hardly say: "Not is not or", which, if the DM-Identity Theory of Predication were correct, would be equivalent to "Not = not or", and the first "not" would name something other than not, namely "not or" with which it is now 'identical'!
[Exactly why all words are not names was considered in Essay Three Part One.]
More importantly, negation in language typically attaches to propositions (or clauses; however, see here), and if they too are names (in that they allegedly name the true, or the false, or facts, or whatever), then it would seem that any named thing could be negated. This certainly accounts for the nominalisation of the word "negation" in Hegelian/DM-circles, where the word slides imperceptibly between its nominal and verbal forms. One minute it is the name of 'negativity', or perhaps of a subsequently "sublated" 'opposite', next minute it is a process that creates novelty. Of course, it is this lexicographical slide that causes the problem. But, negation is something we do in language, and we do it to certain sorts of expressions. Treating it as the name of something in the physical world could only therefore amount to the fetishisation of the negative particle. [More on this, too, in Essay Twelve.]
Well, even if this syntactic slide represented a sound piece of Stone Age Logic, negation would still only apply to language, not things. Or, to put this another way, if negation applied to objects and processes in the world, DM-theorists have been remarkably coy about how this has been, or even could be, substantiated. [Further ruminations along these lines are explored here. More details will be given in Essay Twelve.]
Following Hegel, Engels just assumed that 'things'/processes could be negated; his only 'proof' seems to have been the fact that it is possible to negate sentences and clauses. To be sure, in Hegel's system it makes some sort of crazy sense to suppose 'things'/processes can be negated; in his mental universe the line between reality and language had become even thinner than George W's stated excuse for invading Iraq. However, in a materialist theory no physical meaning can be given to this odd idea. On a similar basis, one might just as well think that conjunctions can attach to objects in reality just because we can speak about cats and dogs (or, if we attached this connective to processes (such as "heating and dissolving")) -- which facility would supposedly then allow us to 'claim' that reality contains 'objects' called "cats-and-dogs" (or "heating-and-dissolving") that an alleged natural process of "conjunction" could turn them into. This linguistic trick could then be justified by an appeal to the fourth 'Law' of dialectics, the 'Conjunction of the Conjunction' -- in a similar way as we might think, DM-style, that reality contains "negated-seeds". Or even, that nature contains "and"s, or that things are glued together by 'andivity'.
Of course, the motivation for thinking that reality contains negation (and that it does not contain conjunctions) had its own spurious 'logical' origin. It derived from Hegel's defective 'analysis' of the LOI, and from his odd belief that this 'Law' stated negatively implied the LOC, as well as his belief that the 'logical' processing of certain ideas (connected with Spinoza's reckless claim that every determination implies negation) had profound implications for the entire universe, and for all of time. That 'argument' was demolished here. [However, a summary of that argument can be found here.]
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction.]
Even so, this 'secondary' argument (that the world must contain negativity if we have a word for it) fails too, for as we have seen, if this were a sound argument, then reality should also contain adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions and expletives (among other odd linguistic items) -- or what they allegedly 'represent'.
We saw in Essay Three Part One (and will see again in more detail in Essay Twelve (summary here)), that the idea that inferences like this (i.e., from language to the derivation of fundamental principles that govern reality, which underpin the physical world, and which are accessible by thought alone) is a dodge that ancient mystics invented to account for the link between 'God's' word and 'His' creation --, which was then employed to rationalise the 'legitimate' rule of the State, in that both the natural world and the State supposedly reflected the 'divine'/logical order of things.
Moreover, if the structure of language in fact allowed us to infer a priori truths about reality from linguistic expressions then we might just as well openly accept the Ideal nature of the world, and be done with it as Novack pointed out:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
In that case, the material flip Hegel's system is supposed to have undergone in 'Materialist Dialectics' will have been the full 360 degrees, and not the advertised 180.
However, the main objection to the idea that the negative particle finds a counterpart in reality is based on the nature of empirical propositions, and will be aired in Essay Twelve Part One.19a
Terminator Four: The Rise Of Monsanto
Engels argued that as things stand, the development of grain into barley is a natural process; hence the plant that subsequently grows from each seed is its 'natural' negation. But, many things can 'naturally' happen to seeds. For example, they can be eaten or burnt as energy. But they can also rot, ferment, dry-out and be thrown at weddings. In fact, since anything that happens in nature must be natural (it is surely not supernatural), all such processes must, it seems, be governed by these and other DM-'Laws' (that is, if they are genuine laws).
Nor could it be agued that the "natural" development of objects and process is whatever would happen to them if they were 'left alone' to develop naturally as a result of the operation of their "internal contradictions". This is because nothing in the DM-universe is ever 'left alone' -- everything is part of an allegedly interconnected DM-Totality. Whatever happens in nature must have been 'mediated' to do so by some DM-'Law' or other, if DM-theorists are to be believed.
It could be argued that if seeds are left to develop according their own "internal contradictions", the NON will assert itself quite naturally. In that case, the above examples (of seeds being crushed, or eaten, etc.) are not relevant to this 'Law'.
However, quite apart from the fact that the phrase "internal contradiction" is itself as clear as mud (and has yet to be explicated by a single DM-theorist, as Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three show), dialecticians themselves appeal to "external contradictions" to account for change (since, without these, their theory would imply that everything in nature is either self-moving, or is hermetically sealed-off from the rest of the universe; on this see Essay Eight Part One, again).
Anyway, several of the above examples involve 'internal change': rotting and fermenting, for instance. Moreover, once grain is inside an animal, that animal's internal regime will take over, and the grain will 'naturally' develop into tissue or energy. In fact, 'internal' to a wedding celebration, the 'contradictions' inherent in the bourgeois institution of marriage will surely prompt someone to throw grain at the hapless couple. All quite 'natural'.
So, exactly where the 'natural' boundaries of this 'Law' are to be found is somewhat unclear, DM-theorists, once more, not having given the fine detail of their own theory very much thought.
Clearly, the advancement of science and technology often confronts older theories with unexpected problems. Hence, Engels was not to know that one day a company like Monsanto would turn up and develop its so-called "Terminator Gene". This is a gene that can, by all accounts, stop certain plants from producing seeds, which 'scientific advance' seems capable of halting the NON in its tracks --, forcing farmers to buy all their grain from Monsanto, etc.20
Is, therefore, the NON so weak and ineffectual that a large corporation can countermand its inevitability? Or, is the NON still at work somewhere in all this, 'negating' the rights of Third World farmers behind their backs, as it were, so that they will no longer be able to produce their own seed --, if, that is, Monsanto change their minds, ignore public pressure, and go ahead with the production of this gene? Are Monsanto potential negators of the NON? Or have they learnt how to control it?
In this case, therefore, have we not now got a sort of 'seed-plant-non-seed-non-plant' type of NON-development here? Shouldn't we rename Monsanto "NONsanto", as a result?
But, we needn't wait until Monsanto change their minds and produce this NON-starter; anyone who buys fruit these days knows about seedless grapes. In fact, most fruit nowadays does not come from seed; it is produced by propagation from grafts and cuttings.21
The question now arises: how come the NON is so easy to by-pass? Countless processes in nature seem to be, as it were, non-NON-events of this sort, as human beings have 'upset' the 'natural' DM-order of things.
And what are we to say about genetic engineering in general? Is this an interference in the operation of the NON, an infringement of the 'dialectical law' that all change is internally-generated? Or is this a natural process, in view of the fact that none of the scientists or capitalists involved are supernatural beings (so we are led to believe), but are eminently physical objects?
In that case, if all the above are natural processes, then it can truly be said that no grain is an island. Anything that happens to grain anywhere inside the universe must be natural.
Hence, even if barley is dropped into the sea, crushed by a falling tree, genetically modified, or hit by American 'friendly fire', all these (and many more) are natural events and must, one presumes, be governed by DM-'Laws'. In that case, there doesn't seem to be a single thing that could constitute, or which could act as, the 'natural negation' of a grain of barley. So, does it have one? On the contrary it seems, given the supposed universal dominion of the 'Laws' of dialectics (which DM-fans tell us are the most "general" laws there are), there must be countless 'natural negations' of anything and everything.
Indeed, it now seems that anything and everything could be the natural, or even 'dialectical', 'opposite' of grain -- especially, if according to Lenin "every determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every other…." If so, and if we apply this overly-generously open-ended 'Law' to Capitalism, once again, it should be possible for the latter, too, to change into a grain of barley, and vice versa. And it is little use saying that this sort of change has never been observed, since, according to the above, anything could be the opposite of grain and/or of Capitalism. [And like Black Swans, perhaps we just have to wait long enough...]
In that case, since barley is "not-Capitalism", and Capitalism can only change into what it "is not", profligate 'logic' of this sort means that revolutionaries should consider radically re-configuring their aims. Instead of the struggle for socialism, they should perhaps struggle for…, well, er, sowing. Clearly this suggests, too, that our slogans will need to be revised somewhat --, perhaps to: "Capitalism digs its own garden", or "You have nothing to lose but your daisy chains", or "There is a tractor haunting Europe". Or maybe even "From each according to his ability, to each according to his seed".
Now, any who object to the above 'off-the-wall' conclusions should direct their ire rather at this 'Law', and its Hermetic 'Law'-givers, not at this piss-taker.
Either that, or they should say clearly, and for the first time ever, what NON-sense there is to this 'Law'.21a
Socialism Brought From Without -- Perhaps By Aliens?
Nevertheless, and despite the above, as far as the descendants of barley plants are concerned, little development seems to take place; barley stays barley for countless generations -- unless change is externally induced (on that, see below).
More interesting, however, is the fact that based on such botanical stasis --, and if the NON is to be used as the DM-model for social change (as dialecticians often so enlist it) --, Marxists should now become staunch conservatives, since, in the majority of cases, the NON is itself impressively conservative.
So, the NON as applied to barley (and everything else in the living world, it seems), implies universal near-stasis (unless, once again, change is introduced from the outside). In that case, anyone foolish enough to use this 'Law' as a metaphor for social change should (if consistent) be committed to the idea that society must develop peaceably, naturally, slowly -- possibly cyclically -- with no overall change at the end (unless, again, this is induced from the outside).
However, since organisms develop as a result of mutations (mostly in response to violent, externally-induced interruptions to the 'natural' order of growth and reproduction), this process cannot, it seems, be reconciled with the above NON-inspired, internally-generated but staid view of change (or indeed lack of it).
If, on the other hand, the superior, 'externalist' model of change is adopted (wherein the facts of nature are allowed to speak to us for a change, and speciation is recognised as largely externally-motivated), then the revolution, if and when it does occur, should result from the intervention of Aliens, or other NON-humans (as external causes) -- if, that is, we insist on using the NON as a metaphor for revolutionary change.
In that case, it looks like the 'internal contradictions' of Capitalism are not enough to bring about its end -- since they are far too conservative -- if Engels's analogy drawn against barley seeds is to be believed.
Some might object to the above on the grounds that it confuses classical materialist dialectics with Second International Marxism, where the NON was interpreted in deterministic terms. Since, Capitalism is governed by the actions of human beings, this leaves room for human decision, choice and intervention. Or, so the objection might go.
However, given the 'law'-like nature of the NON, its effects seem to be no more easy to escape than those of the law of gravity. Of course, DM-theorists get around this by arguing that 'freedom' somehow 'emerges' from 'necessity', as the first 'Law' (i.e., Q«Q) kicks into gear at some level of complexity.21b But, that particular 'Law' is far too weak to sustain this miraculous defence; as we have seen, it cannot even account for baldness or melting butter!
Anyway, this topic will be taken up in detail in Essay Three Part Five. There we will see that, unless dialecticians can come up with new evidence/argument, the NON (whether or not it is interpreted along the lines of Second International theorists) is eminently 'deterministic', eminently NON-Marxist.
In response, it could also be argued that some mutations are internally-generated. Perhaps so, but these are errors of replication and can in no way be seen as negations (they are more like random spelling mistakes). Moreover, the random nature of these internal copying errors is difficult to square with a law-governed process. Not only are most mutations highly lethal (whether they are internally-, or externally-caused), they are not the least bit directional. Hence, at any particular point in its history a particular mutation might be of no use to an organism, or population (in terms of natural selection); at another, it could be a species-saver. There does not, therefore, appear to be much here that can be squeezed even into this NON-boot.
In addition, it is not easy to see how this NON-theory is applicable to other natural life-cycles. What for instance are we to make of the development of moths and butterflies? Engels seemed to think their development illustrated his 'laws':
"With most insects, this process follows the same lines as in the case of the grain of barley. Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg by a negation of the egg, pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs." [Engels (1976), p.173.]
But, moths and butterflies go through the following developmental stages: adult→egg→pupa→chrysalis→adult. Which is the negation of which here? And which is the NON? And what about organisms that reproduce by splitting, such as amoebae and bacteria? In any such spit, which half is the negation and which the NON?
Are such "splitters" enemies of dialectics -- or just natural dissectarians?23
Spare a thought, too, for Hermaphrodites, for example, the African Bat bug; this is what the New Scientist had to say about this odd insect:
"If you thought human sexual relationships were tricky, be thankful you're not an African bat bug. They show what could be the most extreme case of transsexualism yet discovered. Male bat bugs sport female genitalia, and some females have genitalia that mimic the male's version of the female bits -- as well as their own redundant vagina.
"Bat bugs, and their relatives the bed bugs, are renowned among entomologists for their gruesome and bizarre method of reproduction. Males never use the vagina, instead piercing the female's abdomen and inseminating directly into the blood, where the sperm then swim to the ovaries. It is this 'traumatic insemination', as it is termed, which is at the root of the extreme levels of gender bending in the African bat bug, says Klaus Reinhardt of the University of Sheffield, UK.
"Female bat bugs have evolved a countermeasure to the stabbing of the male's penis -- structures on their abdomens known as paragenitals. These are a defence mechanism that limits the damage by guiding the male's sharp penis into a spongy structure full of immune cells.
"When Reinhardt's team studied bat bugs in a cave on Mount Elgon, Kenya -- already famous as a place that elephants visit to mine for salt -- they found that the males also had defence genitals. What's more, they had scarring on their abdomens similar to that of the females following copulation. In other words, males had been using their penises to stab other males.
"If that isn't strange enough, when the team looked at 43 preserved female bat bugs, they found that 84% had male versions of the defence genitals. Females with this male version of female genitals had less scarring due to penetration than the other females.
"'This is what we think might have happened,' says Reinhardt. 'Males started getting nobbled (sic) by other males, so they evolved the female defensive genitals. As this reduced the amount of penis damage they were getting, females evolved the male version of the female genitals.'
"While theoretical models have predicted that females should evolve different morphologies to escape male attention, this is the first time it has been seen in genitalia, Reinhardt says. 'It's a spectacular example of evolution through sexual conflict.'" [New Scientist, 195, 2622, 22/09/07, p.11. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
It is to be hoped that the NON visits these highly confused insects one day to give them more than just friendly marriage counselling.24
However, there appear to be countless processes in nature that are NON-defying: for example, how does the NON apply to such things as the periodic extinction of life on earth (by meteorites, or other ambient causes)? When a comet hits the earth (if it does), which is the negation and which the NON? And where is the development here? Do meteorites develop into anything new after they slam into the Earth? Is the resulting crater creative?
Furthermore, when a planet orbits a star, is there even a tiny sliver of space for the NON to gain a toe-hold? The said planet may continue to orbit for hundreds of thousands of years with little significant change (in mass, speed, inclination to the ecliptic, etc.). Again, where is the development?
[Objections to these objections (on the lines that the NON in fact only applies to 'development') will considered in Essay Eight Part One.]
Again, it could be argued that this seriously misconstrues the NON; but we have already seen that events and processes, which dialecticians regard as eminently developmental, do not in fact develop; indeed, they go backwards.
So, until DM-theorists actually tell us what is and what is not 'genuinely developmental' (and/or what is or is not in fact a correct example of the NON at work), the above objections must stand as counter-instances with as much right to be such as the (very few) instances dialecticians themselves use. If they are defective, then the one's that DM-fans regularly use so too.
All this shows that this 'Law' is not just the scrag-end of a poor theory; as an account of the natural world (and much else besides) it is a definite NON-starter.
[This 'Law' and the previous one (that relating to UOs) are considered in more detail in Essays Five and Eight Parts One and Two, so no more will be said about them here.]
Conclusion: Same Tune -- Different Words
Finally, as noted in Essay Two, with respect to each of these three 'Laws', it is worth pointing out yet again that DM-theorists have been quite happy to derive acres of Superscience from a few square millimetres of obscure terminology -- only this time such Supertruths have been obtained from badly garbled, less than half-formed musings and seriously botched 'thought experiments'.
01. A comrade has recently raised a few legitimate questions about glass, claiming (at first) that it is a liquid, nit a solid. In that case, what I say in the main body of this Essay (that the phase transition is slow, not rapid) cannot be correct. However, scientists are not quite to sure. Here is what one online source says:
"It is sometimes said that glass in very old churches is thicker at the bottom than at the top because glass is a liquid, and so over several centuries it has flowed towards the bottom. This is not true. In Mediaeval times panes of glass were often made by the Crown glass process. A lump of molten glass was rolled, blown, expanded, flattened and finally spun into a disc before being cut into panes. The sheets were thicker towards the edge of the disc and were usually installed with the heavier side at the bottom. Other techniques of forming glass panes have been used but it is only the relatively recent float glass processes which have produced good quality flat sheets of glass.
"To answer the question "Is glass liquid or solid?" we have to understand its thermodynamic and material properties."
[The author of this article now goes into considerable detail, which I won't quote.]
"There is no clear answer to the question "Is glass solid or liquid?". In terms of molecular dynamics and thermodynamics it is possible to justify various different views that it is a highly viscous liquid, an amorphous solid, or simply that glass is another state of matter which is neither liquid nor solid. The difference is semantic. In terms of its material properties we can do little better. There is no clear definition of the distinction between solids and highly viscous liquids. All such phases or states of matter are idealisations of real material properties. Nevertheless, from a more common sense point of view, glass should be considered a solid since it is rigid according to everyday experience. The use of the term "supercooled liquid" to describe glass still persists, but is considered by many to be an unfortunate misnomer that should be avoided. In any case, claims that glass panes in old windows have deformed due to glass flow have never been substantiated. Examples of Roman glassware and calculations based on measurements of glass visco-properties indicate that these claims cannot be true. The observed features are more easily explained as a result of the imperfect methods used to make glass window panes before the float glass process was invented." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added. Accessed 10/11/08.]
In that case, according to the criteria we ordinarily apply to other substances, glass is a solid, and when heated it loses its 'solid' properties gradually, and non-"nodally".
This is confirmed by the Wikipedia article on Glass:
"Glass in the common sense refers to a hard, brittle, transparent amorphous solid, such as that used for windows, many bottles, or eyewear, including, but not limited to, soda-lime glass, borosilicate glass, acrylic glass, sugar glass, isinglass (Muscovy-glass), or aluminium oxynitride....
"In the scientific sense the term glass is often extended to all amorphous solids (and melts that easily form amorphous solids), including plastics, resins, or other silica-free amorphous solids....
"Glass is generally classed as an amorphous solid rather than a liquid. Glass displays all the mechanical properties of a solid. The notion that glass flows to an appreciable extent over extended periods of time is not supported by empirical research or theoretical analysis. From a more commonsense point of view, glass should be considered a solid since it is rigid according to everyday experience." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added. Accessed 10/11/08.]
See also this New York Times article:
"'It surprises most people that we still don't understand this,' said David R. Reichman, a professor of chemistry at Columbia, who takes yet another approach to the glass problem. 'We don't understand why glass should be a solid and how it forms.'...
"Scientists are slowly accumulating more clues. A few years ago, experiments and computer simulations revealed something unexpected: as molten glass cools, the molecules do not slow down uniformly. Some areas jam rigid first while in other regions the molecules continue to skitter around in a liquid-like fashion. More strangely, the fast-moving regions look no different from the slow-moving ones....
"For scientists, glass is not just the glass of windows and jars, made of silica, sodium carbonate and calcium oxide. Rather, a glass is any solid in which the molecules are jumbled randomly. Many plastics like polycarbonate are glasses, as are many ceramics....
"In freezing to a conventional solid, a liquid undergoes a so-called phase transition; the molecules line up next to and on top of one another in a simple, neat crystal pattern. When a liquid solidifies into a glass, this organized stacking is nowhere to be found. Instead, the molecules just move slower and slower and slower, until they are effectively not moving at all, trapped in a strange state between liquid and solid.
"The glass transition differs from a usual phase transition in several other key ways. Energy, what is called latent heat, is released when water molecules line up into ice. There is no latent heat in the formation of glass.
"The glass transition does not occur at a single, well-defined temperature; the slower the cooling, the lower the transition temperature. Even the definition of glass is arbitrary -- basically a rate of flow so slow that it is too boring and time-consuming to watch. The final structure of the glass also depends on how slowly it has been cooled. [New York Times, 29/07/08. Accessed 10/11/08, Bold emphases added.]
So, I was not wrong to call glass a solid.
However, all this was not known in Engels's day, but he surely cannot have been ignorant of the fact that glass melts slowly. Why then did he "foist" this 'Law' on the facts?
1. "Not so!" I hear some readers exclaim. But, as we will see, the nature of these "nodal points" is left entirely obscure by dialecticians. Until they clarify what they mean by this word, not even they will know whether the claims made in the main body of this Essay are inaccurate or not.
To be sure, the picture nature presents us with in this regard is highly complex, which is one of the reasons why Engels's 'Laws' cannot possibly capture this complexity, regardless of the other serious flaws they exhibit. In addition, it is also worth pointing out that the nature of state of matter transitions is not being questioned here, just whether all of them are sudden.
Consequently, either the "nodal" aspect of the first 'Law' is defective, or it only works in some cases, but not others -- in that case, it cannot be a law.
In fact, Physicists tell us that what they call "second-order" Phase Transitions can proceed smoothly. As one online source says:
"Second-order phase transitions, on the other hand, proceed smoothly. The old phase transforms itself into the new phase in a continuous manner."
[See also Note 9 -- where we will find that "first order" phase changes are not straight-forward, either.]
Moreover, under certain conditions it is possible to by-pass phase transformations altogether.
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish here between states of matter, and phases:
"Phases are sometimes confused with states of matter, but there are significant differences. States of matter refers to the differences between gases, liquids, solids, etc. If there are two regions in a chemical system that are in different states of matter, then they must be different phases. However, the reverse is not true -- a system can have multiple phases which are in equilibrium with each other and also in the same state of matter. For example, diamond and graphite are both solids but they are different phases, even though their composition may be identical. A system with oil and water at room temperature will be two different phases of differing composition, but both will be the liquid state of matter." [Wikipedia.]
On another page we find the following:
"States of matter are sometimes confused with phases. This is likely due to the fact that in many example systems, the familiar phase transitions are also transformations of the state of matter. In the example of water, the phases of ice, liquid water, and water vapour are commonly recognized. The common phase transitions observed in a one component system containing only water are melting/solidification (liquid/solid), evaporation/condensation (liquid/gas) and sublimation/deposition (solid/gas).
"Transitions between different states of matter of the same chemical component are necessarily a phase transformation, but not all phase transformations involve a change in the state of matter. For example, there are 14 different forms of ice, all of which are the solid state of matter. When one form of ice transforms into another, the crystal structure, density, and a number of physical properties change, but it remains a solid." [Wikipedia.]
But, as this Wikipedia article goes on to say:
"In general, two different states of a system are in different phases if there is an abrupt change in their physical properties while transforming from one state to the other. Conversely, two states are in the same phase if they can be transformed into one another without any abrupt changes." [Wikipedia. Bold emphasis added.]
So, some "qualitative" changes of state are non-"nodal".
And the situation is even more complicated still:
"In the diagram, the phase boundary between liquid and gas does not continue indefinitely. Instead, it terminates at a point on the phase diagram called the critical point. At temperatures and pressure above the critical point, the physical property differences that differentiate the liquid phase from the gas phase become less defined. This reflects the fact that, at extremely high temperatures and pressures, the liquid and gaseous phases become indistinguishable. In water, the critical point occurs at around 647K (374°C or 705°F) and 22.064 MPa." [Wikipedia. Bold emphasis added.]
"In physical chemistry, thermodynamics, chemistry and condensed matter physics, a critical point, also called a critical state, specifies the conditions (temperature, pressure) at which the liquid state of the matter ceases to exist. As a liquid is heated, its density decreases while the pressure and density of the vapour being formed increases. The liquid and vapour densities become closer and closer to each other until the critical temperature is reached where the two densities are equal and the liquid-gas line or phase boundary disappears. Additionally, as the equilibrium between liquid and gas approaches the critical point, heat of vaporization approaches zero, becoming zero at and beyond the critical point. More generally, the critical point is the point of termination of a phase equilibrium curve, which separates two distinct phases. At this point, the phases are no longer distinguishable." [Wikipedia. Bold emphasis added. Spelling changed to conform to UK English.]
This can only mean that qualitative differences between the liquid and gaseous phases of water are energy-neutral beyond this "critical point", contradicting Engels.
And, here is what a standard Physical Chemistry text had to say:
"[W]e must distinguish the thermodynamic description of a phase transition and the rate at which the transition occurs. A transition that is predicted from thermodynamics to be spontaneous may occur too slowly to be significant in practice. For instance, at normal temperatures and pressures the molar Gibbs energy of graphite is lower than that of diamond, so there is a thermodynamic tendency for diamond to change into graphite. However, for this transformation to take place, the C[arbon] atoms must change their locations, which is an immeasurably slow process in a solid except at high temperatures." [Atkins and de Paula (2006), p.118. Bold emphasis added.]
In that case, nature (i.e., the real material world, not the Ideal world that Hegel and Engels dreamt up) is far more complex than this Mickey Mouse 'Law' would have us believe.
Once more, not every change is "nodal".
Indeed, scientists in the USA recently reported they had discovered a new state of matter, which while being solid, appears to behave like a liquid (hence, we would have a change of quality with no change in quantity here):
"In the 15 January 2004 issue of the journal Nature, two physicists from Penn State University will announce their discovery of a new phase of matter, a 'supersolid' form of helium-4 with the extraordinary frictionless-flow properties of a superfluid. 'We discovered that solid helium-4 appears to behave like a superfluid when it is so cold that the laws of quantum mechanics govern its behaviour,' says Moses H. W. Chan, Evan Pugh Professor of Physics at Penn State. 'We apparently have observed, for the first time, a solid material with the characteristics of a superfluid.'
"'The possible discovery of a new phase of matter, a supersolid, is exciting and, if confirmed, would be a significant advance,' comments John Beamish, professor of physics at the University of Alberta and the author of a review of Chan's discovery published in the 'News and Views' section of Nature. 'If the behaviour is confirmed, there are enough questions to be answered about the nature and properties of supersolid helium to keep both experimentalists and theorists busy for a long time.'...
"'Something very unusual occurred when the temperature dropped to one-tenth of a degree above absolute zero,' Chan says. 'The oscillation rate suddenly became slightly more rapid, as if some of the helium had disappeared.' However, Chan and Kim were able to confirm that the helium atoms had not leaked out of the experimental capsule because its rate of oscillation returned to normal after they warmed the capsule above one-tenth of a degree above absolute zero. So they concluded that the solid helium-4 probably had acquired the properties of a superfluid when the conditions were more extreme....
"If Chan's experiment is replicated, it would confirm that all three states of matter can enter into the "super" state, known as a Bose-Einstein condensation, in which all the particles have condensed into the same quantum-mechanical state. The existence of superfluid and 'supervapor' had previously been proven, but theorists had continued to debate about whether a supersolid was even possible. 'One of the most intriguing predictions of the theory of quantum mechanics is the possibility of superfluid behaviour in a solid-phase material, and now we may have observed this behaviour for the first time,' Chan says." [Science Daily, 15/01/2004. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here; spelling changed to conform to UK English.]
Sure, the above change is sudden (whoever denied that some changes were?), but while that particular aspect of the first 'Law' has been confirmed in this case, the main part (where Engels said it was impossible to alter the quality of an object/process without the addition or subtraction of matter or energy), has been refuted by the discovery of such superfluids/supervapors, and now by these supersolids: the substance in question remained Helium either side of the change.
Even so, it is entirely unclear whether the term "quality" -- as it is used by dialecticians -- means the same as "state of matter" or "phase". Either way, the substance involved, whether it is in a different phase or state, remains the same substance. So, in that sense, if quality is defined in terms of the nature of substances (as was the case with Hegel and Aristotle -- on that, see here), it is clear that even though there are phase/state of matter changes, they cannot count as qualitative changes of the right sort, since the substances involved remain the same throughout. Hence, howsoever slowly or quickly iron melts or solidifies, for example, it remains iron.
Now, has a single DM-fan ever given any thought to this?
Are you serious?
Recall, this is Mickey-Mouse Science we are dealing with here!
Moreover, as noted above, until we are told the exact duration of a dialectical "node", the first 'Law' cannot be considered anything other than hopelessly vague and/or subjective. If "nodal" points are several minutes long, then many of the examples dialecticians give would cease to be "nodal". On the other hand, if such points last, say, a few nanoseconds perhaps none at all would survive. A case of survival of the quickest, one presumes.
However, the bemused reader can search through DM-texts till the cows evolve for any hint of clarity or precision on this score; indeed, DM has been so amateurishly constructed that this point will not even have occurred to most DM-fans. And even now (after reading this) they will hand-wave it aside as a pedantic irrelevance -- so sloppy have their thought processes become. [On 'pedantry', see here.]
We can be thankful that scientists are not so careless; can you image a Physicist waving aside as irrelevant the timing or duration, say, of certain nuclear reactions?
One imagines that if ever the Olympics were run by such cavalier dialecticians, everyone would get Gold on the grounds that precise timing is a 'pedantic irrelevance'.
In that case, it is to be hoped that DM-fans are never given the opportunity to run a train service -- and are allowed nowhere near a demolition site.
[The above was written before I had read this.]
1a. For example, Ghiselin (1975), and Hull (1976, 1988). On this, see here.
1b. Of course, it could be objected that organisms do in fact 'contradict' one another when, for example, they compete for scarce resources, etc. Contradictions thus apply to the 'struggle' for survival among conspecifics.
But, even if this were a correct way of picturing 'dialectical contradictions', there still do not seem to be any that are internal to particular organisms which engender evolutionary change in those organisms.
And this is not just because evolution works on populations, not individuals. It is because changes to organisms are both internally- and externally-induced. Mutations, of course, can be internally-generated (as copying 'errors', etc.), but many are not; they are externally-motivated by radiation, viruses and certain chemicals. Indeed, some organisms even share mutations (for example, bacteria). What kind of 'contradiction' is that?
In addition, populations of organisms change in response to environmental pressure, which is an external constraint.
As we shall see later, depicting any of these as 'contradictions' -- howsoever they are caused -- is a serious confusion. [This is discussed in more detail in Essay Eight, Parts One, Two, and Three.]
On this topic in general, see Ridley (2004); on the 'external' and 'internal' causes of speciation, see Coyne and Orr (2004).
Notwithstanding this, it is not easy to see how conspecific competition could be 'contradictory'. Not only do many animals and plants cooperate [on this see Kropotkin (1939)], those that compete with heterospecifics do not in general struggle against members of their own species. So, for example, if a herd of deer is running away from a predator, and the fastest of them survive, no one imagines that they did so by knobbling those that did not. Of course, there are many examples of organisms that do compete conspecifically, but there are just as many (perhaps more) that do not. So, if this 'Law' applies here, it does so only fitfully. Once more, calling this sort of competition a "contradiction" would be a serious error. [Again, see Essay Eight Parts One, Two, and Three.]
[On animal cooperation, there is an amazing film posted at YouTube of a hippopotamus rescuing an impala from the jaws of a crocodile, and then attempting to revive it. It has to be seen to be believed -- an animal of one species rescuing one of another. Where is the 'contradiction' here? Some might think that the hippo 'contradicted' the crocodile, but if you watch carefully, the former says nothing at all to the latter. Moreover, the hippo does not turn into the crocodile, nor vice versa, as we were told should happen to objects and processes in nature that 'oppose' one another 'dialectically'.]
In general, too, competing conspecifics or heterospecifics change into one another as a result of this alleged 'contradiction'. A well-fed lion does not, for example, change into a starving lioness, nor yet a hungry hyena.
Furthermore, those who think that altruistic or cooperative behaviour in animals and plants can be explained in neo-Darwinian terms, perhaps through the 'Theory of Inclusive Fitness', would do well to read Stove (1994a and 1994b) -- the latter has just been re-issued as Stove (2006) --, as well as Franklin (1997), which was in response to Blackburn (1994) -- and then think again.
[For those unfamiliar with work of David Stove, it is worth pointing out that up until his death just over ten years ago he was an atheist, and he believed that Darwin's theory was the best explanation we have for the origin of species, but he held that it was not without its own serious problems. He was also a right-wing conservative (who held many offensive views, especially on race, and about women), but that should no more stop us reading his critique of neo-Darwinian theory than dialecticians allow Hegel's right-wing views to prevent them from reading his 'Logic'.]
1c. It is worth noting the response of one comrade (here), who offered what amounts to a subjectivist counter-argument, as follows:
"She [i.e., Rosa L] also does not understand that thousands of years are actually very short periods of time, geologically speaking."
Which fact is not, of course, something that evolution itself understands, possessing neither a memory nor a working knowledge of Geology. Hence, the processes involved clearly do not know when something is short or long, nor do they know when to speed up just to make sure they 'obey' this 'Law'. [The point of these remarks will become clear presently.*]
As seems plain, such a comparison with all of geological time depends on a subjective view of events, one that we as observers of the whole process form of the course of evolution and the development of the Earth. In that case, to describe these "nodal" points as either "long" or "short" would be to do so from our perspective. From the 'perspective' of the organisms involved, however, tens of thousands of years would not be a short time. So, for amateur 'dialectical-palaeontologists' to describe these "nodal" episodes as "long" or "short" would be no less subjective.
It could be argued that a ten- or twenty-thousand year period is short when compared with the hundreds of millions of years that organisms have been evolving, and so this is not the least bit subjective.
Of course, the point is that nature itself cannot take this view -- since, plainly, it is not conscious! Human observers may make comparisons like this, and as such these comparisons are not observer-independent -- hence they are non-objective. [Of course, that depends on how "objective" is defined. On that, see here.]
Again, exception could be taken to this response in that this does not make these comparisons non-objective, since these periods exist independently of human observers.
But, once more, comparisons do not exist in nature. Without conscious beings to do the comparing, they would never be made. So, while the processes concerned certainly exist without human observers to record them, this is not true of the comparisons themselves. [*Which is the reason for those earlier comments.]
Moreover, the phenomena themselves do not dictate to us that we should or must compare the rapid speciation of certain organism with the whole of geological time, no more than we would allow similar comparisons to be made with anything else. In that case, it certainly won't do for someone sat in a restaurant, say, who has been waiting several hours for their food to arrive to be told that in comparison to the amount of time since the Pre-Cambrian Period they have in fact been served rather quickly.
Such comparisons are not forced on us by nature, and that is why we can't just use them anywhere we please, as that weak joke sought to bring out. If we are going to draw lines somewhere, that would need justification of some sort; as far as I am aware, none has yet been produced by a single dialectician.
Anyway, why should we compare the speciation underway in one population with all of geological time? If we have to make comparisons, a more relevant one would certainly be with the length of time a certain species has been in existence, which may only be of the order of tens of thousands of years. In that case, the time period Gould envisaged for a new bout of speciation would be relatively long (or, rather, it will not always be relatively short), compared to the time that a relevant species has been around, making this "nodal" point quite protracted, and hence not really "nodal", after all.
There is nothing in nature itself that tells us we have to slice things up one way or another (although it might be possible to give some sort of a rationale for one specific choice over an alternative, as was done in the previous paragraph); while development may or may not be punctuated, geological time itself has not been punctuated for us, with objective periods highlighted for our convenience. Certainly geologists have divided up the past into the familiar geological ages, but that in itself does not force any particular choice on us when it comes to comparing the development of organisms with the whole of earth's history.
And we should certainly resist slicing up the past just to make life easy for dialecticians. Naturally, they can parse nature as they see fit, but then that would merely highlight the subjectivism that we already know is inherent in this 'upside-down' version of Hegelian Idealism.
In that case, the comparison of any of these alleged "nodes" with all of geological time would be no less subjective.
Alternatively, if it is claimed that this 'dialectical' re-classification isn't subjective, then dialecticians need to reveal the objective criteria upon which this piece of convenient temporal parsing has been based -- and then show how nature could possibly have agreed to implement these criteria, and why it failed to signpost them for our convenience.
And, it would be interesting to see this 'subjectivist' re-definition applied to several of the other examples DM-theorists regularly use to illustrate this 'Law'. To that end, consider a man who has gone bald over the space of, say, ten years. Because this time interval is short compared to all of geological time, we could count this as a 'rapid' change, with a short "nodal" point. But, is this sensible?
On the other hand, and more reasonably, we would surely compare this example of follicular change with that man's entire life to date. In that case, let us assume he was, say, thirty when he finally became follically-challenged, with the first signs appearing when he was perhaps twenty. Given these background details, his subsequent hairless condition can now be seen as the result of slow change and the alleged "nodal" point would have to be adjusted accordingly to this new and more reasonable perspective. Indeed, it would clearly be a rather lengthy "nodal" point --, in which case, describing it as "nodal" would be about as accurate as describing a tortoise as "fleet of foot", and Tony Blair as "honest, straight-forward and true".
[However, as is pointed out here, there is no 'nodal point' in this case, anyway; there is no point at which someone who is not bald becomes bald if they lose just one more hair. Naturally, a person's hair could fall out overnight, in which case, we would have a much clearer "nodal" point; but in the majority cases baldness is progressive, not acute.]
Consider another example: what if a body of water were heated up very rapidly (for example, because the heat source was immense -- say, from a nuclear explosion), and it went from water to steam in just a few seconds; the "nodal" point involved here would clearly be very short. Compare this to the same body of water heated up very slowly (perhaps as a result of long term global-warming), so that it evaporated gradually over the space of a few centuries, for the same input of energy. Clearly, there would be no "nodal" point here -- because in this case the water would never actually boil, but it would still evaporate. Indeed, this is a process that takes place all the time, right round the world as the oceans re-cycle water into the atmosphere, very undialectically. Even if there were a "nodal" point here, it would be protracted, not short. Calling it "nodal" would therefore do violence to this word once again.
In that case, the duration of "nodal" points themselves seem to change from short to long and back again (or they disappear entirely), depending on the context, for the same energy budget -- and, even better, they do this without the intervention of any 'internal contradictions'. Unfortunately for his epigones, this too refutes Engels's first 'Law', but now as applied to such points themselves, for here we would have a qualitative change to "nodal" points with no addition of matter or energy, something Engels said could not happen. For the same energy input, these "nodal" points could be long, short or non-existent.
However, subjectivist conclusions like this are of little use even to dialecticians, for if we are now meant to refer to the whole geological period to record such "nodal" changes, then the massive 'qualitative' transition from single-celled organisms to present day flora and fauna manifestly took place over a "nodal" point lasting several billion years. Given that comparison, the phrase "nodal point" must lose whatever sense it once had (if it had one), since it looks as if it can mean anything to anybody.
Someone might still complain that this several billion year-long "nodal" point isn't a single point at all. There are in fact countless thousands of small "nodal" points dotted throughout this entire period, all illustrating dialectical change.
But, who says? Where are the objective criteria that decide where "nodal" points begin and end? Or that help us identify and/or count them? Or that tell us which periods we are supposed to compare with which? Or even what a "nodal" point is to begin with.
So far, not only have DM-fans not thought to define (or even so much as loosely characterise) these all-important "nodal" points of theirs, they have signally failed to say how we can count them, distinguish them, compare them or even ascertain their length.
In Mickey Mouse Science like this, it looks like it is sufficient to wave a loose and ill-defined phrase about and fool oneself into thinking that this constitutes genuine scientific knowledge.
This probably helps explain why there is (to my knowledge) not a single PhD thesis in any of the sciences devoted to this aspect of DM, and which attempts to tighten-up the loose phraseology of any of its 'Laws', or that confirms even so much as a single one of them. Of course, there are any number of books and articles produced by DM-fans (which are mostly highly repetitive, and which re-cycle the same examples year in, year out) that offer a few hastily cobbled-together ideas on this topic. Almost invariably this 'evidence' is padded-out over a few paragraphs, or over a few pages. [Compare that to the hundreds of pages of detailed evidence found in standard scientific textbooks, to say nothing of research papers and monographs.]
Woods and Grant (1995) is an excellent example of this genre. Even though their display of 'evidence' is more protracted than is usual, it is still highly selective and plainly slanted to fit this 'Law' --, rather than this 'Law' having been being derived from all the available evidence. Indeed, they consider none of the obvious points raised in this Essay.
In their case, Cornforth's words seem rather apt:
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphasis added.]
Nevertheless, not one of these forays into sophomoric science would satisfy the requirements even of a first year undergraduate paper in Chemistry, Physics or Biology. Can you imagine saying that of any branch of the genuine sciences?
And even if Gould's alleged "nodal" points (a term which I do not think he used) were as subjectively short as they are said to be, during each one of them no individual organism actually undergoes speciation, since speciation applies to populations, or possibly even 'gene pools', not individuals, as noted earlier.
So, in this case, the alleged passing over of "quantity into quality" attaches to no identifiable object in nature; hence this 'Law' does not apply even here.
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added.]
Naturally, this sloppy approach to science allows dialecticians to imagine that Gould's hypothesis can be used to illustrate their 'theory', but still with no 'objective' criteria or data to back it up. Which once again means that DM has been imposed on nature --, or rather, in this case, it has been foisted on Gould.
Finally, it is worth noting that Gould's theory was introduced partly to help resolve a serious difficulty that Darwin's theory has itself faced from the beginning: the fact that there are still far too many gaps in the fossil record.
[On this, see Schwartz (1999); cf., also this and this. In fact, since Schwartz's new theory of origins is pointedly non-gradualist, it should therefore appeal to DM-fans more than does Darwin's!]
Now, without taking a position on this (since it is outside my area of expertise), we need to remember that Gould and Eldredge's theory is still just a theory. It might not pan out; most theories do not. [This allegation will be defended in a later Essay.] In which case, DM-fans would be unwise to pin all their hopes on it.
There is an excellent article on this here, which stresses the relatively rapid changes that Gould and Eldredge's theory postulates, but it also underlines the fact that these changes are still gradual and not saltational (i.e., they are non-"nodal"):
"Punctuated equilibrium is therefore mistakenly thought to oppose the concept of gradualism, when it is actually more appropriately understood as a form of gradualism...." [Wikipedia, quoted from here.]
Other comrades might be tempted to appeal to what might be called the 'statistical' defence here, and claim that the application of Engels's 'Law' to individual objects (or organisms) in evolution is yet another example of 'formal thinking'. However, and on the contrary, these laws apply to averaged (etc.) data sets. Or so it might be claimed.
But unless we can specify what it is that bears the qualities that actually undergo change, then this 'Law' can gain no grip --, for in that case, there would be no quality of anything specific that would change because of the increase in some other unspecified quantity.
The only way round this, it would seem, is to attribute a quality to a sort of 'collective individual', the population (or gene pool) in question. But, as noted above, even here change is smooth, and non-"nodal", and largely externally-motivated. In that case, it is of no use to dialecticians. [On this see, Coyne and Orr (2004).]
Moreover, since statistical values do not appear in nature (that is, the world itself does not contain, nor does it calculate, the mean, standard deviation, cumulative frequency, or Poisson distribution of anything whatsoever), then this response is entirely subjective, too.
To be sure, we use statistical concepts to help us understand nature aright, but that does not mean such measures are 'objective' --, any more than the Prime Meridian (through Greenwich, in South London, UK), the Equator or the Centre of Mass of the Galaxy are 'objective'.
2. A clear example of just this sort of "nodal" revolutionism can be found in Woods and Grant (1995), pp.61-63, but it is widespread throughout the genre, as anyone familiar with dialectics will know. See also Kuusinen (1961), p.89.
3. One benighted DM-soul tried to argue that the increase in quantity here is time, forgetting that unless time is energy this response falsifies Engels's 'Law'. This is quite apart from the rather bizarre idea that time is a quantity!
The Necker Cube looks like this:
Figure Six: Invented By MI6?
Other examples of the same phenomena can be found at countless sites on the internet devoted to optical illusions; here, for instance.
Indeed, the very same material object can change qualitatively if its context or background is altered, so that no material change to that object will have occurred, but it will have qualitatively changed. The black figures below are identical, but they look qualitatively different (and this could form part of a moving image, so the figures below could look bigger as they moved into this shape -- or 'developed' --, and thus alter qualitatively with no input of energy):
Figure Seven: Is This Just One Of The Spectres Haunting DM?
[This example was obtained from here.]
Lest someone be tempted to argue that these are not 'real' objects, but 'mental' entities, it is worth recalling that Engels argued:
"Dialectics, however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976) p.180. Bold emphasis added.]
Necker cubes are at least objects of thought, and so should be subject to this 'Law'.
4. This how Wikipedia puts things:
"In chemistry two stereoisomers are said to be enantiomers if one can be superimposed on the mirror image of the other, and vice versa. A simple analogy would be that your left and right shoes are enantiomers of each other. Two molecules that are made up of the exact same atoms, having exactly the same neighbours, and differing only in their spatial orientation are said to be stereoisomers. A test for enantiomers can be stated thus: Do the molecules possess mirror planes of symmetry? That is, is it possible to find a plane that cuts through the molecule such that the two halves are mirror images of each other? It has to bisect all of the chiral centres.
"An enantiomer of an optically active isomer rotates plane polarized light in an equal but opposite direction of the original isomer. A solution of equal parts of an optically active isomer and its enantiomer is known as a racemic solution and has a net rotation of plane polarized light of zero. A more in-depth explanation of this is in the footnotes for optical isomerism....
"Research is expanding quite rapidly into the field of chiral chemistry because, for the most part, only one enantiomer is active in a biological system. Most biological reactions are enzymatic and the enzymes can only attach to one of the enantiomers. (The left-shoe stretcher will only fit in the left shoe, not in the right shoe -- enzymes and their targets must fit together.) This is usually not a problem because mother nature only tends to make the one that you need, but if you are introducing a synthetic chemical care must be taken. For example, one enantiomer of thalidomide cures morning sickness, the other causes birth defects.
"There are exceptions where both enantiomers are biologically active. One example is (+)-carvone and (-)-carvone; one smells like spearmint and the other like caraway." [Quoted from here.]
I addition, it is also worth consulting the following:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isomer
http://www.mhhe.com/physsci/chemistry/chang7/esp/folder_structure/or/m3/s2/
[These pages and articles were accessed: 31/03/05. They have been changed since.]
See also: Nelson and Coz (2005), and Clayden et al (2001).
Cameron [in Cameron (1995)] claims that in DN Engels had anticipated this objection:
"All qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical composition or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy) or, as is almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In this form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious.
"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser quantities of motion communicated to the bodies.
"But what is the position in regard to change of form of motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same? Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion as with Heine's vices; anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Engels (1954), pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
Cameron argues as follows:
"However, do all qualitative changes arise from the 'addition or subtraction of matter or motion'? Engels points to another factor that is sometimes involved: 'by means of a change of position and of connection with neighbouring molecules it ["the molecule" -- Cameron's insertion] can change the body into an allotrope or a different state of aggregation'.... Engels then is arguing that qualitative change can come about by means of 'change of position' or as he put it in another passage, 'various groupings of the molecules'...." [Cameron (1995), pp.66-67. Quotation mark altered to conform to the convention adopted here.]
However, as Cameron goes on to point out, Engels also said the following:
"For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphases added.]
In which case, Engels was either thoroughly confused or he regarded a simple change of position as a "quantitative" change.
Even so, the counter-examples considered here (i.e., those derived from stereoisomers) do not just concern mere "changes of position", but a symmetrical re-arrangement of constituent atoms. The point of referring to such isomers in this Essay is that these molecules are exact copies of each other, unlike those involved in allotropy. [Indeed, that is why I did not use allotropic examples.]
Now, despite the fact that Engels refers to isomers in DN (see below), it is doubtful whether he had heard of stereoisomers (even though they were first isolated by Louis Pasteur; indeed structural chemistry did not come into its own until the 1860s -- on this see Brock (1992), pp.257-69). Nevertheless, despite the above, it could be maintained that Engels had covered this base with his comment that "qualitative" change could occur:
"...by means of a change of position and of connection with neighbouring molecules it ['the molecule' -- Cameron's insertion] can change the body into an allotrope or a different state of aggregation." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
In response, once more, it is worth pointing out that this makes a mockery of Engels's claim that such changes can only come about through the addition of mater and/or motion, and that it is "impossible" to alter a body "qualitatively" in any other way.
This means that, should any dialecticians want to use the above passage to argue that Engels had anticipated stereoisomers, then they will have to drop the "only" and the "impossible", too. In that case, why call this a "Law" if it admits of no clear boundaries? Would we call Newton's Third Law a "law" if it turned out that it was typically possible for a reaction not to have an equal and opposite reaction?
This is quite apart from the fact that (as noted above) Engels is here denying that such ordering relations are a separate factor in "qualitative" change:
"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser quantities of motion communicated to the bodies." [Ibid., p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
Here, Engels is clearly attempting to reduce aggregational change to his principle requirement: that "qualitative" change can "only" come about through the addition of matter and/or energy. Hence, far from anticipating stereoisomerism as a factor in "qualitative" change, Engels is here ruling it out as such a factor! He is in effect saying that the re-arrangement of atoms is no more nor no less than the addition of matter and/or energy, and that it is thus not an extra or separate cause of such change which he also has to consider.
This reading of Engels at least has the merit of rescuing him from the accusation that he was an outright simpleton, who, on the same page (and in successive paragraphs) declared (1) that "qualitative" change can "only" come about through the addition of matter and/or energy, and that (2) it was "impossible" to alter a "quality" in any other way, even though (3) there was another way to alter such "qualities"!
[Perhaps we can put his rather loose wording down to the fact that these comments appeared in what were after all notebooks.]
However, as we will soon see (here and here), Engels is decidedly unclear what Engels meant by the "addition" of matter and/or motion/energy; indeed, he is also hopelessly vague about what he meant by "quality". Even though was no simpleton, Engels was definitely a sloppy thinker. [And this cannot be put down to the fact that we are considering notebook entries, for he was no less sloppy in published work on philosophy and science.] And, in view of the fact that subsequent dialecticians have merely copied Engels's ideas (and have plainly devoted little thought to them), it is reasonably clear that his epigones have failed to merited any other descriptor in this regard, too.
Some might object here that these examples do not involve the development of single processes -- they concern parallel processes, or co-existent objects. In that case, they are not relevant counterexamples to the first 'Law'.
However, Engels (and other DM-fans) appeal to various co-existent organic molecules and elements in the Periodic Table to illustrate the first 'Law' (on this, see Note 9 below), produced by parallel chemical reactions. In that case, if they can appeal to examples like this to support their 'Law', they cannot complain when examples of the very same sort of thing are used against them.
For example, Woods and Grant list several molecules from Organic Chemistry (but they merely lifted this from Engels); here, the qualitative differences between the organic compounds they mention are independent of whether or not they have been derived from one another. They patently exist side-by-side:
"Chemistry involves changes of both a quantitative and qualitative character, both changes of degree and of state. This can clearly be seen in the change of state from gas to liquid or solid, which is usually related to variations of temperature and pressure. In Anti Dühring, Engels gives a series of examples of how, in chemistry, the simple quantitative addition of elements creates qualitatively different bodies. Since Engels' time the naming system used in chemistry has been changed. However, the change of quantity into quality is accurately expressed in the following example:
'CH2O2
-- formic acid boiling point 100o
melting point 1o
C2H4O2
-- acetic acid ".............." 118o
"..............." 17o
C3H6O2
-- propionic acid "..............." 140o
"..............." —
C4H8O2
-- butyric acid "..............." 162o
"..............." —
C5H10O2--
valerianic acid "..............." 175o
"................" —
and so on to C30H60O2, melissic acid, which melts only at 80o and has no boiling point at all, because it does not evaporate without disintegrating.'" [Woods and Grant (1995), p.52, quoting Engels (1976), p.163.]
Moreover, the plain fact is that Engels himself used the example of isomers to illustrate this 'Law':
"In these series we encounter the Hegelian law in yet another form. The lower members permit only of a single mutual arrangement of the atoms. If, however, the number of atoms united into a molecule attains a size definitely fixed for each series, the grouping of the atoms in the molecule can take place in more than one way; so that two or more isomeric substances can be formed, having equal numbers of C, H, and 0 atoms in the molecule but nevertheless qualitatively distinct from one another. We can even calculate how many such isomers are possible for each member of the series. Thus, in the paraffin series, for C4H10 there are two, for C6H12 there are three; among the higher members the number of possible isomers mounts very rapidly. Hence once again it is the quantitative number of atoms in the molecule that determines the possibility and, in so far as it has been proved, also the actual existence of such qualitatively distinct isomers." [Engels (1954), p.67. Bold emphases added.]
But, there is no "development" here! So, if Engels can use examples where there is no "development" to illustrate his 'Law', dialecticians can hardly complain if similar examples are used to refute it.
Anyway, it is quite clear that Engels did not appreciate how this radically compromised his claim that:
"It is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Ibid., p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
Once more: here we have change in geometry "passing over" into a qualitative change, refuting this 'Law'.
Nevertheless, it could be objected that Engels is quite clear: he is plainly arguing about qualitative change to the same body. So, the above examples are all irrelevant, since qualitative changes appearing in different bodies are being compared.
Or so it could be argued.
However, this leaves it entirely obscure what the phrase "same body" means, here. For example, when dialecticians refer us to Mendeleyev's Table, and the elements it contains, the atoms there are all different bodies, but that does not stop them presenting it as a multiple example of this 'Law'. Even though Helium might be obtained from Hydrogen by fusion, the Helium that emerges as a result is not the "same body" as the original Hydrogen.
Of course, dialecticians do not deny this; indeed they argue that as elementary particles are added, an atom undergoes a genuinely qualitative change, resulting in something entirely new. Even so, with respect to Hydrogen, the Helium that emerges as a result is not the "same body" as the Hydrogen from which it came.
It might prove possible to neutralise this difficulty if dialecticians were to tell us what constitutes the "same body", here. Until they do, the counter-examples above still stand. This is because, if exactly the same Carbon, Hydrogen and Oxygen atoms are arranged differently (as part of an Enantiomer), they will exhibit different qualities with no additional matter or energy added to the system. In that case, a different geometrical arrangement will "pass over" into a qualitative change in the "same body" -- once more, contrary to what Engels says.
Moreover, Engels's version of his 'Law' also leaves it entirely obscure what the "addition" of matter and/or energy amounts to. As we will see in Note 6a below, it is important to be clear about this, otherwise it would be possible to show that there are countless counter-examples waiting in the wings which refute this 'Law'.
This is all quite apart from the fact it is not easy to see how the elements we find in nature arose by the mere addition of elementary particles. Many were produced by fusion; in that case, the objection recorded in Note 6a applies to one of DM's most overworked examples: Mendeleyev's Table.
Furthermore, many of the counter-examples to this 'Law' listed in this Essay do in fact apply to the "same' body". For instance, those connected with background conditions and ordering relations.
Moreover, and once more, if this "same body" requirement is indeed part of Engels's 'Law', then many of the examples DM-theorists themselves use will fall by the wayside. For example, this overworked one from Engels goes out of the window:
"In conclusion we shall call one more witness for the transformation of quantity into quality, namely -- Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French cavalry, who were bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes, who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but lacked discipline, as follows:
'Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 Mamelukes.'" [Engels (1976), p.163.]
But, where is the "same body"? At best, all we have here is a changing collection of non-identical Mamelukes and French soldiers. Hardly the "same body".
[And, does anyone think that Napoleon actually carried this experiment out? At best, this is a Napoleonic 'thought experiment'. But that has not stopped DM-fans quoting it as if it were gospel. In that case, we do not even have a single material body to consider here!]
And, as noted above, the organic chemical examples will also have to be ditched, for the differences Engels noted between the various molecules he listed do not depend on them being made from precisely the same atoms, or even in the same laboratory, or at the same time.
This too will have to go:
"And now let the reader admire the higher and nobler style, by virtue of which Herr Dühring attributes to Marx the opposite of what he really said. Marx says: The fact that a sum of values can be transformed into capital only when it has reached a certain size, varying according to the circumstances, but in each case definite minimum size -- this fact is a proof of the correctness of the Hegelian law. Herr Dühring makes him say: Because, according to the Hegelian law, quantity changes into quality, 'therefore' 'an advance, when it reaches a certain size, becomes capital'. That is to say, the very opposite." [Ibid, p.159.]
It is quite obvious that the "same body" is not implied in this case.
But, even if it were, Marx's argument here (as reported by Engels) is defective. Values (it is assumed that these are "exchange values") do not become capital by mere quantitative increment. It requires a capitalist mode of production for this to happen, and the capitalist concerned has to do something with these exchange values. So, the mere increase of exchange values does not automatically pass over into a qualitative change and become Capital. They have to be invested, and that too is not automatic (in certain circumstances, they could be consumed). Has a single DM-fan ever given this any thought?
Indeed, this error crept into Das Kapital:
"The guilds of the middle ages therefore tried to prevent by force the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist, by limiting the number of labourers that could be employed by one master within a very small maximum. The possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist in such cases only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the maximum of the middle ages. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel (in his 'Logic'), that merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative changes." [Marx (1976), p.423. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
Over the last twenty-five years or so, in my travel through the topsy-turvy world of dialectics, I have yet to encounter a single dialectician who has pointed out that the above application of Hegel's 'Law' is in fact an error! £x owned by a Medieval Lord in the High Middle Ages could never become capital, no matter how large it became, whereas £y in nineteenth century Manchester, even though it might be less than the £x pounds above (allowing for inflation, etc.), would be capital if employed in certain ways. It is not the quantity that is important here but the Mode of Production and the use to which the money is put.
This mistake re-surfaced in correspondence between Marx and Engels:
"Have read Hofmann. For all its faults, the latest chemical theory does represent a great advance on the old atomistic theory. The molecule as the smallest part of matter capable of independent existence is a perfectly rational category, a 'nodal point', as Hegel calls it, in the infinite progression of subdivisions, which does not terminate it, but marks a qualitative change. The atom -- formerly represented as the limit of divisibility -- is now but a state, although Monsieur Hofmann himself is forever relapsing into the old idea that indivisible atoms really exist. For the rest, the advances in chemistry that this book records are truly enormous, and Schorlemmer says that this revolution is still going on day by day, so that new upheavals can be expected daily." [Marx and Engels (1975a), p.175. Engels to Marx, 16/06/1867.]
To which Marx replied:
"You are quite right about Hofmann. Incidentally, you will see from the conclusion to my Chapter III [later, this was Chapter XI, RL], where I outline the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist -- as a result of purely quantitative changes -- that in the text there I quote Hegel's discovery of the law of the transformation of a merely quantitative change into a qualitative one as being attested by history and natural science alike [See Capital, Chapter XI]...." [Ibid., p.177; Marx to Engels 22/06/1867.]
We will be returning to Engels's letter later. However, it is not easy to excuse Marx's error here, and as we can see from the Anti-Dühring quote below, Engels missed it too!
More or less the same can be said of this:
"In proof of this law we might have cited hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus, for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital -- production of relative surplus-value -- deals, in the field of co-operation, division of labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase, a "new power", which is essentially different from the sum of its separate forces." [Ibid, p.160.]
The reader will look in vain in Das Kapital for Marx's own reference to this 'Law' -- except for one mention of it in over 2000 pages(!) -- noted above -- and even then, Marx admitted that he had merely "coquetted" with Hegelian jargon -- so this reference cannot be taken too seriously. [More on this in Essay Nine Part One.]
And no wonder, the examples to which Engels vaguely alludes cannot be shoe-horned into this dialectical boot. The "quantity" of the things he mentions here do not affect their "quality"; it takes a massive change in social relations to do that. [Or, does he imagine that a mere increase in machinery turns it into something else?]
Despite this, and once more: where is the "same body" here? All we seem to have is more of something or other -- more machines, more workers, greater division of labour -- but, we do not have more energy/matter fed into the "same body".
Finally, dialecticians like to use this 'Law' to argue that as one rises in the orders of existence (from the molecular to higher levels) this change in 'quantity' (but, what change in what quantity!?) passes over into a qualitative difference. We saw that in Engels's letter, above. [More on that here.]
Now, there is no way that this can be squeezed into the more energy/matter input into the "same body" straight-jacket. Precisely what energy/matter is fed in here?
We will meet this appeal to 'levels' in Essay Three Part Five, where it will be used to counter the claim that these 'Laws' are not deterministic.
Hence, and once again, if Engels and other DM-fans are allowed to appeal to things other than the "same body" (and/or matter and energy fed into it), they can hardly complain if several counter-examples of the same sort are used against them.
[There is more on this 'objection' here.]
4a0. Resonance was introduced in 1930 by Linus Pauling, and further developed by George Wheland, in order to account for serious problems with the structural formula for Benzene proposed by August Kekulé. However, for many years -- between, say, 1940 and 1970 -- Soviet scientists refused to accept this "bourgeois" "Machist"/"Idealist" concept, preferring the interactive model proposed by Butlerov. [Although UK Marxist J B S Haldane described resonance as a perfect example of dialectical materialism (illustrating once again how this theory can be used to justify anything and its opposite; more on this in Essay Nine Part Two -- Haldane is quoted in Graham and van Brakel, below.]
An excellent summary of this dispute can be found in Graham (1971), pp.297-323, which also contains a useful summary of resonance, and van Brakel (2004), pp.27-34. See also Pauling (1960), and Wheland (1955), that latter of which contains a translation of the criticisms of this concept advanced by two soviet scientists (Tatevskii and Shakhparanov), along with Wheland's reply: pp.613-15.
4a. Some might want to argue here that moving a force in the manner envisaged requires energy, so these examples are not in fact energy neutral. However, the arrangements listed could exist side by side. A qualitative difference then would be obvious, but there would be no quantitative discrepancy between them.
In addition, the expenditure of energy itself depends on the nature of the force field in which they are embedded (i.e., whether or not the field is "conservative"). [On conservative forces, see here and here.]
In a conservative field, the work done in moving a force in a circuit is zero, but certain (non-circuitous) line integrals in such fields can also be zero, if these are chosen carefully.
So, a force could 'develop' in this way in an energy neutral environment.
In either case, we would have a qualitative difference for no extra quantitative input. Naturally, once again, this 'Law' could be tightened to exclude these and other awkward counterexamples, but then it would cease to be a law and would become just a narrow, subjective convention (and thus one that will have been imposed on nature).
5. Here are a few more examples of the radically altered qualities of events, objects and processes for no necessary overall difference in energy input:
The ordering sequence of the same bases in DNA molecules has a radically different affect on gene sequence.
Numbers in ascending order are qualitatively different from the same ones in descending order.
The same instructions in the wrong order could cause serious problems: e.g., "Take the antidote and throw away the poison", compared with "Take the poison and throw away the antidote"; or, "Ask questions first, shoot second", compared with "Shoot first, ask questions second", etc.
Of course, all the above counter-examples could involve genuine energy differences, but this is not always necessarily so. It would depend on how the overall local system is defined. But, once again, this terminally vague first 'Law' omits mention of such details. Indeed, its very vagueness allows any number of wild speculations to be mounted for and against it. It is hard to think of a genuine law in the sciences which is quite so semantically-challenged, and thus so eminently accommodating.
Hence, if we define the local system as all the energy (chemical, potential, kinetic, etc.) within a volume interval equal to that containing the objects and events concerned, then there would be no discernible energy difference in the above examples. To be sure, no system in nature is hermetically sealed against all outside influences in this way, but even slight energy leakage (inwards or outwards) at the boundary will have no significant effect on the potentially huge qualitative differences one could imagine in such cases.
[In what follows, I do not want to descend into too much technicality, but dialecticians have yet to specify whether the systems (or "same body") to which this 'Law' applies are thermodynamically open or closed.]
These considerations would then allow the following example to work: "Read Reason in Revolt first, criticise it second", compared with "Criticise Reason in Revolt first, read it second". The total localised energy budget here could be the same in each case (if say the aforementioned criticism were "What a confused book!" in each case), but the qualitative difference is plain to see.
Readers should no doubt now be able to supply their own (potentially endless list of) examples drawn from everyday life (and/or from the sciences) where ordering differences initiate significant qualitative changes for no overall, localised difference in energy.
Naturally, the above attempt to tighten-up the vague DM-'definition' of the first 'Law' (i.e., insisting on a clear delineation of the boundaries of the systems involved) would now lay it open to all manner of counterexamples. Hence, if the relevant energy locale is widened sufficiently then even when water is boiled, no energy will have been added to the entire system. So, we would have a qualitative change with no quantitative increase in the defined energy locale, in this case.
This would come about if the local region where the said boiling occurred is defined to be, say, the entire country within which it takes place (or the entire planet, and so on). So, with respect to that wider system, no energy will have been added, just transferred from one part (the gas supply, say) to another (the heated water).
In this instance, any energy leakage at the periphery would be far too remote from the action to affect it before the boiling had taken place. Moreover, other examples of more rapid energy interference (from remote sources of radiation, say) would not be such as to affect the actual boiling process, and so would be irrelevant, too. Indeed, as things now stand, no dialectician has thought to argue that when water boils, minute remote energy inputs from distant stars (etc.) have a relevant effect, despite their commitment to DM-Holism.
Anyway, the energy locale could be defined in terms of a suitable light cone, ruling-out all external energy inputs. [On this see below.]
Now, it takes very little dialectics to see that if the energy locale is defined widely enough, no (relevant) matter or energy will be added to any complete system that exhibits a phase or state of matter change in one or more of its parts. In that case, dialecticians (as a matter of some urgency) need to devise a new, non-question-begging definition of the permitted energy locale relevant to their first 'Law'.
["Non-question-begging" is meant to be taken in the sense that the boundaries of this energy locale would need to be drawn so as to avoid the accusation that this 'Law' only works because of yet more ad hoc word-juggling --, or as a result of a few convenient stipulations (i.e., 'persuasive definitions'). Unfortunately for DM-fans, however, there do not appear to be any objective criteria to which they could appeal to prevent their 'Law' sinking into just such a subjectivist swamp.]
However, there are at least two reasons why even this task might prove to be more daunting than the above seems to suggest.
(1) Since dialecticians believe that all things are interconnected, there appears to be no way that they can objectively isolate one part of the universe from the rest so that they could then assert truthfully that that sub-system was a sealed unit, with no energy leakage (in or out).
If so, there is no way they can define a single phase or state of matter transformation that would rule out the above attempts to widen the energy locale to all of reality, scuppering their first 'Law'. And, in that case, no phase or state of matter transformations at all would result from an overall increase in matter or energy, since the whole of the energetic and material universe would (obviously!) experience no change in energy as a result; such changes would simply arise from the localised re-distribution of matter/energy. Engels's own reference to an increase in matter/energy would now have to be withdrawn (or re-defined) in terms of locally re-distributed 'packets' of energy/matter, for such an increase could not take place in such circumstances otherwise. [This is just the generalisation of a more limited point made in Note 6a, below.]
(2) The second reason why the aforementioned task seems impossible to carry out in DM-terms is connected with any attempt to tighten up the boundaries of the systems involved. As we will see, if they are made too restrictive, no change will take place; in that case, either no energy could be fed into the system (meaning that no qualitative change will result( according to Engels), or, any qualitative change that does occur will not have been created by new energy fed into the system (since it is a sealed unit)!
On the other hand, if such systems are made less restrictive, there is no way to avoid the inflation mentioned a few paragraphs back (and again below).
The horns of this dilemma can be made less indistinct if we consider a response that might be made to the above: It could be argued that the boundary to such an energy locale (relevant to each phase or state of matter transition) could be defined quite naturally as the immediate surroundings. Clearly, that would mean that an energy input into a system that involved, say, the boiling of water, would be that which constitutes the immediate cause of this particular change in quality, etc., and these would naturally be those that take place inside the space (loosely) defined by that local boundary. Or so a response might go.
But, in that case, plainly, no energy could be fed into any system so constrained. If we fix our attention on the immediate surroundings to locate/isolate the proximate cause of the above change in quality (in order to short-circuit objection (1) above, that would plainly force us to look to the source of that change in slightly more remote events (for example, to those taking place in the power station, or gas plant, which supplied the energy). On the other hand, if we do not do that, then Engels requirement that energy be fed into the system, now defined as the immediate surroundings of the said change, in order to initiate that change, would be not be fulfilled. Again, if that system is a sealed unit, no such outside inputs can be allowed!
Plainly, energy does not come from nowhere; it has to be input into a system from somewhere. However, if energy is input into such a system, then the local boundary must be re-defined to include the source of that energy (the power station, or gas plant, etc.). Again, if we do not do that, then the change in quality witnessed that system will not have been caused by an input of energy, meaning that the whole system will not have changed qualitatively as a result of a new input of energy.
We could now try to seal this new wider locale in a similar manner to the earlier attempt made above. In that case, once more, all we would have then is a transfer of energy from one part of that sealed unit to another, from the power station to the kettle of water, say. But, and again, if that is so, then there would be a change of quality to that system as a whole with no new energy added, since this wider system itself included the energy source!
All that will have happened is that energy will have been transferred form one part of that system to another.
The reader will no doubt now see where this is going, for the next question forces itself upon us: Is this wider system a sealed unit, too?
As seems obvious, the energy processed in that gas/electricity plant had to come from somewhere. In that case, in order to comply with Engels's requirement that energy be added to a given system to initiate qualitative change, we would have to look outside it once more for such an input. So, we would now have to move even this widened boundary, perhaps to include the field from which the gas was extracted, or to incorporate the coal/gas/water that generated the electricity, and so on. But, in that case, and for the same reasons, do we would now have to widen this still further to include the organisms that lived millions of years ago that produced that gas/coal/oil, or the geological and atmospheric processes that produced the water. How then could we prevent this inflating uncontrollably to include the entire universe, as indicated earlier?
Indeed, Engels's first 'Law' seems to require inclusion of the entire universe if it is to work. Not even the infamous boiling kettle can be isolated from the rest of reality, as DM-classicists argued:
"When we consider and reflect upon Nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away....
"We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather than the things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away....
"[The] new German philosophy culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great merit -- for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change, transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development." [Engels (1892), pp.405-08.]
"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms, indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the last named. In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels (1954), p.70.]
"Dialectics is the science of universal interconnections…." [Ibid., p.17.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others."
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97; 221-22. Emphases in the original.]
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard Nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things…are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.
"The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in Nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena….
"The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being….
"Speaking of the materialist views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all is one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the principles of dialectical materialism.' [Lenin (1961), p.347.]" [Stalin (1976a), pp.837-38, 845. I have quoted from the online edition of Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks here.]
[Many other passages could be quoted (several more are in fact listed here).]
But, once that is done (i.e., as soon as the boundary is widened to take in the whole universe), an earlier problem simply reasserts itself: If we widen the energy locale to take in all of reality, no phase or state of matter transformation at all would result from an overall increase in matter or energy -- since, plainly, the whole of the material universe would have experienced no change in that regard!
Now, it could be countered that it is perfectly clear what Engels was trying to say; he meant that if energy or matter is fed into an object or process, at some point it will undergo a qualitative change. The last few paragraphs have merely complicated a simple description of a familiar phenomenon --, such as that of water boiling.
However, it is worth recalling that the continual widening depicted above was initiated in response to a suggested attempt to define the immediate surroundings of the object/process undergoing the said qualitative change. And that was done so that it we could be clear which objects/processes we were talking about --, and that in turn needs to be done to rule out the awkward counter-examples listed above (and in the main body of this Essay). It is also worth adding that the energy boundary needs to be drawn tightly to stop leakage at the margins, and to forestall the cosmic energy inflation outlined earlier.
But, if the immediate surroundings are defined to exclude the input of energy needed to effect the said change in quality, then obviously no change such will ensue. On the other hand, if there is a qualitative change inside that boundary, it could not have resulted from an input of energy!
If now the boundary to that local system is relaxed to allow energy in, and that input itself is included in the immediate surroundings -- as it would have to be to rule out those annoying counter-examples, once more --, then that would only serve undermine Engels requirement that energy be added to the system, since that 'added energy' will now have been included in the immediate surroundings, and so will not have been added!
It could be objected that above argumentative moves are unfair, if not ridiculous. As soon as Engels's requirement that energy is added has been observed, the law will work perfectly well. All that the present critic has done is rule it out as not having been added!
I will resist making an easy counter-jibe that anyone who complains along these lines does not "understand 'anti-dialectics'", nor will I go for an easy cop-out and play another Nixon card (claiming that 'anti-dialectics' also "grasps" the contradictions in DM, but only in order to help in the latter's speedy demise); dialecticians would certainly be hoisted on their own petard if these genuinely unfair tactics were deployed against them. [This is just a long-winded way of saying that DM-theorists are the last people on the planet who should complain about "unfair" moves.]
The point of the above "unfair" moves is to underline the fact that however we try to repackage the first 'Law' it cannot be made to work. Of course, if any DM-fans reading this Essay think otherwise, they are welcome to say for the first time in 150 years what the dickens Engels was on about.
So, this is the quandary outlined earlier, and we have found that whichever option we chose, it cannot be made consistent with Engels's hopelessly vague description of the first 'Law':
On the one hand, if the boundary to the immediate surroundings is drawn too tightly, then no energy can be fed into the system and nothing will change. On the other, if some energy is allowed in, that would throw open the doors to the above inflation. Once more: however we try to re-define a local system, the first 'Law' suffers a mortal wound.
This is not just a DM-failing; as we will find, this is also the case with other metaphysical theses (considered in several of the Essays posted at this site). When it comes to spelling-out the details, not only does material reality invariably erect insurmountable obstacles to such theses, the language derived from a long-term interaction with that reality (i.e., ordinary language) actually prevents such theses from making any sort of sense.
And that is just one reason why there has been no progress in traditional Philosophy for 2500 years, and none at all in dialectics in 200.
[This argument is set out in detail in Essay Twelve Part One.]
As a last desperate attempt to breath life back into this dying 'Law', some might try to argue that the above constraints would scupper science too. This is not so; scientific laws are surrounded by countless ceteris paribus clauses, and so do not pretend to be metaphysical. Now, since this topic is dealt with extensively in Essay Eleven Part One and Essay Twelve Part One, the reader is directed there for more details.
Lest the reader be tempted to argue that dialecticians do not need to consider things in such pedantic detail -- their 'Law' is fine as it is --, it is worth pointing out that if scientists themselves proceeded in such a slap-dash, 'dialectical' manner, few would remain in their jobs for long, and even fewer would have advanced human knowledge beyond the invention of the wheel. If science is to progress, its practitioners need to consider (as they have considered, and as they still consider) their research areas in even more pedantic detail than has been attempted so far in this Essay. [On 'pedantry', however, see here.]
Anyone who has studied or practiced genuine science will know exactly what I am talking about.
Anyone happy with the simple 'truths' of dialectics, won't.
6. Many more examples of contextualised qualitative change (supervenient on an energy-neutral background) come to mind: think of the way that the 'same' action can assume different qualities if the circumstances are filled in. A driver puts her hand out of the window; depending on the background, that same physical act could be one or more of the following: a right turn signal, a gesture to a friend, an effort to cool down, an attempt to throw away, or to catch, something, an aimless act, a coded message, and act of bravado, and so on. As we all know, there are countless examples of this sort of situation (for each energy-neutral, local environment) where bodily movements can take on qualitatively different aspects if the surroundings are filled in.
Another set of counter-examples include the following: The wrong signatures on two different localised cheques could invalidate both. Swap the signatures around and they would become valid.
The same number (a large 20, say) printed on a batch of £20 (or $20) notes would be qualitatively different from the same number (the serial number) printed on all the same notes (which would invalidate them since they would then all have the same serial number).
A necklace in your pocket might result in your arrest. The same one in mine might win me a reward (and vice versa).
Once again, the reader can no doubt think of their own examples of such 'dialectically-challenged' facts.
Some might lose patience with the triteness of these counter-examples, but they could only be readers who are remarkably forgiving of the many trite examples found in every single DM-tract.
Furthermore, it could be objected that dialecticians would appeal to the part/whole relation to account for this set of mischievous objections to their first 'Law'. Maybe so. [Anyway, DM-Holism will be criticised in Essay Eleven Part One and Part Two.] However, the first 'Law' explicitly states that there can be no qualitative change without a quantitative increase/decrease bringing it about:
"For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphasis alone added.]
In that case, if the part/whole relation can also effect such alterations, then that must mean that the first 'Law' is not only defective, it is inconsistent with other DM-principles. Of course, if qualitative change can arise by other means then the first 'Law' is not a law to begin with.
6a. Someone could still object that there has been an increase in matter here. If one litre of red is added to one litre of green, this causes a qualitative change in colour, as Engels argued.
Once more, there is no increase in matter here, since we started with two litres and ended with two litres. [The following examples are more concrete instances of the general objection presented in Note 5, above.]
At any rate, this perhaps highlights another serious ambiguity in Engels account of this 'Law':
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Engels is entirely unclear what it is that constitutes the "addition" of matter and/or energy to a "body", which is probably what underlies the counter-objection noted above. The latter, it seems, takes it as read that one litre of red is added to one litre of green, but if we word this differently, even that would become false. Imagine this scenario: we have a can of paint holding one litre of red and one litre of green, separated in the middle by a collapsible barrier (which stays inside the tin). Let us assume that the barrier is collapsed so that the red and green begin to mix. In this scenario, the object/body in question was the entire container along with its contents. At the end, we would still have the same object (the paint tin with exactly the same quantity of paint, and the original collapsed divider), only now exhibiting a new quality. [Moreover, the collapsing of the barrier could be induced by a battery-powered device internal to the container, too.]
Put this way, we would have a change in quality to an object/body with no new matter added, contradicting Engels.
Now, it could be argued that this example is highly contrived, and so is not a 'natural' process. And yet it is not supernatural, but it still contradicts Engels. Anyway, even if that were a viable objection, there are countless processes in nature that display similarly non-dialectical traits.
Just to take one at random; consider the Bombardier Beetle:
"Bombardier beetles store two separate chemicals (hydroquinone and hydrogen peroxide) that are not mixed until threatened. When this occurs the two chemicals are squirted through two tubes, where they are mixed along with small amounts of catalytic enzymes. When these chemicals mix they undergo a violent 'exothermic' chemical reaction. The boiling, foul smelling liquid partially becomes a gas and is expelled with a loud popping sound...." [Wikipedia.]
If the original object/body is the said beetle, then we have here a change in quality (this animal has turned into noxious beetle), where once we had an ordinary insect, but for no change in matter or overall energy in that animal. Sure matter is subsequently lost, but before that happens, the beetle has already changed (or it would not happen!).
Even more annoying, the above change is part of that beetle's 'development', so this example is not susceptible to the challenge we met earlier.
Or consider another --, and one that is perhaps more familiar to most dialecticians than the Bombardier Beetle is --, the Widget in certain cans of beer:
"A can of beer is pressurised by adding liquid nitrogen, which vaporises and expands in volume after the can is sealed, forcing gas and beer into the widget's hollow interior through a tiny hole -- the less beer the better for subsequent head quality. In addition, some nitrogen dissolves in the beer which also contains dissolved carbon dioxide.
"The presence of dissolved nitrogen allows smaller bubbles to be formed with consequent greater creaminess of the subsequent head. This is because the smaller bubbles need a higher internal pressure to balance the greater surface tension, which is inversely proportional to the radius of the bubbles. Achieving this higher pressure is not possible just with dissolved carbon dioxide because of the greater solubility of this gas compared to nitrogen would create an unacceptably large head.
"When the can is opened, the pressure in the can quickly drops, causing the pressurised gas and beer inside the widget to jet out from the hole. This agitation on the surrounding beer causes a chain reaction of bubble formation throughout the beer. The result, when the can is then poured out, is a surging mixture in the glass of very small gas bubbles and liquid.
"This is the case with certain types of draught beer such as draught stouts. In the case of these draught beers, which before dispensing also contain a mixture of dissolved nitrogen and carbon dioxide, the agitation is caused by forcing the beer under pressure through small holes in a restrictor in the tap. The surging mixture gradually settles to produce a very creamy head." [Wikipedia.]
Change in quality, no change in quantity.
It could be argued that there is in fact a difference in matter and/or energy in this can, namely the ring pull and gases near the opening. That is undeniable, but are these significant? What causes the change in quality is the Widget, not the ring pull. This can be seen by the fact that in cans where there is no Widget, the above does not happen.
However, someone could still object that the above differences in matter/energy are relevant to the subsequent change in quality; after all, they set in motion those very changes.
There are several problems with this response. First, we saw above (in Note 5) that there was no question-begging way to define the energy locale of such DM-changes.
Secondly, it is questionable that the removal of a ring pull, and the loss of small quantities of vapour amounts to the addition/removal of matter or energy from the beer/Widget ensemble itself. This, naturally, raises issues touched on in Note 5, and above. What exactly is the DM-"object" here? Until we are told, this objection itself cannot succeed. Even after we are told, that cannot help but beg the question (as noted above), for it will be plain that any new demarcation lines will have been drawn in order to save this 'Law', making it eminently subjective.
Finally, after the ring pull has been removed, and the small quantity of vapour has escaped, the beer/Widget ensemble will undergo a qualitative change for no new matter or energy input into that system, violating the first 'Law'. Anyone who objects to the 'line' being drawn just here (i.e., corralling-off this system at the Widget/beer boundary just after the ring pull has been removed) will need to advance objective criteria for it to be re-drawn somewhere else.
Now, if that boundary is re-drawn to include the removed ring pull and the escaped vapour, then, once more, no new energy or matter will have been added to that system (i.e., the beer/Widget/ring-pull/vapour ensemble) even while it will have undergone a qualitative change.
[This is, once more, just a particular example of the general point made in Note 5.]
[Incidentally, the same comments apply to similar objections made to the Bombardier Beetle example given above.]
Anyway, the aforementioned ring-pull could be removed by a battery-operated device inside the can, controlled by an internal timer, meaning that the resulting change in quality will have been occasioned by no new energy added to the can/beer/widget/battery-device system.
7. As we shall see, the radically confused way that both of these words (i.e., "quantity" and "quality") are used in DM-circles allows practically anything to be dragged in as an example of an increase in quantity causing a change in quality. For example, in RIRE (Reason in Revolt), comrades Woods and Grant include different levels in reality as different quantities, or qualities (it is not too clear which):
"Newton's dynamics were quite sufficient to explain large-scale phenomena but broke down for systems of atomic dimensions. Indeed, classical mechanics are still valid for most operations which do not involve very high speeds or processes which take place at the subatomic level. Quantum mechanics...represented a qualitative leap in science.... But for a long time it met with a stubborn resistance, precisely because its results clashed head-on with the traditional mode of thinking and the laws of formal logic." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.53-54.]
We will have occasion to comment on Woods and Grant's innovative approach to formal logic [FL] in Essay Four (here and here), exposing some of their more egregious errors (here); suffice it to say in this case that they failed to substantiate this latest criticism, too.
Now, readers should check the original (here). There they will find that these two comrades advanced this allegation, offering no supporting evidence. This is in fact typical of their approach to FL (just as it is typical of a similar approach adopted by the vast majority of dialecticians): they make the same sort of accusations right throughout their book. Woods and Grant would, of course, be the first to complain if the enemies of Marxism invented analogous things to say about Leninism and/or Trotskyism.
Be this as it may, the fact that there is a "qualitative" difference between Classical and Quantum Mechanics cannot be put down to anything obviously quantitative. Or, at least, if it can, Woods and Grant were remarkably coy about what that might be. [The 'quantity' of magnification, perhaps? But where is the energy input here?]
And note, too, that such levels are compared to one another, even though they do not develop into each other. Indeed, what would it be for microscopic particles to develop into macroscopic objects? Do electrons grow in size?
In that case, an earlier objection to many of the counter-examples listed here (that they are not relevant because the first 'Law' only applies to objects and processes in "development") cannot now be maintained. DM-theorists use the above 'difference in levels' all the time -- for example, in arguing about determinism, or about the emergence of life and/or mind --, and constantly link these to the first 'Law'. [These will be examined in Essay Three Parts Three and Five, and Essay Thirteen Part Three.] So, they cannot complain if my counter-examples are not all "developmental" either.
Here is yet more of the same:
"At a certain point, the concatenation of circumstances causes a qualitative leap whereby inorganic matter gives rise to organic matter. The difference between inorganic and organic matter is only relative. Modern science is well on the way to discovering exactly how the latter arises from the former. Life itself consists of atoms organised in a certain way. We are all a collection of atoms but not "merely" a collection of atoms. In the astonishingly complex arrangement of our genes, we have an infinite number of possibilities. The task of allowing each individual to develop these possibilities to the fullest extent is the real task of socialism....
"The enormous complexity of the human brain is one of the reasons why idealists have attempted to surround the phenomenon of mind with a mystical aura. Knowledge of the details of individual neurons, axons and synapses, is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon of thought and emotion. However, there is nothing mystical about it. In the language of complexity theory, both mind and life are emergent phenomena. In the language of dialectics, the leap from quantity to quality means that the whole possesses qualities which cannot be deduced from the sum of the parts or reduced to it. None of the neurons is itself conscious. Yet the sum total of neurons and their connections are. Neural networks are non-linear dynamical systems. It is the complex activity and interactions between the neurons which produce the phenomenon we call consciousness." [Ibid., pp.55-56. Bold emphases added.]
We find Engels appeals to this sort of change too:
"If we imagine any non-living body cut up into smaller and smaller portions, at first no qualitative change occurs. But this has a limit: if we succeed, as by evaporation, in obtaining the separate molecules in the free state, then it is true that we can usually divide these still further, yet only with a complete change of quality. The molecule is decomposed into its separate atoms, which have quite different properties from those of the molecule. In the case of molecules composed of various chemical elements, atoms or molecules of these elements themselves make their appearance in the place of the compound molecule; in the case of molecules of elements, the free atoms appear, which exert quite distinct qualitative effects: the free atoms of nascent oxygen are easily able to effect what the atoms of atmospheric oxygen, bound together in the molecule, can never achieve." [Engels (1954), p.64.]
Naturally, in the imagination, no energy or matter is added or subtracted from the said bodies.
It could be argued in reply that if the above procedures are actually carried out (and they are not just imagined), the same results would emerge. Nevertheless, what Engels is in fact appealing to here is not an increase or decrease in energy/matter, but to its division. Manifestly, at the end of the dividing process, we would have the same amount of matter/energy with which we began, only arranged differently, as argued in Note 5.
Recall that in Note 5 it was pointed out that the extreme vagueness of this 'Law' means that it is impossible to rule certain counter-examples out unless the local energy boundary is well-defined, as a sealed unit. But, once that is done, the above problem reasserted itself. In the end we discovered there was no way of preventing a catastrophic inflation taking place, resulting in the entire universe becoming the sealed unit in question! Since the latter undergoes no overall energy change for any qualitative change, Engels's 'Law' cannot be made to work whatever we try.
8. Of course, many of these items (but not all) involve what might be called "internal relations". These will be discussed in more detail in Essay Three Part Three, and in Essay Eleven Part Two. Suffice it to say that we only have DM-theorist's word for it that such 'relations' actually exist in the physical world. This is because there is no evidence -- nor is there anything that could conceivably be counted as evidence -- supporting this doctrine. That is, there is no 'evidence' over and above the bogus 'conceptual arguments' dialecticians have borrowed from Hegel.
Naturally, this shows that these 'relations' must have been "foisted" onto nature, not read from it. This is not surprising since a commitment to 'internal relations' is one of the defining characteristics of Idealism. [On this see, Mulligan (1995), and Hylton (1990).]
It therefore seems that this 'Law', which was already under suspicion for having been read into nature, can only be defended by yet more of the same. This tactic is about as impressive as that adopted by Christian Fundamentalists who, in the face of the existence of natural disorder and 'evil', appeal to the Bible to defend the moral status of 'God', but then point to the alleged "order in nature" and 'His' assumed "goodness' to prove 'He' exists, and is benevolent, after all!
The sight of dialecticians tugging on these Ideal bootlaces ("internal relations") to lift this ailing theory out of oblivion is no less unedifying.
8a. It could be objected that in the transition from a liquid to a sludge --, and then to a semi-solid, and then perhaps to a full-blown solid, as more salt is dumped into the soup --, we would have a clear example of change of quantity into quality. But even then, that change would be gradual, and non-"nodal". And solid soups are still soups, so no change in that quality is applicable even here.
8b. Even if tastes are a relational features of sensory modalities --, so that it is in fact the reaction of the taster to the chemicals in the soup which constitutes the taste --, the experienced taste is still registered in the taster, not the soup.
And dialecticians cannot afford to allow the relational properties of objects and/or processes to be counted as 'qualities', for while that might save this example, it refutes this 'Law' elsewhere.
Hence, if the relational properties of bodies are included as part of an object's qualities, then many things would change qualitatively with no increase or decrease in matter or energy. Several such have already been listed, but here are a few more:
NN is watching her friend, MM, walk away from her. As MM recedes into the distance, she seems to NN to grow smaller. At some point she disappears. Here we have a change in quality prompted by no increase in quantity. And it is to no avail appealing to the quantity of metres that separate the two, for Engels was quite specific:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added.]
"Matter or motion" -- not separation distance.
Still less help would it be appealing to Engels's reference to "motion" here, since he was also clear that he meant by this the addition of "energy". Now it could be argued that it takes energy to make MM move. Maybe so, but unless MM is at a different height than NN, no energy will have been added to MM in the process.
And, of course, no energy has been added to NN in whom these changes in quality are perceived. [No one supposes, I hope(!), that even if MM were to walk up a hill, adding potential energy to her body, she would actually grow smaller (and not just look smaller) as a result!]
Take another example: consider three animals in a row: a mouse, a pony, and an elephant. In relation to the mouse, the pony is big, but in relation to the elephant it is small. Change in quality, with no matter or energy added or subtracted. There are countless examples of this sort -- with respect to the relations that hold between any object, or set of objects, and the rest of the local (or remote) universe -- here alone.
Someone could object that the mouse-pony-elephant example really relates to the perception of an observer, and so it is not a genuine counter-example.
This can't be correct for it is surely the case, independently of any and all observers, that a pony is bigger than a mouse while it is smaller than an elephant.
But even if this objection were valid, the qualitative change in perception of the alleged observer is not the result of any change in quantity in her. So, this is a genuine counter-example.
Others could object that these animals do not "develop" into one another; maybe so, but this response has been dealt with already, here and here.
8c. I will be arguing for an anti-Essentialist line in a later Essay. In the meantime, the reader is directed to the following: Dupré (1993), Hallett (1984, 1988, 1991), Ramsey (2000), Van Brakel (2000), VandeWall (2007).
If, however, Essentialism is a non-starter, then that will leave a huge conceptual hole in this 'Law'.
9. The boiling water example is one of the most overworked clichés in the dialectical box of tricks. Hardly a single DM-fan fails to mention it, so mantra-like has dialectics become.
However, it's worth noting that as water is heated up, steam increasingly leaves the surface in a non-"nodal" fashion. So, even here we have a smooth transition from liquid to gas; indeed, if a pan of water is kept at 99oC for long enough, all of the water will disappear as steam. Hence, this example illustrates a well-known fact, many, if not most processes in nature run smoothly, and are non-"nodal".
At 100oC, events accelerate dramatically; but even then they do so non-"nodally". A few tenths of a degree below the critical point, depending on the purity of the water, ambient conditions and how it is being heated, bubbles begin to form in the liquid more rapidly. This accelerates increasing quickly as that temperature is reached. What we see, therefore, is a non-"nodal" change of phase/state of matter, even here. The phase or state of matter change here is not sudden -- like the snapping of a rubber band, or of glass breaking. We do not see no bubbles, and then a micro second later a frothing mass, which we would do if this were "nodal".
Of course, dialecticians could concede the truth of the above observation -- that before water reaches 100oC water molecules leave the surface all the time --, but they might argue that this is not non-"nodal". Thus, when a water molecule changes from its liquid to its gaseous state certain chemical bonds are broken, and that happens suddenly, and "nodally".
Once more, this depends on how a "nodal point" is defined.
As we saw earlier, since the time interval allowed for a dialectical "node" to be described as such is left hopelessly vague, dialecticians might want to challenge the above assertions. But, they can only do so if they are prepared to specify the length of a DM-"nodal" interval. Otherwise, my opinion here is as good as theirs -- which is why I earlier labelled this 'Law' subjective in the extreme. Is there a DM-standards authority we can appeal to here? Genuine scientists use this system; that is why their results can be checked. Are there any standards at all in this branch of Mickey-Mouse Science?
The answer is pretty clear: no, there are none.
On the other hand, if dialecticians take the trouble to re-define the word "node" just to accommodate these awkward non-dialectical facts (we noted earlier that in certain circumstances this is sometimes called a "persuasive definition"), it would become increasingly difficult to distinguish DM from stipulative conventionalism.
However, it is worth pointing out that, as we will see in later Essays, there is in fact no problem with this, since scientists do this sort of thing all the time. Unfortunately, this would mean that dialecticians will have to abandon their claim that DM is 'objective', and thus admit that it is conventional -- and conventional riling-class 'wisdom' to boot.
So, DM-theorists could specify a minimum time interval during which a phase or state of matter transition must take place for it to be counted as "nodal". In the case of boiling water, say, they could decide that if the transition from water to steam (or vice versa) takes place in an interval lasting less than or equal to k seconds/minutes (for some k), then it is indeed "nodal". Thus, by dint of such a stipulation, their 'Law' could be made to work (at least in this respect). But, there is nothing in nature that forces any of this on us -- the reverse is, if anything, the case. Phase/state of matter changes, and changes in general take different amounts of time; moreover, under differing circumstances even these alter, too. If so, as noted above, this 'Law' would become 'valid' only because of yet another stipulation and/or foisting, which would make it eminently 'subjective'.
However, given the strife-riven and sectarian nature of dialectical politics, any attempt to define DM-"nodes" could lead to yet more factions. Thus, we are sure to see emerge the rightist "Nanosecond Tendency" -- sworn enemies of the "Picosecond Left Opposition" -- who will both take up swords with the 'eclectic' wing: the "it depends on the circumstances" 'clique' at the 'centrist' "Femtosecond League".
However, if such phase/state-of-matter changes are defined thermodynamically, then many are undeniably abrupt. But, even this is not as clear-cut as it might seem:
"The first-order phase transitions are those that involve a latent heat. During such a transition, a system either absorbs or releases a fixed (and typically large) amount of energy. Because energy cannot be instantaneously transferred between the system and its environment, first-order transitions are associated with 'mixed-phase regimes' in which some parts of the system have completed the transition and others have not. This phenomenon is familiar to anyone who has boiled a pot of water: the water does not instantly turn into gas, but forms a turbulent mixture of water and water vapour bubbles. Mixed-phase systems are difficult to study, because their dynamics are violent and hard to control. However, many important phase transitions fall in this category, including the solid/liquid/gas transitions and Bose-Einstein condensation.
"The second class of phase transitions are the 'continuous phase transitions', also called second-order phase transitions. These have no associated latent heat. Examples of second-order phase transitions are the ferromagnetic transition and the superfluid transition.
"Several transitions are known as the infinite-order phase transitions. They are continuous but break no symmetries.... The most famous example is the Kosterlitz-Thouless transition in the two-dimensional XY model. Many quantum phase transitions in two-dimensional electron gases belong to this class." [Wikipedia. Bold emphasis added.]
Which is, of course, just another way of making the same point that was made earlier: not all changes are unambiguously "nodal".
Now, with respect to the length of "nodal" points, Kuusinen had this to say (Kuusinen does not use the word "node", but it is plain that his "leaps" are "nodes"):
"The transition of a thing, through the accumulation of quantitative modifications, from one qualitative state to a different, new state, is a leap in development. This leap is a break in the gradualness of the quantitative change of a thing. It is the transition to a new quality and signalises (sic) a sharp turn, a radical change in development." [Kuusinen (1961), p.88. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphasis added.]
This seems pretty clear: all "leaps" are "sharp" turns, "radical" breaks in qualitative change. Kuusinen clearly defines "nodes"/"leaps" just as Hegel and Engels did. How then does he handle the slow qualitative changes we met earlier?
"Leaps, transitions from one quality to another are relatively rapid.... The leaps are rapid in comparison with the preceding periods of gradual accumulation of quantitative modifications. This rapidity varies, depending upon the nature of the object and the conditions in which the leap occurs.
"Some substances pass at once from the solid to the liquid state on reaching a certain critical temperature.... Other substances -- plastics, resins, glass -- do not have an exact melting point. On heating, the first soften and then pass into the liquid state. We might say that in their case the qualitative change, i.e., the leap, occurs gradually. But it is still relatively rapid." [Ibid., p.88. Italic emphasis in the original.]
This is all very confusing; "leaps" are rapid except where they aren't! Now, this is about as scientifically useful as defining acids (a là Brønsted-Lowry) as "substances which donate a hydrogen ion, except where they don't". Would genuine scientists be allowed to get away with cop-outs like this? Would anyone take a Physicist seriously who said that a half-life was the time taken for a radioactive compound to decay to half its original mass, except where it isn't?
Apparently, in this branch of Mickey Mouse Science, this is fine.
However, this sits rather awkwardly with Engels own take on the matter:
"We have already seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0oC from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100oC from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water. [Engels (1976), p.160.]
Engels seems to know nothing of Kuusinen's protracted "nodes".
Now, Kuusinen tries to get round this with the usual "relatively-speaking" get-out clause tacked on at the end. But the transition from liquid water to steam (at 100oC) is genuinely rapid no matter how quickly or slowly the water is heated up in the build-up to that. And the melting of say, plastic can be long and drawn out (lasting weeks, if necessary) if the temperature rise is regulated accordingly.
And we might ask: "Relative to what?" With what may we 'objectively' compare the time it takes for plastic objects to melt so that we might truly say that it was "relatively sudden"?
But, what about qualitative changes that are very slow in cases where the build-up to it is rapid? Consider the larval stage of moths. The larva/grub will build a cocoon rapidly, but the radical qualitative changes inside that cocoon (from larva to adult moth), in its pupal stage, are painfully slow (relative to the previous stage, and to the lifetime of most moths and butterflies) -- ranging from a few weeks to many months. To be sure, when the moth breaks out, that change is rapid; but the unseen qualitative changes that have already happened before this event takes place, are slow. By no stretch of the imagination is this unseen development, these radical qualitative changes, a "leap".
And the same comments apply to the development of reptiles, birds, fish and other animals that grow inside egg sacks. Even a human baby takes nine months to "leap" from fertilised egg to fully-developed foetus before it is born --; as is well-known, fertilisation is pretty rapid in comparison. So, the "relative" clause is not just vague, it fails to apply in many cases itself.
All this, of course, is independent of the earlier comments made about the subjective implications of this "relatively-speaking" get-out clause.
In short, Kuusinen's amateurish attempt to spell-out the length of these dialectical "nodes"/"leaps" is no more impressive than the other things he and his Mickey Mouse Dialectical Scientists try to sell us.
Another over-used example enlisted to illustrate this 'Law' is Mendeleyev's Table.
"Finally, the Hegelian law is valid not only for compound substances but also for the chemical elements themselves. We now know that "the chemical properties of the elements are a periodic function of their atomic weights" (Roscoe-Schorlemmer, Complete Text-Book of Chemistry, II, p. 823), and that, therefore, their quality is determined by the quantity of their atomic weight. And the test of this has been brilliantly carried out. Mendeleyev proved that various gaps occur in the series of related elements arranged according to atomic weights indicating that here new elements remain to be discovered. He described in advance the general chemical properties of one of these unknown elements, which he termed eka-aluminium, because it follows after aluminium in the series beginning with the latter, and he predicted its approximate specific and atomic weight as well as its atomic volume. A few years later, Lecoq de Boisbaudran actually discovered this element, and Mendeleyev's predictions fitted with only very slight discrepancies. Eka-aluminium was realised in gallium (ibid., p. 828). By means of the -- unconscious -- application of Hegel's law of the transformation of quantity into quality, Mendeleyev achieved a scientific feat which it is not too bold to put on a par with that of Leverrier in calculating the orbit of the still unknown planet Neptune." [Engels (1954), pp.67-68.]
[The example of Neptune is not in fact a happy one; on that see here.]
The claim that scientists can be regarded as 'unconscious dialecticians' is a fancy with which DM-theorist like to flatter their theory -- clearly in compensation for that fact the 99.9% of scientists ignore it, that is, if they have ever heard of it. [More on that here, and here.]
In this particular case, it is argued that as the number of elementary particles is added to certain atoms, they change qualitatively into others (which is not, of course, how Mendeleyev saw things, nor is it how Engels interpreted this 'Law', since elementary particles were unknown in their day; indeed, the atomic theory of matter was not widely accepted until after the work of Jean Perrin, 40 or 50 years later. As the above quotation shows, Engels interpreted this example in terms of atomic weight. [On this, see Nye (1972). On Mendeleyev, see Gordin (2004), and on the Periodic Table in general, see Scerri (2007).]
Of course, the elementary particles involved do not themselves appear to change (in the relevant sense --, that is, qualitatively), but even if they did, the atoms concerned do not. What seems to happen is that as new particles are added, new atoms come into being with new qualities. So, the old qualities and the old atoms simply disappear. Change of quantity, disappearance of quality, perhaps?
Naturally, dialecticians will want to argue that this is not what this 'Law' depicts here, maintaining perhaps that a change in quantity does indeed lead to a change in quality, and that this is a classic example that confirms this law. It is only the deliberate mis-description above that raises any doubts. Or so they might claim.
But, even dialecticians will agree that not just any old quantitative increase in elementary particles or energy will alter the relevant qualities to produce the different elements in the Periodic Table. It takes certain sorts of elementary particles to change one element into another, and since these particles exhibit their own qualities -- and they effect the changes they do because of those qualities --, it is clear that it takes qualitative and structural-geometric change to induce development of the elements in the Periodic Table. So, if we ignore for the moment the 'disappearing atom' observation above: when new qualities (not merely quantities) are added to atoms they change in quality themselves. So the application of this 'Law' is not as clear-cut as DM-enthusiasts would have us believe, even in this allegedly classic example.
Of course, dialecticians might still want to insist that quantitative increase or decrease effects qualitative change here, but, again, there is nothing in the phenomena themselves that forces that description on us. If so, this 'Law' is at best subjective when it is applied here, too; i.e., it only appears to work if subjected to a preferred description.
Once more, how is this different from forcing a view onto nature?
Furthermore, since even dialecticians will admit that it is only certain qualities that effect the desired changes in this area, the depiction outlined in the previous paragraph is in fact more consistent with a more honest qualitative re-appraisal of the phenomena in question. In that case, by clinging to Engels's first 'Law' as stated, dialecticians would be foisting onto nature a view that is not even in line with their own more honest appraisal of it!
Moreover, it is not mere increase in quantity that induces change; as noted above, these changes are qualitative as such because of the new geometry (i.e., the new orbital structure) of the resulting atoms, and it is this geometry as much as anything which determines the new properties of the resulting atomic change.
We saw earlier that there are many different ways that change can be depicted in Physics and Chemistry (for example in relation to Isomers and the ordering relations that occur both naturally and artificially in nature), and the energetics involved can be parsed in many different ways. In that case plainly, there is no single law that governs all Chemical change (except perhaps Conservation of Energy) -- or all change in general. Indeed, in this, one of its best examples used by DM-fans, we discover that even if we accept the standard picture, it is as much geometry as it is quantity that determines quality.
Now this is a more honest reading from the extant data, is it not? And not a single foisting anywhere in sight!
These comments also apply to the other examples drawn from Organic Chemistry that Engels quotes (and in RIRE, examined in Note 4, above); cf., Engels (1954), pp.161-63 and (1976), pp.65-68. See also Woods and Grant (1995), pp.50-53.
[More comments on this will appear here at a later date.]
[RIRE = Reason In Revolt; i.e., Woods and Grant (1995).]
10. That is why Physicists have to define energy as a "capacity" to do work. On this see here. Indeed, as Marc Lange notes, energy no more exists than does the average family -- it is not a kind of "stuff". [Lange (2002), pp.111-64.]
10a. To be sure, there are a handful of scientists who accept this and the other two 'Laws' as laws -- particularly those who hail from previous generations of the Communist Party (e.g., Bernal, Haldane and Levy, etc.), but it is quite clear that these comrades would have treated with contempt a PhD thesis that relied on evidence as weak as that found in this area of dialectics. [Incidentally, the same comments apply to Nobel Laureate Jacques Monod, who also seemed to like these 'Laws'; Monod (1972).]
Indeed, their acceptance of the adequacy of the impoverished 'data' that supports DM is somewhat analogous to a similar acceptance by Creation Scientists of 'evidence' in favour of, say, the scientific accuracy of the Book of Genesis.
In both cases, faith has clearly 'affected' their scientific judgement. This can be seen quite plainly in relation to the Lysenko 'affair'. For example, even though Bernal was widely considered to be one of the best scientific minds of his generation (and perhaps the 20th century), and Haldane was one of the leading biologists of his day, both bought into the ideas of that charlatan for rather sordid political reasons. [On Bernal and Lysenko, see Brown (2005). On Haldane and Lysenko, see this Science and Society article from 1940. On Lysenko, see Joravsky (1970), Lecourt (1977), Medvedev (1969), and Soyfer (1994). See also this article by Robert Young. (Some of the original documents can be found here).]
10a1. Defenders of Hegel have for years tried to convince us of his sophisticated knowledge of science (rather like Engels's epigones, who try to do likewise for him). Perhaps the most detailed example of this is Burbidge (1996). Burbidge manages to show that Hegel was a well-informed amateur chemist (although he does not mention Hegel's Alchemical and Hermetic mind-set, a serious omission that undermines Burbidge's credibility somewhat), and he struggles heroically to make Hegel (2004) §§326-336 comprehensible. One wonders quite honestly what the point is of the whole exercise, since Hegel manages to mystify and render obscure processes that have since been made perfectly clear by modern chemists.
Be this as it may, when it comes to scientific 'proof' Hegel's commitment to Mickey Mouse Science is not in much doubt.
[On Hegel's Alchemical and Hermetic roots, see Magee (2001).]
10b. Hegel certainly did not think this 'Law' was as universally applicable as DM-theorists now seem to. On this, see Levine (1984), pp.111-26. In fact, Trotsky himself almost admitted as much:
"Hegel himself undoubtedly did not give the law of the transition of quantity into quality the paramount importance which it fully deserves." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88-89.]
10b1. When confronted with such allegations, dialecticians with whom I have 'debated' this have tended to respond in one or more of the following ways:
(1) They deny these authors meant what they said (or they did not even say it!).
(2) They argue that these quotations are not representative.
(3) They claim that the author in question mis-spoke, or made an error.
(4) They argue that my demolition of this core DM-principle is merely "semantic", or that it is a classic example of "pedantry".
[Response (4) was neutralised here.]
However taking (2) first: Here is a list of representative passages lifted from the dialectical prophets (and lesser DM-clones) which shows that the quotations given in the main body of this Essay are indeed representative. [Quotation marks have been altered to conform to the conventions adopted here; bold emphases alone added.]
"If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.
"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18.]
"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Ibid., p.174. Bold emphasis added.]
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]
"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]
"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]
"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]
"...but the theory of Essence is the main thing: the resolution of the abstract contradictions into their own instability, where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone than it is transformed unnoticed into the other, etc." [Engels (1891), p.414.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285. The translation in the edition I have consulted reads differently from the one Lenin used; Hegel is referring to "tones" here, not "things", as the reference to "harmony" indicates.]
"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]
"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]
"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature....
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes." [Stalin (1976b), pp.836, 840.]
"[The sides of] dialectical contradictions do not dissolve one another, do not neutralise one another, while oppositely directed forces do not prevail over one another but turn into one another, and this transition of every phenomenon, every process into its opposite also constitutes the essence of all forms of movement of matter, a general law of its existence." [Boris Gessen and Ivan Podvolotskii, quoted in Weston (2008), p.435. These two characters were Deborinites writing in the 1920s. Bold emphasis added.]
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]
"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....
"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....
"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid., pp.311-18.]
"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]
"So far we have discussed the most general and
most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of
opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main
proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the
law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the
process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with
examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the
first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of
this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as
in Lao-tse and
his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in
Heraclitus.
Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.
"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well
as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that
things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All
fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or
development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and
absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that
all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.
"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere
proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something
about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It
states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place
through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.
"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other
words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is
represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation
of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the
law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid.,
pp.170-71.]
"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….
"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]
"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]
"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]
"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….
"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....
"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....
"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.
"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]
"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….
"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….
"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….
"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891), p.414.]
"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.
"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....
"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]
"The statement that the struggle of opposites is decisive in development in no way belittles the importance of their unity. The unity of opposites is a requisite of struggle, because there is struggle only where opposite sides exist in one object or phenomenon....
"And so, objects and phenomena have opposite aspects -- they represent the unity of opposites. Opposites not merely exist side by side, but are in a state of constant contradiction, a struggle is going on between them. The struggle of opposites is the inner content, the source of development of reality." [Afanasyev (1968), pp.95-97. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphases added.]
"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'
"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.
"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.
"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)
"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.
"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'" [Rob Sewell, quoted from here.]
It would not be difficult to double or even treble the length of this list of quotations (as anyone who has access to as many books and articles on dialectics as I have will attest). From the above, it is quite clear that classical and later dialecticians do indeed believe (a) that all change is a result of a "struggles" of "opposites", and (b) that all objects/processes change into their "opposites", and (c) that they produce these "opposites" when they change, as is argued in the main body of this Essay.
Now, as far as (1) is concerned, if the above DM-worthies did not mean what they said then latter-day DM-fans (who advance this excuse) will, it seems, have to ignore their own classics! [Less irrational readers will note that many of the above authors quote one another word-for-word, so they at least thought their sources meant what they said.]
More-or-less the same can be said for excuse (3); if the above worthies miss-spoke, or were wrong, then contemporary DM-clones would be well advised to ignore these error-strewn classics!
Of course, anyone foolish enough to adopt this sound piece of advice will have to endure the same amount and volume of abuse that I have received from those misguided enough to ignore it.
10b2. Consider another example I have used elsewhere:
This dialectical 'Law' informs us that cats, for example, change because of a
'struggle of opposites', and that they change into those 'opposites'
(since we are told everything changes this way).
In which case, a live cat C that changes into dead cat C* must have
'struggled'
with that dead cat!
But, live cat C cannot change into dead cat C* since dead cat C*
already exists! If C* did not already exist, C could not
'struggle' with it and so could not change. Hence, C cannot die, for to do so it has to change into something
that already exists, and this is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM, the 'world view of the proletariat' implies that cats are immortal!
On the other hand, DM also implies that cats are continually scrapping with the
dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
Has anyone witnessed this universal phenomenon? Perhaps none of us 'understands' dialectics?
Incidentally, the same result emerges if we consider the intermediate stages in
the life and death of cat C.
Let us assume that cat C goes through n successive stages C(1), C(2),
C(3)..., C(n-1), C(n), until at stage C(n+1) it finally pops its clogs.
But, according to the dialectical classics, C(1) can only change into C(2)
because of a 'struggle of opposites', and that C(1) inevitably
changes into that 'opposite', C(2).
So, C(1) must both 'struggle' with C(2) and it must change into it.
If so, then the same problems emerge, for C(1) can't change into C(2) since
C(2)
already exists. If it didn't, C(1) could not 'struggle' with it!
By n applications of the above argument, all the stages of a cat's life must
co-exist, in which case no cat can change, let alone die! And what applies
to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages
must co-exist, too. It's a mystery, therefore, how there is room left in the
dialectical universe for anything to move!
With such peculiar implications, is it any wonder that workers in their hundreds of millions ignore DIM?
10c. We have already seen that there are many changeless things in nature.
10d. Of course, in certain circumstances it is possible to interpret the word "struggle" non-literally. Indeed this is precisely what Kuusinen, for example, does. Commenting on Lenin's claim that development is a "'struggle' of opposites", he says:
"It stands to reason that this proposition must not be understood too simply. The struggle of opposites in the direct, literal sense of the word occurs chiefly in human society. It is by no means always possible to speak of struggle in its literal sense as regards the organic world. And as regards inorganic nature the term is to be understood still less literally. That is why Lenin put the term in quotation marks." [Kuusinen (1961), p.94.]
But this sits rather awkwardly with all the many places in Lenin's writings (and those of other DM-theorists) where the word "struggle" appears without its protective quotation marks. Here are a few:
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Bold emphasis added.]
"The basis of all things is therefore the law of change, the law of constant motion. Two philosophers particularly (the ancient Heraclitus and the modern Hegel…) formulated this law of change, but they did not stop there. They also set up the question of the manner in which the process operates. The answer they discovered was that changes are produced by constant internal contradictions, internal struggle. Thus, Heraclitus declared: 'Conflict is the mother of all happenings,' while Hegel said: 'Contradiction is the power that moves things.' [Bukharin (1925), pp.72-74. Bold emphasis added.]
"The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward." [Mao (1961b), pp.316-17. Bold emphasis added.]
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides...; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born..., constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes...." [Stalin (1976b), pp.835-46. Bold emphasis added.]
"The general conclusion [is] that whenever a process of development takes place, with the transformation in it of quantitative changes into qualitative changes, there is always present in it the struggle of opposites –- of opposite tendencies, opposite forces within the things and processes concerned….
"The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.86, 90. Bold emphases added.]
"The essence of the dialectical contradiction may be defined as an interrelationship and interconnection between opposites in which they mutually assert and deny each other (sic), and the struggle between them serves as the motive force, the source of development. This is why the law in question is known as the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. [Konstantinov, et al. (1974), pp.144. Bold emphasis added.]
"Contradiction also expresses this feature of the relation of opposition, i.e., the mutual exclusion and mutual presupposing of its formative aspects. It can therefore be briefly defined as the unity of opposites which mutually exclude one another and are in struggle. The law of dialectics the demonstrates the driving force of contradictions is formulated as the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
"According to this law, contradictions are the inner impetus of development, the source of the self-movement and change of things. If things were a constant identity in themselves, and lacked differences and contradictions, they would be absolutely immutable.... Contradiction is a dynamic relation of opposites.... The determining element in contradiction is therefore the struggle of opposites." [Kharin (1981), p.125. Bold emphases added.]
"The development of the most diverse objects and phenomena shows that opposite aspects cannot exist peacefully side by side; the contradictory, mutually exclusive character of opposites necessarily causes a struggle between them. The old and the new, the emergent and the obsolete must come into contradiction, must clash. It is contradiction, the struggle of opposites that comprises the main source of development of matter and consciousness....
"...The struggle of opposites is the inner content, the source of the development of reality.
"Such is the essence of the dialectical law of the unity and struggle of opposites." [Afanasyev (1968), pp. 95, 97-98. Bold emphases added.]
Hence, it is quite clear that dialecticians have in general understood this word universally and literally.
But even if Kuusinen were right, and the word "struggle" was meant to be taken non-literally (as it applies to the inorganic world), what possible sense could we attach to it? Kuusinen does not say, and as we will find out in Essay Eight Parts One and Two, no sense can be given to it.
10e. It could be argued that this Essay ignores the essential connection between opposites, so that not just anything can be the opposite of something else. This is brought out well in Marx's criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Right:
"It is remarkable that Hegel, who reduces this absurdity of mediation to its abstract logical, and hence pure and irreducible, expression, calls it at the same time the speculative mystery of logic, the rational relationship, the rational syllogism. Actual extremes cannot be mediated with each other precisely because they are actual extremes. But neither are they in need of mediation, because they are opposed in essence. They have nothing in common with one another; they neither need nor complement one another. The one does not carry in its womb the yearning, the need, the anticipation of the other. (When Hegel treats universality and singularity, the abstract moments of the syllogism, as actual opposites, this is precisely the fundamental dualism of his logic. Anything further regarding this belongs in the critique of Hegelian logic.)
"This appears to be in opposition to the principle: Les extrêmes se touchent. The North and South Poles attract each other; the female and male sexes also attract each other, and only through the union of their extreme differences does man result.
"On the other hand, each extreme is its other extreme. Abstract spiritualism is abstract materialism; abstract materialism is the abstract spiritualism of matter.
"In regard to the former, both North and South Poles are poles; their essence is identical. In the same way both female and male gender are of one species, one nature, i.e., human nature. North and South Poles are opposed determinations of one essence, the variation of one essence brought to its highest degree of development. They are the differentiated essence. They are what they are only as differentiated determinations; that is, each is this differentiated determination of the one same essence. Truly in real extremes would be Pole and non-Pole, human and non-human gender. Difference here is one of existence, whereas there [i.e., in the case of Pole and non-Pole, etc.,] difference is one of essence, i.e., the difference between two essences. in regard to the second [i.e. where each extreme is its other extreme], the chief characteristic lies in the fact that a concept (existence, etc.) is taken abstractly, and that it does not have significance as independent but rather as an abstraction from another, and only as this abstraction. Thus, for example, spirit is only the abstraction from matter. It is evident that precisely because this form is to be the content of the concept, its real essence is rather the abstract opposite, i.e., the object from which it abstracts taken in its abstraction -- in this case, abstract materialism." [Marx and Engels (1975b), MECW Volume Three, pp.88-89. I have used the on-line translation here, which differs markedly from the published version. Bold emphasis added.]
However, as we will see in a later Essay, this sort of Aristotelian Essentialism is impossible to defend. [On this, see Note 8c, above.]
Independently of this, it is quite clear that Marx has fallen into error (and he did so in a manner similar to Hegel), since he failed to examine a wide enough series of examples, and he mis-described several of those he did consider. Take the Poles of a magnet: in what sense is a magnet an 'essence'? Marx does not say. Hegel did not say. Of course, both men wrote before scientists decided that magnetic fields are an expression of the vector alignment of electrons, so there is in fact no 'essence' here at all.
Moreover, the alleged 'essence' pertaining to males and females is not too clear either (and this is so even if we ignore for the time being hermaphrodites and asexual organisms). In fact, evolution has taught us that Aristotle was wrong, there are no 'essences' in biology (as hybridisation, among other things, attests). As with Hegel, Marx was clearly led astray by his reliance on out-dated science and Hermetic vagaries.
Marx also failed to consider other examples (many of these are discussed in the main body of this Essay). For instance, what is the opposite of a cat? If it has none, it cannot change (that is, if we are to believe the Dialectical Gospels). Indeed, what is the 'essence' of a cat? Is it the variety, the species, the genus, the family, the order, the class...? And yet cats can change in many ways; does this mean that cats have many 'dialectical opposites', and thus many 'essences'? It seems it must. Of course, what applies to cats applies to other animals. Alas, such dialectical headaches merely intensify if we direct our attention to the plant kingdom; what, for example, is the opposite of grass? Or of a Larch tree? Or of a diatom?
If we now move on to the inorganic world: non-living objects seem not to have 'essences', either. What, for instance, is the 'essence' of any of the following: buttons, railway sidings, TV aerials, leather chairs, rift valleys, mountains, cuff links, motorway signs, piles of dust, volcanic eruptions, ice erosion, continental drift, empty space...? If none of these has an 'essence', then they cannot have 'dialectical opposites', either, and so cannot change.
Furthermore, as should seem obvious, all of these can change in many ways. Do they all then have countless 'dialectical opposites', and thus countless 'essences'?
[Bemused readers will search long and hard (and to no avail) in the highly repetitive 'dialectical literature' for any help in answering these questions -- or, indeed, for any sign that a single DM-fan has even so much as considered them.]
11. Woods and Grant list several examples of internal and external opposites -- not really distinguishing between the two --, perhaps basing this prize example of sloppy Philosophy on principles they learnt from far too little exposure to FL.
[FL = Formal Logic]
Since RIRE is now being quoted all over the Internet as the book to read on DM, a few words seem appropriate. To that end, the reader should consult my comments on this book in Essay Four (links in Note 7, above), and those written under a pseudonym, "LevD", here.
To assist the reader, this has been relocated here.
[More comments on Woods and Grant will be posted here at a later date.]
12. These claims will be analysed more fully when Note 11, above, is finished.
12a. Some might think that, for example, positive numbers do in fact change into negative numbers, and vice versa, but that would be a mistake. Mathematicians can play around with the number 4 all day long, and hit it with whatever function they please, it stays super-glued as number 4. Sure, one can multiply 4 by -1 to produce the output -4, but 4 has not actually changed into -4, otherwise no one would be able to use 4 ever again (it having changed). Not even the numeral on the page has altered: look here it is: 4 x -1 = -4. Did you see 4 change?
And it is worth noting that whatever it is that numbers like 4 can be mapped onto, this is achieved by the application of well-defined functions; it is not the result of an internal struggle going on in 4. Neither is it the case that the opposite of 4 actually changes 4 into whatever it is that results from any such operation: -4 has no affect on 4, nor does it change 4 into -4.
Indeed, it is a moot point what the 'opposite' of four is. Is it -4? Or 1/4? Or -1/4? Or is it even 0-4i, if we extend this into the complex plane? Maybe it is -1, since -1 maps 4 onto -4; this is because, as we saw here, in DM it is the opposite of an object or process that effects the changes to or in that object or process. In that case, -1 must be the opposite of 4!
But, what if a reactionary mathematician multiplies 4 by -2, to obtain -8? Is -8 now the opposite of 4 --, or is it -2?
Moreover, zero can be mapped onto any number by adding that number to it; for example: 0 + 123456 = 123456. Does this mean that these are opposites? What about: 0 + -123456 = -123456, then?
As should now seem obvious, howsoever we try to repackage this mathematical morass, no dialectical process can be constructed from the fragments, nor any sense made of it. [More on this later in this Essay, and here.]
12b. It is worth recalling at this point that literal contradictions would involve just such a gainsaying.
Naturally, if dialecticians understand the word "contradiction" in a new and as yet unexplained sense, all well and good. But what is this 'new' sense?
The various attempts DM-theorists have made to tell us what this 'new' sense is have been examined in detail in Essays Four and Five, and Essay Eight Parts One, Two, and Three. The reader is directed there for more details.
13. Once more, the confused nature of DM-'contradictions' will be examined in Essays Four, Five and Essay Eight Parts One, Two, and Three, as well as in Essay Eleven Part One.
13a. And sure enough, there are scientists who question the results -- and not just the interpretation -- of the famous "two slit" experiment, which is supposed to show that a photon or an electron is both a particle and a wave.
For example, Harvard Physicist, Shahriar Afshar's alleged experimental refutation of the 'orthodox' Copenhagen Interpretation of QM was reported in the New Scientist in July 2004. [Chown (2004a); see also Chown (2004b).] On this see here, too. This particular article also links to several authoritative critiques of Afshar's work. Whatever the outcome, this whole incident reveals how scientific knowledge is actually negotiated, but more specifically how challenges to orthodoxy are handled by other scientists. More on this in a later Essay.
[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]
In the article (posted at the second of the above two links), University of Washington Physicist John Cramer explains why he thinks Afshar's experiment does indeed refute the Bohr/Heisenberg interpretation of quantum phenomena, but he then offers his own "Transactional" account, which he says does not imply a paradox; this is accessible here.
To be sure, Afshar's interpretation could turn out to be a monumental error, but dialecticians consistently could only advise the Physics community not to reject it out of hand (even before they considered the evidence), along with Cramer's solution, and many others -- even if this advice halts the advancement of science -- because of their a priori solution (i.e., that nature is fundamentally contradictory).
[Readers can access Afshar's own blog to monitor progress themselves; DM-fans can even try to advise his critics to give up now, since they are flogging a dead hypothesis.
His original paper can be downloaded as a PDF from here.]
In early 2007, the New Scientist reported this about Afshar's work:
"It rocked quantum theory when it was first proposed in 2004, unleashing a dam-burst of vitriol in the physics community. Now the controversial experiment that questions our understanding of the wave-and-particle nature of light has finally been published, forcing some of its initial opponents to take it seriously." [Chown (2007), p.19.]
Now, it may be argued that this shows that the contradictory nature of photons is actually being observed in this experiment (in that it purports to show that particles can be seen to exhibit interference patterns, contrary to Bohr's Complementarity Principle), but it is too early to say if this is so. One thing for sure, as noted above, DM-fans have an a priori solution to this 'problem', and should therefore advise the physics community to stop trying to pick holes in Afshar's results.
Nevertheless, the history of Physics suggests that it is only a matter of time before someone finds a widely accepted realist account of the nature of quantum phenomena that does not rely on paradox and 'contradiction'. Indeed, this is precisely what professor of Physics, P Wallace, argues in Wallace (1996). Indeed, Richard Feynman went as far as to assert:
"I want to emphasize that light comes in this form -- particles. It is very important to know that light behaves like particles, especially for those of you who have gone to school, where you were probably told something about light behaving like waves. I'm telling you the way it does behave -- like particles....
"This state of confusion was called the 'wave-particle duality' of light, and it was jokingly said by someone that light was waves on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays; it was particles on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, and on Sundays, we think about it! It is the purpose of these lectures to tell you how this puzzle was finally 'resolved'." [Feynman (1985), p.15, 23. Emphasis in the original; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
For other alternative explanations of "quantum complementarity" -- once more, all of which DM-fans must rule out on a priori grounds --, see Wick (1995). See also here.
[There are more details on this in Note 14, below.]
13b. Since the vast majority of scientific theories are now on the scrap heap, the probability is rather high that any randomly selected theory will join them there one day. More on this in Essay Thirteen Part Two (not yet published).
14. As already noted, this is discussed with enviable clarity in Wick (1995).
In fact, other aspects of the 'orthodox' interpretation of QM certainly worried Soviet/Stalinist scientists a few generations ago; they regarded this view of modern Physics as thoroughly Idealist, and a product of anti-Marxist forces at work in Weimar Germany. [See Graham (1971), pp.69-110, and Forman (1971).]
However, it is undeniable that there are theoretical consequences of some interpretations of QM that seem to imply the existence of instantaneous non-local interactions, suggesting that some processes in nature are inter-connected (at least with respect to certain specific quantum states). On this, see here.
The fact that this conclusion is decidedly premature, if not a little rash, will be examined more fully in a later Essay.
There are however Internet sites where the standard view is seriously questioned: for example, Caroline Thompson's Physics site (which is no longer accessible). Sadly, I received notice in March 2006 that Caroline has died of cancer. Her website seems to be unavailable now. Several of her ideas are preserved here.
Update, October 2008: many of her papers can now be found here.
Even so, quantum entanglement is still largely theoretical; it possesses only limited and highly controversial evidential support (mainly derived from the work of Alain Aspect). In fact, the experimental substantiation on offer for entanglement is all the more alarmingly slender when it is compared with the universal interconnections that dialecticians posit -– i.e., those stretching across vast expanses of space and time, rather than those that reach the other side of a Physics lab, or perhaps confined to small regions of this planet. Indeed, non-local, long-distance interconnections are in principle impossible to test, let alone verify.
In fact, Caroline Thompson managed to find errors in the original paper published by Aspect, ones that undermine his whole project. On this, see here and here, although her most important papers (except this one) do not seem to be available any more. [Correction, they now appear here.]
However, Christopher Norris is admirably clear on this topic:
"…[O]ne can take a singlet-state pair of particles whose combined angular momentum is zero and then project them on divergent paths towards two detectors…. [I]f a measurement is carried out on particle A and produces the value 'spin-up = +½' for a given parameter, then any measurement conducted simultaneously on particle B will produce the inverse value 'spin-up = -½'….
"Where the paradox shows up is with the further requirement…that any results thus produced with respect to either particle will depend upon the kind of measurement carried out, i.e., the setting of the spin-detector and hence the particular outcome in this or that case. Moreover, that result will decide the outcome of any measurement which might be performed simultaneously on the other particle…this must always be the case for…[particle pairs] that have a common source or which have interacted at some previous stage.
"But then, what precisely is meant by the terms 'simultaneous' and 'previous'…? For it follows from orthodox QM that these events must transpire in a space-time framework that permits violations of special relativity, or which allows for superluminal (faster than light) interaction between particles at any distance from each other. In which case there can be no appeal to Einstein's principle for establishing simultaneity relative to the speed of light, the latter taken as an absolute limit on causal propagations of whatever sort…. [T]here is clearly a marked tension (if not perhaps a downright inescapable conflict) between the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics and Einsteinian relativity theory. Moreover, any talk of 'previous' states or events -– such as the particles' orientation when separated at source or the spin-values that might have been measured at some 'earlier' stage in their trajectory -– is likewise rendered highly problematic. That is to say, it takes for granted the impossibility that those events could somehow be affected -– or those measurements somehow retroactively determined -– by whatever occurs at a 'later' stage in the system's space-time evolution." [Norris (2000), pp.7-8.]
Admittedly, while Norris goes on to outline in considerable detail the factors involved, he clearly failed to note that his 'solution' to this particular paradox actually undermines his own commitment to Scientific Realism. If paradoxes like this can be clarified by an analysis of the meaning of words like "simultaneous" and "previous" -- as these appear in competing theories -- then any supposed 'solution' must be convention-sensitive, and hence non-'objective' -– i.e., in the Metaphysical Realist sense of that term, which is what Norris requires.
In relation to this, as Whitaker makes clear [Whitaker (1996)], it is ironic that instantaneous interconnections such as these were actually propounded by the anti-realist camp in Physics (as part of the orthodox "Copenhagen Interpretation" of QM), whereas their denial was maintained by the Realists, some of whom advocated (among other things) an appeal to several as yet undiscovered "hidden variables" to resolve the problem -- which brings us to the work of David Bohm.
About this, and in relation to the aims of this Essay, Phil Gasper comments as follows:
"The Physicists David Bohm and B J Hiley interpret 'the quantum interconnectedness of distant systems' in terms that Marx and Engels would have relished…." [Gasper (1998), p.155.]
Well, perhaps Engels might have "relished" them, but even he would have balked at Bohm's descent into Idealism in his later work (see, for example, Bohm (1994)) -- a trajectory already implicit in the Organicist view of nature expressed in his earlier writings. [Cf., Bohm (1995).] In fact, Engels would have been horrified to learn of Bohm's later advocacy of individuals like Uri Geller! [Cf., Gratzer (2000), p.105. See also Richard Feynman's comments on Bohm and on Geller, here. More details here, too.]
However, given the quasi-mystical view of the universe that Bohm adopted as a dialectical Marxist, his subsequent trajectory is not the least bit surprising. As will be argued in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here), DM in fact represents a return to an earlier magical (if not enchanted) view of nature; this being so, spoon bending will have sounded eminently reasonable to Bohm.
Martin Gardner, in an unusually fair review (for him!) of an unorthodox scientific theory, had this to say of Bohm's ideas:
"Bohm's quantum potential binds the entire universe together into what he liked to call a seamless 'unbroken wholeness'. Every particle in the universe is connected by the quantum potential to every other particle. He likened the cosmos to a hologram in which each point on the film carries information about the entire picture. Bohm's GWT [guided-wave theory], far more sophisticated than de Broglie’s crude version, is a 'holistic' vision in which all parts of the universe are joined to every other part. 'Interconnectedness' was one of Bohm's favourite words. He saw the universe as resembling the unity of a living organism, a kind of pantheism not unlike Spinoza's -– a pantheism Einstein himself favoured.
"Although Bohm's GWT is identical with standard QM in its predictions, its way of talking about quantum phenomena is entirely different. The randomness of the Copenhagen interpretation…is replaced by a strict determinism. There are no quantum jumps, no superpositions, no collapsing wave functions.... The universe is real, 'out there,' independent of you and me. Human consciousness is not essential, as von Neumann, Eugene Wigner, and others supposed, to collapse wave functions." [Gardner (2000), pp.78-79. US spelling altered to conform with UK English.]
Of course, this might seem conducive to a DM-view of reality, but Gardner went on to point this out:
"In Bohm's revolutionary theory…particles are as real as golf balls. At all times they have precise, unfuzzy properties such as position and momentum, and precise paths through space-time. The particles are never waves. Associated with each is an invisible undetectable wave in a field which Bohm called the 'quantum potential'. Its waves are real waves, not probability waves. They guide the particle's motion…the way radar information guides a ship. This quantum field, like the fields of gravity and electromagnetism, permeates all of space-time, but unlike those fields, its intensity doesn't diminish with distance. Also unlike other fields, it exerts no force on particles. Essentially it is a wave of undecaying information.
"It is the ad hoc nature of this undetectable pilot wave that reminds so many of the old stagnant aether of the nineteenth century…. As J.C. Polkinghorne…said: 'In the opinion of many Bohm had jumped out of the indeterminate frying pan into a crackling nonlocal fire….'
"But how does the pilot wave manage to guide the paths of a particle? This is one of the darkest mysteries of GWT. It is able to push particles around without at the same time exerting any force on them. If it did, photons would have their energies altered. But this doesn't happen…. Somehow each photon must pick up information from its pilot wave without having its energy modified. This may be spooky, but no spookier…than the probability waves in orthodox QM…." [Gardner (2000), pp.75-77.]
Naturally, DM-supporters tempted to adopt Bohm's theory will have to abandon the idea that sub-atomic particles confirm the fundamentally contradictory nature of reality since Bohm's theory denies they have a dual wave/particle nature. Their behaviour he explains as the result of a particle and a separate guiding wave.
This is something that Woods and Grant failed to notice in their advocacy of Bohm's "dialectical method". [Woods and Grant (1995), p.58; here: Whole and Part.]
However, as pointed out in Essay Eleven Part One, scientists are forever changing their minds. A recent report in the New Scientist now records doubts arising over the mathematics used to derive Bell's Theorem (a key idea behind the rejection of 'hidden variables' and thus central to current theories of 'entanglement'), and how this is all part of a growing feeling among Physicists that their fundamental theories are ripe for change:
"Listen to Joy Christian at the University of Oxford and you may wonder if these grandiose quantum conclusions are really necessary at all. He claims that physicists' supposed proofs of the impossibility of more 'realistic' theories rest on false assumptions and so don't prove much at all.
"'Contrary to the received wisdom,' he says, 'quantum theory doesn't rule out the possibility of a deeper theory, even one that might be fully deterministic.' Christian's conclusion follows from a relatively simple calculation using alternative mathematics, described in a paper now under review at the journal Physical Review Letters....
"Quantum theory also asserts that particles have no particular spin before they are observed. Instead, the spin is an indefinite superposition, pointing up and down simultaneously. Only when you measure the spin, do you 'force' it into the up or down state.
"Do this to an entangled photon and its counterpart responds instantly, even if they are light years apart. If you measure one photon and find its spin pointing 'up', you'll find that the other has spin 'down'. Consequently, quantum theory appears to dictate that what happens in one part of the universe can have instantaneous 'non-local' effects in another part, which seems to threaten the basic assumptions of Einstein's special theory of relativity....
"Bell assumed the hidden variables in his
argument would be familiar numbers, akin to the value of a velocity or a mass.
Such numbers obey the ordinary rules of algebra, including a law that says that
the order of multiplication doesn't matter -- so that, for example, 2 × 5 equals
5 × 2. This property of multiplication is called commutation. The idea that
hidden variables are commuting numbers might seem so basic as to be beyond
question, but Christian argues it is important to question this point because
mathematicians know that different kinds of variables needn't obey commutative
algebra. Take rotations in space, for example. They differ fundamentally from
ordinary numbers in one important respect: the order of rotations matters
"So why is all this important? Christian argues that the existence of this other algebra reveals a weakness at the core of Bell's proof: the only hidden variables Bell considered were ordinary numbers. But ordinary numbers are not the be all and end all. 'Why should theorists be obliged to remain unimaginative and consider only commuting numbers in their theories?' Christian says....
"He claims that Bell's argument no longer leads to its impressive conclusion if you allow that hidden variables can have other algebraic properties. Following the logic through, Christian shows that a local, realistic model can actually reproduce everything that quantum theory can. Christian concludes that Bell's theorem is simply not equipped to say whether or not hidden variables are a possible explanation for non-local quantum effects....
"The debate seems likely to continue for some time while researchers puzzle over details. However it turns out, Christian's work reflects a growing willingness among physicists to question whether quantum theory is really the ultimate foundation for theoretical physics. Even those who doubt Christian's conclusion suggest that there's a long way to go to before we truly understand quantum mechanics. 'I have no problem thinking that quantum theory is incomplete,' says Nicolas Gisin of the University of Geneva.
"Twenty years ago, it was heretical even to raise such an idea, but physicists are now questioning quantum theory for a range of reasons. Lee Smolin of the Perimeter Institute in Waterloo, Canada, for one, doubts that physicists can really make headway building a true theory of quantum gravity and space-time before making some serious revisions to quantum theory itself. The inability of theorists to extend quantum theory to the entire universe, he suggests, may imply that it only works for parts of the universe, as an approximation of some deeper reality....
"So after decades of physicists bending their minds over the weirdness of the quantum world, it is just possible that its uncertainties and paradoxes may give way to something a little less weird and more definite. Suddenly it's more acceptable to challenge the dogma and to look for a more fundamental, simpler story." [Buchanan (2007), pp.37-39.]
Of course, if these new lines of research resolve the 'paradox' of the wave/particle duality of certain quantum objects, dialecticians should consider picketing the research labs proposing this, for if the above theorists are right, that will undermine one of the best examples that DM-fans claim supports the idea that nature is fundamentally contradictory. Anyway, as we saw earlier, dialecticians have an a priori solution here and on that basis alone should advise scientists to save money and scrap this line of enquiry.
On this, see also here.
15. After having divided nature into three levels: (a) atomic, (b) biochemical and (c) that which appertains to individual human beings (suitably inter-linked), Woods and Grant argued as follows:
"In the last analysis, all human existence and activity is based on the laws of motion of atoms.... And yet, when we pass from a) to c) we make a series of qualitative leaps and must operate with different laws at different 'levels'…." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.60; here: Complex Organisms.]
In fact this is part of their main argument against reductionism, but it is manifestly dependent on the highly dubious first 'Law' again. As we shall see in another Essay, this argument cannot even stand up straight on its own two legs, regardless of how weak this extra theoretical 'Zimmer Frame' of support turns out to be -- for here we have a qualitative change caused by a mere change of level, contrary to what Engels said could happen. [On this, see Note 7.]
Figure Eight: Badly Needed Support For 'Materialist Dialectics'?
15a. Some DM-fans, when they see this demand for empirical proof, automatically think this makes me an 'Empiricist'; this is rather odd, since the DM-theorists under review here (Engels, Woods and Grant, Trotsky, etc.) all state very clearly that dialectics must grow from the facts, and not be imposed on them. But, if facts are not empirical, it is not easy to see why they should be called "facts" in the first place.
Such comrades also need to note the many appeals to empirical proof made by Marx and Engels, throughout their mature life. To take one source at random, The German Ideology is full of these. For example:
"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way....
"The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will....
"In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.
"This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.42-48. Bold emphases added.]
If I am an Empiricist, then so were Marx and Engels.
However, I am not an Empiricist (in fact I hold all philosophical theories in contempt as an expression of ruling-class ideology (on this, see Essay Twelve Part One (and here)); I do not use verification as a general method, or as a criterion of meaning, or even as a criterion of anything whatsoever. I am merely holding dialecticians to their word: that their theory be confirmable in some way. Naturally, they are liberty to deny that facts can or should be adduced in support of DM, but in that case they should openly admit their Idealism, and be done with it.
15b. Of course, this is mere word-juggling, for it is equally legitimate to argue that a cell or an organism changes into what it is and not into what it is not, in view of the fact that change is built into our concept of living things. Hence, while cells and organisms are changing all the time, their identity remains the same, for it is the same cell or organism that undergoes the said change, not some other. So, if we speak about cell C, or organism A, part of what we mean here is that these living things change in certain ways (or they'd be dead!), but neither C nor A changes into what it is not (i.e., into not-C or not-A). Our concepts of growth and development imply that while these living things change they remain both C and A all the while. And even when these organisms die, we have an equally sophisticated vocabulary to cope with this eventuality. We certainly do not need to appeal to the obscure jargon Hegel invented to talk about change, life, growth and death. [This argument is developed in much greater detail here.]
16. This is not to suggest that mathematics is not the product of social development.
Nevertheless, dialecticians will in general want to reject the claim made here that mathematical concepts are not abstractions and that they are even based on abstraction; indeed, they will reaffirm their belief that mathematical objects have in fact been 'abstracted' from real processes (etc.) in the material world. [For example, RIRE devotes a whole chapter to this idea; Woods and Grant (1995), pp.349-68.]
This topic is discussed in more detail in later Essays. Suffice it to say here that since no mathematical object even remotely resembles a single material object or process --, and whatever it is that material objects do or do not share with one another, these are not mathematical concepts --, they cannot have been derived by abstraction from them, nor can they be imposed on them as a law.
Mathematical lines, for example, have no thickness (since they are one- dimensional by definition), and even though they are actually made of nothing whatsoever, they are unbreakable -- and yet they can be segmented with ease. They neither age nor disintegrate over time, and they originated from nowhere (since they do not exist in space and time even if we who think about them do), and they will go nowhere. Moreover, they have no causal affect on material bodies, and the same is true in reverse. None of their qualities can be obtained by abstraction from physical lines, points, planes or manifolds. [This is not to suggest, however, that mathematical objects and concepts are in any way Platonic; on this see Shanker (1987); see also Ernest (1998), Marion (1993, 1998) and Slater (1998). In fact, mathematics is a system of rules.]
On the failure of earlier (and later) theorists to derive number concepts by abstraction, see Frege (1953).
[Frege's own abstractionism is in fact a special Logicist variant, and bears no relation to earlier forms of abstractionism. On this, see Wright (1983), and chapters 18 to 20 of Schirn (1998).]
Abstractionism in general is taken apart in Essay Three, Parts One and Two. Also , see Note 18, below.
17. Further comments on this aspect of Engels's dubious doctrines will be added to this Essay at a later date. Readers should also refer to Jan Van Heijenoort's discussion of Engels's mathematical fantasies. Heijenoort was at one point a leading member of the Fourth International, and helped provide security for Trotsky in his final years. [On this see Heijenoort (1978) and Feferman (1993).] Heijenoort was also an expert logician, and as such he was less than impressed with this side of Engels's thought. Cf., Heijenoort (1948); this is now available here.
17a. Frege (1904) was in fact an attempt to criticise certain contemporaneous ideas held about mathematical functions; in order to do that Frege had first to consider current ideas about the nature of 'variables'.
He begins by noting that variation must take place in time, which fact alone removes the variable (as it was understood in his day) from pure mathematics, whose theorems are independent of time.
Furthermore, we need to ask precisely what it is that varies:
"The answer one immediately gets is: a magnitude. Let us look for an example. We may call a rod a magnitude in respect of its being long. Any variation in the rod as regards its length, such as may result, e.g., from heating it, occurs in time; and neither rods nor lengths are objects of pure Analysis." [Frege (1904), p.107.]
But what of the real world? Has mathematics nothing to say about change in reality? Is mathematics of no use here? In order to answer this, Frege points out the obvious: numbers are employed by scientists to account for change. But, an immediate problem arises herw: when theorists speak of 'variable magnitudes' they never refer to 'variable numbers', for numbers cannot vary. [Frege means that no matter what happens, the number three, say, remains the number three, and does not change into the number four. We must be careful here to distinguish numbers from numerals!]
However, someone might object and maintain that there are indeed 'variable numbers'. We may speak of a certain number which is the length of a rod, and since that rod can vary in length, that number can vary too. [Indeed, Marx and other dialecticians are fond of talking this way.] So, by using the expression "the number that gives the length of this rod" it seems we can designate a variable number.
Frege responds to this in the following way:
"Let us compare this example with the following one. 'When I say "the King of this realm" I am designating a man. Ten years ago the King of this realm was an old man; at present the King of this realm is a young man. So by using this expression I have designated a man who was an old man and is now a young man'" [Ibid., p.108.]
We might be tempted then to think that the expression "the King of this realm" designates a 'variable man'.
However, unless time is mentioned the expression "the King of this realm" does not in fact designate a man at all. Hence, the expression "the King of this realm" could designate a different man depending on the time specified. So, "the King of this realm in 1900" refers to a different individual than "the King of this realm in 1820" (assuming, of course, that there was in fact a man on the throne in that year). If that is the case, we plainly have a different subject of predication here; we are talking about two different individuals. In like manner, the expression "the number that gives the length of this rod" does not designate a number at all unless the time is indicated. If the time is mentioned, then the number, say, 1000, may indeed be that which is designated. But, then 1000 itself is invariable. At a later time, we would use a different expression (for the length) which would designate a different number, say, 1001. Here we clearly have a new subject of predication; we are talking about two different numbers designating two different lengths, not one number which has altered. It is not as if 1000 has grown into 1001; 1001 has merely replaced 1000. [Again, dialecticians like to talk as if numbers can change, but they disguise this as variable expressions.]
We can see this is so, for if someone replaced the original rod with a longer one, we would not say that the first rod was now longer. That is because we would in this case have a different subject of predication each time -- two different rods, just as we had two different numbers, 1000 and 1001.
On the other hand, if the same rod lengthens (if it is heated, say), we would have the same subject of predication; in this case, the same rod would now be longer. But, what is it that remains the same when a number referring to a length allegedly varies? The answer is quite plain: nothing remains the same! We do not have the same number -- which, as we noted above, in these two cases it is a different number! We do not in fact quantify the numbers we use for the size of rods in the same way that we measure rods, and that is because numbers are not physical objects like rods which can vary over time. It would make little sense to say that we had measured 1000 and found it had grown to 1001. There is nothing common here (no 'same but changing' number) of which we could predicate this supposed variation, as we can with rods. In that case, there can be no 'variable numbers' as there can be variable rods.
But, what about the letters we use to designate 'variable numbers', such as "x", "y" or "z"? Frege responds to this as follows:
"This way of speaking is certainly employed; but these letters are not proper names of 'variable numbers' in the way that '2' and '3' are proper names of constant numbers; for the numbers '2' and '3' differ in a specified way, but what is the difference in the variables that are said to be designated by 'x' and 'y'? We cannot say. We cannot specify what properties x has and what different properties y has.... Since we cannot conceive of each variable as an individual, we cannot attach any proper names to variables." [Ibid., p.109.]
So, if these letters are not proper names, they cannot designate anything, let alone a 'variable number'.
May we not then speak about 'indefinite numbers'? But, this way of speaking is rather odd. Do we speak about 'indefinite men'? Sure, we may not be definite about which man/woman we are speaking of, but the individuals concerned cannot themselves be 'indefinite'. There is no such thing as an 'indefinite man'.
Someone might retort: "But, surely, the number n is indefinite; that is why we have to use a letter, not a numeral to designate it." And yet, when we speak of "the number n", it is always in a certain context -- for insatnce: "If the number n is even, then cosnπ = 1". The whole sentence has a sense, not any of the detached parts. For example, it is impossible to answer the question "Is the number n odd or even"? without such a context, any more than we can answer the question "Does cosnπ = 1?" If we could answer it, then n would have to be the proper name of a specific number, in which case n would not be 'indefinite', after all.
So, we should not say that n designates an 'indefinite number' but that it indicates numbers indefinitely.
Some may want to say that a "variable assumes a certain value", but this is a completely obscure way of speaking. How does an indefinite number set about "assuming" a value, that is, "assuming" a certain number (for that is what a value is: a number)? Does an indefinite man go about "assuming" a definite man?
"In other connexions, indeed, we say that an object assumes a property; [but] here the number must play both parts; as an object it is called a variable or a variable magnitude, and as a property it is called a value. That is why people prefer the word 'magnitude' to the word 'number'; they have to deceive themselves about the fact that the variable magnitude and the value it is said to assume are essentially the same thing, that in this case we have not got an object assuming different properties in succession, and that therefore there can be no question of a variation." [Ibid., p.111. Italic emphasis in the original.]
So, those who speak of numbers as 'variable magnitudes' do so because it allows them to treat numbers as both objects and properties at the same time, as the subject of predication and as the predication itself.
Now, we have met this syntactical segue before (in Essay Three Part One). Traditional theorists (and dialecticians) confuse predicates with proper names all the time (since that is the only way they can make their theories work). But, because objects change over time by assuming new properties, the predicates we use to depict this are time sensitive, whereas names are not. [On this, see Geach (1968), pp.22-46.] If numbers are treated as both objects and properties (that is, if names and predicates are regarded as no different), then no wonder they can be made to appear to change.
[This is, of course, quite apart from the fact numbers cannot change, for they are not physical objects.]
Now, this is where the dialectical legerdemain enters in; this syntactical segue allows dialecticians to imagine that magnitudes (expressed as numbers) can change. Numbers are treated as both subjects and predicates (this conceptual slide 'justified' by the use of the sort of 'dialectical' incantation with which we have become familiar). And this also explains why dialecticians (like Engels, and alas Marx) soon descend into linguistic confusion, and who then see 'contradictions' everywhere in algebra, too (and not just in material reality), which they then attempt to 'resolve' by the use of yet more magical, Hegelian jargon. Instead of asking whether the language they use makes any sense, whether they have confused names (and/or objects) with predicates (and/or properties), or whether they are treating mathematical objects as if they were physical objects, they create a whole mythology from yet another syntactical gaff.
In that case, if there can be no 'variable numbers', or, indeed, 'variable magnitudes', then the idea that dialectics can help us understand the Calculus falls even before it reaches the first hurdle.
[This, of course, explains why Marx struggled against the grain of language to try to make dialectics actually apply to the Calculus, and why his epigones since has likewise laboured in vain.]
It is no surprise then to recall that Engels traced all this back to Descartes, a traditional thinker of the first water. So, as we can now see, Descartes did not in fact "introduce" 'variable magnitudes' into mathematics, since mathematics does not use 'variable magnitudes', and never has. Sure, in their 'prose' about their results mathematicians might talk as if this is what they do, but as Frege has shown, in their actual practice they do not in fact do this.
[Incidentally, the word "prose" is taken from Wittgenstein; on this see Shanker (1987), pp.161-219. This word refers to the language mathematicians use to try to make sense of their work, but which language is not part of their work, but an add-on which often contains (covert) amateur metaphysics. In that case, "prose" is rather like the hand-waving of stage magicians.]
Now, Frege in fact allows for the use of "variable magnitude" outside of pure mathematics, but to my mind he does so inconsistently, for it seems to me that his arguments apply to any use of this term.
Even so, this concession of Frege's is of little use to dialecticians, for their 'solution' to the problems of the calculus must apply to 'variable numbers', that is, it must relate to mathematical theory for it to be a solution, and not just apply to the incidental measurement of bodies. Certainly, Marx thought he was making a contribution to "pure" mathematics. In that case, Frege's arguments apply to his 'solution', too.
17b. Although Carchedi seems to be unaware of this! [Carchedi (2008), p.422, Note 8.]
18. Cf., Yanovskaya (1983), Kol'man (1983) and Smith (1983).
Nevertheless, Fregean Logicism has made a strong recovery of late; cf., MacBride (2003), Noonan (2001) and Wright (1983). An excellent account of the general background to this can be found in Giaquinto (2004). See also chapters 13 to 17 of Schirn (1998). More details can be found here. However, there is a serious note of caution in Burgess (2005).
Why Gödel's result is described here as "philosophically irrelevant" is examined briefly here. However, on this topic, see Marion (1998), Shanker (1987, 1988a, 1988b), and Rodych (1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2002, 2007).
19. Since writing this I have discovered much more material on the Internet relating to Marx's comments on the Calculus (and particularly to Non-standard Analysis and infinitesimals developed by Abraham Robinson). I will add some of my own comments on this when I obtain hard copies of this material. However, Kennedy's article can be obtained as a PDF file from here. [This has now been published, along with other relevant material, as Kennedy (2006). From that particular essay, it is quite clear that Kennedy has made the same sort of errors that other commentators have (that is, in transferring attention away from motion in reality and onto to the 'movement' of variables), as well as failing to notice several glaring errors in Marx's own argument. More details will be posted here at a later date.]
The Internet site maintained by the organisation to which Woods and Grant belong has an article that they say is reputed to have helped rehabilitate Marx's analysis of the Calculus. However, that article (which is in Spanish) has not yet been translated into English, so I cannot comment on it. On this, see here.
19a. It could be argued that we use the negative particle quite uncontroversially to speak of events and processes in the world. For example, we say things like: "What you have just done negates everything you have ever stood for", or "Alkalis negate the action of acids". Indeed, certain alleged synonyms of "negate" could also be quoted in support.
However, with regard to the latter point, several comments made in another Essay about certain dictionary definitions of the word "contradiction" are apposite:
To be sure, one online dictionary says the following sort of thing:
"contradiction, n 1: opposition between two conflicting forces or ideas..."
However, it is worth recalling that dictionaries are repositories of usage, and are neither normative nor prescriptive. Indeed, they 'define' many things dialecticians would disagree with. For example:
"God: A being conceived as the perfect, omnipotent, omniscient originator and ruler of the universe, the principal object of faith and worship in monotheistic religions.
The force, effect, or a manifestation or aspect of this being.
A being of supernatural powers or attributes, believed in and worshiped by a people, especially a male deity thought to control some part of nature or reality.
An image of a supernatural being; an idol.
One that is worshiped, idealized, or followed: Money was their god...."
And:
"negation n 1: a negative statement; a statement that is a refusal or denial of some other statement 2: the speech act of negating 3: (logic) a proposition that is true if and only if another proposition is false."
No mention here of "sublation" or the NON, but does that force dialecticians into accepting this 'definition'? Of course not; they pick and choose when it suits them.
In that case, dictionaries record ideology as much as they record use or meaning. Here, the writers of this dictionary have recorded the animistic use of this word as employed by DM-fans.
As this shows, since no literal sense can be made of the equation of forces and contradictions, dialecticians should not believe all they read in dictionaries (or Thesauruses)].
Now, the question whether or not certain words act as synonyms of "negate" is a philosophical issue, the answer to which certainly cannot be taken for granted. However, I have yet to find an argument in a single DM-text which makes the case for equating "negation" with words like "annihilate", "cancel" or "nullify" in the way that dialecticians clearly require (i.e., as a 'dialectical' concept). In fact, they just assert the connection dogmatically, foisting DM not just onto nature, but now onto words!
However, the equation of "negate" with "cancel" was shown to be untenable here.
As far as "nullify" goes, in the above example (i.e., "What you have just done negates everything you have ever stood for"), that word cannot be taken literally, for in that case it would imply backwards causation (i.e., into the past)!
Now, if "nullify" and "negate" are taken to mean "undo", then we are surely on firmer ground, for certain actions/commands clearly undo others, and can be spoken of loosely as their negation. For example "I declare this bridge open" and "I declare this bridge closed", or "Open the door!" and "Close the door!" are pragmatic contradictories in this sense, -- and, of course, only if they are about the same bridge and door in each case.
But, dialecticians should take no comfort from this, for such uses of the word "negation" and "contradiction" are hardly dialectical. These actions/objects do not struggle, nor do they turn into one another. To be sure, an open door can be turned into a closed door, but a closed door does not cause an open door to close -- nor does it do this as a result of an 'internal struggle of opposites'. Admittedly, the action of closing a door can effect such a change, but the action of closing a door does not contradict an open door, it merely undoes its opening. Now, if anyone were to suppose that the action of closing a door contradicted an open door, they would also have to suppose that an action can turn into a door! This is because, as the DM-classicists assure us, dialectical contradictions turn into one another, or they cause 'dialectical opposites' to do so.
Since this particular issue overlaps with my discussion of contradictory forces, the reader is referred there for further details.
20. On the Terminator Gene, see here.
According to some reports, this technology has itself been terminated.
This good news suggests that popular opposition has saved the day for the NON; the latter 'Law' can now go back to turning seeds into plants, and plants into seeds.
Nevertheless, there remain a few NON-threatening clouds on the dialectical horizon: the Wikipedia article above informs us that Monsanto "have no plans to commercialise" the Terminator Gene (and that it will soon "be back"). [This page has now been changed, but it can be accessed in the History section.] For those who know what that phrase means, it is pretty clear that the NON is operating on borrowed time, at least as far as seeds are concerned. [Indeed, as of May 2008, the signs are that the Terminator Gene is on the rise again.] In fact, similar future 'non-natural' human interventions in nature might further undermine the alleged universality of this increasingly pathetic-looking DM-'Law'.
And, as if this were a plot against the NON, we now learn from the New Scientist that researchers have discovered a physical state half-way between life and death, a kind of suspended animation. If so, the NON must feel decidedly nonplussed -- unless, of course, we allow for a sort of 'fractional negation' of life, in this case, as a special sort of dispensation to preserve the morale of beleaguered DM-fans. [Trivedi (2006).]
Now, since the above process is supposedly reversible, someone who had formerly been regarded as dead might be brought back to life. That must mean that scientists themselves can 'negate' the NON at will. Should we therefore regard such life-saving work as reactionary, or conclude that the NON has been refuted?
Or, better: that this 'Law' was always "nonsense on stilts".
Moreover, and more recently, the same journal tells us that geneticists have succeeded in 'reversing' evolution:
"You have probably heard of evolution in action -- but how about evolution in reverse?
"Many of the genes in our bodies have descended from ancient genes that have mutated and changed their function. Petr Tvrdik and Mario Capecchi of the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, have now managed to demonstrate this in mice by recreating an ancient gene from two of its modern descendants.
"Half a billion years ago, the size of our ancestor's genome quadrupled. With four copies of every gene knocking about, genes either had to make themselves useful, or be swiftly dumped. The quadrupling meant that 13 Hox genes, which control the development of body shape, became 52. The ones that didn't mutate to do something useful were lost, so today mammals have 39 Hox genes.
"Tvrdik and Capecchi focused on two that were originally duplicates but have evolved to perform different functions. Hoxa1 controls brain stem development in the early embryo, while Hoxb1 directs nerve growth in an area of the brain that controls facial expression.
"The two genes make the same protein, but in different places in the brain, and at different times. In other words, it is the regulatory region of the gene that differs between Hoxa1 and Hoxb1, not the protein-coding region.
"To reconstruct the ancestral Hox1 gene, Tvrdik and Capecchi attached the regulatory sequence from Hoxb1 -- which turns the gene on later in foetal development -- to the Hoxa1 gene. That way, one gene did the job of two. Mice with the new Hox1 gene, but with their Hoxa1 and Hoxb1 genes knocked out, developed normally....
"'We constructed a gene that is fairly similar to the ancestral Hox1 gene present in the vertebrate lineage half a billion years ago,' says Tvrdik." [New Scientist, 12/08/06, p.11.]
Is this an example of the un-NON?
So, it looks like Lenin was right: the partial nature of knowledge means that no scientific principle is immune from revision, or forever safe from being consigned to the theoretical knackers yard (especially by those with no respect for the NON). In that case, the NON should now be archived (alongside, say, the humoral theory of disease, the crystalline spheres and the idea that women can give birth to live rabbits) as an example of the whacky ideas that human beings once used to believe.
[On the belief that women can give birth to live rabbits, see Pickover (2000); or look here.]
21. On this see here and here.
There are many varieties of seedless fruit; these include: navel oranges, clementines, seedless watermelon, persimmon, seedless cucumber, and Bartlett pears. Some seedless fruit are propagated naturally by vegetative reproduction (e.g., bananas and pineapples). On this, see here, here and here.
Indeed, many seedless fruits come from triploid plants (i.e., cells that do not have the normal diploid paired sets of chromosomes) -- for example, bananas. Do we have here yet another instance of organisms in nature which are not UOs? And, even though Woods and Grant swore blind that everything in nature exists as paired opposites (here), these Centrist Chromosomes have clearly sold out.
"Polyploidy" (as this state is known) occurs in animals too; e.g., in goldfish, salamanders and lizards. But, it is also very common in ferns and most flowering plants. The wheat that goes into bread is hexaploid (i.e., it has six sets of chromosomes).
The following organisms are (1) triploid: bananas and apples; (2) tetraploid: durum or macaroni wheat, maize, cotton, potato, cabbage, leek, tobacco, peanut, Pelargonium; (3) hexaploid: chrysanthemum, bread wheat, triticale, oats; (4) octaploid: strawberry, dahlia, pansies, and sugar cane.
Polyploidal animals are often sterile, and so have to reproduce by parthenogenesis (another eminently non-dialectical aspect of nature); on this, see here and here.
As is well-known, this form of reproduction proceeds without the intervention of the male; it is found in the following thoroughly bourgeois species: water fleas, aphids, honey bees, lizards, salamanders, turkeys and some varieties of fish.
Many other organisms reproduce asexually, showing admirable (one could almost say, "bolshie") contempt for the NON. However, and mercifully, there are far too many of these radical creatures to list here. [But, there are some more rather odd counter-examples in Note 23 and Note 24, below.]
Sterile offspring/hybrids also seem to be no less contemptuous of the NON, too. The mule and the hinny are classic examples (the mule results from crossing a male donkey with a female horse; the hinny, from a female donkey with a male horse) --, but many other organisms exhibiting polyploidy are sterile. However, the product of the union of a horse and a donkey (a mule/hinny) does not produce sterile offspring, just no offspring. In this case, it looks like the NON has hit another very material brick wall. [On this, see here and here.]
Even more problematic for the NON is the Liger; this cat is a hybrid cross between a male Lion and a female Tiger. Male Ligers are sterile while females are fertile. The NON must have gotten its wires crossed. Similar comments apply to Tigons, a hybrid between a female Lion and a male Tiger. As with Ligers, males are sterile and females fertile. Wikipedia adds:
"At the Alipore Zoo in India, a female tigon named Rudhrani, born in 1971, was successfully mated to an Asiatic Lion named Debabrata. The rare, second generation hybrid was called a li-tigon. Rudhrani produced seven li-tigons in her lifetime....
"Reports also exist of the similar ti-tigon, resulting from the cross between a female tigon and a male tiger. Ti-tigons resemble golden tigers but with less contrast in their markings. A female tigon born in 1978, named Noelle, shared an enclosure in the Shambala Reserve with a male Siberian Tiger called Anton, in the belief that she was sterile. In 1983, Noelle produced a ti-tigon named Nathaniel. As Nathaniel was three-quarters tiger, he had darker stripes than Noelle and 'spoke' tiger rather than the mix of sounds used by his mother. Being only about quarter-lion, Nathaniel did not grow a mane. Nathaniel died at age eight or nine years old due to cancer. Noelle also developed cancer and died soon after." [Quoted from here.]
Fortunately, once more, there are too many examples of hybrids to list; on this, see here.
In fact, there seem to be so many exceptions to Engels's third 'Law' among plants and animals that it is in danger of becoming terminally sterile itself.
And this is to leave out of account all mention of symbiosis (mutualism), an eminently non-'contradictory' way for many organisms to underline the radically non-dialectical nature of life. Far from 'struggling' against one another, such friendly organisms go out of their way to assist each other. [On the important influence symbiosis has had on evolution, see Ryan (2002).]
Now, I used the term "dialectical tautology" elsewhere in this Essay -- so, if we absolutely have to impose dubious metaphors on nature, these 'collaborationist' organisms should rightly have this one imposed on them, too. In which case, evolution has produced countless organisms that refute at least two of Engels's 'Laws'.
Just as it is to leave out of account the origin of mitochondria, widely believed to have been the result of an endocytosis billions of years ago, when certain bacteria were absorbed by prokaryote cells, to form the harmonious cellular union we see today. Yet another amazing 'dialectical tautology'?
In January 2007, the BBC reported on a research program into hybrid embryos, which are 99% human, 1% animal (i.e., non-human). A recent article in Socialist Worker also recorded this reactionary anti-dialectical move by scientists -- cf., Parrington (2007).
And now, in January 2009, in an article about Darwin's Tree of Life, the New Scientist reports that Horizontal Gene Transfer [HGT] and Hybridization may be nearly as important in evolution as mutation and natural selection are:
"Some researchers are also convinced that hybridisation has been a major driving force in animal evolution (see below), and that the process is ongoing. 'It is really common,' says James Mallet, an evolutionary biologist at University College London. 'Ten per cent of all animals regularly hybridise with other species.' This is especially true in rapidly evolving lineages with lots of recently diverged species -- including our own. There is evidence that early modern humans hybridised with our extinct relatives, such as Homo erectus and the Neanderthals (Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, vol. 363, p 2813).
"Hybridisation isn't the only force undermining the multicellular tree: it is becoming increasingly apparent that HGT plays an unexpectedly big role in animals too. As ever more multicellular genomes are sequenced, ever more incongruous bits of DNA are turning up. Last year, for example, a team at the University of Texas at Arlington found a peculiar chunk of DNA in the genomes of eight animals -- the mouse, rat, bushbaby, little brown bat, tenrec, opossum, anole lizard and African clawed frog -- but not in 25 others, including humans, elephants, chickens and fish. This patchy distribution suggests that the sequence must have entered each genome independently by horizontal transfer (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 105, p 17023).
"Other cases of HGT in multicellular organisms are coming in thick and fast. HGT has been documented in insects, fish and plants, and a few years ago a piece of snake DNA was found in cows. The most likely agents of this genetic shuffling are viruses, which constantly cut and paste DNA from one genome into another, often across great taxonomic distances. In fact, by some reckonings, 40 to 50 per cent of the human genome consists of DNA imported horizontally by viruses, some of which has taken on vital biological functions (New Scientist, 27 August 2008, p 38). The same is probably true of the genomes of other big animals. 'The number of horizontal transfers in animals is not as high as in microbes, but it can be evolutionarily significant,' says Bapteste.
"Nobody is arguing -- yet -- that the tree [of life] concept has outlived its usefulness in animals and plants. While vertical descent is no longer the only game in town, it is still the best way of explaining how multicellular organisms are related to one another -- a tree of 51 per cent, maybe. In that respect, Darwin's vision has triumphed: he knew nothing of micro-organisms and built his theory on the plants and animals he could see around him....
"It could be time to ditch the old idea that hybrids are sterile individuals that cannot possibly have played a role in shaping the history of life on Earth. Hybridisation is a significant force in animal evolution, according to retired marine biologist Donald Williamson, formerly of the University of Liverpool, UK. His conclusion comes from a lifetime studying marine animals such as starfish, sea urchins and molluscs, many of which lead a strange double life, starting out as larvae and metamorphosing into adult forms.
"The conventional explanation for metamorphosis is that it evolved gradually, with the juvenile form becoming specialised for feeding and the adult for mating, until they barely resembled each other. Williamson thinks otherwise. He points out that marine larvae have five basic forms and can be organised into a family tree based on shared characteristics. Yet this tree bears no relationship to the family tree of adults: near-identical larvae often give rise to adults from different lineages, while some closely related adults have utterly unrelated larvae.
"It's as if each species was randomly assigned one of the larval forms -- which is exactly what Williamson argues happened. He believes metamorphosis arose repeatedly during evolution by the random fusion of two separate species, with one of the partners assuming the role of the larva and the other that of the adult.
"If that sounds unlikely, Williamson points out that many marine species breed by casting their eggs and sperm into the sea and hoping for the best, giving ample opportunity for cross-species hybridisation. Normally nothing comes of this, he says, but 'once in a million years it works: the sperm of one species fertilises another and two species become one'. The most likely way for this biological mash-up to function is if the resulting chimera expresses its two genomes sequentially, producing a two-stage life history with metamorphosis in the middle.
"This explains many anomalies in marine biology, says Williamson. His star witness is the starfish Luidia sarsi, which starts life as a small larva with a tiny starfish inside. As the larva grows, the starfish migrates to the outside and when the larva settles on the seabed, they separate. This is perfectly normal for starfish, but in Luidia something remarkable then happens. Instead of degenerating, the larva swims off and lives for several months as an independent animal. 'I can't see how one animal with one genome could do that,' says Williamson. 'I think the larval genome and the adult genome are different.'
"The idea that microbes regularly swap portions of genetic code with individuals from another species doesn't seem so far-fetched (see main story). But could the same process also have shaped the evolution of multicellular animals? In 1985, biologist Michael Syvanen of the University of California, Davis, predicted that it did (Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 112, p.333). Back then there was no way to test that claim, but there is now.
"Syvanen recently compared 2000 genes that are common to humans, frogs, sea squirts, sea urchins, fruit flies and nematodes. In theory, he should have been able to use the gene sequences to construct an evolutionary tree showing the relationships between the six animals.
"He failed. The problem was that different genes told contradictory evolutionary stories. This was especially true of sea-squirt genes.
"Conventionally, sea squirts -- also known as tunicates -- are lumped together with frogs, humans and other vertebrates in the phylum Chordata, but the genes were sending mixed signals. Some genes did indeed cluster within the chordates, but others indicated that tunicates should be placed with sea urchins, which aren't chordates. 'Roughly 50 per cent of its genes have one evolutionary history and 50 per cent another,' Syvanen says.
"The most likely explanation for this, he argues, is that tunicates are chimeras, created by the fusion of an early chordate and an ancestor of the sea urchins around 600 million years ago." [Lawton (2009), pp.36-39. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here. Italic emphases in the original.]
In that case, cooperation, symbiosis, merging and unification appear to be important natural processes, about which forces Darwin and Hegel were ignorant. Is this not yet more proof of the 'tautological' (as opposed to the 'contradictory';) nature of reality?
It looks, therefore, like the NON is losing its iron grip on nature and is slowly disappearing from reality, somewhat like an abstract version of the Cheshire Cat. A suitably ironic non-"nodal" end to this mystical 'Law' this is, too!
21a. To be sure, this off-the-wall reasoning is ridiculous in the extreme, but it can only be neutralised by the adoption of rational principles that are foreign to DL (i.e., those found in FL and Informal Logic).
In fact, DM invites such parody.
[DL = Dialectical Logic; FL = Formal Logic.]
21b. This is attempted in Molyneux (1995). In addition, Woods and Grant argue that the classical 'problem' concerning the origin of 'order' out of 'chaos' is solved by Engels poor-as-piss first 'Law' -- apparently, as is the conundrum of the connection between 'freedom' and 'necessity':
"The answer to the problem is supplied by the law of the transformation of quantity into quality. Out of the apparently random movement of a large number of molecules, there arises a regularity and a pattern which can be expressed as a scientific law. Out of chaos arises order. This dialectical relation between freedom and necessity, between chaos and order, between randomness and determinacy was a closed book to the science of the 19th century, which regarded the laws governing random phenomena (statistics) to be entirely separate and apart from the precise equations of classical mechanics....
"All that exists evidently does so of necessity. But not everything can exist. Potential existence is not yet actual existence. In The Science of Logic, Hegel carefully traces the process whereby something passes from a state of being merely possible to the point where possibility becomes probability, and the latter becomes inevitable ('necessity'). In view of the colossal confusion that has arisen in modern science around the issue of "probability," a study of Hegel's thorough and profound treatment of this subject is highly instructive.
"Possibility and actuality denote the dialectical development of the real world and the various stages in the emergence and development of objects. A thing which exists in potential contains within itself the objective tendency of development, or at least the absence of conditions which would preclude its coming into being. However, there is a difference between abstract possibility and real potential, and the two things are frequently confused. Abstract or formal possibility merely expresses the absence of any conditions that might exclude a particular phenomenon, but it does not assume the presence of conditions which would make its appearance inevitable....
"In order for potential to become actual, a particular concatenation of circumstances is required. Moreover, this is not a simple, linear process, but a dialectical one, in which an accumulation of small quantitative changes eventually produces a qualitative leap. Real, as opposed to abstract, possibility implies the presence of all the necessary factors out of which the potential will lose its character of provisionality, and become actual. And, as Hegel explains, it will remain actual only for as long as these conditions exist, and no longer. This is true whether we are referring to the life of an individual, a given socioeconomic form, a scientific theory, or any natural phenomenon. The point at which a change becomes inevitable can be determined by the method invented by Hegel and known as the 'nodal line of measurement.' If we regard any process as a line, it will be seen that there are specific points ('nodal points') on the line of development, where the process experiences a sudden acceleration, or qualitative leap....
"The impossibility of establishing a 'final cause' has led some people to abandon the idea of cause altogether. Everything is considered to be random and accidental. In the 20th century this position has been adopted, at least in theory, by a large number of scientists on the basis of an incorrect interpretation of the results of quantum physics, particularly the philosophical positions of Heisenberg. Hegel answered these arguments in advance, when he explained the dialectical relation between accident and necessity.
"Hegel explains that there is no such thing as causality in the sense of an isolated cause and effect. Every effect has a counter-effect, and every action has a counter-action. The idea of an isolated cause and effect is an abstraction taken from classical Newtonian physics, which Hegel was highly critical of, although it enjoyed tremendous prestige at that time. Here again, Hegel was in advance of his time. Instead of the action-reaction of mechanics, he advanced the notion of Reciprocity, of universal interaction. Everything influences everything else, and is in turn, influenced and determined by everything. Hegel thus re-introduced the concept of accident which had been rigorously banned from science by the mechanist philosophy of Newton and Laplace.
"At first sight, we seem to be lost in a vast number of accidents. But this confusion is only apparent. The accidental phenomena which constantly flash in and out of existence, like the waves on the face of an ocean, express a deeper process, which is not accidental but necessary. At a decisive point, this necessity reveals itself through accident. This idea of the dialectical unity of necessity and accident may seem strange, but it is strikingly confirmed by a whole series of observations from the most varied fields of science and society. The mechanism of natural selection in the theory of evolution is the best-known example. But there are many others. In the last few years, there have been many discoveries in the field of chaos and complexity theory which precisely detail how 'order arises out of chaos,' which is exactly what Hegel worked out one and a half centuries earlier....
"Dialectical determinism has nothing in common with the mechanical approach, still less with fatalism. In the same way that there are laws which govern inorganic and organic matter, so there are laws that govern the evolution of human society. The patterns which can be observed through history are not at all fortuitous. Marx and Engels explained that the transition from one social system to another is determined by the development of the productive forces, in the last analysis. When a given socioeconomic system is no longer able to develop the productive forces, it enters into crisis, preparing the ground for a revolutionary overturn.
"This is not at all to deny the role of the individual in history. As we have already said, men and women make their own history. However, it would be foolish to imagine that human beings are 'free agents' who can determine their future purely on the basis of their own will. They have to base themselves on conditions which have been created independent of their will -- economic, social, political, religious, and cultural. In this sense, the idea of free-will is nonsense....
"Is it possible to attain freedom? If what is meant by a 'free' action is one that is not caused or determined, we must say quite frankly that such an action has never existed, and never will exist. Such imaginary 'freedom' is pure metaphysics. Hegel explained that real freedom is the recognition of necessity. To the degree that men and women understand the laws that govern nature and society, they will be in a position to master these laws and turn them to their own advantage. The real material basis upon which humankind can become free has been established by the development of industry, science and technique. In a rational system of society -- one in which the means of production are harmoniously planned and consciously controlled -- we will really be able to speak about free human development. In the words of Engels, this is 'mankind's leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.' [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.126-40. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here. Bold emphasis added; italic emphases in the original.]
It is worth noting here that the sole authority for this slide from 'necessity' to 'freedom' is Hegel; nothing in science justifies this verbal sleight-of-hand. It is also worth pointing out that those parts of the above passage that have been highlighted in bold reveal yet again how quick DM-fans are to impose their ideas on nature. Indeed, how could these two possibly know all this for a fact?
This, and other dialectical/Idealist fancies will be exorcised in Essay Three Part Five.
22. On this see Note 1b, above. Anyway, are we really supposed to believe that internally-arranged 'opposites' produce such mutations? If so, and if all things are created by the tension between 'dialectical opposites', then a non-mutated gene must already exist side by side with the mutant version, or that mutation will not take place! In which case, this mutant gene cannot have been produced by that mutation!
As we have seen several times already, the radically-confused nature of DM-'theory' of change implies either that (1) nothing novel can come into existence, or (2) UOs cannot produce novelty and/or change:
(1) If such opposites cause change then both must exist in order to do so. If, therefore, change involves an object or process developing into its opposite, then that opposite must already exist, and must produce itself! But if it exists already, no novelty can ensue.
(2) On the other hand, if it does not already exist, it can play no part in the action. More on this here.
23. Consider, too, the thoroughly reactionary life form Myxomycota (The Slime Mould), which belongs neither to the plant nor animal kingdom, but to the Protoctista. Their life-cycle involves the following: a giant amoebal stage, followed by a slug-like existence, which morphs into a fungal-like fruiting body, which then releases spores.
Now it might be that this organism is so primitive that it does not "understand dialectics", and has thus not quite figured out which of these four stages is the 'negation', and which is the NON, let alone what 'sublates' what -- especially since the first phase of its life-cycle involves a union, a 'dialectical tautology', if you will!
No doubt a commissar will be assigned to 're-educate' it after the revolution.
"The Dictyosteliomycota are also known as the social amoebae. Their life cycle is considered among the most bizarre among microorganisms. It begins with free-living amoeboid cells (not to be confused with the Amoebae); there is no true plasmodium. As long as there is enough food (usually bacteria) the amoebae thrive. However, when food runs out, the amoebae send out chemical signals to surrounding amoebae. Next, they stream toward a central point and form a sluglike multicellular pseudoplasmodium, which can then migrate like a single organism. When conditions are right, the pseudoplasmodium stops migrating and forms a multicellular fruiting body. Some of the cells become spores that disseminate, while the rest form stalk cells whose only function is to raise the spores up into the air to be more easily caught in air currents." [Quoted from here.]
Figure Nine: Slime Mould -- Negation Of The NON?
24. In fact, the NON (or at least the second 'Law' with its UOs) seems to be coming under sustained attack from all sides of the animal and plant kingdom. Consider the sea slug:
"Striking that happy balance between giving and receiving in a relationship can be fraught with difficulty. But not, it seems, for hermaphrodite sea slugs. These gentle soft-bodied animals, blessed with both male and female genitalia, solve the battle of the sexes by engaging in 'sperm trading'.
"They donate sperm only on the condition that they receive it, so thwarting the male desire to fertilise and run. During sex, each slug inserts its penis into the other and one transfers a small package of sperm. The transfer of further sperm will only proceed if the other partner reciprocates by transferring a package of its sperm.
"That hermaphrodite sex worked this way was suggested 20 years ago but this is the first time it has been demonstrated. Nico Michiels and colleagues at the University of Tübingen, Germany, sealed off the sperm ducts of Chelidonura hirundinina sea slugs so that they could insert the penis but not transfer sperm.
"In 57 staged sexual encounters, sea slugs paired with a 'cheating' partner, unable to transfer sperm, were more likely to abandon sex than animals paired with a 'fair trader' (Current Biology, 15, p.792).
"'I expect that sperm trading is widespread in hermaphrodites,' says Michiels. 'These sea slugs have found a way to optimise sperm transfer so that both partners benefit.'" [New Scientist, 2521, 15/10/05. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
There seems to be a unity of non-opposites going on here. And don't even think about the fire ant:
"It is often said that males and females are different species. For the little fire ant, that seems to be literally true.
"The ant Wasmannia auropunctata, which is native to Central and South America but has spread into the US and beyond, has opted for a unique stand-off in the battle of the sexes. Both queens and males reproduce by making genetically identical copies of themselves -- so males and females seem to have entirely separate gene pools.
"The only time they reproduce conventionally is to produce workers, says Denis Fournier from the Free University of Brussels...in Belgium, a member of the team that discovered the phenomenon (Nature, 435, p.1230). But workers are sterile and never pass on their genes.
"This is the first reported case in the animal kingdom of males reproducing exclusively by cloning, although male honeybees do it occasionally.
"But it is too early to assume male and female gene pools are entirely separate, cautions Andrew Bourke from the Institute of Zoology in London. Males may occasionally reproduce by mating with a queen to top up the gene pool. Fournier's study analysed DNA from 199 queens, 41 males and 264 workers collected in New Caledonia in the south Pacific, and French Guiana. Only a much larger study could rule out gene pool mixing, he says." [New Scientist, 2506, 02/07/05.]
And, such dialectically-benighted creatures are not confined to the non-vertebrate world, for evolution has thrown up the mangrove Killifish:
"Something fishy is happening in the mangrove forests of the western Atlantic. A fish is living in the trees.
"The mangrove killifish (Kryptolebias marmoratus) is a tiny fish that lives in ephemeral pools of water around the roots of mangroves. When these dry up the 100-milligram fish can survive for months in moist spots on land. Being stranded high and dry makes it hard to find a mate, but fortunately the killifish doesn't need a partner to reproduce. It is the only known hermaphrodite vertebrate that is self-fertilising.
"Now biologists wading through muddy mangrove swamps in Belize and Florida have discovered another exceptional adaptation. Near dried-up pools, they found hundreds of killifish lined up end to end, like peas in a pod, inside the tracks carved out by insects in rotting logs. "They really don't meet standard behavioural criteria for fish," says Scott Taylor of the Brevard County Environmentally Endangered Lands Program in Florida, who reports the findings in an upcoming issue of The American Naturalist....
"The rotting logs may help explain how killifish occupy such a large range, stretching from southern Brazil to central Florida. Self-fertilisation makes it easy for individuals to colonise new places, and dead logs are good rafts for getting around, says John Avise, an evolutionary biologist at the University of California at Irvine. 'They might be washed ashore in a rotting log and start a new population.'" [New Scientist, 196, 2626, 20/10/07, p.20. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
Even worse news, for it now seems that scientists can further 'negate' this 'Law', in so far as it applies to an already NON-confused semi-hermaphrodite worm:
"The sexual preferences of microscopic worms have been manipulated in the laboratory so that they are attracted to the same sex, offering new evidence that sexuality may be hard-wired in the brain.
"By activating a single gene in the brains of hermaphrodite nematode worms, scientists have induced them to attempt to mate with other hermaphrodites, instead of being attracted exclusively to males....
"While nematode worms are extremely simple organisms, and details of their behaviour are difficult to apply to people with any accuracy, the researchers said that the existence of a biological pathway to same-sex attraction offered a possible insight into human sexuality.
"Erik Jorgensen, Professor of Biology at the University of Utah, who led the study, said: 'Our conclusions are narrow in that they are about worms and how attraction behaviours are derived from the same brain circuit.'...
"'We cannot say what this means for human sexual orientation, but it raises the possibility that sexual preference is wired in the brain. Humans are subject to evolutionary forces just like worms. It seems possible that if sexual orientation is genetically wired in worms, it would be in people too. Humans have free will, so the picture is more complicated in people.'
"Nematode worms, of the species Caenorhabditis elegans, are one millimetre long and live in soil, where they feed on bacteria. The overwhelming majority -- more than 99.9 per cent -- are hermaphrodites, which produce both sperm and eggs and generally fertilise themselves before laying eggs.
"About 0.05 per cent of nematodes are male, however, and these worms must seek out hermaphrodites to reproduce. Hermaphrodites will mate with an available male rather than fertilise themselves, and though they produce sperm they will not impregnate other hermaphrodites as they lack the required copulatory structure.
"There are no true females and hermaphrodites were treated as female for the purposes of the study. C. elegans shares many of its genes with human beings and other animals, and is a standard organism used for early laboratory studies of genetics.
"'A hermaphrodite makes both eggs and sperm,' Professor Jorgensen said. 'She doesn't need to mate [with a male] to have progeny. Most of the time, the hermaphrodites do not mate. But if they mate, instead of having 200 progeny, they can have 1,200 progeny.'
"As the worms have no eyes -- hermaphrodites have only 959 cells and males 1,031 cells -- they detect one another's sex using scent cues.
"In the study, published in the journal Current Biology, the scientists activated a gene called fem-3 in hermaphrodites. This gene makes the nematode body develop as male, with neurons that appear only in male brains and copulatory structures such as tails.
"In the experiment, fem-3 was activated only in the brain, so the worms developed male nerve cells but not other male body characteristics. Despite this, they behaved like males, attempting to seek out and fertilise other hermaphrodites.
"'They look like girls, but act and think like boys,' said Jamie White, who conducted the key experiments. 'The [same-sex attraction] behaviour is part of the nervous system.'
"Professor Jorgensen said: 'The conclusion is that sexual attraction is wired into brain circuits common to both sexes of worms, and is not caused solely by extra nerve cells added to the male or female brain. The reason males and females behave differently is that the same nerve cells have been rewired to alter sexual preference.'
"In a second phase of the study, the scientists manipulated different kinds of nerve cell in the male brain to determine which were responsible for switching on male attraction to hermaphrodites. They found that, although switching off one of the eight sensory neurons impaired attraction in adults, young males developed normally if just one such nerve cell was intact.
"This finding suggests that there is considerable redundancy built into the sexual development of males. Dr White said: 'It must be that the behaviour is very important.'" [The Times, 26/10/07. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
Finally, in relation to the third 'Law', if we recall the problems that tautomerism created for the first 'Law', we may ask, as these isomers flip back and forth every microsecond, billions of times: which tautomer is the 'negation' and which is the NON?
How many more counter-examples do we need before this 'Law' turns into its own opposite: a NON-law?
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