Hegel Screws Up

Hegel Screws Up

This is a very elementary summary of some of Hegel's more important and serious logical errors. Any who object to the alleged 'pedantry' below should check this out, and then think again.

Dialectical 'Logic' derives from Hegel's (deliberate) misunderstanding of Aristotle, and from a linguistic dodge invented in the Middle Ages.

First of all, Hegel thought that certain sentences contained an in-built contradiction.

If we use Lenin's example:

J1: John is a man.

we can see where this idea came from, and thus where it goes astray. [Hegel in fact used the sentence, "The rose is red".]

First of all, Hegel accepted a theory invented by Medieval Roman Catholic theologians (which is now called the Identity Theory of Predication) that re-interprets propositions like J1 in the following way:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

The former "is" of predication was replaced by an "is" of identity.

The argument then went as follows: since John cannot be identical with a general term (or, rather, with what it represents, a universal), we must conclude the following:

J3: John is not identical with Manhood.

But then again, if John is a man, he must be identical with (or at least he must share in) what other men are, so we must now conclude:

J4: John is not not identical with Manhood.

Or, more simply:

J5: John is not a non-man.

It's hard to believe, but out of this was born the Negation of the Negation.

Hegel thought this showed that motion was built into our concepts, as thought passes from one pole to another, and that this indicated that thought has dialectics built into it.

It also allowed him to begin to doubt the validity of the 'Law of Identity' (LOI) -- a 'Law', incidentally, that cannot be found in Aristotle's work, but which was invented by Medieval Roman Catholic theologians, once more.

Hegel thought this showed that it was now possible to negate this 'Law'.

However, in order to proceed, Hegel not only employed a barrage of impenetrably obscure jargon, he relied on some hopelessly sloppy syntax. He plainly thought he could ignore the logical/grammatical distinctions that exist between the various terms he used, or, at least, between the roles they occupied in language -- i.e., between naming, saying, describing and predicating (i.e., saying something about something or someone). This 'enabled' him to pull-off several neat verbal tricks --, and from the ensuing confusion 'the dialectic' emerged.

For instance, Hegel thought that the LOI could be negated, and that this implied a contradiction. But, the LOI concerns the conditions under which an object is identical with itself, or with something else; it is not about the alleged identity of propositions.

[Hence, if a proposition has no identity, it wouldn't be a proposition to begin with. That is, if it is unclear what is being proposed, then plainly nothing has yet been proposed, and so nothing can follow from it.]

In that case, the alleged negation of the LOI can have nothing to do with the connection between a proposition and its contradictory. The so-called Law of Non-contradiction (LOC), on the other hand, is about propositions, not objects. Only by confusing objects (or the names of objects) with propositions -- that is, by confusing objects and their names with what we say about them, truly or falsely -- was Hegel able to concoct the 'dialectic'.

[The details here are rather messy, so I have omitted them. However, readers can find out what they are here, here, here and here.]

Furthermore, propositions are not objects; if they were they could not be used to say anything. Sure, we use signs to express propositions, but these signs become symbols (i.e., they signify things for us, and convey meaning). We achieve this by the way we employ such signs according to the grammatical complexity our ancestors built into language.

To see this, just look at any object or collection of objects and ask yourself what it/they say to you. You might be tempted to reply that it/they say this or that, but in order to report what it/they allegedly say, you will be forced to articulate whatever that is in a proposition. You could not do this by merely reproducing the original objects, or just by naming them. This is not surprising, since objects have no social history, intellect or language, whereas we do, and have.

Unfortunately, Engels and Lenin swallowed this spurious line of reasoning; and that is because they both knew no logic, but had a wildly inflated view of Hegel and his expertise in this area. [This is not to pick on these two great revolutionaries; many others, who should have known better, have similarly been taken in.]

However, because of this misplaced respect for Hegel, Marxists have been saddled with his loopy logic ever since.

Here is Lenin, for example:

To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….

Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a "nucleus" ("cell") the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. [Lenin (1961), i.e., Philosophical Notebooks, pp.359-60.]

In this passage, Lenin felt he could 'derive' fundamental truths about reality, not from a scientific investigation of the world, but from examining a few words!

[And yet, dialecticians still tell us with a straight face that their theory has not been imposed on nature!]

However, because J1 is a descriptive sentence, it cannot be treated in the way Hegel imagined. In fact, Aristotle would have approached it differently. In order to explain its structure, he would have said:

A1: Manhood applies to John.

[J1: John is a man.]

In other words, J1 describes John; it is not expressing an identity.

Indeed, it makes no sense to suppose with Hegel that John could be identical with a general term (any more than it would make sense to suppose you, for example, are identical with a conjunction, a preposition or an adverb, or, indeed, with what (if anything) they designate) --, or even with what any of these allegedly represent.

In which case, this Medieval Roman Catholic supposition is not simply false, it is bizarre!

It plainly takes a rather special sort of 'genius' (which we are assured by Lenin that Hegel possessed) to suppose that an object like John could be identical with the meaning of a certain sort of word!

Now, it we return to the original sentence, translated into Hegel-speak, we can see where the argument goes further astray:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

Some might disagree with the above re-write, but any who do will find it impossibly difficult to explain what the extra "is" here means (highlighted in green), which would have to be used to make the alleged identity between John and Manhood (or whatever) plain.

Now, if all such uses of "is" express disguised identities (as we are assured they must), J2 would now have to become:

J2a: John is identical with identical with Manhood.

as the green "is" is replaced with what it is supposed to mean, i.e., "is identical with" --, in turquoise. After another dialectical switch, J2a would in turn become:

J2b: John is identical with identical with identical with Manhood.

as the new "is" we would have to use in J2a is given a dialectical make-over, too. And so on:

J2b: John is identical with identical with identical with identical with Manhood.

[These untoward moves can only be halted by those who do not think "is" always expresses an identity; but dialecticians gave up the right to lodge that particular appeal the moment they accepted the Identity Theory of Predication.]

On the other hand, Aristotle's approach short-circuits all this; there is no "is" at all in A1:

A1: Manhood applies to John.

In contrast, Hegel's analysis cannot avoid this verbal explosion, it simply invites it.

Anyone who thinks this is nit-picking need only reflect on the fact that Hegel, or anyone who agrees with him, cannot explain his theory without using J2:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

But, then Hegel's theory simply stalls at this point, for this extra "is" cannot be one of identity (for the above reasons), and if it isn't, then the theory that tells us that "is" is always one of identity (in such circumstances) must be false.

Furthermore, this trick of Hegel's can only be carried out in Indo-European languages. By-and-large, other language groups do not have this particular grammatical form. The above moves depend solely on the subject-predicate form taking the copula "is" (and its cognates), which is found almost exclusively in the aforementioned language group.

This shows that Hegel's logic is not just fractured, it is parochial. Hence, no general conclusions can follow from it.

To illustrate these bogus moves, consider, for example, J1 again:

J1: John is a man.

Given traditional grammar, this is in effect:

G1: S is P.

[Where, "S" = "Subject", "P" = "Predicate".]

Now, we already have the facility in language to express identity (and uncontroversially so). For example:

G2: Cicero is Tully.

["Tully" was Cicero's other name. Cicero was a right-wing git who lived in Ancient Rome, about the same time as Julius Caesar.]

So, G2 quite legitimately means:

G2a: Cicero is identical with Tully.

Or:

G3: A = B.

[Where "A" is "Cicero and "B" is "Tully", using "=" as the identity sign, here.]

G3 expresses an unambiguous "is" of identity. No problem with that. But, it is important to note that the identity here is between two names, or named individuals (depending on how it is read). This is typical of the use of the "is" of identity.

Now, just look at the similarity between the following two forms -- especially between G1 (a predication) and G2 (an identity):

J1: John is a man.

G1: S is P.

G2: Cicero is Tully.

G3: A = B.

Highly influential ancient and medieval logicians noticed this, too, and combined the two distinct forms into one, reading the "is" of predication always as an "is" of identity.

But this now turns the predicate "P" into a name, for identities are expressed with names (or other singular terms). And if "P" is a name, it cannot now be a predicate.

Hegel also adopted this approach, confusing the "is" of identity with the "is" of predication. This then 'allowed' him to claim that propositions like J1 were in fact identity statements. Of course, that means this part of Hegel's 'logic' was based solely on what is in effect a grammatical stipulation (i.e., a dogmatic assertion that these two forms were one, but which creates the sorts of problems we have seen above) --, and, it is a stipulation that destroys the capacity language has for expressing generality, for that is what predicates do (they allow us to say general things of named individuals, etc.).

J1 thus becomes J1a and/or J1b:

J1: John is a man.

J1a: John = man/Manhood.

J1b: John is identical with man/Manhood.

[Unfortunately, however, in his old age Aristotle was already moving in this direction -- i.e., he too was beginning to confuse predication with identity, or, rather, he was beginning to confuse predicates with names, and describing with naming.]

Hence, on this view, just as "Tully" names Cicero, "man" 'names' Manhood --, or perhaps, the class/set of all men. The rationale underlying these moves had already been established by earlier mystics/theorists, who were, among other things, concerned about the union/identity between the human soul and 'God'/'Being'. Hence they played around with the Greek verb "to be" until it was made to say what they wanted it to say.

Of course, this grammatical sleight-of-hand helps account for the emphasis placed by subsequent Idealists on the 'identity' of 'thought' with 'Being', which later became the main problematic of German Idealism --, a problematic Engels also accepted.

[On that, see his Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy.]

There is in fact no other reason for adopting the Identity Theory of Predication, which also helps explain why it was theologians who invented it. Of course, none of this occurred in an ideological vacuum; a brief outline of the relevant details can be found here.

Anyway, logicians after Aristotle, and especially those working in the Middle Ages, began to conflate these two distinct forms as a matter of course. This fed into, and was fed in return by, an increasingly elaborate and complex metaphysic supposedly about the ultimate structure of reality and the relation of 'Thought' to 'Being' --, all based solely on this ancient linguistic dodge!

[Similar moves underpinned Anselm's infamous Ontological Argument for the existence of 'God'. In this case, too, Anselm thought he could derive profound 'truths' about 'divine reality', valid for all of space and time -- and beyond -- solely from language.]

So, in the end, J1/G1 and G2-type sentences were both modelled along the lines expressed in G4 and G5 -- i.e., as identity statements.

J1: John is a man.

G1: S is P.

G2: Cicero is Tully.

G4: A = B.

G5: John = Manhood.

But, once more, this treats predicates as Proper Names (i.e., "...is a man" becomes the proper name of Manhood), which it is not. Naming is not the same as describing. We name our children, we do not describe them. We describe the world around us, we do not name it. A collection of names is a list; lists say nothing --, just as objects say nothing.

Of course, it could be objected that there are languages in which names describe. For example, Native Americans use names such as "Sitting Bull", "Crazy Horse", or "Rain In The Face", which also describe what the individual concerned either did or is reminiscent of.

Even so, no Native American would argue as follows:

N1: Sitting Bull has just stood up.

N2; Therefore Sitting Bull is no longer Sitting Bull, but is Standing Bull.

But they would argue as follows:

N3: That animal over there is a sitting bull.

N4: It has just stood up, so it is now a standing bull.

These show that the logical use of names is distinct from that of descriptions. Any contingent psychological or idiosyncratic associations a name has are logically irrelevant, not matter how important they are to a given culture.

Hence the name "Sitting Bull" here is a logical unit, and cannot be split up like a description can. This is because, as Aristotle noted (De Interpretatione, Section 3), names are tenseless, but predicates are not. The above examples bring this out, since change applies to predicates, not to names.

[These and other complications are discussed at length in Geach (1968), pp.22-80. See also here.]

So, "...is a man" became the Proper Name of Manhood, which was then dignified by being called an "abstraction", or, even worse, an "essence" -- both of which entities were conjured into existence by this linguistic dodge, and nothing else.

In this way then, dialectics follows solely from ancient and defective logic compounded by a crass misconstrual of a sub-branch of Indo-European grammar.

Hard to believe? Well, Marx himself indicated that this was so;

"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels: The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

Now, even if the above analysis were incorrect in some way, neither Aristotle nor Hegel (nor anyone else for that matter since) has been able to explain how or why contingent features of Indo-European grammar could possibly have such profound implications built into them --, or how they could reveal to us such fundamental truths about the deep structure of reality, valid for all of space and time.

In fact, I call this approach to knowledge Linguistic Idealism.