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Key Words: Casualties aircraft lost Bomber command RAF 8 United States Army Air Force world war 2 strategic air offensive

        An Independent Paper

         

        Aspects of the Combined British and American  Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939 to 1945.

Including an assessment of

        RAF Bomber Command and the 8^th & 9^th US Army Air Forces’ Casualties and Losses in World War II.

By

Michael Varley

1^st August 2007

Revised edition

Contents (Click for link to section)

1.   Introduction
2.   Available Statistics

3.   Number of aircrew who served in Bomber Command on Operations.
4.   Total Casualties (Bomber Command)
5.   The Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR)
6.   Bomber Command Casualties by nationality
7.   Casualties by crew category
8.   Average Probability of Survival over the whole war, 1939-45.
9.   Casualties by period
10. Casualties in Other RAF Commands
11. Total Sorties Flown and Aircraft Losses
12. Loss Rate, A Measure of Risk
13. The Operational Tour of Duty
14. Theoretical Mathematical Relationship Between Loss Rate and Surviving a Tour of Duty .
15. Theoretical probability of completing a 30 Operation Tour of Duty carried out over  6 month at different periods .
16. Analysis's of Survival Probability over shorter periods, Lancaster v. Halifax
17. Operation Pointblank
18. RAF Striking Power Availble
19. Average Bomb Load per Aircraft
20. Total Weight of Bombs Dropped by Bomber Command, (tons of 2240 lbs)

21. The 8 & 9 US Army Air Forces Effort against Germany
22. Tonnage of Bombs Dropped by 8 & 9 USAAF  (in tons of 2240 lbs )
23. Combined RAF & USAAF Bombing Effort
24. Fatal Casualties 8 & 9 USAAF
25. Number of Sorties and Bomber losses, 8 & 9 USAAF
26. Some Differences between Bomber Command and 8 & 9 USAAF Operations

27. Bombing and its effect on the enemy - Some thoughts

1. Introduction

As from the 21^st January 1943 the Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, agreed to at the Casablanca Conference under the code name “Pointblank”, was a combined British and American operation This paper deals with the losses and tonnage of bombs dropped of both RAF Bomber Command and the 8th & 9^th US AAF in the offensive against Germany within the European Theatre of Operations (ETO). This statistical information is seldom presented as a whole and most British or American books tend to mainly deal exclusively with their author's own country's efforts and losses. Additional information, including details of the bombing offensive before operation Pointblank is provided to complete an overall picture of strategic air operations in Europe during World War II.

About 4,700,000 personnel of United Kingdom citizenship served in the “British”  armed forces during World War II. Of these, according to a British Government “White Paper” published in June 1946,  264,443 were killed, 41,327 were missing and 172,592 were take prisoners of war. The “overall” fatal casualty loss rate , presuming the missing are dead, was therefore 6.5%,  and 3.7% were taken prisoners of war.  Merchany Navy losses were 45,329 killed, 4,654 missing and 5,729 prisoners of war. A further 106,927 civilians were killed, of which about 60,000 were as a result of air raids.

Within  the Royal Air Force (RAF)  “Bomber Command” , which was a ‘unit’  roughly equivalent in both role and size to a United States “Army Air Force’ (AAF),  it is estimated that a total of about 125,000 personnel served at one time or another as aircrew. Of this total it us estimated that about 30% came from personnel of the Dominion and Allied Air Forces who were under RAF posting disposal. The remaining 70%, about 87,500 personnel,  were RAF (& RAFVR) personnel recruited in the United Kingdom.

Of the estimated 125,000 aircrew who served in Bomber Command it is known, with high precision, that a total of 55,500 were killed and 9,835 take prisoners of war. The  overall fatal casualty loss rate for the Command was therefore about 45%, and in addition 8% were taken prisoners of war.

 Insufficient data is available to make as good an estimate for the  8^th & 9^th  AAF, although it may be noted that at a peak in August  1944 there were 4,000 heavy bomber crews, each of 10 people, “on hand” in the UK.  A considered  guesstimate  would be that at least 80,000 aircrew served  with the  8^th & 9^th AAF from bases in the UK during the war. The 8^th & 9^th AAF suffered about 37,000 fatal casualties, whereas total US Forces fatal casualties were 405,500 out of a total of 16,353,750  personnel who served in all theatres, an overall fatal casualty rate of 2.5%.

These assessments of course distinguish between aircrew, who were the active combatants, and the supporting ground infrastructure consisting of engineering, administrative, communications and other personnel who only in exceptional circumstances were in risk of being either killed in conflict with the enemy or taken prisoners of war. They probably outnumbered the aircrew tenfold and their brave and dedicated service was an essential part of the overall operation. Nevertheless I consider that this is the only realistic, even if pragmatic, approach to analysing the losses during the Strategic Air Offensive.

On balance it would appear with little doubt that the  ‘fatal casualty loss rate’ in Bomber Command for aircrew only was the highest  of any similar  size ‘unit’ within the British Forces during World War II.  I consider a similar distinction must broadly apply to the aircrew of the 8^th and 9^th United States Army Air Forces in relation the US forces in general even though it is impossible to find the statistics to prove so. 

Available records generally claim that a grand total of just under 1,600,000 UK tons ( i.e. long tons of 2240lb) of bombs were dropped on Germany and German occupied territories through the combined effort of Bomber Command and the 8^th and 9^th Army Air Forces based in the United Kingdom. However the following comment contained in Appendix 44 Vol IV of the UK publication," The History of the Second World War, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945", Vol.1 to IV, ( HMSO London 1961), often referred to as the official history of the campaign, must be noted :-

  "The precise weight of bombs dropped by the strategic air forces will never be known. No one knows what happened to the great tonnages carried by aircraft which did not return, and in the various sources which survive it is by no means always clear whether these bombs are included or excluded in the reckoning. Confusion is also liable to occur as to whether the tonnages related to bombs claimed to have found targets or merely to bombs expended. For these and other reasons no two sources bear each other out exactly about the same events."

Instead of presenting complex long tables of data I have only shown most of the statistical information in graphical form, which enables comparison and trend easy to visualise. Simple linear/linear graphs in two dimensions have been deliberately used in order to achieve this end. I have always made the "bottom line " of the "y" axis zero, so that areas enclosed on a graph or bar chart appear in their correct relative proportions. Although technology is now available to make much more fancy presentations in graphic form I have avoided doing so. 

2. Available Statistics

Several independent statistical analyses of Bomber command losses have been published but no two precisely agree  when examined in detail. Usually it is difficult to determine why these differences occur owing to the fact that the criteria used in determining the basic data is either withheld or insufficiently explained.  In many cases where aircraft crashed late in an operation, but as a result of damage sustained through earlier enemy action, they were not classified in some official records as operational losses ( i.e. missing)  but lumped together with accidents as “crashes”. The most reliable summaries would appear to be the tables contained in Appendix 40 to the official history. The data on which this information was based was supplied to the authors, Sir Charles Webster and Dr Noble Frankland DFC, the latter a former Bomber Command navigator, by the Air Ministry, although most of it had been released earlier. None of the original information is in graphical form. I have noted that this data is frequently presented in  books, either modified or in its original form, without any source being properly acknowledged.

In considering the overall level of risk experienced by aircrew during a tour of duty within Bomber Command it would seem equitable to take some account of the chance of being killed in a  flying accident which occurred during associated training or when flying back to base after the operation had been carried out. It would seem that this was not always the case and it would quite difficult to do so retrospect and make any revisions. Nevertheless whichever figures are used there is sufficient  broad general agreement  to enable reliable conclusions to be reached on the changes in risk during the war. Particularly as when the data is shown  in graphical form it is quite clear that the differences in it are really of no significance.

ACM Sir A Harris' "Despatch on War Operations", written in 1945 but not  released to the public until 1995, when it was published by Frank Cass Ltd, London, provides extensive tables and graphs but they appear to have been prepared by ‘boffins' as the data is mostly given in cumulative form and the graphs are generally log-linear, neither are easily interpreted by anybody  not familiar with these  forms of presentation.

The best data available for making any analysis of aircraft losses over short periods or on a day to day basis is probably that contained in "The Bomber Command War Diaries", Middlebrook & Everitt, Viking, London, 1985, which was prepared from their own researches. A similar but slightly more concise "Diary", at least as far as the accompanying text  is concerned,  was published on the Internet by the UK Ministry of Defence, as part of the 60th anniversary commemorations of ACM Harris' appointment as Commander of Bomber Command.

In so far as the United States Army Air Forces are concerned considerable statistical data is available in the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (World War II).,Washington USA, published by the Office of Statistical Control, Headquarters in 1946, and available on the Internet at

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_index_table.html

However this document is based on contemporary statistical returns made during the war and does not appear to have been subsequently revised in the light of post war information. A major deficiency in this data is that missing and prisoners of war casualties are lumped together and consequently the data for “Died” does not include the large number of aircrew who were killed in aircraft shot down over enemy territory who were usually posted as missing.

3. Number of aircrew who served in Bomber Command on Operations.

The number of aircrew serving in the Command, on operational squadrons, at any precise point in time can be roughly estimated from the Bomber Command Order of Battle, which was prepared periodically. It would generally appear that it was  around 3,000  early in 1942 and probably reached 20,000 near the end of the war. Early in 1944 the total strength of Bomber Command, including WAAF, allied and dominion personnel under RAF posting direction was about 155,000 according to the official publication," Royal Air Force 1939-1945 "(HMSO, London,1954 ), but the number of aircrew included in this figure is not given. In his book "Bomber Offensive" (London, 1947) MRAF Harris claims that the Command strength was "never more than 250,000" air crew and ground staff.  However the separate total number of both aircrew and ground personnel who had served in the command, for any period during the war, is not known precisely.

Aircrew postings and casualties were a continuous process and were much more frequent and complex than either amongst ground crew or in the other services. If lucky enough to complete a tour of operations, generally lasting 6 to 9 months, an aircrew member would be posted to a training assignment, which was often in another command,  and would normally  have no more to do with the operational squadron he had just served on. Unlike ground crew who might serve with the same unit for several years. As a service unit the RAF squadron cannot be compared with an Army regiment or Naval ship.

Nevertheless a figure  generally accepted for the total number of aircrew who served in the command between 1939 and 1945 is that given by MRAF  A Harris in  "Bomber Offensive" (London, 1947) :  " During the whole period of the war approximately 125,000 members of air-crew entered Bomber Command units." No explanation is given of how this estimate was arrived at, nor is there any estimate in either the official histories or Harris' "Despatch on War Operations", (1945). Without a detailed analysis of records held in archives, a monumental task, it is impracticable to verify Harris' estimate, but as it is the only reputable one available I have accepted it for use in my analysis.

4. RAF Bomber Command, Total Casualties.

That 55,500 aircrew died while serving with RAF Bomber Command has been officially established and the figure widely publicised. Because a total of about 125,000 individual aircrew served in the command over the whole war period it has generally been suggested that aircrew serving in the Command had about an even chance of surviving a tour of 30 operations.  However this is an average figure and it would  only be true if the tour the 30 operations was evenly spread over the whole 6 years of the war.  In practice tours were carried out over periods of more like 6 to 12 months, and the chances of completing one varied considerably. By making certain assumptions and using basic statistical theory I have estimated the theoretical quantative chance, as a percentage, of surviving a tour of operations during different periods of time. This enables subjective assessments of the probability survival to be made.

Accurate and agreed, but never  precisely the same, figures are available from many sources of the total Aircrew Casualties in the Command. The most reliable would appear to be those given in Appendix 41 of vol IV of the official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945"  (London,1961). These have been repeated  by Middlebrook in "The Bomber Command War Diaries "(London 1985) after he had obtained confirmation of their accuracy from the Air Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence. The Figures  are :

Note. Aircrew missing on operations are assumed to have been " Killed in Action". The Air Forces Memorial at Runnymede, Near Egham, England, commemorates 20,401 airmen who have no known grave, the majority of these were lost when flying on Bomber Command  operations.   Of the casualties the aggregate of prisoners of war and fatal casualties, that is those who did not complete a tour of operations, amounted to 65,138. The official history also gives that of those Ground Staff who served in the Command 530 were killed, 1,040 died from other causes and 759 were wounded.

For comparison ACM Harris in his Despatch gives the figures as at 30th June 1945 based on the Air Ministry Casualty Circulation List No.1798 to 8^th May 1945 as

  i.e. Total of POW and fatal casualties -    68,243

The largest discrepancy between these two sets of figures is in the number of prisoners of war, the "official history" gives 9,838 whereas ACM Harris' Despatch gives 12,283, a difference for which I cannot find any explanation. However the official history  figures were completed in 1961 by which time much more revised information was available and consequently by inference alone they should be more accurate.

5. RAF & RAFVR

After the outbreak of war all new aircrew recruited were enlisted in the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) not the RAF. Originally the RAFVR had been formed as a reserve force in July 1936 to supplement the Auxiliary Air Force (AAF) which itself had been formed in 1925 by the local Territorial Associations. Generally I believe that at the time the majority of aircrew were proud that their volunteer status was so recognised. All joined as aircrew cadets, both promotion and commissioning being made at a later stage based on ability and leadership, in this respect the RAFVR was probably the first egalitarian based service.

The AAF was organised on a territorial Squadron basis, either town or county, with local recruitment similar to the Territorial Army Regiments. At the out break of war most AAF squadrons were equipped with fighters and remained so during the war.  Only a few members served in Bomber Command,

Initially, between 1936 and the outbreak of war, the RAFVR was mainly composed of civilians recruited from the neighbourhood of Reserve Flying Schools, which were run by civilian contractors  who largely employed as flying instructors members of the Reserve of Air Force Officers (RAFO), these had previously completed a four year short service commission as pilots in the regular RAF. Any territorial affiliation was accidental not deliberate. The navigation instructors employed, principally for training observers, were mostly former master mariners without any air experience. Recruits were confined to men of between 18 and 25 years of age who had been accepted for part time training as Pilots, Observers and Wireless Operators.

The object was to provide a reserve of aircrew for use in the event of war. By September 1939, the RAFVR comprised 6,646 Pilots, 1,625 Observers and 1,946 Wireless Operators ( AHB/H/116/14 quoted in "The Right of the Line", John Terraine, 1985).

Regular RAF observers were almost nonexistent, the trade had been abolished in 1919 and was not reintroduced until 1936. Observers were not formally made responsible for navigation until May 1939. In practice many co-pilots continued to be responsible for bomber navigation well in to 1941. Pre war other crew members in bomber aircraft were usually and relatively informally obtained from volunteer ground staff on a part time basis.

During the war a civilian volunteer on being accepted for aircrew training took an oath of allegiance ('attestation') and was then inducted in to the RAFVR. Normally he returned to his civilian  job for several months until he was called up for aircrew training. During this waiting period he could wear a silver RAFVR lapel badge to indicate his status.

By the end of 1941 more than half of Bomber Command aircrew were members of the RAFVR not the RAF. Most of the pre-war 'regular' pilot and observer NCO aircrew had been commissioned  and surviving regular officers and members of the RAFO were filling the posts of flight and squadron commanders.

Eventually by 1945 of the UK recruited aircrew in the Command probably more than 95% were members of the RAFVR. The very nature of the type of combat as a member of a small crew, with the individuals always in close proximity, together with the egalaterian methods of recruitment, led to a much more informal relationship between officers and NCOs than existed in the other armed forces. The presence of 30% bomber aircrew from the dominions undoubtedly intensified this camaraderie within the Command. When examined in retrospect the way in which relationships between ranks in the wartime command evolved seems to be at variance with the pre war regular RAF concept, which was based on elitest officer selection on entry. The majority of officers in the RAFVR were educated at the pre war secondary and grammar schools and very few came from the public schools (Note. The latter institutions are equivalent to US military academies).

Although the name “RAFVR” has been retained for a small number of officers supervising the Air Training Corps and a few reserve appointments the real RAFVR consisting almost entirely of aircrew ceased to exist in 1954, when the Reserve Flying Schools were disbanded.

6. Bomber Command Casualties by nationality

Thirty one percent of  those killed on operations and accidents came from Commonwealth and Allied Airforces, either serving with RAF or special national squadrons, but all under RAF Bomber Command direction. The actual number of such personnel who served with Bomber Command is not known but I have assumed that their numbers are in the same proportion as the fatal casualties by nationality and year, which is given in the official history. The following figures are derived from this source
 

Fatal Casualties in Bomber Command

To put this contribution in to perspective one must take in to account the populations of the dominion concerned :

The number per 100,000 population is probably lower for Australia because that country was also heavily involved in  fighting the war against Japan. In 6 Group Bomber Command most of the aircrew and many ground staff came from Canada

It is often wrongly stated that all Bomber Command aircrew were commissioned officers, in fact overall only about 30% of aircrew were commissioned and 70% were NCOs, but less were commissioned at the outbreak of war and more by its end. Later in the War a lot, but certainly not all, pilots and navigators were commissioned if they completed a tour of operations. During the later stages of the War in Bomber Command a much larger proportion of RCAF aircrew were commissioned than in the RAF – RAFVR.

Also at the outbreak of war there were a small number of pilots from the Dominions who had served on short service commissions with the RAF and were included in the "RAF" figures as being from the UK. Among these was the pathfinder leader Air Vice Marshal D C T Bennett who came from Australia.

7. Variation in Casualties by crew category

Alan Cooper in "Target - Dresden" (Bromley, 1995) attempts to breakdown losses by crew category, but his totals only come to 35,215, perhaps he only refers to  4 engine aircraft losses? Generally Cooper's figures indicate that navigators and bomb aimers had almost twice the chance of surviving after being shot down than other crew members.

 Several books have stated subjectively that on Halifax aircraft the navigators and bomb aimers stood a better chance of successfully bailing out in an emergency, and generally the layout of the aircraft would suggest that this  could be true.

Middlebrook in his book "The Berlin Raids" ( 1988) gives the average number of crew surviving, out of 7, in a shot down aircaft as being :

Nevertheless precise data I have for one squadron , No.77, operating Halifax II, III & V aircraft between January 1943 and April 1945 indicates 1.6 (23%) survivors for aircraft shot down.

8.  Average Probability of Survival over the whole war, 1939-45.

Accepting Harris' estimate for the number of aircrew who served in the the command, then overall out

of every hundred : 

9. Casualties by period

No official analysis of casualties  month by month seems to have been made. The main reason for this is that the breakdown in to the categories of killed, missing and prisoner of war could only be made with any degree of accuracy in retrospect after the war. However the official history gives a detailed post facto breakdown of casualties year by year commencing annually on the 3rd September. A credible estimate of monthly losses, and risk, can be made based on the close correlation, by inference and analysis, between the numbers of aircraft lost and the total crew killed, missing and taken prisoner. Not unexpectedly the correlation coefficient between 12 month totals for casualties and aircraft losses is very high, about 0.985.

10. Casualties in Other RAF Commands

The official history "Royal Air Force 1939-1945", Vol III (London,1954) gives the total RAF killed and missing as being 70,253 up to 14th August 1945. It also says  47,293 of these losses occurred on operations with Bomber Command. This figure  is rather misleading as the Bomber Command losses given  include about 17,000  killed and missing who were from the Dominion & Allied Air Forces, and only about 38,000 of these were RAF personnel recruited in the UK. It would  appear that the total figure of 70,253  does not include  the Dominion & Allied Air Forces' losses in other commands

In June 1946 a Government White Paper gave RAF killed as 69,606, missing as 6,736 and POW as 13,115. These figures are repeated in the “Statistical Digest of the War”, HMSO, London. 1951.

The official history "The Royal Air Force 1939-1945" Vol III(London, 1954)  gives the Coastal Command losses as being  :"5,866 pilots and crews, of whom 1,630 belonged to the Dominions and European Allies". However the Coastal Command Book of Remembrance contains 10,875 names.

The number of aircrew, mostly pilots, serving in the "Battle of Britain" is generally given as about 3000, and the losses  between 500 and 550 pilots killed. However many were severely wounded. Participants in the Battle of Britain are fairly well documented in several on line lists.

A more recent set of figures which is displayed on the Air Forces' Memorial at Plymouth Hoe gives, when added up, a total "air forces"  losses, air and ground crew, of around 107,000, which are broken down as follows :

 I have not been able to find out the source of these figures, neither do they appear in any of the official histories, nevertheless they seem fairly realistic. The figures for Bomber Command  include  allied and dominion losses but whether this is so in respect of the other commands is not known. One website  claims that the total  losses of the commonwealth "air forces", together with those of some allied air forces other than the USAAF and Russian, were about 117,000.

The "RAF" figure of 70,253 is taken from the official history, "Royal Air Force 1939-45, Vol III", and appears to include RAF, RAFO, AAF & RAFVR personnel, but not members of the Allied and Dominion Forces serving under RAF "posting".

 In respect of  the Bomber Command figure of 58,378 the difference between this and the official figure for aircrew, of 55,500 given above in para.4 is largely accounted for by the inclusion of ‘deaths from natural causes’ and ground staff deaths.

 Most of the other figures probably include ground staff deaths, including those from natural causes, which were higher overseas than in the United Kingdom but generally still much lower than the number of aircrew deaths.

Personnel of the US Army Air Forces who were killed during the war are only included in the Bomber Command, and probably the other command's losses, if they were serving with RAF units.

Note. During the period 1939-45 the following acronyms were widely used, RAF .= Royal Air Force, RAFO = Reserve of Air Force Officers, AAF = Auxiliary Air Force, RAFVR = Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve.

11.  Total Sorties Flown and Aircraft Losses, Bomber Command

Tables showing monthly  sorties flown and aircraft lost appear in the official history . These figures were derived after the war from Bomber Command Operations Record Books and reports of the command's Operational Research Section. Before February 1942 the reports were less detailed than later. The data for despatched and missing aircraft are considered to be  reliable, but the criteria used in determining what was considered to be a crashed aircraft is not always clear. ACM Sir A Harris' Despatch also contains cumulative data for sorties and missing aircraft, from which monthly figures can be derived. Some tables list all sorties but others do not include minelaying and radar counter measure sorties.

Graphs based on the data in the official history clearly show the trends in both operational sorties despatched and aircraft lost, the latter also shows the number of crashed aircraft. Half of all the sorties  took place after April 1944, during the last year of the war period . But 73% of aircraft that went missing did so before this date.

.
   Operational Sorties Despatched Each Calendar Month

Phases of the Offensive
                                   (i) The Phoney War
                                   (ii) Night bombing of Germany commences
                                   (iii) Mainly Wellington attacks on German cities
                                   (iv) ACM Harris' takes over, "1000" bomber raids
                                   (v)  Operation "Pointblank" begins
                                   (vi) "Battle of Berlin"
                                   (vii) Invasion of Europe

From the annual totals for the whole war the official history gives 364,514 Sorties despatched and 8325 aircraft missing, whereas according to data contained in ACM Sir A Harris' Despatch a total of 389,809 Sorties of all categories were despatched during the war and 8655 aircraft went missing. The latter figure includes mining, counter measures and miscellaneous. Throughout the war there was a marked seasonal variation in command activity with both the number of operations and losses peaking during the summer months.

Note
W R Chorley, in his " RAF Bomber Command Losses" Vol 1-6 ( published 1990-2000), gives figures which total 11,099 operational aircraft losses, 1,098 non operational and 101 ground losses.

12. Loss Rate, A Measure of Risk

A sortie is a flight by a single aircraft on an operational (combat) mission.  “Loss rate” is the number of aircraft lost divided by the number of sorties dispatched, expressed as a percentage.

The average loss  rate, missing aircraft only, on sorties over the whole war period was about 2.0% whereas if  ‘crashed' aircraft are included the rate increases to 2.7%. As a substantial number of aircraft crashing did so as a  result of damage sustained on operations it would not seem unreasonable in making any analysis, at least as far as risk is concerned, to include them as operational losses, nevertheless often this is not done.

 Over both short and long periods, and for different aircraft types, the short term loss rates differ from the average due to changes  in operational factors, including such factors as new navigational aids, counter measures (e.g. window), radar cover and weather conditions.

After March 1944 the Command mainly switched from the bombing of industrial cities to tactical attacks in support of Operation "Overlord", the invasion of Europe. Notwithstanding continuing high losses the loss rate declined substantially  due to the considerable increase in the number of sorties flown, and during the last year of the war the breakdown in German defenses. The above graph shows the variation in average monthly loss rate for all aircraft types, including both missing and crashed aircraft. In assessing risk to crew members, loss rate is the governing factor rather than total losses.

During 1939 and 1940 relatively few operations took place and statistically the average loss rate varied considerably with quite small changes in actual losses and any assessment made during this period should be viewed with caution. However by 1941 sufficient operations were taking place  to indicate a meaningful trend. It should be noted that some raids had a considerable effect in boosting home morale and lowering morale in Germany,  out of all proportion to the number of aircraft and tonnage of bombs dropped when compared to the last year of the war.

Between July 1942, when detailed analysis started and May 1945, 5807 aircraft went missing on night operations. Of these  2278 (39%)  were shot down by fighters, 1318 (23%) by flak and 112 (2%) were lost in collisions. But in 2069 (36%) cases the cause of loss is not known.  Based on these figures the ratio of fighter to flak losses was very roughly 2 to 1. However because of the large number of cases when the cause was not known this ratio can only be a rough estimate. On night raids losses through fighter attack increased rapidly in the first half of 1943, but declined sharply following the introduction of the radar countermeasure  "Window" in July 1943. It then increased again and only declined after the invasion of Europe, when the allied attacks were mainly against tactical targets and included many daylight raids. It reached a low in October 1944 and then again increased during the final throes of German defeat.

13. The Operational Tour of Duty

John Terraine in "The Right of the Line "(London, 1985) deals with tours of duty under the heading of "Moral Fibre", he suggests that the concept of a tour of duty stems from the pattern of trench warfare which started in 1915 when it became obvious that troops required relief after long periods at the front. The US AAF also had tours of duty but not the German Air Force (Luftwaffe).

All aircrew serving in the Royal Air Force had volunteered for flying duties, however once they had done so they were bound by military law to carry out any orders they were given. Flying ceased to be voluntary and they could not pick and choose which operations they flew on.

By the end of 1940 the Air Ministry had generally unoficially accepted that a tour of operational duty should offer a 50%  chance of survival, and  in the case of Bomber Command this was accepted as being 30 sorties, but not exceeding 200 hours of operational flying. It was also accepted that after a period  of 6 to 12 months free from operational flying that a crew member would be required to carry out a second tour, but a third tour was not mandatory.

In August 1942 ACM Harris, the new head of Bomber Command, indicated that he wanted to change the basis of a tour to 30 "sorties completed", and that a completed sortie would be one for  which the crew satisfied the squadron commander, normally by photographic evidence, that the target had been bombed. However the taking of a photograph of the actual target aiming point was generally opposed by crews as this required that the aircraft be flown straight and level for two or three minutes after bomb release, during which period evasive action could not be taken and the aircraft became an easy target for both ack-ack fire and fighter attack.   

The de jure length of operational tours for all commands were not officially laid down by the Air Ministry until May 1943, when that for Bomber Command   was set at 30 sorties for a first tour and not more than 20 for a second tour, with no mention been made of any need to satisfy the squadron commander that the target had in fact been bombed. The stint for the crews in the Pathfinder Force (8 Group) was set at one tour of 45 sorties. It should be appreciated that any crew member who had completed a tour before the end of 1943 was pretty certain to be required to carry out a second tour. Many of the early members of aircrew were lost on second tours. During the last year of the war the length of a first tour was widely extended for up to 40 sorties. 

14. Theoretical Mathematical Relationship Between Loss Rate and Surviving a Tour of Duty.

(For the mathematically minded only )

The validity of any analysis of the probability of surviving a tour of operations is largely dependent on the extent to which an aircraft loss can be considered to be a random event rather than one predetermined by the conditions surrounding its occurrence. If losses were entirely random than the  mathematics of probability should be applicable. However inference would suggest that more operational experience should increase the probability of survival whereas lack of it should have the opposite effect,  nevertheless there is insufficient statistical data or other evidence  available to prove this. It can be argued that as a crew completed more operations they were able to abort in the event of engine or equipment failure without any fear of being accused of being lacking in moral fibre, a stigma feared by many . New crews hated this slur and therefore probably took greater risks . Whilst there is no overall agreement many former bomber aircrew consider that  the chance of being shot down was lacking in any plan, system or purpose. In other words it was a random event. You were lucky, you survived.

All  theoretical treatments have to make certain assumptions which are often only part truths.  Notwithstanding this the end result can still give a very good approximation of the truth in meaningful numerical terms, which can either confirm or reject conclusions based on intuition. In this instance it should be noted that Middlebrook in Chapter 12 of "The Bomber Command War Diaries" and the official history both draw attention to the mathematical  chances of a crew surviving 50 operations with different average loss rates, and that the Air Ministry used such scientific advice in its deliberations.

The principles involved are as follows:
 If the probability of survival on one operation = Ps    And that of failure = Pf
 then    Ps +Pf = 1
 and     Ps = 1 - Pf

 If the probability of survival on n operations is Pn
 Then
 Pn = (1 - Pf )^n              i.e. the quantity in brackets is raised to the power n
   The percentage probability of surviving n operations is  Pn x 100.
 This calculation is easily carried out on a pocket scientific calculator or a loglog slide rule.
 .

EXAMPLE
 Problem.
 If the average loss rate over 3 months is 4% what is the probability of surviving 30 operations  carried out during that period ?

Answer.     In probability calculations a 4% loss rate is equal to 4/100, or 0.04,
The number of operations n is 30,
The probability of surviving 30 operations is then (1 - 0.04)^30 or    (0.96)^30,
(i.e. the quantity in brackets is raised to the power 30)
Solving with a pocket calculator in this case the probability of surviving 30 ops is 0.2938 or 29.4 %.
A 2.7% average loss rate would give the average probability of surviving 30 ops as 44.0%,
and a 2.2% average loss rate gives a probability of survival of 51.3%.
To achieve a 50% probability of survival on a 30 ops tour the average loss rate should not exceed 2.3%.
 

15. Theoretical probability of completing a 30 Operation Tour of Duty carried out over  6 month at different periods .

The calculation of the product of the individual survival probability on each operation, analysed by aircraft type, would enable a more  truthfull estimate but it is difficult to work out in practice and the use of the average loss rate over short periods produces a close approximation to the truth.

Using  calculated average monthly loss rates over the preceding 6 months I have calculated the theoretical probability of completing a tour of 30 operations. This is of course  an average probability for the whole command, and if the data is analysed separately for different aircraft types significant variations appear.

.

The above graph only takes in to account missing aircraft, but excludes losses in crashes, and  it is therefore "conservative". In this context probability is likely to be best understood if it is thought of as the number of aircrew surviving 30 operations  out of a group of  one hundred entering the command, spread out over different groups and squadrons, rather than that of an individual's chance of survival. For the purpose of this analysis surviving a tour means neither being killed, posted missing nor  taken prisoner of war. The object of the graph is to indicate the broad trend in the probability of surviving a tour rather than a specific individual's chances of having done so.

16. Analysis's of Survival Probability over shorter periods, Lancaster v. Halifax

The following graph shows the average monthly loss rate between January 1943 and June 1944 for the two main aircraft types used over this period, separately. It shows clearly that the loss rate for Halifax aircraft was higher than that for Lancasters

.

The following graph shows the estimated probability of surviving a tour carried out over the preceding 6 months on either Halifax or Lancaster aircraft over the period June 1943 to June 1944. The data on which it is based has been derived  mainly from the  sorties and losses given in Middlebrook's "The Bomber Command War Diaries". It covers all major raids and most but not all smaller ones, where the data is not  broken down in to aircraft types.

...

Over the 113 day period 3rd November 1943 to the 25th February 1944 the command carried out 31 major raids, 15 of which were against Berlin. The period is generally referred to as the "Battle of Berlin". The losses for Halifax aircraft,  primarily Mark II & V, were 258 out 3,982 sorties  dispatched on 20 of these raids, a loss rate of 6.5%. Anybody flying on all these 20 raids had a theoretical  26% probability of surviving them.

The highestHalifax losses were :

Any crew member taking part in all these 5 raids had only a 54% chance of surviving them. In fact the losses were so high that  insufficient replacement crews were under training to replace them and on some squadrons the strength dropped well below establishment level.

Appendix 42 to Vol IV of " The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany" gives a breakdown of  Halifax loss rates which shows that in December 1943  with 713 sorties flown the loss rate was 8.1%, and in February 1944 with a total of 269 sorties flown it was 10.8%.

As an example of an individual squadron's losses, 77 Squadron, based at Elvington in Yorkshire, lost 22 aircraft during the period, November 1943 to February 1944.  117 aircrew were killed in action, or missing presumed dead, 39 were taken prisoner of war and 3 evaded capture.  A total of 159, almost equivalent to loosing 80-90% of the "squadron strength" over the  4 month period. ( Based on data in "Some of the Many, 77 Squadron 1939-45" (Roy Walker, 1995)).

After the  loss of 34 Halifaxes  on the night of 19 February 1944 ten squadrons equipped with Halifax II & V aircraft were withdrawn from operations against major German targets, however the "Battle of Berlin" was nearly over and in a few weeks most of the British and American bomber force was soon to be engaged in the assault on tactical targets  in support of the invasion of Europe.

17. Operation Pointblank

Following the meeting between President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill at Casablanca in January 1943 it was agreed by the Chiefs of Staff that the RAF Bomber Command operations against Germany should be reinforced by the active participation of the US 8th Army Air Force, which although it had been based in England since mid 1942, had only carried out a few raids. The resulting Combined Operations Offensive plan was called Operation Pointblank. In October 1943 the US 9th Army Air Force was transferred from North Africa to join up with the 8th in England.

The opening text of the directive was 

 "Your primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed  resistance is fatally weakened."

Whilst MRAF Sir C Portal was charged with the "strategic direction" of both British and American bomber operations, matters of tactics and technique were left to the commanders concerned, ACM Sir A Harris and Lieut.Gen. Ira Eaker, with the result that the two  forces tended to go their own different ways in  respect of detail. Whilst the RAF mainly carried out area bombing and the USAAF precision attacks against small targets the bomber offensive against Germany was a combined one and the overall tonnage of bombs dropped, aircraft and crews lost, must be taken together in assessing the effect on Germany.  

18. RAF Bomber Command Striking Power Available

Large four engined bombers were being planned and designed for the RAF in the mid thirties but when the war broke out in 1939 the bomber force consisted entirely of twin engined aircraft, and these predominated until the autumn of 1942.
 ACM Sir A Harris' Despatch gives the Average Number of Aircraft in the Squadrons of Bomber Command, Available Daily, with Crew as :-

...............................

In the light of the above figures the high turnout on the three ‘1000' bomber raids in May and June 1942 on Cologne, Essen and Bremen, was not representative of the normal striking force of the command and was only  achieved by utilising training aircraft, OTU instructors and crews under  training.
( Note OTU= Operational Training Unit)

According to John Messenger in his book "Cologne the first 1000 bomber raid" (London 1982), on 30/31 May 1942,  898 aircraft (86%) out of the 1047 dispatched bombed the target, 40 aircraft went missing and 19 crashed. 367  of the aircraft came from OTUs. The total weight of bombs dropped was 1,455 tons of which 63% were incenderies.  The overall loss rate was 5.6% of those despatched.

Instructor crews and those  under training could not be used on a regular basis, otherwise squadron losses would not be replaced and the command would decline in strength. The 1000 bomber raid on Cologne was judged a great success but that on Essen was not, due to many crews failing to locate the target. That on Bremen was in between. The raids were a warning to Germany of what could happen in the future but they were not repeatable at that period of time. Post war analysis indicted that they did not have any significant effect on  German war production.

ACM Harris in his "Despatch" (page 46, table 4) gives the "Available Bomblift in Tons " , this was the effective load of all available crewed aircraft. In consequence when incendaries were carried instead of high explosive the figure is lower. It was an approximate and  "conservative" estimate, but when given graphically it clearly shows the growth in the command's striking power over the last two years of the war.

... ...............

 
19. Average Bomb Load per Aircraft

In 1941 the average bombload per attacking aircraft was 2,889 lbs whereas by 1944 it had risen  to 9,155 lbs according to ACM Harris' Despatch. In the official history the average bomb load of RAF bombers is given as 6,903 lbs in 1943, and 8250 lbs in 1944, and the corresponding figures given for the US AAF were 3,220 lb and 3,980 lb respectively. US AAF aircraft carried considerably more defensive armament and ammunition than RAF Bomber Command aircraft, they also used up a lot of fuel formating prior to setting course for the target, they consequently carried a lower average bomb load in terms of weight per aircraft,

20. Total Weight of Bombs Dropped by Bomber Command, (tons of 2240 lbs)

The total weight of bombs dropped by Bomber Command amounted to 988,281 tons, or excluding sea-mines 955,044 tons, of which  45%  was dropped on industrial city targets, amounting to some 431,000 tons, 13% on Troops & Defences after D-Day, 14% on Transportation in NW Europe and 10% on Oil Targets. In the last three months of 1944 more weight of bombs was dropped than during the whole of 1943.  According to data in ACM Harris' Despatch 68.8% was dropped on Germany, 30.19% on "Enemy Occupied Territory" and 0.94% on Italy.

The 8 & 9 US Army Air Forces Campaign

21. General

The figures given in this paper about the 8 & 9 USAAF have been derived from data given in the "Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (World War II) (Washington,1945)" and  the "Table Numbers" given refer to those in that document. Most of the information was collected and summated monthly soon after the relevant events occurred, consequently the figures for missing crew and prisoners of war are  given as one figure and not separated. For the purpose of analysis the war against Germany was split in to:

  (I) European Theater of Operations (ETO), covering the 8 AAF, and 9 AAF operations beginning October 1943, from bases in Great Britain.

 (II) Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO), covering the 12 AF and 15 AF, and 9AF operations prior to October 1943. Many operations, such as the raid on Ploesti, were from bases in North Africa and although the targets were in Europe the operations are classified as being in the MTO.

22. Tonnage of Bombs Dropped by 8 & 9 USAAF ( in tons of 2240 lbs)

NOTE

The weight of bombs dropped given in the original data is in Short Tons, of 2000 lb, for the purposes of this paper these weights have been converted in to British Imperial ( or Long) Tons, of 2240 lb, so that a direct comparison can be made with the RAF figures. The Metric Tonne is equal to 2204.6 pounds, almost the same as the Long Ton for practical purposes.

The tonnage of bombs dropped by the USAAF against all targets " VS Germany" from bases in both the European (ETO) and Mediterranean (MTO) Theaters of Operation amounted to 1,388,000 tons (Table 141), of this 638,000 tons were dropped by the heavy bombers ( Table 143 ) of the 8 & 9 AAF operating from bases in the United Kingdom.

23.Combined RAF & USAAF Bombing Effort

In 1977 MRAF Sir A Harris said :

"You know the work our crews did in Bomber Command and whenever I speak of the Bomber Strategic Offensive, I couple with it 50-50 our gallant American friends of the Eighth United States Airforce. Whenever I think of what they achieved, I realize that you have never really been given adequate recognition of what you all did ."*

 However the resultant tactical, morale and economic effect of the different techniques used by the two forces are almost impossible to evaluate comparatively in numeric terms. Whilst British and American bombing surveys were carried out immediately after the war, when examined in retrospect neither appear to have been without some bias in assessing the effect of the other's efforts.

It should be noted that ‘Germany' in this context includes the occupied territories. All RAF Bomber Command raids, including those against Italy from bases in the UK, are included. However raids carried out by the 12th & 15th US Army Air Forces, and the 9th US Army Air Force  before October 1943, from bases in the ‘Mediterranean Theater of Operations' are not included e.g. the raids on Ploesti in Roumania.

RAF Bomber Command figures do not include bombing raids carried out over Europe  by the RAF from bases in the Middle East, except for a few shuttle flights.

The data used for the above graphs is only an indication of the tonnage of bombs which was loaded on to aircraft. The actual amount dropped on targets was undoubtedly  considerably less. The accuracy of bombing was generally low in the early days of the campaign but improved considerably during the latter stage of the war.  Although the usual objective  of the RAF was the  night bombing of

i

industrialised areas and that of the USAAF the precision bombing in daylight of specific targets, the latter was by no means “precise” in actual operations.  In practice, if not by intent, the two objectives often complimented each other, leading to a relentless assault against Germany during the last year of the war.

The following quotation from the “United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Summary Report. Washington Sept 1945” gives in retrospect a far different assessment of  “precision bombing” by the USAAF than has been  generally publicised :

“The U. S. Army Air Forces entered the European war with the firm view that specific industries and services were the most promising targets in the enemy economy, and they believed that if these targets were to be hit accurately, the attacks had to be made in daylight. A word needs to be said on the problem of accuracy in attack. Before the war, the U. S. Army Air Forces had advanced bombing techniques to their highest level of development and had trained a limited number of crews to a high degree of precision in bombing under target range conditions, thus leading to the expressions "pin point" and "pickle barrel" bombing. However, it was not possible to approach such standards of accuracy under battle conditions imposed over Europe. Many limiting factors intervened; target obscuration by clouds, fog, smoke screens and industrial haze; enemy fighter opposition which necessitated defensive bombing formations, thus restricting freedom of maneuver; antiaircraft artillery defenses, demanding minimum time exposure of the attacking force in order to keep losses down; and finally, time limitations imposed on combat crew training after the war began.

It was considered that enemy opposition made formation flying and formation attack a necessary tactical and technical procedure. Bombing patterns resulted -- only a portion of which could fall on small precision targets. The rest spilled over on adjacent plants, or built-up areas, or in open fields. Accuracy ranged from poor to excellent. When visual conditions were favorable and flak defenses were not intense, bombing results were at their best. Unfortunately, the major portion of bombing operations over Germany had to be conducted under weather and battle conditions that restricted bombing technique, and accuracy suffered accordingly. Conventionally the air forces designated as "the target area" a circle having a radius of 1000 feet around the aiming point of attack. While accuracy improved during the war, Survey studies show that, in the over-all, only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within this target area. A peak accuracy of 70% was reached for the month of February 1945. These are important facts for the reader to keep in mind, especially when considering the tonnages of bombs delivered by the air forces. Of necessity a far larger tonnage was carried than hit German installations.”

24. Fatal Casualties 8 & 9 USAAF  - a new assessment. 

The official source for information on USAAF casualties during World War 2 is the "Army Air Forces Statistical Digest (World War II), published by the HQ Army Air Forces immediately after the War. This document is currently available on the Internet at http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_index_table.html

Total fatal casualties are not classified separately  but shown as either "Died" or included under the general heading "Missing, Interned and Captured". The separate numbers  of those “Captured”, i.e. prisoners of war, and “Missing” are not given in the Digest.  This  is because the figures are derived from data collected at the time the operations took place, and it was not possible to split them . The  present day US Air Force Historical Research Agency is unable to come up with a breakdown by either "Theater" or "Air Force" of the numbers of prisoners of war or missing personnel.  Because  of the absence of a breakdown it is not possible give a graph of the monthly fatal casualties, nevertheless as generally 10 crew flew in each heavy bomber  a graph of monthly crew losses would be similar to that  for heavy bomber losses shown below :-

 A total figure of  about 26,000 USAAF aircrew taken prisoners of war in Europe is frequently mentioned in unofficial sources, and I have used that figure in this paper to work out the estimated numbers of "missing".  It is assumed that the prisoners were taken in both the ETO and MTO. Today it is not unreasonable to assume that nearly all “Missing” personal may now be considered to have been killed (i.e. “Died”).

The crew casualties include those incurred in the fighter aircraft which operated as an integral part of the bombing force, but only sorties and aircraft losses are given separately for fighters and bombers.

In addition to the separate tables for the ETO and MTO, a third set of tables is given in respect of "......in Theaters VS Germany.." which  combines figures from both theaters for operations against Germany.

Combined "Battle casualties - Died, Missing, Interned and Captured"  in "Theaters against Germany" (Table 35) ,i.e. European Theater of Operations (ETO) plus the Medeiterranean Theater of Operations (MTO), amounted to 81,205, (i.e. 94,565 total casualties less  13,360 wounded  and evacuated), of which 30,099 are classified as "Died" and 51,106 as "Missing, Interned and Captured".

No breakdown is given for the number of  "Interned and Captured" included in the 51,106 figure, however the unofficial estimates of around 26,000  POW would give the estimated total number of  “ killed and missing” as  about  55,000 (i.e. 81,205 less 26,000) for the two "Theaters". This figure  includes  both bomber and associated fighter crew members .

The above figure is comparable with the United Kingdom RAF Bomber Command fatal casualties of  55,500 during the same campaign.

The “Battle casualties, Died, Missing, Interned and Captured" (Table 36)  for the 8 & 9 AAF only,  operating from bases in Great Britain, amounted 54,997, (i.e. 63,410 less 8,413 wounded and evacuated), of which 19,876 are classified as died and 35,121 as "Missing, Interned and Captured". No official  separate estimates are available for the "Interned and Captured" but if it is assumed to be the same ratio as in the combined European and Mediterranean theaters i.e. 69% in ETO, then the POW, i.e.“interned and captured” would amount to about 18,000,   and  the estimated number of  “ missing”  17,121. 

The estimate for the total number of died (i.e.killed) and missing (now presumed killed) on these operations becomes about 37,000, (i.e. 17,121 “missing” plus 19,876 “Died”),

(Note. ETO = European Theater of Operations,  MTO = Mediterranean Theater of Operations)

25. Number of Sorties and Bomber losses, 8 & 9 USAAF

The aircraft employed by the 8 & 9 US AAF, the B17 and B24 four engined bombers, generally carried a crew of 10 consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, wireless operator and five air gunners. The RAF Bomber Command Lancaster, Halifax and Stirlings carried 7 crew consisting of pilot, navigator, flight engineer, bomb aimer, wireless operator and two air gunners.

The combined number of heavy bomber sorties mounted by the 8 & 9 USAAF between August 1942 and May 1945 was 332,904 of which 274,921 were classified as "effective". A peak numbers of 28,925 sorties were mounted in the month of June 1944.  and 31,169 in March 1945. (Table 119)

A peak number of about 4000 heavy bomber aircraft "on hand" for operations was reached in August 1944, comprising 2,392 B17 and 1,608 B24, supported by 1,951 P51 Fighters.

The number of heavy bombers "lost" by the 8 & 9 AAF amounted to 5,548, of which 2,452 were shot down by enemy fighters and 2,439 by anti aircraft fire. 607 bombers were lost through other causes. 5,324 fighter aircraft of the 8 & 9 AAF were also lost, but it is not clear whether all the fighter losses occurred during protection cover on bombing raids.(Table 159). Because operations were in daylight and losses were observed by other aircraft these figures are probably very accurate.

The overall heavy bomber loss rate for the 8 & 9 USAAF was 1.7%. In 1943 1036 bombers were lost with an average loss rate of 3.8%. A tour of operations was set at 25 missions so that during 1943 the probability of completing a tour of operations was 38%.  In October 1943 186 heavy bombers were lost on 2831 sorties, a loss rate of 6.6%.   A tour of operations with the 8 & 9 AAF was at first 25 sorties but in the last year of the war this was increased to 40 sorties,

26. Some Differences between RAF Bomber Command and 8 & 9 USAAF Operations

From 1941 until June 1944 nearly all raids carried out by the heavy bomber force of RAF Bomber Command were at night. Each Aircraft flew on its own and without navigation lights. Avoiding collision was largely a matter of look out and luck.The pilot was normally in command of the aircraft and the crew was responsible to him for finding the target and bombing it, although on many occasions the Pathfinder Force might mark the target area and direct the general bombing tactics. When Bomber Command carried out daytime raids in 1944 the aircraft did not fly in formation but as a "gaggle", with each crew bombing on their own initiative. The crew of a bomber was very much a separate operational unit, fully responsible for taking  all its own decisions and actions until return to base. Keeping on track was the responsibility of the navigator and pilots might fly  for long periods using the autopilot. A flight or squadron commander, once airborne had very limited command over other aircraft. A station commander, if he ever flew, would probably do so as a supernumerary crew member responsible to the aircraft commander, even if the latter was of lower rank.

The 8 & 9 USAAF flew as a team, aircraft took off and formated in to squadrons, wings and groups in the base area before setting forth as an aerial armada for the target. As the force approached enemy territory it was joined by escorting fighter cover. Position in formation had to be rigidly maintained, and if another aircraft was shot down or damaged, then those remaining would move up in the formation. Navigation and target location was the responsibility of lead aircraft, usually flown by senior officers, the navigators in following aircraft just kept a plot of position in case they had to take over as  lead aircraft. Gunnery officers  could direct and coordinate fire. When the target  was reached the bombardiers in the lead aircraft told the others when to drop their bombs. High ranking officers often flew in lead aircraft as active commanders and combatants. To reduce losses amongst senior officers the "lead aircraft" was not always placed at the front of a formation.

27. Bombing and its effect on the enemy - Some thoughts

It must be appreciated that ACM Sir A Harris was an early protagonist of victory in warfare through bombing alone, and much of what he wrote was with the object of persuading people that this was an effective way of waging war and achieving the defeat of Germany without the use of ground forces.

Although early in the war it was agreed that daylight bombing was more likely to be accurate and effective than night bombing the high losses sustained in early British daylight bombing raids indicated that to continue them, with the small force available, was impracticable. Consequently in October 1940 the Air Ministry declared a policy of concentrating on night bombing only.

The new policy was implemented  by a raid, on 16 December 1940, on the general area of Mannheim,  with the main aim of attacking civilian morale. John Terraine in "The Right of the Line" (London,1985) points out that ‘attacking morale' means putting the fear of death into individuals. Whilst some people have claimed that such action was contrary to the ‘the rules of war' it was practiced by Germany in 1940 and was never excluded by any International Treaty in force. British policy became one of area bombing rather than the precision attack of selected industrial targets, although a reduction in oil production was a stated aim.

Only a relatively small proportion, less than 10%, of the  total tonnage of bombs delivered by Bomber Command during the war were dropped prior to 1943. The actual damage inflicted up to this point in the war was relatively small when compared to that  later inflicted in the combined offensive. Nevertheless it is generally considered that the early bomber attacks were not a waste of effort as they had a substantial  morale and propaganda effect both at home and in Europe. This was particularly true when  conditions allowed successful raids to be carried out, for example those on Rostock (26 April 1942), Lubeck (28 March 1942),  Cologne (30 May 1942) when about 870 aircraft attacked the target dropping 1455 tons of bombs, Augsburg (17 April 1942) and the Ruhr. These raids not only boosted civilian morale in Britain, and its Allies, but brought home to the Germans the fact that they were not secure from air attack regardless of  Goering and Hitler's claims to the contrary. However in considering the period prior to 1943, except for the raid on Augsburg which was carried out by Lancasters, the majority of the aircraft involved were  twin engine bombers and in retrospect it can be argued that the damage caused  and loss of war production was not ‘cost effective' when taking in to account the considerable losses in both highly trained  crews and aircraft. The Bomber Command average monthly loss rate during 1942 and 1943 varied between 2.5% and 6.5%, or about 4.5% overall, so that during this period about 75% of crews were either killed or taken prisoners of war.

According to the Butt Report (1941,  text given in the official history vol.IV) and  data in ACM Harris' Despatch, up to early 1943 the accuracy of bombing was such that only between 22% and 32% of photos plotted, based on 6 monthly averages, showed that bombs had been dropped within 3 miles of the aiming point, however later in the war this figure increased to 90%.  ACM Harris' admits that insufficient  data was available and adequate statistical techniques were not developed until much later in the war to make a satisfactory assessment of bombing accuracy and effectiveness. Generally the inference is that as the war progressed  the amount of bombing increased and both its accuracy and effectiveness improved at the same time.

It should be appreciated that the bombers used in the early part of the war were  inadequately equipped to carry out night operations  satisfactorily. They relied on radio direction finding, celestial navigation, map reading, systematic estimation and relatively elementary techniques to locate the target, much of which could only be used properly in good weather conditions and when there was a full moon. Neither were the compasses, bomb sights and  auto pilots accurate or reliable. Radar aids to navigation did not start to become available until early in 1942 when 10 Squadrons ( less than 200 aircraft) were progressively equipped  with the "Gee" ground based navigation position finding aid, and this was soon jammed over Europe by German countermeasures. The initially used airborne equipment  had a very low reliability and frequently failed, maintenance costs both in parts and manpower was very high. Airborne radar using the  "H2S" radar mapping equipment was slowly introduced in 1943, but similarly had a very low initial reliability. The first equipment operating on 10 cm proved very difficult to use in practice due to the coarseness of the picture, and it was not until its replacement by 3 cm equipment at the end of 1943 did "H2S" become a really useful navigation aid. H2S also had the disadvantage that it enabled German night fighters to home on to the aircraft using it. By 1943 practically all the four engine bombers were fitted with a remote indicating gyro stabilised compass system linked to the Mk.14 bomb sight and an automatic device (Air Position Indicator) for keeping a record of  course flown and speed, all of which resulted in a considerable improvement in the accuracy of navigation and target location.

Late in July 1943 ACM Harris ordered 4 raids on Hamburg. For the first time the radar countermeasure "windows" was dropped to confound the German defences and as a result considerably reduced the losses in bomber aircraft. A total of 3,091 sorties were despatched on which about 10,000 tons of bombs were dropped, half of which were incendiaries. On the second raid on the 27th July due to an unexpected chain of events an immense firestorm broke out and it is estimated that about 40,000 people were killed and an entire residential area containing 16,000 buildings  destroyed. Consequently the raid was a severe blow to both the German economy and morale.  However the raid demonstrated  the unpredictability of the outcome of area bombing raids and an equivalent level of damage on one raid was not repeated until those on Dresden and  Pforzheim in February 1945, when similar fire storms broke out.  Generally the number of civilian deaths resulting from area bombing raids were nowhere as high as during these two raids.

Sometimes a raid could be disastrous for the attacking force but with little loss of life or damage on the ground. For example on the 30^th March 1944 a force of 795 RAF bombers was dispatched to attack Nuremberg. German fighters had a field day and 95 bombers were lost, 12 % of the force sent. About 460 aircrew were killed and 150 taken prisoners of war. The damage on the ground was negligible and only about 70 people were killed. The task of attacking Germany by air was by no means the walkover  often portrayed by critics today.    On the 17^th August 1943 the USAAF sent 376 B17 bombers to attack factories  at Regensburg and Schweinfurt (ball bearings) , 60 aircraft were shot down  with the loss of about 560 aircrew. Whilst production at Schweinfurt was at first cut to 35%  it was restored to its previous level within four months.

During the 4 years between the  fall of France and Operation Overlord, in 1944, only Bomber Command, and later the US 8th AAF, carried the War in to the German heartland thereby confounding Nazi claims of Luftwaffe supremacy in the air. The bombing assault also meant the diversion of vast German resources  to domestic air defence, thereby  reducing the number of troops and armament available on the military fronts. However the joint cost to the United States, Great Britain and other Allies  was heavy  with a total of about 110,000 well educated and highly trained aircrew being killed and around 35,000 taken prisoners of war.

The overall bomber losses during the winter of 1943-4 were sufficiently large as to create some doubts as to the allied ability to maintain strategic bombing. However the preparation for the invasion of Europe was underway and it had been agreed that the bombing effort should now mainly be diverted to tactical and transportation targets in NW Europe.

About 50% of the total tonnage of all bombs  dropped took place during the last 9 months of the war and in looking at the  damage to Germany afterwards this should be taken in to account. It would also seem that as the effectiveness of bombing increased the ability of German industry to recover declined more rapidly. On the other hand neither the British and American Bombing Surveys nor the analyses made in the official history generally support the view that the war could have been won by bombing alone. Nevertheless after the war a number of senior German commanders and leaders, including Field-Marshal von Rundstedt and Field Marshal Kesselring, have been quoted as saying that in their view the Strategic Bombing Offensive was one of the main reasons Germany was defeated . ( Air Power, MRAF Visc.Trenchard, 1946).