"2. (1) It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all his employees."
And:
"3. (1) It shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety."
In 1949, in Edwards v National Coal Board (Ref.6), which was an action for compensation for the death of a worker who was killed whilst at work, Lord Justice Asquith decided that:
"a computation must be made by the owner in which the QUANTUM of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them - the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice - the defendants discharge the onus upon them. Moreover this computation falls to be made at a point in time anterior to the accident. The questions he has to answer are, firstly, what are the measures necessary and sufficient to prevent any breach, and secondly, are these measures reasonably practicable."back to index
'The starting point must be the ordinary meaning of the language of section 3(1). In our judgment the interpretation of the prosecution fits in best with the language of section 3(1). In the context the word 'risks' conveys the idea of the possibility of danger. Indeed, a degree of verbal manipulation is needed to introduce the idea of actual danger which the defendants put forward. The ordinary meaning of the word 'risks' therefore supports the prosecution's interpretation and there is nothing in the language of section 3 or indeed in the context of the Act, which supports a narrowing down of the ordinary meaning. On the contrary the preventive aim of sections 3, 20, 21 and 22 reinforces the construction put forward by the prosecution and adopted by the judge. The adoption of the restrictive interpretations argued for by the defence would make enforcement of section 3(1) and to some extent also of sections 20, 21 and 22 more difficult and would in our judgment result in a substantial emasculation of an essential part of the Act of 1974. The interpretation which renders those statutory provisions effective in their role of protecting public health and safety is to be preferred.We have not lost sight of the defence submission that we ought to concentrate on the word 'exposed' rather than 'risks' in section 3(1). If the word 'risks' has the meaning which we consider it has, the point disappears. In that event exposure to a possibility of danger is sufficient. The word 'exposed' simply makes clear that the section is concerned with persons potentially affected by the risk… But the word 'exposed' cannot change the meaning of 'risks' from a possibility of danger to actual danger. On the principal points in this case the argument for the defence is really a red herring.'
"The maximum tolerable risk to workers should not exceed 1 in 1000 each year. The maximum tolerable risk to any member of the public from any large industrial plant should not exceed 1 in 10,000 each year but with a benchmark figure for any new nuclear installation of 1 in 100,000 each year. For accidental risks, the risks for both normal operation and accidents taken together, then the risk for most people in the vicinity of a nuclear installation would be at or near 1 in 1,000,000 each year."In the case of the Sizewell 'B' nuclear power station, no proof was provided that these rules had been, or were ever likely to be enforced.