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Iraq War 2003
Iraq attack: How to supplement the US budget (pre-war)
Ultimatum: The Bush/Blair lie: France’s veto (March 12-20 2003)
WarTalk-1 (March 20 – April 13 2003: Combat)
WarTalk-2 (April 15-18 2003: Occupation)
The pretexts for war: WMD + France’s veto (this page)
National Intelligence Estimate (Oct. 1 2002), excerpts released July 18 2003
Henry Waxman’s letter to Condoleezza Rice (July 29 2003)
David Kay transcript: Annotated, linked, and challenged (Jan. 28 2004, Senate Armed Services Committee)
“Saddam was a bad man”: The post-war pretext for war (coming-up)
The pretexts for war:
WMD + France’s veto
by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
First, the mushroom cloud:
“The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.”
–G.W. Bush, Jan. 28 2003
The question Jack Straw refused to answer
(UK Foreign Secretary), a lawyer. UK House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, “Response to Questions to the Foreign Secretary” (July 30 2003):
Question (July 15 2003):
“Will the Secretary of State put in the Library of the House in the next 24 hours the dates on which the security and intelligence services learned that the Niger documents were forged {292 kb pdf} and the date on which Ministers were advised that they were forged?”
Answer (July 29 2003):
“We first had indications that the IAEA had suspicions about the authenticity of some of the documents in late February but no confirmation of that until the IAEA gave its report to the Security Council on 7 March. Ministers were then informed.”
And so, instead of answering the question (when did they first learn the documents were forged), they stated when they first learned that the IAEA first learned about it. This purposeful evasion likely means only one thing, namely: that UK Government officials first learned much earlier that the documents were forged.
The US has criminal laws to punish such purposeful evasion, and thereby enforce the integrity of government. Hence, this answer (if persisted in) would constitute a criminal offense in the US (refusal to answer the question), a one-year prison sentence (2 U.S.C. § 192).
In the UK, purposeful evasions, like this one, are routine. The UK has no criminal laws to enforce integrity of government. A witness can refuse to answer a question from a Parliamentary committee and can also lie to the committee, and in House of Commons debates, without fear of criminal investigation or prosecution.
–CJHjr
The question nobody asked Stephen J. Hadley
(US Deputy National Security Adviser), a lawyer, at the White House “Press Briefing by Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley on Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction and the State of the Union Speech,” July 22 2003 3:45-5:08 p.m. EDT:
Q Mr Hadley, you said several times:
“The President’s guidance is,
I don’t want anything in the speech of an intelligence nature that George Tenet can’t stand behind.
That’s the test of the President.”
And, you said you have sole responsibility for all intelligence assertions in the speech:
“I am the senior most official within the NSC staff, directly responsible for the substantive review and clearance of presidential speeches. The President and the National Security Advisor look to me to ensure that the substantive statements in those speeches are the ones in which the President can have confidence.”
Yet, you did not ask George Tenet — did he stand behind the President’s speech (intelligence assertions) — as the President’s test required you to do (State of the Union, Jan. 28).
Did you decide to disobey the President’s standing orders because both you and the President already knew what George Tenet’s answer would be (uranium assertion)?
And did you arrange, instead, for Robert G. Joseph (NSC staff) to work with a complicit CIA official (Alan Foley, senior analyst) to approve the President’s speech behind George Tenet’s back?
And behind George Tenet’s back, to work with another complicit CIA official (Robert Walpole) to endorse the President’s Report to Congress (Jan. 20), your anonymous White House report (Jan. 23), the State Department’s anonymous report (Jan. 23) on your report, Condoleezza Rice’s article in the New York Times (Jan. 23), Paul Wolfowitz’s speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 23), and Colin Powell’s speech in Davos Switzerland (Jan. 26)?
And behind George Tenet’s back, to stand-up your own article in the Chicago Tribune (Feb. 16), asserting what Colin Powell refused to vouch for at the UN (Feb. 5)?
And behind George Tenet’s back, to brief the Voice of America (Feb. 20), with the whole fictional tale?
–CJHjr
A supposed DDCI CIA staff meeting, January 28 2003:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully –
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
– 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)
“Well, Britain did say it, and we sometimes get our story out that way because, in the UK, it’s no crime to lie to Parliament or to brief lies into the mouths of unwary, or complicit, UK Ministers.
And as for us here, “knowingly and willfully” making use of “any ... document knowing the same to contain any materially false ... statement”: Well, it’s the President who’s saying it, not us.
And as for conspiracy to “conceal ... a material fact,” and thereby lie to the President, or enable him to lie to Congress and the Nation: Well, we told the responsible White House officials (Rice, Hadley, Joseph, Gerson), so if they want to keep him in the dark, that’s their business, and if the President wants to lie to Congress and the Nation, that’s his business.
So if we write a letter saying the President’s statement is factually correct, and address that letter to a person who knows the full truth, then if s/he decides to give that letter to the President and conceal from him the full truth, then s/he’s the one deceiving the President not us.
The President implies the British assertion is true (“has learned”), and he thereby induces two inflammatory inferences. One, we know is untrue: That Iraq could obtain uranium from Niger. France takes 100% of the uranium and controls the operation under close IAEA supervision. The other — that Iraq is actively seeking to reconstitute its nuclear program — is not substantiated by wishful suspicion:– that a visiting Iraqi diplomat, or Iraqis in other countries, might want to buy uranium. Iraqi officials know they cannot obtain uranium from Niger.
(3) the term “misleading conduct” means – ...
(B) intentionally omitting information from a statement and thereby causing a portion of such statement to be misleading, or intentionally concealing a material fact, and thereby creating a false impression by such statement ...
– 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(3)(B)
As for omitting from our letter our opinion and our evidence that the British claim is untrue, we can say we did not “knowingly and willfully” conspire, or aid and abet anybody’s lie, by proving our addressee knew the full truth, and we thus had no need to repeat what we had previously said to that person. And if s/he claims s/he forgot what we had said, or supposed we had changed our minds, we can say we thought our position was well known and s/he would have asked, if s/he wanted an update on our analysis.
And we can claim we never felt prompted to state the whole truth in our letter, because we trusted our addressee, and the President’s staff, and never suspected any scheme to deceive the President, or any scheme by the President to lie to Congress and the Nation.
The public doesn’t know we investigated and disproved Britain’s claim. And they don’t know our opinion on the matter. Let’s keep it that way, like we always do, and leave the politicians scope to their thing.
The Director (George Tenet) may not be in a position, personally, to endorse the President’s speech for another reason:– Blowback. And keep this in mind when talking to the White House. I’m not saying this is what happened, but what if Mr. Tenet knows this assertion is based on forged documents and a covert operation to trick British Intelligence and Tony Blair into saying what they said? (“We know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa”). On these facts, if the Director’s in the loop to approve the President’s speech, then he’s staring at a long prison sentence, even if the President already knows about the scam, because the President is addressing Congress and the Nation, and they don’t know about it.”
______________________
The claims
August 26 2002:
Dick Cheney (US Vice-President), Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention, Nashville Tennessee, August 26 2002:
“But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. ... Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.
The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago.”
September 8 2002:
Condoleezza Rice (US National Security Adviser), “Interview with Condoleezza Rice,” CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, Washington D.C., Sept. 8 2002 12:00 p.m. EDT:
“Blitzer: Based on what you know right now, how close is Saddam Hussein’s government — how close is that government to developing a nuclear capability?
INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges ...
Rice: You will get different estimates about precisely how close he is. We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do know that there have been shipments going into Iran, for instance — into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to — high-quality aluminum tools that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs. ...
The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don’t what {sic: want} the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”
US officials had planted this topic in the press on this Sunday morning: Michael R. Gordon, Judith Miller, “U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts,” New York Times, Sept. 8 2002.
1) Size: the tubes were too long to be centrifuge rotors, but too short if cut in half. They were just exactly the right length to be 81 mm rockets based on an Italian design. The walls of a centrifuge rotor are typically 1 mm thick; these tubes were much thicker.
2) Metal: some alloys of aluminum have the strength and corrosion resistant qualities to be used in centrifuges with the enormously corrosive gas, uranium hexafluoride — but most Al alloys don’t. Some alloys are strong enough to be whirled around at 100,000 rpm and have only a 1 millimeter wall thickness. Others rip apart.
3) Coatings: some tubes have coatings on them that make them difficult to use in a centrifuge for technical reasons. You could scrape the coatings off, but then Iraq would have spent money on something that it would quickly destroy.
–Peter Zimmerman (Physicist, chief scientist, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, science adviser for Arms Control, State Department, Clinton administration), Washington Post, online forum, Aug. 14 2003
September 12 2002:
George W. Bush (US President), “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” New York City, Sept. 12 2002 10:39-11:04 a.m.; U.N. Doc. A/57/PV.2 (267kb.pdf), pp.5-9; 38/37 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents pp.1529-1533 (19kb.txt, 48kb.pdf):
“Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program — weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq’s state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons.”
4. By the time the inspectors were withdrawn {Dec. 16 1998}, the IAEA ... had destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all of the physical capabilities of Iraq to produce amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance. ...
b. All nuclear material of significance to Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme was verified and fully accounted for, and all nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material (plutonium and high enriched uranium) was removed from Iraq. ...
5. As of December 1998, there were no key outstanding disarmament issues in the nuclear area ...
6. In the four years following the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors, the IAEA’s activities in Iraq were limited to annual verification, pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement, of the nuclear material (several tons of yellow cake and other natural uranium and some low enriched and depleted uranium) that remained in Iraq under IAEA seal.
–Mohamed ElBaradei, U.N., Jan. 20 2003
September 12 2002:
White House (authorship/responsibility unknown, US President’s staff), “A Decade of Deception and Defiance: Saddam Hussein’s Defiance of the United Nations” (64kb.pdf), Sept. 12 2002 (emphasis in original):
“A Decade of Deception and Defiance serves as a background paper for President George W. Bush’s September 12th speech to the United Nations General Assembly. ...
A new report (5590kb.pdf) released on September 9, 2002 from the International Institute for Strategic Studies — an independent research organization — concludes that Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb within months if he were able to obtain fissile material.
Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb. In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes which officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium.”
The CIA were consulted throughout the drafting process and were passed a draft {2318kb.pdf} of the WMD section on 11 September.
September 24 2002:
British Government, authorship and responsibility claimed (Hutton Inquiry, Transcript, August 26 2003, p.29 et seq.) by John McLeod Scarlett (Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, and Head, Intelligence and Securities Secretariat, UK Cabinet Office), incorporating changes desired by Alastair Campbell (Director of Communications and Strategy for Tony Blair, UK Prime Minister), and representing it to be the unanimous consensual product of the Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee (GCHQ, MI5, MI6, DIS, and “senior policy makers” (politicians?) from the MoD, FCO, HO, DTI, Treasury) which, however, apparently did not meet to debate it and did not approve it, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government (439kb.pdf, 429kb.pdf, 429kb.pdf), No. 10 Downing Street, London England, Sept. 24 2002 8:00 a.m. BST.
The more we advertise that unsupported assertions (eg Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of WMD) come from intelligence the better.
Philip Bassett to Alastair Campbell, et al.,
“Re Draft Dossier (J Scarlett Version of 10 Sept)”,
email, Sept. 11 2002 3:27 p.m. (83kb.pdf)
The facts remain thin on nuclear.
Daniel Pruce to Alastair Campbell, et al.,
“Dossier–16 September draft”,
email, Sept. 17 2002 12:01 p.m. (19kb.pdf)
September 24 2002:
Tony Blair (U.K. Prime Minister), “Prime Minister’s Iraq statement to Parliament,” 390 Hansard, 6th Series, columns 1-156, at 3-4 (House of Commons, London England, Debate: Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Sept. 24 2002 11:30 a.m. – 10:14 p.m. BST):
“The Prime Minister (Mr. Tony Blair): Mr. Speaker, thank you for recalling Parliament to debate the best way to deal with the issue of the present leadership of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.
Today we published a 50-page dossier, detailing the history of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programme, its breach of United Nations resolutions, and its attempts to rebuild that illegal programme. I have placed a copy in the Library. ...
We have not seen intelligence which we believe “shows” that Iraq has continued to produce CW agent in 1998-2002, although our judgment is that it has probably done so. Whilst we are even more convinced that Iraq has continued to produce biological weapons agent (on the basis of mobile production intelligence) we would not go so far as to say we “know” this to be the case.
Brian Francis Gill Jones, “probably the most senior and experienced intelligence community official working on ‘WMD’” (Head, Scientific and Technical Directorate, Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff, Defence Intelligence Staff, UK Ministry of Defence) to Tony Cragg (Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence), et al., letter dated Sept. 19 2002, p.1 (57kb.pdf).
There is one common, consistent theme, however: the total determination of Saddam to maintain that programme. ... His weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down; it is up and running now.
The dossier is based on the work of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. For over 60 years, beginning just before world war two, the JIC has provided intelligence assessments to British Prime Ministers. Normally, its work is obviously secret. Unusually, because it is important that we explain our concerns about Saddam to the British people, we have decided to disclose its assessments.
I am aware, of course, that people will have to take elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence services, but this is what they are telling me, the British Prime Minister, and my senior colleagues. The intelligence picture that they paint is one accumulated over the last four years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative. It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability. ...
Baghdad could make enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by 2005 to 2007 if it obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has all the other materials and technological expertise necessary to build production-scale uranium enrichment facilities.
As for nuclear weapons, Saddam’s previous nuclear weapons programme was shut down by the inspectors, following disclosure by defectors of the full, but hidden, nature of it. That programme was based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. The known remaining stocks of uranium are now held under supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
But we now know the following: since the departure of the inspectors in 1998, Saddam has bought or attempted to buy specialised vacuum
... a planned magnet-production line whose suitability for centrifuge operations remains unknown.NIE, Oct. 1 2002
pumps of the design needed for the gas centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium; an entire magnet production line of the specification for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges; dual-use products, such as anhydrous hydrogen fluoride and fluoride gas, which can be used both in
... the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the procurement efforts ...
NIE, Oct. 1 2002
petrochemicals but also in gas centrifuge cascades; a filament winding machine, which can be used to manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors; and he has attempted, covertly, to acquire 60,000 or more specialised aluminium tubes, which are subject to strict controls owing to their potential use in the construction of gas centrifuges.
In particular you should note that we have toned down the reference to aluminium tubes in paragraph 22 on page 28, and removed it from the Executive Summary. This reflects some very recent exchanges on intelligence channels.
John Scarlett, Sept. 19 2002, Memorandum to Alastair Campbell, et al., “Iraqi WMD: Public Presentation of Intelligence Material” (34kb.pdf)
Just before the dossier was finalised, the CIA offered a comment noting that they did not regard the reference to the supply of uranium from Africa as credible. But the CIA provided no explanation for their concerns.
In addition, we know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, although we do not know whether he has been successful. Again, key personnel who used to work on the nuclear weapons programme are back in harness. Iraq may claim that that is for a civil nuclear power programme, but I would point out that it has no nuclear power plants.”
By his “we know,” Blair converts into unassailable fact what he conceals, namely: mere unsubstantiated supposition (the facts disclosed so far). This is a prima facie criminal lie under U.S. law, unless the “interpretation” (opinion) of any undisclosed facts is objectively certain beyond reasonable doubt (unlikely). In secret, this supposed fact was nothing more than a supposed opinion, the basis of which is yet concealed, and a reluctant opinion (“brokered with some difficulty”), unconvinced and thus unconvincing. –CJHjr:
Iraq’s existing holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA supervision. But there is compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.
UK draft Dossier, Sept. 11 2002 (2318kb.pdf)
On the uranium from Africa, the agreed interpretation of the intelligence (brokered with some difficulty with the originators and owners of the reporting) allows us only to say that he has “sought” uranium from Africa.
John Scarlett to Alastair Campbell, et al., Memorandum, Sept. 17 2002, “Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction” (68kb.pdf)
I think — I mean, it is very, very difficult to interpret the views of people who feel they are under pressure and being pressed and worked very hard.
Brian Francis Gill Jones to the Hutton Inquiry, Testimony,
Sept. 17 2002, Transcript, p.30, lines-23 et seq.
September 24 2002:
George W. Bush (US President), “President Urges Congress to Pass Iraq Resolution Promptly: Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the Cabinet the Cabinet Room” White House, Sept. 24 2002 11:00-11:09 a.m. EDT; 38/39 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents pp.1610-1612 (11kb.txt, 35kb.pdf) (from the Weekly Compliation):
“The President. ... I’ll answer a couple of questions, starting with Fournier [Ron Fournier] of the AP.
Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Can I have your reaction to two recent assessments on the situation in Iraq? First, Tony Blair said today that Saddam has tried to acquire significant quantities of uranium and can quickly deploy chemical and biological weapons. But there seems to be little new information in the dossier. Secondly, former Vice President Al Gore —
The President. That might explain why.
Q. Pardon me, sir?
The President. Explain why he didn’t put new information—to protect sources.”
September 24 2002:
Ari Fleischer (US President’s Press Secretary), Press Briefing, White House, Washington D.C., Sept. 24 2002 12:20 p.m. EDT:
“Q Ari, some members of Tony Blair’s own party — say there’s nothing new in the dossier Blair delivered to his Parliament. Is there a smoking gun?
Mr. Fleischer: Well, I think there was new information in there, particularly about the 45-minute threshold by which Saddam Hussein has got his biological and chemical weapons triggered to be launched. There was new information in there about Saddam Hussein’s efforts to obtain uranium from African nations. That was new information.”
September 26 2002:
George W. Bush (US President), “President Bush Discusses Iraq with Congressional Leaders: Remarks by the President on Iraq, The Rose Garden,” White House, Sept. 26 2002 10:46-10:51 a.m. EDT; 38/39 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents pp.1625-1626 (4kb.txt, 34kb.pdf):
“The President: ... The danger to our country is grave. The danger to our country is growing. The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary to make more biological and chemical weapons. And according to the British government, the Iraqi regime could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order were given.
The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist organizations. And there are al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq. The regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material, could build one within a year.”
October 1 2002:
Six agencies of the US Intelligence Community (15 agencies), National Intelligence Estimate: “Iraq’s Continuing Programs For Weapons of Mass Destruction” (October 1 2002, 90 pages), secret, authorship/responsibility unknown, quoted by Henry A. Waxman (Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, US Congress) to Condoleezza Rice (Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), letter dated July 29 2003:
“The NIE was delivered to Congress on October 1, 2002, about a week before Congress voted on the resolution to authorize the use of force in Iraq. The classified document included the following statement under the heading “uranium acquisition”:
“Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake.””
An unclassified CIA White Paper in October made no mention of the issue ... because we had questions about some of the reporting.
George J. Tenet DCI,
CIA, July 11 2003
October 4 2002:
Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” (1170kb.html, 2327kb.pdf), October 4 2003:
“•If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.
• Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until the last half of the decade.”
It is unclear how the CIA could be so certain about the uranium claim on October 1 when it delivered the NIE, and yet argue so strenuously against using it just three days later in the White Paper.
–Henry A. Waxman to Condoleezza Rice, July 29 2003
October 7 2002:
George W. Bush (US President), “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat,” Address to the Nation, Cincinnati Ohio, Oct. 7 2002 8:02-8:31 p.m., 38/41 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents pp.1716-1720 (22kb.txt, 43kb.pdf):
Although we have no problem with a judgment based on intelligence that Saddam attaches great importance to possessing WMD we have not seen the intelligence that ‘shows’ this to be the case.
Jones (MoD), Sept. 19 2002
The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime’s own actions — its history of aggression, and its drive toward an arsenal of terror. Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith. ...
And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that Iraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite international sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world. ...
“It is seeking nuclear weapons. ... We agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons.
George Tenet ... asked that any reference to Iraq’s attempt to purchase uranium from sources from Africa to be deleted from the speech.
Special Press Briefing, July 22 2003
The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his “nuclear mujahideen,” his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. ...
Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”
October 10-11 2002:
U.S. Congress “To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq,” H.J. Res. 114; House debate, 148 Congressional Record, October 8 2002: H7178-H7186 (78kb.txt, 97kb.pdf), H7189-H7247 (579kb.txt, 411kb.pdf), H7268-H7301 (345kb.txt, 266kb.pdf), October 9 2002: H7309-H7345 (349kb.txt, 267kb.pdf), H7375-H7410 (385kb.txt, 000kb.pdf), H7413-H7442 (301kb.txt, 244kb.pdf), H7706-H7735 (319kb.txt, 240kb.pdf), October 10 2002: H7739-H7799 (657kb.txt, 478kb.pdf) (U.S. Congress 107-2, House, Oct. 8-10 2002), House vote: Oct. 10 2002 3:05 p.m.; Senate debate, 148 Congressional Record, October 4 2002: S9933-S9975 (405kb.txt, 324kb.pdf), October 7 2002: S10006-S10031 (250kb.txt, 207kb.pdf), October 8 2002: S10063-S10077 (146kb.txt, 128kb.pdf), S10077-S10108 (312kb.txt, 242kb.pdf), October 9 2002: S10145-S10162 (168kb.txt, 150kb.pdf), S10164-S10217 (512kb.txt, 376kb.pdf), October 10-11 2002: S10233-S10283 (502kb.txt, 378kb.pdf), S10284-S10334 (515kb.txt, 353kb.pdf), S10335-S10342 (76kb.txt, 83kb.pdf) (U.S. Congress 107-2, Senate, Oct. 7-11 2002), Senate vote: Oct. 11 2002 12:50 a.m.; George W. Bush “President Signs Iraq Resolution,” Washington D.C., Oct. 16 2002 11:17-11:30 a.m., 38/42 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, pp.1777-1779 (10kb.txt, 44kb.pdf), “Statement by the President,” ibid, p.1779 (4kb.txt, 37kb.pdf); Public Law 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (15kb.txt, 36kb.pdf) (Oct. 16 2002).
December 19 2002:
US State Department, Fact Sheet, “Illustrative Examples of Omissions from the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council,” Dec. 19 2002 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman), discussed, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Daily Press Briefing, July 14 2003 (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman):
Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly dubious.
DoS, NIE, Oct. 1 2002
“Illustrative Examples of Omissions from the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council ...
Nuclear Weapons
• The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger.
• Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?”
The Declaration ignores Iraq’s nuclear submarines. Why?
–CJHjr