This question has been central to the life and concerns of humanity since the earliest days. Perhaps it was at first taken for granted that God or "the gods" existed. How else could primitive men and women explain the wonders and horrors of life and the world in which it was played out? Over time the question has become more contentious as many have come to believe that belief itself is at least misguided and delusional and at most pathological. Before considering the arguments in favour of "the existence of God" (not all of which I approve of or agree with!) I shall review some of the arguments against belief in God, and before that I shall address the prime issue "What is God?"

What is God?

Some believers are happy to attribute to God dependencies upon the Cosmos that make the "divinity" nothing more than the most elevated of all things: not absolutely distinct from everything else, but only the greatest thing of all. This is normally done on the basis of portraying God as compassionate, loving and caring: all of which I believe God to be, in a fundamentally important but not simple sense. The ultimate version of this doctrine is "patripassionism", the notion that God the Father suffered in the crucifixion of Jesus; something that was unequivocally condemned by the Early Fathers of the Church. Such a "divinity" is simply not divine. At best it is the "demi-urge" of Gnosticism, an instrument that God might use to do the dirty work of creation. There are echoes here of Arianism, the doctrine that the Christ was not God, but only "divine" in the sense of (very) god-like. There are understandable motives for such a view of God, as I shall describe in my brief treatment of the "Problem of Pain", but these do not excuse the simple metaphysical mistake. If God is not absolutely independent of the Cosmos, utterly other and sovereign then God isn't God and we are talking incoherent nonsense.

What is existence?

A better question to ask is simply "Is God?" but this sounds affected in English. For a discussion of this topic, I recommend the play "Jumpers" by Tom Stoppard, in which the hero agonizes over this question at some amusing length.

Some misexplanations of Theism

An emotional crutch

Of course, the fact that some people entertain the notion that "God is" from personal inadequacy does not mean that "God is not". The fact that many people find such an inadequacy within themselves is rather some sort of an argument for God's being - but not a very good one, I think.

A support for sanity

I find this highly plausible, except for the fact that there are many people who profess to be agnostic or atheist, have no notion that their lives have any lasting or objective significance and yet seem to maintain their sanity well enough. I'm not sure that I could do this, if I became unconvinced of God's being: after more than forty years of theism!  However the fact that they can and do so invalidates this argument, it seems to me. In any case, I would argue that belief in God doesn't really answer this purpose. The futility of final extinction is no more mitigated by the fact that "God is" than by the fact that friends and family may survive one's death - for a while. The horror of the termination of my particularity of personhood can only be mitigated by a belief in some kind of continuity of life, experience and activity after death!

Of course, this has most definitely not been a core feature of all religions. While the Egyptians had a sophisticated doctrine of the immortality of the soul, the Hebrews got by very well for over a millennium with no belief in any kind of worth-while after-life. Even in Jesus' day, the elite Sadducees rejected the novel doctrine of the populist Pharisee party in this regard [Mat 22:23]. For the Sadducees it was good enough to be faithful to God, that was its own reward [Psalms 1 & 118]. It was enough to do what was right, because it was right, and to expect no reward or recompense except - hopefully - some tranquility and prosperity in this short life [Job 1:8-11, 42:10].

An externalization of parenthood

Moreover, I suppose that there is a core element of truth in it. If God was not, then perhaps we would invent God. However, this analysis tells us nothing whatever about whether God is or is not: only about what our response might be if God was not! In any case St. Paul admits the relationship between parenthood and God when he says "....I bow my knees before the Father, from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named" [Eph 3:14,15].

Finally, I want to say that problems an individual has with their own parents tend to have a detrimental affect on their attitude towards God, especially when God is presented to them as a Father (or Mother!) that they cannot choose and did not choose them as persons, rather than as a Friend, who they can choose and has chosen them knowing exactly who and what they are.

A projection of the Super-Ego

I am quite sure that this process takes place. I think it is manifest in some of the most extreme forms of fundamentalist religion such as Islam,  Calvinist Christianity or Conservative Catholicism.

The opium of the masses

It is certain that the idea of God has often been used in this way. Indeed, even leaders of the Catholic Church have done so - and continue to do so! However, the fact that something can be misused and exploited for ill does not mean that it is wrong or mistaken or evil.

A conceptual virus

1. Symbiotically: by helping their mental owners to survive and prosper, but not especially procreate - ideas are passed on by conversation not by copulation;
2. Parasitically: by diverting much of their proponents' energy into propagating them, perhaps even contrary to their own self-interest - perhaps by wasting many hours generating pages of web-site material!

Theologies majoring in "guilt" and "threats of damnation", certainly have the required characteristics; but this theory hardly explains the undoubted success of more gentle religions like Shikism, Buddhism - where there is no real basis for a concern for the "salvation" of anyone else other than oneself, and no tradition of missionary zeal - or Judaism - where no strategy to spread beyond the ethnic boundary of the Jewish people has ever taken off, other than in the more aggressive "Jewish heresies" of Christianity and Islam.

I suspect that it is a dim awareness of the second possibility (of mental parasitism) that makes many people wary of "The God Squad". Some forms of religion certainly match up well with the model of a contagious "social disease". The evangelical preoccupation with proselytism conforms closely to this paradigm.

Of course, Christianity claims to be "good news" - that is to have a message which gives the clue to the living of a fulfilling life. The simple pleasure and satisfaction of seeing others discover the same truth and delight that oneself has benefited from is a coherent motive for "passing it on". A shared joy is a joy multiplied. Another motive is the wish to transform the society in which one lives for the better - so that it is more pleasant and safe and supportive for oneself.

A problem that I agonize with is how much I do or don't wish various close non-Catholic friends to become Catholics. As a faithful Catholic, I believe that it is objectively right for them to do so. As a realistic person I fear that it may be subjectively harmful for them to do so. In the present state of the Church, they are liable to receive only emotional hurt and intellectual misdirection; and to suffer greatly for no clear purpose. I cannot wish that fate on anyone.

The problem of pain

The problem is familiar to any but the most callous and hard-hearted soul. It is this: "How can a God that is supposed to be both good and omnipotent tolerate evil, death, sickness, suffering, injustice and pain? Either God mustn't care about such matters: in which case God isn't good; or God is unable to do anything: in which case God isn't omnipotent."

It is possible to avoid this difficulty by taking one of the two gambits offered. Now, it may be possible to make some sort of a case for either a good but impotent God, or for an omnipotent but disinterested God: but I have no interest in doing so. This paper is not an attempt to score debating points, but rather to make an attempt on the truth. My intuition, fostered by the Judaeo-Christian Tradition, is that God is both good and omnipotent. I wish to explore how this can be, given our undoubted experience of sorrow and sickness and death.

Defence 1: Evil is a means to an ultimately good end

"One attempt by theologians to answer the question is to claim that evil is just a means to an ultimate end, which is always good. An example is given where a doctor amputates a patient's leg, an 'evil', in order to prevent gangrene from spreading throughout the patient's body, 'the ultimate end', which is 'good'. Yet this example is only justified on the basis that the doctor has limited powers. With the limitations of medical technology at his disposal, he of course chose the lesser evil; since there was no way of saving both the patient's leg and his life. However, this analogy cannot be applied to God and the problem of evil, since God, unlike the doctor, has unlimited powers. In fact, a more accurate analogy is a doctor who first actively infects the leg of his patient (God is the cause of all things), and then decide to amputate his leg when a less severe cure was available (God is all powerful). We would call such a doctor wicked and mad. Why do we call such a God good?" [A MySpace Friend (June 2008)]

Defence 2: Moral evil is an inevitable consequence of free will

"Another argument brought forward by theologians is that evil is a natural consequence of God allowing man free-will. This argument may be allowed to explain some moral evil caused by man such as theft, murder and rape. But how does giving man free-will relate to physical evils such as earthquakes, famines, plagues and floods? Thus, the free-will explanation cannot explain the existence of natural calamities that befall man. In fact, the free will explanation cannot even satisfactorily explain moral evil. If God is all powerful, he could have created all man with free will and with a predisposition towards doing good. But according to the same theologians, man is sinful by nature, with a predisposition for doing bad. God's action in giving man free-will and at the same time giving him a predisposition towards doing bad is no different morally from a man who drinks, on purpose, in front of a recently reformed alcoholic! If we describe such a man as irresponsible and immoral, why do we persist in calling such a God good?

The abstraction 'man' used above is also misleading. All of mankind have free-will; some, a small minority, chose evil and rob, kill, cheat and maim. Are the more numerous victims to be consoled by saying that this is a consequence of their (the victims) having free will? In other words, are the innocent victims somehow responsible for the crimes on themselves because they have free will? The right to be protected from crimes is basic for all citizens in the world; any government that fails to deliver a reasonable amount of protection from these would be condemned and duly removed from power. Yet somehow it is okay for the all powerful God to give men free will and allow them to suffer the consequences from the minority who misuse it. To say that all will be rectified in the afterlife where the good will be rewarded in heaven and the bad will be punished in hell does not resolve the issue. No appeal to an afterlife can actually eradicate the problem of evil. An injustice always remains an injustice, regardless of any subsequent effort to comfort the victim. If a father, after beating his child unmercifully, later gives him a lollipop as compensation, this does not eradicate the original act or its evil nature. Nor would we praise the father as just and loving. Yet, this is exactly what the Christians claims their God to do. He allows the faithful to suffer (remember Job!) and later rewards them. This God cannot, by any moral yardstick, be called good." [A MySpace Friend (June 2008)]

According to Catholic (as opposed to Protestant) theology, the "predisposition towards evil" that is called "concupiscence" and which results from "original sin" is not something that God placed in the nature of mankind. 

"this evil influence... comes from a source... innate in mankind as a result of crimes of long ago that remain unexpiated... you should take precautions against it... seek the rites that free a man from guilt... seek the company of men who [are] virtuous... run from the company of the wicked... if by doing so, you find that your disease abates somewhat, well and good; if not then you should look on death as the preferable alternative." [Plato "Laws IX" (854b)]

"The good is susceptible to becoming bad... but the bad is not susceptible to becoming; it must always be.. It is impossible to be a good man and continue to be good, but possible for one and the same person to become good and also bad; and those are best for the longest time whom the god's love." [Plato "Protagoras" (344d-345c)]

The second paragraph fails because it strives to distinguish two populations: the "good folk" who deserve to be protected from the "wicked folk". In fact, no such destination is possible. The actual spectrum of wickedness is continuous. Even the kindest and gentlest person has a dark side and even the greatest sinner has some positive features. Moreover, if God were to regularly and effectively protect the "better folks" from the "worse folks" this would become very obvious very rapidly; and I take it as axiomatic that God's purposes in creating the Cosmos - whatever they are exactly - require that God remains largely hidden and out-of-sight.

Some suffering and pain is self-inflicted, and is not God's responsibility. For God to prevent this pain would involve Him substantially interfering with human Free-Will. A loving but omnipotent God has to accept such suffering in His Cosmos and respond to it as an independent agent; that is by miraculous intervention, as God judges to be appropriate. The only alternative would have been to refrain from creating at all.

Defence 3: Physical evil is a means to increase moral urgency

"One theistic attempt to explain physical evil is that its existence helps to increase the 'moral urgency' in the world. This 'moral urgency' will bring out the heroic, the virtuous and the good in people. Thus the theist W.D. Niven in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics argues:

'Physical evil has been the goad which has impelled men to most of the achievements which made the history of man so wonderful. Hardship is a stern but fecund parent of invention. Where life is easy because physicals ills are at a minimum we find man degenerating in body, mind and character.. Which is preferable - a grim fight with the possibility of splendid triumph; or no battle at all?'

Thus, according to this argument, war brings out the heroic in men, and earthquakes, famines and plagues brings out the virtuous in those people who fought to odds to bring relief to the victims. It is also implicit in this argument that the total evil of these calamities is outweighed by the occurrence of good and virtue brought about by their occurrence. There are three main defects to this argument for the existence of physical evil; which together shows the argument to be untenable.

1. Isn't it better to eradicate forever the occurrence of physical evils - such as famine and plagues - than to simply treat the victims when they occur? It is clear to everyone that the former is more desirable. But if that is the case, this would mean that eliminating physical evils would make the world a better, not a worse, place. Accepting that the presence of physical evil makes the world a better place would mean that the elimination of smallpox, the discovery of the polio vaccine and the discovery of the antibiotic are three of the most disastrous events to have happened this century! This is, obviously, an absurd proposition. Therefore the idea that physical evil generates more good is immediately put into question.
2. The action that results from physical evils are not always due to morally praiseworthy reasons. Thus the formulation of a drug to cure a certain pestilence may be due purely to the profit motive of a pharmaceutical company and has nothing to do with any heroic struggles to do good.
3. Some physical evil simply cannot be squared away with promoting virtuous actions. The resent outbreak of the ebola virus in Africa is a case to point. The disease kills within a couple of weeks and no cure is possible. What possible good could have resulted from that? Earthquakes volcanic eruptions, floods have been known to kill thousands people instantly, leaving the people behind to simply pick up the pieces. What good came out of those?" [A MySpace Friend (June, 2008)]

1. The fact that it is good to eradicate physical evils does not mean that the initial presence of those evils might not have served the purpose of evoking heroic virtue. The main way in which the world was better after eradication of Smallpox was in the heroic virtues inculcated in those people who fought hard and long to eradicate the disease, not so much in the mere fact that the disease no longer existed. After all, there are plenty more horrid diseases to go! Moreover, the "world being a better place" is not clearly the proper criterion. "Better for what?" it must be asked. It would not be better for "evoking heroic virtue" to have no opportunities for heroic virtue to be evoked and exercised!
2. This is true and of no significance. The fact that a response is found that is not "heroic virtue" does not mean that the original cause was not appropriate for the evocation of heroic virtue.
3. This is largely true - except that in the case of floods and similar there is generally the opportunity for charitable response.

Some forms of pain are essential parts of life. The very concept of "animal life" implies the destruction of other life (food) in order to construct and preserve itself. Even plant life is competitive and strives against other plant life to obtain and secure resources, as any gardener well knows. Life as we know it necessarily involves suffering. According to my definition of life: "order in flux", competition for resources is inevitable. Nature is red in tooth and claw neither because She wants to be so, nor because God chose for Her to be so: but because there is no other way for life to be!

"For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of God. For the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God. We know that the whole creation has been groaning in labour pains until now; and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly while we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies." [Rom 8 19-23]

Of course, it is arguably Man's job to mitigate the pain of nature:

"The Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it." [Gen 1:15]

"The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them. The cow and the bear shall feed; their young shall lie down together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. The sucking child shall play over the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the adder's den. They shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the LORD as the waters cover the sea." [Isa 11:6-9]

Some additional considerations

"For behold, I create new heavens and a new earth; and the former things shall not be remembered or come into mind. But be glad and rejoice for ever in that which I create; for behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and her people a joy. I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and be glad in my people; no more shall be heard in it the sound of  weeping and the cry of distress .... They shall not labour in vain, or bear children for calamity; for they shall be the offspring of the blessed of the LORD, and their children with them. Before they call I will answer, while they are yet speaking I will hear. The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, the lion shall eat straw like the ox; and dust shall be the serpent's food. They shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy mountain, says the LORD." [Isa 65:17-19,23-25]

"Behold, the dwelling of God is with men. He will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself will be with them; He will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning nor crying nor pain any more, for the former things have passed away." [Apoc 21:3,4]

"I consider that the sufferings of the present time are not worth comparing with the glory about to be revealed to us" [Rom 8:18]

The Christian God does not stand by as an impassive onlooker. In Jesus, God chose to experience the last dregs of physical and intellectual and emotional pain [Mat 27:46]. Whoever is to blame for suffering, the impassible God chose to become passible and so bear the whole of the pain of physicality, finitude and futility in his own human Heart. This is the core message of the doctrine of the Incarnation.

It should also be noted that even though we have seen that God is impassible, this does not mean quite what it might seem. Just as the Incarnation enables God the Son (and through Him, the other persons of the Trinity) to experience first hand the joys and pains of human life; so God could more generally experience what it is to be contingent through various energies: created effluences/eminations which God inhabits and through which God interacts with the created order. Examples might be Abraham's Angelic visitors [Gen 18]; the man who wrestled with Jacob [Gen 32:22-52]; Moses' Burning Bush [Ex 3:2]; the Cloud of God's Glory [Ex 24:15-18, 40:34-35; II Chron 5:14]; and Ezekiel's Throne of Majesty [Ezk 1].

Much pain and suffering can be transformed into a positive experience, if only a suitable attitude is adopted towards it. Hence the problem of pain isn't quite as bad as it would seem. However, I do not think that this partial truth does justice to the sufferings of starving children in Ethiopia or sub-Saharan Africa, for example. They are too young to comprehend such a philosophy or to draw any comfort from it. I do not think it proper to tell someone who is starving to death that their suffering is all a matter of perspective, and that they should exercise themselves in adopting a "positive attitude" to their hunger. Neither do I think that it proper to tell those suffering from AIDS that their plight results from "bad karma" accumulated in earlier lives. Jesus tells us explicitly to seek to alleviate suffering, not just accept it as part of reality [Mat 25:32-46].

It can be hoped that God has created "The best of all possible worlds", no matter how unconvincing this may seem. We cannot judge this, for the following reasons.

1. We don't know the alternatives open to God (apart from "this world" and "no world").
2. We can't conceive with any degree of certainty what God's objective was in creating the Cosmos. All simple answers, such as "God was lonely" are too naive to be given any credence.
3. We can't justify any measure of what "best" might be! Even if it was clear that it was the overall sum of all joy and pleasure and fun minus all sorrow and pain and misery (which isn't clear!) then how such a formula be evaluated? The philosophical problems involved are immense and varied. I will restrain myself from discussing them here.

Personally, I find the above remarks sufficient to answer the question I have put forward. I accept that the answers I have given are neither complete nor adequate. I suggest that a little reflection tells one that no better kind of answer is possible. After all, we are on the inside of the problem and so cannot be objective. I know that the occasional cry of my heart "Oh dear God, why did you make, us when our lives are so full of tears?" is adequately answered, for me, by the promise of Jesus: "Behold, I make all things New" [Apoc 21:5], and this I choose to believe.

Some mistaken ideas of God

Deism

Dualism

According to the Christian tradition, evil is not a "thing in itself", a "substance" that can infect, possess or subvert other things, as vividly portrayed as a smoking coal in the film "The Time Bandits" [Terry Gillian] or as the "Illearth Stone" in the book of that name [Steven Donaldson]. Rather evil is a defect in reality, a distortion of the truth: a disordering of things that are in themselves  entirely good, simply because they are. Evil is a lie, as good is the truth. It is not true to say that good and evil are two sides of the same coin, or that each requires the other in order to exist. Good is peace, harmony and wholeness - "Shalom", and has no need for conflict, discord or disease for its excellence to be manifest. On the contrary, even in the greatest evil there is necessarily a core of good. The most perverted act is a misguided attempt to obtain what is perceived to be of benefit. Evil wishes for its own good, and is (sadly) reinforced in its wickedness by its inevitable failure to achieve this desired end.

Because evil is not a substance there is no need to hypothesize a source for it. While good isn't a substance either, the Christian tradition identifies it with "being in itself". The ultimate good of any-thing is simply to exist, the purpose of Life is to Live! God, while no-thing: is Being [Ex 3:14] is Good [Mk 10:18] is Love [1Jn 4:8]. This analysis contrasts starkly with that of Buddhism, which tends to identify existence with striving, suffering and pain (so: existence is evil, not good; and God is not!) and prescribes the pursuit of passivity and non-existence (blending back into the background) as the practical answer to the Problem of Pain.

The source of order and meaning

Of course, as God is, ex hypothesis, the basis, origin and creative source of the Cosmos: it is God that determined (to within whatever freedom logic allowed) the specifics of its constitution. God inevitably decided "what was good", in the sense that God may have chosen to create one of a number of possible self consistent realities. To this extent, God rules His Cosmos by diktat. God decided which Universe to make: this one and no other - setting aside the possibility that God has made very many (or even all possible) Universes. God is answerable to no-one other than God outside of the Act of Creation: though within that very act, God took on board a moral responsibility for and towards what God created. The fact that God made a Cosmos in which sentient beings consider that a maker has a responsibility of care towards the made [Pinnochio and the film "A.I."] tells a great deal about the character of God.

Finally, it is good simply to be. God cannot possibly vary or spin this. God is being in itself. From this point of view, God has no choice in setting up the ethics of the Cosmos. Contrary to my (inadequate!) understanding of the tenets of Buddhism, the foundational principle of ethics is the goodness of existence, and all detailed morality flows from that once the specific nature of the ethical agents is set.

Urizen the Lawgiver

Some arguments for God's being

The Ontological Argument [courtesy of my Second MySpace friend, Andrew (September 2008) - somewhat edited]

1. Suppose that: "the greatest or best or most perfect conceivable being (GCB) is no more than an idea in the mind, having no objective reality."
2. We can conceive of a being that is identical in form, pattern and constitution to the GCB that we have supposed, but that actually exists in objective reality as well as in some mind.
• As the GCB is by definition conceivable (and so coherent and without intrinsic contradiction or conflict) 

there is nothing as such to prevent it from being real save for arbitrary circumstances; that is contingencies.
• Hence, it is certainly possible to conceive of the GCB as being objectively real.
• Note that we have simply conceived of it up to now. This fact alone does not in any way make it real!
3. The state of having objective reality is superior to that of being no more than an idea in the mind.
• This I am happy to grant, but it is disputable - see below.
4. Therefore, there is a conceivable being that is greater - or better or more perfect - than what we had supposed to be the greatest conceivable being.
5. This is impossible, for it is a direct contradiction and absurd.
• This is not altogether true, for supposing and conceiving are not obviously the same - see below.
6. Therefore, it must be false that: "the GCB  is no more than an idea of the mind, having no objective reality."
7. So the GCB must be objectively real.
• One can easily see that this second possibility does not lead to any contradiction.
8. This being is, by definition - ar at least general use! - "God".

"It is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies."

"The most definitive refutations of the ontological argument are usually attributed to the philosophers David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Kant identified the trick card up Anselm's sleeve as his slippery assumption that 'existence' is more 'perfect' than non-existence."

'The doctrine that existence is a perfection is remarkably queer. It makes sense and is true to say that my future house will be a better one if it is insulated than if it is not insulated; but what could it mean to say that it will be a better house if it exists than if it does not?'

What does "better" mean? It means "provides greater advantage to its possessor in regard to those matters which it might be expected to be advantageous in" or "serves its purpose more adequately". Better is a teleological term. Now a house that exists only as a set of perfect plans provides no advantage - as a house - to its possessor whatsoever! A house that actually exists (even if it is far from the ideal house) is indefinitely better (more useful or effective) than a house that exists only in concept. 

On the other hand the plans for a mansion (together with possession of funds adequate to construct it) might be preferable to an actually existing log cabin. Hence, it is impossible to establish a non-arbitrary metric for "better" when more than a single criterion (such as total floor area or resilience to earthquake damage or level of thermal insulation) is concerned. Hence it is impossible to identify one thing as greater than another thing unless the former excells (or at least equals) the latter in each and every regard.

Why is it ridiculous? It is ridiculous because for any "greatest conceivable THING" (GCT) either the amount of matter that would be needed to constitute it must necessarily exceed the quantity of matter in the entire finite universe; or else the granular, atomic and quantum nature of matter would prevent its realization on the microscopic scale. Hence there is always at least one "arbitrary circumstance" or "contingency" that necessarily prevents us conceiving any GCT (not just the Greatest Conceivable Computer, but also the "Greatest Conceivable Tooth-pick" - which would have to be perfectly sharp and perfectly unbreakable) as existing in reality. This circumstance is simply "physicality" or, indeed, "existence" itself! 

This circumstance fails to apply as soon as one abstracts one's thought beyond "material things" and "existence" to consider "beings in general" that do not obviously have to be part of the physical contingent order. Hence this criticism of the Ontological Argument (and the "weakness" which it manifests) serves our purposes exactly. It prevents it from being applied to any thing that we might imagine (and so prevents us from defining myriads of greatest things into existence) without in any way compromising the application of the argument to exactly that one sole question which it had originally been crafted to address: namely the reality of God - and, possibly, of the Ideal Forms.

"I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it." 

This is true of any contingent being (any "thing" that "exists") but not of God. God does not exist. God simply is.

"It is pretended, that the deity is a necessarily existent being, and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that, if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident, that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice to be four. The words, therefore, 'necessary existence' have no meaning; or which is the same thing, none that is consistent."

The fact that we cannot conceive in specifics of the being of God does not invalidate the Ontological Argument. 

The fact that one can assert that it is possible "to conceive of God not existing" is not at all the same as saying that it is in fact possible "to ratoinally and coherrently conceive of God not being." In particular, it is true that: "God does not exist"!

The fact that such a great mind as Anselm thought that the Ontological Argument was true should give us pause for thought. I shall return to this topic later on.

The Argument from Design

The Five Ways of Aquinas

The teaching of the Oecumenical Council of the Vatican

A physicist's view of contingency

"Wise men claim that partnership and friendship; orderliness, self-control and justice hold together heaven and earth; and gods and men, and that is why they call this universe a world order, my friend and not an undisciplined world-disorder." [Plato "Gorgias" (508a)]

"When we find one thing producing a change in another... will there ever be in such a sequence, an original cause of change?  How could anything whose motion is transmitted to it from something else be the first thing to effect an alteration?... the entire sequence of their movements must surely spring from some initial principle; which can hardly be anything except the change effected by self-generated motion." [Plato "Laws X" (895a)]

So, for a Physicist, the Cosmos requires an explanation: or "a cause", speaking metaphysically. Why is it that the Cosmos in fact it is? Why does it have the dynamics that it has? Why is it governed by the Laws of Physics that it is in fact governed by, and not by other Laws? Why do the fundamental constants that feature in these Laws have the values that they do in fact have? Why does space-time happen to have the dimensionality that in fact it has? Why is the Cosmos in the particular (low entropy) state now that we find it to be in? Why, in fact, is the Cosmos at all?  One can label the required explanation for all this "God: the UnCaused First Cause; the UnMoving First Mover; the UnGoverned Law Giver, etc. etc."

"All things that are so, are equally removed from being nothing; and whatsoever hath any being is by that being a glass in which we see God, who is the root and the fountain of all being. The whole frame of nature is the theatre; the whole volume of creatures in the glass; and the light of nature, Reason, is our light." [John Donne]

What Causes God?

God is not part of the Cosmos. God does not interact with physical reality in the sense of exchanging energy and momentum. After all, this would contradict the law of energy and momentum conservation. Although God is the foundation of all that physically is, God is not physically at all! God does not exist in the way that any physical thing exists. While God underwrites the Laws of Physics, God is not governed by them: God is no thing and they simply do not apply to God. It is improper to combine God with the Cosmos to make some larger whole (perhaps on the basis that God acts miraculously within the Cosmos) and then ask what is its cause? This is wrong because we have no reason to believe that God has anything except "being" in common with the Cosmos. and every reason to believe that the kind of being that God has is very different from the kind of being that the Cosmos has. Putting God and the Cosmos together in order to compose a "greater reality" is highly suspect, on the basis that they have no commonality and therefore no connection or basis for combination.

We can have no expectations of  God: except, it would appear, that God is. Unlike all physical things, one can presume that God is noncontingent; that God is necessary being: God is what God is because God is unavoidably so. God (who is no thing) is so, just as nothing else is so!

"Of God himself can no man think. And therefore I would leave all that thing that I can think, and choose to my love that thing that I cannot think. For why: he may well be loved, but not thought. By love may he be gotten and holden, but by thought never. And therefore, though it be good sometime to think of  the kindness and the worthiness of God in special, and although it be a light and a part of contemplation, nevertheless yet in this work it shall be cast down and covered with a cloud of forgetting. And thou shalt step above it stalwartly, but listily, with a devout and a pleasing stirring of love, and try for to pierce that darkness above thee. And smite upon that thick   cloud of unknowing with a sharp dart of longing love; and go not thence for (any)thing that befalleth."
[Anon "The Cloud of Unknowing"]

"Every being that exists either exists by itself, by its own essence or nature, or it does not exist by itself. If it exists by its own essence, then it exists necessarily and eternally, and explains itself. It cannot not exist, as a triangle cannot not have three sides. If, on the other hand, a being exists but not by its own essence, then it needs a cause, a reason outside itself for its existence. Because it does not explain itself, something else must explain it. Beings whose essences do not contain the reason for their existence, beings that need causes, are called contingent, or dependent, beings. A being whose essence is to exist is called a necessary being.. God would be the only necessary being - if God existed." [Peter Kreeft: "The First Cause Argument"]

Logical alternatives to Monotheism

• The Cosmos as a whole is (somehow) noncontingent, even though its parts are contingent. This theory is identifiable as Pantheism.
• I suppose that it might just about be possible that everything has a Platonic "participation in being".
• In which case, the "larger" something is, the more fully it "participates in being": requires less external explanation.
• On the Microscopic scale of Quantum Mechanics, existence is fragile:

hence all the problems that physicists have with "the collapse of the wave packet" and "wave-particle duality"; 
• on the Macroscopic scale of normal human experience existence is experienced as robust but contingent; 
• and on the Cosmic scale existence is necessary. 
• Personally, I like this theory as a poetic sequence of pleasant words, but don't think that it could be made to mean anything! 

If it could, then it would reduce to Pantheism.
• Many modern physicists pursue this possibility further, conceiving of an infinity of parallel universes each having its own arbitrary set of laws.
• In such a plethora of possibilities, everything is certain and nothing unlikely - let alone impossible!
• It seems to me that this way lies madness, as there is no possibility of explaining or understanding anything. Everything is exactly what it is just because it is so in this arbitrary world in which we happen to live which is indefinitely similar to an infinity of other worlds only distinguished from it by vanishingly small discrepancies. 
• This theory doesn't account for the reality of the MultiVerse, of course. It simply takes its being as necessary without noticing that it is doing so. 
• While describing the Multiverse in the same manner as everything else is described (and so tacitly placing it in the category of "thing") the Multiverse is raised to the level of the "unquestionably necessary" - and so equated to either "God"
• - which amounts to Pantheism, or
• "The Mind of God" - which amounts to Monotheism.
• The fundamental presumption of Physics is wrong.
• In fact, there is one or more noncontingent things (rather like inverse Black Holes) within the Cosmos: sources of being (the metric itself, space-time and the Laws of Physics) which are the uncaused causes of everything else. 
• In effect this is Polytheism. 
• Rather than postulating one transcendent omnipotent and omniscient God outside space-time, one postulates an indeterminate number of local deities.
• This is, it strikes me, much less tidy; restrained, economical and generally satisfactory than the Monotheistic hypothesis. 
• Note that Polytheism with one local god is not at all the same as Monotheism. 
• The Cosmos is an illusion and does not really exist. 
• All that exists is my mind. I am therefore God. 
• This is "Solipsism" an extreme form of the Philosophical system called "Idealism" (named in contrast to "Materialism"). 
• Although irrefutable, the fact it implies that I can imagine geniuses such as Bach and Einstein who are capable of work that is utterly beyond my own competence makes it implausible, in my view. Buddhism tends to this kind of world view.

The Ontological Argument revisited [courtesy of my Second MySpace friend, Andrew (September 2008) - somewhat edited]

Included with the publication of his Meditations were Objections and Replies. Since many philosophers of his time did not agree with him, they wrote objections to his work. He then took those objections, replied to them and then included them in his book. The other day I wrote my own objection to his argument. Then I read the first objection in his book and satisfied myself that this objection was pretty much identical with my own. The objection written in the book is as follows:

"Even if it is granted that:

• a supremely perfect being, by its very nature, implies existence, 

it still does not follow that such an existence is something that is actually present in the nature of things, but only that:

• the concept of existence is inseparably linked with the concept of a supreme being. 

You cannot deduce from this that the existence of God is something actual, unless you presuppose that God is a supreme being who actually exists. If that were true, it would actually include all perfections, including the perfection of real existence."

Putting it another way:

• Is it possible to conceive of (imagine in the abstract) the GCB as having reality while believing or definitely supposing (postulating in reality) that it does not?
• If it is coherent to do so, then the fact that we can conceive of the GCB as objectively real is not inconpatible with the following version of our first supposition:
• Suppose that: "the GCB, while being truly conceived of as real is in fact not so; but rather is no more than imaginary."
• Hence, it is not possible to show that this version or our supposition is absurd by the means presented here.
• Hence the Ontological Argument fails.
• I argue that it is not possible to conceive of the GCB as having reality while supposing that it does not.
• Conceiving and supposing are indestinguishable and interchangeable.
• Hence, it is not possible to consistently suppose "A" while conceiving of "not-A".
• Whenever I conceive of X as being objectively real, then I am supposing X to be objectively real.
• Whenever I conceive of X as not being objectively real, then I am supposing X not to be objectively real.
• Hence, if I suppose the GCB to be no more than imaginary, then that which I suppose the GCB to be must be conceived of as being no more than imaginary.

1. Whatever we understand clearly and distinctly as belonging to the true and immutable nature, essence, or form of something, can be truly predicated of it.
2. When we have examined with sufficient care what God is, we understand clearly and distinctly that it belongs to his true and immutable nature that he exists.
3. Therefore, we can then truly predicate of him that he exists.

"The conclusion at least follows correctly, in this case, from the premises. Now the major premise cannot be denied either, since it was already agreed earlier that 'everything that we understand clearly and distinctly [That is, have episteme of - Pharsea] is true.' Only the minor premise remains, and I agree that there is a significant difficulty in this."

"[In the first place,] we are so used to making a distinction in everything else between existence and essence that we do not realize adequately the extent to which existence belongs to the essence of God more than in the case of other things. 

[Secondly,] if we do not distinguish 

• what "belongs to the true and immutable essence of something" 

from 

• what "can be predicated of it only by a figment of the intellect", 

then even if we realize adequately that existence belongs to the essence of God, we fail to draw the conclusion that God exists because we do not know whether his essence is immutable and true or merely one of our figments."

"But in order to remove [the first part of] this difficulty, we need to distinguish between possible existence and necessary existence, and we should note that 

• possible existence is contained in the concept or idea of everything that is clearly and distinctly understood. 
• However, necessary existence is contained only in the idea of God. 

Whoever is careful in paying attention to this difference between the idea of God and all other ideas will undoubtedly realize that, although we understand all other things only as if they existed, it does not follow that they exist but simply that they are capable of existing. For we understand that it is not necessary for actual existence to be combined with their other properties. But from the fact that we understand actual existence to be combined necessarily and always with the other attributes of God, it certainly does follow that God exists."

Now that I have reiterated that I cannot define computers into existence by slapping a "perfect" label on it, what is the argument for God's existence? We will have to demonstrate that necessary and actual existence is truly contained in the idea of God, so that it would logically follow without contradictions that God does exist. But once again we shouldn't get ahead of ourselves. Let us refer back to Descartes.

"To remove [the second part of] the difficulty, it should be noted that ideas that do not contain true and immutable natures - but are merely fictitious natures which are invented by the intellect - are capable of being divided in this way [he is going to describe the way in a moment - Pharsea] by that same intellect, not only by abstraction but by a clear and distinct mental operation. Thus any idea that cannot be divided in this way by the intellect was certainly not composed by it in the first place.

For example, when I think about a winged horse, an actually existing lion or a triangle drawn inside a square, I easily understand that I can also think, conversely, about a horse without wings, a non existing lion, or a triangle without a square, and so on, and therefore these ideas do not have true and immutable natures. However, if I think about a triangle or a square (I will not use the examples of a lion or a horse, because their natures are not completely clear to us), then certainly I can assert truthfully of the triangle whatever I understand as being contained in the idea of a triangle - for example, that its three angles are equal to two right angles, etc. Likewise, I can claim that whatever I find contained in the idea of a square is true. And even though I am able to understand a triangle while abstracting from [he means "ignoring" or "discounting" - Pharsea] the fact that its three angles are equal to two right angles, I still cannot deny, by means of clear and distinct operation, that is has that property - that is, if I understand correctly what I am saying. Besides, if I think about a triangle drawn inside a square and avoid attributing to the square what belongs only to the triangle, or to the triangle what belongs to the square, and if I examine only those properties which result from the combination of the two figures, its nature would not be any less true and immutable than the nature of a triangle or a square considered separately. Thus it would be appropriate to claim that the square is not less than twice the area of the triangle drawn inside it, and other similar things, which belong to the nature of this composite figure."

We are still left wondering why we should conceive of God as actually existing. In order for this to work, we have to first establish what we mean when we say "God". If you realize that your idea of "God" is anything different than what is being discussed in this argument, then you need to momentarily abandon your idea of God in order to take part in this. I have heard about people who think of "God" as simply logic which always existed and is not powerful at all. While that is just fine to believe, if we are discussing an argument which involves a specific definition of "God" then we have to make sure that we do not ignore this argument simply because we define "God" differently. If we judge this argument based on a different idea of "God", that would be like trying to discuss baseball with someone when your definition of baseball is the sport called football. With that said, the notion of "God" in question here is simply that of "the supremely perfect being." This will make more sense as I call on Descartes words again. 

"However, if I thought that existence is contained in the idea of a supremely perfect body, because to exist both in reality and in the intellect is a greater perfection than to exist only in the intellect, I could not thereby conclude that such a supremely perfect body exists but only that it is capable of existing. For I am well able to recognize that 

• such an idea was constructed by my own intellect, by combining together all physical perfections at the same time, 

and that

• existence does not result from those other perfections; on the contrary, one can just as easily affirm or deny the existence of them. 

Indeed, while examining the idea of a [material] body I perceive no power in it by which it can produce itself or conserve itself in existence; from this I conclude validly that necessary existence, which alone is in question here, no more belongs to the nature of a [material] body, no matter how perfect it is, than it belongs to the nature of a mountain that it does not have a valley or to the nature of a triangle that it has angles which together are greater than two right angles."

"However, if we now ask not about a [material] body but about something else (whatever it happens to be) that possesses all possible perfections at the same time, whether existence should be included among them, we shall initially have doubts about it. Our mind, which is finite, is used to thinking about those perfections only separately and therefore it may not notice immediately how they are necessarily combined together. But if we examine carefully whether existence - and what kind of existence - belongs to a supremely perfect being, we shall be able to perceive the following clearly and distinctly. 

• Firstly, that at least possible existence belongs to it just as it belongs to all other things of which we have distinct ideas, even to those which are invented by a figment of our intellect. 
• Then if we acknowledge its immense power, we cannot think that its existence is possible unless, at the same time, we acknowledge that it can exist by its own power, and we shall conclude from this that it really exists and that it existed from eternity. For it is very well known by the natural light of reason that anything which is capable of existing by its own power always exists. 
• We shall thus understand that necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely powerful being, not by a figment of our intellect, but because it belongs to the true and immutable nature of such a being that it exists. 
• We shall also easily perceive that such a supremely powerful being is incapable of not having in itself all the other perfections that are contained in the idea of God and, therefore, without any figment of our intellect and by their own nature, they are combined together and they exist in God."

This is why Descartes believed that he proved that God exists with mathematical certainty, in the same way that he can prove the essence of a triangle. So how well does Descartes establish that existence is part of God's true and immutable form? As we realized earlier, that which is true and immutable cannot be changed in our minds. We cannot imagine a triangle as being a four-sided figure, as long as we clearly and distinctly understand a triangle. The clear and distinct understanding of "God" is as "the supremely perfect and powerful being". This being, by necessity, contains the power to produce or conserve itself in existence. It is a contradiction to imagine a supremely perfect being as not being all-powerful or non-existent. The form of "God" is true and immutable because after we understand its character we cannot change "God's" form in our mind without reaching a contradiction, just like a triangle.

Putting it another way:

• Major Premise: Suppose that the Greatest Conceivable Being (the GCB) is a thing (and so is contingent).
• It follows that this supposed GCB does not necessarily have to be real.
• Hence, it must be possible to conceive of this supposedly GCB as not being real;

for all things which are in fact true must (at least in principle) be conceivable.
• Now, it is also possible to conceive of the GCB as being real; 

because the fact that the supposedly GCB is conceivable means that there is nothing intrinsic to the "supposedly GCB, conceived as unreal" to stop it being real.
• Minor Premis: Furthermore, the "supposedly GCB, conceived of as real" is greater than the "supposedly GCB, conceived of as unreal".
• Hence the "supposedly GCB conceived of as unreal" is not in fact the GCB.
• Hence the major premise is contradicted as absurd.
• Hence its negation must be true.
• Conclusion:  the Greatest Conceivable Being (the GCB or God) is not a thing and is non-contingent and so necessarily real.

1. There is truth and falsehood.
2. Argument and thought can and ought to be rational.
3. The rules of classical logic are a good representation of ratioanlity.
4. There is being.
5. It is correct to speak of beings.
6. It is correct to make a distinction between "real" and "imaginary" beings.
7. It is correct to speak of "value" and of "more" and "less".
8. It is possible, in principle, to attribute relative value to beings.
9. The real has value over and above the imaginary.

We must of course make sure we understand exactly what Descartes understood "God" to be, which in his own words he said,

"By the word 'God' I understand some infinite substance, which is independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and by which both I, and everything else that exists (if anything else exists) were created."

"The real question is: Is there anything we can think of which, by the mere fact that we can think of it, is shown to exist outside our thought? Every philosopher would like to say yes, because a philosopher's job is to find out things about the world by thinking rather than observing. If yes is the right answer, there is a bridge from pure abstract thought to things. If not, not." [Bertrand Russell]

1. You are almost certainly a Platonist - whether you know it or not - and definitely an "Objective Realist".
2. You have a firm grasp of the idea of God - again this is most unusual for people of today. It is absolutely necessary to understand about God (as you clearly do) that "what God is" (the "essence" or FORM of God) is entirely and absolutely and precisely identical with "the Good" which is "unqualified, robust and necessary BEING".
3. I prefer to restrict "exist" to what Descartes calls "bodies" and I call "things". I do not believe that God is in any way a "thing" and so, for me "God is nothing" and "God does not exist", but nevertheless "God is" - has being, that is. I find that these two statements make thinking and arguing about God much more definitive.

It further seems to me that::

• The fact that I think that I can conceive of "perfect being" or "necessary being" doesn't mean that I am not making a mistake when think that I have so conceived. Perhaps I am wrong to conceive it. Perhaps it is a delusion. Perhaps the idea of "perfect being" or "necessary being" involves a basic contradiction which you and I haven't yet noticed?
• It is not true that anything that is capable of "existing" by its own power does "exist". There are two solutions to that conundrum. One is Descartes': that such a being has always and will always "exist", and the other is: that it never has "existed" and never will do so!
• It does not seem to me to be ABSURD to say that: 'the perfect being that could necessarily "exist" in point of fact does not do so.' It may seem somewhat surprising, given that many things that don't necessarily exist do so - but this is to call upon the Argument from Contingency as corroboration and underpinning for the Ontological Argument.
• In any case, it seems to me that one cannot have a clear notion - episteme - of the FORM of God; this is (I would say) forever beyond our direct intellectual knowledge; and the kind of argument you are putting forward seems to me to rely on such episteme.

Regards,

                 Stephen AKA Pharsea

              I am very pleased to have received such positive feedback. I had to write this because it was consuming my thoughts. I was also craving some input on this topic. Thank you for taking the time to read it and reply. And you may certainly quote it for your WebPage.I have a few things to say about your response. 

• You said that you like to limit existence to "things." Is that the same as saying that only physical objects have existence? In that case, God, angels, and human souls do not have existence but have being. I do not understand the difference. When Descartes asserts that God must necessarily exist, is that not the same as claiming that God must necessarily be/have being?
• You are correct that because we can conceive of "necessary being" does not mean that we are not making a mistake in our conception. However, is this not extreme scepticism? Would it then be sceptically justified to claim that we may be under a delusion when we conceive of the necessary essence of a triangle? Nevertheless, I do admit that there may be a contradiction in the term "necessary being."
• You state that it is not true that "anything that is capable of existing by its own power does exist." That statement also presents a problem to me, but I cannot figure out what the problem is.
• It is definitely not absurd to say that a "perfect being that could necessarily exist does not exist." But the absurdity comes when one says "a perfect being that must necessarily exist does not exist."

- Andrew

                      I tend to use the word "existence" to mean "exist as a physical body".

This is not appropriate to God. God simply "is", but doesn't exist - God isn't at all "like any thing". God doesn't "exist within a context" [stand-out as an embossed pattern from a shield] because God doesn't have any environment. Heaven is "the state of being in fellowship with God" not "the place where God is".

Descartes doesn't make this distinction between "existence" and "being" in the way that I do; though it is pretty clear that he thinks that the mode of God's "existence" is very different from that of any physical body/object/thing. I guess he didn't make the distinction that I do simply because he wasn't a physicist and because "scattering theory" hadn't been concocted by then, any-how!

It is unclear to me whether souls and angels "exist" or simply "are". Neoplatonists concocted the idea of "subtle matter" of which "spiritual things" were constructed. I am an agnostic on this question, but it was what the infamous: "How many angels can dance on a the point of a pin?" dispute was all about.

The form of a triangle is purely abstract. It is not possible to doubt it; it is no more (or less!) than what it is defined to be. No sceptic can deny this! All that a sceptic can deny is that the abstract form has any bearing on physical reality or any existence outside the human mind. I don't do either of these, of course. I'm not that much of a sceptic. Physicists find triangles exceedingly useful for dividing up and mapping out space!

I agree with the rest of what you say.

I agree that the statement: "necessary being is not" is totally absurd. I agree that according to the normal rules of logic this absurdity would inevitably result in the infallible conclusion: "it is not true that there is no necessary being" and so, on simplification, "there is necessary being" which is equivalent to "God is".

I think that the reason that the first statement is absurd is because: "there exists a mind that is conceiving it." If there was no mind capable of holding this thought then there would be no argument and nothing would exist and there would be no necessary being. Hence this - the most abstract presentation of the Ontological Argument I have ever encountered - is revealed to be the same as the "Argument from Contingency". It is precisely because there are thinking creatures - namely you and I - that one can (by the unaided light of human reason) come to the definitive conclusion that: "God is". I think this is the root power of the ontological argument.

I think this is brilliant!

Stephen AKA Pharsea

The Argument from Design revisited.

Although the specifics of carbon chemistry ..... may not be necessary for life .... a living being must contain organized complexity, or information. The minimum requirements for information content can be determined by fundamental mathematical theory, and it is clear that it requires .... a local decrease in entropy. Entropy is .... the disorder in a system, and for a closed system .... entropy always increases ..... cups fall and shatter, they do not coalesce and jump back onto their saucers. More importantly, without sustenance and breath, bodies die and decay, while corpses do not come back to life. A living being with the ability to ask the question "why am I here?" must contain an incredible amount of order to be able to frame such a deep, information filled thought, whatever kind of chemistry or physics underlies the being. So the question is, "what kinds of universe could allow such order to arise?" If the answer is "just about any" then we should not be so surprised about our universe - the right, well suited type of order would arise to fit the environment in any universe. However, if the answer is "almost none," then we do need to question why the universe is so special.

Many cosmologists are attempting to find what explanation they can within science, in preference to invoking a Creator .... the ripples left on the cosmic background radiation .... provide strong evidence for a period of .....   exponential expansion .... in the first 10-33 seconds of the universe's existence. If such an era existed, there is no reason that the universe we observe is all that condensed .... There could be a plethora of .... sub-universes, that are completely unobservable to us ..... it is not so surprising that one of a multitude of sub-universes happens to have the right conditions for life.

Prof Miller continues:

It is well known that all life on Earth (barring the strange sulphurous life arising around deep-sea volcanic vents) is ultimately dependent on the inflowing energy from the sun. The sun is an average star, and, like all stars, can provide the power for life, by providing vast amounts of energy (as heat and light) at very low entropy (from a small region much hotter than the rest of the universe). Hot spots, such as stars, are necessary to allow any form of organized complexity to arise. Living things must all take in low entropy (hot or organized) energy and release it at high entropy (useless waste heat) in order to increase or at least maintain their internal information. The "hot spots" which allow any living being to survive, must also be there for it to evolve, so must remain stable over a large period of time, compared to typical physical processes in the life cycle of the being. Now, in our universe there is a specific resonance in the nuclear reaction process, which enables stars to burn at all, and endure for the billions of years that have been necessary for life to develop. In a universe almost the same as ours, but perhaps with a slightly different electron mass, the resonance would not occur, stars would not shine, and the universe would be dark, dead and dull.

There is a multitude of similarly finely tuned properties of our universe .... The delicate balance between the original expansion of the universe and the gravitational attraction, which tends to pull everything back together, ensures that the explosive debris from one star can arrive in the vicinity of another star which forms separately. All life on Earth is made from atoms of debris from the first star, and relies on heat and light from the second star, namely our sun. In a gravitationally stronger universe, the first star would swallow the second, while in a .... more spread out universe, the debris would never reach another star.

A similarly untestable possibility put forth by scientific sceptics is that the universe is really infinite in time, and just bounces in and out of big crunches and big bangs. There is supposedly a new set of laws of physics each time round (though, this is rather implausible in my view, as the new mashed up fundamental laws must always lead to another bouncing universe, without being specifically tuned!).

In contradiction with any form of the MultiVerse hypothesis, it is the hope of many physicists that only one consistent set of Laws of Physics is possible. Finding this unique set together with the principle that gives rise to it would complete Einstein's programme of reducing dynamics and gravity to generalized geometry or the principle of continuity: "No Action at a Distance", known to the Ancient Greeks. It would require extending the treatment somehow to all the forces of Physics  with the aim of   unifying General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics.

If, in addition, these Laws featured no arbitrary parameters, then everything would be explained (except for the fundamental question: "why is anything?") It would be astounding (though not "improbable"), if  the only possible set of laws and fundamental constants is exactly the one that gives rise to life in such a delicately balanced and baroque manner! This would mean that logic itself indirectly and obscurely necessitates life! Of course, the prologues of Genesis and John's Gospel could be taken as suggesting exactly this doctrine.

The Weak Anthropic Principle

The Strong Anthropic Principle

While scientific sceptics deny the strong anthropic principle, many theologians and religious scientists embrace it, as it points to a Creator who stimulates life and enables us to flourish. The uncovering of such a fertile universe, which is so clearly conducive to beauty, encourages process theologians, as it appears that the universe follows a very thin line between rigid order and incoherent chaos. Other religious thinkers remain wary of the whole argument, and following the "contrast" viewpoint, are loathe to incorporate any scientific evidence, which may be later reinterpreted, in their vision of God. As the "many universe" theories are not completely outside the realms of falsifiable evidence, it is perhaps right to be patient before hailing the fine-tuning as proof of God. Nevertheless, I for one do not cease to be amazed by the transcendent beauty inherent within the laws of nature. These will always speak to me of the Nature of God.

Appendix I: A critique of the Cosmological Argument

1. There are particular things and events.
2. Any event in the history of a thing happens at a certain time.
3. All events are in need of explanation.

1. Such explanations always involve a reference to general laws as well as to particular things, persons, and events. Now the general laws are themselves facts, with no trace of self evidence or necessity about them.
2. Earlier events require explanation, just as much as the event which they supposedly explain. No extension of this kind of explanation to remoter and remoter epochs can remove this defect.

1. There is a Cause which is neither a part of nature nor the Cosmos as a collective whole,
2. The existence of this extra cosmic Cause must be necessary. It is an uncaused cause.
3. This Cause brings all Cosmic events into being via a metaphysical dependence different from the physical dependence of a later state of affairs on an earlier.

1. No explanation in terms of ordinary causation is capable of giving the kind of intellectual satisfaction about natural things and persons and events which is obtainable about purely mathematical facts.
2. If the universe is such that this kind of understanding is theoretically obtainable about nature, then its structure must be very much as philosophic Theism says that it is.

• It may be divided into two parts, negative and positive.
• At the transition from the negative to the positive part, it is arguable that there is a suppressed premise.
• This suppressed premise is false.
• Therefore the argument fails.
• Moreover, the conclusion is not only unproven but is either false or meaningless.

There is at least one necessary existential proposition: the "Uncaused Cause".

All other true existential propositions then follow necessarily: "Absolute Determinism".

The Cosmos is such that mathematical intellectual satisfaction concerning events is possible.

Moreover, it seems there can be no necessary existential proposition of the kind envisaged in the first premise. Such propositions always concern the connection (or disconnection) of other propositions. They are always conditional, taking the form: 'If P is true, then Q is true'.  It follows that the conclusion of the Cosmological Argument is not only unproven but also false.

Even if this objection be waived, an equally formidable one remains. The difficulty is as follows. Anything whose existence was a necessary consequence of its nature would be a timeless existent. Now nature is composed of things and persons and processes which begin at certain dates, last for so long, and then cease. How could a temporal fact, such as the fact that there began to be a person having the characteristics of Julius Caesar at a certain date, follow logically from facts all of which are non-temporal? The necessary consequences of facts which are necessary are themselves necessary, and the necessary consequences of facts which have no reference to any particular time can themselves have no reference to any particular time.

An Answer to this Critique.

1. It falsely portrays the Cosmological Argument as concerning mathematical certainty.
2. It thereby treats the Cosmological Argument as a disguised form of the Ontological Argument.
3. It misunderstands the role of Physical Law.
4. It confuses a cause with a proposition.
5. It confuses determinism and causality.

Nevertheless, the Cosmological Argument is more an abstraction from Physics and Epistemology, rather than a deduction within Ontology. It reflects on human experience of what it is to know, rather than working from supposed a priori truths concerning being in itself. To treat it in terms of a formal axiomatic structure is to mistake its import.

The Cosmological Argument is not about positively "completely satisfying the intellect", but rather concerns itself with highlighting the defect in all contingent being. It asserts that this deficit must be supplied: or else one admits that in once case "Why?" is not a legitimate question. It continues that this can only be done by hypothesizing some non-contingent being: Being unlike any being to be encountered within the Cosmos: being that is entirely beyond our experience and is almost entirely beyond our comprehension.

The Theist should not contend that the Act of Creation was necessary, in the sense that Dr. Broad implies that he must. Though the uncaused cause be necessary, the Cosmos is not created of necessity. It is not necessary for the truth of the Cosmological Argument that it be so! Neither should it be maintained that every detail of the Cosmos is pre-determined by the Divine Act of creation, as Dr. Broad insinuates it must be. The prime deficit in contingent being is the contingency of the Laws of Physics, rather than that of events in themselves. It is this contingency that the hypothesis of the uncaused cause primarily addresses.

On the one hand, it may prove possible to package-up the contingency of events altogether in the initial- and
boundary conditions of the Big-Bang, which may in turn transpire to be inevitable: if anything is to be at all. On the other hand, it may turn out that a radical contingency characterizes all epochs of the Cosmos. Although all events are caused: in the sense that they obey the Laws of Physics and that "one thing leads to another", it may be that some, and perhaps many, event sequences converge backwards to singularities in space-time. In which case, the reason why one such sequence arises rather than another must be looked for either in its future rather than its past: and it be admitted that causality runs backwards as well as forwards in time, or outside time altogether: that is either to God or some Conscious Agent.

If God wants something from me, he would tell me.

All that God "wants from you" is your fulfilment - which will require you to be in fellowship with God.

Indeed. Moreover he couldn't "leave this to someone else". Only God knows the mind of God.
Still, God might use intermediaries, for any number of reasons; some are pretty obvious, and others might exist that are beyond our understanding.
It is impetuous and conceited to lay down the law as to what God has to do or must do.
We simply do not see things from God's perspective.

I beg to disagree. This would subvert the basic intention of God.
God's fundamental intention for us is to "educate us into being His friends" and "seduce us into being His lovers", not to "instruct or train us into being His servants".
On the other hand, I believe that for those with the right outlook (and who are at the right point on their spiritual journey) the fact of God's being is sufficiently obvious to produce such an exclamation of "eureka!"

No it doesn't. You are adding a gloss of your own and it is this gloss that allows you to make the prediction which you then - correctly - say is inconsistent with experience. However, all that you have done is falsify your own gloss; which, while being a worthwhile thing to do, is not what you are claiming to have done!

• God is not "a supremely powerful being". God is rather "Being-In-Itself". I don't think that this error affects your argument, though.
• God does not want "to set things right" as this would imply that things were not already "set right" and this would implicitly contradict the first statement.
• You later rely on this idea to implicitly justify comparing the God-Man relationship with that between a physician and their patient.
• I agree that God "doesn't want us to get things [even more] wrong."  However, this is subordinate to the fundamental intention that God has; namely to educate us into being His friends and seduce us into being His lovers. If these two intentions come into conflict, then it is the second - which is absolutely prior to the former - that prevails. The reason being that whatever mess we make of things, God can - and will - eventually put it right.
• The gloss that you are adding silently is something along the lines of 

    "What matters is the possession of information or knowledge, not the process by which that information or knowledge comes to be possessed."
This is pretty obviously false. It is one thing to be able to parrot a set of facts because one has been told them - by an instructor. It is quite another to understand something because one has figured it out for oneself - perhaps with help and guidance from a good teacher.
• Human beings have been busy figuring out mathematics and physics - and all the other sciences and technologies that derive from them - for themselves over a thousand years or more. Even so, there is a great deal of confusion as to the fundamentals of physics, in fact - but I don't think that this error affects your argument.
• Similarly, we have been engaged in a process of philosophical and theological discovery over the same period of time. The only real difference being that - I and other believers hold - God has specifically gotten involved in this process, for exactly the kind of reasons that you have already implied, namely because God is concerned for our well-being.

• It is! What God wants is for us to discover what we can be and then to become that.
• First and foremost this requires us to be anything - that is to continue to exist.
• Second it requires us to understand what beauty and justice are; so that we can come to desire and relentlessly pursue these goods and so be fulfilled and happy.
• God has no need of any goods or benefits from us - how could He, being God? God is entirely adequate to God and lacks no good!
• All that God "wants" is our welfare. God's will for us is for us to do what is good for our welfare and to refrain from doing what is bad for our welfare. What could be easier than this to understand and fathom?
• The only problem is determining in any circumstance and context what this might be, exactly. Of course, this is a big problem - but not something that any set of rules or laws could possibly address, except as understood as guidelines that often have to be broken.

• In fact all human expertise is limited and often two experts will genuinely differ - with good cause - over the course of action to be taken in any circumstance. The contrast you are attempting to set up between technical matters and theological/ethical matters is pretty much unrealistic. However, this error doesn't affect your basic argument.
• Moreover, in theological - and especially ethical matters - the state of affairs you describe would be a bad thing!
• There is a more than sufficient tendency within a fallible Church [as a Catholic, I know this only too well!] to over-state the trustworthiness of human authorities. The effects that such over-statements have is to discourage
• human imagination, questioning and inquiry; in favour of waiting for pronouncements
• thinking for oneself[ in favour of repeating slogans
• personal moral responsibility; in favour of "holy obedience"!
• If there was some manifestly infallible oracle to consult [a supercharged papacy, if you like - God forbid!] this would result in every human being turning off their own judgement and conscience and simply obeying the decrees of that oracle.
• It was precisely in order to avoid this pathological state of affairs [which directly contradicts God's prime intention for Man] that Jesus ceased to dwell in the physical world and instead established the Church - under the guidance and protection (rather than the imperious command) of Holy Spirit. - as His more gentle means of remaining indirectly engaged in human affairs.

No. Only your gloss is false, but this fact should have been obvious from the start!

No. Our souls are "saved" precisely through our free-will. Without our autonomy we cannot become God's Friends.

This is not an excuse. Human autonomy is the foundation of all God's dealings with Man! If you want to "disprove Christianity" you must take the theory as given; otherwise you are simply setting us a "straw man" and then shooting him down - which is rather pointless!

• This is fine, as far as it goes, but that is not very far.
• No believer can reasonably claim that Christianity is anything other than a "reasonable hypothesis" or "rational account" - a theory. It is no "more confirmed by evidence" than is "Darwinian Evolutionism" or "Copenhaganist Quantum Mechanics" or "Einsteinian General Relativity"! Read some [more] Popper if you doubt this!
• Indeed (from the nature of the case), the evidence in favour of Judaeo-Christianity [or Catholicism, for that matter!] is more indirect, more experiential and less experimental than that in favour of the typical physics theory; but the way that modern physics is going this is becoming less and less true. Physics and metaphysics are rapidly merging into pure mathematics - just as any good Platonist - such as myself - would hope and predict!
• In the end, all knowledge is based on faith and conviction. Even our acceptance of logic as the basis of this argument is a matter of faith. How can either of us establish that logic is valid when the very idea of validity requires the avidity of logic to have been already established!

Agreed!

• First, because human beings suffer from conceit and don't like to have their favourite (but mistaken) ideas corrected.
• Second, because different perspectives can give rise to different accounts which superficially seem to disagree while being, at a deeper level, compatible.
• "Matrix Mechanics" and "Wave Mechanics" were originally proposed as two competing (and highly antagonistic!) accounts of Quantum Mechanics. Subsequently, it was shown that they were simply two alternative and equivalent viewpoints of the same thing.

• No. As, I've already said, people are wilful. Even those of us who on one level want to understand the things of God are often frightened to give up on ideas which we honestly (but wrongly) think are good and wholesome, but which are in fact exactly the opposite.
• In the end, this doesn't matter - because what God primarily wants of us is that we try to understand and that we struggle and fight with our own ignorance and imperfections. It is the process that is important. What matters is to be of "good will" or to "hunger and thirst for justice", not to be in possession of all the right answers!
• Gods purpose is for us to be morally perfected - sanctified - through this struggle, with His help and encouragement; that is, by His grace.

• The "rational account" that agrees most closely with the evidence available to us at present is indeed "The Inflationary Big Bang Theory"; but note the "at present". Increasingly, however, evidence is turning up which this theory does not satisfactorily account for and we still aren't clear about what caused the "inflation".
• Your "by far" tends to suggest that the "degree of support" (how might one evaluate this?) implies some kind of "probability (or plausibility or reasonable expectation) that this theory will never be overturned." This pseudo deduction is profoundly unjustifiable.

God speaks everywhere. On one level you are willing to hear His voice, that I gladly acknowledge; but on another you are not.
You want to have the answer given in your own terms - but those terms are wrong and fundamentally exclude the very answer that you seek!

• It is not always proper (consistent with justice, from which flows God's first intention in His dealings with Man) for God to do everything that God could do, just considering God's might.
• Might is not right!
• God wants to persuade and seduce us, not coerce and spiritually rape us!

That's where you are wrong. It is not good for someone to be spiritually raped - "for their own good".
As to whether - in the fullness of time - God does manage to seduce and befriend every soul, I cannot say - I am not God. I hope so, but I cannot know so. It is possible (to the best of my ignorance) that some people get themselves so messed up that they are ultimately unsalvageable.

Later, it turned out that one of the victim's children, her daughter, had survived. She had drifted pretty far from the wreck, but the rescue team pulled her out, and the woman who had beaten the crap out of her rescuer apologized and thanked her for saving her against her will. Everyone in my group agreed the rescue swimmer had done the right thing, and we all would have done the same - because that is what a loving, caring being does. It follows that if God is a loving being, he will do no less for us. In the real world, kind people don't act like some stubborn, pouting God who abandons the drowning simply because they don't want to be helped. They act like this rescue swimmer. They act like us.

In analogous circumstances, God will certainly act analogously; but note all the struggling involved.
However, this story only sounds good because of how it turned out. It is logically possible that the "rescuer" might have condemned the "rescuee" to a life of unmitigated loss and misery.

He has done. Read the Bible, listen to the testimony of the Church!

And you clearly sketch out exactly the problem with this vision. It is manifestly incompatible with human autonomy; which you consistently ignore and write-off as of no value; simply because - I suspect - you haven't thought through the implications of the existence of such an Infallible Divine Oracle.

And God doesn't! We have discovered all that we know of meteorology for ourselves - perhaps with some help from God, how would I know? - but certainly not with any violation of our autonomy! The situation is similar with theology and (what is of more practical importance) ethics. Theology and "religious belief" has the prime purpose of underpinning and motivating ethics - this was the amazing and innovative realization of the Hebrews,

• However, the situation we are in is not comparable to the physician patient relationship (where it is the business of the physician to actively cure the patient who is passive in the physician's care) but rather the teacher student relationship (which is predicated on a certain equality and on friendship), with the prospect in view of this developing into the lover beloved relationship.
• The teacher's best tactic at all times is to ask questions and to challenge and to critique their student, not simply to drill and indoctrinate them. Even if the student demands "to be given the right answers to memorize for the exam" (as I have been!) it is entirely wrong for the true educator to do so. Indeed, the first thing that the student must learn - if they are ever to understand anything at all - is that they must not make such demands, or at least never expect them to be satisfied!
• Your problem is that you haven't twigged how high is the vocation that you have received from God. You are assuming a lower vocation (one that seems more reasonable) then discovering that this doesn't fit in with the facts and finally (unreasonably) claiming that because this theory is wrong the very idea of Christianity (which you have never actually considered) is false.

What would count as "the fundamental facts of salvation"? Have you ever tried to express what these might be. I accept that you have gone some way to having done so in this essay, and I have attempted to respond - suggesting where your vision might be extended and broadened, just as your (other) physicist friends helped you to gain some understanding of the "Big Bang Theory".
Perhaps people do agree well enough about "the fundamental facts of salvation". Perhaps this is why you and I are able to have this argument.

St Paul tells us that - in fact - this is exactly the case and Catholics believe that every soul - even that of a pagan - receives sufficient grace [help, guidance, encouragement and support] from God to be saved. Perhaps we should reverse your argument and evaluate what "the fundamental facts of salvation" are more in terms of what is in fact common knowledge rather than stating that because there isn't enough agreement the whole "God thing" is false. Perhaps some humility is called for here!

Agreed, but they are not God and are not infallible! Their answers and advice and help are not ultimately and absolutely authoritative and unquestionable - and you know that. Hence, you would subject them all to your own scrutiny and judgement - except in the case of an urgent emergency This is the huge difference!

• It is wrong to argue from what it is right and proper for a human being to do to what it is right and proper for God to do.
• God is not any-thing-like a human being! Every one of God's actions is necessarily indefinitely puissant and if not moderated and mediated forces the outcome.
• This is why God always acts through intermediaries. When God Himself came into this world, as Jesus, He chose to do so in an obscure way and to teach in parables.
• Even when He rose from the dead, He chose to reveal Himself informally and only to a select group (quite a few, actually, but still select) rather than appear in glory, stepping out of the "Holy of Holies" of the Jerusalem Temple!

God does all these things, if you look in the right places. God has been a great comfort to me in my anguish. God has shown me that I was wrong about things and guides me into better ways of thinking. God simply doesn't do these things in the way that you think that He ought to!

Indeed, it wasn't. For them to accept that what Jesus said was authentic required a step of faith - which many other contemporary people didn't make. It was not utterly obvious that Jesus was the Messiah, else why did both the religious and secular authorities reject Him? Would you have been with Peter and Paul and Thomas in their professions of faith based on evidence; or with Caiaphas and Pontius Pilot in their rejection of Jesus' credentials?

Or various aspects of it - this is in fact the precise basis of "heresy" and the cause of divergence of theological opinion among sincere Christians.

As an Infallible Divine Oracle which would then utterly erase human autonomy. Rather like the vision that the Queen of the Elves foresaw for herself; and which motivated her to refused to take the Ring of Sauron, when Frodo offered it to her.

In fact there is a considerable uniformity about fundamental ethics from one culture to another. In the end: "Be excellent to one another" pretty much sums it all up!
If we truly knew all the facts, there would be no basis for choice - unless we were to "chose" irrationally, which is no choice!
The only basis upon which any kind of free choice can be made is a certain degree of ignorance!

No! Only that your "gloss" is false: namely that it is "the possession of information or knowledge that matters, and not at all the process by which it is to be obtained."

Appendix III: Dialogue with an Existentialist

"When it is a question of what things are good, we no longer find anyone so heroic that he will venture to contend that whatever a community thinks useful, and conventionally establishes as such, really is useful (just so long as it is the established order) unless, of course, he means that it is simply called 'useful'; but that would be making a game of our argument, wouldn't it?"

[Plato "Theaetetus" (177d)]

So far, if I plug in your statements into a deduction I get this:

1. Value and justice are concepts.
2. A rational account can be given of these concepts.
3. This present world is basically futile and unfair and cruel.
4. Therefore, a rational account of these concepts directly require eternal life.

As you see, you did not provide me with enough information about your position for me to understand your rationale behind your claims. But overall, I still see no reason why a rational account cannot be given of the world without eternity, but I will elaborate on this later in my response.

Fair comment. I shall consider what you have to write there.

As for the second choice that you provided, you started off by using a straw man argument. Calling value and justice insignificant right off the bat completely denigrates the existentialist position. So let us change it to: The ideas of value and justice are significant (because they are important to humans), accidental constructs of evolution with a coherent significance and rational basis, and a subjective psychological expediency. I like that choice and will explain why in a minute.

I also am happy with how you put this, because it directly exposes the irrational nature of existentialism. Note my emphasis of your words.

You claim that the existentialist denies the only possible rational basis for that validity.

Indeed, because the existentialist claims that value exists even though human life is mortal. I claim that this is a rationally insupportable proposition. It is a noble, even heroic, cry; but it is incoherent and irrational and desperate.

That statement of yours answers one of my questions. I was wondering if you thought that your view was the only rational view, as opposed to being a more rational view than others.

Indeed.

So far, you have not demonstrated why your view is rational, but I am sure you will explain this in your next response.

I shall try to, below.

Before I provide my rational account of value, I would like to mention the importance of subjectivity here. You said that if I can provide a rational account of value without..., then your contention is clearly falsified. That is true but there is a catch. You first have to be convinced that my account is rational, which means that my rationale must meet your standards of reasoning, which is a tricky thing since we obviously hold very different views.

Why do you say this? It seems to me that in fact we talk exactly the same language and work in an identifiably similar metaphysical and epistemological framework. We seem to understand each other very well and do not seem liable to "come to blows";.

It seems to me only that I believe in "God's being" and in "Eternal Life" and that you (as yet) don't. I accept that these are important propositions - life changing propositions, in fact - but I don't think that if you came to accept them it would change a good deal of what you have already cleared up for yourself, philosophically. I think it would simply clarify your "view" not fundamentally change it.

What is rational for one person may be considered irrational for another, hence the importance of subjectivity. I can provide my account and then you can claim that it is not rational and then a person may read our debate and think that my account is rational. So in your mind your contention is still true, while in another's it is false. I am positive that we can agree on this,

Perhaps. There are two ways in which such a dispute about "rationality" might arise.

In my experience the most common reason is that one party does not accept as "reasonable" some of the premises that the other party takes as "reasonable". For myself, I don't think that (most?) premises can be judged "a priori" in this way. I think one has to evaluate the systems that they give rise to and judge them "a posteriori" in terms of what they result in. As Jesus of Nazareth said about something entirely different: "By their fruits ye shall know them!" This whole process is necessarily "subjective", because the just criteria to be applied in any "evaluation" are never clear even to the person who is honestly attempting to apply them!

The other basis of such a dispute is that one or both of the parties is/are in fact failing to be rational in their argumentation and failing to notice and/or acknowledge this fact. With good will and courtesy and patience this kind of dispute can always - in principal - be resolved, technically.

therefore you should never claim that all rational people should reach your conclusion, because rationality is completely subjective.

An interesting claim. In which case is "rationality" anything distinctive at all? What makes superstition or psychosis irrational if "rationality is completely subjective"? The mad-man will claim to be rational. His disordered and incoherent and self-contradictory account of reality seems to him, subjectively, to be reasonable. Is he justified in claiming to be "rational"? Are we justified in claiming that he is not "rational"?

"When one who lacks skill in arguments puts his trust in an argument as being true, then shortly afterwards believes it to be false - as sometimes it is and sometimes it is not - and so with another argument and then another. You know how those in particular who spend their time studying contradiction in the end believe themselves to have become very wise and that they alone have understood that there is no soundness or reliability in any object or any argument; but that all that exists simply fluctuates up and down as if it were in the [violent straits of] Euripus and does not remain in the same place for any time at all!...

We should not allow into our minds the conviction that argumentation has nothing sound about it; much rather we should believe that it is we who are not yet sound and that we must take courage and be eager to attain soundness...

The uneducated, when they engage in argument about anything, give no thought to the truth about the subject of discussion, but are only eager that those present will accept the position they have set forth...

Give but little thought to Socrates, but much more to the truth. If you think that what I say is true, agree with me; if not, oppose it with every argument and take care that in my eagerness I do not deceive myself and you." [Plato "Phaedo" (90b-91c)]

Of course, if one believes in reality and one believes that one has a half-decent account of it then one has to believe that any other seemingly contradictory account is liable to be wrong! If one doesn't believe in objective reality and the possibility of a proposition being either "true" or "false" what is the point of having a discussion about any idea or notion?

If one has a modicum of humility, one always remains open to the two possibilities that:

One's own half-decent account is less true than one had thought. One should never be absolutely and definitely "convinced that things are definitely one way". Such certainties are dangerous! In which case one must be willing to learn and make progress in understanding by admitting that one was wrong. The beginning of wisdom is the recognition of one's own ignorance!
1. It may be possible to synthesize the two seemingly contradictory accounts into an even better account of reality.

Subjective beings (humans) have subjective perceptions. Justice and value are part of these perceptions.

So are "justice" and "value" simply arbitrary? If not what constitutes their non arbitrariness?

They are significant to humans because they help them establish a way to categorize the world and the people within the world.

This, it seems to me, is an attempt to define "significance" in terms of other concepts.

Is this "way" a true way or a false "way"? How would one decide?

"Help"; with what purpose in view?

As I asked before, how and why is human life significant, as far as you are concerned? We all die and the universe is set to "come to nothing". So why does anything matter at all? Everything is futile! How is this "fulfilling" in any reasonable sense of that word? How is it "fulfilling" to be the food of worms?

If all that you mean by "significance" is that "I chose to say that it is significant" then WHY do you make such an "existentialist" choice? What motivates this choice? Is it rational?

Is not your "existentialism" just an "emotional crutch"?

Also, we cannot separate ourselves from it. Since morals, values, and justice are relative, they are also temporary.

How do you know that "morals, values, and justice are relative"? This seems to be an unsubstantiated assertion. Moreover it isn't even clear what it means!

What is relative to what?

What is the alternative proposition that this one is intended to oppose and be antithetical to?

Explaining these concepts through relativism is rational because it is natural and easily observable around the world.

This is the first sentence you've written here that has no clear meaning.

1. In what sense is it "rational" to "explain these concepts through relativism" because "it is natural" and because "it is easily observable"?
2. How is it "natural" to do so?
3. What do you mean here by "natural"?
4. What is "easily observable"?

1. Do you mean to say that "it is unsupported to think that there is an objective reality"?
2. In which case, why not say so?
3. In which case am I nothing more than a figment of your imagination?
4. Or, failing that, is my view of any matter just as good/bad/valid/invalid/true/false as yours or any-one else's?
5. Is everything just a matter of arbitrary opinion and personal whim or prejudice?
6. In either case, why are you bothering with this dialogue?
7. If not, then how can one avoid the concept to objective reality?
8. Moreover, why would one desire to avoid the concept of objective reality?
"If whatever the individual judges by means of perception is true for him; if no man can assess another's experience better than he, or can claim authority to examine another man's judgement and see if it be right or wrong; if, as we have repeatedly said, only the individual himself can judge of his own world, and what he judges is always true and correct: how could it ever be, my friend, that Protagoras was a wise man...? To examine and try to refute each other's appearances and judgements, when each person's are correct - this is surely an extremely tiresome piece of nonsense, if the Truth of Protagoras is true, and not merely an oracle speaking in jest...." [Plato "Theaetetus" (161d-162a)]

That remains to be seen! Why do you need to know what I believe in order to convincingly represent your own view of the matter? Especially when in your preliminary analysis of the problem situation and what you have already understood of my position you were lucid and coherent!

Why is not rational to believe that our concepts of justice and value are temporary?

Such a belief could be rational; but it would mean that we wouldn't have to be bound by these concepts and it would in fact destroy them: so the proposition would come to be a proposition about concepts that no longer existed!

I think my biggest problem is that it appears you believe in an objective reality. You hold so strong that your position is the only rational way, so everyone else must simply be wrong, in your mind. That is why Nietzsche said that "Convictions are more dangerous foes of truth than lies."

I do not "appear" to believe in an objective reality. I am an unashamed "Objective Realist!" All Platonists and Catholics are fundamentally committed to this metaphysic. To believe in objective reality is not the same as believing that one personally has a very good idea about the character of objective reality.

I agree with the Nietzsche quote if by "convictions" he means those ideas that are held so strongly that their holders are incapable of questioning and criticizing them and take them as absolutely certain. It seems to me that atheists, "Subjective Relativists" and existentialists are just as (or more!) capable of having such ideas as theists, "Objective Realists" and Platonists!

I admit that I am not too sharp when it comes to mathematics and physics, but I feel that I do not need to be to make the point I was making. You claim that "most" mathematicians and physicists believe that they are discovering that which already existed. This is an issue of semantics and I see a way to illustrate this.

Let us say that we do not know how to mathematically explain Proposition A. Mathematicians are trying to explain it; they just do not know the way yet. Group A believes that the way to explain it already exists, they just need to find it. Group B believes that the way to explain it does not exist until they can perceive it. I am on the side of Group B. We did not know how many degrees were in a right angle until we created the system.

Of course -; this is an arbitrary convention, not a mathematical result.

Group A claims that a right angle existed for past eternity, while Group B claims that a right angle did not exist until we created a system called math. These days, mathematicians and physicists are trying to uncover new ways of explaining nature by using the systems that we created. Now in the Group B sense, the ways of explaining nature do not exist until we invent them, because obviously any explanation is based on our perception of the world, which did not always exist.

No. An explanation is "based on" an abstract general theory, like "E=mc²" or "F=dp/dt" or "F=G.m₁.m₂/r₁₂²";. We never experience or perceive such a thing, we propose or conjecture it [according to Popper] or discover or remember it [according to Plato].

What the explanation has to explain is "our perception of the world".

In the Group A sense, the way to explain the universe has always existed, we just needed to find it. Obviously a tornado has always worked the same way; all we discovered was a way to explain it; that is the job of the scientist. But anyone who claims that mathematics is not an invention has some probing questions to answer.

Ask away!

So when you say that most mathematicians and physicians are on your side, you are leaving room for some who are not on your side; they are on the Group B side.

Yes, of course! See below for further comment.

Even though you claim that most agree with you (I am not sure what statistics you have in your possession to be able to claim that), claiming that the majority agrees with you is not a compelling case.

I emphatically agree. As a Platonist, I have no time for majority opinions!

This issue is a classic example of the differences of perception; no physics or mathematics degree is necessary to understand this.

It is impossible to give a convincing rational account of why most mathematicians and theoretical physicists tend to a pretty Platonic view of their endeavours without calling on a good general appreciation of what higher mathematics and theoretical physics is all about.

When I first discovered that the whole of electromagnetism could be written down, mathematically, as the two extremely simple equations:

I was taken aback at the fundamental simplicity and beauty of this mathematical account of what in practice is a very rich and complex area of physics. The idea that men had "created" such a simple account of such an apparently complicated set of phenomena was very far from my mind. The proposition that the simple reality had always been there: the d'Alembertian Equations calmly governing the Cosmos before any human being yet walked the Earth, seemed altogether much more sensible to me!

You are definitely correct that self ordering processes work by the expense of an external influence and I was well aware of that when I made my statement. The truth is, we have no idea what or if anything exists outside of our universe which may be affecting it. Of course one may hear that and conclude that God must be the external force, but that is simply jumping the gun before we discover more about our universe. One day there may be a way to account for a naturally ordering universe.

As soon as one admits the idea of an "outside of the Universe" one has admitted to the concept of God, because this is one perfectly adequate definition of what God is. As to the character of this "external force" - that is another matter entirely, of course!

As for the world being ordered, there is always confusion in these kind of topics because of language. What exactly do we each interpret as order is important. You say that there is no scientific reason to believe in order of the universe, but then you say that there must be order for us to exist.

Indeed, as I said, this is the "Anthropic Principle" given that we are here, the Universe in which we exist must be of a character that is compatible with us being here.

Deducing that something must be a certain way due to an observable fact is definitely scientific.

No. It is a matter of logic, not science; but I don't think this distinction here matters much!

Is that not what scientists do all of the time?

No.

They propose new theories.
Then they test these theories against the evidence,
Then if these theories are not shown to be false in well controlled circumstances they apply them to other situations.

Indeed. Physicists hope that we will one day be able to go further. As a Catholic, I think that this final explanation will eventually have to refer - however obliquely - to God. Already, I think that it does so, implicitly.

I think claiming that the universe is governed by mathematical laws is just another way to say that the universe is ordered and all we have to do is figure out a formula to explain it.

Not quite. There are two entirely different meanings of "ordered".

The first is "lawful", that is any and every particular thing or event can always be "accounted for" according to certain general principles or mathematical formulae.

The second is "low entropy", that is the whole can be "accounted for" or "described" in a manner that is much briefer than a simple listing of all of the positions and movements of its constituent parts.

I also think it is a mistake to make a huge, general statement that all science today is motivated by such a conviction. Not all scientists agree that mathematical laws are governing the universe.

All mathematical physicists do, I assure you!

That statement sort of implies that math existed before us,

Quite. Once more, your clear perception of the reality of the situation has betrayed you!

and that is exactly what I am, and other scientists, are against.

Not all scientists (especially those that are not mathematical physicists) see the issue as clearly as you do. Most scientists (even mathematical physicists) are very bad at philosophizing. Experimentalists in particular are very much pragmatists.

This is all a problem of language, which is very common in debates around the world. If people do not make clear what exactly we mean by our words, we will continue to have the same disagreements because of our language.

It is not all a problem of language. The problem of poor use of language is real, but philosophy is not just a question of being careful with one's verbal expression.

"People say again and again that philosophy doesn't really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say that don't understand why this has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions." - Ludwig Wittgenstein

This I heartily disagree with. The reason that philosophy doesn't progress in the sense that is intimated here is two-fold.

First, it keeps on shedding those areas of itself that become relatively mature and these are re-named as one science or another. Sometimes these areas are shed prematurely, and they become pseudo sciences like psychology and sociology.

Second, it deals with those questions that are at once most crucial for human life and most remote from immediate experience, perception and observation. Hence its subject matter is the most contentious and the techniques it must use are the most speculative.

Now for a brief explicit statement of my "theory of values":

I start from the idea that all ethics and value originates in "the self" and the concern for "self preservation". In other words "true selfishness is the fundamental virtue". See:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/pharseas.world/teleology.html

and Chapter 6 of my book: "New Skins for Old Wine"

"The Virtue of Selfishness"

"It is valuable to be" and/or "Being is Good"

There is only one problem with life. This is the only fact about life which stops it being of "value in itself", just as an existentialist might (understandably) like/want/desire it to be. This fact is mortality. If there was no death then I think that life (and human life in particular) would be a perfectly good moral absolute in itself. See:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/pharseas.world/Life.html

and Chapter 3 of my book : "New Skins for Old Wine"

"The problem with life is death."

• being = good = value
• life = being
• life = good = value

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/pharseas.world/WhyBeGood.html

and Chapter 8 of my book: "New Skins for Old Wine"