Essay Three Part One
Abstractionism -- The Heart Of The Beast
Readers need to make note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
If you are viewing this with Mozilla Firefox you might not be able to read all the symbols I have used.
The opening sections of this Part of Essay Three are aimed at introducing the rest of the site. Many of the things I say here are thus deliberately provocative; but they will all be substantiated in later Essays -- the most important of which is Essay Twelve Part One.
In Essay Three as a whole I propose to unravel DM-epistemology. In Parts One and Two, will be examining a thoroughly traditional concept, abstraction. There I hope to show that little sense can be made of abstractions (as these are understood both by traditional Philosophers and by dialecticians) or of the process of abstraction itself.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Moreover, in line with the comments made in Essay Two about dialecticians' philosophical traditionalism, Abstractionism is a traditional doctrine that DM-theorists have been only too happy to appropriate. As we will soon see, the 'process of abstraction' is the source of much of the dialectical confusion that has helped cripple Revolutionary theory.
In Part Two of this Essay I will examine other aspects of the traditional approach to abstraction in more detail, showing how, by incorporating this notion into their theory, dialecticians have invited a Trojan Horse into their midst. [Brief descriptions of the other Parts of Essay Three will be added later.]
This Essay is over 47,000 words long; a summary of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections:
(1) Closet Idealists
(a) So -- What Precisely Are Abstractions?
(b) Are Abstract General Ideas Just Particulars In Disguise?
(c) Due Process?
(d) Concrete Block
(2) Linguistic Idealism -- Superscience From Mere Words
(b) The Fetishisation Of Language
(c) The Ruling Ideas Are Always Those Of The Ruling-Class
(3) Welcome To The Glorious New Abstractor Factory
(a) All Truth Is Concrete -- Except For This Abstraction
(b) The Abstract And The Concrete
(d) Imposed On Nature, Not Read From It
(4) DM-Epistemology: Set In Concrete?
(a) Dialectics Fails To Make It Out of The Starting Blocks
(b) A Name By Any Other Name Is Still A Name
(c) Are Indicative Sentences Just Disguised Lists?
(5) John And The Entire Universe -- Lenin's Word-Magic
(a) No Entity Without Identity
(b) Dialectics 'Emerges' From Logical Chaos
(c) Theses From Thought -- Dogma From Daydreams
(a) Engels Nails His Colours To An Ideal Mast
(b) So Does Lenin
(c) Is Reality Plastered With Dialectics?
(e) Ok -- Reach For The Prozac
(7) Hegel Screws Up
(9) Notes
(10) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
So -- What Exactly Are Abstractions?
In Essay Two, we saw that dialecticians are as eager to impose their theses on reality as any randomly selected Idealist is. In this Part of Essay Three we will find out just how they manage to do this. [In Essays Nine Parts One and Two, and Essay Twelve, we will discover why they do it; a summary of the latter can be read here.]
To be sure, DM-theorists claim that theirs is a materialist theory, and they vigorously resist any imputation to the contrary. Far from imposing their theses on nature, DM-theorists argue that scientific knowledge advances because of a dialectical interplay between abstract knowledge on the one hand and practical activity on the other, rendering it increasingly objective over time.
Nevertheless, to state the obvious, without minds to create them there would be no abstractions.1 On the surface, therefore, it would seem that any theory that is committed to the 'objective' existence of 'abstractions' must be Idealist, whatever protestations are made to the contrary.
On the other hand, if 'abstractions' are not 'objective' -- that is, if they are not "mind-independent", if they do not relate to anything that exists in "mind-independent" reality --, then it is difficult to see how they could help in the construction of an accurate account of nature, or one that is supposed to be objective. Nor is it easy to see how scientific knowledge could possibly advance by means of abstractions if they are somehow fictional. How could fictional concepts help account for a non-fictional world?
On the other hand, perhaps there is a way of interpreting the nature of abstractions that could rescue them from the world of make-believe? Could it be that their only 'legitimate' role is to help maintain the morale of scientists and Philosophers? One suspects so, otherwise much of traditional theory could rightly be jettisoned as yet more hot air -- or, more appropriately, reclassified as a considerably less entertaining alternative to the Brothers Grimm, as fiction on stilts.
And yet, if abstractions are objective -- but only minds can construct or even appreciate them --, questions must naturally arise over what they could possibly reflect in nature. Exactly what corresponds to an abstract idea in the physical world?
Of course, for non-materialists (and old-fashioned Realists) quibbles like these presented few problems --, except perhaps a relatively awkward one over the precise meaning of the word "objective".
For traditional thinkers like this, the ultimate constituents of reality were in the end either mind-like objects or non-material "concepts" and "Ideas". In that case, the word "objective" (that is, before that word changed its meaning a couple of centuries ago (it used to mean what "subjective" now means, and vice versa! -- on this see Daston (1994))) was for them almost synonymous with what we might these days call "Ideal". In fact, old-fashioned Realists are difficult to distinguish from Objective Idealists; as far as the latter were concerned, the word "objective" clearly did no real work.
Now the same cannot be said of dialecticians -- if one accepts their version of their theory at face value. Nevertheless, and controversially, this can and will be said of 'Materialist Dialectics' [MAD] --, but only after the tangled undergrowth has been cleared away somewhat, its main roots in traditional thought exposed.
Oddly enough, however, we find a DM-classicist like Lenin arguing along familiar lines, for all the world sounding like a born-again Realist with added Hegelian spin:
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961), p.171. Emphases in the original.]
Unfortunately, Lenin forgot to say how any of this is possible if abstractions are creations of the human mind. If scientific knowledge more truly reflects the world the more its abstractions are correct, how could this be if abstractions do not exist 'objectively', in some form or other, for science to reflect?1a If abstractions don't exist in the outside world then what is there in nature for them to depict, or for them to depict to us? On the other hand, if abstractions do exist, of what are they composed, and what form do they take? Worse still, where do they exist and how can they possibly interact with us?
Clearly, to settle such questions we need something a little more helpful than Lenin's enigmatic prose. Surprisingly, as we shall see, DM-theorists have to this day remained studiously silent on these issues -- saving, of course, where they have merely been content to repeat Lenin's words in the vain hope, perhaps, that mere repetition creates clarity and constitutes adequate proof.
Traditional theorists often regarded such abstractions as an 'reflection' of the "essential" features of the world, which, according to them, lie 'behind' appearances, this latest metaphor left conveniently obscure. [We will have occasion to question its aptness later.]
In stark contrast to the particulars we meet in everyday life, abstractions are not just universal in form, their content is general, too. Indeed, the use of abstract ideas, so we are told, allows human cognition to arise from immediate experience in its ascent toward an increasingly universal, law-governed picture of reality found in science and Philosophy.
So, it seems that abstractions are necessary if human beings are comprehend the generality found in nature, and thus consolidate scientific knowledge. An abstraction is, therefore, like a key that helps unlock secrets governing the inner workings of the world, an artefact of thought that connects each theorist with universal principles which, oddly enough, do not actually exist in the material world.
But, if abstractions are general in form, how does this generality actually express itself in reality? Are abstractions somehow 'spread out' and dispersed, as it were, over the concrete particulars that supposedly instantiate them, uniting the seeming diversity we see all around us by some power still unbeknown to us?
Or, are they merely part of the tales human beings tell themselves -- subjective stories dressed up in pseudo-objective finery --, which are essential for the progress of theory, but somehow not 'real' in themselves?
Unfortunately, their origin in overtly Idealist Philosophy does little to improve their image. Small wonder then that consistent materialists have regarded them as guilty until proven even more guilty.
Nevertheless, more work will need to be done before it is clear that such 'principles' are not just "useful fictions", handy at least for boosting the morale of scientists -- or for giving dialecticians something terminally obscure over which they can endlessly perseverate -- but for nought else.
Even so, short of burying this entire topic under several layers of Hegelian jargon, dialecticians have not advanced much beyond this subjectivist approach. In fact, as we will see, their view of abstractions actually undermines the generality they were introduced to explain, thus thoroughly compromising their approach to scientific knowledge.
This dialectical inversion, if you like, is the subject of the rest of this Essay.
Abstractions -- Just Particulars In Disguise?
Admittedly, when it is viewed traditionally, language seems to present abstractions as though they are superficially (if not misleadingly) universal in form. Words supposedly denoting them appear to be (or to express) general ideas, categories or concepts.
To be sure, things are rarely this straight-forward; the problem here is that the words traditional theorists use to depict abstractions turned out to be the names of so-called "Universals" (in other cases "Forms", "Concepts", "Categories" or "Ideas"). Unfortunately, this implied that these "Universals" were in fact particulars of some sort, named now by an abstract noun, and conjured into existence by a mysterious 'process' of abstraction that defies explanation to this day.
How, then, is it possible for an abstraction to be both general and particular all at the same time?
Well, are abstractions like classes? Classes are abstract particulars of a rather peculiar sort: they are singular in form, but compound in nature, but no less Ideal. If Universals are like classes -- which somehow seem to exist anterior to material reality -- it would suggest they are ghostly containers of some sort, but with material contents. Does this intellectualist approach to reality not now commit us to the existence of classes over and above their members? Indeed, is such a 'theory' little more than bargain basement Platonism?
And yet, what are classes apart from their members? Indeed, what were they before their members existed? Was there, for example, a class of tigers (existing somewhere) waiting for these magnificent beasts to evolve just to give it some sort of material content, and, of course, to provide theoretical distraction for taxonomists? Does nature plan ahead in this way?
Conversely, are classes material in form, like tables, chairs, rocks and planets? If they are, of what are they composed? And yet, if they are made of something, why then call them abstractions? That particular epithet does not even look right. Abstractions are constructed -- so the traditional story goes -- either (1) by means of some sort of mental subtraction, which progressively ignores particular features of material objects in a theorist's bid to ascend to the general, or (2) by means of a law-like generalising process that each abstractor applies to reality.
However, both of these individualised skills are mysteriously coordinated across an entire population of abstractors in equally mysterious ways. No doubt there is an abstraction that covers that, too. [This will be the subject of much of Part Two.]
But, if (1) were the case, in the limit, one would expect abstractions to be more like Mother Hubbard's Cupboard, not the Old Woman's Shoe -- i.e., empty. As we will see this is indeed the line of thought that motivated Hegel's own reduction of generality.
On the other hand, if (2) were the case, as we will also see, nature cannot be anything other than Ideal.
Maybe these are not even the right questions to be asking? Perhaps the process of abstraction can tell us more?
The process of abstraction is widely held to a skill that all (or most) human beings possess, one that enables those rightly so minded to form abstract ideas almost at will.2
One interpretation of this allegedly universal skill involves the further idea that abstractions already exist in reality, there waiting for such mental gymnasts to discover by the operation of Reason alone. But, as noted above, that would make them both 'objective' and 'mind-dependent' all in one -- an odd combination to be sure, but one we will find resists all serious attempts at clarification, and all known attempts to explain.
Anyway, this view suggests that most, if not all, abstractions pre-date human existence and depend on some mind or other to think them into existence. Small wonder then that such abstractions are the proud offspring of the over-ambitious thoughts and theories of assorted Idealists and 'God'-botherers that the class war has inflicted on humanity.
Clearly, this is not the right sort of metaphysical company for self-respecting materialists to frequent. Unfortunately, sound advice like this has arrived far too late, for this is just the sort of company dialecticians have been keeping. But worse, they take great exception to anyone attempting to point this out.
Nevertheless, using their 'natural' abstractive skills, intrepid abstractors are supposed to be able to do one or other of the following:
(1) Ignore certain features of material objects, enabling them to form more general ideas or concepts to which increasingly wider classes of objects belong.
Or:
(2) Access the 'abstract concepts' which they (somehow?) already possess -- but, which are only capable of being brought to the surface if 'Reason' is given a free hand. However, by shear coincidence, these 'concepts' emerge in each mind only if exactly the same categories and jargonised-expressions that philosophers have dreamt up are used --, which indicates, perhaps, that such novice abstractors weren't in possession of these notions before being talked into thinking they were by fast-talking traditionalists.
Either way, abstract ideas emerge in each individual head in miraculously the same way.
Nevertheless, whatever their provenance, the creatures of thought can then be used to cast material particulars in a new light.
At least, that is what the metaphysical brochure would have us believe.
But, materialists should be suspicious of such moves. And for good reason:
(1) How could such abstractions be material (in any sense of the word) if adepts have to disregard (or rise above) all aspects of material reality to derive (or ascend to) some idea of them?
(2) How could abstractions even be materialist notions if only a select -- nay, exclusive -- group of human beings (of the 'right' class) are in fact capable of apprehending them, or of employing a priori categories/concepts/laws, which allegedly determine the nature of every material object in existence? At the very least, this suggests that material objects in themselves are 'real' only because of the 'existence' of an Ideal world underpinning them, accessible to thought alone.
Hence, if, according to Lenin, materiality is bound up with "objective existence" outside the mind, and if it requires the exercise of mental gymnastics to conjure abstractions into existence, how could a single one be material? More to the point: how could any of them be "objective" (i.e., be "mind independent"), if they are in fact not "mind-independent"?
Or, is this just another 'dialectical contradiction' we are supposed merely to "grasp", or to 'Nixon', and then ignore?
To be sure, the above fails to take note of at least three key ideas: (1) the distinction between "concrete" and "abstract" universals,2a (2) the flip-side of the dialectical coin, "concrete particulars" (before and after they have been 'dialectically processed'), and (3) the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" dialectics.
As far as (2) is concerned, if anything, concrete particulars are even more difficult to understand.
Consider a familiar enough feline example: a cat. Is this a concrete particular? DM-theorists would perhaps want to argue that it isn't until it has been comprehended against a background of all its interconnections, these being infinite in number. But surely that would mean that nothing could ever be viewed by us as a concrete particular; and that clearly implies that nothing could be a concrete particular unless an Ideal Observer (or Abstractor) viewed it against just such an infinite 'tapestry'. This in turn suggests that concrete objects are only concrete in the Ideal limit.
If that is so, the more we know about cats, the more Ideal they would seem to become!
That can't be right. And yet is seem to be the implication of this approach to knowledge. [More on that it in Part Two, and in Essay Ten Part One, where we will see it collapse into scepticism.]
On the other hand, if it is correct, it looks like the class of concrete objects would (a) only ever have aspiring, but never successful, members to boast about, or (b) increasingly resemble the Cheshire Cat -- the more we know about them the less substantial they would seem to be. [On this, see below.]
Moreover, given this way of seeing things, no abstractor (novice or adept) would ever have the remotest idea what could possibly count as the genuine article, since bona fide 'concrete particulars' will only emerge from their Ideal shells at the end of an uncompletable, infinitary exercise in interconnection.2b
Indeed, on this account, a fully accurate depiction of the very first 'concrete particular' (in the whole of human history) will leap from the Ideal page only on 'Epistemological Judgement Day', so to speak. Because of this, it looks like no mortal being will be in a position to form a clear idea of a single 'concrete particular', ever. On that score, humanity is doomed never to know what the nature of a single one.
So what the dialectics are they?
Unfortunately, this now means that abstractions themselves must be based on, or must be applied to, nothing at all, if they are grounded (as some suppose) on just such 'concrete particulars'. Abstractions must, seems, be applied, or constructed in almost total ignorance. [Objections to this unexpected conclusion are defused here.]
To be sure, dialecticians might take exception to these claims because they ignore not only the dialectical interplay between the knower and the known, but that between the abstract and the concrete. They also seem to confuse "subjective" with "objective" dialectics. Naturally, that brings us to items (1) and (3), mentioned above. However, further ruminations on the complex relation between these epistemological Siamese twins (i.e., the abstract and the concrete) will be left for later in this Essay -- and again in Parts Two and Three.
The question before us now is: Despite the inversion that Hegel's system is said to have undergone at the hands of dialecticians, does an acceptance of the existence of abstractions mean that DM is little more than an upside down version of Idealism? Is there anything to support this contentious claim?
As will soon become apparent, this infant suspicion will not only mature alarmingly in the course of this Essay, it will grow to full adulthood throughout the rest of this site.
But first, we must take an apparent detour.
Linguistic Idealism -- Or SuperScience From Mere Words
There is a very clear thread running through the entire history of traditional Philosophy, that substantive (i.e., non-trivial, metaphysical or necessary) truths about reality can be derived from a consideration of the meaning of a handful of words.
Few Philosophers would be ready to admit that this is all they ever do (or all they have ever done) -- that is, spin complex tales from mere words. Outside the Rationalist tradition, even fewer would be happy to concede that in so doing they were in effect been treating language as a sort of 'Cosmic Code', knowledge of which allows them to derive profound truths about fundamental features of the universe from thought alone.
Nevertheless, this is indeed what one and all have been doing.
However, over the last two-and-a-half millennia, and perhaps in order to disguise this fact, this approach to knowledge has prompted traditional Philosophers into inventing various subterfuges, ruses and likely stories, aimed at justifying their godlike ability to derive substantial truths about "Being" from the consideration of the supposed meaning of a few carefully chosen/invented words.
Among these are the following:
(1) The world was created by a 'Divine Being' or 'Mind'. This handy doctrine 'justified' the nearly universal belief that reality had an underlying 'rational' structure, one that is either a reflection, creation, or "emanation" of this 'Mind'.
This in turn meant that only those with the right sort of intellectual skills -- or, more truthfully, only those with the correct social standing, adequate means, indulgent patrons and leisure time -- were capable of 'discovering' such Super-Truths.
Fortunately enough for these intellectual 'drones', such Super-Facts could be obtained by the exercise of the mind alone; indeed, those capable of performing this impressive trick found that they were able to uncover 'Cosmic Verities' (which will forever lie beyond the comprehension of the great 'unwashed') simply by dissecting the alleged implications of their own specially-invented jargon. This impressive skill naturally required the use of even more arcane terminology, which was at one time itself widely regarded as a gift from on High, hence its prolixity. Divine Jargon 'naturally' gave spurious substance to the abstract discourse traditional thinkers produced (as ambient social conditions permitted/required) -- superficial aspects of the material world having been effortlessly stripped away, and then dumped.
Clearly, there is no way that surgically-enhanced words like these could have been the product collective labour and communal life (on this, see Essay Three Part Two), nor could they have been grounded in physical reality by any sort of material practice. They thus not only had a strictly limited utility radius but a highly exclusive clientele. And deliberately so. Only those words blessed that are with a special pedigree of this sort could possibly act as an intermediary between select groups of 'superior' human beings and the 'Mind of God'; and only by this means was it possible for theorists to reflect "Essence", "Being", and the "Rational" almost to order.
In this way, therefore, theories exploring the relationship between "Thought" and "Being" were often just covert extensions to Theology.
Of course, these are no mere suppositions; what we know of the history of Philosophy fully supports this unflattering, if not deflationary, exposé. [On this, see Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here).]
This mystical approach to knowledge supplied a rationale of sorts for thus use of specialised language, an obscure for of discourse that enabled skilled adepts to gain easy access to truths that revealed the underlying 'necessary' structure of 'Being'.
In this way, profound secrets could be unmasked by thought alone; no expensive equipment or messy experiments were required. In fact, no real contact with the material world was needed. Wealth, patronage, adequate leisure, a lively imagination, and, of course, a flare for jargon, were all that were required.
It is thus no mere coincidence that this approach to abstract thought proved to be highly conducive to a ruling-class view of nature, society, and the State. [More on this later (summary here).]
This ancient (and originally aristocratic) approach to 'knowledge' has re-surfaced many times, in many disguises, in many forms, in different Modes of Production right throughout human history. It is indeed the common thread that unites every shade of ruling-class thought, despite the frequent re-packaging it has undergone as and when the class war required.
Unfortunately, the theses found in DM show similar signs of (what can only be described as) linguistic megalomania -- the idea that words invented on this planet can inform us of the deepest secrets of 'Being', and that the human brain lies at the very heart of the meaning universe.
In the West, since early Greek times, linguistic megalomania of this sort has afflicted the thought of the elite, their hangers-on and their "prize-fighters" (as Marx once called them), and it has done so as a sort of intellectual disease, allegedly underpinning the "ruling ideas" of each epoch.
[Similar processes can be found in other class societies; the details of which will be given in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here).]
This 'philosophical personality disorder' is indeed part of the wider array of ruling-class traits that have dominated all forms of 'acceptable' thought ever since.
Its chief symptom is an over-blown faith in the belief that the Super-Truths a few (select) human beings are capable of expressing in language must necessarily apply to all of reality, for all of time. It thus manifests itself often in its more general form as LIE, the idea that reality is just 'condensed language' -- the result either of the activities of the 'Word of God', or of some other 'Mind' or 'Will' -- which 'Mind' or 'Will' just so happened to have sanctioned the social order from which such ideas sprang.
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism.]
(2) Logic reflects the essential nature of 'Being'. This notion is coupled with the parallel idea that reality's secrets can be unmasked by an examination of the logical structure of suitably doctored sentences, spruced up with no little speculation.
[Once again, it is no coincidence that the word "speculate" (as in "speculative philosophy") comes from the Latin speculum, or mirror, a term widely used in Hermetic circles.]
Not only were Logic and Epistemology two sides of the same bent coin, the view prevailed that Logic was just a higher form of Psychology, the study of the "laws of thought", which seemed to make sense to those who also viewed reality as a form of thought.
But, the idea that Logic mirrors the deep-structure of reality only encouraged the widespread belief that it was a sort of cosmic Super-Code and prime source of Super-knowledge, which mapped out reality way beyond the remit of the senses. Small wonder then that the vast majority of traditional thinkers succumbed to this temptation, and began to see Logic as the expression of -- or as identical with -- Logos and Mind, and thus with the world-order.
Even today, many find it impossible to abandon of this primitive idea: that humanity is situated at the very centre of the meaning universe, the special creation of a Super-Logician/Mind (or, in its atheistical form: the special creation of the NON), so that their thoughts can be graced with some sort of cosmic significance. Even today, and even though science has leapfrogged over many of their former fancies, metaphysicians still attempt to derive super-knowledge from a few marks on the page.
[NON = Negation of the Negation.]
Indolent ruling-class thinkers naturally found this view particularly appealing. For obvious reasons, this approach invariably assumed linguistic form. [The reasons for this are explored at length in Essay Twelve (summary here); see also here and here.] Thus, if human beings are centrally important to 'Cosmic Being', and if language governed both nature and society (this itself being reflected, for example, in the dual use of the word "law": first to depict the 'legitimacy' of social sanctions, and secondly to characterise universal principles that governed everything in existence), then language and thought must be intimately linked to the nature of 'Being' itself, which view in turn underpinned the 'legitimate' authority of the State.
Specially-concocted language must therefore be able to connect finite minds to the ultimate/infinite Ground Of Meaning (which was the main aim of all mystical thought -- expressed later as part of the "Subject/Object" problematic of German Idealism, and now of dialectics). This meant that an unlimited set of 'truths' could now flow legitimately from the meaning of words alone --, a priori knowledge accessed with ease in the armchair of one's choice.
Clearly, Philosophers were quite happy to cling onto the idea (which they had helped create) that human thoughts (but, oddly enough, only their thoughts) were universally significant -- i.e., that what went on in their heads was the best, nay the sole guide to absolute truth.
However, the bottom line was that it was they alone who were capable of deriving necessary truths from their own jargon -- obtaining theses that could not fail to be true, and which thus needed no evidence in support, except, of course, from still more jargon. These super-verities were indeed self-evident. In fact, it is only "crude materialists" who would think to challenge this convenient and suitably comforting picture. [The significance of that remark, but with respect to dialecticians, will emerge in Essay Nine Part Two.]
But, all this was just self-deception; as we will see, this approach to super-knowledge was itself based on the idea that the essential properties of 'Being' were merely reflections of (what were in fact) the contingent features of the logico/grammatical properties of just one family of languages -- the Indo-European --, the language group in which most of these fairy-tales have been spun.
As a result, "subjects" and "predicates" suddenly became cosmically significant. By means of "abstraction", predicates were turned into individuals, and vice versa --, but this was actually the result of the re-configuration of predicate expressions as the names of abstract particulars, compounded by the idea that individuals were identical with universals.
But, whatever their origin, these Ideal Forms were more real than anything found in material reality; indeed, they only served to render material reality somehow 'unreal'.
Nature's secret names thus allowed those who knew them to forge a mystical link with the non-material forces/'essences' that governed all of reality, and thus in this way perhaps assist them gain control over nature itself (as some theorists actually thought). But, far more importantly, this 'secret knowledge' helped rationalise state power, and thus the status quo. For if the latter is guaranteed by, and is a reflection of the Cosmic Order, class domination could be 'legitimated' as a necessary part of 'Being' itself. And in Hegel's case, with the necessary development of 'Being'.
Hence, linguistic manipulation (or better: 'Jargon-Juggling') would confer on those suitably so skilled considerable prestige -- if not apparent power -- as the theoretical legitimators of elite authority.
Keith Thomas highlighted a similar tactic among 16th
century magicians:"It would be tempting to explain the long survival of magical practices by pointing out that they helped provide many professional wizards with a respectable livelihood. The example of the legal profession is a reminder that it is always possible for a substantial social group to support itself by proffering solutions to problems which they themselves have helped to manufacture. The cunning men and wise women had an undoubted interest in upholding the prestige of magical diagnosis and may by their mere existence have helped to prolong a mode of thinking which was already obsolescent." [Thomas (1972), p.295.]
A Metaphysical Rumplestiltskin now walked the earth, and was well paid for its services.
Traditional Philosophers justified their unique role by suggesting that their thoughts reached right into the heart of 'Being', linking their theses with the Divine Order. If reality had an a priori structure, which the State also mirrored, then Philosophy and power could be, and were permanently linked.
At least, this is how things seemed at first.3
If religious affectation is the opiate of the oppressed, rationalising suffering in its wake, metaphysical abstraction is the reverse opiate of the oppressor -- justifying and naturalising the power of the very class that created the need for such opiates in the first place.
As will be demonstrated in this Essay, and throughout this site (especially here), this aprioristic tradition in Western Philosophy has allowed DM-classicists to fool themselves into thinking that they had successfully flipped Hegelian Idealism upside down, changing it into its materialist, inverted alter ego: DM.
A change of name, perhaps; but a ruse by any other name is still a ruse.
(3) Philosophy is the source of a special sort of knowledge -- knowledge that is anterior to the sciences, but which nonetheless contains a Superscientific picture of reality. Superscientific in the sense that its theses reveal what are in effect Super-Necessities underpinning 'Being' itself, knowledge of which is attainable by the application of 'Reason' alone, and which by-passes the need for material confirmation.
However, as it turns out, the provenance of these Cosmic Verities is rather more mundane: 'philosophical reasoning' turned out to be little more than the creative and idiosyncratic use of a limited number of words specially-invented for the occasion.
Naturally, that meant that Superscience of this sort was only capable of being confirmed by an appeal to Super-Evidence -- obtainable, of course, Super-Naturally (i.e., not from nature). Not surprisingly then, as noted above, the theses that traditional Philosophers concocted were incapable of being empirically verified, falsified or confirmed in any other materially-grounded way.
Perversely, this is still regarded as one of Philosophy's greatest strengths.
Indeed, anyone who questioned the validity of this epistemological perversion was automatically classed a "crude" materialist (or categorised as an "empiricist"). Questioning the provenance of semi-divine gems like these is to pass beyond the pale of 'acceptable' (ruling-class) thought. Philosophy --, true Philosophy --, must be prolix, baroque and incomprehensible. This is one ruling-idea that still rules, and proudly so.
The downside is, of course, that if for any reason the special role that Philosophers have arrogated to themselves can be shown to be a fraud --, that is, if it can be shown that the baroque linguistic structures Philosophers have concocted are just "houses of cards" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein) -- then the whole enterprise would cease to have a point. With no reason for its existence, Philosophy would become little more than an endless source of tortured prose, its books fit only for gathering dust in the basement stack of the local library, or, perhaps better still, for providing ample fuel for several large bonfires, as Hume correctly suggested.
However, few practitioners of this ancient art could afford to contemplate such an outlandish fate -- especially those whose livelihood depends upon it; but, more specifically those Dialectical Marxists who still refuse to see a link between the superstitious belief that there is a "rational" order to reality and the 'legitimation' of class power.
Hence, it was (and still is) just assumed that Philosophy must have a role to play in the discovery of knowledge, even if this is only to provide employment for those caught up in the time-worn production of jargon-infested, and empty prose -- the intellectual equivalent of digging holes just to fill them in.
If the question is now put: "Why does there have to be a rational order to reality?", there seem to be only three possible answers: (1) to impress the superstitious, and thus enforce deference; (2) to legitimate the status quo; and (3) to provide the select few with bogus 'Superscientific knowledge' and thus work for those easily fooled by the invention of empty jargon. These are phrases which Francis Bacon called the "idols of the market place":
"There are also Idols formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other, which I call Idols of the Market-place, on account of the commerce and consort of men there. For it is by discourse that men associate; and words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar. And therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. Nor do the definitions or explanations wherewith in some things learned men are wont to guard and defend themselves, by any means set the matter right. But words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies....
"The idols imposed by words on the understanding are of two kinds. They are either names of things which do not exist (for as there are things left unnamed through lack of observation, so likewise are there names which result from fantastic suppositions and to which nothing in reality corresponds), or they are names of things which exist, but yet confused and ill-defined, and hastily and irregularly derived from realities. Of the former kind are Fortune, the Prime Mover, Planetary Orbits, Element of Fire, and like fictions which owe their origin to false and idle theories. And this class of idols is more easily expelled, because to get rid of them it is only necessary that all theories should be steadily rejected and dismissed as obsolete." [Novum Organum, quoted from here.]
Except, of course, these philosophical gems were not invented by the "vulgar", as Bacon would have it, but by elite thinkers, and the "market-place" in this case is academia.
However, these days, if you are a dialectician, you just do not ask such awkward questions. You do not even think them.
For if you do, someone might confuse you with a philosophical radical, and thus with someone who is not content to re-package, in a dialectical form, another cart load of ruling-class thought.
Why, you might even be accused of not "understanding" dialectics!
The Fetishisation Of Language
If thought and discourse are intimately connected, and if ruling-class ideology dominates the former, it would be reasonable to suppose that alienated thought will be linked somehow to the systematic (and ideologically-motivated) distortion of language. If so, this won't have taken place in a social vacuum.
Ordinary language -- as a social product, devised by those who interface daily with the material world, mediated by cooperative labour --, has had to endure many such ideologically-motivated attempts at distortion and denigration. For present purposes, however, the most significant of these arose from the nature and origin of class society.
[The details behind the transformation of ordinary discourse into a cosmic code, aimed at the representation of the Secrets of 'Being' in the minds of ruling-class hacks, will be fully exposed in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here).]
However, the point worth emphasising here is that what had once been the product of the social relations among human beings (ordinary language) was transformed and fetishised into an expression of what were taken to be the real relations between things, or as those things themselves. In this way, discourse was graced with 'magical' powers, and the aforementioned linguistic megalomania was given a licence to practice.
If the "essential" nature of reality was inaccessible to experience, then thinkers had to appeal to so-called "thought experiments" to unmask its "hidden secrets". Fetishised in this way, language became a surrogate for objective reality, and talk about talk became confused with talk about things. Only now, language was rendered in an abstract and lifeless form. Linguistic categories (i.e., 'abstractions') were projected onto the world, which implied that nature was a reflection of discourse, rather than the other way round. Traditional Philosophy thus became the prime source of LIE, a doctrine based on the idea that if language contains profound secrets, nature must be fundamentally linguistic --, originally constituted by the word of some 'god' or other.
The Ruling Ideas Are Always Those Of The Ruling-Class
The above then is but a brief sketch of the nature and provenance of the most abstract versions of ruling-class ideology, which can be found to a greater or lesser extent in all forms of traditional Philosophy. These ruling ideas rule not just because they are useful to those who rule, they picture the world as rulers have always seen it -- rational so that it rationalises their power.
Hence, over the centuries the rise and fall of different Modes of Production have had no fundamental effect on these core ruling forms-of-thought -- they are still a priori, still based on linguistic chicanery, still founded on abstraction, still imposed on reality. And all this despite their many changes in content as the social form of ruling-class power has changed. [The details behind this will appear in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here).]
Indeed, only the eradication of their power, and the elimination of class rule will rid humanity of this alien thought-form.
Unfortunately, this traditional approach to knowledge has found some of its most fervent supporters and stoutest defenders among those who should know better: Dialectical Marxists.
[Why this is so will be explored in Essay Nine Parts One and Two.]
Because of this, ruling-class ideas have come to dominate Marxism.
And, as we saw in Essay Two, Dialecticians are quite happy to concoct a priori theories of their own, imposing them on nature as if they were born-again traditionalists.
Welcome To The Glorious New Abstractor Factory
Of course, serious allegations like these need more support than the flowery rhetoric rehearsed above, or they would worth considerably less than the computer screen on which they now appear. Fortunately, the Essays posted at this site are aimed at that precisely that end.
But first we need to locate the logical/linguistic origin of the abstract ideas of traditional thought, reveal exactly what motivated their invention, and outline the effect they have had on DM.
All Truth Is Concrete -- Except For That Abstraction
With respect to truth, Lenin famously argued that:
"[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth' is always concrete, never abstract…." [Lenin (1921), p.93.]
On the other hand, he also maintained that:
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961), p.171. Italic emphases in the original.]
At first sight, these two passages do not appear to be consistent. Admittedly, in the second, Lenin does go on to mention "practice" as a crucial component in the "cognition of objective reality", but that does not explain how "all scientific…abstractions" could possibly "reflect nature more…, truly", when "truth is always concrete, never abstract" (emphases added). How can practice reconcile a "never" with an "always"? And how can an abstraction like "All truth is concrete" be true itself?
Of course, the epistemology outlined in Lenin's work is a little more sophisticated than this initial paradox might otherwise indicate. This suggests that the resolution of this difficulty will at least require greater clarity over the meaning of words like "abstract” and "concrete" as they are used by dialecticians.
There appear to be at least two different senses of the terms "abstract" and "concrete" at work in DM.4
Abstract, Sense1 -- AB1
This sense of "abstract" is somewhat analogous to that found in the traditional rationalist use of the phrase "abstract universal" -- but, with several major differences.5 Even so, in DM it is clearly linked to the apprehension (by 'Reason' perhaps) of general concepts that give expression to common elements connecting, underlying, or running-through concrete individuals, or events -- but not 'externally'-connected with them (that is, there is held to be some sort of logical/internal connection linking individuals with the 'concept' they instantiate).
Abstract, Sense2 -- AB2
This use of "abstract" emphasises the "one-sided" and "simple" nature of abstractions, how they are "removed from reality", "cut off", "separated or divorced from interconnections", etc. In this case, a subtractive process (involving the mental disregard (abstraction) of the particular features of each item), or perhaps even a separational exercise, seems to underlie the creation of such abstract general concepts.
Concrete, Sense1 -- CON1
This sense of "concrete" is clearly linked with AB1 above and appears to involve things in their individuality (that is, of a certain type) -- often as they are given in experience -- depending on which part of the dialectical process of cognition they make their appearance.
Concrete, Sense2-- CON2
Again, this contrasts with its twin AB2, and serves to emphasise the interconnectedness of objects and processes in reality, their all-round relationship with, and development alongside, other objects and processes -- as opposed to their separation in non-, or pre-, dialectical thought.6
In the first of the two passages quoted above, Lenin seems to be using "abstract" in sense AB2, but in sense AB1 in the second. This means he must be using "concrete" in sense CON2 in the first. These distinctions might help resolve the apparent inconsistency noted above.
However, Lenin only succeeded in confusing things again when he said:
"Logical concepts are subjective so long as they remain 'abstract,' in their abstract form, but at the same time they express the Thing-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract, both phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source." [Lenin (1961), p.208. Italic emphases in the original.]
In this passage, Lenin appears to have used both of these terms in three of the four (or possibly even all four) ways at once.
Similarly, John Rees argues that:
"[A]ll science generalizes and abstracts from 'empirically verifiable facts.' Indeed, the very concept of 'fact' is itself an abstraction, because no one has ever eaten, tasted, smelt, seen or heard a 'fact,' which is a mental generalization that distinguishes actually existing phenomena from imaginary conceptions. Similarly, all science 'deductively anticipates' developments -- what else is an hypothesis tested by experimentation? The dialectic is, among other things, a way of investigating and understanding the relationship between abstractions and reality. And the 'danger of arbitrary construction' is far greater using an empirical method which thinks that it is dealing with facts when it is actually dealing with abstractions than it is with a method that properly distinguishes between the two and then seeks to explain the relationship between them." [Rees (1998), p.131. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
At the beginning of this passage, Rees appears to be using "abstract" in sense AB1, whereas in the second half he seems to be employing it in sense AB2. In addition, even though he says that "facts" are abstractions, it looks like he is using "fact" in sense CON2, too -- when, for example, he claims that that facts help discriminate among beliefs. They could hardly do that if they were disconnected from other facts. But, who can say? [This passage is analysed in detail in Essay Three Part Four (to be published soon).]
Nevertheless, the loose and ill-defined way these terms are employed in DM-texts mirrors Hegel's own obscure and inconsistent use.7
For example, if abstractions are divorced from reality, cut off and separated from other things, how might they be employed to interconnect concrete objects and processes in nature, as Lenin argued? And, if "concrete" objects and/or processes are interconnected with everything, what makes them anything in particular? What individuates, say, a photon? If all photons are seemingly identical (and on some accounts, are unchanging), and interconnected (in the abstract?), then what right have we to call them either individuals or particulars?8 Depicted this way, photons (but not just photons) look pretty abstract; not only that, they appear to refute Trotsky's comments on identity, as well as his own, Lenin and Hegel's ideas about change -- if, that is, photons are "concrete".
Moreover, according to Lenin, objects and processes only become "concrete" when they are interconnected with everything else; but if they are to count as "objective" they must already be inter-connected in reality before any sentient being so relates them. But, what in reality could possibly do all this relating and all this inter-connecting?8a Are there non-physical links between objects (of the same kind), which somehow unerringly manage to pick out every single member of that group/category in the entire universe (even while they are changing), like some sort of super-powered bloodhound, never missing a single one? And when an object of one sort changes into another, are the inter-galactic links that object has with other objects of that sort instantaneously altered, or severed, perhaps instantaneously --, so that it can change --, but which also allow it to be inter-linked with all the other objects (of the sort it has developed into) everywhere in the universe, instantaneously? [These problems are explored at length in Essay Eleven Parts One and Two.]
Of course, human beings might not at present know what all these interconnections are, but since humanity will never know what these interconnections are in their entirety, it seems that any objects they inter-connect will never become either concrete or objective for us. In that case, how can anyone reason about a single one of them now? Anything said about these alleged interconnections, and these supposed 'concrete' particulars, must be infinitely far from the truth, and must thus stand almost zero probability of being correct.8b
It could be objected at this point that these complaints are academic at best, thoroughly misguided at worst; the four senses of these terms (if there are indeed four) should not be thought of as separate or distinct -- as seems to be the assumption motivating the above comments. They terms must be understood "dialectically".
But, as with many other key DM-concepts, it is difficult to make sense of what DM-theorists say, nor is it easy to form any clear idea of what they mean, when they use words like "concrete", "abstract" and "dialectically". This is not to suggest that no effort has gone into writing about these terms, but much of what has been published by dialecticians on this issue is about as clear as the Athanasian Creed.9 Hence, the appearance here of yet more quasi-Hegelian jargon (i.e., "dialectically") in no way helps.
Anyway, one thing seems reasonably plain: the generalisations dialecticians make (which are connected with the use of these terms) are not based on any sort of evidence. To what could one appeal? In that case, what is there here for a consistent materialist to agree with? To be sure, for an Idealist like Hegel, all this makes some sort of crazy sense, but how might we make physical sense of any of it?
Since these notions (i.e., "abstract" and "concrete") cannot be read from nature, the only conclusion is that they must have been foisted on it. In fact, not only were these two categories invented by earlier non-Marxists, non-working class theorists, but dialecticians have eagerly adopted them and selectively imposed them on reality, too. It is clearly impossible to derive either of these notions from nature, or from any amount of evidence -- as will be argued in Part Two of this Essay.
Of course, dialecticians notionally follow Hegel here -- but they then ignore the material spin that even they say they have performed on his system. This can be seen from the fact that they view abstractions in the same rationalist light as Hegel.
Or rather, they rely on the same logical blunders.
"Concrete" And "Abstract" Imposed On Nature
In the past, even before the evidence we now have existed, traditional Philosophers made a conscious decision to use abstract concepts to force knowledge in certain directions.9a Well, we certainly know who made those choices, and they manifestly weren't thinkers who were known for their lack of sympathy with ruling-class priorities; indeed, they were made by Idealists, Theologians and assorted Hermeticists.
Naturally, this only serves to underline the claim made above (and in Essay Two) that dialecticians have not broken with this conservative philosophical tradition, in this or other area. In fact, they are only too happy to copy and defend it.
[TAR = The Algebra Of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]
Worse still, both of these terms (i.e., "abstract" and "concrete") appear to be abstract themselves; neither would pass, for example, TAR's 'gastronomic test': "no one has ever eaten, tasted, smelt, seen or heard" either or both of these concepts. [Rees (1998), p.131.] To be sure, when vocalised or written down, these traditional terms-of-art are material objects in their own right, but that fact alone cannot ground either of them in material reality, nor can it validate their use. If it could, we should all have to start believing in "God" just as soon as that word was committed to paper.
Indeed, according to Lenin, it now seems that no one could "eat (etc.)" a single concrete object:
"But there are more than these two properties and qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Lenin (1921), pp.92-93. Italic emphases in the original.]
If not even a humble tumbler is concrete unless it has been set against its infinite interconnections, who is there alive that could swear truthfully tumblers are in fact concrete? No matter how many inter-connections we set up for it, there will always be an infinite number still left to connect, making any judgement we make of it infinitely far from the truth, with an infinitely high probability of being incorrect.
[The response that only 'relevant' connections should be considered is batted out of the park here.]
Clearly, whatever applies to tumblers surely applies to things we now think we can eat; perhaps they are not concrete either? In that case, TAR's 'gastronomic, touchy-feely test' fails to pick out even concrete objects! If so, exactly how it can be used to test for 'abstractness' is even less than clear.
Of course, it could be argued that whether we know it or not, concrete objects are still concrete for all that. But are they? Who says? And where is the infinite body of knowledge which would be needed to substantiate a 'cosmically' bold claim such as that?
For example, is, say, an apple now actually interconnected with everything in reality? Lest an impatient objector is tempted to snap back a hasty "Yes, of course it is!" to such an impertinent question, it is worth pointing out that that fact (if it is one) could never itself be confirmed, but must either be imposed on the said apple/reality or accepted as an article of faith. In that case, whatever it is that dialecticians now claim they know about allegedly concrete objects must, it seems, be foisted on such objects, since no one would ever be justified in calling anything "concrete" at present unless they could point to an infinite amount of "patiently collected" evidence that supports that contention. [This topic is discussed in greater detail in Essay Eleven Parts One and Two.]
Do we have this much information about apples?
As has already been pointed out, both of these words (i.e., "abstract" and "concrete") are age-old philosophical terms-of-art, invented by thinkers keen to rationalise the status quo. However, even though they have become somewhat hackneyed with over-use, DM-theorists uncritically appropriated them simply because they found them in Hegel, and for no other reason (it seems) -- and he in turn used them because they had been long-standing entries in the Idealist's Phrase Book.
Worse still, and as far as I am aware, no attempt has ever been made in DM-circles to show precisely how a single abstract 'concept' can be derived from, or be seen in, concrete particulars (or from anywhere else, for that matter -- other than by copying this idea from Hegel, of course). And this is not surprising; no one has been able to demonstrate how this seemingly miraculous trick is humanly possible. To be sure, theorists have invented countless abstract terms over the centuries, and muttered various incantations over them as they were recruited into traditional philosophical discourse. But materialists should no more be impressed with such rituals than they are with those that supposedly justify belief in God. [This topic is discussed in more detail in Part Two of this Essay.]
And yet, for all that, it is possible to show these strange beings actually arose as a result of rather more mundane, historically-conditioned material causes -- and not from an occult "inner process" of abstraction, rational or otherwise --, causes that were in fact motivated by the ideological requirements of our class enemies --, albeit, 2500 years ago!10
Anyway, and despite this, what we actually find in DM-writings (in place of evidence and supporting argument) are the same old vague attempts at justification; these will be examined fully in what follows, and in later Essays.
This means that the entire edifice of DM-epistemology has been built on alarmingly insubstantial foundations -- in fact, as we will see, they are all sand and no concrete.11
From Concrete To Abstract -- And Back Again
In the previous section, it was alleged that the origin and provenance of abstract concepts are both highly suspect. This part of the Essay will examine these serious charges a little more closely.
Consider once again Lenin's attempt to specify what our knowledge of particular objects consists in:
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity…." [Ibid., p.93.]
Hence, a fuller and more complete understanding of any particular must involve a consideration of its wider, law-governed connections with other particulars. Unfortunately, this is a strategy we will soon find there is good reason to question.
The first serious problem with this passage is that these ever-widening 'law-governed' connections must themselves involve the use of general terms (or "abstractions" -- sense AB1) right from the start. If so, it seems that the dialectical process of cognition cannot even begin.
Naturally, it could be argued in response to this that the above objection is spurious, since, according to TAR knowledge actually starts with:
"…an abstraction from the inessential and accidental features of reality to grasp more clearly its key features…. Constant empirical work is therefore essential to renew both the concrete analyses and the dialectical concepts that are generalized from these analyses." [Rees (1998), p.110.]
This suggests that law-governed generalisations are themselves integral to dialectics. This is because human knowledge has:
"[Brought] to it a framework composed of our past experiences; what we have learned of others' experience, both in the present and in the past; and of our later reflections on and theories about this experience…. Concepts and theories are necessary to interpret the world." [Ibid., p.63.]
Reference to -- and use of -- general terms in the pursuit of knowledge is also required since neither science nor dialectics can rely on surface appearances alone. The idea seems to be that while the latter might relate to our initial view of things, scientific knowledge rightly seeks to locate and integrate nature's underlying law-governed "essence", by the use of further and more refined abstractions (or generalisations), tested in practice.
This notion can be found in Marx himself:
"[S]cience would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided." [Marx (1981), p.956.]
All this appears to mean that while scientists/dialecticians might have to begin with what look like concrete particulars given in experience (albeit understood indeterminately, at first), in order to gain genuine knowledge, they must apply abstract concepts to the phenomena (perhaps deploying those that have been inherited from the past -- or those 'critically re-formulated' from whatever resources there are to hand in the present) to interconnect and account for phenomena with increasing accuracy, and in a more all-round, determinate manner.
However, except perhaps at the very beginning of human 'consciousness', this process never actually starts from scratch (as it were); we use the gains of previous generations to assist us in the advancement of knowledge. But, even this is not sufficient; abstractions have to be referred back to the material world so that they can be tested against further experience and refined again in practice (etc.). Even though human beings inherit generalisations and epistemological categories from the past, all of these are revisable. This process of revision continually shapes and colours the search for knowledge in all Modes of Production, achieving a different expression in each.
This appears to be the import of Lenin's words (quoted earlier):
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely. From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice, -- such is the dialectical path of cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality." [Lenin (1961), p.171. Italic emphases in the original.]
Indeed, the above passage looks like an embellishment of Marx's own thoughts:
"It seems correct to begin with the real and the concrete…with e.g. the population…. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest…. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception of the whole, and I would then, by further determination, move toward ever more simple concepts, from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations…. The latter is obviously scientifically the correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence the unity of the diverse." [Marx (1973), pp.100-01.]12
Again, these comments (alongside others that have already been examined) look as if they could help resolve the apparent inconsistency noted near the beginning of this Essay. Hence, it is now clear that the dialectical method includes all or some of the following:
(1) The search for knowledge must begin at some point with an interface with the world, interpreted by means of general concepts inherited from previous generations.
(2) From this point, further abstract general ideas must be extracted, refined, borrowed, applied, constructed, deduced, critically constructed or modified. Used correctly, these help represent and explain with increasing accuracy the essential features that underlie the surface appearances of nature and society --, but only if they are continually tested in practice.
(3) To that end, newer abstractions must be used to re-interpret concrete particulars, which means that the latter will be more fully understood, since they will now be much richer and more widely interconnected.
(4) Every stage must be checked against, reality. As part of revolutionary practice, all traces of ruling-class ideology must be exposed and removed.
(5) Whatever emerges as a result must always be regarded as tentative and subject to revision.
(6) Absolute truth is only ever a goal.
Viewed in this way, and in its own terms, therefore, what Lenin says appears to be correct: all truth is concrete not abstract. This is because all knowledge-claims must constantly interface with concrete reality, more and more widely understood, against a law-governed background.
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