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16-03-02: Summary Of Essay Three Part Two -- Abstraction, Science On the Cheap
These are Introductory Essays, which have been written for those who find the main Essays either too long, or too difficult. They do not pretend to be comprehensive since they are simply summaries of the core ideas presented at this site. Most of the supporting evidence and argument found in each of the main Essays has been omitted. Anyone wanting more details, or who would like to examine my arguments and evidence in full, should consult the Essay for which each is a précis. [In this particular case, that can be found here.]
Mirroring An Ideal World
Despite appearances to the contrary, the observations made in Part One are in fact good news; if abstractions could be used to state truths about the world, it would mean that reality was rational, and thus Ideal.
But, what exactly could there be in material reality for a single abstraction to reflect? According to Lenin, scientific abstractions are supposed to reflect nature more truly and deeply:
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961), p.171. Emphases in the original.]
And yet, if this were the case, there would surely have to be extra-mental abstractions in reality for the mind to reflect. Surely, abstractions would not exist had human beings not invented them, they are fundamentally products of mind. This seems to indicate that the idea that abstractions can reflect nature "more deeply" commits believers to the view that nature is either Mind or is mind-like.
Small wonder then that Greek thinkers invented this process because that is exactly how they saw things. [The details supporting that assertion are given in Essay Twelve, and summarised here.]
The only way to avoid this result must, it seems, involve a denial that abstractions actually reflect anything in nature, but which dialectician would want to admit that?
Of course, it could be claimed that abstractions help us to reflect nature, but how they are capable of doing this if they do not exist (or are only 'mental constructs') is entirely obscure. How are they different from the "useful fictions" of Positivism?
And anyway, what exactly do they help reflect? Now, in order to be able to answer that particular question, such abstractions would have to be imposed on nature. If abstractions do not reflect anything actually in nature (if there are no material correlates of abstract ideas in the physical world), they cannot have been be read from it, but must have to be imposed on it. This is precisely what DM-theorists say they do not do --, but then we find they have to do it.
As ancient mystics once pictured things, the inner microcosm must reflect the outer macrocosm; or as they put it: "as above, so below". In its more modern incarnation in DM, abstractions therefore reflect in the mind "essences" that supposedly exist in nature: as outside, so inside. But, then again, what exactly are these "essences" if they do not exist, but are still somehow the referents of these equally puzzling abstractions?
[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Once more, this is no surprise given the demonstrable influence that Hermetic ideas had on Hegel. No surprise either then that, according to Lenin, each and every proposition is capable of reflecting the dialectical structure of the entire universe. This they could do only if nature were in some way linguistic, or mind-like, and if that earlier sentential microcosm (i.e., "John is a man") was indeed able to reflect the entire macrocosm -- i.e., in this case, the "eternal development of the world" (Lenin (1961), p.110) -- in at least Lenin's mind.
Unfortunately, however, Lenin unwisely let it slip that Hegel had in fact "divined" these mysteries into existence for us -- perhaps not noticing the significance of that particular dialectical gaffe:
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Emphases in the original.]
The 'Problem' Of Universals
In order to account for the similarities we find around us, and for the reference of general terms (and we saw that even this move was the result of a crass interpretation of contingent grammatical forms in indo-European grammar -- summary here), Greek Philosophers from Plato onwards invented a whole series of Abstract Particulars (variously called "Forms", "Ideas", "Universals", "Essences", etc.). These were accessible to thought alone, and were based on a mysterious process of abstraction that defies description to this day.
[It is important to note that in Plato's work, the Forms are best viewed as heavenly exemplars, a bit like the Standard Metre, and not solely as Abstract Particulars. In that case, it is possible to re-interpret these Forms as the abstract embodiment of social norms, reified and then projected into 'heaven', on the lines Feuerbach revealed.]
Rationalist Philosophers viewed such Universals variously as abstract ideas which the mind was able to apprehend (by the "natural light of reason", etc.) as it surveyed the diversity the material world presented to 'consciousness', or, alternatively, as law-like idealisations applied to nature. On the other hand, Empiricist theorists tended to argue that the mind was somehow able to organise the impressions the senses sent its way by means of such Universals (but these were still objectified as abstract ideas in the mind). [I leave out all reference to the Nominalist tradition.]
In the ancient and medieval world, the over-arching structure of these abstract ideas was seen as hierarchical, mirroring the dominant Aristocratic and Feudal class structures of the time. In early modern society, at least among empiricist thinkers, such abstractions were individualised and shared equally in each bourgeois head, reflecting the fragmentation the market had introduced into the formation of knowledge. The hierarchical order was broken, but the appeal to abstraction was still alive and still corrupting. Same form, different content.
More recently still, rationalist and quasi-rationalist theorists (like Kant and Hegel) sought to restore order to these unruly ideas by imposing a priori categories and concepts on them. These recently liberated abstractions were now put back in chains. The early bourgeois individual was now controlled by a bureaucratic state (in order to advance their "common affairs").
As should seem obvious, in order to solve the 'problem' of generality, it is not a good idea to begin by destroying it. Unfortunately, as we saw in Part One (summary here) this was precisely the effect of the fractured logic brought to bear in this area, as general terms were transformed into the names of Abstract Particulars.
Indeed, it is an even worse idea to double your problems, for if there is a difficulty explaining how ordinary general terms work, there is an even bigger one determining how these abstractions are able to regiment unruly ideas, especially if they are now projected across the heads of all those capable of entertaining them. If an abstraction is need to account for the similarities we think we detect in ideas, or objects, then what accounts for the similarity between any given abstraction and the ideas it regiments? On the other hand, if there is no similarity just here, then how do novice abstractors determine which ideas any given abstraction is capable of regimenting, and correctly? In short, if ideas sort themselves, what need have we of abstractions? If they do not sort themselves, how can abstract ideas help out if there is no commonality between abstractions and the ideas they supposedly regiment?
And this brings us to the heart of the problem, for this approach to language in fact fragments knowledge. This is because it is surely impossible for Abstractor A to decide whether or not he or she possesses the same general idea (of anything) as Abstractor B. This is not just because no one has access to the thoughts of another, but because it has yet to be established that one and all share the same understanding of the word "same". And how might that be determined, for goodness sake?
The problem, of course, began much earlier. Traditional theorists saw language as fundamentally representational (that is, its primary role was to re-present the thoughts of the 'gods', or the 'rational order', to humanity), which helped create a series of 'problems' that could not be solved (and have remained unsolved to this day). In ancient and feudal society, only the elite could abstract the 'correct' divine representations, and commonality was imposed by divine fiat, or state authority.
Later, in nominally 'equal', bourgeois society, theorists could not rely on such crudities, hence it was impossible for theorists to guarantee that the thoughts represented in each bourgeois skull would agree with those contained in any other. This abstract Humpty Dumpty, fragmented by representationalism, could not, it seems, be put back together again. Not even the 'objective' or 'inter-subjective' concepts of Kant and Hegel could repair the damage, since it is plainly impossible to tell if one Kantian/Hegelian means the same by the words they use to depict the contents of their privatised skulls as any another Hegelian/Kantian. Just calling such fragmented concepts "objective" would have no more effect on the problem than a "keep off sign" would have on a swarm of locusts.
Abstractionism thus could provide knowledge with no objective foundation. But worse, it threatened subjectivity too, for Abstractor A would not now be able to tell if the fresh deliverances of today's abstractions were the same as, or were different from, the increasingly stale ones arrived at only yesterday, in his/her 'consciousness'. Memory would be little help here, for it too is subject to the same constraints.
All this is, of course, in addition to the fact that this process destroys generality (as we saw in Part One).
Naturally, the adoption of traditional thought-forms like these (representationalism and abstractionism) has had a disastrous effect on dialecticians, too, for it is now impossible to decide if dialectician A means the same as dialectician B about anything whatsoever, let alone with regard to their respective 'abstractions'.
On the other hand, dialecticians say they accept Marx's emphasis on the social nature of language, but in fact one and all have adopted a bourgeois-individualist theory of the origin of meaning. According to this approach, we all represent the world to ourselves first (by means of "images" and/or abstractions), and then try to share our ideas with others second. Unfortunately, this would destroy communication; except by sheer coincidence, no two dialecticians would share the same ideas about anything, making communication impossible.
Of course, had dialecticians not bought into traditional thought, and had they adopted instead the communicational model of language proposed by Marx and Engels (wherein each of is socialised into the use of language and we are all taught what our words mean, so that when we try to represent the world to ourselves, we have something common to share with others), none of this would have happened.
Now, one of the aims of the Essays published at this site is to return Marxist theory to the above social/anthropological view of language and thought, in accordance with the ideas expressed by Marx and Engels, and along lines detailed in Wittgenstein's work.
That explains the emphasis placed at this site on the ordinary language of the working-class, for the vernacular is not representational, but inherently communicational, having been invented by working people in collective labour precisely to facilitate communication.
In addition, and this is another of its recommendations, this medium stands in the way of the formation of metaphysical beliefs, including those found in DM, which is one reason the vernacular has been attacked by boss-class hacks since Greek times.
[This will be the subject of Essay Twelve (Part One can be found here here, summary here). The alleged limitations of the vernacular are neutralised here.]
Appearances Ain't What They Used To Be
Dialecticians have also bought into the traditional division of the world into "appearance" and "reality". Even if it were valid, this metaphysical dichotomy would fatally undermine science, and not just DM, since it makes validation impossible.
This is because dialecticians tell us that science and DM are confirmed in practice, but if the latter takes place anywhere, it takes place at the phenomenal level in the world of appearances. That being the case, the deliverances of practice would be no less unreliable than any other superficial feature of empirical reality supposedly is. If a possibly suspect theory can only be confirmed by phenomenologically-challenged practice, what is there left to exonerate practice? More suspect practice? More suspect theory?
But, each and every theory has to make its shaky entrance in this world as an appearance of some sort. In other words, they all have to be written down on paper or broadcast into the air, as words, as phenomenal objects. Each infant theory, born in this way, would be quite incapable of fighting its corner, and thus totally incapable of substantiating its equally unreliable epistemological cousins: those questionable appearances.
On this view, knowledge would remain forever trapped in sceptic-land.
The solution here is of course to reject in its entirety the metaphysical dichotomy "appearance/reality", a theoretical approach to knowledge which was invented by Aristocratic Greek thinkers who held the material world (and the labour that bought them enough leisure-time to concoct such brainless ideas) in open contempt.
Now, a 'dialectical' response to all this might include the claim that science/materialist dialectics is in fact converging on absolute (or less relatively-challenged) truth, a target which presumably lends to knowledge its objective clout. Indeed, Engels himself asserted that DM/science is converging "asymptotically" on just such a target (which he calls "being"):
"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), pp.457-58.]
Unfortunately, this analogy is inimical to DM-epistemology. First of all Engels forgot to say how he knew that knowledge is convergent. Of course, if what he said were true, his words would actually be infinitely incorrect. That is because, when asserted, this claim would itself be infinitely far away from absolute truth, and thus infinitely unreliable. That is, the probability that this claim was itself incorrect would be infinitely high. An appeal to practice would be to no avail here, for practice cannot confirm that knowledge is an infinitary process, or that it is even convergent. Nor can practice discriminate the good from the bogus. [More on that in Essay Ten Part One.]
Second, Engels failed to prove that there is such a limit for knowledge to converge upon (in fact, he did not even attempt such a proof, and as far as can be ascertained, no dialectician has bothered to supply one since). In that case, this mathematical metaphor is doubly inappropriate: if there is no limit, human knowledge must be divergent. And if that is so, then at any point in human history, knowledge must be infinitely far from this supposed epistemological goal -- which still hasn't been shown to exist. On this view, given Engels's inapt metaphor, humanity will always be infinitely ignorant of anything and everything.
Now, it could be argued that Engels actually claimed that:
"The identity of thinking and being...run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting." [Ibid.]
This indicates that human thought does indeed converge on something that does exist, "being"; in that case, Engels did not need to prove it existed.
Unfortunately, the word "being" (derived from traditional though) is no less vague a term than any other imported into dialectics. [More on this in Essay Twelve.] But, even if that were not the case, the conclusion that "being" exists must itself be infinitely far from its target, if what Engels says is correct. It cannot just be assumed to be true, otherwise one truth (namely this conclusion) would coincide with its object, falsifying Engels's claim. So, if this conclusion (that "being" exists) is itself infinitely far from the truth, then Engels has yet to show that "being" exists.
Once again, it is no use appealing to practice to bail this theory out; given the truth of what Engels said, the claim that practice confirms theory is itself infinitely far from the truth (which target still hasn't been shown to exist).
Appearance Contradicts 'Essence'
Connected with this is the DM-idea that there is a "contradiction" between appearance and reality (or between "appearances and underlying essences"), which thesis itself is surprisingly ill-considered.
First, if things only appear to be so, then they surely cannot contradict a true proposition that they are not so -- not unless, of course, appearances are themselves propositional, which alternative would mean that reality was linguistic after all.
[Of course, if appearances were linguistic agents, and were capable of arguing their corner, they could contradict whomsoever they liked; but they aren't and so they can't.]
Second, given the DM-theory of change, this must mean that appearances are "struggling" with underlying "essences" -- and indeed turning into them, and vice versa! [Anyone who doubts these conclusions should read this, and then think again.]
Third, the distinction itself rests on yet another superficial 'thought experiment', and one which, just as soon as it has been uttered, or written down (as a phenomenal object), must fend for itself in this supposedly untrustworthy phenomenal world, which this theory has just impugned -- but which phenomenal object (i.e., the linguistic expression of this thought) must somehow miraculously remain unsullied, for all that.
In that case, the Immaculate Conception is not just a feature of Roman Catholic Theology, for here we have the Immaculate Concepts of DM-Epistemology. On this basis, while these dialectical objects of thought ply their trade in material reality as phenomenal objects, they somehow manage to remain stain-free and above epistemological reproach -- indeed they appear to be capable of self-justification -- having been born into this world without the usual inherited character defects shared by all other fallen material appearances and/or phenomenal objects.
Hence, delivered into the world of appearances, these materially-embodied dialectical concepts are surely appearances themselves, with an equally suspect pedigree. Despite that, they are supposed somehow to be miraculously free from epistemological stain: Immaculate Concepts.
In that case, it is entirely mysterious how and why a single DM-proposition should be trusted when it is written down or uttered (since each would thus become part of appearances). In either material state (i.e., expressed in ink, or as vibrations in the air) one and all must surely come under immediate suspicion, and be contradicted by the (underlying) reality they foolishly tried to picture.
And it will not do to be told that dialecticians do not believe that appearances cannot be trusted. The fact that the 'dialectical' view of appearances means just this is confirmed by the way that DM-theorists themselves depict them. For example, when this distinction (between appearances and reality) is applied to Capitalism, we are told that while that system might, for instance, appear to be fair, in reality it isn't; underlying reality 'contradicts' this superficial view. In that case, appearances must be deceptive, and dialecticians must believe that they deceptive. [Otherwise, why would dialectical Marxist find they have to inform everyone of the underlying exploitative nature of Capitalism?]
[It is worth noting that this is not my belief (i.e., that appearances are deceptive), but it is that of dialecticians. But, just try getting one of them to admit to this. No worries; we can apply some 'dialectics' to sort this out: DM-fans appear not to admit this, but that just means that in reality they do.
Of course, that is far too quick and trite an argument -- or so it appears. Again, no problem: in essence this argument must contradict this appearance. So despite its superficially trite appearance, in reality that argument is quintessentially profound. Isn't Diabolical Logic amazing!]
Of course, if DM-propositions are phenomenal objects, what they appear to say must contradict what they really say -- that is, if all appearances contradict reality, as we have been led to believe. Hence, every DM-proposition that plies its trade in this material world, but which brashly asserts that appearances contradict reality, must, it seems, contradict itself. [Or, it must at least appear to do so.]
This is worth spelling-out in more detail: if appearances always contradict reality, then with respect to any true DM-proposition, "p", say, its contradictory, "not-p", must really be true (i.e., it must be "essentially" true). But, if "not p" is essentially true, "p" must be false. That means that no DM-proposition that appears to be true is in fact true. In that case, this particular DM-thesis (that appearances contradict reality) must be self-refuting: if it appears to be true, it must really be false.
[Of course, the above uses the LEM, which dialecticians do not trust. However, they can console themselves with the thought that if the LEM appears to them to be defective, in reality it must be eminently sound!]
[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
This surprising result can, of course, be generalised until it ends up falsifying every true empirical proposition, no matter how valid it might otherwise appear to be. Thus, it must in reality be false that Paris is in France, Hydrogen Cyanide is poisonous, and the Sun is hot. Worse, if, according to DM-theorists, appearances contradict reality, and the material world appears to change, then in reality it must remain changeless!
Of course, it could be argued that dialectical logic holds that appearances and under-lying realities are both true.
In that case, both the following must be correct: (1) Nitric Acid appears to be corrosive; (2) Nitric Acid is not corrosive. Are both of these true? However, dialecticians carefully choose which propositions they apply their supposedly universal dialectical solvent to, but for any apparently successful application of this suspect method, reality must say the opposite. Hence, if it appears to be the case that dialecticians think that reality contradicts appearances, in reality it does not. [Now: can both halves of that be true?]
However, for the purposes of argument, let us assume that appearances do indeed contradict reality, and that although Capitalism looks fair to some, in reality it is highly unfair and grossly exploitative.
But, as should now seem plain, no Marxist could actually assert that fact without compromising the objectivity of what had just been said, for as soon as any proposition saying that Capitalism is unfair is written down or asserted, it enters the shadowy world of appearances, and like the cat in the proverbial hot place, it stands zero chance of emerging unscathed.
It may indeed be true that capitalism appears to be unfair, just as it is true that in reality it is the opposite, but adherence to this Aristocratic and metaphysical dichotomy means that no Marxist could ever risk asserting either of these facts (in written or verbal form) for fear that by doing so he or she would condemn both -- by turning them into appearances.
Furthermore, this ancient distinction would completely undermine scientific knowledge. This is because, scientific theory and practice not only take place in the phenomenal world, they can only be confirmed there. To select just one example: if light appears to bend when it passes between media, and all appearances are contradicted by underlying "essences", then it must be true that light does not really bend when it passes between media. Clearly, both of these cannot be true -- no matter how many dialectical prayers are said over this dying theory.
In addition, dialecticians have hitherto applied the distinction between "appearance" and "reality" without giving much thought to the effect this has on social and economic phenomena. Although it is undeniable that workers hold many false beliefs (as do others), the claim that this is down to "false consciousness" on their part cannot be attributed to Marx. Not only did he not employ the term, Engels himself only used it once, and then only in a letter written late in life. This is not a solid base on which to build a reliable theory of ideology. [On this, see here.]
DM-theorists have clearly been unwise to rely on ideas and bogus distinctions they imported from traditional defenders of class society -- i.e., those who based their concepts on a denigration of ordinary material language and common understanding, and thus on a dismissal of the collective experience of working people.
This means, of course, that DM is not even a materialist theory.
It also implies that any revolutionary party that taps into this Aristocratic tradition must cease to be the genuine "memory of the class". By relying on distinctions that actually undermine the language and collective experience of workers, such a group would become, in effect, the amnesia of the class.
In order to rescue HM from this immaterial black hole, the metaphysical dichotomy between appearance/reality and essence/accident must be rejected in its entirety.
In fact, anyone asserting the opposite of this can safely be ignored on the grounds that whatever they say, it must be a mere appearance, and cannot therefore be real.
[A rather nice negation of a rash prospective negator that, one feels.]
[HM = Historical Materialism.]
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