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March 19 1970 hearing (pages 635-700)
CIA/DoD Phoenix Program:
Targeting non-combatants (civilians)
Also: Exit strategy, rigged elections, puppet government

CIS: 71 S381-2 SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:V 67/17

Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970 {58.4mb.pdf, source}










February 17, 18, 19, 20, and March 3, 4, 17, 19, 1970 {appendix}

GPO mark

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

44-706 WASHINGTON : 1970


J. W. Fulbright, Arkansas, Chairman

John Sparkman, AlabamaGeorge D. Aiken, Vermont
Mike Mansfield, MontanaKarl E. Mundt, South Dakota
Albert Gore, TennesseeClifford P. Case, New Jersey
Frank Church, IdahoJohn Sherman Cooper, Kentucky
Stuart Symington, MissouriJohn J. Williams, Delaware
Thomas J. Dodd, ConnecticutJacob K. Javits, New York
Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island
Gale W. McGee, Wyoming

Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff

Arthur M. Kuhl, Chief Clerk

Note.— Sections of this hearing have been deleted at the request of the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Deleted material is indicated by the notation “[Deleted].”



{To come}

{March 19 1970 hearing, pages 635-700}



Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970


U.S. Assistance on Information Matters and U.S. Psychological or Propaganda Operations


Thursday, March 19, 1970

United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church presiding.

Present: Present: Senators Fulbright (chairman), Church, and Gore.

Senator Church. The hearing will come to order.


The principal purpose of this morning’s meeting is to continue the committee’s consideration of the operation of various U.S. programs in Vietnam.

First, the committee will hear testimony from Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., of California, who was in Vietnam only a few weeks ago. I am sure that his observations will be of interest and assistance to the committee.

Following Congressman McCloskey’s testimony, the committee will hear testimony concerning U.S. activities to assist the Vietnamese Government on information matters and the scope of U.S. psychological or propaganda operations generally.

The United States is engaged in a broad-scale program to assist and promote the Government of Vietnam through the use of the entire spectrum of the communications media, from leaflet drops to television. I hope that this hearing will develop the full facts concerning the nature and extent of these activities. But of far greater significance than the specifics of what is being done in Vietnam is the underlying policy which presumes that it is proper and in the national interest for the U.S. Government to engage in propaganda activities in behalf of a foreign government.

There is also the question of whether the Congress in passing the Smith-Mundt Act, the USIA’s basic statutory authority contemplated such a role for the Government’s official overseas information agency.

However, the witness here to discuss U.S. programs in Vietnam, Mr. Edward J. Nickel, a career officer of the USIA, who is Director of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon, is not responsible {p.636} for the policy which thrust the USIA into that role. His job is only to implement that policy.

We will now hear from Congressman McCloskey.

Statement of
Hon. Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Representative in Congress from the 11th Congressional District of the State of California

Mr. McCloskey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In testifying before you today, I would like you to know first of the limitations on the accuracy of any opinions I may give.


As a Marine Corps Reserve officer, I have been a student of counter-insurgency warfare since the late 1950’s and was privileged to participate in the last large-scale combat exercise in this field prior to our landing of combat troops in Vietnam in the spring of 1965. I applied for an active duty Marine Corps assignment to Vietnam in the fall of 1965, which was rejected; in the following year, I was offered the opportunity to serve as an AID provincial adviser in Vietnam but declined. Since being elected to the Congress in 1967, I have been able to visit Vietnam only twice, once for a period of 11 days just prior to the Tet offensive of January-February 1968, and more recently, for a period of 6 days in February of this year.

I tried to visit the same areas last month which I had seen 2 years earlier in order to appraise the progress of pacification, and more particularly the so-called Vietnamization program. Aside from headquarters briefings and the study of captured enemy documents and prisoner interrogations, I spent the bulk of my time in the hamlets and villages where the pacification program is being conducted, and with the infantrymen and advisers engaged in field operations.

My most recent observations and inquiries were limited to four of Vietnam’s 44 Provinces, but I believe the northerly two Provinces, Binh Dinh and Quang Nam, to be fairly representative of the coastal portions of the I and II Corps areas, and the southerly Provinces, Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong, to reflect the range of problems faced in the delta and the territory surrounding Saigon. Since all four of these Provinces are rated fairly near the bottom for security purposes under the hamlet evaluation system (28th, 37th, 34th, and 35th, respectively, as of January), it is possible that my conclusions will be a little more pessimistic than the overall situation justifies. These conclusions are certainly susceptible of a considerable range of error in any event, but they represent my best judgment and I have no hesitancy in presenting them for your evaluation and comparison with those of our military and State Department personnel.


About 6 million people, roughly one-third of the population, reside in the I and II Corps areas. Ninety percent of them live within a few miles of the coast in fertile valleys which are bordered by rugged and heavily forested mountains. {p.637}

The ordinary manner of living in the rural areas of Vietnam is in hamlets of a few hundred people. The Vietnamese rural hamlet is ordinarily a very pleasant place. The people are courteous, affectionate toward their families, respectful toward their elders and reverent about their ancestry. A family can grow its own food in the equivalent of 2 or 3 acres of land. The climate is mild and the soil fertile. There is no need, and I could observe little inclination, for leaving the area of one’s home. I doubt that there are many places in the world where people can live in closer harmony with their land and environment than in the coastal provinces of the I and II Corps areas.


In waging counterinsurgency war in this area over the past several years, I was advised that we have destroyed 307 of the original 555 hamlets of Quang Nam Province.

I flew over miles and miles of area south and southwest of Danang where nearly every hamlet had been destroyed that was not within a mile of the main highway or larger settlements. Tree lines, hedgerows, and gravesites are all that remain.

The purpose for this destruction was to deny rice, cover, and support to the Vietcong, as well as to the North Vietnamese units operating in the adjacent mountainous areas.

In one interior valley of pleasant hamlets and productive soil which was pointed out to me 2 years ago, some 20,000 people have been forcibly evacuated to refugee camps along the coastal highway and their hamlets destroyed by either bombing, artillery fire or the action of individual soldiers.

The result has been predictable. One high-ranking CORDS officer told me that he estimated at least one-third of the Vietnamese people in Quang Nam Province to be hostile to the American military presence.

In the 5th Marine regimental tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) southwest of Danang, for example, the bulk of the casualties in 1969 came from booby traps. Infantrymen from the regiment discovered over 1,200 booby traps during the year, of which about half were detonated causing 95 KIA’s (killed in action) and 1,195 WIA’s (wounded for action), many of them amputees. Thus in 1 year’s time the odds of being killed or wounded by a booby trap in this particular regimental area were about 1 in 2 for the 2,400-odd marine riflemen in the regiment.

Under these circumstances, I do not think enough can be said for the courage, morale, and patriotic service of American troops and the officers who lead them.


In both Quang Nam and Binh Dinh Provinces, I visited hamlets which had originally been destroyed and defoliated, but which were in the process of resettlement. In Quang Nam Province thus far, some 63 of the 307 hamlets destroyed are being reoccupied as the Government seeks to expand the areas under Government control.

The protection of these hamlets is being assigned to PF and PSDF forces as the American forces are withdrawn, but I observed no evidence that the people were learning any great sense of commitment {p.638} ”to the Saigon government as they returned to their lands and commenced rebuilding homes and restoring land to production.

From a military standpoint, if U.S. troop withdrawals continue, I would predict that the entire coastal area from Binh Dinh north to to the DMZ (demilitarized zone) will fall to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese within 90 days after the last American troops withdraw.

There seems little hope that the fragile institutions of hamlet and village government will survive increasing North Vietnamese and VC pressures once American troops are withdrawn.

Withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division last year and the pending withdrawal of additional brigades from the coastal areas has already caused an increase in enemy activities; remaining American units are required to expand their tactical areas of responsibility to the breaking point.

In both Quang Nam and Binh Dinh Provinces, for example, battalions of the 1st Marine Division and 173d Airborne Brigades, respectively, have been required to cover over 100 square miles each by breaking down into platoons and small units located at considerable distances from one another. It is presently requiring the full abilities and efforts of these units to maintain a status quo with small units of local VC and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) units operating in the adjacent mountainous areas.

Of the rural hamlets I visited in both provinces, it was apparent that local RF/PF (Regional Forces/Popular Forces) and PSDF (Peoples’ Self-Defense Forces) forces would be unable to protect any individual hamlet in the event that U.S. Main unit forces were withdrawn. While the ARVN divisions in I Corps are deemed excellent by U.S. troop commanders who have been working with them, no American officer was willing to predict that such units alone could withstand a determined assault by NVA units presently operating in I Corps or located just across the DMZ or Laotian frontier.

There appears to be no reasonable expectation that an additional 18 months of resettlement and training of local forces would be sufficient to withstand the historic attitudes of a large percentage of the populace, exacerbated by our clear and destroy and defoliation policies of years past.


A different situation exists in the delta in my judgment. There, on flat terrain, with an absence of jungle and mountain cover except in the areas close to the Cambodian border and the U Minh forest pacification has progressed far more rapidly. The province chiefs and adviser teams in the two provinces I visited, Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong, had achieved a far greater cohesion at the hamlet and village level, and prosperity and security have been materially advanced in the past 2 years. American combat troops have not operated in the delta since the 9th Infantry Division vacated the area in late 1969.

The number of VC-controlled hamlets has been substantially reduced and VC local forces and guerrillas have been prevented from any major interference with commerce and communications.

Perhaps the best indication of Government success in the area has been the progress in arming the PSDF. A decision to issue arms to large numbers of civilians 2 years ago would have been unthinkable; most such weapons would have ended up in the hands of the VC. {p.639}

In the hamlets I visited in Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong Provinces, however, the large number of RF/PF available plus arms issued to the PSDF had caused the hamlet chief to feel relatively secure against anything but a major NVA or VC attack.

A qualification should be noted here, however. It is not entirely certain that the loyalty of either the RF/PF or PSDF is so assured as to guarantee against infiltration by the VC. One instance was cited to me where one individual had caused an entire PSDF squad to defect to the VC.

Also, a hard-core Communist prisoner told me, in an hour-long interviewing that Americans were getting a distorted view of the true views of the rural South Vietnamese, since we only talked to them in the presence of armed forces. This prisoner, a deceptively sweet-appearing lady who had been the VC mayor of My Tho, the Province capital for Dinh Tuong Province, indicated that “resolve, not numbers, will determine the final issue.”

I would tend to agree.

The military and pacification progress in III and IV Corps, coupled with the terrain there, could permit a maintenance of the status quo, solely by South Vietnamese troops, barring a major NVA invasion from the Cambodian border. Should such an invasion occur, the issue will be squarely up to the abilities and resolve of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) divisions presently stationed in the southerly half of Vietnam. From hearsay only, I gather that most American military officers have grave doubts of the abilities of most of the ARVN units involved, and that the issue would be significantly in doubt.


From what I could determine, nearly all Vietnamese, both North and South, desire reunification. If the NVA and VC resolve and willingness to undergo hardship remains firm, it would be my judgment that upon our withdrawal that they will ultimately succeed in forcing, first, a coalition government on the South and ultimately a reunification of their country.

I can see no reason why a U.S. presence of over 18 months will affect the ultimate result any differently than if we continue to withdraw, having all of our troops, both combat and support, home by the end of June 1971.

We have tended to equate “progress” with a guarantee of ultimate success. There has indeed been progress, but to obtain it, we have been required to militarize South Vietnam and to create a political structure which far outweighs the South Vietnamese economy’s capacity to fund.

To cite an example, one hamlet I visited, with a population of less than 1,000, had local PF protection costing over 1.5 million piasters per year, and a civil administration costing another 1.5 million piasters per year. The total tax revenues from this hamlet were less than one-quarter million piasters per year, about a 12-to-1 ratio. These figures do nor include the cost of the central government or American military and economic assistance. Repeated for some 10,500 existing hamlets in Vietnam, it is apparent that the operating expenses of the Saigon government, merely to maintain the status quo, are staggering. {p.640}



In conclusion, I would like to say a word in support of the Mathias resolution to terminate the Gulf of Tonkin authority, as well as comment on the responsibility of Congress, as opposed to the executive branch, in bringing American involvement in Vietnam to an early conclusion.

I had occasion to refer recently, Mr. Chairman, to the Federalist Papers of Alexander Hamilton, particularly Nos. 24 and 26, where he was urging adoption of the Federal Constitution. It seems to me that the following statements of Mr. Hamilton are worthy of consideration by both Houses of Congress today:

The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.

I think that puts the burden on the Congress of the United States to determine how long we fund this conflict, and if we face that issue between now and November.


I would be pleased to answer any questions. I think the summation of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, is this: Pacification in the northern half is not successful and cannot be successful. In the south half of the country it is succeeding, but its continued success will depend on the ability in the—

Senator Gore. I did not understand you after the conjunction “but.”

Mr. McCloskey. I said in the north.

Senator Gore. I understood that part of it.

Mr. McCloskey. In the south half of the country, in my judgment, pacification is proceeding successfully and can be successful, but only if the ARVN, South Vietnamese army units, are capable of withstanding a determined assault from across the Cambodian border in the future and that issue would be very much in doubt both on the quality of the ARVN troops in the south and on their resolve to fight.

Senator Gore. What dividing line do you choose between the northern part of the country and the southern part of the country?

Mr. McCloskey. Well, it is not precisely between the four corps areas, Mr. Senator. It is the nature of the terrain in the north half of the country, the mountainous jungle, heavily covered terrain where the rice paddies go right up against the areas of cover and concealment, these are the areas, in my judgment, where pacification cannot succeed. As you get down into the delta where the terrain is flat, where there is no heavily jungled cover, where there is no way in which troops can conceal themselves to come back into the villages and get their rice, in those areas pacification has been successful and is succeeding, in my judgement. But its continued success requires the prevention from intrusion of major NVA units. Every time major NVA units have come {p.641} into the area, the guerrilla incidents have increased and the loyalties of the people have become far more tenuous.

Senator Gore. May I continue with a question or two, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. (presiding). Certainly.


Senator Gore. Is there any loyalty, if that is the right term, on either side? Is it a matter of fear? This has been difficult for me to comprehend.

Mr. McCloskey. This is an impression, Senator, because I share your committee staff’s feeling that it is very difficult for an American to understand what a Vietnamese thinks from what he says. But I would appraise the situation that there is very little loyalty to the Saigon government and there is very little love for the Hanoi government amongst the rural peasantry of South Vietnam; that the overwhelming bulk of the people, over 80 percent of them, would prefer peace at any price regardless of who happened to govern them; and that loyalty to a central government located in a city far away is a term that is not appropriate to apply to the rural countryside in Vietnam.


Senator Gore. What is your assessment of their attitude toward American military presence?

Mr. McCloskey. Again that would be an impression that I could not guarantee as to its accuracy, but I see no reason for them not to accept the presence of anyone who is giving them a million piasters a year, to any village that would elect a village chief.

I can understand why a village might happily welcome the Americans who bring them the million piasters. But I do not think there is any long-range love for Americans.

Senator Gore. Did you mean to imply that the measure of the bounty was the election of a chief who was friendly to us or what do you mean to suggest?

Mr. McCloskey. I do not detect any bitter hatred of Americans amongst the villagers who seem to bear our artillery fire and our aircraft bombardment, but whom we pay a million piasters a year to any village that will elect a village chief. But I do not detect any love on their part for us either, and I suspect, and this is only an impression and not testimony under oath, but I suspect everyone in Vietnam would welcome the day when the last American has left Vietnam.


Senator Gore. I notice you described the effective use of boobytraps. Can such traps be effective without at least the tacit approval and cooperation of the natives?

Mr. McCloskey. No, sir. Those areas south of — southwest of Danang where tremendous boobytrap casualties are occurring in the very areas that our troops go into day after day after day and in which the populace on the surface of things is at least passive if not {p.642} friendly to us, but obviously in those areas a large percentage of the people are willing to support the Vietcong that operate amongst them.

Senator Gore. I am asking you not out of information, but out of interest. If American GI’s in small numbers are stationed in isolated villages, are they particularly vulnerable because of differences in physical appearance?

Mr. McCloskey. I do not know that, sir. The boobytrap casualties that the young men are suffering occur when they go out on patrol either day or night into areas in which they can operate in the daytime without too much fear of receiving sniper fire. We have been able to hold VC and NVA units at bay by our power. If they mass three men at one time, we hit them with artillery or bombing or we land a helicopter full of troops and go after them, but the troops are still there. The enemy are still there. They are not showing themselves. They have adjusted their tactics to match our firepower, but they are out there sowing boobytraps every night and those boobytraps are causing casualties to us in an overwhelming percentage. The fact they are able to sow these boobytraps night after night so that when our troops go out on a path they might hit a tripwire with a detonation which may cause 2.3 casualties every time the boobytrap is detonated means they are getting the support of the local populace in the countryside or they would not be able to do that.

When I say support, I do not mean that the local populace are loving the VC more than they love Saigon, but they are not willing to commit themselves.

Senator Gore. If the natives are to avoid the boobytraps, they must at least know where they are or have some knowledge of them.

Mr. McCloskey. The greatest advance by the Marine units that I observed was their growing sophistication in discovering boobytraps by locating the means by which the Vietnamese signal their location, perhaps two bamboo sticks left pointing to a “V” in a certain trail junction and apparently any Vietnamese in the area knows that means there is a boobytrap some distance away.

The American troops are gaining greater knowledge to deal with this situation.

Senator Gore. At least we are not slow to catch on.

Mr. McCloskey. We are not slow, but the penalty of failure can be that you lose both legs, sir.

Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Church. I think, Congressman McCloskey, your statement was excellent.


Is it your judgment that, after we have left Vietnam, two things are likely to happen; the present Government is likely to be replaced in Saigon by some form of coalition government and the two halves of Vietnam are likely to be reunited?

Mr. McCloskey. That is correct. Just by way of example, in the village capital, in the village hut that goes for a city hall in the provinces in the north, there is a plaque on the wall that says “The Nation Overall” in Vietnamese; and the map is of all of Vietnam, North and South, not just South Vietnam. I could find no indication {p.643} on the part of anyone that South Vietnam was considered a permanent and independent nation as we would have it.

Senator Church. In your judgment, then, the overwhelming sentiment in both North and South Vietnam is to reunify the country.

Mr. McCloskey. I think I can say honestly — I have never been to North Vietnam — the resolve that keeps them coming 800 miles south to try to unify the country would so indicate.

Senator Church. Yes.

American policy for years has been to keep Vietnam divided, as well as to support and sustain an anti-Communist government in Saigon that would be closely allied with our country. From your testimony I understand there is no evidence whatever that that objective has been abandoned by the present Administration—

Mr. McCloskey. I would have to agree.

Senator Church (continuing). And that that objective will not be achieved once American forces leave.

Mr. McCloskey. Senator, let me make a qualification to my prior answer. I did detect in the President’s speech early after his election the mention of a peace based on the Geneva accords of 1954, and such a peace would presuppose the reunification of Vietnam within 2 years because that was the understanding under the Geneva accords of 1954. Unfortunately, I have seen no other mention by this Administration of a concurrence that they would accept a peace based on the Geneva accords which involved a unification of Vietnam.

Senator Church. The policy by which we fought this war has hardly been directed at a reunified Vietnam. Yet this will very likely occur by the forces that we have been opposing.

Mr. McCloskey. Correct.


Senator Church. I think the inability of the U.S. Government to know how the people of Vietnam really feel, what their political values are, and what their national objectives may be, has been evident throughout the whole course of our involvement in that country. It is also reflected in what has just happened in Cambodia.

From the contacts that I have had with the State Department and from the briefings that this committee has been given, it was unanticipated that Prince Sihanouk would be displaced in Cambodia. In fact, official opinion plus informed expert opinion here had it that if anyone was secure in Southeast Asia, it was Sihanouk.

This clearly demonstrates the fragility of any policy on our part which seeks objectives that are intimately indigenous, and the futility of attempting to win a civil war in a country such as Vietnam with a foreign army.

In the face of that experience, why are we not disengaging American military forces from Southeast Asia generally, especially from Laos and Thailand, before we find ourselves confronted with questions of honor, commitment, and the other political consequences that flow from such a predicament?

Did you have an opportunity in your trip to visit Thailand or Laos?

Mr. McCloskey. No, sir. I have not had the privilege of visiting the other countries. {p.644}

I think that the great lesson of Vietnam is that in a land where people are wedded to their soil, and their tradition, and their history, that to try to say to a country of 17.5 million people, “We will impose a government of our type, of our choice,” in a country which has no real reason to have any cohesion with any government — these people live very happily in their own villages and are unwilling to make a commitment to any kind of government — that in that kind of a country, the use of American firepower is almost immoral.

Senator Church. Immoral. Immoral is perhaps not strong enough a term. After all, you mentioned that 307 villages out of 555 had been destroyed in one province alone by American firepower.

Mr. McCloskey. I would say this, Senator. That where we seek to lead the world to a peace through law and the only legal precedents we look to are the Hague Convention and perhaps the Nuremberg agreement where we said wanton destruction of villages was a war crime, there is no way we could state that our policy of destroying Vietnamese villages to deny rice and support to the VC that operate in the vicinity and in some respects out of those villages is not of the same level to be condemned as we did in Nuremberg when we executed German officers for pursuing a policy of wanton destruction of villages, and if a war has to be fought by destroying people’s homes because so many of the people who live in an area are sympathetic to the enemy, then I do not think America should ever again fight such a war with our weapons in such a country.

Senator Church. I concur wholeheartedly in what you said. If we had just left those people alone, if we had just stayed out of their affairs, none of this terrible agony, none of this wanton destruction, none of this mass killing would have occurred on the scale that has taken place. And, ironically, the security interests of the United States would not have been affected one iota.

Our Vietnam policy has been touched with madness; this foreign adventure is undoubtedly the greatest catastrophe that has ever occurred in the history of our country overseas.

I appreciate very much your testimony. I think it has been very helpful.

The Chairman. Mr. Congressman, I am sorry I was a bit late. I read your statement, and I know something of your views. I expect anything I ask you may be repetitive and yet I do not think it hurts to go over one or two points.


You have made very clear your views about the destruction of the villages. The Senator from Idaho mentioned our objective of creating a government there that was friendly to us. How do you see the objective of our policy and activity in Vietnam? What does it strike you that we seek to achieve there?

Mr. McCloskey. Well, I think, quite honestly, that the North Vietnamese have characterized it properly, and that is to permanently divide that country preventing Communist domination of the entire country, that our policy has been to divide it and to furnish such military and economic assistance as is necessary to preserve its division.

The Chairman. Does that strike you as being a valid objective? {p.645}

Mr. McCloskey. No, sir; I think that in the long run you can trace most trouble spots in the world to countries that were divided — Germany, Korea, the Israelis—

The Chairman. In other words, if they did achieve their announced objective, it would not be in the interests of this country. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. McCloskey. My feeling is that any divided country is a potential source of world war III and that it should be our national policy to seek a reunification of Vietnam and Korea.

The Chairman. I suppose our people would say we are perfectly-willing to reunify it provided it is on our terms and if they will accept our views as to what kind of government they will have; will they not? Our people will not object to Vietnam’s reunification providing they accept our terms.


Mr. McCloskey. I think if this issue is fairly debated, Senator, that the people will decide it at the polls in November. This was the reason for my quote from Alexander Hamilton because the Congress of the United States has it within its power to stop our involvement in Vietnam just as much as the President does.

The Chairman. How would you propose that that be done?

Mr. McCloskey. I would propose a continuing withdrawal over a period not to exceed 18 months offering sanctuary to any Vietnamese who chose to leave the country because he felt imperiled by our withdrawal.

The Chairman. Maybe I did not understand. You said the Congress had the power to stop the war. What did you have in mind about the Congress — cutting off the money?

Mr. McCloskey. Two ways, sir; I thought that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, under which President Johnson indicated he felt he had this power, should be terminated effective December 31, 1970. I think I would extend that now to 1971. Also under the Constitution where we are given the sole power to provide for a standing army for a period not to exceed 2 years, I think that means exactly what it says and perhaps we should attach to appropriations measures this year the qualification that the Congress will vote only such funds as are sufficient to permit our continuing and steady withdrawal with all American troops to be out at the end of fiscal 1971.

The Chairman. We have the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution under consideration and will actively consider it on Friday, I think, in the Mathias resolution, but I understand from the letter they gave us that the Administration’s position is that repeal of the Tonkin Gulf would not affect the President’s right to continue the war. He is not relying on it. This President says he is not relying on the Tonkin Gulf resolution for his right to carry on the war. So I do not think that would do it.

The money business I think would do it. Do you think there is a majority of the Congress that would vote that?

Mr. McCloskey. Not right now, Senator, but I think as this matter is debated between now and November and congressional candidates, all of whom run for office in November, are forced to a yes or no answer on the question, “Will you or will you not fund money to continue {p.646} our indefinite involvement in Vietnam?” that that issue may be determined by the American people, and I think exactly that is what the framers of the American Constitution had in mind when they said one body will face election every 2 years.

I have heard different figures from the Pentagon but if our strength — we had the equivalent of 12 combat infantry divisions in Vietnam, 108 maneuver battalions. Every time one division is brought home, I have heard the Pentagon say it saves this country $1.5 billion in the defense budget, so it is merely a matter of multiplying that sum of money by bringing our troops home and attaching a rider in the appropriation bills when they come before the House and Senate.

The Chairman. It takes the votes. I have been under the impression that a very strong majority of the House supports the war.

Mr. McCloskey. Yes, sir. When I was elected to the Congress in 1967, I think I was the only Republican opposed to the war. Perhaps there were two or three others. But I noticed in October last year 64 Republicans signed a resolution drafted by Paul Findley of Illinois. They supported the President in his expressed determination to withdraw all American troops at the earliest practicable date, and I suspect by next November a majority even in the House of Representatives will support the Administration on this as troops are beginning to be withdrawn on a steady, continued rate.

The Chairman. Of course, if your judgment as to their sentiment is true, then it is very hopeful that something can be done.


This is a drastic step. I am inclined to favor it; do not misunderstand that. I think this war is the greatest tragedy that this country has ever encountered, but our people are not conditioned to the policy of directly challenging a President of the United States.

Have you seen George Reedy’s book about our Presidency? There was a portion of it in Look magazine which was entitled, “Do We Need a Kick?” Did you see that?

Mr. McCloskey. I have not seen that.

The Chairman. It is a very interesting book. I mean it is a very good one. As you remember, Mr. Reedy had considerable experience in the White House and the sort of royal attitude and regal attitude that developed in recent years about it.

I do not know whether we can do it or not. I think it is something to consider. Your views that it might come about ought to be encouraging to the President to give him backing to move out of this place quickly.

Mr. McCloskey. I have supported what he has done thus far, Senator. I think that the studied and orderly withdrawal have taken out almost a third of the American combat troops in the first 9 months since he commenced the withdrawal and that this is consistent with the views I express today. I am concerned with whether or not that withdrawal will continue. Within the next 3 to 9 months I suspect that the status quo will change in Vietnam as American troops continue to be withdrawn because it is a very tenuous situation there in the north, and if those American troops continue to be withdrawn over the next year, I suspect that the balance of power will change between the conflicting elements. {p.647}


The Chairman. The Senate may be too interested in precedents. It has been accused of being precedent ridden, but take this case: I cannot think offhand of a war of any consequence having been stopped by one side gradually withdrawing without any negotiated agreement with regard to the ending of the war.

If I thought this could take place, as you described it, I certainly would be for it if it would happen in a reasonable period of a year or 2 years. I know of no precedent, and therefore it, among other reasons, makes me very skeptical that this is going to happen. What I anticipate as much more likely to happen is that a number of troops will be withdrawn but a very large contingent will be left with the most sophisticated weapons which will give logistics support to the best troops of the Vietnamese government and they kind of stay there in a kind of a stalemate in a modification of the enclave theory. This could go on for 5 or 10 years without a negotiated settlement.

This is the only reason. It is a practical matter. The most similar war to this is the war of the French in the same country after being there 100 years. How did they end their war? They did not just walk off. They went to Geneva and had a cease-fire and had a negotiated and agreed upon settlement called the Geneva Accord.

It is hard for me to believe that if we are really serious about ending the war with a clean-cut end to it, if that is not the procedure most likely to bring that about.


Mr. McCloskey. Senator, this is speculation, of course, but as American troops continue to withdraw, and assuming that the Vietnamese who have become quite adept with our artillery, gain an increasing sophistication in the use of helicopters and communication and logistics in which they have a particularly grave problem, and assuming that they are able to build a South Vietnamese army that can hold its own, the very nature of Vietnam, as an 800 mile long country with roughly 15 ARVN divisions matched against an equal number of North Vietnamese and Vietcong, in my judgment will require the South Vietnamese forces to retire into a modified enclave giving up much of the northern coasts, some of the central highlands, some of the III Corps area, and concentrating around Saigon. If this happens, bearing in mind there will be over a million men in South Vietnam under arms and there never have been over 200,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong opposed to them, the South Vietnamese retiring and becoming stronger as their lines grow less, the North Vietnamese grow weaker as they fight a longer distance from home, you would have the Vietnamese people, a very pragmatic people, not desirous of continuing the execution of each other.

For example, I think of the four province chiefs where I had visited, two of them were from the north. Three-eighths of the Saigon government, their house of delegates, are from the north; three-eighths of the North Vietnamese leadership is from the south.

I think as a pragmatic people faced with the destruction of their country by foreign forces over all these years, they will reach some accommodation between themselves which will bring their war to an {p.648} end, and I do not see that the continuing American military presence will contribute to that settlement. I think it is counterproductive when we destroy villages, kill people, arm increasing numbers of the peasantry. We are prolonging the conflict by our presence there.

The Chairman. I think so too.

Mr. McCloskey. We could not train these people from 1960 to 1970, Senator. I doubt 3 years instead of 18 months remaining there will change the balance.


The Chairman. What do you anticipate will happen if we get down to 300,000 men and the Vietcong become impatient and attack a city or do something provocative? Do we continue to deescalate? The President was implicit in his statement that if they did not sort of cooperate and make it easier for us to get out, he would retaliate.

Mr. McCloskey. I think it is very noteworthy in the President’s two speeches that when he spoke of the possibility of retaliation he referred only to the danger to U.S. forces. He made it clear in both of those speeches, one of which was very carefully worked out by him personally, that a threat to the South Vietnamese need not provoke our retaliation, but only a threat to U.S. forces would do so. I do not think we need fear a Dunkirk. I do not know of any U.S. unit in Vietnam which would be left there without sufficient firepower and air support to defend itself in the process of withdrawal.


The Chairman. Do not misunderstand me. I am for ending the war in any way we can do it, but which is the most feasible and likely way to do it and which could come the soonest? It seems to me that the traditional political settlement by which nearly every war I can think of has been ended is the one that has the most promise, but if the other will work, I am for that too.

I do not criticize doing it. It is a question of how much time we allow. This Administration has been in nearly a year and 3 months. That is becoming a very substantial time period to look for results. There has been a decrease in the casualties, it is true, but they are still quite substantial.


I have a few more specific questions. While you were there did you notice any signs of defoliation of the countryside?

Mr. McCloskey. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Was it extensive?

Mr. McCloskey. Well, let me put it this way: In the coastal plains of the north they have had to move the people into within a mile or so of the main roads in the cities and they have moved them out of their villages and destroyed their villages in the interior valleys that go back from the coast because of the desire to deny rice to the Vietcong.

Several officers pointed out to me that in the interior valleys whenever there was the indication of someone growing a crop back there, whether it was civilians left behind or people who had gone back to their homes or Vietcong, the planes were instructed to go in and imme- {p.649} diately defoliate any crops that were being grown in the interior valleys.

In the two hamlets that I visited which are being revisited, that is close to 550 in Quang Nam, 307 were destroyed, some 63 have now been resettled or they are in the process of resettlement. When I spoke with the villagers in those towns being resettled, they spoke of the fact they could not grow coconuts as they had and they pointed out the coconut trees which had been destroyed or defoliated with chemicals at the time the village had been destroyed back in 1966 or 1967, whenever it had occurred. So in the resettlement process while they can restore the rice paddies and grow some younger trees for reproduction, it is going to be a long time before they restore some of those trees that have been hurt by the defoliation.

The Chairman. We really do not know enough about the ultimate effect of defoliants to know how long it will be or how permanent is the destruction by the chemical; do we?

Mr. McCloskey. I can only say what I have observed, Senator, I do not know. But I did see people tilling ricefields in areas which they told me had been defoliated in the last 2 or 3 years. What the crops will be and who will suffer from them I do not know, but they were actually tilling the soil.

The Chairman. There was one article in the paper which said we had defoliated an amount of territory approximately equal to the State of Massachusetts.

Mr. McCloskey. I could believe that from what I saw, sir, because these interior valleys that stretch away from the coast are considered free fire zones and apparently we defoliate anything growing there as part of this rice denial program, but they are substantial areas. I would say there are hundreds of square miles of areas where every village had been razed to the ground.


The Chairman. How long has it been since you have been in the Marines? When did you get out?

Mr. McCloskey. I served in the Marine Corps in Korea as a platoon leader in 1951. I was released to inactive duty in 1952, I stayed in the Reserve until 1965. I was on active duty in Operation Silver Lance at the time the 1st Marine Brigade was sent to the Gulf of Tonkin in March of 1965. I tried to remain as an infantry officer when I was a civilian between 1952 and 1967 when I went to Congress.


The Chairman. I had a letter this morning from a former marine in my hometown, Fayetteville, dated March 12. It says:

This past week saw five marines charged with murder. There are elements surrounding this that I do not understand. Civilians in this instance were supposed to be in a free fire zone. I don’t know what a free fire zone is. The term wasn’t in currency when I was a Marine. However, I take it to mean a zone where anything that moves is a candidate for sudden death. I am very concerned about how such information on a zone of this sort is disseminated to the civilians in the area, especially in light of the fact that the area was an enemy-held territory. Did these unfortunate souls know that this part of their land was off limits to them? Who told them and how? {p.650}


Do you know the answer to that?

Mr. McCloskey. I do not, sir.

The areas that we flew over and the hamlets which I visited in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh in the north, there were obviously free fire zones where nothing stood; but there were people walking around down in those areas, and this is what I spoke of in my testimony. The greatest single attachment that the Vietnamese has, in my judgment, is to his lands and they are not going to be easily moved off the lands even at the cost of the risk if they remain. They risk remaining in the zone, even with signs showing the limits of the village and the limits of the free fire zone.

The Chairman. How did we propose to tell the people they were in a free fire zone and to get out? Did we go through any motions? Did USIA tell them or not?

Mr. McCloskey. Well, I only know this by hearsay. I have not seen the operations, but I understand that in a cordon and search operation, or search and destroy, they will attempt to have people in aircraft with megaphones telling people where to go and why and what is going to be the free fire zone and what isn’t and scatter thousands and thousands of leaflets. But I do not think we are ever going to be sure with that kind of information that there are 10 percent who will not get the word. And the result has been in that particular country a lot of innocent people have been killed.

The Chairman. It is very risky to go about talking from a helicopter. They could shoot it down; could they not? We have been losing on the average about one and one-tenth helicopters per day in recent months. Did I see that in the paper recently?

Mr. McCloskey. The figures seem very staggering. I could not verify the precise figures.


The Chairman. I would like your comment on the next paragraph of this letter. He says:

No matter how you look at it, you cannot escape the fact that it would not have happened if we had not been there in the first place. We have put our young men in an impossible situation. They are damned if they do and they are dead if they don’t.

I thought that was a rather striking way to put it. I am speaking of our own young men who are now being accused of murder.

Mr. McCloskey. I think they are the finest young men in the country.

The Chairman. I say if they did not do what they did, they are very likely to be dead; are they not? They think they would in any case. They are being put into an intolerable situation.

Mr. McCloskey. The reaction time of a marine rifleman to a situation which may or may not cause his death very seldom permits judicious decision. I think Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, “Sober reflection is not required in the presence of an uplifted knife.” And to that rifleman walking in a rice paddy, the question of whether he is a civilian or enemy certainly does not give him much time or opportunity and certainly not the inclination to take the chance.

The Chairman. The next sentence says: {p.651}

The only possible answer to me is to remove them from this situation. If we don’t, we can expect more of the same, and we will have to bear our share of the blame.

He goes on for several pages. It is quite an interesting letter. He says the time is far past when we should have stopped and asked ourselves where it is that we are going. It is a very interesting letter from a marine.


I appreciate very much your taking the time to come here. You are very optimistic, I think. I hope you are correct about the attitude of the Congress. I am not nearly in as close touch with the House, as you are and, therefore, I certainly do not wish to challenge your judgment. All I can say is I hope. When I look at some of the actions recently taken on military affairs, the urgency with which they wish to give jets to Taiwan and more money to Korea with which to fight, it does not seem to me they have become very pacific in their attitude. They seem to be much more eager to heat up the war than they are to calm it down, but I certainly hope you are correct in your judgment that they would not do it. I feel the Senate has moved very strongly in that direction.

Mr. McCloskey. I would not suggest that we have anywhere near a majority which would do as I say, Senator, with respect to cutting off the money or indeed stopping the Gulf of Tonkin authority, but I suspect with those November elections looming that perhaps the 92d Congress may be of a little different persuasion.

The Chairman. That is encouraging. After all, the final justification for our system of government is that the people do have an opportunity to make such a change this fall if they wish to take it. If they do not wish to take it, if they do not wish to make this a major issue, of course, they do not have to and we can continue. But you are quite right and I have confidence and faith in the efficiency and workability of our system. So many of us have been here too long perhaps or at least very long and we become impatient, I guess, too impatient, with the slowness with which these decisions are finally reached, especially when you are concerned with such a tragic situation as this war.


Speaking for myself, I am very happy to see you there who can interpret what the war is about and give and bring to it an estimate and a judgment which not many people have had and which will be very important to the Congress.

Mr. McCloskey. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. I think it has been very helpful to have your testimony this morning and such testimony is one of the main reasons that maybe what you say about the judgment of the people in the coming election will come about.

Thank you very much.


Mr. Reporter, I want to put in the record an interview with the Congressman. {p.652}

Mr. Congressman, do you know the interview by Lou Cannon? It does not have a date on it. Was it in February? Put it in the record.

(The information referred to follows:)


[February, 1970]


(By Lou Cannon)

WASHINGTON.— A Republican congressman and former Marine officer has returned from an inspection tour of Vietnam convinced that the United States must speed its withdrawal from “this immoral war.”

Rep. Paul N. McCloskey of California, the man who came to Congress in 1967 by defeating Shirley Temple Black and others in a special election, inspected Vietnam on a weeklong trip sponsored by Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

This 90-member group of essentially anti-Pentagon congressmen from both parties paid for McCloskey’s $968 round trip fare to Vietnam in an effort to assess military strategy and withdrawal progress there.

McCloskey, a decorated Marine combat officer in the Korean war and a counter-intelligence reserve officer who later helped participate in guerilla war planning, emerged from his second inspection of Vietnam more critical of the U.S. role than ever before.

The California congressman believes that President Nixon, “while preserving his options,” is actually embarked on a policy that will leave between 200,000 and 250,000 American support troops in Vietnam and frustrate the opportunity for a coalition settlement ending the war.

McCloskey also came away convinced that news reports of battles showing many Communists are killed in proportion to the American casualties are seriously misleading. He says the casualty figures of his own Marine regiment, the 5th, show that the United States is taking the majority of its casualties from booby traps in situations where the enemy takes no casualties at all.

But McCloskey’s strongest-held perceptions appeared to involve neither military strategy nor political timetables but the U.S. participation in the war itself.

“I flew over miles and miles of areas where the hamlets and villages had been totally destroyed.” McCloskey said. “I have real reservations that this policy is anything but a war crime. If you look back to Nuremberg and our policy in 1946, we insisted that it was a war crime to wantonly destroy villages.”

McCloskey visited Vietnam two years ago shortly after his election to Congress.

While he was sharply critical then of the policy the United States was pursuing, he tended to view the war from the perspective of an essentially military man who was convinced the country was caught up in a war it could not win.

“When I was there two years ago it was not apparent to me that we were pursuing a scorched earth policy,” McCloskey said. “No one told me and I didn’t observe it. This time the difference was immediately apparent.”

McCloskey said that the policy of destroying villages in the north and coastal areas has now been largely abandoned because it has been “counterproductive.” But in these areas, up to one-third of the people may be living in refugee centers and McCloskey says he is convinced that the areas, now occupied by I Corps and II Corps, would quickly go Communist when the American forces withdraw.

It is the “scorched earth” policy that clearly concerns McCloskey the most.

“This bothers me more than My Lai,” he says.

He does not want to comment on the guilt or innocence of anyone accused of the purported My Lai murders, but he says that the “underlying facts” are the orders to destroy villages.

“The only purpose of destroying villages was that they gave occasional shelter to the VC that came into them or provided rice for the VC,” McCloskey believes. “It’s exactly what we executed Germans for doing.”

The situation, he found, was different in the delta area south and west of Saigon than in the I Corps and II Corps area.

Here, McCloskey discovered some “real progress” in helping villages to establish a modicum of local democracy and defense. He thinks it conceivable that the South Vietnamese forces in the delta might be able to survive on their own after American withdrawal.

But even in the delta, McCloskey is sharply critical of American policy. {p.653}

He says that the villages have been defended by an uneconomic policy that expends 20 or more times on them what is taken out in taxes and that places virtually every citizen under arms.

In McCloskey’s view this policy will stiffen the determination of South Vietnamese generals to resist the pressures for a coalition government and a unified Vietnam.

“We’ve destroyed a good part of the country and what we’re doing now in the delta is almost equally indefensible,” McCloskey said. “We’re militarizing the country and creating seeds of warfare for the next generation.”

McCloskey, who in Korea earned the Silver Star and a Purple Heart, has analyzed the casualties of his old unit during the last year.

He said the unit encountered 1,277 booby traps and detonated 604 of them.

This caused, he said, the death of 99 American servicemen and the wounding of 1,135 many of whom suffered amputation. In other words, one-third of this unit’s troops were killed or wounded by booby traps irrespective of battle casualties.

In the first 13 days of February this same unit lost eight killed and 31 wounded from all causes. Of this total five of the men killed and 25 of those wounded were booby trap victims.

For this reason McCloskey contended, the reports of battles which show a disproportionate Communist loss are misleading.

“We’re causing casualties by massing our fire,” he said. “They’re causing them in situations where no enemy is even encountered or any battle fought.”

McCloskey is concerned that the ratio of support to combat troops in the Nixon Administration withdrawal is only 2-1 compared to a 4-1 ratio in Vietnam.

If this continues, McCloskey said, the U.S. would wind up with four divisions in Vietnam to back up South Vietnamese forces there.

McCloskey said all forces should be withdrawn within 18 months, a goal the President still is capable of reaching.

“But I suspect that Mr. Nixon’s policy is that we should get out at such a rate that the American people’s concern is quieted while leaving behind enough troops that the South Vietnamese military establishment is strengthened,” he added.

Other McCloskey views expressed in an interview here soon after conclusion of his trip:

— Vietnam will become an issue in the election this year unless troop withdrawals continue.” The great silent majority support the President (on this issue) only because of the withdrawals.”

— Nearly everyone in Vietnam desires unification and many are “hedging their commitments” in expectation of ultimate Communist victory.

— Anyone who wants sanctuary should be given the means of leaving South Vietnam, although a “blood bath” of any except the very wealthy, the province chiefs and the military commanders is unlikely.

— “There is nothing about the government in the north that is so harsh and repressive that it is worth the continued loss of life ... The great bulk of the people want peace at any price and are denied it because of American assistance.”


The Chairman. The next witness is Mr. Edward J. Nickel.


Mr. Nickel, in keeping with the procedure followed in the previous hearings involving personnel brought back from Vietnam, in order that I show no partiality in this matter, I will ask you and your associates who may be called upon to testify to be sworn at this point. Would you please stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Nickel. I do.

Mr. Osborne. I do.

Mr. Hays. I do.

The Chairman. You have a prepared statement, I believe, Mr. Nickel? {p.654}

Mr. Nickel. I do, sir.

The Chairman. Would you proceed, please, sir.

Testimony of
Edward J. Nickel, Director, Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Saigon,
Otis E. Hays,
Office of USIA Assistant Director for East Asia and Pacific

Mr. Nickel. Mr. Chairman, I would like first to describe briefly the office in Saigon which I head. It is called the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office or JUSPAO. This Office, which was established in 1965, includes American military and civilian personnel and its functions are:

To provide policy guidance for all U.S. psychological operations in Vietnam.

To provide media materials in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam to the U.S. Information Agency for use in third countries.

To perform the normal USIS cultural and information mission.

To provide assistance to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) to improve its public information programs.


I will confine my statement to a description of this last function. JUSPAO’s efforts in this regard can be grouped in four categories:

First, assistance in the construction and operation of mass media communication facilities including the national radio network and the national television network.

Second, assistance in the improvement of personnel, training, organization, methodology, and the equipping of the Ministry of Information’s field organization called the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS).

Third, assistance in the production of information materials by the Government’s mass media and by the Vietnamese Information Service.

Fourth, assistance through joint planning and joint production of information materials by JUSPAO and the Ministry of Information to support the Government’s pacification and development programs.

Additionally, Mr. Chairman, JUSPAO indirectly influences the psychological warfare activities of the Vietnamese Armed Forces because we provide policy guidance for psychological operations to the U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV) which assists the Vietnamese Armed Forces in this field.

These categories of assistance cover a wide range of cooperative efforts to which the U.S. Government and the GVN contribute staff, funds, and equipment. The number of personnel and the amounts of money contributed by each side have varied from year to year. However, in the last year and a half we in JUSPAO have begun to establish terminal dates for several assistance operations and to transfer greater responsibility for others to the Government of Vietnam. This process is related to the overall effort to replace the U.S. contribution to the war effort with an increased Vietnamese contribution. {p.655}



JUSPAO is presently in the process of defining specific reductions in its contributions of personnel, money, and equipment. By the end of the current fiscal year American civilian positions will be reduced by 31 (from 132 to 101); American military positions by 11 (from 118 to 107); Vietnamese positions by 42 (from 385 to 343); third-country nationals by eight (from 12 to 4). As the GVN absorbs more of our currently joint operations, more American positions will be eliminated.

Our support in the information field should be completely terminated by the middle of 1972. Some projects will be completed earlier. For instance, the terminal date for the television project is June 1971. Radio construction will be completed in the spring of 1971. However, technical training needed to operate the new radio network will require an additional year.

Our role increasingly will become more and more an advisory one as our financial support and our production of media materials is reduced. But, in the category of printed material, the GVN in the near future will not be able to take over all of our present production. We believe this situation will be partially offset when the radio and television networks are completed and when more Vietnamese Information Service personnel have been trained in face-to-face communication techniques. We are planning now to increase this type of training.

For some time the GVN has lacked trained and experienced personnel needed to sustain effective information programs. Our training programs and support have helped alleviate this problem to some degree. However, many of those trained have been drafted for military service. Mass communications skills will continue to be in short supply in South Vietnam for some time.


Lately the GVN has manifested an increasing understanding of the importance of developing better lines of communication with the people, especially those in rural areas. The 1970 pacification and development program expresses this awareness by making the goal of establishing an effective information system one of its eight national objectives. The realization of that goal could make an important contribution to successful communication between the Government and the governed.

Other objectives of the 1970 plan are designed to encourage increased participation by citizens in the governmental process and to encourage local initiative.

Among the substantive programs of the plan are land reform; elections at the local, provincial, and national levels; recruitment of citizens in local militia forces with arms provided by the Government; and Government grants of village self-help funds to be used for development projects the villagers themselves desire. A large part of the GVN information effort in 1970 and U.S. support for it is being devoted to publicizing these programs and encouraging the South Vietnamese citizens to participate in them. {p.656}

I would like to describe some of our assistance projects and to indicate our plans for reducing them as the GVN assumes increasing responsibility for them.


Between the years 1952 and 1964, the U.S. financed the purchase of low- and medium-power radio transmitters to help the GVN to set up stations in various parts of the country or to increase the signal strength of existing stations. The cost to the United States of this equipment was about $1.1 million. Australia contributed a high-powered station through the Colombo plan.

However, the collection of stations was never quite a network and its range was still inadequate. As the pace of the war stepped up 5 years ago, the United States began a project aimed at providing the GVN with an integrated radio network capable of reaching 95 percent of Vietnam’s population, rather than the 65 percent possibly reachable with varying quality signals and programing through the then existing group of stations. Feasibility studies were followed by preconstruction architectural and engineering studies. These were almost completed when the 1968 Tet attacks took place. In those attacks transmitters at Hue and Ban Me Thuot were badly damaged as were studios and other installations in Saigon and Qui Nhon.

As a result of those attacks, the United States and GVN decided against constructing a 12-station network in favor of a network of four stations of higher power. This change was dictated by security and manpower considerations. It was felt it would be easier to protect four installations than 12, and also to staff them. The coverage of the population would be the same in either case — more than 95 percent.

That four-station network is now being built and will be complete about 1 year from now at a cost of approximately $6.8 million in U.S. funds. Technical training for operation and maintenance of the new network will continue for 1 year after construction is completed.

An additional sum equivalent to about $1 million in GVN-owned but jointly controlled counterpart funds is being used in the project.

The rest of the GVN contribution to this project is an indirect one, largely in the form of its budget for radio operations, including the salaries of a staff of 464 personnel. In 1965, that budget was the equivalent of about $750,000. This figure has increased steadily in the past 5 years. This year the budget is the equivalent of about $1.7 million.

We believe the quality of programing has improved during that period. More and more the GVN officials concerned with radio have become aware of the concept of providing a service to the people. This has resulted in increased use of radio broadcasting to engender participation by the people in Government programs ranging from land reform and improved agriculture to self-defense.


In 1966 the United States agreed to install a four-station television network in Vietnam. The GVN was committed to furnishing land, buildings, staff and an operating budget.

Telecasting initially was for 1 hour nightly to the Saigon area from an airborne transmitter. Now ground stations in Saigon, Hue and Can Tho are on the air an average of 4 hours nightly. Between Saigon {p.657} and Hue an airborne transmitter provides coverage for the coastal area. By early 1971, a fourth ground station — at Qui Nhon — will have replaced the air operation.

The U.S. cost will total about $8.2 million when we phase out of the operation by July 1, 1971. GVN counterpart funds amounting to the equivalent of about $2 million paid for land and building costs. In addition, the annual operating budget of GVN television has risen from the equivalent of about $400,000 including salaries of 17 employees in 1966 to more than double that amount including salaries of 139 employees in the current year.

The Chairman. Could I ask for a point of information? Do the GVN counterpart funds arise from American imports?

Mr. Nickel. In the original instance; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Is there any real distinction in their impact upon American costs between GVN counterpart funds and $1 million?

Mr. Nickel. The difference, of course, sir, would be that they are not directly appropriated funds.

The Chairman. No; but the total cost really is American; is it not? It is not GVN. It is American costs expressed in two different ways.

Mr. Nickel. It would be derived from the commercial import program.

The Chairman. OK.

Mr. Nickel. A rigorous program of training in the difficult TV skills is being carried out under contract by the National Broadcasting Co., International. Most of the training is on site in Vietnam. However, six engineers who will constitute the GVN supervisor engineering staff are being trained in the RCA Institute in New York.

We estimate there are now 300,000 TV receivers in Vietnam, with a viewing audience of about 2 million. Many sets are outside the cities in the heavily populated flat delta region where the signal is particularly good.

Of the programs presented by the GVN’s TV network, less than 10 percent are imported. Ninety percent of the programing is locally produced, either live or on film or tape. As with radio, the television medium is used extensively to explain GVN programs to the people. Last September the GVN began a weekly program called “The People Want to Know,” during which officials and other leaders are interviewed by journalists in the format of “Meet the Press.”


A major part of our assistance is directed to the operation of the Vietnamese Information Service. This is the field arm of the Ministry of Information, with officer staffs at corps headquarters cities and in all provinces and districts of the country. Starting this year, the Ministry began an intensive training program for additional personnel at the village and hamlet levels. As these new lower level personnel are trained, they are now being placed under the operational control of the village and hamlet chiefs with program support coming from district and provincial VIS offices.

The job of the VIS is to use a wide range of information and psychological techniques to support GVN programs as prescribed in guidances from the Ministry in Saigon. The techniques include the publication of district newsletters and province newspapers, leaflets {p.658} and posters; the relaying of news and commentaries and the playing of prerecorded tapes over loudspeaker systems in village and hamlet centers; the showing of motion pictures; visits to families in villages and hamlets to discuss GVN programs affecting them; the distribution of national magazines and other materials received from the Ministry and JUSPAO; and the sponsoring with other local officials of campaigns, public meetings, exhibits and artistic and cultural presentations.

From fiscal year 1955 through 1967, the United States contributed an average of $497,000 in dollar funds annually to equip the VIS with audiovisual equipment, the vehicles, the office machines, and other materials necessary to carry out these programs. In the succeeding 3 years the dollar expenditure for this program has been $187,000 in 1968, $85,000 in 1969, and $60,000 in the current year. In the last 2 years we have gradually transferred to the GVN full responsibility for maintenance and replacement costs for this equipment as well as for the operation of repair centers.

During the same period, an average of the equivalent of $200,000 annually was used for the VIS from GVN counterpart funds. We do not have adequate figures for the GVN’s budget for the VIS prior to 1964. However, from that year to the present the budget has averaged about the equivalent of $6.4 million annually through 1970. The 1970 budget is about the equivalent of $15 million, a substantial increase over previous years.

The Chairman. What caused that?

Mr. Nickel. To a large extent, sir, an increase in personnel, but there was also a real increase in operations. There was a large increase in local personnel with the improvement of hamlet and village information programs.


Contact with the VIS is maintained both in the field and in Saigon. In the capital it is the function of several elements of JUSPAO. In the field it is carried out by 81 American civilian and military advisers located in 34 of the 44 Provinces. These advisers are detailed to the U.S. Military Assistance Command CORDS program and are under the operational control of the Province senior advisers at the Province level and the U.S. Command elements at the various corps headquarters. Just as the VIS chief is required to participate with the province chief and other GVN officials in planning and operating GVN programs, so our CORDS psychological operations staff perform a similar function within the U.S. province team. The providing of advice and support to the provincial VIS operation is the principal duty of these American psychological operations personnel.

Thus, the American structure for information operations parallels in broad outline that of the GVN, permitting a degree of coordination at all levels.


The efficiency of the VIS varies from place to place. Where key officials are dedicated and competent, operations are generally effective. And there are a number of these. Where they are not well motivated and energetic, the programs suffer. And there are some of these {p.659} also. In the past year, two new approaches have been undertaken by the Ministry of Information with our cooperation to try to improve the efficiency of the VIS. These are the planning of a comprehensive series of training courses for various levels of VIS personnel and the regular holding of joint meetings of Saigon and field personnel, usually on a corps area basis. We believe these two measures have had and will continue to have a good effect on the VIS operation. During the current year, we will use the equivalent in counterpart funds of about $63,000 to support the training program. We are also providing the assistance of one American adviser to help develop course materials.


JUSPAO’s liaison with the Ministry itself takes many forms. At the top, I meet frequently with the Minister and his senior staff. At the planning level, JUSPAO policy officers meet daily with Ministry officials to plan joint campaigns, instructions, and guidances to media producers and to field personnel. On the media production side, our writers and editors work together in the publication of magazines, pamphlets, posters, loudspeaker tapes, and radio programs.

I have tried, Mr. Chairman, to describe here the evolution of some of the current major programs we are conducting to assist the GVN in the information and psychological fields. In the expansion of these programs over the years, the American contribution has been substantial. So has the Vietnamese contribution. In the past 2 years, a considerable portion of the load the United States was carrying has been shifted to the GVN. We plan to continue moving in that direction.

Thank you, sir; that is the end of my statement.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Nickel.

How long have you been in charge of this program, Mr. Nickel?

Mr. Nickel. Two years, sir.

The Chairman. Do you live in Saigon?

Mr. Nickel. I do, sir.


The Chairman. I believe you said there were 132 Americans under your immediate direction; is that correct?

Mr. Nickel. We are reducing this year, sir, by 31 positions from 132 American positions to 101 American positions.

The Chairman. Is that in the office in Saigon or how extensive is this?

Mr. Nickel. Those are civilian USIA officers, some serving in Saigon and some in the Provinces. I should add that we also have American military personnel serving with JUSPAO, sir.

The Chairman. You mentioned that in the Provinces you have military advisers who are Americans. Is that right?

Mr. Nickel. We have some civilian advisers in the provinces but the bulk of them are military, sir.

The Chairman. To get some idea of the magnitude of the effort, take the present fiscal year of 1970. Is it correct to say that the civilian positions are 132 or 101?

Mr. Nickel. 101 civilian positions, sir. {p.660}

The Chairman. That is in the current year.

Mr. Nickel. Fiscal year 1970.

The Chairman. How many of these military advisers are assigned to this work?

Mr. Nickel. We have 107 military spaces in JUSPAO, sir.

The Chairman. 208 is the total American personnel?

Mr. Nickel. 208 is the figure, sir.

The Chairman. What is the size of the budget for the USIA operation in Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. The USIA budget for Vietnam, sir, is $6.4 million.

The Chairman. Is that for the year of 1970?

Mr. Nickel. For fiscal year 1970; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Does that include construction or is that only support of the personnel?

Mr. Nickel. That is the USIA component of the budget, sir. Construction would be funded by an AID component of our budget. I will give you these add-ons. We also have $2.4 million funded by AID and $2.1 million funded by the Department of Defense, to make a total budget available to me for JUSPAO’s operations of $10.9 million.

The Chairman. Would that include the pay of the military men to whom you referred?

Mr. Nickel. It does not include military salaries. However, it does include USIA civilian salaries.

The Chairman. The military salaries would be in addition then?

Mr. Nickel. They would be in addition, sir.

The Chairman. Do you have any estimate of what that would cost?

Mr. Nickel. I have no estimate, but I could furnish it for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)



(The military pay and allowances, as reported by the four Military Services whose personnel are involved, amount to $1.2 million.)


The Chairman. What I am trying to get and what we are interested in is the total cost of this overall operation. It is the usual basic material that we would like to have.

Mr. Nickel. I could furnish the information about military pay, sir.


The Chairman. Do these personnel figures include the personnel in the military units not associated with USIA who work in the field of propaganda?

Mr. Nickel. They do not, sir.

The Chairman. Do you know how many people there are in that?

Mr. Nickel. May I furnish that, sir. I have it, but I cannot put my hands on it.

The Chairman. Yes; you can furnish it. Could you give a rough estimate that you can correct later?

Mr. Nickel. Sir, I now have the information. In 1970 there are 761 U.S. military psyops field personnel and 50 serving on staff or as advisers to the Vietnamese, for a total of 811. {p.661}

The Chairman. That is very much larger than your own operation; is it not?

Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.


The Chairman. This brings up a further question. What do you consider to be the mission of your operation? What are you trying to accomplish?

Mr. Nickel. My principal mission, sir, is to assist the Vietnamese Government in developing and conducting an effective program of communications.

The Chairman. Your mission is to assist the Vietnamese Government to create a system of communications. Is that it?

Mr. Nickel. To assist the Vietnamese Government in developing a means of communicating with the electorate and to provide technical and professional advice.

The Chairman. What leads you to believe that the purpose of our Government in establishing the USIA was to create an agency to create a means of communication for a foreign government?

Mr. Nickel. I would answer that, Mr. Chairman, by stating that my operations are responsive to the instructions and directions I receive from the Director of the U.S. Information Agency and from the American Ambassador in Saigon.

The Chairman. Then you would characterize your mission to be to carry out orders. Is that the right way to put it?

Mr. Nickel. In my position; yes, sir.

The Chairman. You have no idea what the real mission of this operation is other than to carry out orders?

Mr. Nickel. I know what my instructions are.


The Chairman. This is a matter, I think, of considerable interest. Let me refer to section 2 of the basic legislation creating this operation:

The Congress hereby declares that the objectives of this Act are to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.

Do you think that language authorizes USIA to create for another country a system of communications for that government and its people?

Mr. Nickel. My organization, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Mr. Chairman, was established in 1965 by order of the President. I would suggest that any justification of the suitability of the mission we are performing is something that should be addressed to the people to whom I report. I would be very happy to address this problem to them.

The Chairman. I think it would be very interesting if you would. You say it was created by Executive order. It was not created by statute. There is no statute law authorizing you to do what you are doing; is there?

Mr. Nickel. I said that the U.S. Public Affairs Office was created as a result of Presidential directive. {p.662}

The Chairman. Yes. And in pursuance of that action you have been directed by your superiors to do what you are doing. So you would not wish to undertake to say what this whole operation is intended to accomplish for the people of the United States; would you?

Mr. Nickel. I believe I said earlier, sir, that my mission in Vietnam was in large measure to assist the Vietnamese Government in developing and improving its means of communicating with its people.


The Chairman. It occurs to me that in this country there has always been not only a great reluctance, but aversion, to the creation of a ministry of information in our Government to inform our own people. Is that not so?

Mr. Nickel. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. Does the law not specifically forbid the USIA to indoctrinate or brainwash, or whatever you want to call it, the American people? Is that not so?

Mr. Nickel. Clearly, sir.

The Chairman. Are you not creating in Vietnam just such an information agency? The way you describe here what you have done and are in the process of doing, it is to create in Vietnam an agency to enable that Government to control its people through this device which we ourselves abhor in this country? How does this seem to you to be consistent with our own views?

Mr. Nickel. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that Vietnam is not unique in possessing a ministry of information. I would also suggest that in Vietnam, as in many other developing societies, there do not exist any strong commercial or nongovernmental media.

The Chairman. Mr. Nickel, I am quite aware that it is not unique. In every dictatorship I know of they have a ministry of information just like this. But we are told, on the one hand, that we are seeking to establish the government of self-determination and this leaves the impression we are seeking to establish a democratic system there.

I quite agree with you that information agencies are typical. They were typical of Hitler’s Germany and typical of nearly every dictatorship and authoritarian government I know of, but I would not have thought we would be a party to helping construct such a governmental apparatus.

Mr. Nickel. Are there not also some regimes we regard as being democratic that have ministries of information?

The Chairman. What, for example, would be one from your point of view?

Mr. Nickel. If I am not mistaken, is there not a French Ministry of Information?

The Chairman. I would not know. Is there one in Sweden, which is a country that I think has achieved a high degree of democracy or self-determination if you like, or England? I do not recall that in England they have a minister of information whose job it is to sell the people of England upon the merits and virtues of that Government. I do not recall ever having heard of it. France has recently gone through a rather unusual evolutionary period, almost revolutionary under De Gaulle, of course, and France may be an example. I would not want to say for sure. I do not know that. {p.663}


How many private newspapers have been closed by the Government of Vietnam during the past year?

Mr. Nickel. I could not give you the number, sir.

The Chairman. There have been several.

Mr. Nickel. There have been several closings.

The Chairman. You say there is not a heavily developed private sector. It is largely because that Government is so sensitive to criticism that they close the private newspapers whenever they criticize the Government. Is that not a fact?

Mr. Nickel. There have been some closings; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do you ever feel a bit uncomfortable in being alined with a government which is so clearly an authoritarian government or do you feel perfectly comfortable in your relationship with that government?

Mr. Nickel. I have no problems in performing my job.

The Chairman. You have no problems. You feel perfectly at home?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.


The Chairman. Coming back to a more pedestrian subject of the costs, could you tell me what is the average pay of the American employees of USIA in Saigon?

Mr. Nickel. The average pay of a USIA employee with JUSPAO, sir, including allowances, minus housing, would be about $28,900.

The Chairman. What is the total cost to the Government of the United States for those employees, including everything? Do they furnish housing?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, housing is furnished, sir. I am unable to break out that figure for an individual. Do you want the total cost?

The Chairman. Perhaps if you could tell me your own. What is your pay and what do your allowances amount to? You are the Director?

Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. What is your total? What is the total cost to the Federal Government?

Mr. Nickel. The combination of my salary and allowances, again making no provision for my housing, is $45,473.

The Chairman. Plus housing?

Mr. Nickel. Housing?

The Chairman. Do they furnish you with a house?

Mr. Nickel. I am furnished with housing.

The Chairman. What would be the reasonable cost of the house that is paid for by the Federal Government?

Mr. Nickel. That is right, the house is paid for by the Federal Government.

The Chairman. How much is that? You ought to know that.

Mr. Nickel. Let me see if I have that, sir.

The Chairman. You have been there for 2 years. You have no idea what that would be?

Mr. Nickel. My house, sir, is a U.S. Government house.

The Chairman. Is it a good house? {p.664}

Mr. Nickel. It is comfortable, sir.

The Chairman. Was it one that the Government built or is it an old villa?

Mr. Nickel. It was there. It is a U.S. Government-owned house.

The Chairman. How many houses does the U.S. Government own in Saigon? Do you know?

Mr. Nickel. I do not know that answer, sir.

The Chairman. Is it several?

Mr. Nickel. It is more than several.

The Chairman. It is more than several.

Then I would estimate your total cost would be somewhat in the neighborhood of at least $50,000.

Mr. Nickel. That would seem right, sir.

The Chairman. Are you furnished an automobile?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Are USIA officials in Saigon given special pay equivalent to combat pay for military people?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir. We receive a differential.

The Chairman. What does it amount to? Is it 25 percent?

Mr. Nickel. Twenty-five percent.


The Chairman. If our Government decides that it is proper to furnish assistance in the building of a propaganda operation for Vietnam, how does it decide in which country to do this? Is this the only country in which we have done this?

Mr. Nickel. Specifically have done what, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Have we created a communications system which enables the government to, as you say, communicate with its citizens? Have we done it in Thailand? Are we doing it or have we done it in Thailand? Does the USIA have a comparable operation in Thailand, may be not on as large a scale but a lesser scale?

Mr. Nickel. Certainly, as you say, not comparable in order of magnitude.

The Chairman. Do we have a similar operation?

Mr. Nickel. I am not — I personally am not aware that—

The Chairman. Are any of your associates?

Mr. Nickel. I am not aware and I do not think my associates are aware that we are doing any such thing as building a TV network or building a radio network. I cannot speak more directly to the specific programs, sir.


The Chairman. Before I leave that, you said you did not know how many newspapers. Do either of your associates know how many newspapers the government of Saigon has closed in the last few years?

Mr. Hays. No, sir.

The Chairman. Is that information not available?

Mr. Osborne. It can be made available. I do not have it available.

The Chairman. Would you supply it for the record?

Mr. Osborne. Yes, sir. {p.665}


(The information referred to follows:)



During 1968 the Government of Viet-Nam indefinitely suspended six newspapers. Sixteen others were temporarily suspended, for an average of 35 days per suspension.

During 1969 through March 23, 1970, the GVN indefinitely suspended 12 newspapers. An additional 14 received temporary suspensions ranging from a few days to almost 11 months, for an average of 46 days per suspension.


The Chairman. I notice in the paper every now and then there is a notice that X paper has been closed by the government. I simply have not made a counting of it, but I am under the impression there have been several.

Mr. Nickel. I will supply it, sir.

The Chairman. Of course the government controls the supply of newsprint and it is no problem for them simply to cut off the newsprint if they wish to close a newspaper. Is that so?

Mr. Nickel. Yes.


The Chairman. Does the USIA, Mr. Nickel, or any other agency attempt to analyze Vietnamese public attitudes periodically?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Have polls been taken?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir; polls have been taken.

The Chairman. How is this done? Is it done by you directly or by contract?

Mr. Nickel. By contract, sir.

The Chairman. What organization has done it?

Mr. Nickel. May I answer that, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I have been informed that you have written the Director of the U.S. Information Agency asking for information about our polling in Vietnam, that this is now under consideration, and that I would prefer to have the information come to you through that channel.

The Chairman. I wrote that letter partly to give you notice that this is a matter in which we are interested. I hoped that you would be prepared to answer it this morning. Are you saying that this is a matter that affects our security and that you do not wish to testify in open session on it?

Mr. Nickel. I prefer not to go beyond stating, sir, that we do engage in polling in Vietnam, as in some other countries.


The Chairmen. {sic: Chairman} Have you been instructed to state to the committee that you will not testify in open session on this matter?

Mr. Nickel. I am not able to discuss the polling in open hearing, sir.

The Chairman. Have you been instructed not to respond to questions about polling?

Mr. Nickel. Yes. sir.

The Chairman. Who instructed you, sir? Did Mr. Shakespeare tell you not to answer such questions? If not, who did? {p.666}

Mr. Nickel. I have been instructed by my principal.

May I have just one moment, sir?

The Chairman. Certainly. You confer with your lawyer if you like.

Mr. Nickel. In answer to your question, sir, I have been instructed by the director of my agency.

The Chairman. Mr. Shakespeare has instructed on this?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What grounds did he give you for instructing you not to reply to this question?

Mr. Nickel. This question is under consideration as to the possible security elements involved.

The Chairman. Possible security involved.

You heard the previous witness, Congressman McCloskey; did you not?

Mr. Nickel. I did, sir.

The Chairman. You realize that this committee has some authority in the authorization of the funds for you agency; do you not?

Mr. Nickel. I am very well aware of that.

The Chairman. We normally expect people in USIA to respond to questions about their operations if they expect this committee to authorize any funds for the agency. You realize that; do you not?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Does Mr. Shakespeare realize that?

Mr. Nickel. I cannot speak for Mr. Shakespeare, sir.

The Chairman. I want to make it clear that I do not accept your reason for refusing to answer. It is a perfectly legitimate question. You are engaged in an activity which is very dubious in its authority under an executive order, in any case, and I think that you should be very careful in refusing to answer questions about these operations.

I would like to know how much you paid, for example, for a contract to take a poll in Vietnam and see how it compares to polls in this country. Would you be willing to say how much you paid for the poll?

Mr. Nickel. I do not believe I am able to, sir.

The Chairman. Who was the gentleman who advised you not to answer? Was he sworn also?

Mr. Nickel. The gentleman with whom I just talked did not advise me not to answer.

The Chairman. He did not?

Mr. Nickel. I wanted to check something with him. He is the General Counsel of the U.S. Information Agency.

The Chairman. He did not advise you as to your instructions.

It is very unusual. I did not expect you to refuse to answer these questions. One reason why I sent that letter inquiring about these matters was, as I say, to alert the Agency that we are interested in the poll.

When was the latest poll taken? Will you refuse to answer that?

Mr. Nickel. I find myself unable to answer it, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. You mean by saving “unable” that you do not know?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. Do either of your associates know when the latest poll was taken?

Mr. Nickel. I believe, sir, that they are bound by the same instructions. {p.667}


The Chairman. I asked you if you were instructed to tell it. There is a difference between your answer if you know, and are instructed not to tell and if you do not know. I want to make the answer clear. On what grounds are you refusing to say when the latest poll was taken?

Mr. Nickel. I am under instructions, sir, not to discuss this subject.

The Chairman. Then you do know when it was, but you are under instructions not to discuss the subject. You are in effect taking the equivalent of the Fifth Amendment; is that correct?

Mr. Nickel. No.

The Chairman. Why is that not correct? You do not consider that the USIA is a sensitive undertaking similar to the CIA; do you?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. Usually your activities are open and above board; are they not?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You are not authorized to engage in covert operations; are you?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. Would you be willing to answer this kind of question? What was the poll about? Did it ask about the attitude of the local citizens toward Americans?

Mr. Nickel. I find, sir, in line with my instructions, that I am unable to discuss the subject of polling.

The Chairman. You would not discuss as to whether or not the poll involved the question of the extent of the support of the Vietnamese people for the Thieu government?

Mr. Nickel. I do not believe, sir, in line with my instructions, that I am able to respond.

The Chairman. I may say before I leave this subject, this is very unsatisfactory. I regret very much, and I hope you will tell your superior, Mr. Shakespeare, that, speaking for myself, I very much regret this attitude. This committee is entitled to know what the poll cost, what it asked, and what the results were.

This is not a document, it seems to me, that comes under executive privilege. It has nothing whatever to do with the President directly. I mean it is not a confidential document. It is a matter that is paid for by the public funds of the Government, and the committee is entitled to actually have the poll, in my opinion, and we shall ask for it. I regret he gave you such instructions.


Do the U.S. advisers work with the Vietnamese on matters involving TV and radio program content and makeup?

Mr. Nickel. Our advisers work with both radio and TV. They occasionally are involved in the format of a program.

The Chairman. Do they work with them in the preparation of printed information materials?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir. {p.668}


The Chairman. Was the case of Tran Ngoc Chau reported over the Vietnamese radio and television stations?

Mr. Nickel. I can only assume it was. I would have to retire to an assumption because I was not in Saigon at that particular time, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Are you familiar with the Chau case?

Mr. Nickel. I have read about it; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do you know Mr. Chau?

Mr. Nickel. I do not, sir.

The Chairman. Do either of your associates know whether or not the radio and television stations of Vietnam carried any news about Mr. Chau?

Mr. Hays. No, sir.

The Chairman. You do not know?

Mr. Hays. No, sir.

The Chairman. You do not know?

Mr. Osborne. No, sir; I do not.

The Chairman. Were any printed materials put out by the South Vietnamese Government on this case?

Mr. Nickel. I do not know, sir. I can find out.

The Chairman. In your statement you say “JUSPAO’s liaison with the Ministry itself takes many forms.” That is the Ministry of Information.

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You say:

At the top, I meet frequently with the Minister and his senior staff. At the planning level, JUSPAO policy officers meet daily with Ministry officials to plan joint campaigns, instructions and guidances to media producers and to field personnel. On the media production side, our writers and editors work together in the publication of magazines, pamphlets, posters, loudspeaker tapes, and radio programs.

In doing all of that, do you still say you do not know whether anything was put out on the Chau case?

Mr. Nickel. If I may offer a brief explanation, sir, our relationship with the Ministry would deal with things like support of the pacification program, but would not consist of liaison in terms of tactical matters. We have never had occasion to discuss the Chau case with anyone in the Ministry.

The Chairman. Did our advisers or did you advise against the public attacks on Chau by the Government media?

Mr. Nickel. I have never personally been involved in the Chau case in any way, sir.

The Chairman. Did any of your employees under your direction give any advice whatever about the Chau case?

Mr. Nickel. I do not believe so, sir. Again, I wish to state that I myself was absent from Saigon during most of this period, but I believe that they did not.


The Chairman. Does the Minister of Information in Saigon ever ask your advice about the formulation of his Government’s public position on major issues? {p.669}

Mr. Nickel. My discussions with the Minister in line with my own responsibilities, sir, are concerned more with the operations of the Vietnamese Information Service program than with substance.

The Chairman. Then are you saying you do not give him advice about substantive measures; is that right?

Mr. Nickel. My advice is primarily operational.

The Chairman. Is it exclusively?

Mr. Nickel. No. We might, for example, Mr. Chairman, discuss how best to promote or to conduct information campaigns in support of the People’s Self-Defense Force, and matters like that which fall within the pacification and development program.

I think I should point out that I am not responsible, Mr. Chairman, for our press operation in Vietnam. That responsibility falls to a colleague of mine who is the special assistant for press affairs to the Ambassador.

As the director of JUSPAO I do not speak for the Embassy on press affairs.

The Chairman. What is his name?

Mr. Nickel. Mr. Newman.

The Chairman. Is he in Saigon now?

Mr. Nickel. He is in Saigon, sir.

The Chairman. Have you discussed with the Information Minister the South Vietnamese refusal to attend the opening of the expanded Paris talks?

Mr. Nickel. I did not, sir.

The Chairman. Did you discuss with him what the official reaction to the death of Ho Chi Minh would be?

Mr. Nickel. We had some discussion with the Ministry of Information about this matter; yes, sir.

The Chairman. What was your advice to them with regard to how to treat the death of Ho Chi Minh?

Mr. Nickel. We agreed, sir, that a maximum effort should be made to inform the enemy forces in Vietnam of Ho’s death. We also agreed that our treatment should be straight information, and that there should not be any exultation in our output to the enemy forces.


The Chairman. Do you or any of your officials ever advise President Thieu or other GVN officials on the potntial {sic: potential} impact in other countries of policy matters, particularly about the potential impact in the United States of GVN policies?

Mr. Nickel. I do not advise Vietnamese officials about the impact on the United States or the impact on American public opinion, sir.

The Chairman. Does anyone?

Mr. Nickel. I presume this is discussed, but not by me, sir.

The Chairman. You do not know of it. You are not aware of any such advice?

Mr. Nickel. Not specifically; no, sir.

The Chairman. You are not aware of any advice that was given to Mr. Thieu or anyone else in the higher echelons of the Government as to the possible reaction in this country of the imprisonment of Mr. Chau?

Mr. Nickel. As I said earlier, I was not involved in the Chau case. I do not know. {p.670}

The Chairman. It would not be a deep involvement.

Has there ever been any discussion with them about the impact in this country of his imprisonment of Mr. Dzu? Do you know about Mr. Dzu?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You are aware of who he is?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do you know what happened to him?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Did you ever advise them as to what the reaction in this country is to his imprisonment?

Mr. Nickel. I have never advised the Minister of Information about impact on U.S. public opinion.

The Chairman. Do any U.S. personnel ever assist Vietnamese officials in the writing of speeches?

Mr. Nickel. Certainly no one in my organization, to the best of my knowledge.

The Chairman. Are U.S. officials consulted by Vietnamese officials in the handling of statements that relate to U.S. policy?

Mr. Nickel. I presume so, sir, but not within my cognizance so far as my organization is concerned.

The Chairman. You do not know anything about it anyway?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.


The Chairman. Are any Americans attached directly to the Minister of Information’s office?

Mr. Nickel. We have one or two Americans, Mr. Chairman, who are physically located in the Ministry of Information headquarters building for liaison purposes. They are not attached directly to the office of the Minister.

The Chairman. What is their function?

Mr. Nickel. They perform liaison in terms of our overall advisory efforts. I believe the thrust of your question was whether any of my officers are attached directly to the office of the Minister. No one serves directly on the Minister’s staff, sir.

The Chairman. There is no such thing as an adviser to the Minister of Information?

Mr. Nickel. We have advisers to various elements of the Ministry. There is no adviser to the Minister, sir.


The Chairman. I do not know enough about it to make a distinction. Could you tell us the distinction? I mean advisers to an element. What is an element? It is a person; is it not? You advise people; do you not?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What do you mean by that?

Mr. Nickel. We have advisers who work with the radio network. We have advisers who work with the TV network.

The Chairman. What do they do?

Mr. Nickel. We have advisers who work with the Vietnamese Information Service. {p.671}

The Chairman. About what do they advise them? Do they not advise them about U.S. policy?

Mr. Nickel. Most of their advice, sir, is concerned with improving operational efficiency of the various elements of the Information Ministry.

The Chairman. How do you improve the efficiency without any attention to the substance which they are using? Do you mean to say they are concerned only with the technical operation of the broadcast system?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir. With respect to the Vietnamese Information Service, for example, our advisers would be concerned with discussing with their Ministry counterparts how best, for example, to support and promote the various objectives of the pacification and development program.


The Chairman. How has your Agency handled the Mylai massacre theme during the past several months?

Mr. Nickel. JUSPAO, sir, has handled the Mylai incident by taking the position that a serious investigation is underway by the U.S. Government and that if a crime has been committed, the U.S. Government will try the personnel concerned. In other words, we have not in any way attempted to be evasive. We take the position it is under investigation and we have to wait and see what the investigation reveals.

The Chairman. What has been the position of the Vietnamese Information Service regarding these incidents?

Mr. Nickel. I think the Vietnamese Information Service position has been very similar to ours, sir.

The Chairman. Did the USIA or other American advisers offer advice to the Government of South Vietnam about the handling of this matter?

Mr. Nickel. Our policy people in JUSPAO discussed it with the policy people in the Ministry of Information with respect to the guidance that should be given to the psyop media.

The Chairman. Did the Vietnamese Government play down the incident as being of little importance?

Mr. Nickel. It has been treated in the Vietnamese press. I am unable to say myself whether the Vietnamese Government played it down, sir. It certainly has been mentioned in the Vietnamese media.

The Chairman. Would you say that it had been emphasized or was it deemphasized as a matter of great significance?

Mr. Nickel. It certainly has not been emphasized, sir.


The Chairman. How has the USIA treated the Communist massacres at Hue in the program aimed at the Vietnamese people through leaflets, newspapers, or television?

Mr. Nickel. We have done our best to assist the Vietnamese in telling the story of the massacres at Hue, sir.

The Chairman. Has the USIA itself in its own pamphlets, newspapers and programs emphasized the massacre at Hue?

Mr. Nickel. We in JUSPAO have provided material to USIA for use by USIA posts in other countries, sir. {p.672}


The Chairman. What is the function of the North Vietnamese Affairs Division of JUSPAO?

Mr. Nickel. The North Vietnamese Affairs Division of JUSPAO, sir, is a staff office which seeks to keep abreast of the propaganda developments involving the North. It is concerned with release to the media of certain enemy documents. It also releases material of a more general nature about certain enemy attitudes, activities, and practices.


The Chairman. Are any psychological operations being carried out against North Vietnam at the present time?

Mr. Nickel. With respect to the operation that I am responsible for, sir, I know of nothing but radio broadcasting.

The Chairman. There are no aerial drops being made of printed material?

Mr. Nickel. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. Have there ever been any made in the past?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Could you give a brief description of their magnitude and purpose?

Mr. Nickel. I could supply that for the record, sir. I cannot describe the magnitude of them since they were discontinued some time ago.

The Chairman. When were these air drops terminated?

Mr. Nickel. At the time of the bombing halt, sir.

The Chairman. They ran coincidentally with the bombing in the north; that right?

Mr. Nickel. They took place at the same time. They were not operationally—

The Chairman. No, I mean they went on at the same time.

Mr. Nickel. And they were discontinued at the same time.

(The information referred to follows:)


Beginning in 1965, propaganda leaflets were released from aircraft operating over North Viet-Nam, or were dropped over waters outside the boundaries of North Viet-Nam and wind-drifted into the country. Until March 31, 1968, this program was designed generally to convince North Viet-Nam — both people and regime — that North Vietnamese aggression in South Viet-Nam would fail, to motivate North Viet-Nam to seek peaceful settlement of the conflict, and to warn the people to stay away from military targets because they were subject to air strike. At its peak, the program involved some 25 million leaflets per month.

Following the partial bombing halt announced on March 31, 1968, leaflet targets were restricted to those south of 20 degrees North Latitude. The primary objective of these leaflets was that of keeping the people in the area aware of efforts by the Government of Viet-Nam and the United States to bring about a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

After the total bombing halt of November 1, 1968, the leaflet program over North Viet-Nam was terminated.



The Chairman. I am not sure this question has been quite clarified. Is it fair to say your operation in all phases of the information, psychological warfare program in Vietnam costs approximately $10 million? Did you say it cost about $10 million?

Mr. Nickel. I said that the money that fell within my area of responsibility was $10.9 million. {p.673}

The Chairman. It does not include the military?

Mr. Nickel. It does not include the military.

The Chairman. The military I remember now you said had 800 people against your 81?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I guess if yours is $10 million, theirs is $80 million, Is it fair to say we spend $80 million or $100 million on propaganda?

Mr. Nickel. I would hesitate to answer that.

The Chairman. What?

Mr. Nickel. I would hesitate to even speculate on what the cost is, sir.

The Chairman. Would you venture a guess?

Mr. Nickel. I just have no base on which to make such a judgment.

The Chairman. We would like very much to have an idea of the total cost. Of course, I realize the Pentagon has an enormous propaganda operation in many places far greater than yours. I wondered whether you could give an estimate.


Did I understand you to say that radio broadcasting is not beamed to the North?

Mr. Nickel. I did not say. Some of it is, sir.

The Chairman. Some of it is, presently.

Mr. Nickel. Yes.


The Chairman. Do you have anything whatever to do with Radio Free Asia?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. Did you ever hear of it?

Mr. Nickel. I think I have. I am not sure of the title.

The Chairman. Do you know what it is? Do you know where the broadcasts come from?

Mr. Nickel. No, I do not.

The Chairman. Do they not come from Korea?

Mr. Nickel. I personally am not familiar with that.

Mr. The Chairman.  To your knowledge, can you hear them in Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. I am not aware of that.

The Chairman. If you can, you do not know it.

Mr. Nickel. I do not.

The Chairman. I do not either, but we have seen these letters soliciting donations to Radio Free Asia. They state that they beam radio programs all over Asia. I do not know that they say specifically Vietnam. I do not know whether they do either. It came to my attention a few weeks ago. You do not know whether you make any contribution to that operation or not.

Mr. Nickel. We make no contribution, sir.


The Chairman. Do you know how much the Vietnamese Government spent on their psychological warfare in the current year and last year, either one or both? {p.674}

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Ministry of Information, sir, in its current fiscal year budget is spending $19.7 million.

The Chairman. $19.7 million?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Is that budget this current year, 1970?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Is that up or down? What was it compared to last year; do you know it?

Mr. Nickel. That is up, sir. Last year it was $9.6 million, sir.

The Chairman. From $9 to $19 million in 1 year?

Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. How do you account for such a large increase?

Mr. Nickel. I believe I mentioned earlier, sir, that there was a sizable increase in personnel which accounted for a good part of this increase from $9 to $19 million, but not all of it. There was also a substantial increase in program money.

The Chairman. How much of that do we furnish, directly or indirectly?

Mr. Nickel. The $19 million which I cited, sir, is from the GVN’s regular budget. There are no counterpart funds in that.

The Chairman. Do you know how much is planned for next year?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.


The Chairman. Do you know how much you have or are planning for fiscal year 1971 for your operations?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir. We plan to have a budget figure of $8.4 million, sir.

The Chairman. For next year?

Mr. Nickel. Next year.

The Chairman. That again does not include the military or any allied?

Mr. Nickel. It does not include the military, although it does include, as I believe you are aware, the AID and DOD funds that are available to JUSPAO.


The Chairman. Has the film, “The Silent Majority” been distributed in Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. It has, sir.

The Chairman. By you? By the USIA?

Mr. Nickel. We made it available to Vietnamese television and to the National Motion Picture Center of Vietnam. It was shown on the GVN television network and in commercial theaters.

The Chairman. Would you estimate how many Vietnamese have seen it?

Mr. Nickel. I will supply an estimate, sir.

(The information referred to follows:) {p.675}




In South Vietnam, the GVN’s Ministry of Information (MOI) was the sole distributor of the film “The Silent Majority.” MOI estimated that 1.2 million persons saw the showings of the film on the national television network, and that an additional 300,000 urban viewers saw the film in theaters in six major cities, for an overall total of 1.5 million.


The Chairman. It would be apparently a very substantial amount. Have you any measure of public reaction to that firm?

Mr. Nickel. We did not undertake any specific evaluation.

The Chairman. Has anyone that you know?

Mr. Nickel. I am not aware that anyone did.


The Chairman. Coming back for a moment, it inspires me to ask a further question about the polls. Have you been instructed to decline to discuss the polling in Vietnam or all polls — any poll in any other country?

Mr. Nickel. Well, the only polling that would come within my purview would be that in Vietnam, sir.

The Chairman. The USIA takes polls in other countries; does it not?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. They are about public attitudes toward the United States and its policies? That has been a practice for a long time; has it not?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You do not know about them and cannot testify about them; is that right?

Mr. Nickel. When I say I do not know about them, I mean that I just do not know in detail anything about them and obviously could not speak to what they were about, sir.

The Chairman. Were you in the USIA before you went to Saigon?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Where did you serve before that?

Mr. Nickel. In Japan, sir.

The Chairman. In Japan?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. While you were in Japan, did you take polls there?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Are you at liberty to discuss the polls you took in Japan?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. You are instructed not to discuss them; is that it?

Mr. Nickel. I am instructed not to discuss polls.

The Chairman. It is very unusual. Where did you serve besides Japan?

Mr. Nickel. I have served in Burma, and I have served in Washington, sir.

The Chairman. Did you take polls in Burma?

Mr. Nickel. To the best of my recollection, I do not believe we did, but that was some years ago.

The Chairman. You do not believe you did?

Mr. Nickel. I just cannot give you a definitive answer. {p.676}


The Chairman. Is the USIA taking a tape of these proceedings?

Mr. Nickel. I am unaware if they are taping these proceedings.

The Chairman. You would know if they are; would you not?

Mr. Nickel. Let us just say that I am unaware if they are.

The Chairman. I wondered how efficient they were in reporting all these matters.


How many newspapers, magazines or other periodicals does the United States publish or print that are aimed at Vietnamese audiences?

Mr. Nickel. We publish, Mr. Chairman, or I should say we assist the Vietnamese in publishing, a pacification newsheet {sic: news-sheet}, a weekly called “Vietnam Today,” in 600,000 copies per issue.

The Chairman. 600,000?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Is that a newspaper type of publication?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. 600,000 copies are published weekly?

Mr. Nickel. 600,000 copies.

The Chairman. Is that given away? What happens to it? I was interested.

Mr. Nickel. It is given away, sir. It is distributed through the Vietnamese information service and it is more or less a vehicle for the Central Pacification and Development Council. In other words, it concentrates on developments in the pacification field.

The Chairman. It is printed in Vietnamese?

Mr. Nickel. Printed in Vietnamese, sir.

The Chairman. Is the cost of printing that a part of your budget?

Mr. Nickel. The printing cost is part of my budget.

The Chairman. What would it cost a week to put out 600,000 copies of that?

Mr. Nickel. $2,400.

The Chairman. Where is it printed?

Mr. Nickel. Printed in Saigon, sir. Part of it — I might say that half of the printing now is handled by the Ministry of Information and half is handled by the USIA.

The Chairman. Does the USIA have a printing plant in Saigon?

Mr. Nickel. JUSPAO has a small printing plant.

The Chairman. JUSPAO. Is it large enough to print this?

Mr. Nickel. This is not printed entirely by JUSPAO. Half of the circulation — in other words, 300,000, sir — is printed by the Ministry of Information printing plant, and the other half by JUSPAO.

The Chairman. Who determines the material that goes into this publication?

Mr. Nickel. Most of the editorial work on this newspaper now is done by the Ministry of Information, sir.


The Chairman. There is another newspaper called “Free South.”

Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. Is it published biweekly? {p.677}

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. How many of those are published?

Mr. Nickel. This is published in an edition of 1.3 million copies. It is a small 8 by 10 sized newspaper. It is air dropped into contested areas.

The Chairman. Being published twice a week that is 2.6 million a week; is that correct?

Mr. Nickel. I am sorry, sir; it is published every 2 weeks, not two a week.

The Chairman. Every 2 weeks?

Mr. Nickel. Every 2 weeks, sir.


The Chairman. I notice here another one called “Rural Spirit.” Are you familiar with that?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What is that? Describe it. Is it a magazine?

Mr. Nickel. The Vietnamese name for Rural Spirit is Huong Que. It is a magazine designed largely for rural audiences, and it is to a great extent agricultural in its approach. It has a monthly circulation of 565,000, sir.

The Chairman. How many pages is a typical issue of that magazine?

Mr. Nickel. Thirty-six pages.

The Chairman. Thirty-six pages. Is it slick paper or what?

Mr. Nickel. No; it is not slick.

The Chairman. Is it a picture magazine?

Mr. Nickel. It has some illustrations, but it is not basically a picture magazine.

The Chairman. Where is it printed?

Mr. Nickel. It is printed in Manila at our regional service center.

The Chairman. Printed in Manila?

Mr. Nickel. At the U.S. Information Agency Regional Service Center. We have a large printing plant there.


The Chairman. Do we have a large printing plant there?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What countries does it service?

Mr. Nickel. It serves for the most part, sir, USIA posts in the East Asia and Pacific area.


The Chairman. Would you say that the Free South newspaper has the largest circulation of any newspaper in Asia outside of Japan and mainland China?

Mr. Nickel. Well, it is a magazine. I just would not be able to make that judgment. It has a very high circulation, if you discount Free South which — are we talking about Huong Que?

The Chairman. Take both of them. One is a newspaper and one is a magazine? {p.678}

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Would you say they have the largest circulation of their kind, both magazine and newspaper, in Asia outside of Japan and mainland China?

Mr. Nickel. I could not make that judgment. They certainly are the largest in Vietnam.

The Chairman. You do not know of any that is larger; do you?

Mr. Nickel. I do not know, sir.


The Chairman. Did you answer the question of what countries the printing office in Manila serves? Does it serve all countries in Asia? Could you tell us how large that operation is?

Mr. Nickel. It exists to provide backstopping for our USIS posts in Asia, Mr. Chairman. If you would like specific information on the plant, I shall see that the appropriate parties in my agency furnish it.

(The information referred to follows:)



USIA’s Regional Service Center in Manila has three main functions: (1) producing publications originated by USIA in Washington for distribution to USIS posts in Asia; (2) producing publications originated by USIS posts in Asia for their own use; and (3) editing and producing regional publications. Products include magazines, photo newspaper inserts, leaflets, posters and “fast pamphlets.” The latter, frequently full texts of Presidential statements, are keyed to major foreign policy events in which the time element is important.

Among the 11 American and 231 Filipino employees currently at the Regional Service Center are editors, artists, photo specialists and skilled printing technicians. The estimated operating budget for FY 1971 is $2,566,000, which includes printing service performed for other U.S. Government agencies on a reimbursement basis.



The Chairman. Is this magazine I have here, The Face of Anguish, Vietnam, an issue of the Rural Spirit?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. This is not its name; is it? What is this issue? It is a picture magazine; I think it came from you.

Mr. Nickel. I do not — I cannot recognize it.

The Chairman. No; this comes from Free Asia Press, Manila, I am sorry. Is that part of our operation?

Mr. Nickel. I do not recognize the magazine, sir.

The Chairman. Since you are in the business, maybe I will give it to you and ask you to see if you can identify it for us. It does not seem to be identified. I do not know what the Free Asia Press is. It is a very elaborate magazine and beautifully done. Who would you say is the sponsor of that?

Mr. Nickel. I would just say that — I have never seen it, and it does not appear to me to be one of our products.

The Chairman. Who would publish such a magazine except us?

Mr. Nickel. I do not know. {p.679}


The Chairman. Here is another one. It has no identification whatsoever. It is called, “Who Are the Vietcong?” Have you ever seen that pamphlet?

Mr. Nickel. That is ours.

The Chairman. It is not identified. There is nothing in it, I am told by the staff, that would identify it as being your publication. Is that the normal way we operate? We do not identify our publications?

Mr. Nickel. No; I would not say that is normal.

The Chairman. What proportion would you say are attributed to us and are identifiable as our publications and what proportion are not?

Mr. Nickel. It would be very hard to give a percentage. It is an English language publication, I believe, Senator. I would feel comfortable in saying that most of our English language publications are attributed.

The Chairman. Do you know where this was distributed? Was it distributed in South Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. Since it is an English language version, sir, I would assume that some numbers were used in South Vietnam, but I would also assume that the English language version was prepared for use primarily outside of Vietnam.

The Chairman. In the United States?

Mr. Nickel. No; not in the United States.

The Chairman. Where outside of Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. For use by posts other than Vietnam.

The Chairman. By the USIA?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You prepared it in Saigon?

Mr. Nickel. It was — may I inquire?

The Chairman. Do you want to look at it or are you familiar with it?

Mr. Nickel. May we see it, sir? The reason I am pausing is because I am not sure whether it was a JUSPAO publication or a USIA publication.

I can find out for you, sir, and supply the information.

The Chairman. But it is a pamphlet which you prepared and published?

Mr. Nickel. We are sure it is a pamphlet in which we were involved. But whether JUSPAO prepared it or USIA prepared it, I do not know.

The Chairman. Would that kind of magazine be printed in Manila rather than in Saigon?

Mr. Nickel. Yes; it would be.

The Chairman. Where would it be distributed? It would not be distributed in Japan; would it?

Mr. Nickel. That would depend on what posts ordered it, sir. Japan certainly would not use large numbers in English.

The Chairman. Will you be able to find out where that was printed and for whom and where it was distributed?

Mr. Nickel. I will see that that information is developed.

The Chairman. Will you supply it for the record, please?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:) {p.680}



The pamphlet “Who Are the Viet Cong?” was initially prepared in English by USIA in Washington for overseas distribution as part of USIA’s worldwide information program. Texts and photos were initially sent to USIA’s Regional Service Center (RSC) in Manila, where 10,250 pilot copies were printed in August 1966. Some 10,000 of these were printed for USIA, for distribution to USIS posts ordering them. There were additional printings at RSC Manila for USIS posts in Saigon, Canberra and Tel Aviv in 1967.

JUSPAO prepared a Vietnamese language version which was printed at RSC Manila in several press runs from December 1966 to March 1967, in a total of 300,000 copies. This version was distributed in South Viet-Nam.



The Chairman. Is any material of this kind without identification ever distributed in the United States?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. You are sure about that?

Mr. Nickel. I am sure to the extent that I am very well aware of the need to keep it out of the United States, and we are always cognizant of this restriction.

The Chairman. If it is not identified, how would you keep it out? What is to prevent someone from distributing it here when there is no way of telling who printed it and where it came from except to the initiated?

Mr. Nickel. In terms of USIS use of materials of this sort, all USIS posts, and all USIS personnel would be aware of the necessity to avoid its introduction into the United States.


The Chairman. On a recent visit to Saigon, two members of the staff of this committee were given this booklet called, “Vietnam, the View Beyond the Battle.” Are you familiar with it?

Mr. Nickel. I have seen it.

The Chairman. This was part of the materials in a welcoming kit.

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. When you say you have seen it, who published it? Did you publish it? It also does not have a date on it.

Mr. Nickel. I believe it was printed at our regional service center in Manila.

The Chairman. It is a very elaborate magazine with extremely fine workmanship in its maps and photographs. There is a magnificent photograph of Thieu and Ky and President Lyndon B. Johnson taken in February of 1966. It does not say itself when it was printed. Can you tell us when this was printed?

Mr. Nickel. I believe, sir, that that was printed at our regional service center in Manila. I believe it was a USAID project, and the cost of printing—

The Chairman. Was it prepared at your request for distribution in Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. I believe it was prepared by a contract writer for AID and I believe printing was at AID expense. However, I make that statement subject to check.

The Chairman. I asked the AID Director the day before yesterday if he had ever seen it. I thought perhaps it was his, but he had no {p.681} knowledge of it. He said he had never seen it and knew nothing about it.

Mr. Nickel. I believe, sir, it was printed 2 or 3 years ago.

The Chairman. He said he knew nothing about it, and he left the impression that he did not think it was an AID project. Again I raise the same question because it is such a fine piece of work. What is the purpose of publishing in English such a fine magazine and what is the distribution of it? Could you find that out on this one too?

Mr. Nickel. I will find out on that, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)



In 1967, because the Government of Viet-Nam wanted to tell to its citizens the story of developing nationhood in South Viet-Nam and because USAID especially was providing advice and assistance in the development, JUSPAO was requested to prepare a one-time publication, “Viet-Nam: The View Beyond the Battle.” Information and photos were furnished by the GVN and USAID, with JUSPAO assuming coordinating responsibility for text, editing, layout and printing. The Vietnamese language publication was printed in 100,000 copies at USIA’s Regional Service Center (RSC), at JUSPAO’s request, for distribution in Viet-Nam.

An English language version was also printed in 68,500 copies. They were ordered by and shipped to JUSPAO and to USIS posts, at Manila, Djakarta, Bonn, Wellington, Canberra, Kuala Lumpur, Lusaka, Lagos, Stockholm, Taipei, Georgetown, Quito, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Rangoon, Suva, Copenhagen, Bern, Kabul, Brussels and Reykjavik.

From the JUSPAO supply, some 5,000 copies were provided to USAID for use in a briefing kit for distribution to visitors, journalists, incoming USAID officers and other persons inquiring about USAID’s activities. Until early 1968 the U.S. Mission Press Center in Saigon, which operates under American Embassy supervision, distributed copies to newsmen.



The Chairman. I do not quite understand why magazines of this kind are not identified as to source. It obviously raises a very interesting question.

Mr. Nickel. I will furnish the information to the committee.

(The information referred to follows:)



As was pointed out in Mr. Nickel’s opening statement, one of the roles performed by JUSPAO is assistance in the production of information materials by the GVN. In 1967, when “Viet-Nam: The View Beyond the Battle” was first printed, the GVN did not have the capacity to produce magazines of this type. In developing this particular project with and for the GVN, JUSPAO decided that this and similar publications might also have an audience in third countries as well. If attribution were given rightfully to the GVN, such attribution could limit USIS use overseas. On the other hand, if attribution were given to USAID or JUSPAO, it could limit or embarrass the GVN’s use of the publication in Viet-Nam. As has been noted earlier, JUSPAO assisted the GVN by providing 100,000 copies of the publication in the Vietnamese language. Accordingly, a decision was made not to positively identify this type publication with either the GVN or U.S. agencies, thereby permitting all interested parties to distribute it through their own outlets.



The Chairman. Do you know who would make the contracts for the publication of such magazines? Put it this way: Has USIA ever made a contract for a similar magazine even though it is not this one? {p.682}

Have you ever asked the regional office to publish for your purposes an unidentified magazine?

Mr. Nickel. Let me answer that by saying we would occasionally use contract personnel to prepare products for us, but the use of a contract writer would not in any way be related to the decision as to whether the product would be attributed or unattributed. I do not myself know why this publication is not an attributed product.

The Chairman. Does your office ever ask for magazines similar to this from the regional office in Manila?

Mr. Nickel. We occasionally order publications from the regional office in Manila.

The Chairman. When you do, do you specify whether they are to be attributed to you or not? Is that decision left up to the regional office?

Mr. Nickel. If they are in English, sir, and they already exist, they already are either attributed or unattributed, so we would not get involved in the attribution. I think I am correct in assuming that most are attributed. If we are doing Vietnamese versions of basic English language publications that originate at the Manila plant, then it would be up to JUSPAO to decide whether we wanted them attributed.

The Chairman. On what basis do you decide whether it is attributed to you or not attributed to you? What is the criteria?

Mr. Nickel. Well, speaking for myself alone—

The Chairman. You ought to speak for the Agency. I do not want you to speak only for yourself, but you can do both.

Mr. Nickel. If you will allow me to speak—

The Chairman. Speak for yourself and then speak for the agency. That is right.

Mr. Nickel. In making the decision as to whether something is to be attributed or not, I generally follow the policy that anything that is explaining some aspect of U.S. policy or U.S. society, should have attribution to the United States. In fact, attribution adds to the credibility of it.

The Chairman. How do you decide when not to attribute it? What is your objective?

Mr. Nickel. Let me put it this way. I have another area of operations in Vietnam where I am engaged in helping the Vietnamese publish materials. Obviously, I do not attribute such materials to my own organization.


The Chairman. They would not publish materials in English; would they?

Mr. Nickel. They publish some materials in English.

The Chairman. Do they?

Mr. Nickel. A few, for use abroad.

The Chairman. For use where?

Mr. Nickel. Well, for use abroad.

The Chairman. In the United States?

Mr. Nickel. Yes.

The Chairman. Really?

Mr. Nickel. But these are not materials I am involved in. {p.683}

The Chairman. But they do publish materials in English that are then distributed in the United States?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, occasionally, sir.

The Chairman. I did not know that. Of how many do you know?

Mr. Nickel. I would have to determine that.

The Chairman. Have you any examples of it?

Mr. Nickel. I have no examples with me, sir.

The Chairman. What would be the objective of such publications? To what are they directed?

Mr. Nickel. Well, when I say for use in the United States, they publish on their own behalf without assistance from us some materials for use overseas. They publish these in French and in English, and I can only assume that some of the material they publish in English, unilaterally, is made available to their Embassy in Washington.

Now, I want to make it very clear, Mr. Chairman, these are aspects of their operation that I am not officially involved in; I provide neither support for, nor assistance in any way.

The Chairman. And no advice?

Mr. Nickel. And no advice.

The Chairman. They do it all on their own?

Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. Could you supply for the record some recent examples of publications that the Vietnamese Government has made in English?

Mr. Nickel. I will, sir.

The Chairman. Give us a few examples during the last year to see what they are doing.

(The information referred to follows:)



Sample materials provided through the Embassy of Viet-Nam include “Fighters for Peace,” “Communist Atrocities During the Latest Offensives,” and “Viet-Nam Bulletin.”



The Chairman. With regard to these other publications, we mentioned three, I believe, the Rural Spirit, which has 565,000, and the Vietnam Today, with 600,000, and the Free South with 1.3 million per edition.

Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. There are nine other publications which I will not take the time to go into at length. I will name them and I think these are correct. This is material which we obtained in Saigon.

A magazine called Mother Heart. Long Me is the way you pronounce it in Vietnamese. It is published bimonthly in 200,000 copies per issue.

There is a magazine called Culture-Drama published bimonthly, 12,000 per issue.


What is “Mother Heart”?

Mr. Nickel. Long Me, sir, is a publication of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi. We provide considerable assistance to the publication. {p.684}

We print it. It is designed to explain and promote the Chieu Hoi program largely in the sense of informing families of prospective Chieu Hoi ralliers.

The Chairman. This is intended for the Vietcong whom you want to come over; is that right?

Mr. Nickel. No; it is intended for families on the South Vietnamese side who may have relatives serving with the enemy. It provides these families with better information about the program. Also, one of its secondary objectives is to supply more information about the program to the Vietnamese officials who themselves are concerned with Chieu Hoi.


The Chairman. What is the magazine Culture-Drama about?

Mr. Nickel. It is known as the Van Tac Vu magazine, Mr. Chairman. It is a magazine designed to provide program material — songs, skits, and general raw material — for a great number of culture-drama teams which exist in Vietnam. The culture-drama form is a very attractive one.

The Chairman. Culture-drama has nothing to do with the theater, I guess.

Mr. Nickel. It is folk theater touring—

The Chairman. Is there a theater in Saigon?

Mr. Nickel. There is opera, renovated opera, classical.

The Chairman. Do they have a local opera company?

Mr. Nickel. There are performances.

The Chairman. Are they traveling people that we bring in?

Mr. Nickel. No; this would be more on the order of classical Vietnamese drama. When I say opera, I mean classical Vietnamese opera which is not unrelated to Chinese opera.

The Chairman. Do we determine the subject matter of a magazine of that kind?

Mr. Nickel. This particular magazine is directed at culture-drama teams which perform in the provinces, and in general perform almost like vaudevillians, if I might use the term, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. What is the objective of our sponsoring such a magazine? What do we seek to accomplish in publishing such a magazine?

Mr. Nickel. We seek to provide program material that is nationalist in its direction because these culture-drama teams play a role in support of the Government.

The Chairman. Do you think this kind of a role would agree with Vice President Agnew’s idea of what a magazine or a publication ought to do? He would not criticize the kind of publications we put out in Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. I prefer not to comment on the Vice President.

The Chairman. If I understood his views, they were that magazines and newspapers ought to support the Government and, therefore, he would approve of this type of publication. It seems to me it is perfectly obvious he would.

I am not quite sure myself though what justifies the spending of American money on the cultural and drama magazine. Not that I have any aversion to culture and drama, but I did not know that we {p.685} were competent to tell the Vietnamese about culture and drama in Vietnam.


Mr. Nickel. Well, of course—

The Chairman. We have a hard time knowing what is culture and drama in Washington.

Mr. Nickel. Of course, Mr. Chairman, the JUSPAO staff that works on this magazine is predominantly Vietnamese.

The Chairman. I see. You think it is so constructed and edited that it would appeal to the effete, intellectual snobs of Saigon?

Mr. Nickel. I would say that it appeals to the performers and culture-drama teams in the provinces of Vietnam.


The Chairman. Of what are posters IR-8 and IR-5 on rice examples? This is about the miracle rice.

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir. Those would be posters.

The Chairman. Is that a one-shot proposition, one poster?

Mr. Nickel. One poster.

The Chairman. 50,000 copies?

Mr. Nickel. It is not a fixed periodical.

The Chairman. It is not a recurring poster or is it?

Mr. Nickel. It is not recurring, but obviously our interest in IR-8 is such that over a period of time we could do many posters on IR-8.

The Chairman. We have another poster entitled, “Our Project Has Been Completed.” Is that a recurring poster or a single shot?

Mr. Nickel. I would assume that is a single shot.

The Chairman. It is 50,000 copies?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Then you have a poster called, “The Government of the Republic of Vietnam Helps Refugees Return Home.” That again is just another poster?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Then there is a pamphlet, “Security Laws Protect the Citizens.”

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. That is 50,000 copies. Is that only for that purpose?

Mr. Nickel. That would be a one shot pamphlet, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Then we have song sheets. One is called “Spring of Hope” and one is called “Native Spring.” What is our objective in printing song sheets?

Mr. Nickel. That song sheet was probably a product that was issued by the Ministry of Information in connection with the Tet observation. As you know, Tet is quite a festive holiday in Vietnam, and the songs were probably connected with the celebration of that holiday.


The Chairman. Could you tell us how many different posters were put out last year?

Mr. Nickel. I can only give you an overall figure on posters, Mr. Chairman — a total of 1.73 million copies in fiscal year 1969. That would be for individual units. {p.686}

The Chairman. Individual units of posters.

Mr. Nickel. 1.73 million pieces of paper, every one of which was a poster. I cannot give you the circulation or the production per poster. I cannot say 50,000 of this or 70,000 of that.

The Chairman. To illustrate the point, you put out 15 posters consisting of 1.7 million issues. Is that about right?

Mr. Nickel. Those are not the figures, but that is the logic.

The Chairman. I know they are not the figures.

Mr. Nickel. That is the logic.

The Chairman. That is what I meant. You could not estimate how many posters there were, not individual pieces but how many different posters there were?

Mr. Nickel. I find that very difficult.


The Chairman. Would you estimate how many publications of all kinds you put out in a year? Would it be 10 million or 50 million publications of all different kinds, including all these magazines and posters and newspapers? The newspapers alone run into several million weekly; do they not?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I wondered if you had an estimate to give us some idea of the volume of our activity.

Mr. Nickel. 24 million plus, sir. That would be magazines, newspapers, posters, and pamphlets.


The Chairman. Would the pamphlets include the leaflets dropped by the military?

Mr. Nickel. That does not, sir.

The Chairman. Do you have any estimate how many there are?

Mr. Nickel. That would be somewhere in the vicinity of 1.5 billion, sir.

The Chairman. Billion?

Mr. Nickel. Billion.

The Chairman. My goodness; 1.5 billion by the military?

Mr. Nickel. Yes.

The Chairman. Who prints those? Where can they get so many printed? That seems incredible.

Mr. Nickel. They would be primarily distributed by the military.

The Chairman. Are these printed in that regional office in Manila?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. Does the military have its own printing plant?

Mr. Nickel. I was a bit hasty. Let me be more precise. Some might be printed in Manila. Many might be printed by the military on Okinawa.

The Chairman. Do they have a big printing plant on Okinawa?

Mr. Nickel. They have a printing plant that provides support for the psychological program in Vietnam.

The Chairman. Is it comparable to the size of yours in Manila?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. It is not as large?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir. {p.687}

The Chairman. Is the USIA plant in Manila a very large one?

Mr. Nickel. It is a substantial modern plant.

The Chairman. Is it capable of printing a magazine as large as, say, Time magazine or Fortune or Newsweek?

Mr. Nickel. It is difficult for me to answer. I am not aware of what capacity it would have for volume. I would think that technically it could do the job.


The Chairman. Does the military, in addition to the 1.5 billion leaflets, also print magazines and publications similar to this? Does it print anything similar to this anywhere?

Mr. Nickel. It would be very unlikely to print a pamphelt {sic: pamphlet} like that. I believe they do print an employee relations magazine for the Vietnamese employees for the military in Vietnam. But to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, that is the only publication of that type that the military publishes.


The Chairman. I do not know who did this, but that is one of the finest pictures of its kind I ever saw of the people in the rice paddies. As a technical matter, regardless of its content, you could well take credit for it because it is a very fine production. I think it is a very attractive thing. Did I show it to you to see if you could identify it, or did you? I do not remember. Do you want to look at it and perhaps you can tell me?

Mr. Nickel. I am familiar with it. I have seen it.

The Chairman. You have seen it.

I have so many publications here I cannot keep them all straight.

I am told by the staff that the USIS press said this morning, after they checked it, that it was printed in March 1967. I still am puzzled about this question of attribution. A magazine of this kind is such an imposing production that it is rather a shock to find there is no way of telling who printed it and where and when it was printed. Yet it is on a subject which apparently either we or the Government of Vietnam would be the only ones really interested in doing it. So I can see now that it was. I would suggest, for whatever it is worth, that it helps our credibility to identify and to claim it as our own when it is. I do not think that the world as it is today is going to be very impressed by our trying to avoid responsibility for the publication.


Did your office have anything to do with the recent granting of press credentials in Saigon to four security agents?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. It is not your responsibility. Do you know anything about that episode?

Mr. Nickel. I am familiar with the general newspaper accounts of that.

The Chairman. Then I suppose you have friends who were aware of that in Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir. {p.688}

The Chairman. Could you tell me in what mission these people were engaged for which they wanted such credentials?

Mr. Nickel. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

The Chairman. You have no knowledge of that.


Could you say whether any CIA personnel are using the USIA as cover?

Mr. Nickel. Comment on such a question must be made in executive session by other appropriate officials, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. All right.


Could you tell me what percentage of USIA personnel in Vietnam speak Vietnamese?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. At three level or better. I am not talking about Vietnamese employees.

Mr. Nickel. Six percent.

The Chairman. How many speak French at the three level or better?

Mr. Nickel. I am sorry, sir. I gave you a percentage figure. I did not mean it to be a percentage. Six employees speak Vietnamese at the three level or better.

The Chairman. That is approximately 6 percent; is it not?

Mr. Nickel. It also works out to approximately 6 percent, but it is not a percentage figure. The figure for French would be 24.

The Chairman. That is at the three level or better?

Mr. Nickel. Yes, sir.


The Chairman. What about all JUSPAO personnel?

Mr. Nickel. All JUSPAO personnel in terms of three or better or what, sir?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Nickel. Well, I am addressing the civilian component of JUSPAO. There are six people who speak Vietnamese and 24 who speak French.

The Chairman. What about the 800 military you mentioned? Do you know anything about them?

Mr. Nickel. I do not.

The Chairman. You do not have the figures on them.


Does the USIA finance or sponsor in any way trips to Vietnam by journalists from the United States?

Mr. Nickel. The U.S. Information Agency, sir, does have a third country journalist program.

The Chairman. Could you indicate the magnitude of that? How many journalists in the course of a year? {p.689}

Mr. Nickel. I would be very happy to supply that for the record. It is a program administered out of the headquarters in Washington, and I cannot speak to the details, sir.

(The following information referred to follows:)



For the record, the program involved 15 foreign journalists during Fiscal Year 1969, and an anticipated equal number during the current fiscal year.


The Chairman. I want it both ways. I want trips from the United States to Vietnam of American journalists and also from other countries to Vietnam.

Mr. Nickel. I believe, sir, that this program is only concerned with third country journalists to Vietnam.

The Chairman. You mean not United States?

Mr. Nickel. Not American journalists.

The Chairman. Then the answer to my first question is no. They do not sponsor U.S. journalists to Vietnam; is that correct?

Mr. Nickel. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. They do sponsor foreign journalists to Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. Could you say what is the purpose of this program? Why do you sponsor foreign journalists to Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. To enable them, sir, to come and see for themselves the developments in that country. This is done in many instances for journalists from publications which could not afford to or would not send their correspondents to Vietnam.

The Chairman. When they arrive in South Vietnam, does your agency take care of them, meet them and make arrangements for their visit?

Mr. Nickel. They are accredited, and they receive the same facilitation from the Mission Press Center, Mr. Chairman, as any accredited journalist would receive.

The Chairman. I realize that, but in addition there is the fact that you sponsored them and paid for their passage. Do you also take care of them and give them any special treatment or are they just allowed like any other journalist?

Mr. Nickel. We give them special treatment when they ask for it, special treatment of the same kind that we would give any journalist in Vietnam who so requested it.

To really get to the thrust of your question, Mr. Chairman, it is up to them. They come out; they are accredited; they are there like other journalists and their programs are theirs to arrange.

The Chairman. If they are not familiar with the place, I would assume in the normal course of events you would take them around and show them the places of interest. I would have thought the answer was yes. It would seem to me a rather dubious investment to bring a journalist from Europe or Africa and then let him go on his own.

Mr. Nickel. The answer is yes. I just wanted to make it clear that what is offered them is what is available for all the journalists in Vietnam. {p.690}


The Chairman. I have some difficulty, I may say, in reconciling this activity with the mission of your agency that you describe. I cannot quite fit this in as to how we are justified as a government and as a people to support this activity. I wish you would enlighten me a little as to the reasoning justifying this activity of bringing foreign journalists to Vietnam to view the—

Mr. Nickel. I think this is another matter, Mr. Chairman, which I will have to refer to my superiors and I am sure they will furnish a justification for it. I say that because it is a program that is not within my purview in terms of responsibility.

(The information referred to follows.)



This activity, known within USIA as the third country journalist program, was begun in 1965 and is currently active. The records of this Committee will reflect that, in hearings on news policies in Vietnam on August 17, 1966, the Agency provided a legal memorandum justifying this program. That record also indicates that the Committee obtained an opinion from the Comptroller General of the United States on the program that found the expenditure of funds for this program to be proper.


The Chairman. I see. In other words, this is carried on, but you have no responsibility for doing it. The decisions are all made here.

You would have to ask Mr. Shakespeare about that; is that what you said?

Mr. Nickel. I am not sure that it would be Mr. Shakespeare, but certainly one of my principals in Washington.

The Chairman. I just use him. He is the nominal head of the Agency. It is quite right he might not know about it, but someone at that level would know. But you would not be willing to share with me your views about the justification for such a program.


When these people arrive there, are they normally given briefings by the American officials?

Mr. Nickel. If they so request.

The Chairman. Is it normal that they do request such a briefing?

Mr. Nickel. I would say not necessarily, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. No?

Mr. Nickel. It is very hard to categorize journalists in that regard.

The Chairman. Do they normally expect to see military officials or the people in the Embassy? What would you say was the norm?

Mr. Nickel. Many of them, Mr. Chairman, would like to interview senior officials in Vietnam. I would say, by and large, they are no more successful or no more unsuccessful in arranging interviews than the average journalist who is accredited in Vietnam. {p.691}


The Chairman. In this matter, do your instructions with regard to the polls also include policy questions? Were you instructed not to discuss policy questions with the committee?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.


The Chairman. Have you ever heard of Mr. Oliver Quayle? Does that name mean anything to you?

Mr. Nickel. The name does not sound completely strange, but frankly I cannot associate it with anything.

The Chairman. You associate Mr. Quayle with something else; do you? That word used to be common, but I have not heard it in that connection for a long time. They have developed new words. He is a well-known figure in U.S. circles and has often done work testing public opinion. In fact there is an article in this morning’s paper. One of the well-known columnists apparently has been down in Alabama with him this week. I happened to see it this morning.

I wondered if you knew whether he had ever visited Vietnam while you were there. Apparently not. You are not acquainted with his work?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. He has done considerable work in this country on the testing of attitudes and opinions, and I think one of the columnists sometime back mentioned that he thought Mr. Quayle had made a poll in Vietnam. Whether he made it at the USIA’s request is another matter. We will try to find that out from your superiors.

(The information referred to follows.)



U.S. Information Agency records indicate that USIA has never commissioned Mr. Oliver Quayle to conduct a public opinion poll in Vietnam.



Are USIA officers assigned in countries other than Vietnam ever sent to Vietnam for brief visits at Government expense?

Mr. Nickel. USIA officers?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Nickel. Yes; we bring some USIA officers to Vietnam for orientation.

The Chairman. Could you indicate about how many during the course of a year are brought to Vietnam for this purpose?

Mr. Nickel. I do not have specific figures but, during the period I have been there, we have brought groups of five officers, I would say, to Vietnam two or three times a year for orientation.

The Chairman. That means 15 or 20 officers altogether?

Mr. Nickel. That is right.

The Chairman. What countries did they come from while you were there? {p.692}

Mr. Nickel. They came from a variety of countries.

The Chairman. Europe?

Mr. Nickel. Europe, South America, and East Asia.

The Chairman. The purpose of this orientation is for them to go back and do what?

Mr. Nickel. Its purpose is to give them a firsthand appreciation of the situation in Vietnam.

The Chairman. Is it in order to aid them in spreading the word when they get back to their posts?

Mr. Nickel. In order to enable them to better speak to the situation.


The Chairman. With regard to the newspapermen, what has been the effect and the result of this program? Even though you did not inspire it nor originate it, do you know whether when they return to their respective countries they report and write their articles in a very sympathetic way to our purposes in Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. I do not know enough about it, sir, to be able to characterize it.

The Chairman. If they do not, it does not seem justified to carry on the program. Is there no followup to find out how they react?

Mr. Nickel. There is.

The Chairman. There is a followup?

Mr. Nickel. There is, sir, but the followup does not fall into my area of responsibility.

The Chairman. I see. You do not know, but clearly they could want to check to see if these people reacted in the proper way and if they appreciate the courtesies you have extended them. Would they not?

Mr. Nickel. I am sure that our people are well aware of what was written by newspapermen who have participated in this program.


The Chairman. Were you there when Mr. Moshe Dayan came to Vietnam?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. Was that before your tour of duty?

Mr. Nickel. That was before my time.

The Chairman. Do you know anything about the program of bringing government officials there? You do not know about that?

Mr. Nickel. No, sir.

The Chairman. It is not your responsibility.

Mr. Nickel. It is not mine, and I am not aware of any.

The Chairman. You do not know about it.


There was a recent publication in the Vietnam Embassy here in Washington which contains an article on what is happening to Vietnamese culture. This is from a statement of the Minister of Culture on which I would like to have you comment. It says and I quote: {p.693}

“Few of these young city people know much about their own culture except for the well-known festival such as Tet or the Mid-Autumn Festival,” says the scholar versed in eastern and western cultures. “It is not that they don’t care. But access to western ways is easier than access to traditional Vietnamese culture. * * * ”

Radio and television are the media mainly responsible for the changes. As a Saigon University coed says, “Probably 80 percent or even more of the young people in Saigon prefer western music and art. We like the music especially. Few of us understand our own culture, mainly because we have never had the opportunity to study its features. But the western forms can be seen and heard daily on the American forces radio and television stations. And now even Vietnamese radio and television have programs devoted to western music.”

Would you say that is an accurate description of what has taken place in Saigon?

Mr. Nickel. Certainly access to Western culture is there. The communications explosion, I would say, Mr. Chairman, has had its effect in Vietnam as elsewhere. The youth of Vietnam like the youth of other countries have been attracted by Western forms. On the other hand, in the countryside of Vietnam, the Vietnamese cultural impact is very pronounced and very visible. I would say from my own view that the cultural problem, the problem of cultural identity in Vietnam, is probably not much different from the problem of cultural identity that you find in most developing nations today.

The Chairman. Do you mean most developing nations or only those in which we have a large presence?

Mr. Nickel. Perhaps I will amend that to say many developing nations. It is largely a problem of what I call the communications explosion.

The Chairman. Is there any indigenous competition in Saigon to the television and radio systems which we have established?

Mr. Nickel. Well, Mr. Chairman, on Vietnamese television, I believe that probably the most popular program offered during a week’s schedule is a night devoted to Vietnamese opera, which is distinctly Vietnamese in form and a very inherent part of their own cultural pattern. You find youngsters as well as elderly Vietnamese clustered around the sets watching it.


The Chairman. Do you think that the impact of the U.S. presence in Vietnam on the Vietnamese culture has been a favorable one?

Mr. Nickel. I would answer that, Mr. Chairman, by saying that whenever you introduce a half million foreigners into a country of a population of 17 million, there are going to be dislocations and some of the dislocations are going to be cultural.

The Chairman. Are you saying that the presence of a half million soldiers is a greater influence than the presence of the USIA with its great publications, its newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and posters? Which do you think is the greater influence on the Vietnamese culture?

Mr. Nickel. What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that the presence of a half million foreigners in a nation of 17 million people is bound to have some impact, some cultural impact.

The Chairman. Supposing you did not have any USIA, do you think there would be a great impact if the foreigners were engaged primarily in fighting out in the rice paddies? All I mean is that it {p.694} seems to me you probably are responsible for a greater part of the impact than the soldiers.

Mr. Nickel. I would not discount the effect of the presence of a half million people.

The Chairman. I am not discounting it.

I do not suppose there are any easy criteria by which we can measure that.

Mr. Nickel, it is getting late. I must say, outside of those areas in which you have been instructed not to answer my questions, you have been very forthcoming and I think it has been a very interesting hearing. It seems to me that you have demonstrated beyond a doubt that the presence of the Americans is overwhelming. It has almost submerged the indigenous traditions and culture, at least in Saigon, although not in some of the remote areas where I suppose it is different. But I hardly know how they could resist it and maybe that is a good thing. I do not know. I guess that is for history to determine.

I appreciate very much you and your colleagues coming here to the committee.


We will take up with your superiors the question of whether or not we are entitled to the information about polls. I must say it is hard for me to find a justification for secrets in an agency for information created and paid for by the American people. I thought it was to instruct everyone. When we ask you what you are doing, it seems to me it is a little incongruous for you to say, “We can’t tell you about that.” We expect that from something like the CIA, but I was a little surprised to have it coming from an information agency. I had not thought of it in that connection, but I realize you are not the policymaker nor the highest responsible official and I do not criticize you for it. If you have been told to do that, I do not want you to cut your own throat out in the open here before the committee. We will talk to Mr. Shakespeare about it or someone else in his agency.

Thank you very much, Mr. Nickel.

Mr. Nickel. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(The following are answers by the U.S. Information Agency to additional committee questions:)



1. What is the current USIA policy with regard to having in its libraries in Viet-Nam books that are critical of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam? Would you name some of the books currenty {sic: currently} stocked that are critical of U.S. policy?

The U.S. Information Agency’s policy with regard to critical books in Vietnamese libraries is one of presenting the issues, both pro and con, to interested readers.

Some typical titles on this subject include the following: J. W. Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (English and French editions); and Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution. In addition the libraries have balanced collections of periodicals, many of which regularly have contents critical of U.S. policy, including New Republic, Nation, Harpers, Look, Life, Foreign Affairs, Newsweek, Time, Saturday Review, Asian Survey, New York Times Magazine, and the New Yorker.

2. Have any films produced by the Vietnamese Government been brought to the United States for showing? If, so, provide the details. {p.695}


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following GVN-produced 16 mm films to the GVN’s Embassy in Washington and to the GVN’s permanent observer to the United Nations since January 1969:

{table to come}

3. (a) Have there been any studies made of the relative effectiveness of GVN and Viet Cong political propaganda? (b) If so, what do they show as to the effectiveness of the various methods of propaganda used by each?

There is no record of any comparative studies. Typical Viet Cong propaganda studies report themes but no comparative evaluation.

4. How many TV sets are there in Viet-Nam — in Vietnamese hands? How many are owned by the Vietnamese Government? How many were paid for by the United States?

The GVN estimates that there are 300,000 television sets in use by the Vietnamese. The GVN owns 4,832 sets, of which 4,582 were USG-funded — 1,082 for the Republic of Viet-Nam’s Armed Forces (RVNAF), and 3,500 for the Ministry of Information’s community viewing program.

5. How many TV crews does the USIA operate in Viet-Nam? What use is made of their production?

USIA does not have any TV crews in Viet-Nam. JUSPAO, however, does have six motion picture cameramen on its payroll, and they are available to produce materials for a TV clip service. Since January 1, 1969, JUSPAO has produced 108 TV clips for distribution to USIS posts in 36 countries. When clips are considered to have application to Vietnamese audiences, they are offered to Vietnamese TV.

6. (a) How does the number of personnel now attached to the (1) USIA, (2) JUSPAO, and (3) in military psychological operations compare with a year ago? How many will there be a year from now?

 19691970Estimate, 1971
(1) Personnel — USIA element:
American civilians (1) 130(2) 99(3) 88
Local and 3d country nationals (4) 397(5) 347(5) 347
Local and 3d country nationals (4) 397(5) 347(5) 347
Total 527446435
(2) Personnel — JUSPAO:
American civilians (6) 132(6) 101(6) 90
Local and 3d country nationals (7) 397347347
American military personnel 118107107
Total 647555544
(3) Personnel — Military psychological operations 996811(8) 


Includes 30 AID-funded, 6 DOD-funded, and 2 VOA-attached officers.

Includes 24 AID-funded, 2 DOD-funded, and 1 VOA-attached officers.

Includes 14 AID-funded and 2 DOD-funded officers.

Includes 133 AID-funded personnel.

Includes 117 AID-funded personnel.

Includes USIA element and 2 MACV civilians.

USIA element.

1971 personnel level is still in the planning stage where some reduction is being considered.


6. (b) What percentage of all USIA personnel overseas are in Viet-Nam? 5.04 percent of all USIA American and local overseas personnel are in Viet-Nam.

6. (c) How many JUSPAO employees are in Saigon and how many are in the field? {p.696}

Of the total of 555 personnel, 389 are in Saigon and 166 in the field:

American civilians 7823
American military personnel 3473
Local and 3d country nationals 27770
Total 389166


7. Is the USIA consulted regularly concerning future military operations, with a view to obtaining its assessment of the effect of such operations on Vietnamese attitudes?

In Saigon, the Director of JUSPAO as a member of the Mission Council has the opportunity to advise the Ambassador and fellow Mission Council members of possible effects on Vietnamese attitudes of planned general and specific military actions.

8. The information booklet entitled “JUSPAO Viet-Nam” states that “It (JUSPAO) also produces for field use leaflets, pamphlets, newspaper articles and photographs, posters, magazines, loudspeaker tapes, motion pictures, and radio and television programs. These items are variously distributed by hand, disseminated from airplanes or broadcast by the GVN, the U.S., and other free world nations.”

8. (a) What was the total number of pieces printed or produced last year for each of these categories? What is planned for this year? Next year?

Category1969Estimate, 1970Estimate, 1971
Leaflets 36,000,00010,000,0005,000,000
Pamphlets 1  3,500,0003,000,0001,500,000
Newspaper articles 6,0003,0003,000
Photographs 66,00036,00036,000
Posters 1  7,800,0008,000,0006,000,000
Magazines 1  9,900,0009,600,0007,800,000
Loudspeaker tapes 11,8197,310None
Motion picture prints 1,514655600
Radio programs 1,2711,048450
Television programs 2  2772None


The estimates provided in the Mar. 19, 1970, testimony were based on volume of U.S. support for the GVN printed media program.

JUSPAO provided scripts and culture-drama team support to GVN television.


8. (b) Do these totals include the propaganda materials put out by the U.S. military forces? If not, how much did the military produce last year? Where are these materials printed?

Military production, for which JUSPAO is not responsible, last year included:

CategoryQuantityWhere produced
Leaflets 7.8 billion 1 7th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Do 2.4 billion 1 4th PsyOp Group, Viet-Nam.
Pamphlets 0.5 million7th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Newspaper articles Not applicable
Photographs do {viz: ditto}
Posters 15.8 million4th PsyOp Group, Viet-Nam.
Magazines 1.9 million7th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Loudspeaker tapes 1,3274th PsyOp Group, Viet-Nam.
Motion picture prints Not applicable
Radio programs 2087th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Television programs Not applicable


The estimate provided in the Mar. 19, 1970, testimony was based on GVN, not United States military publication programs.


8. (c) Does JUSPAO print materials for the Vietnamese government? How much of the GVN printed propaganda is printed in its own plants?

It is estimated that during FY 1970, approximately 70 percent of JUSPAO’s printing output provides information support to GVN programs. Of the GVN’s total support requirements, JUSPAO estimates that the GVN produces about 46 percent of the materials. {p.697}

8. (d) Does JUSPAO produce materials for use by the Korean and Thai forces in Viet-Nam? Has it ever produced any materials relating to allegations of Korean atrocities against civilians?

JUSPAO does not regularly produce materials for use by Korean and Thai forces. However, records list the following printed products:

CategoryDateQuantityHow used
Two posters in Vietnamese 196830,000By Koreans troops.
Paper flags, ROK, GVN, and United States 196812,000Do {viz: Ditto}.
Booklet, in Korean 196915,000By Korean troops involved in the Chieu Hoi program.
Poster, in Vietnamese 196850,000By Vietnamese Information Service to reveal Thai assistance to Vietnam.


JUSPAO has not produced any materials relating to allegations of Korean atrocities.

8. (e) How many publications, in English, concerning Viet-Nam have been produced by USIA and are currently in stock? Please provide copies of these publications, information on the distribution and the cost of each.

USIA has one such publication in stock, “Vietnamizing the Search for Peace,” printed in 20,000 copies, of which 19,720 were distributed to 13 USIS posts in East and South Asia, and the remaining 280 copies held in stock. In addition, JUSPAO has one English-language publication in stock, “Viet-Nam 1970,” printed for the GVN in 20,000 copies by the Regional Production Center, Manila. Distribution was made to the GVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 29 GVN diplomatic posts (excluding Washington), 11,800; GVN Ministry of Information, 6,500; 29 USIS posts where there are GVN diplomatic posts, 475 for information; RSC reserve stock, 1,000; JUSPAO reserve stock, 225.

Cost of “Vietnamizing the Search for Peace” is 7 cents per copy, and “Viet-Nam 1970” is 20 cents per copy.

8. (f) How many of these publications do not bear the USIA imprint? Why? “Viet-Nam 1970” does not bear the USIA imprint but rather that of the GVN Ministry of Information. The publication was originally published in Vietnamese (100,000 copies) at the GVN’s request for GVN use; the subsequent English language version was likewise printed for GVN use.

9. (a) What facilities does the Armed Forces Radio and Television Network maintain in Viet-Nam?

[In kilowatts]

AM power
FM power
ER power
Quang Tri 140
Danang 102540
Chu Lai 140
Pleiku 102540
Qui Nhon 102540
Tuy Hoa 4040
Nha Trang 102540
Saigon 50100240
Can Tho  1 


UHF translator.


9. (b) How many hours is the Armed Forces TV station in operation daily compared with the operating hours for the GVN station?

Armed Forces TV stations average 12 hours of daily operations. Three of the GVN TV stations average four hours daily; the fourth station (Saigon) averages five hours.

9. (c) How many Vietnamese watch the Armed Forces TV network compared with the number who watch the GVN station?

A comparison has not been established.

10. (a) How much has been spent, or is planned to be spent, by the USIA and other U.S. agencies, to help build the physical plants for the GVN radio and television, film, printing and other information programs?

Since 1965 and projected to the completion of the current GVN projects, U.S. agencies have spent or plan to spend the following amounts: 4-station radio network, $6.8 million; television network, $8.2 million; motion picture center, $2.5 million; information printing house, $234,000; other physical plants, none. {p.698}

10. (b) How much has the GVN put up for each of these categories?

Actual amounts earmarked for physical plants for GVN media facilities are not identified per se in the GVN budget. However, for the period since 1965, the following monies, including those for any physical plants, have been spent or earmarked for: radio, $8.3 million; television, $4.2 million; motion picture center, $2.7 million; information printing house, $1.8 million; and Ministry of Information General Directories and the Vietnamese Information Service, $47.6 million.

11. (a) What was the total amount spent last year by the United States on all phases of the information and psychological warfare program in Vietnam, including the costs for all aspects of military psychological operations? How much will be spent this year? Next year?

[In millions of dollars]

Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office controlled programs 13.312.19.7
U.S. military programs 14.610.7( 1 )
Total 27.922.8— 


1971 funding level is still in the planning stage where some reduction is being considered.


11. (b) How much did the Vietnamese government spend on these programs last year? How much is planned for this year?

[In millions]

Ministry of Information $9.6$19.7
RVNAF Psy War activities 1  4.94.9
Total 14.524.6


No detailed breakout of GVN funds expended for 1969 is available. However, officials estimate that the amount is approximately the same as programed for the current year.


12. (a) How many U.S. personnel work directly in or with GVN agencies concerned with propaganda or information matters?

 U.S. civiliansU.S. military
JUSPAO 1  67107
Total 67274


This total includes 16 NBC/I contractual personnel.


12. (b) How many Americans work in the GVN radio network?

Three JUSPAO advisors. In addition, there is one technical advisor assigned to the RVNAF radio branch.

How many Americans work in the GVN television activities?

Sixteen contractual advisors (National Broadcasting Company, Inc.) and three other JUSPAO advisors. In addition, there is one technical advisor assigned to the RVNAF television branch.

How many Americans in GVN films?

Two JUSPAO advisors.

13. What is the purpose and scope of operation of “psychological operations officers” attached to U.S. advisory teams in the provinces? How many are there?

They advise Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) and Vietnamese Army political warfare (PolWar) units in the provinces on effective coordinated information/psychological operations in support of national and local Pacification and Development goals. There are 34 civilian and military “psychological operations officers” attached to U.S. advisory teams in the provinces to concentrate on the functions of the GVN civilian information services; an additional 43 military officers serve as advisors to the GVN military political warfare cadre. {p.699}

14. What control, if any, does the USIA have over the activities of the five Army television camera crews operating in Viet-Nam that produce materials aimed at U.S. television audiences?


15. Have the Viet-Nam Information Services and other Viet-Nam agencies dealing with propaganda matters been receptive to USIA advice?

They have been generally receptive to advice in program, training and engineering matters. Advice in administrative matters has been less effective.

16. (a) How many members of Viet-Nam’s National Assembly have come to the United States in the last two years? How many have had all or part of their expenses paid for by the United States?

During the past two years, 33 Vietnamese senators and 42 deputies visited the United States. Ten senators and 10 deputies traveled in whole or in part at U.S. Government expense. Of these 20, six senators and five deputies were provided domestic travel expenses and per diem from the Department of State in response to invitations issued by members of the U.S. Congress.

16. (b) Does the USIA sponsor any Vietnamese to come to the United States on speaking tours? If so, give details.


17. (a) How many Vietnamese have been brought to the United States for study or training (non-military) in the last five years under government auspices?

{table to come}

17. (b) How many are here now?

Fulbright-Hays scholarship 1
East-West Center scholarships 13
American field service scholarships 30
Television engineers to RCA Institute 5
USAID grants 526
Total 575


17. (c) How many are programmed to come this year? Next year?

Cleveland international program 22
East-West Center scholarships 55
American Field Service scholarships 2020
USAID grants (new) 1  331411
USAID grants (renewals) 384448
Total 742886


Although new participants have been selected and funds obligated, they are authorized to depart Vietnam up to 9 months after the obligation date. {p.700}


{Page 700 is blank} {p.701}



Source: The printed hearings (cited below).

By CJHjr: Photocopied at 141%, scanned, converted to text (OCR: FineReader 6.0), formatted (xhtml/css), links, text {in braces}, text beside a green bar |, text in yellow boxes, bold-face, bold-italics, highlighting, added paragraphing (for ease of reading) marked with this trailing paragraph symbol: ¶ .

This document: March 19 1970 hearing, pages 635-700, Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970 {58.4mb.pdf, source}, “Hearings on Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program” (U.S. Congress 91-2, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, February 17, 18, 19, 20, and March 3, 4, 17, 19, 1970, and Appendix, 7+750 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:V 67/17, CIS: 71 S381-2, OCLC: 119418, LCCN: 76610214 pf, DL, WorldCat}.

Previous: March 17 1970 hearing (pages 569-634) {285kb}.

Next: Appendix (pages 701-748) {250kb}.

See also:

The second Phoenix hearings: U.S. Congress, House Hearings: U.S. Congress, House Hearings, U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 92-1, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, Hearings, July 15 {a.m., p.m.}, 16, 19, 21, and August 2 1971, 4+362 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.G 74/7:V 67/4, CIS: 72 H401-3, OCLC: 235387, LCCN: 71616178 pf, DL, WorldCat}. Ensuing report: U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 92-2, House Report No. 92-1610, House Committee on Government Operations, October 17 1972, 5+107 pages) {SuDoc: [Y 1.1/8:]92-2:H.RP.1610, Serial Set: 12976-6, CIS: 72 H403-19, OCLC: 540690, LCCN: 72603272 pf, WorldCat} {Full text: pages 1-46 2.4mb.pdf, pages 47-97 2.8mb.pdf, pages 99-107 501kb.pdf, omitting page 98 and repeating page 107, instead, at the start}.
The third Phoenix hearings: Nomination of William E. Colby to be Director of Central Intelligence (U.S. Congress 93-1, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings, July 2, 20 {a.m., p.m.}, 25, 1973, 3+186 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:C 67/3, CIS: 73 S201-27, OCLC: 800312, LCCN: 73603022 pf, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: William E. Colby, Robert F. Drinan, Samuel A. Adams, Paul Sakwa, David S. Harrington, Kenneth B. Osborn.
Vietnam Policy Proposals: Hearings on nine proposed items of legislation to end the U.S. war in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 91-2, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, February 3, 4, 5, and March 16, 1970, 5+405 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:V 67/16, CIS: 70 S381-7, OCLC: 78825, LCCN: 74606991 pf, DL, WorldCat}.
National Veterans Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam (Citizens’ Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes, Washington D.C., December 1-3 1970), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 4238-4271 (U.S. Congress 92-1, March 1 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.4, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Robert Bowie Johnson Jr., Mike McCusker, Daniel K. Amigone, Greg Motoka, Kenneth Barton Osborn, Norman Kiger, Gail Graham, Steve Noetzel, Edward Murphy, Daniel Alfiero, Louis Paul Font, Robert Master, Peter Norman Martinsen, T. Griffiths Ellison, Ed Melton, Chuck Hamilton, Lee Meyrowitz, Gordon S. Livingston, Greg Turgeon, Richard Altenberger, Bob Connelly, Robert Lifton, Chaim Shatan, Donald Engel, Gary Thamer, Steven Hassett, Kenneth Campbell, Sam Rankin, Phillip Wingenbach, Tod Ensign, Larry Rottmann, Robert Osman.
Winter Soldier Investigation (Vietnam Veterans Against the War Inc., Detroit Michigan, January 31, February 1-2, 1971), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 9947-10055 (U.S. Congress 92-1, April 6 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.8, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}; 117 Congressional Record E 2825-2936 (U.S. Congress 92-1, April 6-? 1971, Daily Edition (green bound)) {SuDoc: X/A.92/1:117/???-???, ISSN: 0363-7239, LCCN: 80646573 pf, OCLC: 02437919, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.
American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1971 (U.S. Congress 92-1, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Hearings, March 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, April 1, 6, 20 {vvaw}, 1971, 9+583 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/1:P 93/4/971/PT.1, CIS: 71 H381-9, OCLC: 15634210, LCCN: 77612471 pf, WorldCat}, witness: Larry Rottmann (volunteer coordinator, Vietnam Veterans Against the War), April 20 1971 hearing, pages 353-423 {3.2mb.pdf}, at pages 406-423. CIS: “Description of charged mistreatment of prisoners in South Vietnam by American forces; report of receiving Officers Candidate School instruction on the use of torture.”


Legislative Proposals Relating to the War in Southeast Asia {44.14mb.pdf, source} “Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session, on S. 376, S. 974, S.J. Res. 82, S.J. Res. 89, S. Con. Res. 17, S. Res. 62, and S. Res. 66” (U.S. Congress 92-1, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, April 20-May 27 1971: “April 20, 21 and 22, 28, May 3, 11, 12, 13, 25, 26 and 27, 1971,” 7+726+12 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:AS 4/13, CIS: 71 S381-18, OCLC: 198272, LCCN: 79614140 pf, DL, WorldCat}, witness: John Kerry (VVAW: Vietnam Veterans Against the War), Thursday April 22 1971, 11:05am-1:00pm, pages 179-210 {3.1mb.pdf}.
House Ad Hoc Hearing for Vietnam Veterans Against the War (U.S. Congressmen Jonathon Bingham and Paul Findley, presiding, Friday, April 23 1971, Venue: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 13104-13118 (U.S. Congress 92-1, May 3 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.10, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Larry Rottmann, Forest Lindley, Les Johnson, Arthur Egendorf, Kip A. Kypriandes, Phillip Lowley, Vinny Giardina, Michael Paul McCusker, William W. Lemmer, Alex Prim, Robert McLaughlin, Jack Smith, David B. Maize.
Senate Ad Hoc Hearing for Vietnam Veterans Against the War (U.S. Senator George McGovern, presiding, Friday, April 23 1971, Venue: U.S. Congress, Senate, Room G-103 New Senate Office Building), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 15392-15405 (U.S. Congress 92-1, May 17 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.12, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Scott Camil, Vinny Giardina, Melville L. Stephens, Basil Paquet, Joe Nielsen, Dale Granata, Everett Carson, Forrest Lindley Jr., Samuel Miller, David A. Lamenzo, Jon Bjornson, Ken Provan.
Ad Hoc Hearings on Command Responsibility for War Atrocities in Vietnam {copy} (U.S. Congressman Ron Dellums, presiding, April 26, 27, 28, 29, 1971, 9:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m., Venue: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building), transcript, The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam: An Inquiry into Command Responsibility in Southeast Asia (New York, Vintage Books, 1972, 13+355 pages) {LCCN: 79039897 pf, ISBN: 0394717678, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Five West Point graduates (Fred Laughlin, Gordon Livingston {Iraq, copy}, Robert B. Johnson, Greg Hayward, Ron Bartek, Michael O'Mera), five former military intelligence special agents and POW interrogators {omitted from the linked source}, ten former Americal Division members (Gary Battles, Charles David Locke, Terry Mullen, Steve Padoris, Daniel S. Notley, John Beitzel, Guadalupe G. Villarreal, Daniel Barnes, Thomas Cole, William Toffling), overview of air war, pacification, and forced urbanization (John Sack, Kenneth Campbell, Randy Floyd, Elliot L Meyrowitz).
Bertrand Russell Tribunal, “International War Crimes Tribunal” (Stockholm Sweden, May 2-10 1967; Roskilde Denmark, November 20 – December 1 1967).
Tiger Force: “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths: Tiger Force, an elite fighting unit in Vietnam, left a trail of atrocities in that country that have been concealed from the public for three decades.” (The Blade, Toledo Ohio, October 22 2003, February 15, March 28, April 6, May 2, May 12 2004).

This document is not copyrighted and may be freely copied.


Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Posted June 4 2004. Updated May 10 2009.


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