Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970

Finally, on the lowest line, in the center, are the Corps advisers; you were briefed on this, sir. On the left, the central logistics command with its advisers. On the right is the Central Training Command which is run by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, with its advisers, which is really my training directorate. This gives you a very brief outline of the advisory effort.

The Chairman.  The total comprises about a million men in Vietnam?

General Clement.  Yes, sir; the figure of approximately 1 million is the total Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces structure, which includes the RF and PF, on which you have previously been briefed.

The functions of the Vietnamese Army Headquarters are performed by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff whose counterpart is MACV. Therefore, U.S. advisers to the Vietnamese Army are assigned to MACV.

MACV discharges the army advisory task by assigning advisers to all echelons in the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and also to the corps areas under operational control of corps senior advisers. The U.S. senior adviser in each corps area is also the commander of U.S. Army and/or Marine units in that geographical area.

The Chief, Naval Advisory Group advises the Vietnamese Chief of Naval Operations and all naval forces. The Chief of the Naval Advisory Group is also the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. The Marine Corps Advisory Group advises all Vietnamese Marine Corps Forces and is under the staff cognizance of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV).

The Chief U.S. Air Force Advisory Group advises the Vietnamese Chief of Air Operations and all Vietnamese Air Force units. The Chief of the Air Force Advisory Group does not command U.S. Air Force units in Vietnam.

BASIC FUNCTIONS OF ADVISORY GROUPS

The basic functions of the advisory groups are to provide advice and assistance to their Vietnamese counterparts in all matters pertaining to command, administration, training, tactical operations, logistics, and personnel with the objective of establishing combat ready and self-sufficient armed forces.

I will next discuss in broad terms some of the more salient features of the MACV advisory effort. I will exclude from my discussion the advisory effort for territorial forces (that is, regional and popular forces). The committee was briefed on this effort in February by Ambassador Colby.

CRITERIA FOR ADVISER ASSIGNMENT

The criteria for adviser assignment in each service are generally the same; that is, experience in the functional area to which assigned. In addition, to work successfully with the Vietnamese the adviser must be {p.449} sensitive to and respect their way of doing things, appreciating their strengths and weaknesses; he must be dedicated and sincere; patient and diplomatic; must appreciate the fact that the Vietnamese have been brought up to the sound of guns, have been fighting for a long time and foresee a continuing struggle. In brief, an adviser must know his business and be able to get along with the Vietnamese.

There are outstanding examples of leadership, courage, and dedication throughout the Vietnamese military system. There is an innate strength in the Vietnamese which has enabled them to endure combat, strife, and destruction and yet retain their basic values. It is important that we try to appreciate and to recognize the Vietnamese way of doing things which is based on a very ancient culture and traditions. We try to avoid uniquely “American” solutions, although this is often difficult.

METHOD OF OPERATIONS OF ADVISORY EFFORT

Gentlemen, I will describe how the adviser fits into the operational day-to-day aspects of the adviser effort.

The U.S. Army advisory effort parallels the Army of the Republic of Vietnam organization and is tailored to its present operational needs. Advisers are assigned at the Vietnamese Joint General Staff level downward through corps, division, regiment, and battalion in the combat and combat support area and downward through depots, area logistics command and subordinate support units in the administrative and logistics support area. The requirement for adviser skills runs, on one hand, from the detailed knowledge of the M-16 rifle through the operation of an automotive rebuild plant and, on the other hand, from the employment of a rifle squad in combat through the application of all types of combat power in a corps against both guerrilla and conventional enemy forces. Many of our Army advisers are committed to the training of ARVN forces — the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Forces — and are colocated at the many training centers and schools throughout South Vietnam.

The Navy advisory skills run the gamut required for the conduct of naval operations against an active and aggressive enemy in both coastal and inland waterway operations. The U.S. Naval advisory effort extends from the senior Vietnamese Naval Headquarters downward through task forces and river assault and interdiction division (RAID) to an individual small craft conducting combat operations on the many inland rivers and canals in South Vietnam, with the bulk being in the Mekong Delta area. This includes advisers with training and logistic support forces.

The U.S. Marine Corps Advisory Group, operating under the U.S. Naval Advisory Group (COMNAVFORV), is involved primarily in advising a Marine Corps Division.

The U.S. Air Force adviser works with the highest Vietnamese Air Force echelon downward through combat wings, combat groups, squadrons, training centers, forward air controllers, air liaison, and air logistics commands.

A military adviser may be officer or enlisted. He works directly with one or more Vietnamese counterparts. Advisers work alongside their counterparts in all phases of their activities, both advising and assisting them in the accomplishments of assigned missions. This involves the advisers with combat units accompanying the units on both combat {p.450} and pacification operations. Staff advisers at all levels work with their counterparts on combined studies and plans. All advisory efforts are aimed at improving the quality of the RVNAF, improving their management at all levels and making them self-sufficient.

INCREASE IN TRAINING EFFORTS

Training constitutes a major adviser effort in all services. The improvement and modernization of RVNAF brought with it a pronounced expansion of RVNAF personnel strength, and an attendant increase in training requirements. The objective is to increase the level of combat readiness and combat proficiency through individual training (in-country and off shore) and unit training. There are 42 RVNAF training centers and 27 RVNAF schools involved in this effort, located throughout the whole of South Vietnam. Those being trained range from recruits at training centers to senior officers at the Command and Staff College in Dalat, or at the National Defense College in Saigon. Instruction at these centers and schools is carried out by the Vietnamese. This chart very briefly, sir, shows the rapid buildup in the program in the past 2 years in the projected programs.

In calendar year 1968, the training base was saturated. We go from there to 1969, an increased effort, and from there to the 1970 projection. That was increased even more. So there is a great training effort going on in these schools, and training centers.

In addition, to these formal training programs, there is an extensive on-the-job training effort going on in all of the services, aimed generally at the technical skills. We trained over 3,000 in the logistical field alone in this manner in calendar year 1969, and currently have over 4,000 being trained. More than 2,000 Vietnamese are presently being trained in U.S. Navy craft. Of course, the Vietnamese themselves are implementing a supplementary on-the-job program.

FUTURE OF ADVISORY EFFORT

There is continuing improvement in the Vietnamese Armed Forces. As the RVNAF continues to grow, the weight of the advisory effort will be given to the most critical areas.

The RVNAF logistical organization and system are presently capable of reasonably satisfactory logistical support to operating elements. By necessity, there is a strong advisory effort in this area which will continue for some time.

We are advising a military force which has rapidly expanded over the past few years, stretching to the limit the amount of experienced talent available. It will take time for skill levels to catch up with the force structure. This, in itself, has placed severe tasks on our advisory effort. As the force structure increase approaches the end goal, more emphasis will be placed on qualitative improvements of all existing forces.

The size and composition of our present and future advisory effort in Vietnam will be determined in light of the development of RVNAF forces to assume a larger share of the war effort and the rate at which RVNAF units can receive equipment, complete training, and attain operational readiness.

Gentlemen, MACV is very much aware of the importance of the advisory role in connection with improving the Vietnamese Armed {p.451} Forces. The advisory effort contributes to RVNAF’s capability to shoulder the burden of the fighting at an accelerated rate. This allows a progressive reduction of U.S. military presence in South Vietnam. Sir, that concludes my statement. Do you have any questions at this time?

PURPOSE OF COMMITTEE INQUIRY

The Chairman.  Thank you, General. That is a very interesting statement.

Before I proceed with any questions, General, I want to make it very clear that, at least speaking for myself and I think for most of the committee, criticism such as it has appeared in the press has never been against the military activities of your people, either the officers or the men. What we are really dealing with in this question of the difference in view is the political policy and the objectives of the operation as a whole. I hope that the military establishment realizes that we are not inquiring into these matters because of a feeling of disapproval of the way you or your men have conducted yourselves. This is not the issue at all. This committee is concerned with the political implications of the overall effort. It has often been misinterpreted that either this committee or the Senate or certain Members of the Senate did not support the Armed Forces. That is not at all a true reflection of the issue. It is not a question of supporting the Armed Forces or whether they have supported the policy. It is a question of supporting the political policy that results in these questions on Vietnam. I hope you understand.

General Clement.  Yes, sir, I understand.

OBJECTIVE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM

The Chairman.  This statement and most of these statements are based upon the assumption that there is a legislative objective involved in all of this activity, because it is a very substantial and very extensive activity. Do you, as a military man, feel concerned about the question of whether or not the activity as such has a legislative objective? Could you say what you believe the objective is?

General Clement.  Sir, I think I can address it as far as our mission, as far as the military advisers are concerned. We certainly feel it is a worthwhile objective. It is one that we are committed to and we certainly are intent on carrying it out and making sure that we do so to the best of our ability.

The Chairman.  Maybe I did not make myself plain. I know as a military man you are under orders and no military organization can operate without discipline and established traditional organization. You took it back to the beginning in 1951, which is what inspired thought about this. You said the original military assistance was MAAG Indochina in 1951. Are you familiar with the circumstances of its creation?

General Clement.  Not in detail, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you know why it was created or what its purpose was?

General Clement.  I believe I do, sir.

The Chairman.  What was it? What is your feeling about it?

General Clement.  It was established to counter the Communist threat in Southeast Asia, which continues to this time. I think that basically is one of the primary reasons that we are there. {p.452}

The Chairman.  What was the nature of the threat in 1951?

General Clement.  Sir, I am sorry. It really is outside my cognizance and I am not prepared to discuss that aspect.

The Chairman.  This was really the thrust of my first question. It seems to me that perhaps quite properly, as a military man, it is not your responsibility to have a judgment. I do not wish to restrict you in any way if you have a judgment. After all, you are also a citizen of the United States. You are free to express a judgment, whether or not you concern yourself with that objective.

Senator Case.  General, would you pull those microphones closer to you.

The Chairman.  They are not every sensitive. Our technological expertise is exhausted in going to the moon. We cannot make good microphones or trucks.

General Clement.  Sir, if you are asking me whether I feel we are performing a worthwhile task in Vietnam and whether our soldiers are, I would say yes, we certainly are, and, personally it has been a very challenging, very rewarding assignment.

The Chairman.  If I understand you correctly, that does not involve necessarily, at least a judgment of the political justification beginning in 1951 and following through various stages of escalation after 1954 and after Kennedy came in, and then the major one in 1965. That is not your responsibility. Or do you feel it is your responsibility to have any judgment about such a matter?

General Clement.  I believe, strictly speaking, sir, my responsibility is to carry out the orders that are given me by headquarters and which I am trying to do to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The Chairman.  That is what I suspected was the proper answer. I am just curious.

ORIGIN OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

I have a very strong feeling that it was none of our business going in there in 1951. We went in in support of the French to retain control of their colony; did we not? The French were still battling to control Vietnam in 1951; were they not?

General Clement.  Yes, sir; I guess they were.

The Chairman.  There is no guess about it. They were. They were fighting their enemies; weren’t they?

General Clement.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  The Armed Forces had a total strength of 200,000 men, the majority being in the Army. They were the remnants of the Colonial Army which the French had created to support their control of Vietnam. Is that not a fact?

General Clement.  Yes, sir; I believe it probably was.

The Chairman.  It was or was not. That is a fact; is it not? You made this statement; did you not?

General Clement.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Did you create this statement out of your own knowledge or did someone assist you?

General Clement.  No, sir; I did have assistance.

The Chairman.  Was this the 100,000 you mentioned here—

General Clement.  That was the French forces.

The Chairman.  The French Colonial Army: was it not?

General Clement.  Yes, sir. {p.453}

The Chairman.  Their main purpose was to maintain the control of the French in Vietnam; was it not?

General Clement.  I am not familiar with their purpose, sir. As a matter of fact, I was relating a general historical picture. I have not had much time recently to do much historical research. I really have been concerned with this training advisory effort.

The Chairman.  I would not have asked you about it except you mentioned it in your statement. I think it is important, not particularly for you as a military man, and that is why I said that I am not critical of you or any of your colleagues. As a matter of fact, I am not particularly critical of the men who have been charged with atrocities because they are exposed to a situation which is almost intolerable and beyond human endurance. What I am critical of, and still am, is that policy would put them in this position, and that policy finds us in this position. It did then and it still does. I think it is an intolerable position: That is no reflection whatever upon you or any of your colleagues. That is not the point at all, but this is significant.

You have raised the point here that this is the origin of this war. It does have relevance as to whether or not we have any business continuing it, in my view, as a political matter, whether or not it is worth the price that you are continuing to pay because under your statement, we have advisers at every level and we are for all practical purposes running the country militarily.

You say we have 14,000 advisers. Do you know how many French advisers to the military there were?

General Clement.  I do not know exactly.

The Chairman.  I doubt if they had as much as we have. As a matter of fact, we have in effect taken over the effort.

You may be more acquainted with the history of this country. To give you a comparable view do you remember when the British fought the American Colonial power? You are familiar with the American Revolutionary War; are you not?

General Clement.  Yes, sir; we studied it.

The Chairman.  The British brought over a number of troops, of course, to help them, but the American Colonials fought them. When it was all over, and after the British finally gave it up, we had a remnant of an Army left that George Washington had created. That is the equivalent of this 200,000 that you are talking about here. Is it, or is it not?

General Clement.  Yes, sir; I presume it would be.

The Chairman.  No, it is not. You see, these people were fighting for the French. This is the point I wanted to make. These 200,000 were not fighting for the Colonials, the Colonists such as George Washington.

EXTENT AND ADVISABILITY OF CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT

I think it is very important, not so much for you as for the country. Because you are under orders, you do not have to know those things. You prompted me to raise a question which I think is central because this war is now escalating into Laos and we are getting into it deeper and deeper. It simply raised the question once again. Is it in the interest of the United States to go down this road?

Your testimony makes quite clear to me just how extensive our involvement is. You said 14,000 military advisers. {p.454}

General Clement.  I beg your pardon. There is a total of 14,000 advisers; 7,000 is the rough number of military advisers.

The Chairman.  Did I misread it?

General Clement.  No, sir. If you will recall, 14,000 was the total effort and the CORDS people talked of the other 7,000. This is the 7,000 in the military effort, the military advisory unit, with the tactical units, the corps and divisions, the Central Training Command, and the logistics units.

The Chairman.  They are still military or paramilitary. They are closely similar; aren’t they?

General Clement.  For the purposes of the hearings, sir, you wanted to break out the military advisory effort from the total advisory effort. I was just putting it in perspective.

The Chairman.  Would the 14,000, though, include legislatively all in the paramilitary or the police units?

General Clement.  Yes, sir, that is what Ambassador Colby mentioned in his appearance.

The Chairman.  How many were there a year ago? Is this more or less than there were a year ago?

General Clement.  I think it is about the same, sir.

The Chairman.  About the same?

General Clement.  Yes, sir, about the same number.

COST OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman.  Could you tell us what the total cost to the United States is for the military equipment supplied or turned over to the South Vietnamese to date?

General Clement.  Sir, I do have some figures on costs. The fiscal year 1970 cost related to the support of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, excluding paramilitary, is approximately $1.5 billion.

The Chairman.  That is for fiscal year 1970?

General Clement.  Yes, sir. The costs are broken down into different appropriation areas: Military personnel, which is basically rations for the Army; operations and maintenance, which includes offshore training, repair parts, depot overhaul programs, maintenance costs, and procurement, which consists primarily of equipment and ammunition. Those are the major parts of the $1.5 billion, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you have an estimate of the accelerated total we have returned to the Vietnamese? This is the equipment and supplies?

General Clement.  Yes, sir; this is for equipment and supplies.

The Chairman.  What is that?

General Clement.  This is the current appropriation, $1.5 billion.

The Chairman.  That is for 1 year?

General Clement.  Yes, sir.

I do not have the accumulated total.

The Chairman.  An accelerated total for the past.

General Clement.  I do not have that here, sir. I can try to provide it for you.

The Chairman.  Would you get that for the record, please? I assume it is available.

General Clement.  I will get it for the record of the executive session.

The Chairman.  Do you have any estimates for 1971?

General Clement.  No, sir, I have no projections for 1971. {p.455}

The Chairman.  Does this $1.5 — and the figures I want, of course, include the bases and excess equipment we turned over to the Vietnamese? We have recently turned over some large bases, have we not?

General Clement.  This would exclude the plant, sir, only equipment and supplies turned over.

The Chairman.  The plant?

General Clement.  The plant, or bases, are excluded, sir.

The Chairman.  Everything from rifles on up?

General Clement.  Yes, sir; all the programed supplies and equipment.

PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY BUDGET PAID BY UNITED STATES

The Chairman.  What portion of South Vietnam’s military budget is paid for, directly or indirectly, by the United States?

General Clement.  We pay directly, of their fiscal year 1970 defense budget, which is about a billion dollars, about 11 percent, sir, as U.S. funds.

The Chairman.  Of the military budget?

General Clement.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Eleven percent. Who pays the other 89 percent?

General Clement.  This is paid by the Government of Vietnam. They finance it through taxes and customs duties and raise other revenues.

The Chairman.  Are you sure about this?

General Clement.  As it concerns their military budget, yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Then we pay all of the civilian; is that right? How do you judge this? You know very well that the Vietnamese have no resources to pay for 89 percent of the fighting. How is this set up?

General Clement.  Sir, this is the way the defense budget is broken out and accounted for.

The Chairman.  By whom?

General Clement.  It is jointly worked out by the Vietnamese and our people in MACV.

The Chairman.  Those taxes which the Government collects are all paid by the Federal Government of the United States; are they not?

General Clement.  Sir, that is really beyond my area.

The Chairman.  Beyond your area?

General Clement.  Of responsibility.

The Chairman.  Who would know about this? Is either of your colleagues expert in this?

Are you, Colonel?

Colonel Wheeler.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  You do not bother about budgetary matters?

Colonel Wheeler.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  I sympathize with you. I would not either, if I did not have to. I do not blame you.

But I would guess at least 90 percent of the civilian and military costs of the Government of South Vietnam is paid for by the American Government.

What they do, of course, is tax the imports that we send in for them. We send in a very large amount. $500 million of economic goods, to support them and they levy a tax on it and then they do not call that as being derived from the U.S. Federal Government. {p.456}

I said directly or indirectly. What I meant is either by direct budgetary support or by paying taxes to them in the form of import taxes or any other kind.

I am afraid the 11 percent is very misleading if you are saying that that is all that the U.S. Federal Government contributes to support of the military in Vietnam, directly or indirectly. It may be the only direct support.

I have a number of other questions I will direct later, but I want the other Senators to proceed if they are ready.

MEANING OF REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. GROUND COMBAT FORCES

Senator Gore.  General, I was interested in and have become increasingly interested in the last few weeks in military terminology. Now, let me read you a statement which Chief of Staff General Wheeler made. This is with respect to Vietnamization:

If you would be so kind, from your familiarity with military terminology, I would like you to tell me precisely what is the meaning of these words: “Redeploy all of our ground combat forces now there.”

General Clement.  Well, sir, I am sure General Wheeler is referring to the phase redeployment from Vietnam which is currently going on. The current accent certainly is on redeployment of ground combat forces. I am sure he is talking in this context.

Senator Gore.  In testimony before this committee, I questioned Secretary Laird with respect to this. If I correctly recall his terminology, what would remain there a year hence would be support troops, not by definition or description ground combat troops. Would you mind explaining the difference between support forces and ground combat forces?

General Clement.  Sir, support forces would be primarily quartermaster, transportation, engineer, signal, aviation forces. When you speak of support, this is normally what is envisaged: The technical, administrative, and logistical people, et cetera, that support the combat effort.

Senator Gore.  When I inquired of him if it included infantry, the answer was yes. Would you say it would include infantry?

General Clement.  In the definition I gave, it did not, sir. But I am not sure of the context in which the Secretary was replying to your question. Was there a broader context?

Senator Gore.  I am always left with this uncertainty. Just what is meant? The other day I read in the press that Secretary Laird said there were military advisers in Laos, but then changed it and they were military attaches. I do not know exactly the difference. I am frequently left with this.

General Clement.  I am sure that the Secretary was talking in a broader or different context rather than strict redeployment of combat troops per se.

DEFINITION OF VIETNAMIZATION

Senator Gore.  Maybe we will just leave this between you and me and not refer to what term the President or Secretary Laird has used. What is your definition of Vietnamization as you understand it? {p.457}

General Clement.  Sir, because Vietnamization has been interpreted, paraphrased—

Senator Gore.  I see you are prepared for this one.

General Clement.  I would like to read the definition.

Senator Gore.  Yes, I think it is worthy.

General Clement.  {“}Vietnamization is the process by which the United States assists the Government of Vietnam to assume increasing responsibility for all aspects of the war and all functions inherent in self-government. It means building a stronger government with improved economy and strengthening the military internal security forces sufficient to permit the United States to reduce its military and civilian presence in Vietnam without unacceptable risks to the objectives of the United States in the security of the free world and Government of Vietnam forces. Vietnamization refers only to the assumption by Vietnamese of that portion of the war effort carried on by the United States. It does not refer to the total war effort in which the South Vietnamese themselves have carried such a large and heavy burden for some years.”

Senator Gore.  Did you prepare this definition?

General Clement.  We have prepared this definition; yes, sir.

Senator Gore.  I did not understand that.

General Clement.  We have prepared the definition. It is not original with my appearance here.

Senator Gore.  I see.

Then this is an official definition?

General Clement.  It can be termed that, I believe; yes, sir.

SCHEDULE FOR REDUCTION OF U.S. PRESENCE

Senator Gore.  Can you give us some idea of when this millenium may arrive?

General Clement.  Sir, I believe that President Nixon has reserved to himself the announcement of any further withdrawals, or, rather, redeployments of U.S. forces and any time schedule. I am not prepared, really, to put time limits or announce any schedules.

Senator Gore.  Is there a schedule to your knowledge?

General Clement.  Sir, I know of no schedule and, as I say, the President has said that he will make these announcements from time to time.

Senator Gore.  If there is a schedule, you are not aware of it?

General Clement.  I know of plans, sir, but they are plans only. I know of no schedule.

Senator Gore.  Are you prepared to discuss with this committee those military plans?

General Clement.  I believe I can discuss aspects, perhaps, in another session.

Senator Gore.  In executive session?

General Clement.  Yes, sir.

Senator Gore.  I certainly shall not press you there. Do you know if agreements exist between the Pentagon or U.S. military forces and the Saigon government with respect to the support from the Saigon government’s troops?

General Clement.  Sir, I really can’t answer that. I really do not know. It is beyond my area of competence here. {p.458}

Senator Gore.  Mr. Chairman, all I seem to be able to get is another definition. I will turn the witness back to you.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ORIGINAL U.S. ADVISORY EFFORT

The Chairman.  Senator Aiken.

Senator Aiken.  I have only three or four questions.

First, the witness goes back to 1951. I think we ought to realize that from 1951 until 1954 we were considering Indochina and not Vietnam, and Indochina, as I recall, included Laos and Cambodia. So there was quite a difference.

At the time that Indochina was broken up, our advisory group consisted of 324 officers and men who became advisers to South Vietnam.

That is correct; is it not?

General Clement.  Yes, sir.

Senator Aiken.  Then the number of advisers increased slowly until 1960; they reached something less than 700. In the meantime, as I recall, in 1954, the United States was urged to send military assistance to the French; is that correct?

General Clement.  Yes, I believe it is correct.

Senator Aiken.  President Eisenhower at that time refused to put our Armed Forces in there in spite of urging from some of the Joint Chiefs. So by 1960, we had less than 700 advisers there.

Then they increased rather steadily from less than 700 at the end of 1960. The advisers for Vietnam alone increased to some 2,500 personnel. So at the end of 1961 there were over 3,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam. Yet it appears that as our number of advisers increased from 1961 until 1968, the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese military establishment did not increase proportionately or accordingly. Does that mean that they did not have the capacity to study them or to learn or to take the advice? Or does it mean that we considered it our war from 1963 until 1969?

Our advisers certainly were not very effective as far as strengthening the South Vietnamese during those years and were not effective until 1969, if I read correctly the reports we get. What was the trouble?

General Clement.  I am not prepared, sir, to defend the previous advisory effort or to share your judgment that our advisers were ineffective. I would prefer to tell you about our advisory effort now. We feel it is quite effective.

Senator Aiken.  Would you say our advice has been more effective during the last 12 months than it had been during the previous 6 or 7 years?

General Clement.  Sir, I would prefer not to make comparisons out of context, because this effectiveness is a function of the enemy situation and of many other things.

Senator Aiken.  Very well. I think it is so obvious you do not need to make an estimate on that.

ADVISORY EFFORT IN LAOS

The other question I had in mind concerns the military advisers in Vietnam. Do they operate entirely distinct from the military, or perhaps some would say nonmilitary, advisers in Laos who are trying to make an effective army out of those troops? Do they operate entirely distinct or is there collaboration? {p.459}

General Clement.  Sir, I know nothing about the advisory effort in Laos and I am not prepared to discuss it. I can certainly tell you how our advisers operate, and specifically in the training field, what we do.

EFFECTIVENESS OF RECENT U.S. ADVISORY EFFORTS

Senator Aiken.  Do you feel that your work in South Vietnam has been effective during the last year?

General Clement.  Yes, sir; we do.

Senator Aiken.  Is the work which they are doing there in part responsible for the fact that we are reducing the number of our own forces in South Vietnam?

General Clement.  I would say the total effort, the work that everyone has done there, sir, is responsible for that. This is a total war over there.

Senator Aiken.  What do you mean by everyone?

General Clement.  I mean the South Vietnamese and the U.S. troops over there, our civilians working there — everybody working together.

Senator Aiken.  You mean their morale, their spirit, has been better during the last year?

General Clement.  I have only been there a year. I cannot make sharp judgments. I believe there has been a tremendous increase in spirit from what I have seen.

Senator Aiken.  I think we can draw our own conclusions there, because we are getting reports, which I hope are accurate, of great progress being made during recent months, in contrast to the reports that we were getting, say, from 1963 to the end of 1968.

BASIS FOR DECISION TO TURN MORE RESPONSIBILITY OVER TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE

You are aware that we had planned to turn over to the South Vietnamese more responsibility for the defense of their own country. Is that plan based on our belief that the capacity of South Vietnam to assume the burden has increased greatly, or is it based on the theory that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong are getting sick of the job?

General Clement.  No, sir. Personally, I think it is a function of all of those things. The South Vietnamese have demonstrated competence. I can speak particularly of the training area, where they have certainly demonstrated a competence which, for example, would be different from 2 years ago — remarkably different. So this is a part of it.

Of course, the enemy is also always a part of this picture when you are at war.

Senator Aiken.  As the spirit and confidence of the South Vietnamese rises, then the spirit and the confidence of their enemy, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, diminishes or subsides. That seems a natural assumption, anyway.

I think and I hope we do not have any more complications, that the situation is much better than it was 2 years ago.

Thank you.

The Chairman.  Senator Case, do you have any questions?

Senator Case.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know it is embarrasing {sic: embarrassing}, General, but the questions that Senator Aiken was putting are questions that concern me very much, concern {p.460} all of us. Secretary Laird, as I recall it, came back after his first trip over there and said he was appalled at the lack of training of the Vietnamese. Now, this, as Senator Aiken pointed out, was not really indicating progress. Newspaper accounts by responsible analysts who have come back, I think some of our very best people, have made this point.

WITNESS’ EXPERIENCE WITH TRAINING PROGRAM

How long have you been associated with the training program?

General Clement.  Since September, sir. Formerly, I had a tour with the Americal Division for 9 months.

Senator Case.  What division?

General Clement.  Americal Division, sir.

Senator Case.  Would you say the words out?

General Clement.  I am sorry, sir. It was the U.S. 23d Division in the north. We worked very closely with the 2d Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in the I Corps. I had opportunity daily to work and see them.

Senator Case.  How long did you work with that?

General Clement.  That was 9 months.

Senator Case.  So your whole experience goes back about a year?

General Clement.  A year ago December, yes, sir.

Senator Case.  Before that, you were not connected with this problem?

General Clement.  No, sir, I was not.

Senator Case.  Are there any people here who were?

General Clement.  No, sir, I do not believe so.

Senator Case.  So we cannot get from you any idea of what the difference has been in this particular operation between the long period Senator Aiken referred to, from 1961 to 1969, and 1969 on? You are just not prepared to talk about this?

General Clement.  No, sir.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ARVN 2D DIVISION

I can talk in a general way, for example, of the division with which I worked, and the change that did take place even in those months, brief as they were.

Senator Case.  When you say division, you mean the whole training effort, the whole training program of the whole Vietnamese Army?

General Clement.  That is right. The net result of the training is operational effectiveness, which, of course, is what we are after. This 2d Division, we thought, was tremendous, and still is, a very fine division.

Senator Case.  How many men is that?

General Clement.  It runs about 12,000, sir.

Senator Case.  That is the whole division?

General Clement.  That is the entire division, yes, sir.

Senator Case.  That is how many?

General Clement.  Regiments and battalions.

Senator Case.  How large a total force?

General Clement.  This 12,000 would be within the division itself. There would be a backup of logistical support.

Senator Case.  I am sorry, one division out of how many? {p.461}

General Clement.  Twelve divisions. Ten numbered divisions, the airborne division, and the marine division.

Senator Case.  Has that division been good all along?

General Clement.  I am certain that its effectiveness has been greater in the past year than it had been previously.

Senator Case.  Was it in past years better than the rest of it?

General Clement.  I am not prepared to say, sir.

Senator Case.  You do not know anything about that?

General Clement.  I do not know its effectiveness in past years in relation to other divisions in Vietnam.

Senator Case.  This didn’t spring full blown from—

General Clement.  No, it had been a good division.

REASONS FOR EFFECTIVENESS OF ARVN 2D DIVISION

Senator Case.  Why had it been a good division? Why has it been all along a good division?

General Clement.  I say it had been a good division, but I believe it has been much better, frankly, in the past year based on its records.

Senator Case.  Why was it better in the old days, why is it better now than the rest?

General Clement.  A lot of it is built on success, and they have had success in combat. There is nothing better than that to have the morale go up.

Senator Case.  That had to begin some time. How did it get going? What are the qualities that make it different from other divisions?

General Clement.  Leadership; you can begin with that, sir.

Senator Case.  In the South Vietnamese Division itself?

General Clement.  Yes, sir.

The division commander is a good leader.

Senator Case.  Has he been the same commander for many years?

General Clement.  He has been there 2 or 2-1/2 years, sir.

Senator Case.  Did this division just start being good 2 years ago?

General Clement.  Sir, I would like to reserve questions on the division, if you would, for later. Colonel Wheeler is prepared to discuss the 1st Division. He is the 1st Division senior adviser.

Senator Case.  He has been for some time?

General Clement.  Since last July.

Senator Case.  But he knows something of the history of this?

Colonel?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

Senator Case.  You do know something of this—

The Chairman.  If the Senator will yield, since you are interested, the colonel has a prepared statement. Then you can go on with the questioning.

Senator Case.  I do not mind a bit. I am trying to get something specific about this, rather than this tremendous amount of generality.

The Chairman.  He is the adviser. He would be able to answer you on this.

Senator Case.  I will be glad to reserve until later.

The Chairman.  You can do it now.

Senator Case.  I do not want to create a break here. I am trying to get something more useful than the repetition of the many generalities we have had before.

Go ahead. {p.462}

As you suggest, Mr. Chairman, why not let the colonel go ahead.

The Chairman.  All right.

Then we will come back and you can have a go at the rest of it.

Testimony of Col. JESSE L. WHEELER, JR.,
U.S. Army, Senior Adviser, 1st Infantry Division,
Army of the Republic of Vietnam

Colonel Wheeler.  Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am Colonel Wheeler, senior adviser to the 1st Infantry Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The 1st Infantry Division is the northernmost Vietnamese division in South Vietnam. Its area of operations is contiguous with the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and includes the two northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The division headquarters is located on the northeast edge of Hue.

The organization of the infantry divisions in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the advisory teams are basically the same, except the 1st Infantry Division has an additional organic regiment to enhance its capability to cope with the strong threat in and along the DMZ.

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF ARVN 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION

I will discuss briefly the organization of the 1st Infantry Division for two reasons. First, as the senior adviser, I am most familiar with this division and, second, to depict where the advisory effort is employed.

The primary mission of the division is conduct of offensive operations against the enemy in order to provide security for the people in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces and to facilitate the pacification effort.

The division combat units are three regiments with four battalions each and one regiment with five battalions for a division total of 17 infantry battalions and one armed cavalry squadron. Combat support and service support units are very nearly the same as in other ARVN divisions. Normally attached to the division are armored cavalry, artillery, engineer, military police, and Navy units.

The commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division is also the senior military commander of the two northern provinces, Thua Thien and Quang Tri. There are regional force companies and popular force platoons in these two provinces with whom the division is associated.

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ADVISORY TEAM

The mission of the 1st Infantry Division advisory team, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, is to provide advice and assistance in the fields of command, personnel, intelligence, operations, training, and logistics. The 1st Infantry Division advisory team has 197 officers and enlisted men, 49 of whom are staff advisers and 111 advisers with the combat units.

ROLE OF THE ADVISER

The role of the adviser has been to advise and assist the commander and his staff concerning all aspects of military operations to include {p.463} coordinating combat operations and the employment of U.S. combat support and combat service support assets. This advisory effort is changed in direct proportion to the increased tactical proficiency of the ARVN units. For example, as units become self-sufficient, the advisers are withdrawn. In the 1st Infantry Division only newly activated artillery battalions are assigned advisers. In the signal battalion and engineer battalion the advisers have been deleted.

The increase in the level of military sophistication is typified by the professional operations of the 1st Division throughout the two northern provinces, and particularly along the DMZ, in the A Shau Valley, and the coastal areas during 1968 and 1969.

The 1st Infantry Division has effectively developed professional battalion and regimental commanders and principal division staff officers to the degree comparable to U.S. units. The majority of the battalion and regimental commanders have an average of 10 years combat command experience. To a large degree, these commanders have operated within the same general geographical areas. This background experience has enabled these commanders to develop expertise in most areas of tactical employment of military forces. In view of this tactical expertise, the adviser in the 1st Infantry Division has become a consultant for plans development and coordinator of available U.S. combat support and combat service support assets. Accordingly, the emphasis of the advisory effort has been directed toward these functions. Specifically, the adviser must possess the necessary education and experience to assist in the employment of nonorganic combat support assets to complement the combat plan developed by his counterpart, that is, selection of appropriate firepower for the accomplishment of the mission and use of tactical air support, to include gunships where precise English is a requirement.

The adviser must continue to give assistance to battalion and regimental staffs. In general, these staffs lack experience and until the junior officers and NCO’s are better trained, they provide only limited assistance to the commander. Specifically, two areas that require improvement are the analysis of intelligence and intrastaff coordination. Due to the emphasis of the advisory effort in this area, marked progress is being made in their development.

In the combat service support role, demands are made upon the advisor to be knowledgeable of both U.S. and ARVN logistical systems. The adviser must be able to complement the ARVN logistical system with any unique features of the U.S. system. Additionally, adviser assistance is required in administration, maintenance of equipment, and base management.

The adviser is expected to be knowledgeable of civilian military relations and history of the local area in which the unit operates. He must be able to discuss current events and the likely impact of these events upon US/ARVN relations. He must establish personal rapport with his counterpart, which is a most essential factor in adviser-counterpart relations and which provides the necessary foundation for which mutual advice is exchanged and acted upon.

Mr. Chairman, this is a brief resume of the mission and role of the adviser and organization of the 1st ARVN Division which I am senior adviser.

The Chairman.  Thank you, sir.

Senator Case? {p.464}

Senator Case.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Colonel.

It is not necessary that I follow what the chairman said at the outset of this hearing. I think all of us are completely aware of the tremendous difficulty of the job you men have had and still have. It is for us a unique kind of operation, and questions about it are not only, as the chairman suggested based upon questions of policy but also upon whether this kind of thing can be successful.

REASONS FOR EXCELLENCE OF 1ST DIVISION

I would like to come back now to the question I did present to General Clement earlier, and address it also to you, or both of you, if you will. What is there about this 1st Division that has set it apart over the years? What sets it apart now? Besides the fact that — but you do not have to comment upon your being the adviser of it. Undoubtedly, you are responsible for a good deal of its recent excellence. But this is not new. This has been always mentioned as we have one division of the South Vietnamese Army that really is beginning to shape up. This has been going on for years. Why?

Colonel Wheeler.  Sir, the 1st ARVN Division enjoys its particular prestige among all combat divisions from probably two factors. One is the leadership it has in its division commander, subordinate commanders, and the soldiers within the ranks. The soldiers within the ranks of the 1st ARVN Division are 55 percent from the Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces, with 45 percent of the personnel coming from other areas in Vietnam.

Senator Case.  You mean they are natives of that area?

Colonel Wheeler.  They are natives of those two provinces, sir. It has been my observation that the soldier of the 1st ARVN Division, be he private, NCO, or officer, understands the value and the reason why he is fighting. I think he understands the fact that those values are worth fighting for and in some cases, worth dying for because the alternatives were clearly demonstrated to him during the Tet offensive of 1968.

Senator Case.  That goes back only 2 years.

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

The 1st ARVN Division, sir, was taken over by General Truong in June of 1966 at the time that the Buddhist “struggle movements” were taking place. He has built the division through flawless leadership and has made it comparable to any U.S. division.

Senator Case.  Is he also the province political head?

Colonel Wheeler.  No, sir; the two provinces have their own province chiefs. He is the senior military man there and as such, he is the one who is responsible for the security of both provinces. He does not usurp their prerogatives of direct operational command of the PF and RF forces. However, he does include these forces in his planning and deployment for the security of the division tactical area components of his overall operational force.

Senator Case.  Now, when he took over in 1966, what shape was the 1st Division in?

Colonel Wheeler.  The division at that particular moment, sir, was not in the best state of morale because it was torn by the Catholic and the Buddhist factions. {p.465}

Senator Case.  The factor that you mentioned earlier, that half of them or more come from the two provinces in which they are actively operating, that was still effective then; was it not?

Colonel Wheeler.  Would you state the question again, please sir?

Senator Case.  In 1966, though they were torn between the Catholics and the Buddhists and had other difficulties, they were still men from those two provinces; were they not?

Colonel Wheeler.  They were, but I do not know the percentage, sir.

Senator Case.  Do you think that percentage has increased?

Colonel Wheeler.  I cannot say, sir.

Senator Case.  Have you any reason to think it has increased?

Colonel Wheeler.  I would think probably that it has increased to some extent, sir, since the recruitment for the division is primarily within those two provinces now.

Senator Case.  Now, is this a unique factor applicable or attributable to this division as opposed to other divisions in which personnel do not come from the areas in which they are operating?

Colonel Wheeler.  I do not know what percentage the other divisions have of personnel from their own local areas, sir. They all receive trainees from the nationalist training centers.

Senator Case.  Including the 1st?

Colonel Wheeler.  Including the 1st, sir.

UNIQUENESS OF GENERAL TRUONG

Senator Case.  Now, as to the leadership, apart from the commander, the military commander, who is unique in your experience, is he in leadership, is he unusually good?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir, he is.

Senator Case.  Why is he unusually good?

Colonel Wheeler.  Sir, he is a very competent individual, with an extraordinary amount of ability and intelligence. He has a very keen and analytical mind. He takes his job seriously. He is on the job 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 31 days a month.

Senator Case.  Is he independent of Saigon?

Colonel Wheeler.  No, sir; he is under the command of the I Corps commander, who in turn answers to JCS.

Senator Case.  Is he one of the group who we sometimes talk about as the military leader, the real leadership of Vietnam, to which we—

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir; he does enjoy prestige from all quarters, both from Vietnamese and allied officials.

Senator Case.  No. I am talking about is he one of the group of military commanders who are supposed to be the boys who really run the show?

Colonel Wheeler.  I am not sure what you are speaking of here, sir. All I can say is that he devotes his primary effort to the war in the 11th Division Tactical Area which is his assigned responsibility. I will say that he assiduously avoids political involvement, although he does enjoy equal prestige, whether they be political leaders or otherwise.

Senator Case.  What I am trying to get at is does he have unique qualities in his personality and his characteristics which give him the qualities to give leadership? What are the — I know you are trying to answer, but I am trying to find out why he is unique, why we do not have a dozen leaders of this kind thrown up in the process. How did he get to the top? {p.466}

Colonel Wheeler.  Sir, a brief history of General Truong — he graduated from My Tho College in 1953 and attended Officer Candidate School at the Thu Doc Military School from which he graduated in 1954.

Senator Case.  This is when the French were there?

Colonel Wheeler.  That is correct, sir. Upon graduation he was commissioned a second lieutenant and assigned to the Airborne Division.

Senator Case.  Was he a member of the mandarin class?

Colonel Wheeler.  Not that I know of, sir.

Senator Case.  Do you happen to know what his family background is?

Colonel Wheeler.  He comes from the Kien Hoa Province, south of Saigon.

Senator Case.  He is a southerner?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

Senator Case.  A Buddhist?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

Senator Case.  Please go on.

Colonel Wheeler.  From the date of his commissioning until 1966 he served exclusively with the airborne division in all positions from platoon leader to deputy division commander. In June 1966, he became the commander of the 1st ARVN Division. His demonstrated leadership qualities were those associated with a professional of the military art. Furthermore they were achieved through his own efforts.

Senator Case.  Why do we not have more of them? You know, I know this is part of your problem.

Colonel Wheeler.  I am sure, sir, that there are others who are very competent, too.

General Clement.  There are some coming along the line. There are good division commanders.

Senator Case.  Out of 12?

General Clement.  Yes, sir.

Senator Case.  That is pretty — well, I mean not in very large proportions, is it, after almost 20 years of our military advisory effort?

General Clement.  No, sir.

Of course, we have singled out the 1st Division. Colonel Wheeler is the senior adviser. This happens to be probably the outstanding commander. He is well up there. There are others that are very good, very fine commanders. The one I worked with in the 2d Division is very fine.

Senator Case.  Where is that?

General Clement.  That division is also in I Corps, just south of the 1st Division.

Senator Case.  Running down to—

General Clement.  Quang Ngal and Quangtin Provinces.

ESTIMATE OF 1ST DIVISION

The Chairman.  I wonder if the Senator would allow me to read a story? It is on this subject. This is a story dated December 30 in the Christian Science Monitor. It contains an article by George Ashworth about the 1st Division:

He says:

It talks about General Truong. It says, among other things, that he looks after his people. It says there is a commissary at which soldiers and their families can buy rice and other staples at well under the market level. Troops whose families are near are allowed time off, generally once a month, to go see them.

The article says:

This is the Christian Science Monitor which, as you know, is a rather reliable newspaper, if there is one according to the modern day.

What would you say about Mr. Ashworth’s estimate of the 1st Division?

Colonel Wheeler.  I would say his estimate, sir, is very accurate. I have met Mr. Ashworth on several occasions.

The Chairman.  Then the conclusion would be that the 1st is by no means a typical division. It is the outstanding division of the whole ARVN Army; is it not?

Colonel Wheeler.  I have no way of judging the other divisions, sir.

The Chairman.  I see. I should not ask you that. I withdraw the question. That is what Mr. Ashworth and other people say. Being the senior adviser, I can see why you would not want to make a self-serving statement like that. I am sure General Clement, being there on the stand with you, would not want to, either, unless he wishes to volunteer that.

General Clement.  No, sir, I would not wish to comment on that.

UNEVENESS OF PERFORMANCE OF ARVN FORCES

The Chairman.  This is to Colonel Wheeler, too. Following that up on January 12 of this year, there was a panel discussion on national educational television among several reporters in Vietnam. In commenting on Vietnamization, Mr. Beach of the Chicago Daily News, who I believe has been out there longer than any and is very well acquainted in the area, said:

Would you say that is a rather inaccurate statement, General?

General Clement.  Sir, I would say there is bound to be unevenness in performance in all units.

The Chairman.  Yes.

General Clement.  And I think he may have overdrawn the case somewhat. {p.468}

The Chairman.  You think he has, Colonel? Has he overdrawn the case?

Colonel Wheeler.  I can only speak of my area, sir, I can say that the lowlands of the 11th Division tactical area are currently, and have been since last summer, secured by the RF and the PF units. The combat units and the combat support units of the 1st ARVN Division are employed in the Piedmont and the jungle areas where the NVA are located.

Senator Case.  How long has the 1st Division been up there, operating where it is now?

Colonel Wheeler.  The 1st ARVN Division, sir, has been there since its activation in 1955.

Senator Case.  So from recent history, in recent history, it has been there all the time?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

NUMBER OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN 1ST CORPS AREA

The Chairman.  How many American troops are in that 1st Corps area compared to the ARVN troops?

Colonel Wheeler.  I do not have a figure on the total American troops in the I Corps area.

General Clement.  I don’t have a figure. We have a unit, sir; it is a Marine division.

The Chairman.  Don’t you know how many men and arms are in the 1st Corps area?

Don’t you know, General?

General Clement.  I am just wondering if I should provide the exact number or give you a ball park figure, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you think this involves security?

General Clement.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Why don’t you say so? Say you know, but don’t want to tell us in open session. That is the proper answer. Don’t say you don’t know. You leave the impression that you came all the way from Vietnam and don’t know anything to talk about. We can talk about it in executive if that is the way you feel. I did not assume it is any secret, but if it is, all right. That is your privilege.

Senator Case?

HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR 1ST ARVN DIVISION

Senator Case.  What percentage of the helicopter support comes from the Vietnamese force in the 1st Corps, the 1st Vietnamese—

Colonel Wheeler.  The 1st ARVN Division helicopter support provided by the Vietnamese Air Force is about 20 to 25 percent, sir.

Senator Case.  Of the support that that division is given in operations?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

Senator Case.  Has that markedly increased from what it was when you first went there?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

At that time, we did not have support for the 1st ARVN Division provided by the Vietnamese Air Force. A helicopter unit became operational in October 1969 and that unit has provided some support to us on a daily basis for resupply and for combat assaults. {p.469}

Senator Case.  Do they have a gunship helicopter?

Colonel Wheeler.  No, sir, they do not.

The Chairman.  I don’t understand. Are you talking about helicopters that first—

Senator Case.  I am talking about Vietnamese helicopter support by the Vietnamese.

The Chairman.  Do you mean how many they have that are not ours?

Senator Case.  Well, I want to find out what percentage they are supplying of their own helicopter support.

The Chairman.  I could not follow the answer.

Senator Case.  I thought it was about 20 to 25 percent.

The Chairman.  Of what?

Colonel Wheeler.  I understand the question concerns the total amount of helicopter support that is employed or used by the 1st ARVN Division and what percentage of that is provided by the VNAF.

Senator Case.  That is right.

Colonel Wheeler.  I stated 20 to 25 percent.

The Chairman.  Seventy-five percent by Americans.

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Oh, I didn’t understand.

Senator Case.  And none of that VNAF-furnished support is fighter ships?

Colonel Wheeler.  No, sir. VNAF has no helicopter gunships at this time.

Senator Case.  What is the plan and prospect for that?

Colonel Wheeler.  I do not have the information on that, sir.

Senator Case.  That comes from the Vietnamese Air Force, I take it? This is all a matter of central ARVN control?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir, and we do get tactical air, both United States and VNAF.

The Chairman.  How many helicopters does the 1st have?

Colonel Wheeler.  The 1st ARVN Division does not have any organic helicopters, sir.

The Chairman.  Oh, it does not have any?

Colonel Wheeler.  No, sir.

Senator Case.  So your training operation does not include any training in helicopter, even for support?

Colonel Wheeler.  No, sir.

Senator Case.  Even for support as opposed to fighting?

Colonel Wheeler.  Our training includes the utilization of helicopters for combat assault and combat resupply missions.

Senator Case.  That is furnished by 75 percent Americans or 75 or 80, and 20 to 25 supplied by the Vietnamese Army?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

Senator Case.  How long do you think it would be before — you are not prepared, I guess, to say how the Vietnamese Air Force is coming along in its training, are you? You would have to get that from some other place?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

Senator Case.  This kind of support objective is still central to the operations as you conceive that they will be carried on, continue to be carried on?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir. {p.470}

NECESSITY OF HELICOPTER SUPPORT

Senator Case.  You need helicopter support? It is essential, I take it?

Colonel Wheeler.  It is essential to the combat operations there as long as the situation remains as it is now, sir.

Senator Case.  Will you tell me why it is essential? The North Vietnamese-Vietcong operations have never had this kind of support. Why do we have to have it?

Colonel Wheeler.  Sir, the location of the enemy in the area in which the division is employed requires that we have the necessary combat support. Here I am speaking of the artillery, to support the infantry units that are employed into the jungle and mountain areas. To move artillery in where there are no roads we use the helicopters.

Senator Case.  I know you do. But the North Vietnamese do not have that. How do they get around?

Colonel Wheeler.  The North Vietnamese, sir, do not employ fire power from the type artillery weapons that we do.

UNITED STATES INFLUENCE ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE WARFARE TACTICS

Senator Case.  Of course, what I am getting at, Colonel, is this other question as to whether we have corrupted the tactics of the South Vietnamese in the war and tried to make it a war in which we fight our way and try to make them fight it in that way. I wish more comment on this thing. I again am not being critical, but this comment has been made many times, that we have not only taken the war over ourselves and fought it as I expect anybody given a job would want American forces to do, but that we have made it impossible by disabling the South Vietnames {sic: Vietnamese} from the kind of warfare they would be able to carry on any other time. What do you say about that?

Colonel Wheeler.  I would say, sir, in this case, we do not have advisers in the artillery units. They are competent, fully capable, and do employ their artillery without the assistance of advisers.

Senator Case.  That is a very interesting observation, but it does not really go to the question.

General?

General Clement.  Sir, I think we should talk of air mobility tactics since this sort of personifies what we have there. One of the biggest reasons for the success we have had is because of the air mobility concept. This allowed us to get to places we had never been before, that the French had never been in before. Unfortunately, the French did not have this amount of helicopter support. We did. We have been able to move into the war zone C, war zone D, in and out as the enemy evaporated. This meant we could bring pressure on the enemy in places he had never had it before. We could make him move from his base areas. We could operate on his supply lines. This was a tremendous thing.

We first tried it out here in Fort Benning, Ga., and brought it over under General Kinnard and it made a tremendous difference from the very beginning.

Senator Case.  I am not advocating that we have tied our men’s hands, our forces hands at all. That is not the point.

General Clement.  No, sir.

Senator Case.  The point is have we made it impossible for the South Vietnamese to fight the way they have always fought and know how to fight? {p.471}

General Clement.  Let me come back to that and try to paint a picture of the enemy concept and the helicopter per se. It has been a tremendous thing. You mentioned the NVA and the fact that they do not have them. They would love to have them, I am sure.

We talk about the Vietnamese. We have trained them, yes, in the use of helicopters. Many of these combat assaults that Colonel Wheeler described are ARVN. These are Vietnamese soldiers out there, understanding how to be air mobile, understanding the use of the helicopter, how to do things with it. Yes, I think a certain percentage of helicopters ought to be retained by the Vietnamese.

Now, you come to the balance of how many should be retained. The ARVN is not a mirror image army by any means. It is a much slimmer army than ours. Its divisions are not as heavily armed as ours. There would not be as many helicopters as there are in our army, obviously. Certainly air mobility is a concept which should not be forgotten and which they should keep. How much is a question of trade-offs.

IS UNITED STATES SUPPLYING CRUTCH TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE?

Senator Case.  Of course, I am not, again, trying to say how much they should have. All I am trying to say is are they getting to the point where they can take this job on themselves or are we in a sense, with the very best purpose in the world, making it impossible for them to do this by giving them this crutch and supplying this crutch which, when it is taken away, whether this year, 10 years from now, will make them unable to do the job?

General Clement.  Sir, I believe that you maybe paint the crutch a little bit too heavily. I do not believe it is that much of a crutch. It is another facet, another weapon to be used, a different tactical employment to be used.

These commanders we are talking about are seasoned commanders — General Truong, for example, and most of the others — they have been at war for a long time. They understand the use of this measure. If it is taken away, there is another way to do it. They can always do it the way they did it before, which would take longer, perhaps, but given the enemy threat, this is what you are always concerned with.

Senator Case.  I think I have just summed up the testimony that General Wheeler has given. I take it that you would pretty much agree, you are not prepared to talk about the prospects for self-sufficiency on the part of the Vietnamese Air Force, neither one of you.

General Clement.  No, sir.

PROSPECTS FOR 1ST DIVISION OPERATION WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT

Senator Case.  That is involved here. You are prepared to say that in the north, these two northern provinces in the 1st Division area, the South Vietnamese Army is coming along so that it will be able to handle itself and make use of the kind of support that it is getting now and I feel we have come to lead them to think is necessary. So they will be able to take this on increasingly themselves and use it tactically and operationally. You are satisfied with this, that you could let them go fairly soon and they could run the show themselves, with the outside support, of course, especially the air support that we are now providing. {p.472}

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir. The staff of the 1st ARVN Division at the present time does plan by itself tactical operations, and the use of any support which we can provide, to accomplish whatever tactical plan the division commander directs.

Senator Case.  In other words, now, may I broaden this just a little bit? If the rest of the Vietnamese Army could do this, we could pull out tomorrow except for support.

Colonel Wheeler.  Sir, that goes beyond my purview.

Senator Case.  What about you, General?

General Clement.  No, sir, and I think you paint the picture, a little too strongly for the I Corps area. There are a lot of enemy up in I Corps, and there always have been. Quang Ngai Province, I am sure you recognize, has always been one of the most difficult provinces. It still is. The units here have to cover these areas where the enemy may be found. So this problem of where the enemy may be found is a very sensitive problem.

The Chairman.  Will the Senator yield?

Senator Case.  Yes.

The Chairman.  How long do you think it will be before the 1st Division can operate completely independently without U.S. helicopter, artillery, and other support? How long do you think it will be before it can operate on its own.

Colonel Wheeler.  Mr. Chairman, an answer to that particular question would certainly consider the intentions of the enemy. I would not at this time be in a position to state what those intentions are.

The Chairman.  I assume that there has been the assumption that their intention was not the friendliest and that there would be some conflict. I did not mean that they could operate with no war at all. I assumed that with the known attitude of the North Vietnamese.

If you cannot answer, that is all right.

ATTITUDE OF U.S. SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

I would like to go back to a question. You said a moment ago that one reason why the 1st Division was so good is that the soldier in the 1st understands what he is fighting for and he believes in it and that is why he is the best soldier. Is that about what you said?

Colonel Wheeler.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Can you say that about the American soldiers there too?

Colonel Wheeler.  Those that I have observed, yes, sir.

The Chairman.  General, do you feel the same way about that?

General Clement.  I think generally, yes, sir.

The Chairman.  I wanted to examine you a bit on that. There have been a number of news stories in recent months concerning the growing disillusionment of American servicemen in Vietnam with the war. I will put a number of these in the record, but I would just ask you about a few excerpts from them.

The following from an article in the Washington Evening Star describes the problem in this way. These are Americans they are talking about and I quote:

Would you comment on that statement? This is by Donald Kirk, Asia Correspondent of the Washington Star.

General Clement.  If I could just make a brief comment, sir, from experience serving with the American troops, in the 23d Division, I would not say that at all.

The Chairman.  You would not?

General Clement.  I think their attitude, their morale, their dedication, was pretty outstanding.

The Chairman.  You would not agree with that at all?

General Clement.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  You think they know what they are fighting for?

General Clement.  I think they do; yes, sir.

FOR WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES FIGHTING IN VIETNAM?

The Chairman.  I wish you would make as clear as you can what you think they think they are fighting for?

General Clement.  I would rather not speak about what they think they are fighting for. I can tell you what I think I am fighting for.

The Chairman.  All right.

General Clement.  I am fighting for what we first of all do recognize as a Communist threat. This has been over our heads for a number of years.

The Chairman.  You speak for yourself, not with “we.” You go ahead and say what you think you find.

General Clement.  We have encountered Communists on the battlefield, we have taken them under fire, and we feel that the counttry {sic: country} for which we are fighting, and with whose soldiers we are fighting, is making great strides toward becoming a nation on its own, self-determined, and that this is why we are doing it.

The Chairman.  You say you have encountered many of these Communists. Have you?

General Clement.  I say in battles, engagements.

The Chairman.  What is it about the Communists that you think justifies the effort that we are making?

General Clement.  Sir, I would prefer not to get into a lengthy political discussion about the communists.

The Chairman.  The reason this question was prompted is that the Colonel says the reason the ARVN 1st Division is so good is that they know what they are fighting for. They understand it and they believe in it.

It sems {sic: seems} to me it is a legitimate question to ask an American what he is fighting for and why he believes it and why it is so important.

There are contradictions, you see. There are Communists in Cuba, for example, only 90 miles away from America. If it is important and {p.474} the only reason you are fighting there is because these are Communists and therefore they are evil and should be eradicated, why do we not fight in Cuba? This is the kind of question I am asked. I get letters from constituents all the time and this question has been a recurring one.

If I understand you, the reason we are fighting there is because we are fighting Communists. Is that correct?

General Clement.  And another reason, sir; and probably the biggest one, is that our Nation has decided that that is where military forces will be committed by the United States. I am an officer and that is where I am going when I am sent there. I think that is where the forces do really go, sir. When they are sent, they go and they do a tremendous job.

The Chairman.  I think that is a different kind of answer. You are there because you are a military man and you have been ordered there to fight for your country; is that right?

General Clement.  Yes, sir; and I also have belief.

The Chairman.  I think this is legitimate, too. I have inquired with both of them. They are both legitimate and I do not quarrel with them. I am just trying to elucidate it.

This article in the Washington Star is certainly not the last word.

ATTITUDE OF U.S. SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

I have another article here from South Vietnam, “Every Boy, U.S.A.” This is apparently an interview with an American soldier. It says,

He is very disillusioned with the war. This is a quote from an interview by a man named Arnold Abrams in Saigon, carried in the February 12, 1970, Far Eastern Economic Review. He quotes Mr. Miles, saying,

There are other articles. I am going to put all the articles in the record.

(The information referred to follows:) {p.475}

______________________

[From the Washington Evening Star, Nov. 9, 1969]

“LET THEM FIGHT IT OUT” —
GROWING GI DISILLUSION CASTS DOUBT ON MORALE CLAIMS

(By Donald Kirk)

SAIGON.— The worn-out cliche of generals and master sergeants that “morale over here is great” no longer seems to apply to men in the field.

Unlike the veterans of previous tours in Vietnam, many of those here now say the United States should get out — as quickly as possible. “Leave it to the gooks to fight it out between themselves” is a typical comment

Soldiers do not seem to care particularly which “gooks” finally win the war — “our gooks” or “their gooks.” To the Americans slogging through the rice paddies and jungles, under blazing sun or monsoon rain, all Vietnamese are “gooks” whether fighting for the Communists or the Saigon government.

The widespread use of the term “gook,” a leftover of World War II and the Korean conflict, reflects the repugnance and aversion of most soldiers toward the citizens of the country they are ordered to defend.

The term, spoken with contempt, hatred or simple resignation, symbolizes a contradiction between the attitude of the average “grunt” or infantryman and that o