Since their inception (Bertalanffy, 1950; Varela et al., 1974), systems theory and autopoietic principles have had an increasingly diverse impact in many apparently unrelated areas including sociology, political science, psychotherapy, cognition, and law. Mingers (1995) addresses the problem that these disparate disciplines tend to be self-referring and isolated from one another. This paper applies and extends existing autopoietic and systems dynamics ideas. In doing so it provides a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience thereby illustrating a complementary and mutually dependent relationship between the philosophy of consciousness and the science of systems dynamics.

The intention is to describe a dynamic systems model (also called the Hierarchical Systems Theory) linking diverse areas that relate, in broad terms, to the life sciences, and evolutionary psychology and physiology, so as to satisfy specific philosophical and analytic criteria required of a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience. The paper unifies aspects of cognitive science by illustrating a dynamic hierarchy that structurally integrates sensation, cognition, perception, learning, and behaviour. It also provides a coherent evolutionary framework that indicates how the characteristics associated with consciousness determine group and societal behaviours in terms of social psychology, human development, communications, language, attitudes, and conflict resolution. The paper suggests a link between systems dynamics and evolutionary ethics and artificial consciousness application. Lastly, a homogenized understanding of the dynamics of learning and creativity, and their relationship to emotions and individual stances has implications for theoretical and applied personal psychology.

Phenomenal experience is the term used to describe the rather subjective ‘something it is like’ aspect of experience. Examples are the experience of depths and shades of colours, the variety in the subtlety of aromas, the character of sound clusters, or the pleasantness of tactile sensations. Whilst being a fundamental aspect of the way we relate to the environment, the phenomenon of our subjective experience has ineffable qualities that evade objective analysis. Phenomenal experience is the experience that individuals identify as the experience of consciousness. There has been a plethora of attempts to explain consciousness and explore the features of phenomenal consciousness (Armstrong, 1968, 1984; Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1978, Flanagan, 1992; Gennaro, 1996; Kirk, 1994; Lycan, 1987, Nelkin, 1996; Rosenthal, 1986, 1993; Tye, 1995). The inability to demonstrate objective evaluation means that their explanations remain conjectural. It is evident that part of the difficulty, is that phenomenal experience and consciousness evade analysis and definition. Chalmers (1995) argues that there is a uniquely ‘hard problem’ in deciphering consciousness in that any theory must adequately explain the specific characteristics and the textural qualities of personal phenomenal experiences. Some speculate in favour of a non-reductive explanation that would require the discovery of a psycho-physical entity with its own laws. Others argue that a reductive explanation is impossible, despite claims by some to having provided one (Carruthers, 2000a; Dennett, 1991; Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996; Tye, 2000a)

Carruthers (2000a; also cf. 2004) states that a successful explanation of phenomenal consciousness should (1) explain how phenomenally conscious states have a subjective dimension; how they have feel; why there is something which it is like to undergo them; (2) why the properties involved in phenomenal consciousness should seem to their subjects to be intrinsic and non-relationally individuated; (3) why the properties distinctive of phenomenal consciousness can seem to their subjects to be ineffable or indescribable; (4) why those properties can seem in some way private to their possessors; and (5) how it can seem to subjects that we have infallible (as opposed to merely privileged) knowledge of phenomenally conscious properties. Dowell (2007a) considers the recent arguments that analysis of phenomenal experience (using type-A and type-B physicalism methods) and consequently, that reductive explanation is impossible by reviewing Jackson, Chalmers, and Gertler, and Block, Stalnaker, McLaughlin, and Hill. Each offer a rival account of what, in the absence of analysis, would be sufficient to justify reductive explanation. Dowell (2007b) allays the concerns of both views by providing an alternative illustration of a hypothetical strategy (called a type-C physicalism method) that demonstrates how phenomenal analysis is not necessary for an a priori entailment (e.g. the extrapolation of existing physical principles), to satisfy reductive explanation.

This paper is an example of a type-C method of reductive explanation, which requires linking uncontroversial physical facts to uncontroversial phenomenal conclusions. This is an ontic method which Carruthers (2004) argues, is a method that seeks to specify some significant part of a causal process and to describe the causal mechanism that brings about phenomenal experience. It does this by detailing an evolving dynamic systems hierarchy and exploring its relationship with evolutionary, physiological, and behavioural characteristics, and by explaining its structural intention, each of which are key facets for understanding consciousness according to Woodruff Smith (2001), who seeks the principle aspects of a fundamental ontology. Furthermore, it satisfies three evaluative criteria that Chalmers (1995) proposes, require explanation of a coherent theory of consciousness. To paraphrase, these are as follows:

A reductive explanation should explain the experience about which and with which humans are individually aware and report upon and provide an appraisal of prevailing physical facts, and show how these facts must lead to organisms that possess phenomenal experience. This paper claims to do this, providing uniform consistency by showing an evolving systems-hierarchy that extrapolates from physics principles. Futhermore, it uniquely illustrates how the explanation can be theoretically and empirically evaluated, answering all Velmans’ (2001 cf. conclusion) criticisms that reductive physicalism ignores both the first-person phenomenological evidence regarding the nature of consciousness and the third-person evidence about how it relates to a world described by physics.

The paper has bearing on First-order and High-order representational theories (FOR and HOR) in that it formalizes a dynamic hierarchical structure that facilitates and explains physiological and evolutionary connections. This answers questions posed by Carruthers (2000b) as to how and why transitions in the evolution of consciousness take place.

The effect of light striking the eye’s retina differs from when it strikes any other surface. Instead of the light energy just interacting with the surface through absorption and reflection, the specialized and ordered structure that is the brain also translates the light impulse into a neural format where it is held in stasis awaiting expression. The organizational structure of the brain dictates the nature and the timing of this expression. Its neural representation of the light, for example, may become part of a dynamic web of neural associations. Alternatively, it may resolve into a motor response. Whichever form the expression takes, the neural system’s structure is responsible for the ordered maintenance of the neural representation of the light. Following conversion into its neural format, the neural representation of the light energy travels throughout the brain and is fed, filtered, and expressed.

The brain is a high level example of an evolved structure that dissipates various forms of energy in an ordered manner. Additionally, the human mind uses its brain to an even higher degree by translating energy into neural representations that include the realization of its own place within the environment. In this way, the energy maintained within the system, leads to a recognition and development of a concept of reality based on the neural associations it has collated from its senses (more on this later). The task of this paper is to explore the nature of the hierarchy that produces the structures that control the dissipation of energy, from the lowest to the highest levels, and to demonstrate how this hierarchy leads to the evolution of humans with phenomenal experiences. Why and how have ordered systems evolved in the manner in which they have?

There is historical optimism that the scientific fields of complex systems, thermodynamics, and cybernetics might provide applications to explain sophisticated organic processes (Barab et al., 1999; Corning & Kline, 1998; Jorgensen & Svirezhev, 2004; Schneider & Kay 1994; Swenson, 1997). Since the 1940s, there has been significant expository deliberation concerning the relationship between the second law of thermodynamics, order and disorder, self-organization, and biological life. The laws of thermodynamics are one way of interpreting and defining the nature of energy. The second law relates increasing entropy with the tendency for disorder to progress and for uneven distributions of energy to equalize. In an attempt to relate the second law to self-organizing systems and to organic life, Schrödinger (1944) makes the observation that whilst the laws of physics “have a lot to do with the natural tendency of things to go over into disorder…. it is by avoiding the rapid decay into the inert state of ‘equilibrium’ that an organism appears so enigmatic.” (Chap. 6, para 2 & 6). Initially, living organisms appear to contradict the second law because life creates structure and order out of chaos. However, Prigogine (1978) demonstrates in his theory of dissipative structures, that self-organization can evolve spontaneously within chaotic environments. Furthermore, Swenson (1988, 1989) argues that under certain conditions, ordered flows of energy can maximize the rate at which a system satisfies the second law making it more effective at dissipating energy than chaotic flows. However, Corning & Kline (1998) give an in depth critique regarding the general application of the second law of thermodynamics to multileveled structures like biological systems, making a distinction between order and functional organization. Undoubtedly, the laws of thermodynamics are of relevance to complex systems because the laws encapsulate the boundaries of systems behaviours. Boltzmann’s (1886/1974) view that the evolution of ordered systems does not conflict with thermodynamic principles is pertinent, as is Pieper’s (2000 para 2) statement, “the synonymous use of the terms entropy and disorder represent a serious misunderstanding of thermodynamics.” However, what Corning & Kline allude to is that understanding systems dynamics requires understanding the function of systems structures, which is not possible through the application of thermodynamic laws alone.

Bertalanffy (1950, 1951) tried to solve the issue as to whether it was possible to reduce aspects of the biological domain to the physical. This he did with a systems theory that assigns biological systems to self-organizational dynamics. In addition to Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory, Kuhn (1974) developed a systems language in order to effect the theoretical unification of the behavioural and social sciences. As general systems analysis provided the basis for this language, he also argued that it should have an impact on all scientific disciplines. Kuhn argues that all systems tend toward equilibrium through communication (with the exchange of information) and transaction (involving the exchange of ‘matter-energy’), and that a prerequisite for the continuance of a system, by controlled or uncontrolled means, is its ability to maintain a steady state. Consequently, this paper is sympathetic to Bertalanaffy’s and Kuhn’s visions and objectives. It demonstrates how a hierarchical systems dynamic relates the biological domain to phenomenal experience and its associated behavioural characteristics.

A system is a structure that is composed of interacting parts whose dynamic relationships with one another maintain stable and coherently functional behaviours: Any given system exists by virtue of its component dynamic stability because without stability the interacting parts cease to maintain their coherent systems functions and become separate entities. One can say that a system requires dynamic stability to define its existence.

Hierarchical Systems Theory states that under certain conditions, a system may comprise of hierarchically dependent parts that have an identifiable relational status. It is not simply that the parts are interacting with one another, but that the parts are interdependent due to some formulaic relationship. Under such conditions the nature of the relationship of the interdependent parts is specific to the systems structure and function. A hierarchical system describes sequential and evolving systems structures rather than merely reacting systems structures.

A system’s stability is transitory. Environmental interaction demands a systems response. Specifically, systems behaviours arise from dynamic reactive structural re-evaluations in response to environmental interaction. These behaviours are indicative of the displacement or conversion of energy from one state to another. When a system reacts to the environment, it reacquires stability in one of two ways:

Any systems dynamic arising from both ordered and disordered interactions has the capacity to evolve a unique and formal relational systems hierarchy. Such a relationship forms its Hierarchical Systems Dynamic:

Take a scenario where, for example, the structure of a system (S) reacts to type-A interactions in an ordered manner and type-B interactions in a disordered manner. Under these conditions, the structure of system S dictates the nature of reactions for type-A but not type-B interactions. However, if system S’s reaction to a type-A interaction were to lead, coincidentally, to the modification of its structure such that it could react to type-B interactions in an ordered manner too, it would have acquired a new capability. This capability would be self-perpetuating because it would enable system S’s structure to stabilize interactive behaviours with both type-A and B interactions. The structural reaction would inevitably be positively selective.

This paper proposes that the evolutionary dynamic arising from both ordered and disordered interactions evolves a distinct structural hierarchy that one can categorize. This hierarchy demonstrates the inevitability of the evolution of phenomenal experience.

A compound atomic structure, for example, will interact with its environment. Interaction is the means through which (per), an atomic system embraces (capere, to seize) experience and then reacts. Therefore, when a system experiences and reacts, it is being per-ceptive of its environment. Unconventionally, this suggests that the sensation of perception applies equally to inanimate matter as to those experiences gathered by the specialized sensory organs of living organisms. However, one can qualify this definition further by recognizing that when a perceptive system interacts, it achieves stability, in its attempt to acquire a state of equilibrium, in one of two ways:

Disordered reevaluation occurs when, in our example, a compound atomic structure does not dictate the reactive processes that lead to alterations of its chemical composition. Irrespective of the nature of any reactive processes, atomic systems such as this are passively involved in the evolution of their chemical complexity.

However, if ordered reevaluation occurs during interaction, a system’s structure conforms to specific requirements and demonstrates specific behavioural characteristics. Unlike other systems structures that merely react, this system actively dictates its structure’s reactive capability. The only recognizable system’s structure that demonstrates these qualities is an atomic compound that can duplicate, because structural replicates determine the nature of an individual structure’s development even after the parent structure has dissipated and ceases to exist. Murphy & O'Neill (1995) give examples of the earliest structural duplicates that evolved on earth, of which deoxyribonucleic acid is one example:

A duplicating system encapsulates its perceptions actively by enabling the progressive evolution of its particular structure. Environmental interactions do not just happen and then end, but have an impact on a duplicating system’s structure that transcends the structure’s lifespan through its successive generations. A duplicating system is adaptive, whilst other types of systems are merely reactive. The structure of an individual duplicating system represents a snapshot in time of an evolving system whose purpose and requirements are to acquire and maintain a uniform reactive adaptation. Consequently, for each new generation, the interactions of duplicating systems lead to structural mutations, which represent new uniform adaptations by that system over time.

The oldest duplicating system found on earth is a 3.5 billion year old fossilized bacterium, identified in 1993 by Schopf (1999). Following the first evolutionary explosion of the Big Bang, but ignoring the evolutionary effects of early phase transitions that defined the nature of matter and space, the capacity to duplicate marks the start of a second explosion. Coren (2001) is an independent proponent of this descriptive analogy and suggests coincidently in his analysis of the empirical evidence for a law of information growth, that there could be a relationship between cosmological evolution, life on earth, human culture, and thermodynamics. There is no reason to suppose that this explosion has only happened on earth, and Bennett et al. (2003) conclude that it has probably occurred on thousands of other planetary systems. This explosion began with the unintentional evolution of systems whose structures duplicate and are the cornerstone of life.

A category 1 system that perceives actively (i.e., one whose structure can duplicate) is striving for a stable structural adaptation. Due to the incidental mutation of its structures over generations and to the naturally selective effect of the environment, this results in increasingly complex life forms. In contrast to complex structures that arise purely from reactive behaviour, organic complexity is an unintentional symptom of the adaptation to the environment of duplicating structures. Adaptations are not inherently stable nor do they result, necessarily, in survival advantages, but the dynamic relationship between a structure’s stability and its environment does affect its potential lifespan.

One can also view organic complexity as a structural indication of the degree of understanding that a system has of its environment. For example, the complex nature of creating sugars from light, water, and carbon dioxide indicate that the evolved biochemical structures of plants possess understanding of the environment. Dennett (1995a) also argues that adaptation is a form of knowledge and suggests that any functioning structure carries implicit information about the environment in which the function operates. As such, it is with (con) its biochemical structure that a biological system possesses knowledge (scire, to know) and is conscious.

Knowledge is more readily associated with thinking processes derived from neural calculations. However, any structured series of biochemical processes, for example, chemical pumps, feedback mechanisms, inhibitors, and receptors, can encode knowledge. Specifically, an organism is conscious if its system’s structure can acquire and display knowledge of its perceived environment. This distinguishes a conscious organism from other systems that merely react and from manmade allopoietic structures (eg. a thermostat), because only conscious organisms display knowledge that is intrinsic to their system's structure as a singular environmentally adapted physiology, rather than an artificially organised composite. A thermostat is no more a systems structure than, for example, a person and the house in which they live. Both house and person are organised structures. Both display knowledge of the forces of gravity, but one is an evolved, and the other, an artificial systems structure. When the person is in the house, that individual’s environmental parameters are controlled and restricted, but the two combined do not constitute a naturally evolved systems structure.

This relationship between systems structure and knowledge provides a preliminary account of how information growth relates to consciousness, demonstrating compliance with the first part of Chalmers’ double aspect theory of information principle (criterion A), which is that information is fundamental to consciousness. The following sections demonstrate compliance with the second part of criterion A, which is that information corresponds to physical and to phenomenal features that are isomorphic. Fowler (1979) also suggests a relationship between biological structure, information, and the theory of evolution, whilst a possible mathematical foundation may emerge in further applications of information theory, which Schneider (2000) relates to the evolution of biological information.

Duplication ensures that a structure’s physiological adaptation continues from one generation to the next. However, it is not the duplicating structure, but environmental selection that determines the nature of the knowledge that a structure’s physiology acquires as each generation adapts. Consequently, a duplicating organic structure does not dictate the means by which it acquires complex environmental knowledge. Its passively adapted behaviour can be only innate and its application of knowledge, hereditary.

There is an active state however, whereby a complex organism, which has evolved unintentionally in response to the survival advantages afforded by its structural adaptations, can actively influence the acquisition of its knowledge through the immediate and direct evaluation of environmental conditions. Such capability enables an individual to adapt behaviourally in view of its understandings of the environment, rather than rely on innate responses and evolving physiological adaptations. Of the many types of evolved biochemical mechanisms, only the specialized transmitters of the neural networks and sensory organs of animals have maximized this capability.

A neural network encodes knowledge of environmental experience. The significant difference between the knowledge that neural networks acquire over other forms of physiologically structured knowledge, is that neural understandings can evolve spontaneously in response to localized experiences. Under such conditions, the interactions of conflicting understandings materialize as restabilizing neural responses (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992, cf. footnote 1.). These responses potentially have the benefit of enabling behavioural adaptation and all its associated survival advantages.

The neural interactive processes that create these unique understandings and behaviours function as a dynamic interdependent system: Effectively, the stabilizing process describes a changing dynamic relationship between differing stimuli and/or neural processing. That neural description is a translation of the effect of the internal and external causal environments. One can loosely attribute the evocation of feeling to this neural description. Feeling, in this context, is not that which one might associate with human concepts of ‘what it is to have feelings’. Feeling here refers to the effect arising from a process of restabilizing neural responses. Feeling becomes enriched following this causal process only by experiential association, which in turn, results in learning if the organism is able to make an evaluative association between the experience phenomenon and its feeling processes (cf. phenomenal experience - footnote 2.). This non-conceptual association distinguishes innate neural responses to stimuli, from the phenomenon of feelings that an animal associates with experience. Behavioural adaptation and the communication of emotional attitudes are characteristics that are indicative of an evolving complex interdependent system of experience phenomena and prioritized evaluative processes. These processes demonstrate how information or knowledge can correspond to physical and to phenomenal features that are isomorphic, as required of the second part of Chalmers criterion A. Forel (1901/1908) was one of the first experimental psychologists to implicate learning and memory to emotional intent in insects. From studies such as these, one can test the premise that emotional attitude relates proportionally to stability of behavioural understanding, and that species’ emotional complexity relates to cognitive capacity.

Thinking, learning, and being knowledgeable of experience do not give an animal a mind’s eye view, inner wisdom, or self-knowing concept. Learning and feeling are simply a by-product of category 2 consciousness processes. Consider the nature of communication in an animal that is only actively conscious of experience. In this state, an animal can express itself only by communicating its innate responses to stimuli and its learnt associations of its feelings regarding the phenomenon of its experience. The relationship between feelings and learnt associations can evolve a complex communications structure or set of distinct individual and social emotional attitudes. This assessment is also in agreement with Gunther’s (2004, p. 43) view that “each emotional attitude (force) type is accompanied in experience by a distinctive feeling type.” For a category 2 animal, there remain no defined realizations as to the significance of any given feeling regarding its emotional expression or interpretation, or any insight regarding the relationship between an emotional expression and learnt associations. In the absence of conceptual representation, an animal such as this cannot begin to communicate any form of conceptual understanding. Consequently, this phenomenal state of being actively conscious of perception does not embody the notion of what it is to be a human that is aware of the phenomenon of experience. The complications of the human perspective regarding emotion and feeling are due to the reasoning that arises from its conceptual rationale. Gunther (2004) argues, “by introspecting [italics added] on what we feel, we learn to recognize what emotional attitude we’re experiencing.” (p. 44), whilst de Sousa (2003) suggests, “the specific nature of my emotion’s formal object is a function of my appraisal [italics added] of the situation.” ( 1). Introspection and appraisal (as italicized) are distinctive human attributes that alter the interpretations of the status and boundaries of feeling and emotion. In support of this, research by Nielsen (1998), and the reassessment of Damasio (1994, 1999), indicates that human creative, reasoning, and problem solving processes utilize the evaluation and assessment of emotions rather than emotions themselves. Kaszniak (2001) also highlights research to show that functional aspects of emotion operate outside ‘conscious awareness’.

The principle of organizational invariance (criterion B) states that any two systems with the same functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. Wolfram (1984, 1994) suggests that from the application of cellular automata, "one may hope to abstract some general laws that could extend the laws of thermodynamcis to encompass complex and self-organizing systems." (1984, p. 171). The hope is that by determining a relationship between consciousness, thermodynamics, and complexity, this paper could help identify links to cellular automata applications and simulated adaptive behaviour methodologies: Theoretically, a hierarchically based systems-model founded on the principles established by this paper could assist in creating a self-perpetuating artificial state whose functional organization would generate structures with qualitatively identical experiences to animals. Empirically, the application of computer programming that reflects the hierarchical relationship expounded by this paper is necessary in proving compliance with Chalmers’ principle of organizational invariance (criterion B).

The physiological impact of active consciousness is considerable because it alters adaptive parameters. These parameters influence rates of cerebral expansion and physiological development. In their analysis of complex systems, Hinton & Nowlan (1987) demonstrate that “learning organisms evolve much faster than their nonlearning equivalents, even though the characteristics acquired by the phenotype are not communicated to the genotype.”(p. 495). Maynard Smith (1987) gives further support by arguing that learning alters the search space in which evolution operates. Similarly, Complin (1997), who examines the mechanics of adaptation using computational experiments and a wide array of literature from biology and evolutionary computation, concludes that learning is a mechanism that leads to the extension of the boundaries of behavioural adaptation. Consequently, the ordered and disordered systems dynamic that led to the emergence of animals that were actively conscious of perception marks the beginning of a third evolutionary explosion. This explosion began when multicellular organisms first developed the capability of experiential comparison and evaluation in wormlike animals of the phylum Annelida, about 540 million years ago. Initially, a basic form of chemical memory and evaluation fuelled a physiological explosion that followed from the expansion and specialization of sensory organs and neural network mechanisms. This alternative explanation presents coherent and unified answers to the questions that Hameroff (1998) raises in relation to the Cambrian evolutionary explosion.

A category 2 animal that is actively conscious has a neural mechanism that enables it to modify its behaviour in an ordered manner through learning. The purpose of this mechanism is to maintain stable behavioural understandings whose by-product leads to evaluations and associations that give rise to the phenomena of an individual’s experiences. This complex neural mechanism requires the organization and evaluation of experience by the rapid comparison and prioritization of experiential neural events upon whose coherence and unity, an organism’s survival depends.

Additionally, there is a survival driven potential for cognitive function to evolve degrees of sophistication that enable a neural mechanism to compare and prioritize an understanding of the relationship between the phenomenon of experience and learning. If such understandings are disordered, a fleeting conceptual realization acquiesces to the experiential events that produced it. However, if the understandings are ordered, the evaluative processes actively establish and structure the realization of phenomenal experience. This category 3 process involves the comparison and prioritization of conceptual neural events, whereby an individual’s experiential realizations guide its conceptual interpretations of the world in which it lives. This instigates an evolving process that effectively generates recognitional concepts of experience, which Loar (1990) Carruthers (2000a), and Tye (2000b) ascribe to phenomenal concepts, and to a developing concept of the phenomenon of reality. Importantly, as an individual’s existence is part of reality, this perspective demands an emerging identification and concept of self. This concept leads to the active development of an awareness of the conscious state. (cf. Phenomenal Concept Strategy - footnote 3.)

For an individual to be aware of the conscious state is to be aware, not of the processes, but of the phenomenon of experience, learning, and feeling:

For example, recognition of learning methodology fuels the intentional manipulation of an individual’s understandings regarding the impact that its behaviours and the environment have on one another. However, experiential, mental, and cerebral capacities limit an individual’s conceptual capability, thereby confining the boundaries of its innovative manipulation. Various empirical methods help to illustrate this link between conceptual representation and creativity. Nguyen & Murphy (2003) show that young children categorize aspects of their world flexibly and conclude there is a relationship between changing conceptual development and creativity. Analysis of the dynamics of irrational behaviour in humans (Shafir et al., 1993; Wedell, 1991) and irrational behaviour in animals (Bateson, 2002; Shafir. S., 1994), is also supportive by demonstrating that creativity coexists with conceptual representation. By applying game theory, Sato et al. (2002) demonstrate how conceptual understanding enables humans to be creative, uniquely both with rationality and irrationality. Furthermore, Chen & Siegler (2000) conclude from studies with toddlers that there is a relationship between conceptual reality and the development of creative strategies in learning.

Another notable characteristic of an individual’s active awareness of the conscious state is that its higher-order thought (HOT) processes (Carruthers, 2000b notably section 7 on dispositionalist HOT; Pharoah, 2008; Rosenthal, 2002) generate a perspective that has no means of accessing its category 1 processes, which organize the structure of its complex biochemical mechanisms and the category 2 processes, whose first-order representations (cf. Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995 for FOR theories) generate its sensations and feelings (Carruthers, 2000b; cf. Kant - footnote 4.). This does little to deter an individual from trying to conceptualize the phenomenon of its experiences, which include its bodily functions, sensations, emotions, and consciousness itself. Consequently, an individual might come to define sensations as ‘introspectively accessible phenomenal experiences that are irreducible’, thereby giving no clue as to what sensations actually feel like. Inevitably, despite the familiarity of phenomenal experience and consciousness, their conceptual identification remains elusive, as cogitations of thought experiments like Nagel’s bat (1974) and Jackson's Mary (1986) clearly demonstrate (Dennett, 1995b). (cf. Phenomenal concepts that lack phenomenal experience - footnote 5.).

The paper argues that ordered and disordered physical interaction creates a hierarchical systems-dynamic that must evolve structures that duplicate, process environmental information, generate phenomenal experience, and ultimately evolve structures that possess awareness of phenomenal experience. One cannot disregard, as coincidental, the fact that the simple extrapolation of this unified systems-dynamic describes the behaviour, interdependent relationship, and defining characteristics of important and definitive stages in evolution. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates an example of a Dowell (2006) type-C physicalist’s reductive explanation of phenomenal experience by providing a structural link between that of which we are aware, which comprise of our conceptual representations, and that which we experience. In doing so, it satisfies Chalmers’ principle of structural coherence (criterion C). Furthermore, it fully demonstrates the double aspect theory of information principle (criterion A), by showing a hierarchical structure that requires that the information status of phenomenal experience arises from physical information processes. By satisfying these requirements and other evolutionary and physical characteristics the paper ceases to be an elaborately speculative project.

Being actively aware of the conscious state has a profound effect on communication. Whilst the communication of emotional attitudes in category 2 conscious animals can involve complex sounds and gestures, the communication of conceptual reality in category 3 humans is an entirely different proposition. The construction of a conceptual realization is what compels a human to formulate any suitable grammatical framework that can effectively communicate conceptualized reality. Consequently, an individual’s language develops in response to its maturing concepts and a society’s language evolves in response to its grammatical and descriptive suitability. As such, this paper provides a coherent alternative interpretation of the findings that led Chomsky (1988) to suggestion that language arises through a realization in the brain of an innate language faculty, or “language acquisition device” that switches on during language development. This device appears to be innate, but this paper shows that it is merely an intrinsic characteristic of the dynamics arising from being actively aware of consciousness, notwithstanding that natural selection has also led to various physiological adaptations to enhance language acquisition and development. Inevitably, one must reevaluate the conclusions of Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993) and Greenfield & Savage-Rumbaugh (1990) p. 540) that the “evolutionary root of human language” can be found in the “linguistic abilities of the great apes”. Leakey & Lewin (1992) speculate that the cognitive foundation for human language is present in ape brains. This research into infant and ape studies suggests that physiological characteristics are responsible for the emergence and development of language. Conversely, this paper consistently indicates that an evolving systems hierarchy drives the development of physiological evolution in every category. The application of a systems hierarchy to this research shows a clear unifying distinction and a coherent explanation. Category 2 consciousness processes compel apes and immature human infants to communicate only innate responses and emotionally motivated attitudes, whilst category 3 processes, additionally, compel older human infants and adults to communicate conceptualized reality. Whilst category 1 and 2 processes inevitably have an impact on human behaviour, learning, and communication, the evolving development of conceptualized reality in category 3 infants through to adults, additionally, affects the creative manipulation of these characteristics.

Another apparently innate faculty that is an intrinsic characteristic of the dynamics arising from being actively aware of consciousness is mankind’s destructive capability and tendency to be creatively cruel. Every individual’s concept of reality includes the individual’s interpretation of self, which is part of a stable concept. Contemplation and discussion challenge stability, which inevitably challenges the self-concept. Without stability, the system that creates that individual’s self-concept and perspective of reality is at risk. Consequently, individuals protect their opinions aggressively, and individuals in social groups take it upon themselves to protect their group’s appraised opinions that encapsulate their own. Consequently, the interaction of structured realizations, which leads to the reevaluation of an individual’s concept of reality, can generate both positive and negative conclusions that fuel individual and societal physical, mental, and cultural creativity and bias. Prejudice and creativity are symptomatic of the reinterpretation of realizations, and evoke the experiences and behaviours that are unique to human societies. Interestingly, under certain specific conditions, there may develop different classes of conceptual distortions and divergence strategies to maintain conceptual stability. One could classify these classes and their ensuing behaviours in terms of the relationship and evolution of category 1, 2 and 3 anomalies. This classification could lead to advances in psychological profiling and treatments, and in conflict resolution methods.

During the late Pliocene, about two and a half to three million years ago, the fourth evolutionary explosion began. The hominid brain may have initially increased in size gradually because of the adaptive consequence of evolution and survival. However, this incidental adaptation resulted in the emergence of category 3. The benefits of conceptualizing reality had a dramatic affect on cerebral expansion, physiological development, social dynamics, and the survival ethic of the primate family. The development of humankind and its unique identifying characteristics are the conclusion to the fourth evolutionary explosion where conceptual evolution rather than biological evolution has taken precedence.

Theoretically, there is scope for the evolution of a category 4 state. What are the defining characteristics of this future state to which the human mind may evolve? Answering this question sufficiently requires detailed consideration. Briefly, this paper's dynamic systems model indicates the following:

A category 3 human that is actively aware of its conscious state has a cognitive mechanism that enables it to evaluate its behaviour through conceptual appraisal. Whilst assessing the intentions and effects of its behaviour, an individual develops concepts by which it can make definitive judgments. The communication of these considerations in a societal context leads to the development of values. Any particular family of values are based on separate but interacting sets of principles categorized, for example, in the morality of religion, law, ethics, and personal considerations of free will. These frequently are in conflict with one another creating conceptual and behavioural paradoxes. Consequently, the evolution of moralities has been a disordered by-product of passive category 4 processes. This autopoietic process and consequential social attitudes and behaviours indicate that human moral conscience exists and evolves within the bounds of a unified construct that obeys fundamental dynamic systems principles. There is not scope in this paper to give this subject due consideration, but the principles outlined in this paper suggest that a category 4 state will, theoretically, involve the acquisition of an intentionally structured ethical discourse bound by a fundamental wisdom. Again, this should lead, theoretically, to an explosion in human behavioural and physiological development.

Systems theory and non-linear dynamics have had an impact on many diverse areas, for example, ecology, computer science, biology, engineering, sociology, political science, and economics. That such influence should also extend to questions regarding phenomenal experience and other characteristics of human behaviour should hardly seem surprising. To say a concept does a certain job is to say that it effects a certain kind of abbreviation. The primary intention has been to provide a coherent and sustainable argument rather than to explore its full implications.

Against this paper there have been objections that there is no scientific proof, that there are other means of reductive explanation besides, and that extensive debate is required on all aspects of the principle relationships in order for it to hold. Even if these debatable issues have some validity, such scepticism is beside the point. Much as I would like to, it is not incumbent on me to illustrate, for example, how the proposed reductive explanation impacts on the nature of concepts, and on the nature of concept acquistion and evolution. I have provided a reductive explanation - In what manner is it not?



References