Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO CONCLUDE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

In conclusion, I would like to say a word in support of the Mathias resolution to terminate the Gulf of Tonkin authority, as well as comment on the responsibility of Congress, as opposed to the executive branch, in bringing American involvement in Vietnam to an early conclusion.

I had occasion to refer recently, Mr. Chairman, to the Federalist Papers of Alexander Hamilton, particularly Nos. 24 and 26, where he was urging adoption of the Federal Constitution. It seems to me that the following statements of Mr. Hamilton are worthy of consideration by both Houses of Congress today:

I think that puts the burden on the Congress of the United States to determine how long we fund this conflict, and if we face that issue between now and November.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF PACIFICATION

I would be pleased to answer any questions. I think the summation of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, is this: Pacification in the northern half is not successful and cannot be successful. In the south half of the country it is succeeding, but its continued success will depend on the ability in the—

Senator Gore.  I did not understand you after the conjunction “but.”

Mr. McCloskey.  I said in the north.

Senator Gore.  I understood that part of it.

Mr. McCloskey.  In the south half of the country, in my judgment, pacification is proceeding successfully and can be successful, but only if the ARVN, South Vietnamese army units, are capable of withstanding a determined assault from across the Cambodian border in the future and that issue would be very much in doubt both on the quality of the ARVN troops in the south and on their resolve to fight.

Senator Gore.  What dividing line do you choose between the northern part of the country and the southern part of the country?

Mr. McCloskey.  Well, it is not precisely between the four corps areas, Mr. Senator. It is the nature of the terrain in the north half of the country, the mountainous jungle, heavily covered terrain where the rice paddies go right up against the areas of cover and concealment, these are the areas, in my judgment, where pacification cannot succeed. As you get down into the delta where the terrain is flat, where there is no heavily jungled cover, where there is no way in which troops can conceal themselves to come back into the villages and get their rice, in those areas pacification has been successful and is succeeding, in my judgement. But its continued success requires the prevention from intrusion of major NVA units. Every time major NVA units have come {p.641} into the area, the guerrilla incidents have increased and the loyalties of the people have become far more tenuous.

Senator Gore.  May I continue with a question or two, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman (presiding).  Certainly.

LOYALTY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO HANOI AND SAIGON

Senator Gore.  Is there any loyalty, if that is the right term, on either side? Is it a matter of fear? This has been difficult for me to comprehend.

Mr. McCloskey.  This is an impression, Senator, because I share your committee staff’s feeling that it is very difficult for an American to understand what a Vietnamese thinks from what he says. But I would appraise the situation that there is very little loyalty to the Saigon government and there is very little love for the Hanoi government amongst the rural peasantry of South Vietnam; that the overwhelming bulk of the people, over 80 percent of them, would prefer peace at any price regardless of who happened to govern them; and that loyalty to a central government located in a city far away is a term that is not appropriate to apply to the rural countryside in Vietnam.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Senator Gore.  What is your assessment of their attitude toward American military presence?

Mr. McCloskey.  Again that would be an impression that I could not guarantee as to its accuracy, but I see no reason for them not to accept the presence of anyone who is giving them a million piasters a year, to any village that would elect a village chief.

I can understand why a village might happily welcome the Americans who bring them the million piasters. But I do not think there is any long-range love for Americans.

Senator Gore.  Did you mean to imply that the measure of the bounty was the election of a chief who was friendly to us or what do you mean to suggest?

Mr. McCloskey.  I do not detect any bitter hatred of Americans amongst the villagers who seem to bear our artillery fire and our aircraft bombardment, but whom we pay a million piasters a year to any village that will elect a village chief. But I do not detect any love on their part for us either, and I suspect, and this is only an impression and not testimony under oath, but I suspect everyone in Vietnam would welcome the day when the last American has left Vietnam.

USE OF BOOBY TRAPS

Senator Gore.  I notice you described the effective use of boobytraps. Can such traps be effective without at least the tacit approval and cooperation of the natives?

Mr. McCloskey.  No, sir. Those areas south of — southwest of Danang where tremendous boobytrap casualties are occurring in the very areas that our troops go into day after day after day and in which the populace on the surface of things is at least passive if not {p.642} friendly to us, but obviously in those areas a large percentage of the people are willing to support the Vietcong that operate amongst them.

Senator Gore.  I am asking you not out of information, but out of interest. If American GI’s in small numbers are stationed in isolated villages, are they particularly vulnerable because of differences in physical appearance?

Mr. McCloskey.  I do not know that, sir. The boobytrap casualties that the young men are suffering occur when they go out on patrol either day or night into areas in which they can operate in the daytime without too much fear of receiving sniper fire. We have been able to hold VC and NVA units at bay by our power. If they mass three men at one time, we hit them with artillery or bombing or we land a helicopter full of troops and go after them, but the troops are still there. The enemy are still there. They are not showing themselves. They have adjusted their tactics to match our firepower, but they are out there sowing boobytraps every night and those boobytraps are causing casualties to us in an overwhelming percentage. The fact they are able to sow these boobytraps night after night so that when our troops go out on a path they might hit a tripwire with a detonation which may cause 2.3 casualties every time the boobytrap is detonated means they are getting the support of the local populace in the countryside or they would not be able to do that.

When I say support, I do not mean that the local populace are loving the VC more than they love Saigon, but they are not willing to commit themselves.

Senator Gore.  If the natives are to avoid the boobytraps, they must at least know where they are or have some knowledge of them.

Mr. McCloskey.  The greatest advance by the Marine units that I observed was their growing sophistication in discovering boobytraps by locating the means by which the Vietnamese signal their location, perhaps two bamboo sticks left pointing to a “V” in a certain trail junction and apparently any Vietnamese in the area knows that means there is a boobytrap some distance away.

The American troops are gaining greater knowledge to deal with this situation.

Senator Gore.  At least we are not slow to catch on.

Mr. McCloskey.  We are not slow, but the penalty of failure can be that you lose both legs, sir.

Senator Gore.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Church.  I think, Congressman McCloskey, your statement was excellent.

LIKELY RESULT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

Is it your judgment that, after we have left Vietnam, two things are likely to happen; the present Government is likely to be replaced in Saigon by some form of coalition government and the two halves of Vietnam are likely to be reunited?

Mr. McCloskey.  That is correct. Just by way of example, in the village capital, in the village hut that goes for a city hall in the provinces in the north, there is a plaque on the wall that says “The Nation Overall” in Vietnamese; and the map is of all of Vietnam, North and South, not just South Vietnam. I could find no indication {p.643} on the part of anyone that South Vietnam was considered a permanent and independent nation as we would have it.

Senator Church.  In your judgment, then, the overwhelming sentiment in both North and South Vietnam is to reunify the country.

Mr. McCloskey.  I think I can say honestly — I have never been to North Vietnam — the resolve that keeps them coming 800 miles south to try to unify the country would so indicate.

Senator Church.  Yes.

American policy for years has been to keep Vietnam divided, as well as to support and sustain an anti-Communist government in Saigon that would be closely allied with our country. From your testimony I understand there is no evidence whatever that that objective has been abandoned by the present Administration—

Mr. McCloskey.  I would have to agree.

Senator Church (continuing).  And that that objective will not be achieved once American forces leave.

Mr. McCloskey.  Senator, let me make a qualification to my prior answer. I did detect in the President’s speech early after his election the mention of a peace based on the Geneva accords of 1954, and such a peace would presuppose the reunification of Vietnam within 2 years because that was the understanding under the Geneva accords of 1954. Unfortunately, I have seen no other mention by this Administration of a concurrence that they would accept a peace based on the Geneva accords which involved a unification of Vietnam.

Senator Church.  The policy by which we fought this war has hardly been directed at a reunified Vietnam. Yet this will very likely occur by the forces that we have been opposing.

Mr. McCloskey.  Correct.

U.S. PERCEPTION OF AND POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA QUESTIONED

Senator Church.  I think the inability of the U.S. Government to know how the people of Vietnam really feel, what their political values are, and what their national objectives may be, has been evident throughout the whole course of our involvement in that country. It is also reflected in what has just happened in Cambodia.

From the contacts that I have had with the State Department and from the briefings that this committee has been given, it was unanticipated that Prince Sihanouk would be displaced in Cambodia. In fact, official opinion plus informed expert opinion here had it that if anyone was secure in Southeast Asia, it was Sihanouk.

This clearly demonstrates the fragility of any policy on our part which seeks objectives that are intimately indigenous, and the futility of attempting to win a civil war in a country such as Vietnam with a foreign army.

In the face of that experience, why are we not disengaging American military forces from Southeast Asia generally, especially from Laos and Thailand, before we find ourselves confronted with questions of honor, commitment, and the other political consequences that flow from such a predicament?

Did you have an opportunity in your trip to visit Thailand or Laos?

Mr. McCloskey.  No, sir. I have not had the privilege of visiting the other countries. {p.644}

I think that the great lesson of Vietnam is that in a land where people are wedded to their soil, and their tradition, and their history, that to try to say to a country of 17.5 million people, “We will impose a government of our type, of our choice,” in a country which has no real reason to have any cohesion with any government — these people live very happily in their own villages and are unwilling to make a commitment to any kind of government — that in that kind of a country, the use of American firepower is almost immoral.

Senator Church.  Immoral. Immoral is perhaps not strong enough a term. After all, you mentioned that 307 villages out of 555 had been destroyed in one province alone by American firepower.

Mr. McCloskey.  I would say this, Senator. That where we seek to lead the world to a peace through law and the only legal precedents we look to are the Hague Convention and perhaps the Nuremberg agreement where we said wanton destruction of villages was a war crime, there is no way we could state that our policy of destroying Vietnamese villages to deny rice and support to the VC that operate in the vicinity and in some respects out of those villages is not of the same level to be condemned as we did in Nuremberg when we executed German officers for pursuing a policy of wanton destruction of villages, and if a war has to be fought by destroying people’s homes because so many of the people who live in an area are sympathetic to the enemy, then I do not think America should ever again fight such a war with our weapons in such a country.

Senator Church.  I concur wholeheartedly in what you said. If we had just left those people alone, if we had just stayed out of their affairs, none of this terrible agony, none of this wanton destruction, none of this mass killing would have occurred on the scale that has taken place. And, ironically, the security interests of the United States would not have been affected one iota.

Our Vietnam policy has been touched with madness; this foreign adventure is undoubtedly the greatest catastrophe that has ever occurred in the history of our country overseas.

I appreciate very much your testimony. I think it has been very helpful.

The Chairman.  Mr. Congressman, I am sorry I was a bit late. I read your statement, and I know something of your views. I expect anything I ask you may be repetitive and yet I do not think it hurts to go over one or two points.

U.S. OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

You have made very clear your views about the destruction of the villages. The Senator from Idaho mentioned our objective of creating a government there that was friendly to us. How do you see the objective of our policy and activity in Vietnam? What does it strike you that we seek to achieve there?

Mr. McCloskey.  Well, I think, quite honestly, that the North Vietnamese have characterized it properly, and that is to permanently divide that country preventing Communist domination of the entire country, that our policy has been to divide it and to furnish such military and economic assistance as is necessary to preserve its division.

The Chairman.  Does that strike you as being a valid objective? {p.645}

Mr. McCloskey.  No, sir; I think that in the long run you can trace most trouble spots in the world to countries that were divided — Germany, Korea, the Israelis—

The Chairman.  In other words, if they did achieve their announced objective, it would not be in the interests of this country. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. McCloskey.  My feeling is that any divided country is a potential source of world war III and that it should be our national policy to seek a reunification of Vietnam and Korea.

The Chairman.  I suppose our people would say we are perfectly-willing to reunify it provided it is on our terms and if they will accept our views as to what kind of government they will have; will they not? Our people will not object to Vietnam’s reunification providing they accept our terms.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO END U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Mr. McCloskey.  I think if this issue is fairly debated, Senator, that the people will decide it at the polls in November. This was the reason for my quote from Alexander Hamilton because the Congress of the United States has it within its power to stop our involvement in Vietnam just as much as the President does.

The Chairman.  How would you propose that that be done?

Mr. McCloskey.  I would propose a continuing withdrawal over a period not to exceed 18 months offering sanctuary to any Vietnamese who chose to leave the country because he felt imperiled by our withdrawal.

The Chairman.  Maybe I did not understand. You said the Congress had the power to stop the war. What did you have in mind about the Congress — cutting off the money?

Mr. McCloskey.  Two ways, sir; I thought that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, under which President Johnson indicated he felt he had this power, should be terminated effective December 31, 1970. I think I would extend that now to 1971. Also under the Constitution where we are given the sole power to provide for a standing army for a period not to exceed 2 years, I think that means exactly what it says and perhaps we should attach to appropriations measures this year the qualification that the Congress will vote only such funds as are sufficient to permit our continuing and steady withdrawal with all American troops to be out at the end of fiscal 1971.

The Chairman.  We have the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution under consideration and will actively consider it on Friday, I think, in the Mathias resolution, but I understand from the letter they gave us that the Administration’s position is that repeal of the Tonkin Gulf would not affect the President’s right to continue the war. He is not relying on it. This President says he is not relying on the Tonkin Gulf resolution for his right to carry on the war. So I do not think that would do it.

The money business I think would do it. Do you think there is a majority of the Congress that would vote that?

Mr. McCloskey.  Not right now, Senator, but I think as this matter is debated between now and November and congressional candidates, all of whom run for office in November, are forced to a yes or no answer on the question, “Will you or will you not fund money to continue {p.646} our indefinite involvement in Vietnam?” that that issue may be determined by the American people, and I think exactly that is what the framers of the American Constitution had in mind when they said one body will face election every 2 years.

I have heard different figures from the Pentagon but if our strength — we had the equivalent of 12 combat infantry divisions in Vietnam, 108 maneuver battalions. Every time one division is brought home, I have heard the Pentagon say it saves this country $1.5 billion in the defense budget, so it is merely a matter of multiplying that sum of money by bringing our troops home and attaching a rider in the appropriation bills when they come before the House and Senate.

The Chairman.  It takes the votes. I have been under the impression that a very strong majority of the House supports the war.

Mr. McCloskey.  Yes, sir. When I was elected to the Congress in 1967, I think I was the only Republican opposed to the war. Perhaps there were two or three others. But I noticed in October last year 64 Republicans signed a resolution drafted by Paul Findley of Illinois. They supported the President in his expressed determination to withdraw all American troops at the earliest practicable date, and I suspect by next November a majority even in the House of Representatives will support the Administration on this as troops are beginning to be withdrawn on a steady, continued rate.

The Chairman.  Of course, if your judgment as to their sentiment is true, then it is very hopeful that something can be done.

POSSIBILITY OF CONGRESS’S ENDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

This is a drastic step. I am inclined to favor it; do not misunderstand that. I think this war is the greatest tragedy that this country has ever encountered, but our people are not conditioned to the policy of directly challenging a President of the United States.

Have you seen George Reedy’s book about our Presidency? There was a portion of it in Look magazine which was entitled, “Do We Need a Kick?” Did you see that?

Mr. McCloskey.  I have not seen that.

The Chairman.  It is a very interesting book. I mean it is a very good one. As you remember, Mr. Reedy had considerable experience in the White House and the sort of royal attitude and regal attitude that developed in recent years about it.

I do not know whether we can do it or not. I think it is something to consider. Your views that it might come about ought to be encouraging to the President to give him backing to move out of this place quickly.

Mr. McCloskey.  I have supported what he has done thus far, Senator. I think that the studied and orderly withdrawal have taken out almost a third of the American combat troops in the first 9 months since he commenced the withdrawal and that this is consistent with the views I express today. I am concerned with whether or not that withdrawal will continue. Within the next 3 to 9 months I suspect that the status quo will change in Vietnam as American troops continue to be withdrawn because it is a very tenuous situation there in the north, and if those American troops continue to be withdrawn over the next year, I suspect that the balance of power will change between the conflicting elements. {p.647}

NECESSITY OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

The Chairman.  The Senate may be too interested in precedents. It has been accused of being precedent ridden, but take this case: I cannot think offhand of a war of any consequence having been stopped by one side gradually withdrawing without any negotiated agreement with regard to the ending of the war.

If I thought this could take place, as you described it, I certainly would be for it if it would happen in a reasonable period of a year or 2 years. I know of no precedent, and therefore it, among other reasons, makes me very skeptical that this is going to happen. What I anticipate as much more likely to happen is that a number of troops will be withdrawn but a very large contingent will be left with the most sophisticated weapons which will give logistics support to the best troops of the Vietnamese government and they kind of stay there in a kind of a stalemate in a modification of the enclave theory. This could go on for 5 or 10 years without a negotiated settlement.

This is the only reason. It is a practical matter. The most similar war to this is the war of the French in the same country after being there 100 years. How did they end their war? They did not just walk off. They went to Geneva and had a cease-fire and had a negotiated and agreed upon settlement called the Geneva Accord.

It is hard for me to believe that if we are really serious about ending the war with a clean-cut end to it, if that is not the procedure most likely to bring that about.

U.S. WITHDRAWAL COULD RESULT IN VIETNAMESE ACCOMMODATION

Mr. McCloskey.  Senator, this is speculation, of course, but as American troops continue to withdraw, and assuming that the Vietnamese who have become quite adept with our artillery, gain an increasing sophistication in the use of helicopters and communication and logistics in which they have a particularly grave problem, and assuming that they are able to build a South Vietnamese army that can hold its own, the very nature of Vietnam, as an 800 mile long country with roughly 15 ARVN divisions matched against an equal number of North Vietnamese and Vietcong, in my judgment will require the South Vietnamese forces to retire into a modified enclave giving up much of the northern coasts, some of the central highlands, some of the III Corps area, and concentrating around Saigon. If this happens, bearing in mind there will be over a million men in South Vietnam under arms and there never have been over 200,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong opposed to them, the South Vietnamese retiring and becoming stronger as their lines grow less, the North Vietnamese grow weaker as they fight a longer distance from home, you would have the Vietnamese people, a very pragmatic people, not desirous of continuing the execution of each other.

For example, I think of the four province chiefs where I had visited, two of them were from the north. Three-eighths of the Saigon government, their house of delegates, are from the north; three-eighths of the North Vietnamese leadership is from the south.

I think as a pragmatic people faced with the destruction of their country by foreign forces over all these years, they will reach some accommodation between themselves which will bring their war to an {p.648} end, and I do not see that the continuing American military presence will contribute to that settlement. I think it is counterproductive when we destroy villages, kill people, arm increasing numbers of the peasantry. We are prolonging the conflict by our presence there.

The Chairman.  I think so too.

Mr. McCloskey.  We could not train these people from 1960 to 1970, Senator. I doubt 3 years instead of 18 months remaining there will change the balance.

U.S. RESPONSE TO VC PROVOCATION DURING WITHDRAWAL

The Chairman.  What do you anticipate will happen if we get down to 300,000 men and the Vietcong become impatient and attack a city or do something provocative? Do we continue to deescalate? The President was implicit in his statement that if they did not sort of cooperate and make it easier for us to get out, he would retaliate.

Mr. McCloskey.  I think it is very noteworthy in the President’s two speeches that when he spoke of the possibility of retaliation he referred only to the danger to U.S. forces. He made it clear in both of those speeches, one of which was very carefully worked out by him personally, that a threat to the South Vietnamese need not provoke our retaliation, but only a threat to U.S. forces would do so. I do not think we need fear a Dunkirk. I do not know of any U.S. unit in Vietnam which would be left there without sufficient firepower and air support to defend itself in the process of withdrawal.

QUESTION IS ONE OF MOST FEASIBLE WAY TO END WAR

The Chairman.  Do not misunderstand me. I am for ending the war in any way we can do it, but which is the most feasible and likely way to do it and which could come the soonest? It seems to me that the traditional political settlement by which nearly every war I can think of has been ended is the one that has the most promise, but if the other will work, I am for that too.

I do not criticize doing it. It is a question of how much time we allow. This Administration has been in nearly a year and 3 months. That is becoming a very substantial time period to look for results. There has been a decrease in the casualties, it is true, but they are still quite substantial.

EXTENT OF DEFOLIATION

I have a few more specific questions. While you were there did you notice any signs of defoliation of the countryside?

Mr. McCloskey.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Was it extensive?

Mr. McCloskey.  Well, let me put it this way: In the coastal plains of the north they have had to move the people into within a mile or so of the main roads in the cities and they have moved them out of their villages and destroyed their villages in the interior valleys that go back from the coast because of the desire to deny rice to the Vietcong.

Several officers pointed out to me that in the interior valleys whenever there was the indication of someone growing a crop back there, whether it was civilians left behind or people who had gone back to their homes or Vietcong, the planes were instructed to go in and imme- {p.649} diately defoliate any crops that were being grown in the interior valleys.

In the two hamlets that I visited which are being revisited, that is close to 550 in Quang Nam, 307 were destroyed, some 63 have now been resettled or they are in the process of resettlement. When I spoke with the villagers in those towns being resettled, they spoke of the fact they could not grow coconuts as they had and they pointed out the coconut trees which had been destroyed or defoliated with chemicals at the time the village had been destroyed back in 1966 or 1967, whenever it had occurred. So in the resettlement process while they can restore the rice paddies and grow some younger trees for reproduction, it is going to be a long time before they restore some of those trees that have been hurt by the defoliation.

The Chairman.  We really do not know enough about the ultimate effect of defoliants to know how long it will be or how permanent is the destruction by the chemical; do we?

Mr. McCloskey.  I can only say what I have observed, Senator, I do not know. But I did see people tilling ricefields in areas which they told me had been defoliated in the last 2 or 3 years. What the crops will be and who will suffer from them I do not know, but they were actually tilling the soil.

The Chairman.  There was one article in the paper which said we had defoliated an amount of territory approximately equal to the State of Massachusetts.

Mr. McCloskey.  I could believe that from what I saw, sir, because these interior valleys that stretch away from the coast are considered free fire zones and apparently we defoliate anything growing there as part of this rice denial program, but they are substantial areas. I would say there are hundreds of square miles of areas where every village had been razed to the ground.

WITNESS’ SERVICE IN MARINE CORPS

The Chairman.  How long has it been since you have been in the Marines? When did you get out?

Mr. McCloskey.  I served in the Marine Corps in Korea as a platoon leader in 1951. I was released to inactive duty in 1952, I stayed in the Reserve until 1965. I was on active duty in Operation Silver Lance at the time the 1st Marine Brigade was sent to the Gulf of Tonkin in March of 1965. I tried to remain as an infantry officer when I was a civilian between 1952 and 1967 when I went to Congress.

CIVILIAN KNOWLEDGE OF FREE FIRE ZONES

The Chairman.  I had a letter this morning from a former marine in my hometown, Fayetteville, dated March 12. It says:

Do you know the answer to that?

Mr. McCloskey.  I do not, sir.

The areas that we flew over and the hamlets which I visited in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh in the north, there were obviously free fire zones where nothing stood; but there were people walking around down in those areas, and this is what I spoke of in my testimony. The greatest single attachment that the Vietnamese has, in my judgment, is to his lands and they are not going to be easily moved off the lands even at the cost of the risk if they remain. They risk remaining in the zone, even with signs showing the limits of the village and the limits of the free fire zone.

The Chairman.  How did we propose to tell the people they were in a free fire zone and to get out? Did we go through any motions? Did USIA tell them or not?

Mr. McCloskey.  Well, I only know this by hearsay. I have not seen the operations, but I understand that in a cordon and search operation, or search and destroy, they will attempt to have people in aircraft with megaphones telling people where to go and why and what is going to be the free fire zone and what isn’t and scatter thousands and thousands of leaflets. But I do not think we are ever going to be sure with that kind of information that there are 10 percent who will not get the word. And the result has been in that particular country a lot of innocent people have been killed.

The Chairman.  It is very risky to go about talking from a helicopter. They could shoot it down; could they not? We have been losing on the average about one and one-tenth helicopters per day in recent months. Did I see that in the paper recently?

Mr. McCloskey.  The figures seem very staggering. I could not verify the precise figures.

SITUATION OF U.S. SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

The Chairman.  I would like your comment on the next paragraph of this letter. He says:

I thought that was a rather striking way to put it. I am speaking of our own young men who are now being accused of murder.

Mr. McCloskey.  I think they are the finest young men in the country.

The Chairman.  I say if they did not do what they did, they are very likely to be dead; are they not? They think they would in any case. They are being put into an intolerable situation.

Mr. McCloskey.  The reaction time of a marine rifleman to a situation which may or may not cause his death very seldom permits judicious decision. I think Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, “Sober reflection is not required in the presence of an uplifted knife.” And to that rifleman walking in a rice paddy, the question of whether he is a civilian or enemy certainly does not give him much time or opportunity and certainly not the inclination to take the chance.

The Chairman.  The next sentence says: {p.651}

He goes on for several pages. It is quite an interesting letter. He says the time is far past when we should have stopped and asked ourselves where it is that we are going. It is a very interesting letter from a marine.

CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE TOWARD ENDING VIETNAMESE WAR

I appreciate very much your taking the time to come here. You are very optimistic, I think. I hope you are correct about the attitude of the Congress. I am not nearly in as close touch with the House, as you are and, therefore, I certainly do not wish to challenge your judgment. All I can say is I hope. When I look at some of the actions recently taken on military affairs, the urgency with which they wish to give jets to Taiwan and more money to Korea with which to fight, it does not seem to me they have become very pacific in their attitude. They seem to be much more eager to heat up the war than they are to calm it down, but I certainly hope you are correct in your judgment that they would not do it. I feel the Senate has moved very strongly in that direction.

Mr. McCloskey.  I would not suggest that we have anywhere near a majority which would do as I say, Senator, with respect to cutting off the money or indeed stopping the Gulf of Tonkin authority, but I suspect with those November elections looming that perhaps the 92d Congress may be of a little different persuasion.

The Chairman.  That is encouraging. After all, the final justification for our system of government is that the people do have an opportunity to make such a change this fall if they wish to take it. If they do not wish to take it, if they do not wish to make this a major issue, of course, they do not have to and we can continue. But you are quite right and I have confidence and faith in the efficiency and workability of our system. So many of us have been here too long perhaps or at least very long and we become impatient, I guess, too impatient, with the slowness with which these decisions are finally reached, especially when you are concerned with such a tragic situation as this war.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS

Speaking for myself, I am very happy to see you there who can interpret what the war is about and give and bring to it an estimate and a judgment which not many people have had and which will be very important to the Congress.

Mr. McCloskey.  Thank you, sir.

The Chairman.  I think it has been very helpful to have your testimony this morning and such testimony is one of the main reasons that maybe what you say about the judgment of the people in the coming election will come about.

Thank you very much.

WITNESSES’ VIEWS ON VIETNAM WAR

Mr. Reporter, I want to put in the record an interview with the Congressman. {p.652}

Mr. Congressman, do you know the interview by Lou Cannon? It does not have a date on it. Was it in February? Put it in the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

______________________

[February, 1970]

MARINE VETERAN TOURS VIETNAM —
GOP CONGRESSMAN SAYS WAR “IMMORAL”

(By Lou Cannon)

WASHINGTON.— A Republican congressman and former Marine officer has returned from an inspection tour of Vietnam convinced that the United States must speed its withdrawal from “this immoral war.”

Rep. Paul N. McCloskey of California, the man who came to Congress in 1967 by defeating Shirley Temple Black and others in a special election, inspected Vietnam on a weeklong trip sponsored by Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

This 90-member group of essentially anti-Pentagon congressmen from both parties paid for McCloskey’s $968 round trip fare to Vietnam in an effort to assess military strategy and withdrawal progress there.

McCloskey, a decorated Marine combat officer in the Korean war and a counter-intelligence reserve officer who later helped participate in guerilla war planning, emerged from his second inspection of Vietnam more critical of the U.S. role than ever before.

The California congressman believes that President Nixon, “while preserving his options,” is actually embarked on a policy that will leave between 200,000 and 250,000 American support troops in Vietnam and frustrate the opportunity for a coalition settlement ending the war.

McCloskey also came away convinced that news reports of battles showing many Communists are killed in proportion to the American casualties are seriously misleading. He says the casualty figures of his own Marine regiment, the 5th, show that the United States is taking the majority of its casualties from booby traps in situations where the enemy takes no casualties at all.

But McCloskey’s strongest-held perceptions appeared to involve neither military strategy nor political timetables but the U.S. participation in the war itself.

“I flew over miles and miles of areas where the hamlets and villages had been totally destroyed.” McCloskey said. “I have real reservations that this policy is anything but a war crime. If you look back to Nuremberg and our policy in 1946, we insisted that it was a war crime to wantonly destroy villages.”

McCloskey visited Vietnam two years ago shortly after his election to Congress.

While he was sharply critical then of the policy the United States was pursuing, he tended to view the war from the perspective of an essentially military man who was convinced the country was caught up in a war it could not win.

“When I was there two years ago it was not apparent to me that we were pursuing a scorched earth policy,” McCloskey said. “No one told me and I didn’t observe it. This time the difference was immediately apparent.”

McCloskey said that the policy of destroying villages in the north and coastal areas has now been largely abandoned because it has been “counterproductive.” But in these areas, up to one-third of the people may be living in refugee centers and McCloskey says he is convinced that the areas, now occupied by I Corps and II Corps, would quickly go Communist when the American forces withdraw.

It is the “scorched earth” policy that clearly concerns McCloskey the most.

“This bothers me more than My Lai,” he says.

He does not want to comment on the guilt or innocence of anyone accused of the purported My Lai murders, but he says that the “underlying facts” are the orders to destroy villages.

“The only purpose of destroying villages was that they gave occasional shelter to the VC that came into them or provided rice for the VC,” McCloskey believes. “It’s exactly what we executed Germans for doing.”

The situation, he found, was different in the delta area south and west of Saigon than in the I Corps and II Corps area.

Here, McCloskey discovered some “real progress” in helping villages to establish a modicum of local democracy and defense. He thinks it conceivable that the South Vietnamese forces in the delta might be able to survive on their own after American withdrawal.

But even in the delta, McCloskey is sharply critical of American policy. {p.653}

He says that the villages have been defended by an uneconomic policy that expends 20 or more times on them what is taken out in taxes and that places virtually every citizen under arms.

In McCloskey’s view this policy will stiffen the determination of South Vietnamese generals to resist the pressures for a coalition government and a unified Vietnam.

“We’ve destroyed a good part of the country and what we’re doing now in the delta is almost equally indefensible,” McCloskey said. “We’re militarizing the country and creating seeds of warfare for the next generation.”

McCloskey, who in Korea earned the Silver Star and a Purple Heart, has analyzed the casualties of his old unit during the last year.

He said the unit encountered 1,277 booby traps and detonated 604 of them.

This caused, he said, the death of 99 American servicemen and the wounding of 1,135 many of whom suffered amputation. In other words, one-third of this unit’s troops were killed or wounded by booby traps irrespective of battle casualties.

In the first 13 days of February this same unit lost eight killed and 31 wounded from all causes. Of this total five of the men killed and 25 of those wounded were booby trap victims.

For this reason McCloskey contended, the reports of battles which show a disproportionate Communist loss are misleading.

“We’re causing casualties by massing our fire,” he said. “They’re causing them in situations where no enemy is even encountered or any battle fought.”

McCloskey is concerned that the ratio of support to combat troops in the Nixon Administration withdrawal is only 2-1 compared to a 4-1 ratio in Vietnam.

If this continues, McCloskey said, the U.S. would wind up with four divisions in Vietnam to back up South Vietnamese forces there.

McCloskey said all forces should be withdrawn within 18 months, a goal the President still is capable of reaching.

“But I suspect that Mr. Nixon’s policy is that we should get out at such a rate that the American people’s concern is quieted while leaving behind enough troops that the South Vietnamese military establishment is strengthened,” he added.

Other McCloskey views expressed in an interview here soon after conclusion of his trip:

— Vietnam will become an issue in the election this year unless troop withdrawals continue.” The great silent majority support the President (on this issue) only because of the withdrawals.”

— Nearly everyone in Vietnam desires unification and many are “hedging their commitments” in expectation of ultimate Communist victory.

— Anyone who wants sanctuary should be given the means of leaving South Vietnam, although a “blood bath” of any except the very wealthy, the province chiefs and the military commanders is unlikely.

— “There is nothing about the government in the north that is so harsh and repressive that it is worth the continued loss of life ... The great bulk of the people want peace at any price and are denied it because of American assistance.”

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The Chairman.  The next witness is Mr. Edward J. Nickel.

SWEARING IN OF WITNESSES

Mr. Nickel, in keeping with the procedure followed in the previous hearings involving personnel brought back from Vietnam, in order that I show no partiality in this matter, I will ask you and your associates who may be called upon to testify to be sworn at this point. Would you please stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Nickel.  I do.

Mr. Osborne.  I do.

Mr. Hays.  I do.

The Chairman.  You have a prepared statement, I believe, Mr. Nickel? {p.654}

Mr. Nickel.  I do, sir.

The Chairman.  Would you proceed, please, sir.

Testimony of EDWARD J. NICKEL, Director, Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Saigon, and OTIS E. HAYS, Office of USIA Assistant Director for East Asia and Pacific

Mr. Nickel.  Mr. Chairman, I would like first to describe briefly the office in Saigon which I head. It is called the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office or JUSPAO. This Office, which was established in 1965, includes American military and civilian personnel and its functions are:

[

To provide policy guidance for all U.S. psychological operations in Vietnam.

To provide media materials in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam to the U.S. Information Agency for use in third countries.

To perform the normal USIS cultural and information mission.

To provide assistance to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) to improve its public information programs.

ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY JUSPAO

I will confine my statement to a description of this last function. JUSPAO’s efforts in this regard can be grouped in four categories:

First, assistance in the construction and operation of mass media communication facilities including the national radio network and the national television network.

Second, assistance in the improvement of personnel, training, organization, methodology, and the equipping of the Ministry of Information’s field organization called the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS).

Third, assistance in the production of information materials by the Government’s mass media and by the Vietnamese Information Service.

Fourth, assistance through joint planning and joint production of information materials by JUSPAO and the Ministry of Information to support the Government’s pacification and development programs.

Additionally, Mr. Chairman, JUSPAO indirectly influences the psychological warfare activities of the Vietnamese Armed Forces because we provide policy guidance for psychological operations to the U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV) which assists the Vietnamese Armed Forces in this field.

These categories of assistance cover a wide range of cooperative efforts to which the U.S. Government and the GVN contribute staff, funds, and equipment. The number of personnel and the amounts of money contributed by each side have varied from year to year. However, in the last year and a half we in JUSPAO have begun to establish terminal dates for several assistance operations and to transfer greater responsibility for others to the Government of Vietnam. This process is related to the overall effort to replace the U.S. contribution to the war effort with an increased Vietnamese contribution. {p.655}

REDUCTION OF JUSPAO CONTRIBUTIONS

JUSPAO is presently in the process of defining specific reductions in its contributions of personnel, money, and equipment. By the end of the current fiscal year American civilian positions will be reduced by 31 (from 132 to 101); American military positions by 11 (from 118 to 107); Vietnamese positions by 42 (from 385 to 343); third-country nationals by eight (from 12 to 4). As the GVN absorbs more of our currently joint operations, more American positions will be eliminated.

Our support in the information field should be completely terminated by the middle of 1972. Some projects will be completed earlier. For instance, the terminal date for the television project is June 1971. Radio construction will be completed in the spring of 1971. However, technical training needed to operate the new radio network will require an additional year.

Our role increasingly will become more and more an advisory one as our financial support and our production of media materials is reduced. But, in the category of printed material, the GVN in the near future will not be able to take over all of our present production. We believe this situation will be partially offset when the radio and television networks are completed and when more Vietnamese Information Service personnel have been trained in face-to-face communication techniques. We are planning now to increase this type of training.

For some time the GVN has lacked trained and experienced personnel needed to sustain effective information programs. Our training programs and support have helped alleviate this problem to some degree. However, many of those trained have been drafted for military service. Mass communications skills will continue to be in short supply in South Vietnam for some time.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Lately the GVN has manifested an increasing understanding of the importance of developing better lines of communication with the people, especially those in rural areas. The 1970 pacification and development program expresses this awareness by making the goal of establishing an effective information system one of its eight national objectives. The realization of that goal could make an important contribution to successful communication between the Government and the governed.

Other objectives of the 1970 plan are designed to encourage increased participation by citizens in the governmental process and to encourage local initiative.

Among the substantive programs of the plan are land reform; elections at the local, provincial, and national levels; recruitment of citizens in local militia forces with arms provided by the Government; and Government grants of village self-help funds to be used for development projects the villagers themselves desire. A large part of the GVN information effort in 1970 and U.S. support for it is being devoted to publicizing these programs and encouraging the South Vietnamese citizens to participate in them. {p.656}

I would like to describe some of our assistance projects and to indicate our plans for reducing them as the GVN assumes increasing responsibility for them.

U.S. ASSISTANCE IN RADIO

Between the years 1952 and 1964, the U.S. financed the purchase of low- and medium-power radio transmitters to help the GVN to set up stations in various parts of the country or to increase the signal strength of existing stations. The cost to the United States of this equipment was about $1.1 million. Australia contributed a high-powered station through the Colombo plan.

However, the collection of stations was never quite a network and its range was still inadequate. As the pace of the war stepped up 5 years ago, the United States began a project aimed at providing the GVN with an integrated radio network capable of reaching 95 percent of Vietnam’s population, rather than the 65 percent possibly reachable with varying quality signals and programing through the then existing group of stations. Feasibility studies were followed by preconstruction architectural and engineering studies. These were almost completed when the 1968 Tet attacks took place. In those attacks transmitters at Hue and Ban Me Thuot were badly damaged as were studios and other installations in Saigon and Qui Nhon.

As a result of those attacks, the United States and GVN decided against constructing a 12-station network in favor of a network of four stations of higher power. This change was dictated by security and manpower considerations. It was felt it would be easier to protect four installations than 12, and also to staff them. The coverage of the population would be the same in either case — more than 95 percent.

That four-station network is now being built and will be complete about 1 year from now at a cost of approximately $6.8 million in U.S. funds. Technical training for operation and maintenance of the new network will continue for 1 year after construction is completed.

An additional sum equivalent to about $1 million in GVN-owned but jointly controlled counterpart funds is being used in the project.

The rest of the GVN contribution to this project is an indirect one, largely in the form of its budget for radio operations, including the salaries of a staff of 464 personnel. In 1965, that budget was the equivalent of about $750,000. This figure has increased steadily in the past 5 years. This year the budget is the equivalent of about $1.7 million.

We believe the quality of programing has improved during that period. More and more the GVN officials concerned with radio have become aware of the concept of providing a service to the people. This has resulted in increased use of radio broadcasting to engender participation by the people in Government programs ranging from land reform and improved agriculture to self-defense.

U.S. ASSISTANCE IN TELEVISION

In 1966 the United States agreed to install a four-station television network in Vietnam. The GVN was committed to furnishing land, buildings, staff and an operating budget.

Telecasting initially was for 1 hour nightly to the Saigon area from an airborne transmitter. Now ground stations in Saigon, Hue and Can Tho are on the air an average of 4 hours nightly. Between Saigon {p.657} and Hue an airborne transmitter provides coverage for the coastal area. By early 1971, a fourth ground station — at Qui Nhon — will have replaced the air operation.

The U.S. cost will total about $8.2 million when we phase out of the operation by July 1, 1971. GVN counterpart funds amounting to the equivalent of about $2 million paid for land and building costs. In addition, the annual operating budget of GVN television has risen from the equivalent of about $400,000 including salaries of 17 employees in 1966 to more than double that amount including salaries of 139 employees in the current year.

The Chairman.  Could I ask for a point of information? Do the GVN counterpart funds arise from American imports?

Mr. Nickel.  In the original instance; yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Is there any real distinction in their impact upon American costs between GVN counterpart funds and $1 million?

Mr. Nickel.  The difference, of course, sir, would be that they are not directly appropriated funds.

The Chairman.  No; but the total cost really is American; is it not? It is not GVN. It is American costs expressed in two different ways.

Mr. Nickel.  It would be derived from the commercial import program.

The Chairman.  OK.

Mr. Nickel.  A rigorous program of training in the difficult TV skills is being carried out under contract by the National Broadcasting Co., International. Most of the training is on site in Vietnam. However, six engineers who will constitute the GVN supervisor engineering staff are being trained in the RCA Institute in New York.

We estimate there are now 300,000 TV receivers in Vietnam, with a viewing audience of about 2 million. Many sets are outside the cities in the heavily populated flat delta region where the signal is particularly good.

Of the programs presented by the GVN’s TV network, less than 10 percent are imported. Ninety percent of the programing is locally produced, either live or on film or tape. As with radio, the television medium is used extensively to explain GVN programs to the people. Last September the GVN began a weekly program called “The People Want to Know,” during which officials and other leaders are interviewed by journalists in the format of “Meet the Press.”

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE

A major part of our assistance is directed to the operation of the Vietnamese Information Service. This is the field arm of the Ministry of Information, with officer staffs at corps headquarters cities and in all provinces and districts of the country. Starting this year, the Ministry began an intensive training program for additional personnel at the village and hamlet levels. As these new lower level personnel are trained, they are now being placed under the operational control of the village and hamlet chiefs with program support coming from district and provincial VIS offices.

The job of the VIS is to use a wide range of information and psychological techniques to support GVN programs as prescribed in guidances from the Ministry in Saigon. The techniques include the publication of district newsletters and province newspapers, leaflets {p.658} and posters; the relaying of news and commentaries and the playing of prerecorded tapes over loudspeaker systems in village and hamlet centers; the showing of motion pictures; visits to families in villages and hamlets to discuss GVN programs affecting them; the distribution of national magazines and other materials received from the Ministry and JUSPAO; and the sponsoring with other local officials of campaigns, public meetings, exhibits and artistic and cultural presentations.

From fiscal year 1955 through 1967, the United States contributed an average of $497,000 in dollar funds annually to equip the VIS with audiovisual equipment, the vehicles, the office machines, and other materials necessary to carry out these programs. In the succeeding 3 years the dollar expenditure for this program has been $187,000 in 1968, $85,000 in 1969, and $60,000 in the current year. In the last 2 years we have gradually transferred to the GVN full responsibility for maintenance and replacement costs for this equipment as well as for the operation of repair centers.

During the same period, an average of the equivalent of $200,000 annually was used for the VIS from GVN counterpart funds. We do not have adequate figures for the GVN’s budget for the VIS prior to 1964. However, from that year to the present the budget has averaged about the equivalent of $6.4 million annually through 1970. The 1970 budget is about the equivalent of $15 million, a substantial increase over previous years.

The Chairman.  What caused that?

Mr. Nickel.  To a large extent, sir, an increase in personnel, but there was also a real increase in operations. There was a large increase in local personnel with the improvement of hamlet and village information programs.

U.S. CONTACT WITH VIS

Contact with the VIS is maintained both in the field and in Saigon. In the capital it is the function of several elements of JUSPAO. In the field it is carried out by 81 American civilian and military advisers located in 34 of the 44 Provinces. These advisers are detailed to the U.S. Military Assistance Command CORDS program and are under the operational control of the Province senior advisers at the Province level and the U.S. Command elements at the various corps headquarters. Just as the VIS chief is required to participate with the province chief and other GVN officials in planning and operating GVN programs, so our CORDS psychological operations staff perform a similar function within the U.S. province team. The providing of advice and support to the provincial VIS operation is the principal duty of these American psychological operations personnel.

Thus, the American structure for information operations parallels in broad outline that of the GVN, permitting a degree of coordination at all levels.

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF VIS

The efficiency of the VIS varies from place to place. Where key officials are dedicated and competent, operations are generally effective. And there are a number of these. Where they are not well motivated and energetic, the programs suffer. And there are some of these {p.659} also. In the past year, two new approaches have been undertaken by the Ministry of Information with our cooperation to try to improve the efficiency of the VIS. These are the planning of a comprehensive series of training courses for various levels of VIS personnel and the regular holding of joint meetings of Saigon and field personnel, usually on a corps area basis. We believe these two measures have had and will continue to have a good effect on the VIS operation. During the current year, we will use the equivalent in counterpart funds of about $63,000 to support the training program. We are also providing the assistance of one American adviser to help develop course materials.

JUSPAO’S LIAISON WITH MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

JUSPAO’s liaison with the Ministry itself takes many forms. At the top, I meet frequently with the Minister and his senior staff. At the planning level, JUSPAO policy officers meet daily with Ministry officials to plan joint campaigns, instructions, and guidances to media producers and to field personnel. On the media production side, our writers and editors work together in the publication of magazines, pamphlets, posters, loudspeaker tapes, and radio programs.

I have tried, Mr. Chairman, to describe here the evolution of some of the current major programs we are conducting to assist the GVN in the information and psychological fields. In the expansion of these programs over the years, the American contribution has been substantial. So has the Vietnamese contribution. In the past 2 years, a considerable portion of the load the United States was carrying has been shifted to the GVN. We plan to continue moving in that direction.

Thank you, sir; that is the end of my statement.

The Chairman.  Thank you, Mr. Nickel.

How long have you been in charge of this program, Mr. Nickel?

Mr. Nickel.  Two years, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you live in Saigon?

Mr. Nickel.  I do, sir.

MAGNITUDE OF USIA EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman.  I believe you said there were 132 Americans under your immediate direction; is that correct?

Mr. Nickel.  We are reducing this year, sir, by 31 positions from 132 American positions to 101 American positions.

The Chairman.  Is that in the office in Saigon or how extensive is this?

Mr. Nickel.  Those are civilian USIA officers, some serving in Saigon and some in the Provinces. I should add that we also have American military personnel serving with JUSPAO, sir.

The Chairman.  You mentioned that in the Provinces you have military advisers who are Americans. Is that right?

Mr. Nickel.  We have some civilian advisers in the provinces but the bulk of them are military, sir.

The Chairman.  To get some idea of the magnitude of the effort, take the present fiscal year of 1970. Is it correct to say that the civilian positions are 132 or 101?

Mr. Nickel.  101 civilian positions, sir. {p.660}

The Chairman.  That is in the current year.

Mr. Nickel.  Fiscal year 1970.

The Chairman.  How many of these military advisers are assigned to this work?

Mr. Nickel.  We have 107 military spaces in JUSPAO, sir.

The Chairman.  208 is the total American personnel?

Mr. Nickel.  208 is the figure, sir.

The Chairman.  What is the size of the budget for the USIA operation in Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel.  The USIA budget for Vietnam, sir, is $6.4 million.

The Chairman.  Is that for the year of 1970?

Mr. Nickel.  For fiscal year 1970; yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Does that include construction or is that only support of the personnel?

Mr. Nickel.  That is the USIA component of the budget, sir. Construction would be funded by an AID component of our budget. I will give you these add-ons. We also have $2.4 million funded by AID and $2.1 million funded by the Department of Defense, to make a total budget available to me for JUSPAO’s operations of $10.9 million.

The Chairman.  Would that include the pay of the military men to whom you referred?

Mr. Nickel.  It does not include military salaries. However, it does include USIA civilian salaries.

The Chairman.  The military salaries would be in addition then?

Mr. Nickel.  They would be in addition, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you have any estimate of what that would cost?

Mr. Nickel.  I have no estimate, but I could furnish it for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

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PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF MILITARY IN JUSPAO

(The military pay and allowances, as reported by the four Military Services whose personnel are involved, amount to $1.2 million.)

______________________

The Chairman.  What I am trying to get and what we are interested in is the total cost of this overall operation. It is the usual basic material that we would like to have.

Mr. Nickel.  I could furnish the information about military pay, sir.

MILITARY PERSONNEL WORKING IN PROPAGANDA FIELD

The Chairman.  Do these personnel figures include the personnel in the military units not associated with USIA who work in the field of propaganda?

Mr. Nickel.  They do not, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you know how many people there are in that?

Mr. Nickel.  May I furnish that, sir. I have it, but I cannot put my hands on it.

The Chairman.  Yes; you can furnish it. Could you give a rough estimate that you can correct later?

Mr. Nickel.  Sir, I now have the information. In 1970 there are 761 U.S. military psyops field personnel and 50 serving on staff or as advisers to the Vietnamese, for a total of 811. {p.661}

The Chairman.  That is very much larger than your own operation; is it not?

Mr. Nickel.  That is right, sir.

MISSION OF JUSPAO

The Chairman.  This brings up a further question. What do you consider to be the mission of your operation? What are you trying to accomplish?

Mr. Nickel.  My principal mission, sir, is to assist the Vietnamese Government in developing and conducting an effective program of communications.

The Chairman.  Your mission is to assist the Vietnamese Government to create a system of communications. Is that it?

Mr. Nickel.  To assist the Vietnamese Government in developing a means of communicating with the electorate and to provide technical and professional advice.

The Chairman.  What leads you to believe that the purpose of our Government in establishing the USIA was to create an agency to create a means of communication for a foreign government?

Mr. Nickel.  I would answer that, Mr. Chairman, by stating that my operations are responsive to the instructions and directions I receive from the Director of the U.S. Information Agency and from the American Ambassador in Saigon.

The Chairman.  Then you would characterize your mission to be to carry out orders. Is that the right way to put it?

Mr. Nickel.  In my position; yes, sir.

The Chairman.  You have no idea what the real mission of this operation is other than to carry out orders?

Mr. Nickel.  I know what my instructions are.

AUTHORIZATION OF JOINT U.S. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE MISSION QUESTIONED

The Chairman.  This is a matter, I think, of considerable interest. Let me refer to section 2 of the basic legislation creating this operation:

Do you think that language authorizes USIA to create for another country a system of communications for that government and its people?

Mr. Nickel.  My organization, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Mr. Chairman, was established in 1965 by order of the President. I would suggest that any justification of the suitability of the mission we are performing is something that should be addressed to the people to whom I report. I would be very happy to address this problem to them.

The Chairman.  I think it would be very interesting if you would. You say it was created by Executive order. It was not created by statute. There is no statute law authorizing you to do what you are doing; is there?

Mr. Nickel.  I said that the U.S. Public Affairs Office was created as a result of Presidential directive. {p.662}

The Chairman.  Yes. And in pursuance of that action you have been directed by your superiors to do what you are doing. So you would not wish to undertake to say what this whole operation is intended to accomplish for the people of the United States; would you?

Mr. Nickel.  I believe I said earlier, sir, that my mission in Vietnam was in large measure to assist the Vietnamese Government in developing and improving its means of communicating with its people.

ESTABLISHMENT OF MINISTRY OF INFORMATION QUESTIONED

The Chairman.  It occurs to me that in this country there has always been not only a great reluctance, but aversion, to the creation of a ministry of information in our Government to inform our own people. Is that not so?

Mr. Nickel.  That is correct, sir.

The Chairman.  Does the law not specifically forbid the USIA to indoctrinate or brainwash, or whatever you want to call it, the American people? Is that not so?

Mr. Nickel.  Clearly, sir.

The Chairman.  Are you not creating in Vietnam just such an information agency? The way you describe here what you have done and are in the process of doing, it is to create in Vietnam an agency to enable that Government to control its people through this device which we ourselves abhor in this country? How does this seem to you to be consistent with our own views?

Mr. Nickel.  I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that Vietnam is not unique in possessing a ministry of information. I would also suggest that in Vietnam, as in many other developing societies, there do not exist any strong commercial or nongovernmental media.

The Chairman.  Mr. Nickel, I am quite aware that it is not unique. In every dictatorship I know of they have a ministry of information just like this. But we are told, on the one hand, that we are seeking to establish the government of self-determination and this leaves the impression we are seeking to establish a democratic system there.

I quite agree with you that information agencies are typical. They were typical of Hitler’s Germany and typical of nearly every dictatorship and authoritarian government I know of, but I would not have thought we would be a party to helping construct such a governmental apparatus.

Mr. Nickel.  Are there not also some regimes we regard as being democratic that have ministries of information?

The Chairman.  What, for example, would be one from your point of view?

Mr. Nickel.  If I am not mistaken, is there not a French Ministry of Information?

The Chairman.  I would not know. Is there one in Sweden, which is a country that I think has achieved a high degree of democracy or self-determination if you like, or England? I do not recall that in England they have a minister of information whose job it is to sell the people of England upon the merits and virtues of that Government. I do not recall ever having heard of it. France has recently gone through a rather unusual evolutionary period, almost revolutionary under De Gaulle, of course, and France may be an example. I would not want to say for sure. I do not know that. {p.663}

GVN CLOSING OF PRIVATE NEWSPAPERS

How many private newspapers have been closed by the Government of Vietnam during the past year?

Mr. Nickel.  I could not give you the number, sir.

The Chairman.  There have been several.

Mr. Nickel.  There have been several closings.

The Chairman.  You say there is not a heavily developed private sector. It is largely because that Government is so sensitive to criticism that they close the private newspapers whenever they criticize the Government. Is that not a fact?

Mr. Nickel.  There have been some closings; yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you ever feel a bit uncomfortable in being alined with a government which is so clearly an authoritarian government or do you feel perfectly comfortable in your relationship with that government?

Mr. Nickel.  I have no problems in performing my job.

The Chairman.  You have no problems. You feel perfectly at home?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, sir.

USIA PAY AND ALLOWANCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman.  Coming back to a more pedestrian subject of the costs, could you tell me what is the average pay of the American employees of USIA in Saigon?

Mr. Nickel.  The average pay of a USIA employee with JUSPAO, sir, including allowances, minus housing, would be about $28,900.

The Chairman.  What is the total cost to the Government of the United States for those employees, including everything? Do they furnish housing?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, housing is furnished, sir. I am unable to break out that figure for an individual. Do you want the total cost?

The Chairman.  Perhaps if you could tell me your own. What is your pay and what do your allowances amount to? You are the Director?

Mr. Nickel.  That is right, sir.

The Chairman.  What is your total? What is the total cost to the Federal Government?

Mr. Nickel.  The combination of my salary and allowances, again making no provision for my housing, is $45,473.

The Chairman.  Plus housing?

Mr. Nickel.  Housing?

The Chairman.  Do they furnish you with a house?

Mr. Nickel.  I am furnished with housing.

The Chairman.  What would be the reasonable cost of the house that is paid for by the Federal Government?

Mr. Nickel.  That is right, the house is paid for by the Federal Government.

The Chairman.  How much is that? You ought to know that.

Mr. Nickel.  Let me see if I have that, sir.

The Chairman.  You have been there for 2 years. You have no idea what that would be?

Mr. Nickel.  My house, sir, is a U.S. Government house.

The Chairman.  Is it a good house? {p.664}

Mr. Nickel.  It is comfortable, sir.

The Chairman.  Was it one that the Government built or is it an old villa?

Mr. Nickel.  It was there. It is a U.S. Government-owned house.

The Chairman.  How many houses does the U.S. Government own in Saigon? Do you know?

Mr. Nickel.  I do not know that answer, sir.

The Chairman.  Is it several?

Mr. Nickel.  It is more than several.

The Chairman.  It is more than several.

Then I would estimate your total cost would be somewhat in the neighborhood of at least $50,000.

Mr. Nickel.  That would seem right, sir.

The Chairman.  Are you furnished an automobile?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Are USIA officials in Saigon given special pay equivalent to combat pay for military people?

Mr. Nickel.  No, sir. We receive a differential.

The Chairman.  What does it amount to? Is it 25 percent?

Mr. Nickel.  Twenty-five percent.

U.S. COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES

The Chairman.  If our Government decides that it is proper to furnish assistance in the building of a propaganda operation for Vietnam, how does it decide in which country to do this? Is this the only country in which we have done this?

Mr. Nickel.  Specifically have done what, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman.  Have we created a communications system which enables the government to, as you say, communicate with its citizens? Have we done it in Thailand? Are we doing it or have we done it in Thailand? Does the USIA have a comparable operation in Thailand, may be not on as large a scale but a lesser scale?

Mr. Nickel.  Certainly, as you say, not comparable in order of magnitude.

The Chairman.  Do we have a similar operation?

Mr. Nickel.  I am not — I personally am not aware that—

The Chairman.  Are any of your associates?

Mr. Nickel.  I am not aware and I do not think my associates are aware that we are doing any such thing as building a TV network or building a radio network. I cannot speak more directly to the specific programs, sir.

NEWSPAPERS CLOSED BY GVN

The Chairman.  Before I leave that, you said you did not know how many newspapers. Do either of your associates know how many newspapers the government of Saigon has closed in the last few years?

Mr. Hays.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  Is that information not available?

Mr. Osborne.  It can be made available. I do not have it available.

The Chairman.  Would you supply it for the record?

Mr. Osborne.  Yes, sir. {p.665}

(The information referred to follows:)

______________________

NEWSPAPERS SUSPENDED BY GVN FROM 1968 THROUGH MARCH 23, 1970

During 1968 the Government of Viet-Nam indefinitely suspended six newspapers. Sixteen others were temporarily suspended, for an average of 35 days per suspension.

During 1969 through March 23, 1970, the GVN indefinitely suspended 12 newspapers. An additional 14 received temporary suspensions ranging from a few days to almost 11 months, for an average of 46 days per suspension.

______________________

The Chairman.  I notice in the paper every now and then there is a notice that X paper has been closed by the government. I simply have not made a counting of it, but I am under the impression there have been several.

Mr. Nickel.  I will supply it, sir.

The Chairman.  Of course the government controls the supply of newsprint and it is no problem for them simply to cut off the newsprint if they wish to close a newspaper. Is that so?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes.

USIA ANALYSIS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PUBLIC ATTITUDES

The Chairman.  Does the USIA, Mr. Nickel, or any other agency attempt to analyze Vietnamese public attitudes periodically?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Have polls been taken?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, sir; polls have been taken.

The Chairman.  How is this done? Is it done by you directly or by contract?

Mr. Nickel.  By contract, sir.

The Chairman.  What organization has done it?

Mr. Nickel.  May I answer that, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I have been informed that you have written the Director of the U.S. Information Agency asking for information about our polling in Vietnam, that this is now under consideration, and that I would prefer to have the information come to you through that channel.

The Chairman.  I wrote that letter partly to give you notice that this is a matter in which we are interested. I hoped that you would be prepared to answer it this morning. Are you saying that this is a matter that affects our security and that you do not wish to testify in open session on it?

Mr. Nickel.  I prefer not to go beyond stating, sir, that we do engage in polling in Vietnam, as in some other countries.

WITNESS’ INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING TESTIMONY ABOUT POLLING

The Chairmen {sic: Chairman}.  Have you been instructed to state to the committee that you will not testify in open session on this matter?

Mr. Nickel.  I am not able to discuss the polling in open hearing, sir.

The Chairman.  Have you been instructed not to respond to questions about polling?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes. sir.

The Chairman.  Who instructed you, sir? Did Mr. Shakespeare tell you not to answer such questions? If not, who did? {p.666}

Mr. Nickel.  I have been instructed by my principal.

May I have just one moment, sir?

The Chairman.  Certainly. You confer with your lawyer if you like.

Mr. Nickel.  In answer to your question, sir, I have been instructed by the director of my agency.

The Chairman.  Mr. Shakespeare has instructed on this?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  What grounds did he give you for instructing you not to reply to this question?

Mr. Nickel.  This question is under consideration as to the possible security elements involved.

The Chairman.  Possible security involved.

You heard the previous witness, Congressman McCloskey; did you not?

Mr. Nickel.  I did, sir.

The Chairman.  You realize that this committee has some authority in the authorization of the funds for you agency; do you not?

Mr. Nickel.  I am very well aware of that.

The Chairman.  We normally expect people in USIA to respond to questions about their operations if they expect this committee to authorize any funds for the agency. You realize that; do you not?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Does Mr. Shakespeare realize that?

Mr. Nickel.  I cannot speak for Mr. Shakespeare, sir.

The Chairman.  I want to make it clear that I do not accept your reason for refusing to answer. It is a perfectly legitimate question. You are engaged in an activity which is very dubious in its authority under an executive order, in any case, and I think that you should be very careful in refusing to answer questions about these operations.

I would like to know how much you paid, for example, for a contract to take a poll in Vietnam and see how it compares to polls in this country. Would you be willing to say how much you paid for the poll?

Mr. Nickel.  I do not believe I am able to, sir.

The Chairman.  Who was the gentleman who advised you not to answer? Was he sworn also?

Mr. Nickel.  The gentleman with whom I just talked did not advise me not to answer.

The Chairman.  He did not?

Mr. Nickel.  I wanted to check something with him. He is the General Counsel of the U.S. Information Agency.

The Chairman.  He did not advise you as to your instructions.

It is very unusual. I did not expect you to refuse to answer these questions. One reason why I sent that letter inquiring about these matters was, as I say, to alert the Agency that we are interested in the poll.

When was the latest poll taken? Will you refuse to answer that?

Mr. Nickel.  I find myself unable to answer it, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  You mean by saving “unable” that you do not know?

Mr. Nickel.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  Do either of your associates know when the latest poll was taken?

Mr. Nickel.  I believe, sir, that they are bound by the same instructions. {p.667}

WITNESS’ INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING SUBJECT OF POLLING

The Chairman.  I asked you if you were instructed to tell it. There is a difference between your answer if you know, and are instructed not to tell and if you do not know. I want to make the answer clear. On what grounds are you refusing to say when the latest poll was taken?

Mr. Nickel.  I am under instructions, sir, not to discuss this subject.

The Chairman.  Then you do know when it was, but you are under instructions not to discuss the subject. You are in effect taking the equivalent of the Fifth Amendment; is that correct?

Mr. Nickel.  No.

The Chairman.  Why is that not correct? You do not consider that the USIA is a sensitive undertaking similar to the CIA; do you?

Mr. Nickel.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  Usually your activities are open and above board; are they not?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  You are not authorized to engage in covert operations; are you?

Mr. Nickel.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  Would you be willing to answer this kind of question? What was the poll about? Did it ask about the attitude of the local citizens toward Americans?

Mr. Nickel.  I find, sir, in line with my instructions, that I am unable to discuss the subject of polling.

The Chairman.  You would not discuss as to whether or not the poll involved the question of the extent of the support of the Vietnamese people for the Thieu government?

Mr. Nickel.  I do not believe, sir, in line with my instructions, that I am able to respond.

The Chairman.  I may say before I leave this subject, this is very unsatisfactory. I regret very much, and I hope you will tell your superior, Mr. Shakespeare, that, speaking for myself, I very much regret this attitude. This committee is entitled to know what the poll cost, what it asked, and what the results were.

This is not a document, it seems to me, that comes under executive privilege. It has nothing whatever to do with the President directly. I mean it is not a confidential document. It is a matter that is paid for by the public funds of the Government, and the committee is entitled to actually have the poll, in my opinion, and we shall ask for it. I regret he gave you such instructions.

U.S. ADVISORY WORK IN TV, RADIO, AND PRINTED MATERIALS

Do the U.S. advisers work with the Vietnamese on matters involving TV and radio program content and makeup?

Mr. Nickel.  Our advisers work with both radio and TV. They occasionally are involved in the format of a program.

The Chairman.  Do they work with them in the preparation of printed information materials?

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, sir. {p.668}

GVN MEDIA’S TREATMENT OF TRAN NGOC CHAU CASE

The Chairman.  Was the case of Tran Ngoc Chau reported over the Vietnamese radio and television stations?

Mr. Nickel.  I can only assume it was. I would have to retire to an assumption because I was not in Saigon at that particular time, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  Are you familiar with the Chau case?

Mr. Nickel.  I have read about it; yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you know Mr. Chau?

Mr. Nickel.  I do not, sir.

The Chairman.  Do either of your associates know whether or not the radio and television stations of Vietnam carried any news about Mr. Chau?

Mr. Hays.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  You do not know?

Mr. Hays.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  You do not know?

Mr. Osborne.  No, sir; I do not.

The Chairman.  Were any printed materials put out by the South Vietnamese Government on this case?

Mr. Nickel.  I do not know, sir. I can find out.

The Chairman.  In your statement you say “JUSPAO’s liaison with the Ministry itself takes many forms.” That is the Ministry of Information.

Mr. Nickel.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  You say: