British mining operations on the Western Front began
life with outdated and antiquated equipment, poor organisation and a complete
lack of understanding on the part of many senior army commanders as to its
value as a weapon of war given the conditions that prevailed. Only slowly
was it realised the contribution that mining could provide when used in a
wider strategic role rather than in small, singular, tactical operations
that typified most of 1915. However, although the early stages brought about
questions as to the contribution mining had to the war effort, this was a
period of learning for the organisation as a whole.
While the British were slow to recognise the utility that geology offered,
not only to mining operations, but also in the location of water supply and
the excavation of raw materials, the Germans were not and had a large number
of geologists on the Western Front. By comparison the British had only three
by mid 1918. However, these were extremely able men in their field and were
aided by the simple geological make up of the region and by the fact that
many men serving with the tunnelling companies themselves had expertise that
could be used at a local level. The British were also quick to establish
a geological staff and were able to act and advise tunnelling companies in
a more direct way.
The reorganisation of the tunnelling force at the beginning of 1916 resulted
in a restructuring of command and greater continuity than had existed during
the previous year. With the reorganisation came mining schools to give instruction
on tactics and a mine rescue organisation that gave training in the use of
special breathing apparatus in order to save those trapped more efficiently
without further loss of life. Mining became so effective following the reorganisation
that in an attempt to regain the initiative the Germans restructured their
own organisation along similar lines to that of the British. Equipment improved
dramatically to meet the problems that the tunnellers encountered. Electric
air pumps dealt with the problem of air supply as mines became deeper and
the galleries longer, while water pumps dealt with flooding in galleries.
Specially designed metal tubing was also devised to help sink shafts through
water logged and problematic ground. Arguably the greatest aid was that given
by the geophone. This relatively simple device gave early and accurate warning
of an approaching enemy counter-mine which allowed British tunnellers, more
often than not, to destroy the enemy's gallery first.
The psychological effects of mining were immense. Far more soldiers on both
sides feared being undermined that those that were actually killed by the
mines themselves. The tunnellers faced the added problems of falling foul
of an enemy charge bringing down the gallery in which they were working and
often the danger that they would break into a counter-mine where frequently
combat would ensue in the confining space below the ground.
The high point was, of course, the complete success at Messines. Without
the use of mines prior to the assault huge casualties, similar to those inflicted
on the first day of the Somme offensive, would have almost certainly been
the result. The 19 mines that were fired not only destroyed all the strong
defensive points on the ridge, but also affected German morale to the point
where they could offer no effective resistance. The vital differences between
the assault at Messines and the Somme offensive was that mining for the latter
was not considered as vital as that of the former. Artillery was to produce
the step by step advance and mining was seen more of a diversion than that
of eradicating the first line of defence, thereby allowing the infantry to
gain a reasonable foothold with few casualties. Even so there were many mistakes
that were not of the tunnelling companies' making. The early firing of the
Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt mine, against the advice of the Inspector of Mines,
was clearly a tactical blunder. It did not obtain the objective, which the
Corps commander who had ordered its firing had hoped for. The German infantry
had gained a foothold on their side of the crater that was formed and were
in a position to harass the British infantry on the other side. Yet another
problem was poor staff planning. The Russian saps that had been prepared
by the tunnelling companies were not used effectively. The majority of the
infantry that crossed no-mans land fully laden did not learn of their existence
until much later because they had not been informed of their positions or
their intended use. Had these been used as intended then these men could
have crossed to within 30 yards of the German front line in relative safety.
Time was yet another factor. The five tunnelling companies involved on the
Somme were given only three months to prepare the mines that would be used
on the 1 July. The front was in excess of 16 miles compared to a little over
9 miles of front at Messines and the mines and aggregate of explosives, with
some exceptions, were not as large.
While many general accounts give some space to mining operations as they
occurred before the commencement of a particular battle, such accounts do
not convey sufficiently the problems that tunnellers encountered in completing
these mines. What they also fail to highlight is the absence of mining in
preparation for an offensive. The omission of mining at the Battle of Loos,
an area ideally suited to mining, is largely ignored in historical post-mortems
when considering other possibilities that may have produced a battle winning
formula. The vast majority of casualties occurred at the first line of defence
and the battle of Loos was no exception. The fact that some units succeeded
in penetrating the last German line of defence, leaves open the question
of what more could have been achieved if a number of large mines had been
fired prior to the assault? Ironically the area around Loos was only handed
over to tunnelling companies after the battle's conclusion.
Britain began mining operations at a considerable disadvantage. The Germans
had already commenced mining on a pre-defined system while the British struggled
to answer them in the early stages. Yet by mid 1916 there were 32 British
and Commonwealth tunnelling companies at work within an organised framework,
that not only met the German challenge, but took the lead which would remain
with them until the end of the war. Following Messines no further offensive
mining took place on either side. Tunnelling companies during most of 1918
were engaged in other duties, particularly the dismantling of boobytraps,
the repairing of roads and bridges and the sinking of wells for water supply.
Despite the eventual success of the tunnelling companies no peacetime organisation
was established. The reasons why are not exactly clear. There were many infantry
commanders who, even at the end of 1917, did not agree with the use of mines
and who were in a position to prevent the continued existence of the tunnelling
companies. Also the majority of those engaged in mining were volunteers who
were due to be demobilised as the war ended. The size of the peacetime army
was greatly reduced and many senior officers had other conflicting ideas.
Some looked forward to a more mechanised force that entailed new tactics,
while others still looked to the infantry as queen of the battlefield. Mining
was laborious and unglamorous and has not attracted the attention that other
branches have in equal proportion. Nevertheless the contribution of mining
to the war effort, given its less than auspicious start, was immense. Providing
shelter and protection for the infantry the tunnellers' career ended with
a spectacular success, which saved many lives in obtaining the objectives
set out.