Iran Air 655 and Pan Am 103: An eye-for-an-eye?

This Sunday afternoon press briefing, broadcast on TV and radio, gripped a worldwide audience of hundreds of millions of people, live and in later news broadcasts.

It was the day of the 1988 Wimbledon men’s tennis final. Interrupted by rain, with news reports of the ambush filling some of that time. Concluded the next day, a U.S. national holiday, and a day of more such news, and rebroadcasts of this press briefing.

SSR/IFF: Transponder squawk-code

Crowe stated the aircraft did not broadcast a civilian transponder squawk-code:

William J. Crowe Jr. (Admiral, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Press Briefing, July 3 1988.

This was a bold, powerful, persuasive lie. A lie of Crowe’s own personal fabrication, independent of events thousands of miles away.

Persuasive, because the absence of a civilian SSR/IFF transponder squawk code is very fishy. Every airliner broadcasts a squawk-code (as required by binding international Air Traffic Control regulations), to identify its digital data-block, and its pressure altitude (flight level), displayed on radar screens equipped to decode Air Traffic Control data — like the ones on board the USS Vincennes, in its Combat Information Center, the Commander’s cockpit.

Bold, because other U.S. Officers had also seen what Crowe had, in his possession, and knew, for a fact, that Crowe was lying:– The Operation Report from the Vincennes Commander which, though false in most respects, nevertheless disclosed receipt of the aircraft’s IFF civilian transponder squawk-code. But, senior U.S. Military Officers well know that lying is part of their duty, and they can be certain that if they don’t keep quiet when their colleagues lie, and themselves lie on orders, their career prospects are doomed. At this Press Briefing, Crowe was modeling for all senior U.S. Military Officers, and their junior aspirants, what it takes to reach the top of the pile in this powerful United States Government institution, operating in secret and largely outside the rule of law, an essential character quality for leadership:– bold deceit.

A lie, because Crowe also had, in his possession, an account of what the Commander of the USS Elmer Montgomery saw. And, if he had that, then he certainly also had a account — later disclosed in the DoD report — of what the officers of USS Sides saw (the third member of the 3-ship squadron). The Sides officers absolutely refuted the Vincennes Commander’s false report, and themselves saw the aircraft’s IFF civilian transponder squawk-code, and no other IFF signal of any sort, with no equivocation.

A lie, because Crowe surely also had, in his possession, the very same “electronic intelligence” the President had, and later mentioned in the DoD report (¶ 2, p.8; ¶ j, p.28), doubtless reporting the aircraft’s civilian transponder broadcasts — squawk-code (mode A) and pressure-altitude (mode C). And, convincingly, a tape recording and transcript of the radio broadcasts between the pilot and Air Traffic Control, and the supposed “warnings” broadcast by U.S. warships. And an account of the radar flight-profile (high and climbing, in the middle of the airway).

These redacted intelligence sources were, presumably, Naval/NSA signals intelligence officers onboard the Vincennes itself at the time with the Naval Security Group Command (NSGC) in charge of the Ship’s Signals Exploitation Space (SSES); the NSA/DIA on-shore listening/radar station in Oman, on the Musandam Peninsula (at 2,000 feet elevation, with line-of-sight to Bandar Abbas airport, 45 n.miles north); the Hawkeye crew aloft nearby at the time above the Northern Gulf of Oman; the AWACs crew aloft at the time above the Northern Persian Gulf; British Intelligence; British/Italian warships; etc. (several of these).

“Surely,” because that would be the first thing any competent officer in Crowe’s position would ask for. He had many hours to get it. And, naturally, the President apparently also wanted it. And got it.

CBDR: Constant Bearing, Decreasing Range

Crowe listed among his reasons — that the Vincennes Commander “acted with good judgment” in deciding to attack — that Iran Air 655 was “headed directly for the Vincennes,” “coming its way,” “headed directly for Vincennes on a constant bearing,” “coming at it head-on”.

Duh! is the expression which now leaps to mind – an exasperated: “So what”.

But it did not leap to the minds of the hundreds of millions of TV viewers of his press briefing, because Crowe concealed the whereabouts of the Vincennes — dead-center in the airway — one of those material omissions referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 which denominate a “materially false statement” (a prima facie “lie”). And, he elaborated his deceit by asserting that the Vincennes was “outside” the airway, claiming the “suspect aircraft” (which was headed directly for the Vincennes) was four miles “outside the prescribed commercial air corridor”. Very, very fishy.

Like his transponder lie, this too was a deceit of Crowe’s own personal fabrication (in conspiracy with his complicit staff), independent of events thousands of miles away.

Crowe had, in his possession, the Operation Report from the Vincennes Commander. And, his staff had been on the phone for many hours investigating this incident. Certainly, this report, and those investigations, specified the geographical coordinates of the Vincennes at the time of the attack, a normal part of an Operation Report, a preoccupation of all naval officers dealing with charts, a direct read-out from the display of the warship’s laser-gyro inertial navigation system, recorded continuously and time-stamped as the log of the warship’s movements, and no doubt broadcast automatically every minute or so via satellite to the Pentagon, charting in real-time the position of all U.S. warships at sea. Crowe produced a chart at his Press Briefing showing the (supposed) position of the Vincennes.

And, Crowe certainly had a published chart of the public airway — which itself is defined by geographical coordinates 1  — showing its 20-mile width. Yet, that airway chart would have provoked questions at the press briefing and exposed his deceit. So, he concealed that as well:

William J. Crowe Jr. (Admiral, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Press Briefing, July 3 1988.

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Judging from his bold lies at his Press Briefing, I wonder if Crowe was complicit in consenting that the Commander of the Vincennes could file a false report in the first place (a criminal act), to enable Crowe to supplement his own lies at his Press Briefing with details from that false report.

I would expect this, from a chain of command conducting an unlawful secret offensive war against Iran, as a Belligerent, which had already offensively attacked and destroyed much of Iran’s Coast Guard fleet in offensive secret acts of war, not to mention other tactical military support to Iraq, in further aid of Iraq’s war of aggression against Iran (1980-1988), rendering the United States a co-Belligerent with Iraq in willful violation of the U.S. Constitution (without a vote by Congress).

Such bold lies are routine by senior U.S. Military officers, to cover-up their unlawful actions, and their President’s unlawful actions. This President had made secret unlawful offensive wars, a violation of his oath of office, the hallmark of his Presidency, beginning with launching a secret offensive war against Nicaragua (1981-1990). And lying about them when discovered. Such labelling the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut (Oct. 23 1983) a “terrorist” act. What was, instead, plainly, a prima facie lawful military operation in a complex war Reagan had secretly, and unlawfully, directed (Sept. 11 1983) the U.S. Military to enter offensively, as a Belligerent. Which they promptly did, 6 weeks before the bombing, well knowing what they were doing was offensive warfare which Congress had not authorized.

Rogers’ (concealed) Operation Report, submitted 9-1/2 hours after the event (12:30 p.m. EDT, 16:30 UTC), looks to be one of the most carefully crafted criminal lies in the history of the U.S. Navy (and there have been many). Criminal lies on orders are never prosecuted by the U.S. Government.

Crowe certainly lied at his Press Briefing, to the worldwide public in their hundreds of millions, Members of Congress amongst them, a routine way to lie to Congress without risking criminal prosecution.

And I wonder if Crowe also lied privately to his Commander-in-Chief (the President) (a criminal act) and to his other political masters (Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, Vice President, White House Chief of Staff) (a criminal act).

But, looking over the cast of characters in the conference telephone call with the President (and they talked variously with each other earlier), and judging from the bold, confident audacity of Crowe’s lies, my guess is they all agreed for the Vincennes Commander to file a false Operation Report and for Crowe to lie at his Press Briefing.

National myth-making, a Reagan/Bush speciality.

It wouldn’t be the first time that U.S. Military Officers lied, in a criminal conspiracy, on the criminal orders of a U.S. President, as Ward Boston, to his credit, eventually confessed (Oct. 9 2003) (USS Liberty, June 8 1967).

It’s no defense to a criminal indictment, that the President, Secretary of Defense, and Members of Congress may consent to be lied to. Their consent does not render a criminal report lawful. Likewise, Crowe and his subordinates in the U.S. Military do not have the legal capacity to legalize a criminal report by their subordinates. If they authorized the Commander of the Vincennes to file a false report, they are simply complicit with him, and equally guilty with him, in their collective criminal act (18 U.S.C. § 1001) — gang members, henchmen, aiders and abetters, co-principals (18 U.S.C. § 2), united in a criminal conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371).

This is an offense against the United States of America. The President is not the United States of America, nor any other U.S. Officer. The United States of America does not consent to be lied to. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

Though, it’s the apparent secret policy of the U.S. Department of Justice to not prosecute U.S. Government Officers who lie on orders of the U.S. President.

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If you park your car in the middle of the railroad tracks, then any train which happens along will be CBDR your position (Constant Bearing, Decreasing Range).

So too, if you race down the middle of an airway in your warship: Any civilian aircraft which happens along will be CBDR your position.

Hence, if you’re in the middle of an airway, it is not a marker of hostile intent that an aircraft is “coming your way,” “heading directly for you,” “coming at you head on” — thus explaining Crowe’s decision to lie about the whereabouts of the Vincennes.

And a U.S. warship commander is therefore not entitled to take that factor (CBDR) into account in evaluating a target. Precisely the opposite of Crowe’s deceitful pretense.

If the warship commander doesn’t have the stomach to be overflown by aircraft in an environment rich with civilian overflights, then he’s unfit for that command. And, until he is relieved from duty, his commanders have the duty to ensure that he avoids civilian airways so that his unsuitable temperament does not imperil innocent lives.

But, as we shall see, Rogers did not attack because of a queasy stomach.

ATC frequencies

Crowe simply lied that the aircraft was warned seven times.

And the power of this lie lingered, after other of Crowe’s deceits were slowly exposed, one by one, in subsequent days. It proved to be the most persuasive influence on public opinion inside the US, which was desperate for any excuse to blind themselves to the proposition that their armed forces could act so recklessly and so ruthlessly, and their Commanders could lie so boldly.

If you ask anybody today inside the U.S. (the willfully deceived viewers) who watched these events, as they unfolded on TV in 1988 — smothered in TV coverage of the 1988 Presidential election campaign, Arms for Hostages, Iran/Contra, and other sleaze in the Reagan/Bush Administration — my guess is that 10 out of 10 them will, still today, cite their memory of these supposed warnings as justifying the U.S. ambush of Iran Air 655.

The simple truth is, the U.S. Military did not warn the aircraft a single time. And this decision by U.S. Military Commanders to not warn civilian aircraft is the third-most proximate cause of the killing (there were several).

Crowe began his warning lie with the truth, that the Vincennes broadcast its supposed warnings on two distress frequencies, MAD (243.0 MHz UHF) and IAD (121.5 MHz VHF).

For the pilots in Crowe’s audience, this straight-away marked the first glimmer of understanding how this killing came to be. But not for the rest of the hundreds of millions watching Crowe’s press briefing on TV. And Crowe managed to confound the pilots still, with his transponder lie and his airline route lie. Crowe’s entire audience was united in perplexity; just the way Crowe intended.

The warship officers did not broadcast on the frequencies the aircraft was certain to be listening to, as required by international civil aviation Air Traffic Control regulations, binding on all countries in the world, including the United States. It’s as simple as that. The warship radio-talker broadcast supposed warnings into the ether, but not into the radio receiver on board his postulated civilian target, which U.S. Military Officers could be certain was switched on, with the volume turned up.

All U.S. Navy commanders and officers know what those frequencies are. And if they don’t know, it’s because they don’t need to know, but they know how to find it out should their duties change and require them to. Or — as in the case of the Vincennes Commander and his officers, and their higher commands — it’s because they were recklessly indifferent to their duty to know.

This frequency information is available from any pilot, including the crews of the two helicopters on board the Vincennes itself, the flight centers on board all U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, the Air Traffic Control personnel on board all U.S. AWACs and Hawkeyes aloft, from the United States National Flight Center at Washington DC, the U.S. military’s own flight centers, any Air Traffic Control authority at any airport, including the Bahrain ACC, the home base of the U.S. Gulf Squadron for 40 years. And it’s published on all aircraft charts of the region. And how many thousands of those were in the hands of the thousands of pilots and navigators on U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and Air Force bases in the Gulf region, and onboard the Vincennes itself, boggles the mind to contemplate.

Yet, the Vincennes Commander paid this no mind; nor did any of his fellow commanders and officers or higher commanders.

And this I classify as “reckless negligence,” because the commanders responsible for deciding to not warn civilian aircraft could foresee the deadly consequences of their decision to violate their duty. And this includes the fleet commanders, and higher commands, responsible to design the protocol for antiair warfare in fleet operations.

But it also includes the individual warship commanders with authority to kill, and their subordinate officers whose conduct and decisions inform and influence the commander’s decision to kill. It’s the duty of all such killers to apply their minds to their separate and joint tasks and ensure that their operational protocol is suited to its purpose — the first of which is to not target civilians.

This reckless negligence by these senior U.S. Military Officers — a primary proximate cause of the wrongful killing of 290 people — deserves an award of prison time, for involuntary manslaughter (18 U.S.C. § 1112), arson (18 U.S.C. § 81, § 3559(c)(3)(B)), and criminal neglect (18 U.S.C. § 1115), exactly as the Iranians claimed, not the Legion of Merit.

This reckless negligence by these senior U.S. Military Officers did not occur in the heat of battle, and did not occur in the fog of war. It occurred days, weeks, and months earlier, in calm surroundings, when they decided to not do what their duty required them to do; namely, to apply their minds, to design and implement a protocol for talking to civilian aircraft, and to gather information into the Combat Information Center, on each of their warships, necessary to implement and operate that protocol.

Crowe’s lie about the warnings, is another deceit of Crowe’s own personal fabrication (and his complicit staff), independent of events thousands of miles away. It’s a compound lie, a false assertion coupled with a material omission.

Here’s the false assertion: The Iran Air crew would have heard the warnings “if they followed standard practice of monitoring those frequencies”. There is no such standard practice, as explained below, unless you’re over a vast ocean. And, as to four of the supposed warnings, the airliner could not possibly have been “monitoring those frequencies,” because no airliner is equipped with a military UHF transceiver (243.0 MHz UHF).

Here’s the material omission: There is a standard practice of what frequencies to broadcast on if you want to talk to a civilian aircraft which is not over a vast ocean. And this standard practice senior U.S. Military Officers violated when they decided to order their warship crews to broadcast warnings on the wrong frequency. This, Crowe didn’t mention in his press briefing.

This material omission, coupled with his “standard practice” assertion, is Crowe’s lie:– willfully inducing his audience to wrongly believe that the U.S. Military did what they were supposed to do, if they wanted to kill somebody.

A separate, additional, Crowe warning lie — falsely characterizing the broadcasts as “warnings” — is so pernicious that it’s discussed separately, below.

As evidence of Crowe’s willful deceit (that he understood the significance of his warning lie), the U.S. — after the ambush — changed its antiair warfare protocols to require U.S. Military Officers to monitor civilian Air Traffic Control frequencies — as their duty required them to do before the ambush — and to broadcast warnings on those frequencies, as a condition to targeting. And, they also changed their radio-talker script to conform (partially) to the binding international Air Traffic Control protocol on how to address an aircraft in flight (additional reckless negligence by Vincennes officers, and their higher commanders, discussed below).

NOTAMs

Crowe listed the failure of the aircraft to respond to the supposed seven warnings as a marker of hostile intent, which the warship commander was entitled to take into account in evaluating the target. This, too, President Reagan emphasized in his written statement approving the Vincennes ambush of Iran Air 655, which “failed to heed repeated warnings.” And his Vice President, George H.W. Bush, among his lies to the United Nations Security Council: “After seven — I want the Council to be sure to understand this — seven unanswered warnings, the captain did what he had to ...” And U.S. Military Officers in subsequent sworn lies to Congress.

To support his assertion, Crowe fabricated yet another deceit (together with his complicit staff), independent of events thousands of miles away. And, like his warning lie, this too is a compound lie.

Here’s the false assertion: That a U.S. NOTAM required civilian aircraft to respond to a warning, “to identify themselves and to state their intentions”:

William J. Crowe Jr. (Admiral, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Press Briefing, July 3 1988.

Here’s the material omission: Nobody, ever once, asked the pilot to reply to a “warning,” to identify himself and state his intentions. And this Crowe certainly knew because he certainly had the text of the warnings and undoubtedly several copies, one from the Vincennes and the rest from at least three separate electronic intelligence sources.

Though Crowe misrepresented what the NOTAMs required, and lied about the text of the supposed “warnings” (below), I’m sure Mohsen Rezaian, the Iran Air pilot would have happily replied, had anybody asked him to (which nobody did). He was trained by Boeing in the USA, and his brother and sister-in-law lived there, now in Salt Lake City.

Yet, the NOTAMs nevertheless did not require civilian aircraft to respond to U.S. warships — contrary to Crowe’s claim, even if asked to reply — if they complied with the NOTAMs’ simple safety rule: Be higher than 2,000 feet within 5 miles of a U.S. warship, and don’t be “operating in a threatening manner”.

To reinforce it’s promise of safety, the United States included in its NOTAM (which Crowe cited) this reassurance (which Crowe concealed), that aircraft could overfly U.S. warships:

NOTAM, FAA FDC 052/87.

Bandar Abbas airport is on the Gulf coast, but it’s 42 miles inside Iran’s territory along airway A59W (and 47 miles along IR655’s route), due to its geography, at the base of a deep territorial bight, an indentation of the shoreline, like a bite out of a sandwich. Hence, any civilian aircraft departing Bandar Abbas airport is quickly above the NOTAMs’ 2,000 foot safety limit within a couple miles of the airport, more than 40 miles from where any U.S. warship might be. Departure is under Air Traffic Control. And climbing to altitude is not a threatening maneuver:

NOTAM, 112119 KFDC, italics and text {in braces} added.

Crowe omitted to mention this NOTAM. And this NOTAM is so fatal to the pretense by U.S. Officers that the United States committed no wrong, that the DoD report-writers also decided to conceal it, from their deceitful report. But they weren’t content to simply conceal it, a prima facie criminal lie by material omission (18 U.S.C. § 1001). They went further and fabricated a blatant prima facie criminal lie (18 U.S.C. § 1001), pretending that their other NOTAM replaced all previous NOTAMs, notwithstanding they both appeared together in every weekly edition of the International Notices to Airmen (U.S. FAA):

William M. Fogarty (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director of Policy and Plans, U.S. Central Command), DoD Report, p.15, ¶ (17), italics added. This statement contains two blatant lies. The second, that the NOTAM disclosed what it concealed, is explained below (criminal Rules of Engagement).

Crowe, besides concealing the 2000 foot safety-rule NOTAM, quoted part of another NOTAM, also in effect at the time, which added an additional threat to aircraft above 2,000 feet. But only if the pilot did two things: fail to respond to requests (if asked to respond) and operate in a threatening manner:

NOTAM, FAA FDC 052/87, italics and text {in braces} added.

The full text of both U.S. NOTAMs is quoted below. U.S. radio-talkers on the civilian frequency never once asked the radar-contact “to respond to requests for identification and intentions,” as the U.S. NOTAM required them to do.

And this, Crowe concealed, at his deceitful press briefing.

Taking both NOTAMs together, if you take off and climb normally, and stay above 2,000 feet, the NOTAMs do not require civilian aircraft pilots to respond to any radio contact from a U.S. warship, even if U.S. warship radio-talkers asked them to, even if they broadcast on the correct frequency, and even if they managed to speak correctly so that the pilot could know who the warship is trying to talk to.

None of these three things did the Vincennes civilian radio-talker do.

Hence, the failure of a pilot to respond (above 2,000 feet, and climbing normally) can not be taken as a marker of hostile intent (as Crowe asserted), there being no notice to pilots that they might be targeted if they do not respond.

Accordingly, a U.S. warship commander is not entitled to take that factor into account (failure to respond) in evaluating that target. Precisely the opposite of Crowe’s deceitful pretense.

By contrast, the IR655 pilot complied with the NOTAMs, in marked contrast to the U.S. warship commander. IR655 took off, and climbed steadily, on a steady course, to 12,500 feet, and was climbing still, when the Commander of the Vincennes — 12 n.miles away — turned his firing key (06:54:05), in blatant violation of the firm formal published written promise by the United States of America to not attack, as plainly stated in the U.S. NOTAMs — the precise opposite of Crowe’s pretence.

As evidence of Crowe’s willful deceit (that he understood the significance of what he quoted, and what he chose to conceal), the U.S. quickly, but quietly, revoked the 2,000 foot safety rule and issued a single replacement NOTAM (August 13 1988) — after the ambush (July 3), and before releasing the DoD Report (July 28) to the public (August 19) — changing the “and” to an “or,” in the bit Crowe quoted, to license themselves to attack a plane which does not respond even if it’s not also operating in a threatening manner. Though, to actually do so would be a text-book war-crime, under the targeting laws of war, and murder (18 U.S.C. § 1111) or manslaughter (18 U.S.C. § 1112), arson (18 U.S.C. § 81, § 3559(c)(3)(B)), and criminal neglect (18 U.S.C. § 1115), under the laws of peace:

NOTAM, FAA FDC 056/88. Source: Photocopy of “Foreign Notices, Persian Gulf,” International Notices to Airmen, February 23 1989 (U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration), originally issued August 13 1988 via AFTN (Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network), italics and text {in braces} added.

IAD: 121.5 MHz VHF

Instead of themselves complying with obligations binding upon them — international flight rules concerning how to contact aircraft in flight — U.S. Military Officers arrogated unto themselves authority, which they did not possess, to impose upon civilian aircraft in foreign lands (where the United States has no such jurisdiction) an obligation, they did not have, to monitor 121.5 MHz. And, to license U.S. Military Officers to kill people who do not obey that unlawful order. And this we see daily, today, on the streets of Baghdad, just as we have seen on the streets of the USA as well, at Kent State University, for example:– U.S. Military Doctrine in action: Obey, or die.

Aircraft are obligated by international flight rules to monitor 121.5 MHz in only one instance:– when they are over a vast ocean and out of reach of their Air Traffic Control station. (VHF range is line-of-sight). This, to assist ships and boats and aircraft in distress.

And, ICAO recognizes that you can’t have two conversations at the same time and, so, you’re not obliged to monitor 121.5 MHz, even then, when you’re talking on another frequency:

International Flight Information Manual, “Oceanic Long-Range Navigation Information” (Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportion).

If an aircraft is intercepted in flight by a military aircraft, then, at that time, “the pilot of the intercepted aircraft shall attempt radio contact with the interceptor aircraft on 121.5 MHz”. International Flight Information Manual, “International Interception Procedures” (FAA). Accord: “Interception of Civil Aircraft,” {66 kb html} § 5 (Action by intercepted aircraft), being Attachment A to ICAO Annex 2 {395 kb pdf}, International Standards: Rules of the Air (Ninth Edition, March 12 1990), to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, quoting Annex 2, Appendix 2, § 2.1(c).

In recent years, the U.S. FAA has ordered a listening watch on this frequency in the near vicinity of about 19 named large airports inside the U.S., where the United States does have jurisdiction to impose such a requirement.

In all other circumstances, 121.5 MHz is a frequency which a pilot, at his or her option, can choose to broadcast on, in an emergency, though pilots are recommended instead to contact the Air Traffic Control frequency they are then monitoring, where help is sure to be listening. In special circumstances (e.g., at low altitude, offshore, in remote areas, near boats, emergency ground personnel, or known rescue stations, and such), the pilot might feel s/he has a chance to find a closer listener on 121.5 MHz and s/he’s free to try that frequency if s/he wants to.

One of the two U.S. NOTAMs “requested” a listening watch on 121.5 MHz only if the aircraft was within 5 n.miles of a U.S. warship. Iran Air Flight 655 was never within 5 n.miles of any U.S. warship. The Vincennes Commander attacked (turned his firing key) when IR655 was more than 12 n.miles away.

The second U.S. NOTAM was not precise about when a pilot “should maintain a listening watch on 121.5 mHz” (“aircraft operating in these areas,” “within the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea”). In addition, the U.S. left in place its 5 n.mile rule, and this provides a gloss on what this second NOTAM means.

Iran Air Flight 655 was never itself within the Strait of Hormuz or the Persian Gulf. When the Vincennes radio-talker started his first warning broadcast, IR655 was 30 n.miles from the Strait of Hormuz, 7,000 feet above Iranian soil, and busy talking to Air Traffic Control on another (published) frequency. When he started his second (and final) warning broadcast, IR655 was 22 n.miles from the Strait of Hormuz, at 10,000 feet, paralleling Iranian soil less than 1 n.mile offshore. And the radio-talker, in that broadcast, never asked the pilot to do anything or to reply to the broadcast.

The pilot was probably one minute away from turning up the volume on his backup radio, which he may have already tuned to 121.5 MHz. He had just that moment finished his obligatory final report to Bandar Abbas Approach Control, that he had reached MOBET, exiting the Terminal Control Area (TCA) under the jurisdiction of Approach Control. At precisely that moment, when Rogers turned his firing key, the pilot had only two further immediate ATC radio obligations: First, to immediately switch frequencies from Approach Control (124.2 MHz) to the Tehran Area Control Center (131.8 MHz), his new ATC controller, beginning at MOBET. And secondly, to make his obligatory report, to Tehran ACC, upon reaching his assigned flight level 140, which he was then approaching at 1,500 feet per minute, about 1 minute away, about as long as it takes to read this paragraph.

Following that report to the Tehran ACC, still some 8-10 n.miles distant from the Strait of Hormuz, and that far inside Iranian territory, the pilot would then expect no further ATC conversations for the next 39 miles. He could then be free to listen to both his ATC frequency (131.8 MHz) and, on his backup radio, to 121.5 MHz, until he reached DARAX, about half-way to Dubai, where his next obligatory report was due, to both Tehran ACC and, immediately following yet another frequency change, to the Emirates ACC.

U.S. Military Officers did not possess authority, nor the United States jurisdiction, to impose a listening watch on aircraft in other lands. But they did possess authority, and the United States jurisdiction, to impose a listening watch on their own warship crews, to stand watch on relevant Air Traffic Control frequencies.

The ATC radio obligations on the pilot richly demonstrate why U.S. Military Officers were so extremely recklessly negligent in failing in their duty to require their radio-talkers to monitor the Air Traffic Control frequencies. This reckless negligence, by senior U.S. Military Officers, is the second-most proximate cause of the unlawful ambush of Iran Air 655 and the unlawful killing of its 290 innocent souls on board.

Had they done their duty, U.S. Military Officers would never have ordered their warship crews to broadcast on 121.5 MHz in the first place. Monitoring would have immediately revealed to the warship officers that the aircraft was an airliner, long before MOBET. And no broadcast to the pilot would have even been necessary. But if they wanted to broadcast a warning, then only a reckless fool would broadcast on 121.5 MHz to a pilot the fool knew was talking and listening on another, ATC, frequency.

The Vincennes Commander attacked in violation of his own NOTAM:

The Vincennes civilian radio-talker never once asked the radar-target “to identify themselves and state their intentions,” contrary to Crowe’s repeated deceitful claim. And this can only mean, in the mind of the pilot, even if the radio-talker had broadcast on the right frequency, that the aircraft’s intentions were not unclear and the pilot was not approaching a warship.

Here is the full text of both U.S. NOTAMs, exactly as they appear on the page, in the FAA weekly publications prior to the ambush:

Source: Photocopy of “Foreign Notices, Iran–Persian Gulf,” International Notices to Airmen, June 30 1988 (U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration), italics, text {in braces}, and highlighting added. ICAO, p.F-4. NOTAM FAA FDC 052/87 was originally issued Sept. 8 1987. DoD, ¶ (17), p.15. NOTAM 112119 KFDC was originally issued in 1984. ICAO, ¶ 2.2.1, p.10. Both NOTAMs appeared like this in every weekly edition of FAA NOTAMs, and both were in force on the day of the ambush.

Secret 13 n.mile killing zone

U.S. Military Officers, in their NOTAMs, induced the public to believe, that a U.S. warship would not regard an aircraft to be a threat unless it closed within 5 n.miles at less than 2,000 feet and, above 2,000 feet, if it did not “operate in a threatening manner”.

But, U.S. Military Officers maintained secret Rules of Engagement ordering its commanders to attack an aircraft approaching from Iran, before it closes within 13 n.miles, and regardless of its altitude (up to maybe 25,000 feet), and regardless of its flight profile (climbing at 1,500 feet per minute); i.e., even if the aircraft did not “operate in a threatening manner”. And, even if the aircraft broadcast a civilian transponder squawk code:

William M. Fogarty (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director of Policy and Plans, U.S. Central Command), DoD Report, pp.48-49, ¶ E.

The secret Rules of Engagement were a blatant violation of the U.S. NOTAMs, both of which senior U.S. Military Officers themselves drafted and issued.

Attacking, in the teeth of these NOTAMs, on the basis of those secret Rules of Engagement, is the war-crime of “perfidy”:

1977