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H.M.S. LONDON. 28th April, 1949. No. 221/139. Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report on the action which took place between H.M.S. LONDON and the shore batteries of the People’s Liberation Army on the East Bank of the Lower Yangtse River on the 21st April, 1949.
2. On the 20th April H.M.S. LONDON was approaching the Yangtse Entrance Lightship on passage to Shanghai to take part in the St. George’s day celebrations. The Quarterdeck and the Waist awnings were spread and the Ship’s Company were engaged in polishing brightwork and rigging illuminating circuits. The weather was fine, warm and sunny and, although reports of imminent crossings of the Yangtse by the Communists had been received, these had so often been forecast and failed to materialise that there seemed no reason to suppose that the projected visit to Shanghai would not be short and festive as projected. Against this background the first report of the Amethyst’s action and grounding arrived with startling effect.
3. When the lower deck had been cleared and the situation and its possible implications explained to the Ship’s Company the work of preparing the ship for action was started. On arrival at Woosung two Chinese Yangtse pilots were embarked. Mr. W. Sudbury, a Wangpoo pilot who has had much pre-war experience of the Yangtse was also in the pilot boat. Feeling that in the event of any shooting the Chinese pilots might not be entirely reliable I asked Mr. Sudbury to come on board. He agreed readily and cheerfully to come up river in the ship: his presence on the following day was invaluable.
4. LONDON anchored for the night at Kiang Yin at 1900. Several Chinese Nationalist warships were at anchor there. The night was spent fuelling Black Swan and Consort, to whom also was rendered what aid was possible to her casualties and damage.
5. At 0930 I was informed by the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station that he intended that LONDON should attempt the passage of the Yangtse to Rose Island with the object of escorting Amethyst down river. Black Swan was to proceed as far as Beaver Island only and to be prepared to give covering fire if necessary. It was perfectly clear to both the Admiral and to myself that the passage of the river against the opposition of determined and well trained shore batteries was not a feasible operation: we considered that against light and sporadic opposition it was a reasonable proposition and hoped that there would be no opposition at all. It was agreed that if fire was opened on the ship she would reply in self defence with all guns.
6. H.M.S. LONDON was already prepared for action and at 1026, after closing up at action stations, I weighed and proceeded up the river at 25 knots. Large Union Jacks had been rigged on the front and sides of the bridge and on the sides of the hangars. They flew also from the four yardarms on the foremast and two on the mainmast. This galaxy of bunting was completed by a large white flag at the foremast head and an ensign at the peak. There could be no doubt in the mind of any man familiar with the British National Flag and the usage of the White Flag as to the ship'’ nationality or intentions.
7. At 1036 fire was opened from the North Bank in the vicinity of LIU-WEI-CHIANG (lat. 32°1' Long. 119° 59' E.). The ship was hit immediately by projectiles which appeared to be of 75mm and 105mm calibre. The firing continued for four minutes in spite of heavy and accurate fire from the whole of LONDON’s armament.
8. At 1104 fire was opened by a battery in the vicinity of KUO-CHIENG-CHANG (lat. 30° 10' N. Long. 119° 55' E. approximately). The ship was again hit principally on the bridge superstructure and hangar and boat decks. It was evident that damage and casualties were becoming heavy and I started to consider the advisability of withdrawal. I had in mind the fact that, even if it were possible for LONDON to reach Amethyst’s position, the chances of a successful return with Amethyst at slow speed were almost negligible.
9. At 1106 approximately a burst on the bridge killed the Chinese Pilot, severely wounded the Navigating Officer and wounded the Officer of the Watch and myself. Damage to instruments and communications on the bridge were obviously severe and I was in doubt as to whether I was still in control of the ship. LONDON was now 19 miles from Amethyst and I considered that this passage at high speed under heavy fire could not be controlled from the Emergency Conning Position abaft of the funnels. I was in no doubt that the time for withdrawal had arrived and ordered the wheel to hard astarboard and the starboard engine to full astern. At the same time I ordered the Emergency Conning Position to take over. It has now been established that my engine order did not get through and that the remainder of the turn was completed by the Emergency Conning Position. Full speed astern on both engines was ordered shortly after the turn was begun, but it appears probable that the ship touched aft on the East Bank before the turn was completed. A noticeable vibration indicates the possibility of a bent Port Shaft or ‘A’ Bracket.
10. During the turn the ship was between two batteries neither of which appeared to be able to bear. By 1114 the turn was completed and the ship was proceeding at 15 knots to regain the middle of the channel. At 1120 the bridge was able to resume control and I turned over to the Executive Officer for a short period while having my wounds attended. From this time onwards the services of Mr. Sudbury were invaluable, the surviving Chinese pilot having disappeared between decks. During the passage down river the ship was fired on by five batteries, three of which had not fired when previously passed. Damage and casualties mounted steadily and were considerably heavier than those sustained on the passage up river. At 1340 the last battery ceased fire. The ship had been under heavy fire for a total of 48 minutes spread over a period of three hours.
11. The opposition consisted of 4" gun Batteries well dug in, but plainly visible, on the bank and of anti-tank weapons of 40mm calibre which fired high velocity armour piercing shot which were capable of damaging 8" Gunhouse armour and piercing turret trunking. These guns were well camouflaged and none were spotted. One hit on the top of ‘A’ turret suggests that there may also have been howitzers in action. The firing on all occasions was accurate and well sustained in the face of heavy fire from the whole of LONDON’s armament.
12. It is difficult to assess the damage and casualties inflicted on the opposition, but at least, eight direct hits with 8" H.E. shell were obtained on the 4" batteries at an average range of less than 1500 yards. In addition 4" air bursts and close range direct fire must have caused many casualties in the target area.
13. All damage to the ship was quickly and efficiently dealt with by the Damage Control Parties, whose performance I consider to be outstanding taking in to consideration the difficulty of providing realistic training in these duties.
14. The bearing and conduct of the Ship’s Company, a large proportion of whom are very young and were experiencing action for the first time, was beyond praise. As an instance, the 4" Gun Crews and Supply Parties suffered 38% casualties, who were instantly replaced as they fell. These guns continued in action throughout and fired a total of 449 rounds. It is proposed to submit to you at a later date a list, which will, I fear, be necessarily incomplete, of those officers and men whom it is desired to bring to your notice for special commendation.
15. Total casualties consisted of thirteen killed, fourteen seriously wounded and forty wounded.
16. Finally I would again mention Mr. Sudbury, whose unfailing resource and cheerfulness and invaluable advice on the navigation on the Yangtse River were of such great value to me.
I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant
for CAPTAIN. FLAG OFFICER, SECOND-IN-COMMAND, FAR EAST STATION. |