The supply of information took the form of the purchase of a `National Kuwait Day' on twenty of the major college campuses, 'a national day of prayer for Kuwait observed in churches nation-wide, the distribution of tens of thousands of Free Kuwait bumper stickers and T-shirts, and thousands of press kits extolling the alleged virtues of Kuwaiti society' (7)

However this PR work failed to motivate the US public or (more importantly) their government or the UN. H&K attributed this to the widespread and daily media coverage of similar events world-wide by the media.

H&K thus decided that the form of information that CFK required should be highly emotive to the potential audience. H&K thus commissioned a focus group survey in order to determine what would motivate a sample audience to approve military intervention. Sample presentations were put before the group, including one about atrocities committed about babies, which H&K found had effectively shaped public opinion during the Spanish-American war and World War 1. According to Kellner (1992), this group `responded strongly to the Iraqi baby atrocity stories'.

In addition, Lauri Fitz-Pelgado, according to Strauber & Rampton, (1996) H&K's 'account supervisor on the Kuwait account' and 'former Foreign Service Officer at the US Information Agency', decided upon the strategy of producing `alleged witnesses to atrocities to tell stories of human rights violations in occupied Kuwait' (1).

H&K thus fabricated the story that `Iraqi soldiers had removed 312 babies from their incubators and left them to die on the cold hospital floor of Kuwait City'(7). The story was first reported to the London Daily Telegraph (September 5th, 1990) by exiled Kuwaiti housing minister and member of CFK Yahya al-Sumait. Because of the high emotional content of the story, it was repeated globally by much of the media, none of whom adequately checked the source.

According to MacArthur (1993), `the senior account people on the Kuwaiti account included Craig Fuller, Bush's former chief of staff when Bush was Vice President'. Using this connection, H&K set up a hearing with the Congressional Human Rights caucus on October 10th 1990 where they produced `Nayirah', a 15-year Kuwaiti who gave the following statement:

'I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with guns, and go into the room where 15 babies were in incubators. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incubators, and left the babies on the cold floor to die.'(7)

According to MacArthur (1993), H&K 'made a brilliant little video news release out of it, which they beamed all over the world. It was on NBC Nightly News and millions and millions of people saw this'.

This story was then presented to the United Nations Security Council during an audio-visual presentation on the 27th November 1990. In addition to `Nayirah', seven other witnesses were produced, five of whom 'coached by Hill & Knowlton - had used false names without saying they were doing so' (7).

Nayirah was, in fact, 'the daughter of the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States' (1), and had been coached by Lauri Fitz-Pegado to deliver the testimony which (according to Strauber & Rampton) 'even the Kuwaitis' own investigators later confirmed was false'. Not only had she never seen the atrocity she had alleged to, but had never been to the hospital, much less worked there.

Prior to the H&K 'baby atrocity story' as Kellner (1992) termed it, MacArthur (1993) argued that the US was 'divided 50-50 on sanctions versus hostilities back in December 1990 and January 1991'. A brief study of Gallup polls estimating the level of support by the US populace to President Bush's policies (which at that time would have been focusing almost entirely on support of Bush's policy of military intervention) show that in early November 1990 support was limited to only 51%, yet after the H&K baby atrocity story the poll for January 1991 shows 74% approval. In addition, a December 1990 New York Times/CBS news poll indicated, according to Strauber & Rampton, (1996), 'that 48 percent of the American people wanted Bush to wait before taking any action if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by Bush's January 15 deadline.'

The decision to go to war was made on 12th January 1991. Fingrut (1993) alleges that 'before passing this resolution, six pro-war senators specifically brought forth the baby incubator allegations in their speeches supporting the resolution.' Bush himself 'mentioned the story six time in one month' Kellner (1992). H&K's baby atrocity story can therefore be seen as one of the primary motivating forces in both public and government approval to military intervention.

On January 16th 1991 military intervention was initiated, by February 26th Kuwait City was in control of Kuwaiti resistance leaders, and Iraq formally accepted cease-fire terms on March 3rd. All this was done with over 80% approval of the American populace.

The benefits of the supply of information by H&K was the fulfilment of CFK's objectives: namely the restoral of Kuwaiti territories to the Kuwaiti royal family.

The entire cost of H&K's services for CFK is estimated at $10.8 million according to Strauber & Rampton, (1996). JAWSRCE states that CFK were paying H&K '$1m a month plus expenses'. Kellner (1992) notes that the enormity of this fee (which actually consisted of payments channelled into CFK by the Kuwaiti government) as `one of the most expensive PR campaigns in history'.

The high cost of the operation can be attributed to the number of staff H&K deployed on the Kuwaiti account. Fingrut (1993) states that according to H&K's Justice Department registration papers, '119 executives in twelve offices around the U.S. worked on the Kuwait account'. Carlisle (1993) notes that 'top firms like Hill and Knowlton charge up to $350 per hour'.

Over half a million dollars went into the production of video news releases. According to Strauber & Rampton, (1996) 'it was money well spent, resulting in tens of millions of dollars worth of `free' air time' and shown globally by media networks who presumed that the source of these releases were journalists and not a PR firm.

As a final costing irony, in order to allow the baby atrocity presentation to be delivered to the Congressional Human Rights caucus, H&K allowed the caucus free office space at H&K's Washington DC headquarters, which Strauber & Rampton, (1996) note was 'valued at $3,000 a year'.

The story of Hill & Knowlton proves that a single piece of disinformation can cause extreme and long-lasting consequences. That democracy can be suberted by multinational corporations is neither a new or startling fact, but the use of memes who are tailored to be both highly contagious and promote the a sinificant attitude by these corporations is extremely worrying.

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