Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970

Senator Cooper.  What is the range?

Captain Murphy.  Of long-range rockets?

Senator Cooper.  What is the range of a mortar?

Captain Murphy.  A mortar can accurately engage the target up to about 6 kilometers.

Senator Cooper.  Six what?

Captain Murphy.  Kilometers.

MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS BY ENEMY

Senator Cooper.  Have there been many mortar or rocket attacks by the enemy upon U.S. forces or ARVN forces?

Captain Murphy.  Yes, indirect mortar and rocket attacks make up the majority of the enemy-initiated actions.

Senator Cooper.  Do they fire upon villages?

Captain Murphy.  They do mortar villages, particularly the villages which are undergoing pacification.

Senator Cooper.  What is your headquarters, what town?

Captain Murphy.  We are located in Tan An.

Senator Cooper.  Have there been any mortar attacks on your headquarters?

Captain Murphy.  Not for over a year, Senator, and we attribute this largely to the fact that through the pacification expansion we have been able to provide security throughout the periphery of the province capital.

RF AND PF FORCES IN HAMLETS

Senator Cooper.  How many of the 387 hamlets are there that have Regional or Popular Forces? Please give a rough percentage.

Captain Murphy.  I would say well over 300.

Senator Cooper.  How many?

Captain Murphy.  Well over 300 are under GVN security.

Mr. Colby.  You have said the size of your forces is 52 companies, 163 PF platoons. They are present in a certain number of those hamlets.

Captain Murphy.  Yes.

WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator Cooper.  You have given quite a comprehensive list of weapons, vehicles, equipment that has been supplied to the Vietnamese. Have the South Vietnamese been completely equipped now or is there more equipment which is intended for them?

Captain Murphy.  The M-16 rifle conversion program, which is probably the most important and receives more emphasis than any others, has been completed for all the forces which now operate in Long An Province.

Senator Cooper.  You say vehicles, communications equipment. Has that been completed?

Captain Murphy.  We have completed approximately 60 to 75 percent of the conversion in these two categories.

Senator Cooper.  Do you have any idea what the cost of this equipment — what is the cost of this equipment that has been furnished?

Captain Murphy.  No, Senator, I do not have. {p.269}

UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMBAT SUPPORT

Senator Cooper.  You say:

Presence and availability of support from helicopter gunships, tactical air fighters, and medical evacuation aircraft have also greatly enhanced the combat capabilities of Regional and Popular Forces.

Is that support American support?

Captain Murphy.  Yes—

Senator Cooper.  The helicopter gunships—

Captain Murphy.  The helicopter assault battalions, the troop carrying, and the helicopter gunships are flown exclusively by American pilots. The Vietnamese do have their own medical evacuation helicopters.

Senator Cooper.  The support of gunships, fighters, tactical air fighters, medical evacuation support: is this in support of the American forces?

Captain Murphy.  They do also support the U.S. Forces.

Senator Cooper.  What I am asking is do the Vietnamese operate any helicopter gunships, air fighters?

Captain Murphy.  No, not in Long An Province. They do have tactical aircraft.

Testimony of
William E. Colby;
Accompanied by John Vann, Hawthorne Mills, and Clayton E. McManaway — Resumed

Mr. Colby.  Excuse me. I think the Senator asked do the Vietnamese operate any one of these three things that are mentioned here; the gunships, no.

Captain Murphy.  No.

Mr. Colby.  Tactical air fighters?

Captain Murphy.  Tactical air fighters, yes. The Vietnamese Air Force does have both forward air controllers and tactical aircraft pilots.

Mr. Colby.  And medical evacuation?

Captain Murphy.  No, medical evacuation is supported by the United States.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMBAT CAPABILITY WITHOUT U.S. COMBAT SUPPORT

Senator Cooper.  The reason I ask you this is this: Suppose this support were withdrawn, say a year from now, what would be the combat capabilities — what would you estimate the combat capabilities for Regional and Popular Forces to be?

Captain Murphy.  I think, Senator, that it certainly would have an effect on their capability in a negative manner, but I think they could continue in an effective manner.

Senator Cooper.  You have been there 2-1 months and I know you have had great experience there. Do you believe that if American forces are withdrawn, that South Vietnam forces would be able to match, be a match or could they defend themselves against the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong? Do you believe they could sustain the combat capability without the presence of American forces?

Captain Murphy.  Senator, I can only answer within the scope of my perspective. In Long An Province, yes, they could. This is evidenced by the fact that recently the U.S. unit there, the 3d Brigade {p.270} of the 9th Infantry Division, has, in fact, had difficulty finding suitable areas in which to operate.

Senator Cooper.  The 9th Infantry Division?

Captain Murphy.  That is right.

Senator Cooper.  Because of what?

Captain Murphy.  Because of the pacification expansion, and the expanded area in which Regional and Popular Forces now are operating.

ATTITUDE OF LONG AN POPULACE TOWARD GVN

Senator Cooper.  I notice at one point this province is only 10 miles from Saigon; is that correct?

Captain Murphy.  That is correct, Senator.

Senator Cooper.  It seems to me the people there must have some knowledge of the government in Saigon. What do they say about it? Do they support it or are they against the government there in Saigon or do they have any attitude at all?

Captain Murphy.  It is interesting to see the change in attitude in the areas under pacification from the time when the territorial security forces are first deployed to these areas as opposed to the attitude after they have been there for a while, and after the various agencies of the GVN have performed specific tasks in conveying to the people the position of the GVN. They become very much progovernment.

Senator Cooper.  You hear that? Do people say that to you?

Captain Murphy.  Yes, they do. Yes, they do. In many cases it is the first time that any government has displayed a desire to help the people at that level.

Senator Cooper.  I am through.

The Chairman.  Senator Symington?

Senator Symington.  Captain, I am interested in your testimony.

MILITARY BACKGROUND OF CAPTAIN MURPHY

When did you enter the Army?

Captain Murphy.  1966, Senator.

Senator Symington.  Where did you enlist?

Captain Murphy.  In Texas.

Senator Symington.  What is your training, your background?

Captain Murphy.  I took the normal basic training. I then attended the Infantry Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Ga., and received my commission in the infantry. I was sent to Vietnam in January of 1968.

Senator Symington.  Did you have any ROTC training before that?

Captain Murphy.  Yes, sir, I did. I had 2 years of ROTC.

Senator Symington.  I see. How old are you now?

Captain Murphy.  Twenty-seven.

Senator Symington.  When you got out of Benning where did you go?

Captain Murphy.  I served a short time at Fort Benning. Then I went to Vietnam in January 1968 and served 1 year with the 9th Infantry Division. During the last 5 months I commanded the U.S. portion of what was then known as the combined reconnaissance and intelligence platoon. This was a platoon consisting of 20 American and 20 Vietnamese from the regional force province intelligence platoon. We accompanied them on many combined operations. This is when I first became involved with the Regional Forces. {p.271}

COLLAPSE IN THE DELTA

Senator Symington.  I have been out there a good deal myself — believe I have made six trips, went all over the country. In the fall of 1965, things in the delta were quite quiet. I went to Vung Tau, and then on down to Can Tho. We had no guards. We just walked around, and there did not seem to be any problem. I went back again in 1966, twice in 1967. I went down and watched that riverine operation south of where you were. You are pretty close to Saigon; are you not, just a few miles?

Captain Murphy.  I am located about 25 miles from Saigon.

Senator Symington.  What is the reason for the collapse in the delta? The delta was the peaceful part of the situation in 1965 and 1966, 1967. Did it collapse all of a sudden? What is the story?

Captain Murphy.  Senator, I can only answer your question as far as I have knowledge on it.

Senator Symington.  Of course.

Captain Murphy.  Because I was confined in Long An Province.

I do not think we have seen a collapse there.

Senator Symington.  Now things are much better than last year but they were pretty good when I was there in 1967.

I am just wondering what was the problem in between times. We did not have any troops to speak of at all in the delta when I was there. The South Vietnamese seemed to be handling it pretty well.

Captain Murphy.  As far as the entire delta is concerned, I am sure Mr. Vann will be in a better position to speak than I would be, Senator.

Senator Symington.  The problems, as I remember them, were mainly near the DMZ and Danang, Chu Lai, and up in there, and a great deal of fighting west of Pleiku. But I thought the delta—

The Chairman.  He is not in the delta.

Senator Symington.  Yes, he is.

Captain Murphy.  Mr. Chairman, the portion generally referred to as the delta is the area to the south of Saigon.

Senator Symington.  That is right.

The Chairman.  I thought Mr. Vann was responsible for the delta.

Captain Murphy.  He is, further down in the delta.

Senator Symington.  Mekong Delta.

Captain Murphy.  That is right.

Mr. Colby.  Long An is kind of a delta. But it is not part of the Mekong Delta.

Senator Symington.  The only point is I have been in the delta a lot and it seems peaceful down there.

The Chairman.  What delta are we talking about so that I can follow that?

Senator Symington.  You are farther down.

The Chairman.  Will somebody show it?

Mr. Mills.  Here is Saigon and here is Long An. The Province stretches to the south of Saigon, but the so-called delta provinces that Mr. Vann is responsible for begin with the south.

The Chairman.  South of Long An was what I understood.

Mr. Vann.  That is correct. Long An and parts of Hau Nghia are geographically in what is called the delta. {p.272}

Senator Symington.  The only point I am trying to make is this witness I did not think purported to be as competent to speak for the delta as Mr. Vann is; is that correct?

Mr. Vann.  He is speaking of Long An, sir, which is his competence. Long An is geographically part of the delta.

The Chairman.  Okay, proceed.

BACKGROUND OF CAPTAIN GECK

Senator Symington.  Captain Geck, what is your background?

Captain Geck.  I came in the Army in 1967 also. I went through OCS.

Senator Symington.  How old are you?

Captain Geck.  Twenty-three.

Senator Symington.  Twenty-three?

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  What college did you go to?

Captain Geck.  I do not have a college degree. I attended Seton Hall University in New Jersey.

Senator Symington.  And did you enlist as a private?

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir, I did.

The Chairman.  I wonder if the Senator would mind. We are trying to take these men in order. I announced that when we finished with Captain Murphy we would go down the line. Each one will tell his own experiences and we have not come to either of them. What I was suggesting in the beginning was if anyone wishes to ask Captain Murphy anything. Then we will take them in order.

Senator Symington.  I understand.

The Chairman.  Is there anything further from Captain Murphy?

Senator Case.  We will come back to that.

The Chairman.  There are one or two small questions. I did not wish to cut you off.

Senator Symington.  I was late because of another hearing.

The Chairman.  He already explained he went to school. I think you will find the record is quite good on that. I do not wish to cut anyone off, but to proceed in as orderly a manner as we can.

Do you not wish to ask him anything?

Senator Case.  No, not at the moment.

ENEMY KILLED ATTRIBUTABLE TO U.S. SUPPORTING FIRE

The Chairman.  I have one or two questions because of your intimate knowledge on the local basis. You did not quite complete your statement to Senator Cooper, I believe. Can you estimate what percentage of the enemy killed in engagements with Regional and Popular Forces are actually killed by helicopter gunships and aircraft and artillery fire as opposed to the ARVN? Do you have any way of estimating that?

Captain Murphy.  Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

I conducted a study on this last year, and it was determined at that time that 35 percent of enemy killed in action could be attributed to U.S. supporting fire. That includes helicopter gunships, artillery, and tactical air strikes.

The Chairman.  That is about one-third. {p.273}

QUALITY OF RF AND PF FORCES

The CORDS handbook, entitled “The Vietnamese Village,” states that, and I quote, “Studies indicate that RF and PF are often marginal men drawn from the poorest elements of village society.”

Would you agree with that statement?

Captain Murphy.  That they are only marginal men, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman.  This is from the CORDS handbook. Does that reflect your views about it too from your experience?

Captain Murphy.  I think that—

The Chairman.  I will repeat it. “Studies indicate that RF and PF are often marginal men drawn from the poorest elements of village society.”

Captain Murphy.  They are drawn from village society, certainly. I am not sure I understand marginal. In what respect? Do they refer to proficiency as soldiers?

The Chairman.  That is what I think.

Senator Symington.  What is RF and PF?

Captain Murphy.  Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

The Chairman.  That is what I take it to mean. They are not extremely capable or efficient operators.

Captain Murphy.  Well, here, Mr. Chairman, I think we have to determine what we are comparing them to before we can say they are marginal.

The Chairman.  I only asked you to make your own observations about that statement.

Captain Murphy.  I can honestly say, Mr. Chairman, that I have seen, and I have accompanied Regional Force companies on tactical operations which are as good or better than U.S. companies which I have also observed.

The Chairman.  Is that right?

Captain Murphy.  That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

MOTIVATION OF RF AND PF FORCES

The Chairman.  What do you think motivated the average RF and PF member to join the force and for what does he think he is fighting?

Captain Murphy.  The Regional and Popular Forces have a great appeal to the young man of draft age because they enable him to live in his home community. The Regional Forces operate exclusively within the province in which they enlist. The Popular Forces remain within the district in which they are recruited.

The Chairman.  What does he convey to you that he is fighting for?

Captain Murphy.  Well, there is no doubt he is defending his own home, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  All right.

CALIBER OF REGIONAL FORCES IN OTHER AREAS

Do you think that the Regional Forces you advise are representative of Regional Forces in other parts of Vietnam? {p.274}

Captain Murphy.  I am really not prepared to answer that because I have not observed Regional Forces in other parts of the country.

The Chairman.  Have you never talked with any of your colleagues from other parts of Vietnam?

Captain Murphy.  Yes. They encounter the same problems we encounter. Yes, Mr. Chairman. But I just do not know about RF and PF proficiency.

The Chairman.  I mean do they report to you the high caliber of people, as you have described your own counterpart? Do you see any reason to say that your particular province is better or worse or different from other provinces in Vietnam? That was the question.

Captain Murphy.  No, I do not see any reason not to say that.

The Chairman.  I am prompted to ask this because of the comments a soldier also instructing Regional Forces made in a letter to his professor, which I have here in my hand. The soldier, who has a comparable responsibility to yours, wrote to his professor, and I quote part of it, “We’re out in the field South of Hue.” Of course this is the northern part and less prosperous, I take it, than your area.

Captain Murphy.  Yes.

The Chairman.  He says:

Which is a light antitank weapon, I am told—

OVERALL DISCIPLINE AND ORDER OF REGIONAL FORCES

That prompts one to raise a question as to whether all of them are as well disciplined and as well ordered as is your particular responsibility.

Would you have any comment on that letter?

Captain Murphy.  May I ask again, Mr. Chairman, who wrote that letter? {p.275}

The Chairman.  The letter is from a professor at the college in Sacramento, Calif. This is his old student. I will read the professor’s letter. He says:

Obviously he was fearful of retaliation from the authorities if the name were known, which was a very sensible precaution.

Captain Murphy.  I take it, Mr. Chairman, that the individual who wrote the letter was not an adviser, but rather was in a U.S. unit since he refers to combined operations.

The Chairman.  He says he is the soldier instructing regional forces. This is a Thermofax of the actual letter that the boy wrote.

Captain Murphy.  Mr. Chairman, this training that he was giving them was not part of the basic training included in any of the formal training which is given to the Regional Force soldier. The Regional Force soldier undergoes a basic training course which is comparable to our own basic training course. Then the entire Regional Force unit to which he is assigned is periodically recycled to a training center for specific training on new weapons or developments. Teaching a soldier to fire a weapon without an interpreter is not part of the Government of Vietnam’s training program. This particular weapon that he describes, the M-72, is a weapon which is currently being funneled into the Vietnamese supply system. Going along with it will be courses taught to Vietnamese by Vietnamese in their own language on proper firing techniques.

The Chairman.  Americans do not instruct the Vietnamese?

Captain Murphy.  We do give some instruction through interpreters; yes, Mr. Chairman. Our mobile advisory teams do give instruction.

The Chairman.  One last question.

ADEQUACY OF PAYMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL SERVANTS

Mr. Robert Shaplen, who has written a great many articles and I think a book on Vietnam, has spent a great deal of time there. He writes in the New Yorker on January 31 of this year as follows:

Is that correct about what an Army private makes in the ARVN? Do you know?

Chaptain {sic: Captain} Murphy.  In Vietnamese currency?

The Chairman.  Yes.

Captain Murphy.  That is approximately correct.

The Chairman.  What comment would you make on that statement? {p.276}

Captain Murphy.  I would say that the pay grades are based upon the economic situation of the area in which they live. They have high cost of living areas and low cost of living areas. I can speak for Long An, and certainly with the various allowances that they receive they can exist on their income.

The Chairman.  You can. Then would you say this was inaccurate? They do not have to moonlight?

Captain Murphy.  I would say it does not pertain to Long An Province.

The Chairman.  It does not. In other words, they do not have to moonlight or to obtain—

Captain Murphy.  They are not in position to moonlight, Mr. Chairman. These people have commitments which require their services both day and night.

The Chairman.  And they do not—

Senator Case.  Regional and Popular Forces, I want to know what he is talking about.

The Chairman.  An Army private is the way he describes it.

Senator Case.  That is different; that is the ARVN.

Captain Murphy.  He may be referring to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

The Chairman.  He says that officers and civil service are similarly situated.

Senator Javits.  Mr. Chairman, would the Chair yield at that point? I was very impressed with the feeling of both the President and Vice President in Vietnam about this particular matter of which they are extremely conscious and make a very big point. They simply have to raise the salaries because they are having terrible morale trouble. It is a matter of information.

The Chairman.  Then your experience would confirm Mr. Shaplen’s observation?

Senator Javits.  I am going at a somewhat higher level than that, Mr. Chairman. The President of the country himself is very, very deeply involved and concerned in actions to improve this situation. Perhaps Ambassador Colby would comment.

Mr. Colby.  Mr. Chairman, there has been considerable inflation, as you know, an increase in prices over the past few months.

The Chairman.  Do you mean there or here? About which are you talking?

Mr. Colby.  There.

The Chairman.  Is it more there than here?

Mr. Colby.  I believe it is more there than here, but I am really not all that qualified.

Senator Javits.  I can tell you it is more there than here.

Mr. Colby.  The Government has set up a commissary system for the miliatry {sic: military} personnel to try to save them some money. And they are currently discussing the possibility of some kind of direct support through provision of rice and other staple foods. The President, Vice President and Prime Minister are very much interested in this matter.

The Chairman.  I think we had better move to Captain Geck.

Senator Javits.  Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question or two of Captain Murphy?

The Chairman.  Yes. {p.277}

ATTITUDES OF U.S. ADVISERS AND COUNTERPARTS

Senator Javits.  Captain, I have just been in Vietnam and I am no expert at all, but I did want to ask you a couple of questions. Mind you please feel very free to tell me I am wrong about this because I am only testing out a very superficial impression with a man who has been there and lived with the problem. It would be helpful if I am right or just as helpful if I am wrong. We ought to know so I am giving a hypothesis rather than a conclusion. I had the distinct impression that our advisers, like you, were much more enthusiastic about the ideological cause than the Vietnamese of the same rank, station, and parallel responsibility. For example, you speak of a major in your statement. Talking with him and talking with you or your prototype was like day and night. Our fellows were enthusiastic, excited, missionary in their zeal, and these fellows were still rather cynical and rather pragmatic about the corruption and the problems and the murder with which they lived. Do you have any reaction to that?

Captain Murphy.  I think one of the greatest forms of assistance we can give them is through our attitude toward problems which confront them and their Government. Certainly when we express zeal, enthusiasm, and confidence in them and their government, I think we do them a great service. We must realize they have been up against these problems for quite some time, and I know it is only human nature perhaps to let these problems run you down. So when we are enthusiastic, I think this is good.

Senator Javits.  Do you feel that there is corruption at that level of any appreciable character?

Captain Murphy.  I have not seen any corruption. I don’t have any firsthand knowledge of any corruption, Senator. I, of course, have heard rumors, but I don’t have any firsthand knowledge on corruption.

Senator Javits.  Do you think at that level there is any playing ball, as a little bit of insurance, with the Vietcong and the Communists?

Captain Murphy.  Certainly not that I have any knowledge of.

Senator Javits.  In other words, on the Asian theory that you never lose all your options. You understand precisely what I mean by that?

Captain Murphy.  Yes, I do. Again, I have no knowledge of it.

Senator Javits.  You have not seen it.

COMPARATIVE QUALITY OF VC AND RF AND PF

Have you had any operational contact with the Vietcong?

Captain Murphy.  I am not sure I understand your question.

Senator Javits.  Have you been in any operations which brought you face to face with the Vietcong?

Captain Murphy.  Right; yes, I have, Senator.

Senator Javits.  Do you think they are superior in any way to the Vietnamese troops whom you are advising. If so, tell us in what way.

Captain Murphy.  As I stated earlier, Senator. I think the degree of proficiency of the units vary. But by and large I think the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces are superior to the enemy forces. {p.278}

Senator Javits.  They are. Are they superior in firepower and number and morale? Give us a little qualitative analysis on that.

Captain Murphy.  Well, again, the degree of morale, the degree of agressiveness {sic: aggressiveness} varies from unit to unit and depends upon a great many factors. We have some units which are less proficient probably than comparable enemy units within the province.

Senator Javits.  But on the whole?

Captain Murphy.  By and large I feel that we have superior forces.

NECESSITY OF U.S. SUPPORT TO RF AND PF SUPERIORITY

Senator Javits.  To what extent does this rely upon the American input, to wit, logistical support? Give it to us separately, if you can, as air support, artillery support, advisory support. There are four quantities there — logistical, air, artillery, advice.

Captain Murphy.  How does each of these affect it? Is that your question, Senator?

Senator Javits.  Right. You are an adviser. You say you have superior forces over the Vietcong and whatever North Vietnamese there are around. Now give us the input of these four aspects of American support and as they affect your qualitative judgment that the troop strength you are advising is better than the enemy.

Captain Murphy.  The logistical support is entirely Vietnamese, Senator. We advise on techniques, but the system itself is run by Vietnamese.

Senator Javits.  The supplies are ours.

Captain Murphy.  The materials are funneled into the system at a high level.

Senator Javits.  That is what I am asking.

Captain Murphy.  But the distribution is by the Vietnamese.

Senator Javits.  I understand, but how important is the actual materiel?

Captain Murphy.  It is quite important.

Senator Javits.  Indispensable, isn’t it?

Senator Case.  They haven’t anything else.

Captain Murphy.  Nothing that compares with the weapons of the enemy.

Senator Javits.  OK. The enemy’s weapons would be very much superior to theirs, were it not for our input.

Captain Murphy.  Yes, I would say that.

Senator Javits.  Second, how vital is air support to the superiority of the Regional and Popular Forces?

Captain Murphy.  It is definitely a contributing factor, Senator.

Senator Javits.  Is that as indispensable as the supply?

Captain Murphy.  I would have to say no, I don’t believe so.

Senator Javits.  What about artillery support?

Captain Murphy.  U.S. artillery support is not that important because the Vietnamese have access to artillery in Long An Province.

Senator Javits.  And ability to use it?

Captain Murphy.  And they can utilize it effectively.

Senator Javits.  What about adviser backing? How indispensable is that?

Captain Murphy.  This would be related directly to the proficiency of the individual unit. What we aim to do is concentrate our field advisory effort on the units which are less effective than some other {p.279} units. This is the criteria we use for deployment of our mobile advisory teams. I think at this point the field advisory effort is indispensable, but not as indispensable as it was a year ago and not as indispensable as it was 2 years ago. Next year it will be less indispensable.

MOTIVATION OF VIETCONG AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Senator Javits.  The popular idea in the United States is that for some reason or other the Vietcong are more inspired, are better soldiers, are more patriotic believers in their cause than the South Vietnamese in theirs. To what extent do you think this has any real validity?

Captain Murphy.  Senator, 4 or 5 years ago, this might have been a valid conviction. Certainly the degree of motivation of an individual soldier greatly influences his performance in the field. This is one of the factors which now influence the degree of proficiency of the individual soldier.

Going into an area which 2 months ago was under enemy control, providing security which has enabled the Government of Vietnam to perform its other functions, working with the people; building a road, being there providing security and seeing this progress has had a tremendous effect on the morale and the motivation of the individual soldier.

Senator Javits.  So you think that motivation on the part of the South Vietnamese themselves is becoming higher?

Captain Murphy.  Yes, it is. It definitely is.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD GOVERNMENT AND VIETCONG

Senator Javits.  My last question, Mr. Chairman, is this: Again I would like to give you a hypothesis. I was there in 1965, and I was there again the other week and saw Ambassador Colby. I was not in your Corps; I was in the IV Corps area when I was there a few weeks ago. In 1966 I spent most of the time in I Corp up around Hue, but I would like to give you this hypothesis. In 1966 I had the impression that the South Vietnamese were anxious to get rid of their government because they felt their government was just another way of keeping them at war, where they had been for 20 years, that it was just that they hated it and they wanted peace at any price with anyone. They couldn’t have cared less whether it was Communitsts {sic: Communists} or Zoro-astrians, just so there was an end to the war.

This is my hypothesis and I want you to say I am wrong or right even from your little frame. I had the impression they had the same feeling with the Vietcong, “Go away and let us alone. You are the fellows who are now keeping this whole place in turmoil and killing us.”

Captain Murphy.  Certainly, I don’t think the Vietnamese people, like people anywhere, enjoy the rigors of war. I think that they are now for the first time identifying themselves with one side, and that side is the Government of Vietnam.

Senator Javits.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  Do you want to ask any questions?

SIZE, POPULATION, AND MILITARY FORCES OF LONG AN PROVINCE

Senator Case.  I would like to put in terms of numbers some of these figures in your statement, if you will. You are advising in a Province. {p.280}

It has roughly what, 15 by 35 miles, something like that in its dimensions roughly. You know in a rough way.

Mr. Colby.  It is bigger than that. Speaking in kilometers from north to south and east to west roughly. How many grid squares?

Captain Murphy.  From north to south I would say 20 miles, and from east to west probably twice that.

Senator Case.  I was roughly right then, and 365,000 people.

Captain Murphy.  That is correct, Senator.

Senator Case.  You have 52 Regional Force companies. How many personnel?

Captain Murphy.  That represents approximately 7,000.

Senator Case.  And 163 Popular Force platoons. How many are those?

Captain Murphy.  About 5,500 personnel.

Senator Case.  Now two regiments of the ARVN, five battalions.

Captain Murphy.  Each battalion having about 600 personnel, 500 to 600 personnel.

Senator Case.  Roughly 3,000 people.

Captain Murphy.  That would be another 3,000.

Senator Case.  Then you say our 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry, four infantry battalions almost exclusively operating there. How much is that? About 5,500?

Captain Murphy.  The United States is there with the 9th Division of about 5,500 of which about 200 or 250, Senator, are the advisory team.

Senator Case.  So you have over 20,000 troops in this area.

Captain Murphy.  Yes, Senator.

Senator Case.  In your province.

Captain Murphy.  Yes, we do.

Senator Case.  And that is fairly static and has been that way for some time.

Captain Murphy.  Since the end of 1967, we have more than doubled our Regional and Popular Force strength. At the end of 1967 we had 21 Regional and 74 Popular Force platoons as compared with the figure I gave in my statement.

Senator Case.  This is not an active military operation so far as large-scale military operations. This is more or less a permanent garrison of, I take it—

Captain Murphy.  All these forces operate within the province, yes.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LONG AN PROVINCE

Senator Case.  When you say “operate” this isn’t large-scale military operation; is it?

Captain Murphy.  Well, we frequently have operations in excess of two companies. Three and four company-size operations are a daily operation now.

Senator Case.  Now these are conducted largely by the ARVN, I take it.

Captain Murphy.  Under the command and control of the province officials.

Senator Case.  Is it American operation?

Captain Murphy.  No. I am speaking of Vietnamese operations.

Senator Case.  What does our 3d Brigade do? {p.281}

Captain Murphy.  They generally engage in company-size operations for the most part, sometimes even smaller.

Mr. Colby.  If I may, Senator, I believe it was an area of fairly active operations up until fairly recently. I think the Captain made that point a while ago. There was some rather major fighting that went on there.

Captain Murphy.  On a typical day, Senator, we have each of our seven districts conducting one and possibly two company-size operations. U.S. forces operate generally in the unpopulated areas in company size, utilizing, I would say, about 75 percent of their operational forces. In addition, one province-controlled operation may take place within the province center. It is generally of three to four company size.

Mr. Vann.  Senator Case, if I can interject here, Long An Province has for a period of 8 years been probably the most hotly contested province in all of Vietnam. In 1962 through 1965, it had more Vietcong incidents and contacts by a multiple of 3 than any other province in Vietnam. Only in the last year has the level of activity there diminished substantially.

Senator Case.  Has the level of American activity changed?

Captain Murphy.  It has diminished; yes, it has, Senator.

Senator Case.  Would you describe this, just in a very quick way. I don’t mean to go over it again.

Captain Murphy.  During my experience with the 9th Division operating in Long An, my company averaged generally two contacts with the enemy per week. On most occasions the size of the force engaged would be a company or larger. This is not the situation which exists now. The situation now is that the U.S. forces, as I said earlier, are having difficulty finding suitable areas in which to operate. This has occurred because of the pacification expansion, because of the fact there are Vietnamese forces already in these areas and operating within these forces.

Senator Case.  Have American forces been reduced then?

Captain Murphy.  The U.S. forces have not been reduced, Senator. In fact with the departure of the division headquarters from Dong Tarn, which is just south of Long An, some of the support forces formerly in Dong Tam moved up to the Tan An area; the brigade headquarters are colocated with an advisory team in Tan An.

RESULTS IF U.S. SUPPORT WERE ELIMINATED

Senator Case.  Just one other question. Suppose American support was completely eliminated now, what would happen?

Captain Murphy.  All combat support?

Senator Case.  All combat support. All the four categories that Senator Javits spoke of before

Captain Murphy.  It would slow down the progress and, Senator—

Senator Case.  Is that an euphemism? What would happen actually? Who would run the show?

Mr. Colby.  The Senator also included the weapons?

Senator Case.  Talking about weapons, the weapons, I don’t mean to say—

The Chairman.  You mean take away their weapons and ammunition and give them bows and arrows? {p.282}

Senator Case.  I don’t mean that. Let’s take it—

Mr. Colby.  Support is the word of art.

RESULT IF U.S. AIR SUPPORT WERE ELIMINATED

Senator Case.  Let’s take the air, no air.

Captain Murphy.  The Vietnamese could contend with the current level of enemy activity.

Senator Case.  Look, you kids get educated early in the language. The current level of any activity — what would happen in your judgment? We are not antagonistic; we are trying to get answers. You have been given a terrible job to do, all of you, the Ambassador, the Colonel, and everybody, and we are sympathetic as the devil. But we want to get the facts. We don’t want to be getting a lot of stuff that we get from the Admiral in Hawaii and from other people which is just a bunch of baloney. We want to know in plain language what would happen in your judgment if we pulled out all air support. You can talk to us, we are Americans, just the same as you would talk to your commanding officers and to the people in the military, to Colonel Vann or anybody else. He is going to talk to us this way soon. That is why we are having an executive session.

Captain Murphy.  Senator, I hesitate because I am not sure that I know what would happen. Certainly the enemy would capitalize on this and they would take advantage of the fact we didn’t have air support. I presume you are asking me if they could hold the fort.

Senator Case.  Sure. Would they collapse?

Captain Murphy.  No, I don’t think they would collapse.

Senator Case.  Well, they would have in 1965; wouldn’t they?

Captain Murphy.  I think they would have; yes, Senator.

USE OF AIR SUPPORT

Senator Case.  How often is the air support called in and for what purposes?

Captain Murphy.  We only use tactical air support—

Mr. Colby.  I think the Senator means to include helicopters.

Senator Case.  Sure, helicopters, ambulance, or whatever you call them, you know supply, troops.

Captain Murphy.  Whenever we engage an enemy which we think are of squad size or larger we employ this supporting fire on just about every contact.

Mr. Colby.  How often do you have a contact, every day?

Captain Murphy.  No, I would say four times a week: significant contacts, outside of ambush being sprung.

CAPTAIN MURPHY’S COUNTERPART

Senator Case.  You have a counterpart in the Vietnamese force?

Captain Murphy.  Yes, Senator.

Senator Case.  What is his grade?

Captain Murphy.  He is an ARVN major. He is the deputy province chief.

The Chairman.  Senator, we really did cover every word of this. Senator CASE. But they didn’t cover it for me.

The Chairman.  Okay. {p.283}

Senator Case.  I am sorry. I mean the chairman didn’t mean to interrupt you.

The Chairman.  No, go right ahead.

Captain Murphy.  He is an ARVN major. He has been in the Army for 17 years. He is 37 years old. He is the deputy province chief and RE/PF commander.

Senator Case.  He is a well trained, well educated man:

Captain Murphy.  He is well experienced.

Senator Case.  He is a well educated man.

Captain Murphy.  He has the equivalent of 2 years of college by our standards.

Senator Case.  What was his background in civilian life?

Captain Murphy.  He came south in 1954, and as I said he holds an equivalent of 2 years of college. He has been in the Army since he was 20 years old.

Senator Case.  Did he come from a well-to-do family?

Captain Murphy.  No, he didn’t. He came south with just the clothes on his back and not much more.

Senator Case.  I mean before that. How did he get to be a soldier, down there?

Captain Murphy.  I get the impression from talking to him that he did came from a well-to-do family.

Senator Case.  He did; yes.

Captain Murphy.  Yes. Certainly if he has the education that he has—

ELIGIBILITY FOR EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO OFFICER CORPS

Senator Case.  The reason I ask, of course, is that it has been our understanding that only people of the upper classes and a rather small group are eligible for, one, education and, two, admission to the officer classes, is that correct still?

Captain Murphy.  Of course, there are educational requirements, and they are dependent on attaining the education to achieve his requirements. He has to be able to afford it and to be able to afford it—

Senator Case.  And in general whether purposely intended or de facto, as a word that has been used in considerable length around these premises lately, very few people are still eligible for the education that admits them to the officer corp, is that true?

Captain Murphy.  Yes, Senator, with the exception of the infantry field commander’s commission which is available to anyone who exhibits leadership in the field. The educational requirement is waived for this type of commission. The individual who receives it can reach the grade of captain as a field commander.

CAPTAIN MURPHY’S COUNTERPART

Senator Case.  Is this guy corruptible?

Captain Murphy.  I don’t believe he is, Senator. I have never seen any evidence of it.

Senator Case.  Has he a family down there?

Captain Murphy.  He has a wife and seven children. They live in Bien Hoa, which is to the north. {p.284}

Senator Case.  You mean another province?

Captain Murphy.  Yes.

Senator Case.  I was up there myself.

Go ahead, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  How much does he make? Go ahead and finish it.

Senator Case.  I think an impressionistic picture of this kind is the most we can get.

The Chairman.  I agree with you. I think it is very important. All I was suggesting was that we had asked him most of those questions in the beginning before you came in.

Senator Case.  These many other questions somehow don’t—

The Chairman.  What is his pay?

Captain Murphy.  He makes the Vietnamese equivalent of approximately $150 a month.

The Chairman.  Do you wish to ask any questions?

Senator Pell.  No questions.

The Chairman.  Captain Geck, will you give your statement, please.

Testimony of
Capt. Richard T. Geck,
U.S. Army, Advisee, Mobile Advisory Team,
Kien Giang Province

Captain Geck.  Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I am Capt. Richard Geck of New Jersey.

Senator Case.  May I ask what town do you come from?

Captain Geck.  Right now, Toms River.

Senator Case.  You have always lived in that area?

Captain Geck.  No, sir, I lived in Newark, N.J.

The Chairman.  I was afraid we wouldn’t get to the New Jersey part.

Senator Case.  There was never any doubt if we had to sit here all week.

The Chairman.  I never knew he was from New Jersey.

Senator Case.  When he raised the Seton Hall flag I knew he was a New Jersey boy.

The Chairman.  Go ahead.

Captain Geck.  I am currently the commander of a mobile advisory team in Kien Giang Province. I would like to take a few minutes to describe, in brief, the type of work being done by the mobile advisory team in Vietnam and to give you a general idea of how the work is progressing in my area.

SOC SON VILLAGE

My experience comes from the delta region of Vietnam, specifically, Kien Giang Province, located 140 miles southwest of Saigon on the Gulf of Thailand. I will refer specifically to one village; the village of Soc Son. Soc Son is centered in the main stream of enemy infiltration into the delta, and from time-to-time large enemy units inhabit two large mountins {sic: mountains} to the west. During the month of July 1969, Soc Son was the scene of heavy fighting between the government forces and infiltrating NVA units.

OPERATION OF MOBILE ADVISORY TEAM IN SOC SON VILLAGE

From July 1969 until November 1969. I commanded a five-man mobile advisory team located in Soc Son village. The team consisted {p.285} of two officers of the combat arms and three noncommissioned officers, who specialized in light weapons, heavy weapons, and medical training, respectively. Our primary mission in Soc Son was to assist the village chief in the upgrading of the level of security within his village with the emphasis on improving the performance of his existing forces, and the formulation and training of a strong Popular Self Defense Force group in each hamlet. In addition, we accepted the secondary mission of rendering assistance where possible in the field of village administration.

Soc Son, a village of 11,000 people, was notoriously ill run. The village chief, who had lived in Rach Gia City, about 8 miles away, since Tet of 1968, for fear of assassination, was ineffective and little was expected from his staff. The VC assassinated two of the four hamlet chiefs in the village center in late June 1968, and the terrorists had virtually a free hand within the village.

My team began with the work of training the Popular Force platoons in the village. We also began to work with the village staff in forming a People’s Self Defense Force and set about the task of initiating coordination between the various elements on hand. Through constant observation of the Popular Forces, we were able to see wherein their weaknesses lay and suggest methods of improvement. We accompanied the Popular Forces on their operations, rendering advice where needed, and providing liaison with supporting units. In short order, through an increased level of confidence, the results of the PF operations began to improve. Night operations became quite effective and seriously hampered enemy movement in our area. At the same time, elements of our team were busy with the village People’s Self-Defense Force leaders, providing them with written material to better explain their jobs, organizing a training program and assisting in the dissemination of information on the People’s Self Defense Forces. As the Popular Self Defense Forces developed, the village was able to release the PF platoons from their roles of static defense and allow them to operate offensively in the outer reaches of the village, targeting both VC military units and the infrastructure. A method of coordinating the operations of these various forces was needed. With the guidance of the advisers a village security plan was begun. This plan on completion provided each unit leader involved in the security of Soc Son with specific requirements as to his mission and responsibilities as well as the methods and requirement for coordination of operations between units. The resultant increase in security was staggering. Incidents of VC terrorism virtually came to a halt. The VC infrastructure was forced into exile and rendered ineffective. The village chief returned to the village. The Government of Vietnam gained a free hand to operate within the village and was able to turn its attention to improved administration and economic development in the area. As the people gained confidence in the Government, more information became available on enemy activities and VC operations were even further hampered.

Many of the things accomplished were made much easier through the help of the American adviser. The village chief, while in fact a good administrator, did not have the background to effectively coordinate the operations of the units within his village. Many of the staff members were new in their positions and did not know what {p.286} could or could not be done. The unit commanders, in many cases, had become too set in their methods. The alternative solutions to problems as offered by the advisers helped them to vastly improve their operations.

Presently Soc Son continues to grow. Many of the programs begun during and after the tenure of the advisory team have become examples used throughout the Province. The security plan developed in Soc Son is now used corpswide as a planning guide to village security.

In November our team moved to another village within Kien Giang Province and met with similar problems to those encountered upon our arrival in Soc Son. Progress in the new location is quite encouraging and many of the improvements witnessed in Soc Son are being seen in the new area.

The Chairman.  In view of what has gone on before, I wonder if it would not be better if we let the sergeant make his statement and then you can ask questions of either one of them because time is running out. Is that agreeable to you?

Senator Symington.  All right.

The Chairman.  Sergeant, make your statement now and then the members can ask questions of all three witnesses.

Testimony of
Sgt. Richard D. Wallace,
U.S. Marine Corps, Squad Leader,
Combined Action Platoon,
Quang Nam Province

Sergeant Wallace.  Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, my name is Sgt. Richard D. Wallace, U.S. Marine Corps, from Torrance, Calif. I am assigned as the squad leader of the U.S. Marine element of combined action platoon 2-1-5 in Quang Nam Province, Vietnam.

COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

A combined action platoon, or “CAP” as we call it, is a unit composed of U.S. Marines teamed up with Vietnamese Popular Forces soldiers. The Popular Forces, or “PF” as we call them, are a form of local militia who have the responsibility of providing security to their own village. By working closely together with the PF, the Marines help them to provide this security.

DESCRIPTION OF CAP 215

In my CAP at the present time, there are 13 marines, one U.S. Navy corpsman, and 25 PF soldiers. Being residents of the local village, the PF have excellent knowledge of the area and, of course, they also know the people. The marines are strangers from a different culture, but by working with the PF every day and sharing their dangers and hardships, the marines and PF develop close ties. Aided by close ties with the PF, the marines are able to understand and to be understood by the people in the hamlets. In fact, most of the marines come to feel as if they are part of the village community themselves.

My CAP area is located in Hoa Luong Village, located about 5 miles southwest of the Danang airfield, in the area shown in yellow on this map. This village has four hamlets named La Chau. Goc Kha, Duyen {p.287} Son, and Huong Son. The principal occupation of the people in this area is farming.

CAP ACTIVITY AGAINST VC

My CAP was established in its present area in July 1967. Before that time, the VC guerrillas had a free hand in the area, and they were able to depend on the people for food, other supplies, shelter, and information about the movements of U.S. and ARVN forces. The reasons for our staying in this area for this length of time is due to the close proximity of large NVA units just west of Danang. The average stay of a CAP is 1 year.

At the present time, the VC are no longer safe in my CAP area. They no longer receive moral or material support from the people. Nearly all of the hard core VC supporters have been driven out or captured, and the people are supporting their legitimate Government with a minimum of fear that the VC will get back at them.

When I took over the Marine squad in the CAP in July 1969, the hamlet of Huong Son was being repeatedly terrorized by VC guerrillas. Since that time we have concentrated our operations in and around that hamlet, and have reduced the terrorist activities. With the help of the Vietnamese rural development cadre in the village, we have been able to rebuild this hamlet and bring it to a normal life, and we are now in the process of building a school for the children there.

As I said earlier, the CAP’s mission is to protect the people. We accomplish this by patroling the area during the day and setting up two or more ambushes in different places around the hamlets at night. Because the ambushes are never in the same place from night to night, the VC never know where we will be, so they do not feel safe anywhere in our CAP area. Besides that, because they can’t predict our positions, they are not able to catch us by surprise with a larger force.

A CAP marine does not live inside of a fort. He lives among the people, with the PF, often staying in their homes. With no fixed position to defend, the CAP has a closer relationship with the people and can devote full time to the people’s security.

TRAINING OF POPULAR FORCES

While helping to provide security, the Marines are assigned the further task of training the PF so as to make them a more effective fighting unit. We teach them how to make better use of their weapons and we help them to develop better tactics with which to fight the VC. Eventually, the PF will be strong enough to take care of the area without Marines assistance.

DAILY ROUTINE OF CAP 215

At this point, I would like to briefly describe the daily routine of my CAP. Just before daybreak each day, we will secure from our night ambush positions and return to our daytime position. Our daytime position will normally consist of two houses farily {sic: fairly} close together, with half of the Marine squad in each one. Some members of the CAP will be detailed as sentries around the day position to guard against {p.288} surprise attack. The PF leader will normally leave six to 10 PF to stay with the Marines during the day. The remainder of the PF’s will return to their homes to spend the day working.

At some time during the day, the CAP will run a patrol through the CAP area. A typical daytime patrol will consist of five marines and five PF. Also at some time during the day the Navy corpsman along with his Vietnamese assistants and a security element will go to Goc Kha hamlet, where we have set up a simple dispensary in order to offer daily medical attention to the people in the area.

The Marines in the CAP eat three meals a day. Two meals will consist of canned military “C” rations and the third meal, usually in the evening, will consist of hot prepared food delivered by truck to our position. Any other supplies we need will be delivered at the same time. At about 6 p.m., the PF leader and I will get together and complete our plans for the night’s patrols and ambushes. After that, we each brief our men. Sometime after dark, the CAP splits up into two or more patrols, each of which goes out to set up ambushes under the cover of darkness. These ambushes remain in position all night, alert for the approach of the enemy.

This concludes my opening statement. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

WITNESSES’ AGE, EXPERIENCE AND LANGUAGE FACILITY

The Chairman.  Sergeant Wallace, how old are you?

Sergeant Wallace.  Twenty-two years old, sir.

The Chairman.  How long have you been in Vietnam?

Sergeant Wallace.  I have been there 8 months, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you speak Vietnamese?

Sergeant Wallace.  No, sir; I don’t.

The Chairman.  Captain Geck, how old are you?

Captain Geck.  23, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you speak Vietnamese?

Captain Geck.  Yes, I do.

The Chairman.  How long have you been in Vietnam?

Captain Geck.  18 months, sir.

PREPARATION OF WITNESSES’ STATEMENTS

The Chairman.  Did you write your statement, Captain Geck?

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir; I did.

The Chairman.  Has it been cleared by anyone else?

Captain Geck.  Sir, my statement was checked for punctuation, spelling, for things like that, but it was not checked for its content.

The Chairman.  Was your statement checked?

Sergeant Wallace.  It went through my CAP director, and the content of the statement was checked for punctuation.

The Chairman.  Your statements were checked only for punctuation?

Sergeant Wallace.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  Senator Symington?

Senator Symington.  Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. {p.289}

BACKGROUND OF CAPTAIN GECK

When did you join the Army?

Captain Geck.  Sir, I came into the Army in March of 1967.

Senator Symington.  1967.

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  What was your schooling before you came in?

Captain Geck.  Prior to coming into the Army, sir, I attended Seton Hall Prep, and then Seton Hall University for 2 years.

Senator Symington.  Where did you enlist?

Captain Geck.  I enlisted in Newark, N.J.

Senator Symington.  Did you have any ROTC before?

Captain Geck.  No, sir, I did not. I was omitted from the program. Seton Hall has a ROTC program; I did not participate.

Senator Symington.  You enlisted as a private?

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir, I did.

Senator Symington.  When were you promoted to corporal?

Captain Geck.  Sir, I went through the basic training program at Camp Polk, La. Then I went to Camp Wolters, Tex., to the Army’s flight training program. After that I was relieved from that course of instruction and went to the Army’s artillery OCS at Fort Sill, Okla., so I was never promoted through the ranks. I went to OCS.

Senator Symington.  You went right from a private. You were commissioned when?

Captain Geck.  June of 1967.

Senator Symington.  When did you go to Vietnam?

Captain Geck.  Sir, I went to Vietnam in March of 1968.

Senator Symington.  Nine months after you were commissioned then?

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  Were you commissioned a first or second lieutenant?

Captain Geck.  Second lieutenant, sir, in the Army Reserve.

Senator Symington.  When were you promoted to first lieutenant?

Captain Geck.  A year thereafter, sir, and then a year thereafter to captain.

Senator Symington.  And you told the Chairman that you spoke Vietnamese?

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir. I can handle about 70 percent of my business in Vietnamese.

Senator Symington.  Did you study that before you went to Vietnam?

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir. I volunteered for Vietnam in March, went to Fort Bragg, to the military assistant’s training adviser’s course, and then on to the Defense Language Institute where I was trained 3-1/2 months in Vietnamese.

Senator Symington.  Where is that school?

Captain Geck.  That is Fort Bliss, El Paso, Tex.

Senator Symington.  You took Vietnamese there?

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  When did you go into the Province you are in now?

Captain Geck.  I worked in two Provinces, Chau Duc, which we spoke about earlier and Kien Giang. I arrived in Chau Duc in August {p.290} of 1968. Approximately 2 months later I went to Kien Giang, and I have been there ever since.

Senator Symington.  When you arrived there was your Vietnamese pretty good?

Captain Geck.  No, sir, it was fair. I could at that time conduct only about 40 percent of my business. It has progressed since that time.

CONDITIONS IN KIEN GIANG PROVINCE

Senator Symington.  Since you have been there you think conditions have improved; is that correct?

Captain Geck.  Yes, sir, I do.

Senator Symington.  What was the situation when you arrived?

Captain Geck.  When I first arrived in Kien Giang Province the Army was able to operate in fairly large units in most of the area. The conditions within the villages were fairly poor. The village governments were not organized.

Right now all of the villages in Kien Giang have elected governments. Most of the hamlets have elected governments. The people now are participating in the government. I think this is quite an improvement.

The Regional and Popular Forces have never had any outside assistance from the U.S. forces in our area except for air power. We have only had assistance from the regular Army of Vietnam forces.

RIVERINE

Senator Symington.  What is your relationship with the Riverine?

Captain Geck.  Sir, I have no relationship with the Riverine. We have used the Riverine elements to insert units from time to time, but I have no relationship with them.

U.S. TROOPS IN DELTA

Senator Symington.  When you first came there what U.S. troops were in the delta?

Captain Geck.  Sir, I am not sure of any besides the 9th U.S. Infantry Division, but we had no contact with them at all.

Senator Symington.  Mr. Ambassador, I do not believe there were any American troops in the delta in 1965 in any quantity.

Mr. Colby.  No, sir.

Senator Symington.  When did we send troops into the delta in quantity?

Mr. Colby.  We never sent troops to that part of the delta, Senator. The troops were sent to the upper delta only. I believe in early 1967.

Mr. Vann.  They arrived in July of 1966 in Long An Province and in September 1966 in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa and Go Cong Provinces. U.S. troops have never been stationed in the other 13 provinces of the delta, only in three provinces.

Mr. Colby.  You do have the river forces, the Navy forces though. Some of those are in Kien Giang, so in a sense there are U.S. forces.

Senator Symington.  When you say they arrived, who arrived?

Mr. Vann.  The U.S. 9th Infantry Division was assigned