A ROMANS 1 ARGUMENT FOR RELIGIOUS INCLUSIVISM

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draft date: October 30, 2002

In this paper I appeal to one of the favorite Bible passages among Christian exclusivists, Romans 1:18-31, to argue for Christian inclusivism (the view that, while all salvation is through Jesus, it is sometimes available without overt acceptance of Jesus). The bulk of the paper is spent defending the argument’s two main premises:

(P1) The condemnation of the unevangelized is justified only if they have not responded appropriately to general revelation;

(P2) There are unevangelized who have responded appropriately to general revelation.

I also show that my argument serves to neutralize several of the charges often made against inclusivism: that it grants undue salvific efficacy to other religions; that it eliminates the distinction between general and special revelation; and inclusivist salvation is moot once one has heard the gospel in any form.

Some time ago I read that Martin Marty was once asked why the New International Version of the Bible had been translated. Marty’s typically pithy reply: “So Evangelicals wouldn’t have to read the Revised Standard Version.” This comment hits a little too close to home for our laughter to be anything but nervous. However, the comment is also quite profound. Marty was suggesting that the NIV serves as a kind of golden mean – an Aristotelian middle ground between two unacceptable extremes. The NIV delivered the Evangelical from the archaic language and weak text base of the King James Version on the one hand, and from what was for many the suspect theological base and translation theory of the Revised Standard Version on the other.

This delivery was quite apropos, since Evangelicalism itself arose as a kind of golden mean between the de facto naturalistic stance of theological modernism and the reactionary bent of fundamentalism. Evangelicals take pride (often deservedly so) in their ability to navigate between the horns of the modernism/ fundamentalism, liberalism/conservatism extremes that have plagued Protestantism for over a century. Though accused of rampant inconsistency by mainline liberals and demonic compromise by fundamentalists, Evangelicalism continues on its merry way, confident that a high view of scripture and a traditional theistic worldview can be successfully wedded to a proper concern for the dictates of modern scholarship and scientific advancement. And it boasts the fastest growing churches in the world as pragmatic testimony to the worthiness of its quest.

It is a bit puzzling, then, why Evangelicalism has been so slow to adopt the golden mean option available to in the debate over the salvific status of non-Christians. The extremes in this debate are pluralism – the view that all world religions offer roughly equal access to salvation – and exclusivism (or particularism) [1] – the view that salvation is available only through overt, explicit acceptance of Jesus as Savior.[2] Evangelicals have, at their disposal the middle road position of religious inclusivism – the view that, while all salvation is through Jesus, it is sometimes available outside the church or without overt acceptance of Jesus.[3] Yet, while the doctrine has been embraced by many Catholics and mainline Protestants, its support in the Evangelical community has been significantly lacking. Despite adherence by no less an Evangelical icon than C. S. Lewis, Evangelicals have for the most part stood firmly in the exclusivist camp.[4]

Granted, middle-of-the-road positions are not always preferable. And, while the reasons for this retrenchment are undoubtedly many, I believe there are a number of misunderstandings about the bare minimum commitments of an inclusivist doctrine that cause unnecessary fear or precaution on the part of many. It is the purpose of this paper to present and defend a new argument for inclusivism, one that I believe clarifies what a “bare bones” inclusivism is and is not committed do, and may therefore deflect many of the fears of Evangelicals concerning the doctrine.

Debates over inclusivism, exclusivism, and pluralism in Christianity invariably turn at some point to Paul’s justification for the condemnation of the wicked in Romans 1:18-31. The passage is usually appealed to by exclusivists, who see it as teaching that the power of general revelation is sufficient to justify the condemnation of those who have never heard the gospel. The basic idea is that, even if one has never heard the full story of God’s redemptive acts in Jesus, the will and character of God are amply enough displayed via “what has been made” (v. 20) that one’s rejection of such justifies spiritual condemnation. In other words, explicit rejection of the gospel is not a necessary condition for condemnation. Such may be had via rejection of the message of general revelation.

So, in what is for me a deliciously ironic twist, I wish to base my argument for inclusivism on this very passage, which has been the bastion of exclusivism for so long. In particular (as discussed in §3 below), I will use Romans 1 to motivate the first and foundational premise of my argument. One terminological note is necessary before presenting the argument: I use the term “unevangelized” as shorthand for “those who have not heard or have not had a legitimate opportunity to respond to the gospel.” The argument, then, is as follows:

P1) The condemnation of the unevangelized is justified only if they have not responded appropriately to general revelation.

C1) Therefore, if an unevangelized person responds appropriately to general revelation, then it would be unjustified for her to be condemned.

P2) There are unevangelized who have responded appropriately to general revelation.

The argument is valid. C1 follows from P1 by instantiation and contraposition. C2 follows from C1, P2 and P3 by subsequent steps of modus ponens and modus tollens. C3 follows from C2 and P4 by instantiation, and C4 follows from C3 by definitional implication. The argument’s soundness, therefore, rests in the truth of its premises. I will turn to this question in a moment. First, I wish to point out several dialectical advantages of the argument that may heighten the appeal of inclusivism to some who were heretofore leery of its implications.

First, notice that this argument says nothing about the role of non-Christian religions in the salvation of the unevangelized. It is completely neutral concerning whether or not such religions play any role in delivering truth or divine grace. Much discussion among pluralists, inclusivists and exclusivists focuses on this question, and such discussions are fascinating and critically important for an overall theology of religions. However, my argument demonstrates that inclusivism per se does not entail or even suggest a view concerning the extent to which non-Christian religions are capable of delivering truth or grace – short of a rejection of the pluralistic position that they are every bit as capable as Christianity. In particular, one may be an inclusivist even if she holds that non-Christian religions deliver no religious truth beyond that delivered by general revelation per se and that their sacramental value is nil. The power of inclusivism simplicitur derives no nourishment from any particular view of other religions. This fact may make it easier for many to consider the inclusivist option.

Second, notice that this argument admits and uses the distinction between general and special revelation. Inclusivists often argue that this distinction is artificial and unsound, as a step toward arguing that non-Christian religions can serve as conduits of religious truth and grace.[5] But, as has just been shown, this position is independent of the defense of inclusivism. So, therefore, is the rejection of the general/special revelation distinction. The inclusivist need not argue for the dissolution of this often useful distinction in order to make his case. Again, this realization makes the theological cost of committing to inclusivism much less than is often thought.

Finally, I need to say a word about my definition of “unevangelized.” Why did I include the qualifier “or have not had a legitimate opportunity to respond to the gospel”? Discussions of inclusivism often center on those who have never heard the gospel message at all. Indeed, some have limited any hope of non-Christian salvation strictly to those who have never heard the gospel in any form.[6] Yet it is clear that these are not the only ones with whom the spirit of inclusivism is concerned. This shows up, for instance, in the fact that one of the most common examples of a so-called “pagan saint” is Gandhi. But Gandhi was well aware of Christianity as a religious option. An inclusivist position that limits non-Christian salvation only to those who are completely unaware of the gospel option would, therefore, view Gandhi and many such pagan saints as lost – a view that many inclusivists (myself included) would resist.

Clearly most inclusivists have something more in mind when they think of candidates for non-Christian salvation. Exactly what is hard to say. My own inclination is to say many non-Western non-Christians encounter Christianity in a form that makes it significantly less epistemically attractive to them than their own religious heritage. So the only rational thing for them to do is to reject Christianity and continue on their alternative path in search of truth. And for such a move they would not be condemned, but remain candidates for non-Christian salvation. To claim otherwise would be to adopt the untenable position that God will condemn those who believe as they are compelled on pain of irrationality. As one who understands epistemic virtue as an act of stewardship, I cannot bring myself to endorse such a view.

I need to spell my point out more clearly here. Among the gifts we have been given as creatures in God's image is the capacity to think, learn, study, reason, and know – we are epistemic creatures. As epistemic creatures we are under obligation before God to use our epistemic capacities properly. This implies that we are duty bound to accept claims only if they are epistemically warranted.[7] Now, stewardship involves the proper use of the gifts that God has given us. It involves giving back to God via the application of our capacities in proper ways. Hence, it is not just an act of epistemic virtue to believe only that for which we are warranted – it is a duty before God to do so – an act of stewardship. Furthermore, this high view of epistemic duty must, on pain of inconsistency, extend to all epistemic creatures, whether they are aware of their status of stewards before God or not. Hence, one whose non-culpable epistemic situation does not warrant him in accepting Christianity cannot be guilty before God for not doing so. He is only acting as a good steward before God. (Of course, there is much to debate concerning the conditions under which such an epistemic situation would indeed be non-culpable, but that would take me too far afield for present purposes.)[8]

This, I realize, is a very controversial position, and I do not have space to argue further for it here. My present purpose is to point out yet another position the inclusivist need not be committed to – the view that anyone who has ever heard the gospel in any form and rejected it is no longer a candidate for inclusivist non-Christian salvation. While the other two implications of my argument I have noted are designed to make inclusivism more attractive to those with exclusivist tendencies, this should make it more attractive to those with pluralist tendencies.

P3 can be dispensed with quickly. It is a datum of the discussion. The debate among pluralists, inclusivists, and exclusivists is one that assumes that God treats all people fairly. If a given position implies that any person’s condemnation is unjustified, that is understood by all as a reason to reject the position. So on to the other premises.

I have titled this paper and my argument “A Romans 1 Argument for Inclusivism.” But the explicit role of the Romans 1 passage is only to serve as the motivation for P1 (which, in turn, motivates the rest of the argument). It is important to note that this premise does not turn on any complex or controversial exegesis of the text. The only claim being made here is that Romans 1 implies a certain kind of justification for the condemnation of unevangelized persons. This justification is summarized in verse 20: “For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities – his eternal power and divine nature – have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse.”^{^[9]} In other words, God is justified in condemning the unevangelized even though they don’t know the whole truth because they have rejected what truth they do know through general revelation. I know of no one who would take issue with this interpretation of Romans 1:20; therefore, I will spend no time defending it.

One point that does need defending, however, is the way P1 words the justification principle just cited. It makes the rejection of generally revealed truth a necessary condition for God’s being justified in condemning the unevangelized. Some may want to argue that it is better stated as a sufficient but not necessary condition. Because they rejected general revelation, God condemns them – but there may well be other conditions that would justify condemning the unevangelized. Of course, if P1 were reworded to reflect this view, the argument would lose its validity since C1 would no longer follow.

But it seems clear that the rejection of general revelation must be read here as at least a necessary condition, if not a necessary and sufficient condition, for justified condemnation. If the rejection of general revelation by the unevangelized is not a necessary condition for their condemnation being justified, then the passage offers an explanation for only some condemnations of the unevangelized – perhaps only a very small percentage. We have no way of knowing which unevangelized condemnations are and are not covered by this explanation. Hence, it is deeply unsatisfying as an explanation. So if the passage is a successful explanation for the condemnation of the unevangelized – that is, if it is to be utilized even as the exclusivists typically want to utilize it – the rejection of general revelation must be understood as a necessary condition for such condemnation.

It is the assertion of both P2 and P4 that separates inclusivism from its competitors. The pluralist will gladly accept P2, but denies P4. The exclusivist, on the other hand, is all for P4 but will reject P2 – especially if he accepts the defense of P1 offered above. Since it is a primary aim of this paper to convince Evangelical exclusivists that inclusivism is not as scary a doctrine as it sometimes seems, I will forego any defense of P4 and concentrate on P2.

There is one sense in which the defense of P2 should be very simple. One could charge that denial of it constitutes begging the question against inclusivism. What other reason would there be for claiming that no unevangelized have ever responded appropriately to general revelation than the assumption that they are all condemned and that rejection of general revelation is a necessary condition for such condemnation? But of course the only justification for the first of these assumptions would be exclusivism.

However, one might appeal for justification to passages such as James 2:10: “For whoever keeps the whole law and yet stumbles at just one point is guilty of breaking all of it” (NIV). In other words, nothing short of perfect obedience to the dictates of general revelation will do. And, since it would be ludicrous to suggest that anyone has ever been perfectly obedient, we can assume that all unevangelized are justifiably condemned.

But there are several problems with such a line of thought. First, James 2 is clearly referring to special revelation, not general revelation (the passage goes on to quote the Law of Moses), and therefore is inapplicable to the question at hand. Second, this passage cannot mean that those under the law were saved only if they adhered perfectly to the law. Clearly no one ever did adhere perfectly, and clearly many were saved under the law. The sins of such Old Testament saints as Abraham, Moses and David are legendary. One cannot use James 2 to defend the claim that all unevangelized are lost without throwing these heroes of the faith into the pit with them. Finally, such an unreachable standard would cancel out the justification for the condemnation of the unevangelized that is the motivation for our inquiry. Living perfect, unmarred lives of obedience – even to the dictates of general revelation – is an unrealistic standard that no one could be expected to uphold. God knows this; so in setting it, he sets a standard he knows cannot be attained, and is therefore unjustified for condemning those who do not attain it. (I am assuming here that God knows that ought implies can!) It is no more just than requiring the unevangelized to run two-minute miles or breathe in a vacuum in order to be saved.

In fact, this reasoning can be applied to any standard for appropriate response so high that few if any could ever be expected to live up to it. The only standard for appropriate response that would suitably justify condemnation of inappropriate response is one that we would have every reason to suspect many have lived up to. In fact, there is no a priori reason to deny that at least roughly the same percentage of people in unevangelized cultures have responded appropriately to general revelation as those in evangelized cultures who have responded appropriately to the gospel. But if the number is only a tenth of that or even a hundredth, that still makes thousands and millions of unevangelized peoples who have found salvation through Jesus without ever embracing Christianity.

Religious inclusivism has been met with much skepticism, caution and suspicion in the Evangelical world. Undoubtedly, many suspect that what seems a golden mean is in reality an unstable middle ground. Religious pluralist extraordinaire John Hick has called on inclusivists to “go further along the road that led from exclusivism to inclusivism and leads on to pluralism.”[10] Such beckoning from the sirens of theological liberalism can hardly be encouraging to Evangelicals considering the merits of inclusivism.

It is clear that this paper has not dealt with all of the legitimate concerns Evangelicals have regarding inclusivism. In particular, I have not dealt with the questions of motivation for Christian mission, false and anti-Christian teachings in world religions, or the place of acceptance of correct doctrine in salvation. These are difficult issues all, and inclusivists must address them seriously (as many have). However, I believe this paper has contributed to the debate over inclusivism in two significant ways: (i) it has offered a new argument for inclusivism, and one grounded in what has long been seen to be one of the foundational passages for exclusivism, Romans 1:18-31; and (ii) in the explication and defense of that argument, it has pointed out several fears and concerns over inclusivism that are unfounded and can be laid to rest.[11]

[1] The distinction between exclusivism and pluralism, along with the third alternative of inclusivism, was first made by John Hick. See, e.g., “Religious Pluralism,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson et al. (New York: Oxford, 1996), 514-26.

[2] I have here described specifically Christian exclusivism, since that is the focus of this essay. Of course, the exclusivist position is at least theoretically formulable for virtually any world religion – one would simply substitute the given religion’s salvation schema for “acceptance of Jesus as Savior” in the above description.

[3] The view I have described is similar to what Clark Pinnock calls “cautious” or “modal” inclusivism, which maintains that God may (and sometimes does?) utilize non-Christian religions to draw people into a saving relationship with him, but is under no obligation to do so. (Actually, my brand of inclusivism is even more cautious than Pinnock’s, since I make no commitment to the use of other religions to convey truth or grace at all – see §2 below). Pinnock contrasts his formulation with that of inclusivism pioneer Karl Rahner, “who is very positive about other faiths and considers them to possess a salvific status.” “An Inclusivist View,” in Four View on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, ed. Dennis L. Okholm and Timothy R. Phillips (previously titled More Than One Way?) (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995), 99-100 [hereafter Four Views].

[4] Some of the finer defenses of the position among current Evangelical scholars include William Lane Craig, “‘No Other Name’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989): 172-88; Alvin Plantinga, “A Defense of Religious Exclusivism,” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 2^nd ed., ed. Louis Pojman (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1994),528-44; R. Douglas Geivett and W. Gary Phillips, “A Particularist View: An Evidentialist Approach,” in Four Views, 213-45. There have been some significant movements within Evangelicalism toward inclusivism recently. See, for instance, several of the articles in John G. Stackhouse, Jr., ed., No Other Gods Before Me? Evangelicals and the Challenge of World Religions (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001).

[5] However, see Amos Young, “Discerning the Spirit(s) in the World of Religions: Toward a Pneumatological Theology of Religions,” in No Other Gods Before Me, 49-50.

[6] So Clark Pinnock: “When Christ is known, the obligation comes into force to believe on him. The unevangelized are expected to receive the Good News when it reaches them. God’s offer becomes an objective obligation at that time, and refusal to accept that offer would be fatal. No hope can be offered to those declining God’s offer to them in Christ.” A Wideness in God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 168. However, Pinnock’s tone softened just a few years later: “My instinct is to leave this matter with the grace of God … . Living in a country where there is no danger in becoming a Christian, I am in no position to judge such a case. At the same time, it is no small matter to turn away from the grace of God (Heb. 2:1-3).” “An Inclusivist View,” 120.

Karl Rahner speaks of a given non-Christian religion having efficacy only to “the point in time when the Christian religion becomes a historically real factor for those who are of this religion.” While this sounds on the surface like agreement with Pinnock’s initial position, Rahner admits that what this qualification comes to “will have to be left to a certain extent an open question.” “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,” in Christianity and Other Religions: Selected Readings, ed. John Hick and Brian Hebblethwaite (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 61.

[7] I utilize the concept of epistemic warrant in the sense made popular by Alvin Plantinga (see, e.g., Warrant: The Current Debate, New York: Oxford, 1993) – as that property (whatever its nature) which, when added to true belief in sufficient quantity, produces knowledge. Plantinga has successfully introduced this concept into the literature as a welcome content-neutral alternative to the notion of justification, which has become closely associated with specifically internalist stories of knowledge.

[8] I am grateful to Chris Barras, whose probing questions on this point drew me out enough to develop this explication.

^{^[9]}The Holy Bible : New International Version (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996, 1984).

[10] “Response to Clark H. Pinnock,” in Four Views, 124. In his reply, Pinnock challenges the assumption that pluralism is just further down the same road. “Pluralists seem to me to be traveling down a different road altogether.” “To get to Hick’s position, I would need to deny one of the two axioms of inclusivism, the Christological, and would need to move outside the paradigm.” “Conclusion,” in Four Views, 148.

[11] Thanks to Doug Groothuis for very helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. Thanks also to participants of the 2002 Society of Christian Philosophers Midwest Meeting at Indiana University, where another draft was read and discussed.