American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1971

 

American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1971

_______________

Tuesday, April 20, 1971

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on National Security
Policy and Scientific Developments,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:05 p.m. pursuant to call, in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. Zablocki.  The subcommittee will please come to order. Today’s session continues a series of hearings on the subject of American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia being conducted by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments.

This hearing is a continuation of a session held on March 31. Our witnesses at that time were representatives of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam.

Because of a conflict with the Democratic caucus on that day, the session was delayed. As a result, the witnesses were only able to make their statements and answer a few questions from the subcommittee when the hearing had to be adjourned, in accordance with House rules, because of the work being done on the House floor.

We asked the witnesses to come back today to allow members to finish their questioning, and they have consented.

With us today are Mrs. Cora Weiss of New York City, cochairman of the Committee of Liaison, and two members of the board of her organization, Mr. Stewart Meacham of Philadelphia, peace secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, and Dr. Richard Barnet of Washington, D.C., Director of the Institute for Policy Studies.

Thank you for returning. Unless you have a further statement to make at this time, we shall begin the questions. Time permitting, and I assume there will be sufficient time because of the lack of floor action, the subcommittee will hear from Mr. Louis Stockstill of Washington, D.C. Mr. Stockstill is a writer and journalist whose article entitled “Inside the Prisons of Hanoi,” is appearing in the April issue of Reader’s Digest.

We would like to ask representatives of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam if you have any additional comments you want to make before we begin the questioning.

(Witnesses indicated they had no further statements.) {p.354}

QUESTIONS LETTER TO POW FAMILIES

There being no further statement, I would like to ask Mrs. Weiss to comment on a copy of a mimeographed letter sent to families of prisoners of war by the Committee of Liaison.

It is dated January 6, 1971, and is signed by you, Mrs. Weiss, and by Mr. David Dellinger. That letter contains this paragraph, and I quote:

The release of the men which we all seek can be achieved only when the administration sets a date for the total withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. This also includes the release of men held by the NLF in the South. The Vietnamese have consented to freeing the Americans even before the troops have withdrawn as long as the date of total withdrawal has been set.

Do you recall that letter and that statement?

Statement of
Mrs. Cora Weiss,
Cochairman of the Committee of Liaison With Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam, New York, N.Y.

Mrs. Weiss.  Yes, sir.

Mr. Zablocki.  The clear implication of that statement to families is that all the United States need do is to set a date for final withdrawal and prisoner release will begin. Do you believe that to be true, and, if so, what reason do you have for that view?

Mrs. Weiss.  That is not only true but it would be a moment of honor in the history of America. It was most recently confirmed in a story datelined April 16 from Paris by Henry Gininger, where clarification by the North Vietnamese was given to the problem of when the men would be released in connection with setting the date.

Mr. Le, the spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation, in Paris, said, “There is no problem. The goal of the discussion would be the freedom of all military prisoners.

“We have no interest or purpose in keeping the prisoners. It is not true that we consider them to be hostages,” and he cited the precedents of the Geneva Conference in 1954 on Indo-China ending hostilities between the French and the Communists and providing for the partition of Vietnam.

Discussion on release of prisoners began shortly after signing of the accords and all prisoners were freed by October. In the 100th session of the meetings in Paris which took place on January 21, Ambassador Xuan Thuy reiterated the positions of the North Vietnamese that discussions for the release of prisoners of war would begin as soon as the date was set for the withdrawal of all American troops, and Madame Binh, in a statement to Ambassador Bruce, also repeated that they would not even have to wait until the following day, they could begin the discussions the very same day that a date for withdrawal would be set.

That is all a matter of record.

Mr. Zablocki.  Before pursuing the questions, the Chair would like to respectfully request that the gentlemen in the room to maintain the proper decorum, take off their hats, at least out of respect for the ladies that are here, please. {p.355}

HANOI’S REQUIREMENTS FOR POW RELEASE

In an earlier mimeographed letter to families dated October 30, 1970, and signed by you, you stated that release of prisoners depends on the United States fulfilling two demands by Hanoi: (1) setting a date for withdrawal, and (2) agreeing to withdraw support from the Saigon Government.

Yet in your January 6 letter, you made no mention of a second demand. Is it because the North Vietnamese have abandoned that requirement, or were you attempting to mislead the families to think that with the simple setting of a date their loved ones would be on the way home?

Mrs. Weiss.  I wish the setting of a date were so simple, Mr. Chairman. It seems to be the thing that is holding up the end of the war and the very thing the President is resisting. It is both the demand of the American public and the demand of a large percentage of Congressmen.

We absolutely do not want to mislead the families, and cannot be accused of doing so. Those two demands have been as a matter of record the demands made by the North Vietnamese from time to time for settlement of the war.

They have not changed. It is more recent that the emphasis by the North Vietnamese has been that the condition for releasing prisoners is setting the date for total withdrawal of troops.

To say that that is just a simple question and request, I think, is oversimplifying it.

DID HANOI ABANDON ONE REQUIREMENT?

Mr. Zablocki.  May I ask, whether to your knowledge the North Vietnamese have abandoned the second requirement, that is, that the United States withdraw support from the Saigon Government?

Mrs. Weiss.  I cannot speak, nor can any of us at the Committee of Liaison, for the North Vietnamese. I suggest that Congress ask the North Vietnamese.

However, Madam Binh’s first point in her eight-point proposal of September 17th makes it clear that setting the date is the primary condition.

Mr. Zablocki.  Was the second condition made by any North Vietnamese officials which caused you to include it—

Mrs. Weiss.  It has been a condition that has been part of the North Vietnamese position all along.

Mr. Zablocki.  Yet you omitted it in the January 6th letter. What is the significance?

Mrs. Weiss.  I really don’t follow your line of questioning. I think it is creating an issue where there is none, setting the date at this point is sufficient for beginning the immediate discussions on the release of prisoners held both by the North as well as the South.

Mr. Zablocki.  It is very important if there are two stipulations, or if there is one, or if there are more than two. Your earlier letter mentioned two requirements and your letter of January 6th had only one. My question is whether the second requirements is no longer necessary. {p.356}

Mrs. Weiss.  I just finished saying that as far as we know from the press and from the statements that are issued in the Paris talks, it is now sufficient that a date be set for troop withdrawal to begin discussions on the release of prisoners.

Mr. Zablocki.  Then it is your understanding that the second requirement mentioned in your October 30th letter is no longer a requirement?

Mrs. Weiss.  The second requirement would be a condition of the overall parts of the settlement of the war, and it is no longer now, as far as we know, a requirement for beginning discussions on the release of men.

FUNDING OF COMMITTEE OF LIAISON

Mr. Zablocki.  In our last hearing, which was so abruptly terminated, the subcommittee did not have an opportunity to ask the Committee of Liaison representatives how you are funded. What is your budget?

Mr. Weiss. We have received funds since our inception from families, from individuals on the committee, and from individual contributors who are responding to the committee’s work. We spent in the first 8 or 9 months of operation a little less than $5,000.

In the subsequent few months, we have spent less than that. We do not have a large paid staff or heavy expenses.

Mr. Zablocki.  Is there any other organization that is a contributor to the Committee on Liaison?

Mrs. Weiss.  Not to my knowledge. The funds come primarily from families who contribute without solicitation from us, because we do not charge for our services, and secondarily, from individual contributors.

Mr. Zablocki.  That would total the $5,000?

Mrs. Weiss.  That was for the first 8 or 9 months of our operations.

Mr. Zablocki.  What is your total budget operations since then?

Mrs. Weiss.  We have spent less than $10,000 in the 15 months that we have been in operation.

Mr. Zablocki.  And all of that amount was by individuals, small contributions, unsolicited?

Mrs. Weiss.  That is quite true.

Mr. Zablocki.  That is to be our understanding?

Mrs. Weiss.  That is true.

MEANING OF “DISCUSSIONS”

Mr. Zablocki.  Mr. Findley?

Mr. Findley.  Mrs. Weiss, one of the aspects of the attitude of Hanoi that troubles me is that they always qualify their position on releasing POW’s with use of words like this, “We are ready to begin discussions of the question.”

Why do you suppose they are that guarded about it if they are really determined to release all prisoners when American forces are totally withdrawn. Why don’t they say it?

I can’t find any language that the North Vietnamese have used at Paris or elsewhere which does not have such qualifications in it. {p.357}

Mrs. Weiss.  I will share this answer with Dr. Barnet. I would refer you once again to the April 16 statement which is the first clarification that we have had on what the word “discussions” means.

It simply says it means freedom.

“The goal of the discussion would be the freedom of all military prisoners.” Again, we cannot speak for the North Vietnamese. We don’t pretend to. That is not our role, and it should not be.

I would refer you, as other Congressmen have done, to speak to the North Vietnamese.

COMMITTEE’S ACCESS TO CAMPS

Mr. Findley.  I realize that. You do have a unique relationship with Hanoi, one that is not shared by anyone else in this country to my knowledge, and that is why I raise the question.

Because of that relationship, and because of your expressed and I think genuine concern for the welfare of the POW’s, have you at any point asked your contacts for the privilege of going to Hanoi and having a firsthand look at the camps?

Mrs. Weiss.  Mr. Findley, as you know, I was in a detention camp in North Vietnam. Mr. Meacham brought back three prisoners from North Vietnam. Other members of the committee have been both in detention camp and have interviewed prisoners.

Mr. Findley.  But have you asked for access—

Mrs. Weiss.  We are not an international organization. We do not purport to play a governmental or official role in terms of being inspectors. We are people who, because of our interest in ending the war, and our concern for its victims, have the ability and the desire to put families in touch with the prisoners, and that is the role that we felt would be best for us in terms of serving the most humanitarian purpose, and the role that we are able to play.

Mr. Findley.  I would think a logical corollary to that role would be to attempt to see the prisoners firsthand and assure yourself and the families that they are receiving decent treatment. Could you tell us approximately how many of the prisoners you and Mr. Meacham and others representing the COL have had a chance to observe?

45-50 POW’S SEEN BY WESTERNERS

Mrs. Weiss.  I believe in the time since the first prisoners were taken in 1964, about 45 to 50 American prisoners have been seen by westerners. That includes journalists from Europe and other members of the antiwar movement in this country. That also includes the prisoners who were brought home with the help of the antiwar movement.

Mr. Findley.  But the Committee of Liaison has had a chance to observe about how many of those 45?

Mrs. Weiss.  Five men were seen at Christmas. I saw nine, Stewart Meacham came back with three, Dave Dellinger interviewed some 20 or more, and Dennie Davis returned with three.

Mr. Findley.  Did you see the quarters in which they were kept?

Mrs. Weiss.  Yes, we did.

Mr. Findley.  Did you ask for the privilege of seeing other quarters? {p.358}

Mrs. Weiss.  We were grateful for the opportunity that we were given to visit the camp that we were taken to, and to meet and talk with the men with whom we spoke. In the process of visiting this camp, we saw bedrooms with three, five, and eight beds in them, beds having mattresses, blankets, mosquito netting, with items that the men had received from home, such as decks of cards, a sweatshirt, and other items. We saw shower rooms, a social room where there was an exhibit of art on display, and a room where, since we were there just before Christmas, artwork showing the traditional Christmas scenes painted by prisoners was on view.

We were satisfied with what we saw. It was immaculately clean. No one asks for comfort or luxury in a time of a war. It was certainly adequate for the basic needs of people.

And they were protected from bombing with air-raid shelters.

Mr. Findley.  But I assume from your response that you did not ask to have access to quarters other than the ones that you were shown?

Mrs. Weiss.  No, we did not.

Mr. Findley.  Did you ask to see any particular individuals?

Mrs. Weiss.  No. You must recall that when we went to North Vietnam in December of 1969, we did not expect to see any individuals at all. As a matter of fact, we knew very little about who was in North Vietnam, and this was a quite unexpected extra to our 2-week visit there.

Mr. Findley.  I appreciate that and understand it, and I certainly do not want you to feel my questions are hostile.

Mrs. Weiss.  I understand. I appreciate that. I did not know any of the prisoners in December of 1969.

COMMITTEE SHOULD ACT FOR POW RELEASE

Mr. Findley.  But you do indeed have a very unusual relationship with North Vietnamese officials, and I would hope that as you look to the future that you will seize any opportunity that comes to identify those that are held, to inspect their quarters, and also to convey in every way you can the concern of the families.

Mrs. Weiss.  Mr. Congressman, that is a very nice idea, and maybe we should welcome it; but every time we have produced anything that has been requested by Congressmen or Government officials or public opinion in America, it has been rebuffed.

It has been rejected. It has been refused to be recognized as official. Women who have statements before them that their husbands are dead, with a date and a cause of death, are prohibited from getting a change in their status by the Department of Defense from MIA to KIA, so what is the point, you see, in trying again to come out with more information if every time information comes out, something is done to either negate it; or worse, after we came out with a tremendous amount of information in November, Washington’s thank-you to North Vietnam was the Sontay raid. [Applause.]

Mr. Fulton.  Could you repeat that? I missed your intent and meaning.

Mrs. Weiss.  The point that we are making is that every time we have come out with the kind of information that is so desperately {p.359} wanted by Americans, Members of Congress, members of the Government, wives and mothers and fathers, the information is rebuffed.

It is met with contempt. The Secretary of State, for instance, met the official list of 339 POW’s held in North Vietnam with a comment that it was a “contemptuous maneuver”; and the list of dead, which has been desperately wanted by so many people, was met with the Sontay raid in November.

ROLE OF COMMITTEE OF LIAISON

Mr. Findley.  My response to you is that I don’t raise my questions in a spirit of contempt at all, and I feel that the families involved here, and I am sure many of them, if not all of them, are grateful to the COL for the services that have been rendered.

I still feel a great agony because of the lingering uncertainty. The enemy has seen fit not to allow the International Red Cross to make the traditional inspection of camps; and because of your concern for the welfare of prisoners and the mental anguish of the families, I would think it would be highly appropriate for you to try to broaden the scope of your intervention on their behalf of trying to gain access to the prisoners.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Zablocki.  Dr. Barnet, do you care to reply?

Statement of
Dr. Richard J. Barnet,
Codirector, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.

Dr. Barnet.  Yes. My own feeling, and I can only really speak for myself on this, was that when I was there, given the reaction to information that has come in the past that Mrs. Weiss talked about, and given the attitude of our Government on prisoner questions, no very useful purpose would have been served if I visited one, or two, or even three camps. It could always be said, “You did not visit them all. They showed you the camps they wanted to show you.”

I don’t think that the committee, which I believe serves an absolutely unique and crucial purpose in communications, can arrogate to itself the role of an inspector, to be a surrogate for the International Red Cross or anybody else. I think that were we to attempt to play that role, we would be unfair to the families whom we are trying to serve, and also to the public.

Mr. Findley.  Actually, I was not suggesting you be a surrogate to the International Red Cross, but rather to fulfill the humanitarian functions that organization has been historically able to fulfill.

It is a service not to the Defense Department or to the Congress, but to the families involved. I would think it would be a comfort to these families to have knowledge of conditions in more than, say the six or eight different rooms you have seen. The extent to which you were granted access would aid in alleviating this anguish felt by many families.

Dr. Barnet.  I understand, Mr. Findley, and I appreciate that, and the spirit in which you asked the question, I do think that it is difficult in view of the relationship between North Vietnam and the {p.360} United States and the particular role which the committee has been able to play to press terribly hard for that.

I think that any information that we can get, of course, we welcome and we want to get as much information as we can.

I think that the degree of information that we are able to get and the extent to which the committee would be able to bring back information will depend crucially on what happens in the war.

MEANING OF “DISCUSSIONS”

This gets back, really, to a question that you asked Mrs. Weiss, that I would like, if I may, to comment on. That is why the North Vietnamese talk about “discuss” instead of simply saying “we will release the prisoners”?

I think the answer here comes back as it does everywhere in these negotiations to the issue of credibility. I think the North Vietnamese are not going to say in advance that “we are going to do thus and so” for setting a date, because setting a date may not be the same thing as setting a date and carrying out the commitment.

The agreement to come to the table in Paris was premised on a commitment by the United States to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, and as they have seen, the bombing of North Vietnam has not been stopped.

Planes continue to bomb at intervals in North Vietnam. I don’t know that this is the answer. I can’t speak for them or really read their minds, but I think if you look at the history of the negotiations and the way they have operated, it is pretty clear that they are using guarded language for the purpose of making sure that when they, this Government says that we are prepared to set a date for the total withdrawal of all American forces from Indo-China and the cessation of military operations by American forces, that we really mean it and that we are really going to carry it out.

Mr. Zablocki.  Mr. Morse.

PURPOSE OF 1969 HANOI VISIT

Mr. Morse.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Weiss, Mr. Barnet, Mr. Meacham. Tell me if you will, Mrs. Weiss, the original purpose of your December, 1969 visit to North Vietnam.

Mrs. Weiss.  I was invited as a leader of Women Strike for Peace by the North Vietnam Women’s Union, to see what America had wrought in 4 years of bombing in North Vietnam.

Mr. Morse.  In your discussions at that time, there were apparently discussions about the prisoners. Who introduced that subject?

Mrs. Weiss.  We introduced it as it was stated in my testimony originally. We had prior discussions in this country about our readiness and willingness to help ease communication between POW’s and families if the North Vietnamese were ready and willing.

Mr. Morse.  I commend you for the work you have done, but is the principal purpose of the COL to achieve the release of the prisoners, or to effect the identification of a date certain? {p.361}

Mrs. Weiss.  The members of the Committee of Liaison are all active leaders in the antiwar movement. As individuals our principal purpose is to end the war so that the prisoners can come home and everybody else can come home, as a committee our purpose is to provide a chance for communnication {sic: communication}, swap information. If we can help keep families in touch with their relatives, we are more than happy to be able to do that.

Our purpose is that of liaison for communications, but we would not be doing this if we were not primarily interested and concerned with ending the war.

HANOI’S REASONS FOR IGNORING CONVENTIONS

Mr. Morse.  The North Vietnamese have made the point you repeated, that the prisoners are not being held as hostages. If that is the fact, can you account for the fact for their refusal to permit International Red Cross inspection?

Mrs. Weiss.  I think we went over that territory last time.

Mr. Morse.  I apologize for not being here.

Mrs. Weiss.  I will try to summarize it. Under the Geneva Convention, the North Vietnamese have an exemption under article 85, and therefore do not feel required to abide by the requirements for international inspection by an organization such as the ICRC.

Aside from that, the International Red Cross is basically a western body, not an international body, and the North Vietnamese are content that they are providing humanitarian treatment to the prisoners, and that the men could come home if we would leave.

There are no western based international organizations operating in North Vietnam. As you know, there is a history of the difficulty with the International Control Commission as well. They don’t pretend to be unbiased.

Mr. Meacham.  Mr. Morse, if I could just comment on that, you know, one can speculate about the Red Cross inspection angle, but none of us can do more than that.

It is a matter of speculation. I more or less agree with the speculative comments that Mrs. Weiss has made, and the thing that I don’t see is the logical connection that your question, it seemed to me, suggested, that the failure to bring in the International Red Cross reinforces the idea that they are holding these people as hostages.

My feeling is, and this is just speculative again, that if they were thinking of these people as hostages, they would want to dangle them as obviously as they could.

What would be the point in considering them as hostages, which suggestion is that you are using them as a kind of bargaining pawn, without holding them out there where everybody could, you know, have a look.

I don’t see—there does not seem to me to be a logical connection between these two aspects.

CREDIBILITY GAP WITH NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. Morse.  We hear a great deal about a credibility gap in our own society, and I, as one whose credentials on the war are fairly well {p.362} established, find a credibility gap on the part of the North Vietnamese. One of the credibility gaps was the failure for meaningful results to occur after the halt of the bombing halt to the north in November of 1968, because after that halt came, then there was the immediate insistence of the two principals.

It was hoped at this time that there would be meaningful discussions, but those discussions were inhibited by the insistence of the North Vietnamese on two principles, No. 1, total and complete U.S. withdrawal, and No. 2, support by all parties for a government in South Vietnam devoted to “peace, independence and neutrality.”

I am concerned, too, with Congressman Findley’s question. Let us assume that a date for U.S. withdrawal were set. We really have no assurances that the discussions will lead to very much. I realize, too, that the other side perhaps doesn’t have any assurances that the date will be respected.

Dr. Barnet.  To go back for a minute to what I think happened after the agreement to go to Paris. I don’t think that the North Vietnamese said they were going to agree to the American formula for ending the war. I don’t think there is any statement which could have led any official of the United States to think that they would have settled for anything less than withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam at that time.

I think that they have in fact made many changes in their proposal over the period. They are not changes that bring them very close to the American position, which has really in essence been even changed since the war was undertaken.

It has always been the American policy to maintain an independent U.S.-oriented government in South Vietnam. The President very clearly reiterated that just yesterday, and that is what the war has been about.

That is what the fighting has been for—

Mr. Morse.  But, in the October 7 speech, the President did undertake to negotiate the total withdrawal of U.S. forces.

I am sorry. Go ahead.

Mrs. Weiss.  The October 7 speech ignored the initiative of the PRG with respect to releasing prisoners. The October 7 speech also had a hidden clause calling for the return or release of all prisoners of war to the country of their choice.

That was kind of a tricky speech.

HANOI’S NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES

Dr. Barnet.  I think the point is that for the North Vietnamese the issue has always been, “Is the United States going to agree to remove the military power which is what keeps the present South Vietnamese Government in power, and are they willing to permit the domestic political forces in South Vietnam to work out a political solution?”

That has been essentially their proposal all along. They have made various changes and I think very greatly moderated their original position. Their original position was that the NLF was the sole voice of the Vietnamese people. {p.363}

They have moderated this considerably to take into account the positions of other groups in South Vietnam. They clearly contemplate a coalition government at this time.

I think that, if the United States would agree to accommodate a complete withdrawal of its forces and if in fact it would undertake that commitment, then I think it is perfectly clear that the present South Vietnamese government would change, and change rather quickly.

Mr. Morse.  Do you suggest that the second of the two principles is no longer relevant, then?

Dr. Barnet.  I am suggesting that the second of the two principles is not an independent second principle, but would rather follow—it would rather follow from a decision on the first.

That is, I don’t think that the Vietnamese are insisting that the U.S. Government overthrow the South Vietnamese Government, as the State Department has characterized it.

I don’t think that has ever been their position. I think they are demanding that we undertake to remove our forces, all of our forces, and when that happens they are betting, and I would bet with them, that the complexion of the South Vietnamese will change radically.

WHY DID NLF REJECT ELECTION OFFER?

Mr. Morse.  Do you have any special information, Dr. Barnet, as to why the 1969 offer to participate in an election commission in which all elements of the South Vietnamese Government would be represented was rejected by the North Vietnamese?

Dr. Barnet.  I don’t have any specific information about it. Again I can guess. I think the reason was that it was held in the framework of a constitution in which those who were either supporting them or were neutralists had been excluded from—

Mr. Morse.  But the specific offer was made to permit these other elements to participate?

Mrs. Weiss.  Was General Minh in jail at the time?

Dr. Barnet.  This was a government that had jailed an opponent. The Government had put tens of thousands—we don’t know the exact number—of political opponents in jail, a government which discredits itself from time to time.

You may have seen the statements of Vice President Ky a couple of days ago. I suggest that they did not think that looked like a very promising avenue for a good result.

Mr. Morse.  Then you suggest that until the Thieu-Ky government is gone, there will not be a good chance of negotiation.

Dr. Barnet.  Yes, I do.

Mr. Morse.  You said 4 minutes ago that it did not—

Dr. Barnet.  What I said was that, 4 minutes ago, if the United States were to withdraw all its forces and would do it on a reasonably prompt schedule, that the Thieu-Ky government would not have to be overthrown by the United States, that it would fall as a result of popular pressures in South Vietnam.

Mr. Morse.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. {p.364}

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SETTLEMENT AND POW RELEASE

Mr. Zablocki.  Mr. Bingham?

Mr. Bingham.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We—aren’t we getting two things confused here? Aren’t we getting confused the question of what might make the basis for a total settlement and the question of what might provide the basis for the release of American prisoners?

Dr. Barnet?

Dr. Barnet.  They are separate questions, but I think that the agreement for setting the date, in such a way that it was credible would, as one Vietnamese delegate said in Paris recently, and I don’t have the reference, but I recall hearing it—I think this was quoted by Senator Hartke, if I am not mistaken—then bring a cease fire in 48 hours. You could proceed very promptly to a settlement of the other issues. I think the whole question is whether the United States is really prepared to stop exercising power through military means in South Vietnam, and everything behind hinges on that, including the prisoners.

Mr. Bingham.  Well, I am in agreement with that, but I would be very disturbed by a suggestion that if we undertook to do that and proceeded to carry that out that the prisoners might then not be released if there were no end, let us say, to the conflict between North and South Vietnam.

Dr. Barnet.  I see what you mean. No, I think there is no question about that. It seems to to me that the North Vietnamese have absolutely no motivation to keep those prisoners once the United States is out of there, just as they have no motivation to keep the French once the French were out of there.

Mr. Bingham.  Could I suggest this, that there seems at times, particularly before the September 17 statement by Madame Binh, to have been some uncertainty as to just what the North Vietnamese were saying on this, but it seems to me that in the light of what was said clearly on September 17, that what the United States should do is go on the assumption that this statement meant what it said. If it turns out not to be true then we can rexamine it.

Dr. Barnet.  I agree with that completely, Mr. Bingham.

[Applause.]

Mr. Fountain (presiding). Proceed.

HANOI’S VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION

Mr. Bingham.  I was interested in a comment you made, Mrs. Weiss, about the attitude of the North Vietnamese toward the International Control Commission. Do they regard this as a body that is not unbiased?

Mrs. Weiss.  I think it would be wiser, rather than speculate to ask the North Vietnamese themselves how they feel about things like this. This is not within my area of expertise.

I do know we prefer to go into North Vietnam in ways other than with the ICC.

Mr. Bingham.  If what you said earlier is true, it is rather interesting, because I think most people who support the Vietnamese war from the United States point of view would say that the International Control Commission had been biased the other way. That is perhaps in the nature of the situation. {p.365}

I think, also, perhaps for Mr. Morse’s benefit, it might be well for you to make clear, as you did the last time, that you do regret the fact that the North Vietnamese have not applied the Geneva Convention.

At least I know you said that, Dr. Barnet. Do you think it would be highly desirable if they did?

Dr. Barnet.  I think it would be highly desirable if as much information could be had. I think that the human costs of the policy are very regrettable.

Mr. Bingham.  One final point I would like to bring out. In all of the discussions, and indeed in Madame Binh’s statement which I have here, the use of the words “withdrawing troops” are used.

In light of the recent statements, particularly by President Nixon and Secretary Laird, that they seem to contemplate the continuation of air action by the United States, after the withdrawal of ground troops, on an indefinite basis, what is your interpretation of what the words “withdrawing troops” mean?

Dr. Barnet.  I think that withdrawing troops would certainly mean cessation of American bombing operations, and I would think that it would also involve a cessation of American support for South Vietnamese bombing operations in the Indochina area.

I would think certainly it is worth noting that the prisoners who we believe to be in the hands of the Pathet Lao in Laos and in the hands of the NLF in South Vietnam, are apparently not permitted to have any communications on any kind of regular basis, just as the North Vietnamese refused to permit any communications on a regular basis while the bombing was going on in their country. I must say I can understand where a country has been the most heavily bombed country in history, why they would not be very receptive to making concessions over issues of prisoners.

So I think for that reason, too, if we are concerned about prisoners generally in this area which, of course, we must be, we cannot contemplate a policy of continuing bombardment in Indochina.

Mr. Bingham.  I would just like to say in conclusion that I agree with that interpretation. I am very disturbed at statements that indicate that the administration is not contemplating ending American participation in the war. As far as I can see, their statements indicate that they are going to follow a policy that dooms these prisoners to being held indefinitely.

Mrs Weiss.  Right.

[Applause.]

CONTACTS WITH NLF, PATHET LAO?

Mr. Fountain.  Mr. Fulton?

Mr. Fulton.  Has your group ever contacted the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong, the Pathet Lao for information and identification of other American prisoners held either by them or in Cambodia or Laos?

Have you tried to broaden your scope?

Mrs. Weiss.  It has been the policy of the Pathet Lao and the Provisional Revolutionary Government not to provide information on personnel that they may be holding until acts of hostility cease.

Mr. Fulton.  My question was, have you tried to do it, not what their position is. {p.366}

I am glad to have your comments. But have you tried to broaden the scope?

Mrs. Weiss.  Yes; we have asked if they would be interested in providing information, and have been told that while they are most sympathetic with the anguish of the families that as long as bombing and acts of war continue, they are not able. The situation to comply with regard to North Vietnam is completely different they explain, because the bombing has stopped there, or at least theoretically it has stopped, and the communication is available in North Vietnam and they have taken an accounting of the personnel who have been captured, whereas as long as we continue the bombing and the fighting in Laos and in South Vietnam and in Cambodia, we keep making or creating new prisoners each day, so there is no accounting at the moment, and there will be if we cease and leave.

BELIEVES HANOI HAS IDENTIFIED POW’S

Mr. Fulton.  Are you satisfied that the North Vietnamese Government has identified all the U.S. prisoners that they have?

Mrs. Weiss.  I have no reason to believe that they would withhold any information, and I understand that a member of the State Department has told Mr. Barnet the same thing, and he reported that during our previous testimony here.

Mr. Fulton.  Are you the only conduit or source of getting this information, or would it be possible to try to get information through other organizations of a similar nature who are interested in peace?

Why is it that they will only deal through your organization when we talk about the Government of North Vietnam?

Mrs. Weiss.  The North Vietnamese have made it clear that they will deal with the American people, the peace-loving people of America whose motive is to help end the war, and they will be delighted to deal with the U.S. Government as soon as the U.S. Government negotiates a military settlement to the war and concludes the war.

Mr. Fulton.  Why does the North Vietnamese Government limit the U.S. prisoners of war to letters of only six lines?

Why aren’t they more generous with the correspondence? It does not cost them anything.

Mrs. Weiss.  You will have to ask the North Vietnamese authorities that. I think that question relates to an earlier discussion we had with Congressman Findley. They give a little and there is a complaint that it is not enough. If it were 10 lines, you still would complain that it is not enough. You would have to ask them, but even the six lines they allow are not appreciated.

THE TORN ENVELOPE INCIDENT

Mr. Fulton.  When you were here before you spoke about an envelope that had been torn open, and evidently had been delivered to you from a U.S. prisoner of war. Was there any inference in your testimony about it being torn open, that it might have been torn open by someone not authorized, somebody in any U.S. Government agency, the Department of Defense, the State Department, the CIA, or the U.S. Postal Service? {p.367}

Was there any inference in your testimony that it had been tampered with?

Mrs. Weiss.  First, let me just clarify the facts. It was an envelope that was sent to the North Vietnamese in Paris and had been returned to us torn open and empty in that it was refused by the North Vietnamese because it arrived there with the contents removed.

We leave the inference up to the listeners. All we have is the empty envelope.

Mr. Fulton.  When these wives and widows can go directly to the North Vietnam representatives or commission, in Paris, why don’t the North Vietnamese delegation members at least advise these relatives what information they have when they would be dealing directly with the families of those concerned, not with the U.S. Government?

Mrs. Weiss.  The families that have talked with us after visiting the North Vietnamese in Paris, have told us they were cordially received, and they were told that the Vietnamese don’t have the information in Paris, because that is not their duty there, and they must come back and discuss the question with the Committee of Liaison, which they have done, and in those cases, we have followed through on their behalf to find out about their missing relatives.

A CEASE-FIRE IN VIETNAM

Mr. Fulton.  There has been some talk here, Mr. Chairman, of the possibility of cease-fire on both sides. Suppose the fighting would simply just stop, for example, the bombing of the north by the United States or the withdrawal of our troops which our Government is now doing. I recall the tragic Tet incident and North Vietnamese attack where there was an agreed cease-fire for a religious observance of their own by Vietnam people on both sides, a religious observance of Eastern religion, that had nothing to do whatever with the Western culture or religion, or a western power.

This pause was within the purview and to practice the religious beliefs of the Vietnamese people themselves regardless of whether they were north or south.

I do recall that recess and agreement was violated. When there was such a violent and disastrous massive violation, what reason do we have to expect that there would not be another violation if the United States did agree to a cease-fire?

Mrs. Weiss.  There would be no violation, Mr. Chairman, if the presence of the green machine were gone, There could be no violation if American military power left Vietnam.

Mr. Fulton.  Would you have us withdraw all our U.S. troops and then stop the supply of the South Vietnamese Army at the same time that Communist China and the U.S.S.R. were sending full supplies to the North Vietnamese Army?

Should there not be as a specific condition of any cease-fire—a cessation of the delivery of supplies on both sides?

Mrs. Weiss.  As an American citizen, I am concerned with where our taxes and our sons are going and what they are supplying and what they are being asked to do, and I am concerned that we pull out tomorrow morning if not tonight from Vietnam. [Applause.]

(Mr. Zablocki resumed the chair.) {p.368}

Mr. Fulton.  That means taking the men and supplies out?

Mrs. Weiss.  That means dismantling every base and taking out the seven and a half ton bombs, too.

Mr. Fulton.  That means we would leave the South Vietnamese defenseless—

Mrs. Weiss.  I am sure the South Vietnamese could not care how we take care of our problems. I am concerned about what we are doing, and our morality. [Applause.]

Mr. Fulton.  You would not insist that Communist China and the U.S.S.R. likewise stop supplying arms to North Vietnam, the Vietcong and the National Liberation Front, so that the war would then cease? I don’t see how anybody can get the war to cease unless there are conditions preventing the implements of war.

Mrs. Weiss.  Mr. Chairman, as an American citizen, I am concerned about American policy, and I think that is what we are here to talk about.

Mr. Zablocki.  The members will return as soon as they reply to their names on a quorum call.

POW EXECUTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Dr. Barnet, in your statement you alleged, and that is, your statement of March 31, you alleged that some summary executions of Vietcong prisoners have been common practice. What proof do you have of that statement?

Dr. Barnet.  I have, Mr. Zablocki, included in my written record a long account, eyewitness accounts by returned soldiers involved, and newspaper correspondents and others which were introduced into the Senate by Senator Hatfield, and I have included it in the record, as you requested.

There are however, in this room, Mr. Chairman, a number of individuals who informed me before the hearing that they themselves were “witnesses to torture of South Vietnamese prisoners,” and I would strongly suggest that some of them be invited to testify now—

Mr. Zablocki.  Well, we have other witnesses and questions to ask you. I don’t think we should disrupt the orderly procedure. I hope you would agree. Our questions are for you, not of the general public.

Dr. Barnet.  I am certainly glad to answer them. I can answer them secondhand, having spoken with a number of individuals personally, having read the record of the Winter Soldier Investigation in Detroit and other similar hearings which have been conducted around this country by veterans of this war who have been concerned enough, outraged enough by the conduct of our Government and its South Vietnamese Allies that they have gone into communities to tell the American people the truth about this war and who we are fighting for.

COMPETENCE OF RED CROSS INSPECTIONS

Mr. Zablocki.  The International Red Cross inspections of South Vietnamese POW camps have not resulted in the reports of tortures and inhumanities which you alleged in your March 31 report. In your view, is the INCR guilty of publicity or inefficiency?

Dr. Barnet.  I do not know. I know the testimony of numerous individuals, now in the hundreds, and commonplace reports going back as far as 1963— {p.369}

Mr. Zablocki.  Have you visited a South Vietnamese prisoner of war camp?

Dr. Barnet.  No, as I say it is secondhand information, but there are people in the room who have, and I was sufficiently concerned about reports.

(Interruption from the audience.)

Mr. Zablocki.  The witness will continue.

Dr. Barnet.  I was concerned about the stories of ejection of prisoners from helicopters, about the use of electric generators to extract information in interrogations and other reports by responsible known correspondents, that in 1963 I went to the Department of State and asked for information about it.

At that time, there was the usual denial, as there has been since.

CRITICISM OF MAIL CAMPAIGNS

Mr. Zablocki.  In your statement, of March 31, you were critical of the mail campaigns to Hanoi, calling them “a deceit” because they would not make the other side more willing to release prisoners. Do you at the same time deny that the mail campaigns have had the effect of obtaining somewhat better treatment for American prisoners of war, at least in terms of being able to send mail and packages to and from them?

Dr. Barnet.  I deny that completely, Mr. Chairman. I think the improvement in the relations has been due to our committee and the efforts of people in the peace movement who have tried to show that not all Americans support the brutality which the North Vietnamese see as coming from the United States.

I think that the pattern is very clear, Mr. Chairman, that where people in the United States have reacted decently to initiatives, they have been reciprocated and they have been extended, and that where these initiatives have been used for propaganda purposes as in the release of some of the prisoners who were then used to speak out on alleged inhumanity, that has had an adverse effect on moving the prisoner issue along.

It seems perfectly clear that the North Vietnamese would not have released prisoners they had mistreated. They would not be sending them back to the United States—

Mr. Zablocki.  They released only nine.

Dr. Barnet.  Right, and some of those have participated in campaigns to discredit the North Vietnamese treatment of prisoners, and that has had the support and backing of the Government, and has had a most detrimental effect on the possibilities of early release of the prisoners.

Certainly it has had the effect of stopping early release of, unilateral release of, other prisoners.

REPATRIATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE POW’S

Mr. Zablocki.  Dr. Barnet, as you know, there are 9,000 North Vietnamese in South Vietnam prisons. Is that your understanding?

Dr. Barnet.  I don’t know the figure.

Mr. Zablocki.  Are you aware that few of the North Vietnamese prisoners are said to want to return to North Vietnam, nor do they want to be repatriated? {p.370}

Dr. Barnet.  I am not aware of that, but I would be very surprised. It does not, I must say, surprise me that that argument is made, because that, as you recall, was made during the Korean War, and had a very unfortunate effect of prolonging the negotiations for ending that war.

So I think the issue of repatriation to country of choice, which was introduced into President Nixon’s peace proposals is very unfortunate and has the effect, because the Vietnamese also read history, of suggesting once again that we are not serious about ending our relationships with South Vietnam, bringing our troops back, and stopping the aggressive activities that are being carried on in that country.

Mr. Zablocki.  In your conversations with representatives of North Vietnam and Hanoi, was the prisoner of war issue, that is, North Vietnamese prisoners who are detained in South Vietnam, ever discussed?

Dr. Barnet.  North Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam?

Mr. Zablocki.  Right.

Dr. Barnet.  No.

Mr. Zablocki.  It is not true that the North Vietnamese maintain there are no North Vietnamese in South Vietnam, and no prisoners?

Dr. Barnet.  They have not officially admitted that North Vietnamese troops are in South Vietnam.

Mr. Zablocki.  Do you believe their contention that they do not have prisoners in South Vietnam? Do you personally believe North Vietnam in this regard?

Dr. Barnet.  That they do not have any North Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam?

Mr. Zablocki.  Yes.

Dr. Barnet.  I have no reason to believe it.

Mr. Zablocki.  Do you believe North Vietnam? Or do you believe that the North Vietnamese prisoners are indeed in South Vietnam?

Dr. Barnet.  I believe from newspaper reports that there are North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam in considerable numbers.

But I have no reason to believe—

Mr. Zablocki.  My question was to establish the credibility of the North Vietnamese when they make a statement or present a fact. They maintain there are no North Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam. Do you believe them?

Dr. Barnet.  You mean North Vietnamese prisoners in the hands of the South Vietnamese?

No, I don’t believe that. As far as I know, there are some prisoners.

HANOI’S VIEW OF GENEVA CONVENTION

Mr. Zablocki.  What representations, Dr. Barnet, have you made to the North Vietnamese urging that they change their positions regarding their obligations under the Geneva Conventions?

Dr. Barnet.  Excuse me.

Mr. Zablocki.  What representations have you made to the North Vietnamese in urging that they change their position?

Dr. Barnet.  I did not feel it was incumbent upon me to make recommendations. {p.371}

Mr. Zablocki.  Do you think they are fulfilling their obligations under the convention?

Dr. Barnet.  I have said not, but I have explained why they have done it, and I have explained that the consequences of that are not what has been alleged by the Government. That is, I am satisfied by the reports of the visitors, of correspondents, and from what I know of the North Vietnamese themselves that what they say about the treatment of prisoners is probably correct.

As I said, I would have hoped that this issue of the International Red Cross and inspection would not have come up. They have their reasons for taking the position they have, while I neither fully understand nor accept. Since I was not in a position to negotiate with them about anything, I did not feel I could make a representation.

LEVERAGE WITH NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. Zablocki.  Since the North Vietnamese obviously depend on the Committee of Liaison to channel mail to and from the prisoners in a manner advantageous to them, it would seem to give the committee a certain amount of leverage with Hanoi in getting better treatment for prisoners.

How often have you used that leverage to bring relief to our prisoners?

Dr. Barnet.  Mr. Chairman, I don’t think any American has very much leverage with the North Vietnamese on the prisoner issue, whether to get 10 or 20 or 30 letters, when Americans are developing 7-1/2 ton bombs in South Vietnam, when we are consistently using napalm on their people, when we are destroying villages. I think you have to put this in perspective. Sure, I would hope very much that they would be more forthcoming on issues on the prisoners, and I have said that here, and I am sure that they know my attitude on that. But that is not very important to them, given the fact that this country has consistently over 5 years and more carried out a totally destructive policy with the destruction of villages, with the use of napalm. I don’t think we have very much leverage with them. We don’t seem to have very much leverage with our own Government. We have been pointing these things out for 5 or 6 years. We—

Mr. Zablocki.  Doctor, if I may just interject, despite all the conditions you mention, including napalm bombs and other bombing, nevertheless, your committee has been able to have some leverage on the North Vietnamese in obtaining certain correspondence to certain prisoners and allowing families to exchange letters to and from.

Why would you say you have leverage in that instance but no leverage in obtaining better treatment of prisoners in—

Dr. Barnet.  Because the treatment of prisoners, as far as we can tell, is as good as required under the conventions.

Mr. Zablocki.  Why won’t the North Vietnamese permit inspections?

Dr. Barnet.  We have been through that many times, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Zablocki.  I just can’t understand it.

Dr. Barnet.  The reason is that they are a sovereign government, that they have signed and made a specific reservation under article 85 of the Geneva Conventions, that they regard those who come out {p.372} without provocation to bomb their villages and their people as war criminals, that they have as a result of public pressure and their own, what seems to me, clear humanitarian impulse, chosen not to prosecute those men as war criminals and therefore, but by refusing to prosecute have not waived their rights under the reservation in article 85 to decline international inspection.

CIVILIAN CAPTIVES IN NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. Zablocki.  Are you aware that in the number of prisoners in South Vietnam, or in the prisons in North Vietnam, there are some civilian personnel included?

Therefore, would you agree with Hanoi that they, too, are war criminals? Are you satisfied that every North Vietnamese prisoner— every American in a North Vietnamese prison is a military man, and that there are no civilians?

Dr. Barnet.  No; I am not satisfied with that.

Mr. Zablocki.  Why has North Vietnam failed to advise our country about the status of the civilians? Have you brought this matter up with them? You have just told the subcommittee that you are satisfied that Hanoi holds some U.S. civilians. Did you discuss this status of civilians?

Dr. Barnet.  Mr. Chairman, it was my interest when I went there, and it is my interest now, to get the prisoners back, all of them, military, civilian, whoever is there, and the way to get them back is to end this war. To quibble with them—

Mr. Zablocki.  I am referring to your giving credibility, and apparently agreeing with the position of North Vietnam as to the reservations of the Geneva Conventions that they need not, because they classify their prisoners as war criminals, they need not release the identity even of civilians. If you want a legal answer, which I would be glad to give you, article 4 states that persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members, and so on, are to be treated as prisoners of war.

Dr. Barnet.  Now, I do not know under what circumstances the civilians who may be in their hands happen to be there, or the circumstances under their capture. They apparently conclude that they, too, are participants in a war crime.

I believe that one could make a very good argument that this war from its inception is a violation of the principles against aggressive war which were adopted by the United States at Nuremberg, and I think they have a legal case there.

But that is somewhat beside the point. Arguing either publicly or privately about the fine points about the Geneva conventions. I think we have to find a way to get the prisoners back, and back soon, and I am absolutely convinced as many other people who have seen them and talked to them and listened to them in Paris, that we will get the prisoners back, all of them, if we end this war, and if we withdraw American forces and stop the fighting.

INSPECTION OF POW CAMPS

Mr. Zablocki.  Regardless of their position as you have just related it, do you personally believe that North Vietnam should allow impartial inspection of prison camps? {p.373}

Dr. Barnet.  No, I can’t imagine under these circumstances that North Vietnam would do it, or particularly should do it.

Mr. Zablocki.  I am not asking whether North Vietnam will do it. I am asking your personal opinion whether they should.

Dr. Barnet.  You say would you like them to do it?

Mr. Zablocki.  Yes.

Dr. Barnet.  Yes.

Mr. Zablocki.  Do you think they should do it?

Dr. Barnet.  No, “should” is different. “Should” has to do with obligation, I can’t say—

Mr. Zablocki.  You would like them to do it, but you seem to agree with the position that they apparently have some technicality or legality in not permitting inspection. You either have to have one position or the other. Do you think prison camps should be inspected, or should not be?

Dr. Barnet.  My position is clear. I think they have a right to take advantage of the reservations under article 85.

Mr. Zablocki.  Well, even with civilians?

Dr. Barnet.  Even with civilians, and personally I would hope that the maximum amount of communication would be allowed. I said that. But it seems clear to me that the way to get a situation where we don’t need communications is to get the prisoners back.

POSITION ON CLOSING POW CAMPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. Zablocki.  In order that I can understand your thinking more clearly, what would be your position if the prison camps in South Vietnam would be closed to inspection? Inspection would not be permitted. And if you knew civilians were in POW camps in South Vietnam, what would be your position, not what you would like to see? Should the camps in South Vietnam be opened to inspection?

Dr. Barnet.  Yes, it should. In the first place, South Vietnam—

Mr. Zablocki.  Why do you have the double standard?

Dr. Barnet.  Because South Vietnam did not sign the reservation, South Vietnam agreed to be bound by the Geneva conventions without the reservations, and therefore under the law they have an obligation.

Mr. Zablocki.  Do you think the VC’s that bomb theaters and civilian places, if they are incarcerated, do you think those camps should also be inspected?

Dr. Barnet.  We are talking about a matter of law. As a matter of law, we have an obligation because we did not specifically disclaim it. The North Vietnamese do not. That is a different legal question. Now if you are talking about my personal preference, I would ask everybody to be inspected.

Mr. Zablocki.  If the South Vienamese {sic: Vietnamese} Government chose to disclaim under the Geneva Convention the obligation to have their prison camps inspected, what would your position be?

Dr. Barnet.  If they were in the same legal positions, as the North Vietnamese they would have, it seems to me, the same legal rights that the North Vietnamese do, and I would make the same argument for them that I have made here with respect to the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Zablocki.  Mr. Findley?

Mr. Findley.  Mr. Chairman, on that same subject, I think it would be a mistake to leave the record as it is because it might carry the im- {p.374} plication that Hanoi has only rejected inspection by the International Red Cross, while Hanoi’s opposition to inspection by another party from outside its own borders goes well beyond its opposition to the International Red Cross.

Other nonwestern nations offered to fulfill this role in North Vietnam and this offer was rejected.

GETTING THE PRISONERS OUT

Mr. Zablocki.  Mr. Bingham?

Mr. Bingham.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don’t quite understand why we are at this particular point in the discussion. I would phrase some of these sentiments more strongly than these witnesses do about the obligation of the North Vietnamese, but I don’t see that the basic thesis that they are presenting here, which is that we are not going to get these prisoners out until a date is set for withdrawal, is particularly affected one way or the other by their views on the subject of the obligation of the North Vietnamese or the South Vietnamese with regard to the Geneva Convention.

I just have one question at this time. It is a rhetorical one, but I think it is one worth putting in the record.

Is there anything in the Geneva conventions, Dr. Barnet, that would require the North Vietnamese to release American prisoners so long as hostilities continue?

Dr. Barnet.  Nothing, absolutely nothing, but, of course, the customary practice in all wars is to release prisoners at the end of the hostilities. Indeed, the North Vietnamese by releasing the number that they have, have gone beyond their obligations under the treaty.

Statement of
Stewart Meacham,
Peace Secretary, American Friends Service Committee

Mr. Meacham.  I think the Geneva Convention definitely states that prisoners should be released and repatriated after the cessation of hostilities. I think that is the exact language.

Mr. Bingham.  Isn’t this true that with the exception of occasional changes this has been the pattern of warfare as long as anyone can remember?

Dr. Barnet.  That is correct.

Mr. Bingham.  I think it might be well to have in the record again the question of the release of the French prisoners after the negotiations. Would you want to give the facts on that, please?

Mrs. Weiss.  The accords were signed between the French and the Viet Minh on July 1, 1954, and by the first of October all prisoners were freed.

In fact, the majority were released within 6 weeks.

Mr. Bingham.  Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

WOULD COMMITTEE SERVICE NORTH VIETNAMESE POW’S?

Mr. Zablocki.  Mr. Fulton?

Mr. Fulton.  It brings up the question of transposing so that there might be your kind of relief offered to the North Vietnamese prisoners {p.375} in South Vietnam. Would your organization be willing to provide the same service for North Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam by seeing that their mail is carried through without being opened, that there is identification, that there is a word as to their well being, and that their families are contacted?

That is the obverse, the opposite side of the coin we have been speaking about. Would your organization be open to that course of assistance?

Mrs. Weiss.  I am surprised that that should be necessary. The South Vietnamese claim they are functioning under the Geneva Convention and that all those things are things that are happening and are operable.

Mr. Fulton.  Yes, but you and I are the skeptical type.

Mrs. Weiss.  But don’t you trust your ally and the words of your ally?

You see, you are so willing to give us more jobs. I don’t mean to make fun. It is curious that you want us to do more and more and more, and yet everything we have done has been thrown back in the face of the Vietnamese people, and the “thank you” that we get, whether it is for mail, or prisoners we helped to be released, whether it is information, whatever it may be, the results are horrendous.

The flow of information, mail, and release of prisoners, have resulted in killing people, and you want to give us more jobs.

Mr. Fulton.  The one thing that you miss is that on this subcommittee you have been complimented for your work and nobody raised one voice or objection in disagreement on your assisting our U.S. families of servicemen to establish communications with prisoners of war.

Mrs. Weiss.  That is very kind, and we appreciate that, but I am afraid it is not a universal feeling.

COULD COMMITTEE OF LIAISON EXPAND ITS SERVICES?

Mr. Fulton.  I am talking about your reception at this subcommittee hearing. Second, even the chairman has said, to you, “could your services be expanded?”

I have said to you, “Maybe on the obverse, maybe there is not adequate service being given to the North Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam.{”} Through your organization, would you be willing to do the reverse, not that you can do it, but would you be willing?

Mrs. Weiss.  If you would give us the authority to see to it that the prisoners of war and political prisoners and suspects who are taken by the thousands and held in tiger cages in South Vietnam would not be tortured to death, I am sure that we would all be willing. [Applause.]

Mr. Zablocki.  Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. Fulton.  If I could make one comment. Some of us are impartially here trying to arrive at a result that is unbiased. We are trying to explore situations that might open up avenues that could be of benefit, and that will work out adverse results that a lot of us had no part in. For example, I was in the minority in 1965 when this course of action happened, and I believe I am still in the minority.

Mrs. Weiss.  Mr. Fulton, I am afraid that as taxpayers we are all responsible. {p.376}

Mr. Fulton.  I must yield to my friend from New York, who has been patiently waiting.

Mr. Bingham.  I thank the gentleman for yielding. I wonder if the gentleman has any information that either the North Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam or their families, or their Government are desirous of having the Committee of Liaison undertake such work, because they would be the ones to make the request it seems to me, not the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. Fulton.  Well, of course, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has an inquiring mind and very few restraints in searching out possible solutions.

It is better that we look into the ramifications and see what might be the best course, so that actually we are here looking ahead to see what might be worked out. It is an indirect compliment to this organization that some of the members of this subcommittee say, “Maybe you could expand your work,” and where there has been considerable criticism on the other side.

LISTED POW’S WHO HAVE NOT WRITTEN

The question comes up on the previous testimony of Mrs. Weiss, when you had said that there were as I recall, four or five or maybe more, U.S. prisoners of war who had been listed by North Vietnam as prisoners of war, and yet who did not want to, and would not write to their families or their friends.

Could you explain that a little more? Could they have been psycho, logically unbalanced, in need of treatment, or were they just discouraged with the whole country, beginning with their families?

Mrs. Weiss.  The fact of my statement, I believe, Mr. Fulton, was that of the 339 confirmed prisoners we have received mail from all but six. We did not state the reason why the six had not written.

Mr. Fulton.  I am asking you what you think it might be.

Mrs. Weiss.  I am not there, and I have not asked them, and I think it would be pointless to speculate. The fact is that all of the others have written and we certainly hope that one day soon we will have mail from the remaining six.

Mr. Fulton.  Whether you have any information that any of our U.S. prisoners of war in Vietnam would rather be released and stay in North Vietnam, is really one of the points of my question. I would ask any one of the three witnesses for your comment.

Mrs. Weiss.  I have no information about that whatsoever. I would hope that we could find a solution so that all of the prisoners of war can come home. The solution is available.

I think we really have to talk about the power of Congress in achieving that solution, and it is a simple one of setting the date, to withdraw all our troops so they can come home where they belong, and then we won’t have to worry about inspection and conditions and all the other matters we have been dealing with today.

Mr. Fulton.  There is a resolution I placed in the last Congress saying that June 30, 1971 the Administration should come before Congress to outline its policy and obtain the approval of Congress.

Would you agree with that resolution? {p.377}

Mrs. Weiss.  I would hope by June 30th they would pull out. I am afraid if they came to you and outlined their policy, they would repeat what the President repeated three times last week, which I gather would be 20 years remaining there.

USE OF TROOPS FOR CIVILIAN OBJECTIVES

Mr. Fulton.  Would you recommend that when the United States is moving the troops out at a slower rate than you would want, or than I have wanted, that we then turn our swords into plowshares and start using the troops that are there to help advance the Vietnam economy and assist development programs in civilian capacities?

Mrs. Weiss.  Why don’t we let the Vietnamese decide who is going to plough the land and build the homes that we have destroyed?

Mr. Fulton.  You would not, while the United States had troops there, move them out of combat and move them into economically beneficial tasks or projects for the benefit of the Vietnamese even after the war is over?

Mrs. Weiss.  I guess uninvited intervention is uninvited intervention, and I would rather be invited.

Mr. Fulton.  You would not want to proceed with the Mekong Dam for irrigation and flood control?

Mrs. Weiss.  It is interesting to talk about rehabilitation. I am afraid it is a luxury we cannot discuss while we are dropping 7-1/2-ton bombs and napalm. I think we have to think about getting out first.

Then let’s go back in, when invited, in civies.

Mr. Fulton.  We are the representatives of the people in the Congress. We are inquiring into the policies. We are not the Commander in Chief. We are not the Secretary of Defense. We are not the Secretary of State. We Congressmen are here, you see, to inquire as to possible alternatives to policy. Let me tell you, these hearings are read, and read carefully, not only here, but all over the world.

CONGRESS CONTROLS PURSE STRINGS

Mrs. Weiss.  Mr. Congressman, I would hope we would not abrogate our responsibilities as controllers of the purse strings and as Members of Congress, that we don’t feel that the President can just lead us around and make his own policy.

I would hope that the Members of Congress in the interest of solving the prisoner of war problem, for which this subcommittee has been in session, would recommend highly to their brothers and sisters in Congress that they set the date for the total withdrawal of troops this year.

Mr. Fulton.  Well, when you brought up the question of funding and financing our U.S. Forces, you well realize that the Department of Defense is already financed, somewhere between $50 billion and $100 billion for a year to 2 years ahead of time.

As that money is already appropriated, Congress has lost control of it. The DOD can go ahead and spend the funds under the executive branch for what they would, or the executive can withhold the money. We Congressmen are the ones who provided funds originally for U.S. defense. But once the funding is appropriated and in the defense estab- {p.378} tablishment budget, then that becomes the executive function to disburse the money.

So that when you say, “Shut off the funds” that really would mean about a 2-year delay before it would have any effect.

Mr. Meacham.  Mr. Fulton, could I comment?

Mr. Fulton.  I would be very glad for you to. I am open minded.

Mr. Meacham.  I have not participated much in this exchange, and I have been interested in sitting here almost as a bystander yet one who is very much involved.

Mr. Fulton.  You looked very intelligent.

Mr. Meacham.  Appearances can be deceiving.

I don’t want to sound captious or critical, or anything of that sort.

Mr. Fulton.  Go ahead. It is a frank discussion. Let’s have it.

NEED TO CONTROL U.S. MILITARY

Mr. Meacham.  I think I would have been much more interested in many of the questions that have been asked of my colleagues here if this were the Foreign Affairs Committee of North Vietnam rather than of the United States. And I would like to say why I feel that way.

It has seemed to me that it is terribly important for the civilian authority of a government to exercise real control over the military. I think this is one of the great issues of the times, that the military is not only in danger of taking over, it just about has taken over. And with our military conducting itself as it is in Vietnam for this committee to be principally concerned not with the search and destroy missions of our military, not with operations Phoenix, not with the organized assassination activities that are carried on as a matter of course, not with the herbicidal obliteration of vast areas of this country, not with the most terrible obliteration bombing that has ever been visited on any country at any time in history, not with the torture of prisoners under interrogation in interrogation centers built by the CIA, manned and staffed by South Vietnamese trainees of the CIA— for this committee not to be concerned about these things is something I cannot understand. I don’t know what this subcommittee has done about these matters.

I get considerable information from the New York Times about our military excuses in Vietnam. I get it from all sorts of sources, and possibly I have neglected the pages or the reports of this committee. Maybe it is all there. But one thing I have not read is that this committee has done anything at all about these actions.

I have sat here today and listened to my colleagues struggling with your probing questions and your nice moral distinctions about the ethical responsibilities of the North Vietnamese. It seems to me that you first have to fulfill your moral responsibility to your own Government before you can assume to exercise moral responsibility over some other government. And I tell you, gentlemen, your failure at this point somewhat disarms those of us who for one reason or another are in a position to perform some small acts of humanitarian service and then to carry that humanitarian service on to its next step and then to its next step. Because we are all smeared with the brush of American militarism, brutality, and destruction in the world today. {p.379}

This is true of everyone of us in this room. We are not sitting divided on this point. You know, we turn to you as our last hope, and instead what we get is a lot of very moralistic questions directed at the conduct of a government to which you have no access and over which you have no control; it seems to me you are guilty of a certain absence of responsibility toward that government to which you do have access and over which you should have a great deal of control.

I don’t take very seriously your statement that you have no power over money appropriated for this war. I just don’t believe it. I think you do have, and I wish you would assert it.

THE CONGRESS AND UNANIMITY

Mr. Fulton.  I recall Mrs. Weiss’ surprise when I brought up the question of whether the North Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam could not well use the services of this organization to insure their rights.

She expressed extreme surprise that anybody would bring that up on this committee. When you said that everybody was tarred with the same brush of militarism, I don’t think they are, because there are various degrees of opinion here on this Foreign Affairs Committee, every kind of a different degree of opinion. I must say I strongly support U.S. defense and security of the American people, but am selective as to emphasis, and to insure protection of individual rights. A couple of weeks ago I voted against extension of the draft. So I certainly am not of excessive military inclination.

Under the circumstances, I don’t think you should use broad brush treatment in labeling everybody. The American people are trying to get a peaceful and just solution to this Southeast Asia war. The more I stay in Congress, the more I believe in the good intentions of the wonderful American people as people, and the strength of our democratic form of government.

The U.S. Government does not always do everything I say, and I am sure it does not do everything you say, but this is part of the problem of democracy, of working out successful solutions by debate and decision by the people’s representatives. Unless we are all here trying and discussing without any name calling to arrive at some sort of equitable result and, explore these various facets by probing questions, then there is no use using the methods of democracy. The other solution is just to have somebody at the top say it, order action, and that is it.

This is why I think it is very productive that you come, and that you make your points, because they are in the record. Your recommendations are in the committee record not only for this committee, but only they are in the record they are read worldwide.

So I compliment each one of the three of you for appearing and I would say this to you: I don’t believe even you, among yourselves, have one complete solid agreement on all policies and methods to reach these goals.

Mrs. Weiss.  We are all agreed. We all want to get out of Vietnam right away.

Dr. Barnet.  On the main issue, we are in agreement. {p.380}

Mr. Fulton.  I agree that on the main issues you are agreed, but not on every facet of procedure. I want to ask the professor a question.

Would you pull our troops out at the same time that the U.S.S.R. and Red China were sending in the full complement of military supplies to the North Vietnamese Army?

Dr. Barnet.  I think that, if I may say so, Mr. Fulton, that question is not one that should really be of interest to this subcommittee.

I can give you my personal answer. It would depend on a great many facts. I can give you a long discourse on that, but I—

Mr. Fulton.  You can provide the longer statement for the record, but a short summary would help.

Dr. Barnet.  I think the main point is that we are Americans, we are the major obstacle to peace in Indochina, and the return of these prisoners depends on the conduct of the American Government.

We are in a position to talk about that. You are in a position to exercise important influence on the conduct of that government, and I think that is what we should do.

I think the fine points of negotiation when they take place, will happen. I have great confidence in the skill of American negotiators once they have been given the word that we are really prepared to negotiate an end to this war.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE: A HANOI VISIT?

Mr. Fulton.  Suppose some of us said we would request to go to North Vietnam as members of this subcommittee, which has jurisdiction.

First, do you think North Vietnamese authorities would let us in, and secondly, could your organization get us in?

Mrs. Weiss.  We could save your money and you would not have to go to North Vietnam, because our job is here at home. If we ended the war, and we are convinced we can do it, because 75 percent of the American people want out now, we won’t have to go to North Vietnam.

Mr. Fulton.  I mean we Congressmen who are willing to take the risk to investigate on the spot. Why can’t we go?

Mrs. Weiss.  There is no purpose now to go. We should stay here and work hard so that the war ends and so that the men will be released. Then you might go after the war on a friendly visit.

Mr. Fulton.  We were there before the war.

Mr. Zablocki.  On a friendly visit.

Mr. Fulton.  We were on a study trip to East Asia and Vietnam in 1965.

Mr. Zablocki.  Would the gentleman yield?

Members of this subcommittee were in Hanoi and talked to the people of Vietnam.

Mrs. Weiss.  Next time should you go, give them a date for the withdrawal of troops and I am sure you will be more than welcome.

REQUESTS TESTIMONY FROM VIETNAM VETERANS

Mr. Zablocki.  We have another witness.

Mrs. Weiss.  Mr. Chairman, I wonder, considering the unusual circumstances that we are presented with today, if the men who we have {p.381} sent to fight for our cause in South Vietnam and who during their experiences there had first-hand contact and first-hand information regarding the treatment of prisoners by the South Vietnamese and by the Americans, who are Vietnam veterans and who are sitting here today, if they could not join in this testimony?

I think it would be very helpful toward your finding a solution for the problem for which you are sitting.

Mr. Zablocki.  Time permitting, after the subcommittee hears Mr. Stockstill, we will try to hear them. I have a final question.

Mr. Fulton.  Could we have the veterans present designate a spokesman, maybe two or three?

They would designate a spokesman, whoever it might be, and we will then hear two or three and have statements submitted, with the chairman’s permission.

I have some people waiting, I will be right back.

Mrs. Weiss.  I am sure they can consult with each other. With your assurance that they will be able to testify here today while they are here.

Mr. Zablocki.  The chairman cannot give you any assurance. We won’t be here until midnight, of course, but the representatives that are here may file a statement. We have another witness that is scheduled. At the beginning of this session I had clearly stated that we will try to have an orderly session.

REPLY BY AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN EXAMINED

As you know, Mr. Meacham in your early testimony you had referred to the activity of former Ambassador William Sullivan in Laos. He had figured prominently in your testimony.

Subsequent to your appearance here, the subcommittee took testimony from Ambassador William Sullivan, and Ambassador Sullivan said that the instructions which he received, which he communicated to you were that the prisoners were to have free choice as to whether they would travel back to the United States via commercial aircraft or whether they would travel by military aircraft. He says that the instructions he communicated to you before you went to Hanoi were those which were carried out and that the only modification was that originally if they—the men—chose to travel by commercial aircraft they were to go economy class.

Ambassador William Sullivan advises the subcommittee that he protested that instruction that they go economy class, and he was able to get first-class air passage for them.

Have you a comment?

Mr. Meacham.  I wish you had questioned Ambassador Sullivan and myself side by side. After I had finished my testimony, I encountered Jim Murphy in the back of the room, who is a State Department official. I don’t know whether he is here now or not, and if he is, I would like for him to come forward.

He was in Vientiane at the time and was present the first time that I talked to Ambassador Sullivan at the embassy in Vientiane, and I said to him, “Jim, did I tell it the way it was?” That was after this meeting here.

He was a little bit upset. He said, “Yes, you told it the way you knew it”, but, he said, “the newspaper report that you said you {p.382} received while you were in Hanoi regarding Ambassador Sullivan’s statements about the military planes and so forth for the men to come home,” he said, “this was not an accurate report, but you did not know that.”

And I said, “Well, if it was not accurate, why didn’t Ambassador Sullivan just deny it at the time? That would have straightened the whole thing out and it would not have taken 2 weeks.”

He did not give me any specific reply to that question.

CHARGES OF “TORTURE CHAMBERS”

Mr. Zablocki.  Are there further questions?

Mr. Findley.  Just one, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Meacham, I have the highest respect for the Society of Friends and for the Quakers, and for you, and I am sure that you would not make a statement based on very skimpy evidence or hearsay.

You have made a charge against the Government of the United States that is very grave. I am sure you are aware of that. You have charged that a Government agency has actually financed torture chambers in South Vietnam. I think in fairness to our Government, in fairness to the Society of Friends, that you serve, as well as in fairness to this subcommittee which, believe me, is seeking to get the facts about the treatment of prisoners of war, whether it be in the south or the north, you should be as specific as you possibly can be about those charges so that we can delve further into this matter.

Mr. Meacham.  Yes, sir.

Mr. Findley.  I cannot underscore the importance of this too greatly, because I can’t recall a charge against the Government of the United States that has been made that has had greater gravity.

Mr. Meacham.  Yes, sir. I have reference to the interrogation center that is located in Quang Nghai.

Mr. Findley.  Would you spell that?

Mr. Meacham.  Q-u-a-n-g N-g-h-a-i. That is in I Corps. It is one of the very active combat areas of the northern part of South Vietnam. The CIA financed the interrogation center that is there.

Mr. Findley.  The construction of this?

Mr. Meacham.  The construction and the management and the training of people who carry on the interrogations in that interrogation center.

Mr. Findley.  And has it been operated under the authority of the CIA?

Mr. Meacham.  This is a matter which I hope your committee will now investigate. Whether it is under the authority technically of the CIA, or whether it is under the authority technically of the Saigon Government, or whether there is some shared participation.

Mr. Findley.  But you have charged that it was financed by the CIA.

Mr. Meacham.  Let me tell you sir, if I may finish. What I charged was that it was built by the CIA, and that the people who operate the interrogation activities in there are CIA trained.

That is what I charged.

Mr. Findley.  Is it further your belief that the CIA is informed about the procedures that take place there? {p.383}

EVIDENCE OF INTERROGATION CENTER

Mr. Meacham.  This I don’t know. I have never been able to penetrate the state of CIA intelligence—I am using the term in its technical sense—but in the prison that is located at Quang Nghai, people are, you know, held as prisoners who are taken from time to time to this interrogation center.

They are suspected of being adherents of the National Liberation Front, the PRG, they are taken to this interrogation center and they are questioned there, and doctors who have access to them who have been staff members of the American Friends Service Committee in Quang Nghai—one of them is Marge Perisho. She is a young doctor who was—Nelson at that time. Her name is now Perisho. She was captured at the time of TET and held 45 or 50 days as a prisoner and then was released.

She has testified to seeing the marks on the bodies of women after they had returned from the interrogation center which were described to her by these women as being caused by physical aspects of the interrogations, and as well as she could tell, these were the kinds of marks that such interrogations would have made.

Another American Friends Service Committee staff person named Jill Richards—she happens to be a British woman, she is now in England, she is no longer in Quang Nghai. I would imagine that if this committee wanted to bring her here to testify or send someone to England to talk to her, she would tell her experiences.

Incidentally, Marge Perisho testified before one of the congressional committees at the time of the investigation of the Con Son exposé.

Mr. Findley.  What time frame did this cover, do you know?

Mr. Meacham.  With Jill Richards it was, oh, about 1969, in there. She was a psychiatric social worker, and when she first had access to some of these women in the prison, they were showing the physical manifestations of malaria, shaking and trembling and that sort of thing, and the doctor who was treating them for malaria decided that was not what was wrong with them.

He did not know Vietnamese. He asked Jill Richards to come in and see if she could make any sense of this. He thought maybe it was some kind of psychological illness. She knew Vietnamese. They told her that what was happening to them was that they had been tortured, and that this is what was giving them these manifestations. She, too, observed the markings on their bodies.

Mrs. Marge Nelson, she was there for a time period of the better part of a year prior to the TET.

Dr. Barnet.  Mr. Findley, there are people, I am informed, in this room, who can give “eyewitness testimony” as to the operation of those camps, and I think there is nothing more important for the committee to do than to hear that testimony.

Mr. Findley.  Mr. Meacham, your charge was based upon the information you received about this one camp, or center, is that correct?

Mr. Meacham.  That is the most direct and reliable information that I personally have had. One has seen and heard other things. The whole Con Son story bears this out. One sees and hears other things reported in the press that causes you to feel that this kind of thing happens. {p.384}

The stories of kicking guys out of helicopters so that the next two people you question are going to answer questions, this has been published in the paper as something that happens.

Mr. Findley.  That does not relate to your charge of torture financed by the CIA.

Mr. Meacham.  I said torture under interrogation. I mentioned the CIA in connection with this. In the helicopters, it was questioning and when a guy would not answer, he was kicked out of the helicopter and then the next guy was asked, “Are you going to answer?”

Mrs. Weiss.  On the Dick Cavett show, an admission was made by an American military officer of killing a double agent. He said he did it under the orders of the CIA, and he went on to say there were hundreds of examples.

Mr. Zablocki.  The committee will stand in recess until 4:15 in order to give the members an opportunity to vote.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken until 4:15 p.m.)

THE SUBCOMMITTEE RESUMES

(The subcommittee reconvened at 4:15 p.m., Representative Clement J. Zablocki, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.)

Mr. Zablocki.  The subcommittee will resume the hearing.

The next witness is Mr. Louis Stockstill, of Washington, D.C. As I stated earlier, Mr. Stockstill is a writer and journalist whose article entitled “Inside the Prisons of Hanoi” is appearing in the April issue of the Reader’s Digest. If you would proceed, Mr. Stockstill.

Statement of
Louis Stockstill,
Journalist and Writer

Mr. Stockstill.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For about a dozen years I sat here as a newsman at the press table, and I think that was probably a much more comfortable position than I occupy today.

However, since I am a novice at testifying before congressional committees, and for fear that I may forget, I would like, before I begin my prepared statement, to answer, if I may, about three or four questions that were raised here today, or at least try to shed some light on them. My comments will be very brief.

Mr. Barnet was asked again about article 85 of the Geneva Conventions. He said that North Vietnam has not waived its reservations under article 85. As you know, the reservation to this article says in effect that men who are tried as war criminals and convicted are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions.

Mr. Barnet, however, in his prepared statement before this committee noted, and I quote, “Nevertheless, as a result of considerable worldwide pressure, Ho Chi Minh announced in 1966 that the officials of the Johnson administration were the main criminals and declared that the pilots would not be tried.”

Now, of course, North Vietnam cannot have their reservation to article 85 both ways. They cannot say they will continue their waiver and say that they do not intend to try the men as criminals. As you know, of course, there are statutes of limitations even in civil law, and these {p.385} men have been held 4, 5, 6, and 7 years with this waiver hanging over their head.

Obviously, no one with any kind of reasonable intelligence would expect that that condition should continue forever.

Another question that was asked was about the letters from the prisoners who are held captive in North Vietnam and why these are not delivered to their families. As you may know, since the ICRC inspects these camps, and these men are given the protection of the Geneva Conventions, they are allowed to write to their families. Unfortunately, however, North Vietnam will not accept letters written by these men.

Mrs. Weiss was questioned about a number of things relating to North Vietnamese and VC policy, in which she said that she could not address herself to answers to these questions because she could not speak for the other side. But this morning on the Today show she was asked a similar question and she said that Madame Binh had offered to “immediately release” the prisoners if we will set a withdrawal date.

It would appear to me she chooses to quote the North Vietnamese when it serves her purpose and that she prefers not to quote them when it serves her purpose.

Actually, Madame Binh has said no such thing. She has not said she will immediately release the prisoners. She has said that if we will set a withdrawal date that the Vietcong will then talk about the question of releasing prisoners.

BACKGROUND OF LOUIS STOCKSTILL

But in any event, Madame Binh does not represent the North Vietnamese. She represents the Vietcong.

Now, to pick up my prepared statement, my name is Louis R. Stockstill. I am a freelance writer with offices in the National Press Building at 14th and F Streets NW here in the District of Columbia. In following the prisoner-of-war issue very closely over the past 2 years, I have been constantly amazed by the magnitude of the distortion and misinformation that has been aired in one way or another about this grave problem.

And it is in this context that I should like to address some of the comments made in the prepared statements submitted to you by Mr. Stewart Meacham, Mr. Richard Barnet and Mrs. Cora Weiss. As I read the statements of these three witnesses, I was dumbfounded by their numerous misstatements of fact, and by what I can only characterize in the kindest possible way as their highly oversimplified interpolation of other supposedly factual information.

THE 1968 PRISONER RELEASE

Mr. Meacham, as he told you, was one of those who went to North Vietnam in 1968 to “escort” back to the United States three American servicemen who were released from POW detention camps in Hanoi.

The three men were Major James Low, Major Fred Thompson, and Major Joe Carpenter (then a captain). {p.386}

Mr. Meacham told this subcommittee that Thompson and Carpenter “had been captured less than a year prior to their release.” This is not a false statement, but it most certainly distorts the truth. These two men had been captives less than a year—but much less than a year. In fact, Carpenter had been a prisoner only 5 months and 16 days, and Thompson had been captured less than 4 months before the two were turned over to the Meacham group.

Next, Mr. Meacham said that the third prisoner. Major Low, “had been captured about a year and a half before his release.” But Major Low, too, had been imprisoned only a short time. He was captured December 16, 1967, and released to Mr. Meacham 7 months and 2 days later, on July 18, 1968. He had not been a captive for even half the time Mr. Meacham claims.

Mr. Meacham said the three men displayed “no indication of physical emaciation,” that he was impressed with “how alert they were,” and he comments that they all had said “they rarely needed medical attention.”

Perhaps this would be significant if the men had been held as long as Mr. Meacham implies. But remember that, contrary to his testimony, all three had been prisoners of war for periods ranging from less than 4 months to slightly more than 7 months. It is doubtful that they would be representative of our men who have been confined for periods of 4, 5, 6, and 7 years. Yet this is the impression the public might gain if Mr. Meacham’s testimony should stand, uncorrected.

Mr. Meacham also discussed his conversations with the three former POWs during the period after they were turned over to him and his colleagues and transferred to a Hanoi hotel. He testified that in these conversations, all three men “agreed that the basic conditions of their life in the detention camps * * * were adequate” and that they had “denied” ever being pressured, threatened, or in any way mistreated in connection with their interrogation by DRV authorities.

Well, let’s put ourselves in the shoes of these men. They were, after all, still inside the city of Hanoi. For all they knew, their rooms were bugged, their conversations monitored. Surely most of us would not, at this point in time, have called attention to any mistreatment we had received. We would have been gravely aware, just as these men could not help but be aware, that we were not yet free.

Mr. Meacham says he and his fellow “escorts” asked the three POW’s whether they had been subjected to physical threats or harsh treatment. He does not say where this conversation took place, but he does state that some of the conversations were conducted on the plane trip home, after the group had left Hanoi.

He said Low and Carpenter told of such incidents (that is, physical threats and harsh treatment) “before they had been turned over to the authorities.” He said “Thompson told me no story of any threats or abuse by the villagers” and that “all three agree” that after they were in the hands of the authorities they were “not subjected to further threats.”

DISPUTES STATEMENTS IMPUTED TO POW’s

These statements, attributed to the former POW’s, do not agree with what Major Thompson and Major Carpenter have told me. {p.387}

Both of these men, as well as Major Low, were committed to solitary confinement throughout their imprisonment by North Vietnam.

But even before they reached the prisons of Hanoi, and after they were in the hands of North Vietnamese military forces, Major Carpenter was thrown into a bamboo cage with his feet in stocks and his wrists in old, rusty handcuffs. It was 3 weeks before he was transported to a more formal detention camp in Hanoi, and there he was tossed into a cell that did not even have a bed. He had to sleep on the bare concrete floor. He said his captors constantly sought to humiliate and degraded him, that he was subjected to physical brutality and constant threats of torture.

With regard to Major Thompson, Mr. Meacham said, if you will recall, that the major “told no story of any threats or abuse by the villagers.” The facts Major Thompson has related to me sharply contradict the implications of that statement. Even though he was captured by North Vietnamese military forces, Major Thompson was taken from village to village for a period of 10 days and put on public display so the people, among other things, could throw rocks, sticks and clods of dirt at him. At one point, he was even made to run a mile-long gauntlet, with the local populace lined up on both sides hitting and kicking him. In one village where he was confined in a wooden structure, the crowds tore the door down and tore boards off the walls trying to get to him. The guards protected him to the extent of not allowing him to be mortally injured, but as he says, it appeared that they had strict orders to get him to Hanoi in one piece.

This they did. But once inside the prisons of Hanoi, he was committed to solitary confinement, and he remained in solitary cells until released, sleeping on a concrete slab or wooden planks. He says he was never physically tortured, “when they did beat me, it was never with an instrument, only with their hands.” He says some of the guards “appeared not to care about you one way or another,” but that others “would kick you every ti