Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970

Fifth, they do not believe that Vietnamization will work.

Sixth, they seek a commitment on troop withdrawal, a commitment which would be accompanied by an agreement on a provisional government and along with this there could be immediate negotiations with reference to prisoners of war and the manner in which South Vietnam might be governed until a permanent and settled government could be established there.

Mr. Chairman, those are the conclusions I have come to, not just from the conversations in Paris, but in my years on this committee and through the thought and reflection and study I have given to this problem over the last 5 years.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WHAT IS TO BE GAINED BY CONTINUING VIETNAM WAR?

The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator McCarthy. I think it is quite obvious that you have thought very deeply about the war. You have raised questions in which I find myself very interested and with which I am deeply sympathetic. I am very deeply sympathetic to your point of view. It comes back to this question of what is to be gained by a continuation of the war.

I have asked this of some of the witnesses who have been telling us about the actual conditions as they see them in Vietnam. Usually they answer that they are not policymakers and that whether or not we should be there is someone else’s business. All they are concerned with is the best possible administration of their immediate duty.

You raised what I consider the fundamental question of what is to be gained by a continuation of the war. If I understand you properly, you can see nothing to be gained of any great value, of any great importance or significance to this country, by a continuation of the war, nothing that could not be obtained as well or better by a negotiated peace. Is that correct?

Senator McCarthy. Yes, that is my position, Mr. Chairman.

I think we have known all along that we could somehow win a victory in Vietnam if we were prepared to put enough power into it and enough men and enough equipment, enough force.

The question is: What comes with that kind of victory? Do we wish to establish a puppet state of some kind in Vietnam and sustain it as a kind of military government for 10 or 15 or 20 years? Is this what’s meant by a just settlement and an honorable peace in South Vietnam? Or do we wish to work out some other kind of political life for the people of that country?

If we take into account the fact that we have roughly a half million military and police personnel there, and we don’t know just what the number is in the South Vietnamese Army, but they are roughly a million, that is a million and a half military personnel to control a population of approximately 15 million people or one military person for every 10 nonmilitary people. And add to that the force that we have there, artillery and airplanes, helicopters and firepower, you would have to say at some point we could dominate the country.

But the question is what comes of domination and that has never been satisfactorily answered by any spokesman for this Administration or the last one. {p.168}

MEANING OF ADMINISTRATION’S “HONORABLE PEACE”

The Chairman.  What do you feel the Administration means by an “honorable peace”? What are the conditions of an honorable peace?

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know. When President Johnson spoke, at least in his conversation from the Cronkite report, his first telecast, it became a little bit, at least I thought, clearer to me when he said that in his judgment and in the judgment of the Secretary of State that the Tet offensive was a great military failure for the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. ¶

I think we acknowledge that it didn’t accomplish their objectives and that that was a turning point. ¶

If this was his judgment, it became a little clearer to me why the negotiations in Paris never did go any place, because it seemed that we went there not to negotiate but really to accept some kind of surrender. ¶

So you had two parties there, the spokesmen for North Vietnam and the enemy, believing that we were going to negotiate some kind of settlement and, so far as I can see, our people were there to accept surrender. ¶

So there was nothing that was negotiable. ¶

I say this becomes clear in light of what President Johnson says his interpretation of the Tet offensive was in early 1968, that we really have not gone there to negotiate. ¶

So I don’t know what settlement the Administration would accept other than the acceptance of the Ky-Thieu government of South Vietnam and whatever would follow from that.

PRESENT PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD VIETNAM WAR

The Chairman.  Senator McCarthy, do you not detect, however, that the mood of this country is that the war is for all practical purposes over? The shift in emphasis has been dramatic, it seems to me, in the public discussions, in the press, and in the television. There is a shift from discussion of the war, its significance and aftermath to interest rates, to revival of interest in segregation, racial matters. The war has taken very much of a backseat, so to speak. Do you see it that way, and that the public generally is not really interested in the war on the assumption that it is about over or is on its way to being liquidated?

Senator McCarthy. I think part of it is an expression of a kind of hope that the war is going to end. I think also it is a kind of desperate feeling there is not much that can be done about it in this particular period of time.

COST OF VIETNAM WAR

The Chairman.  I would gather from what you say you don’t think it is about to end.

Senator McCarthy. I don’t, no.

The Chairman.  It is going on at a very high cost. Thursday being the reporting day, I heard on the radio coming in this morning that there were, I think, 96 dead and about 350 wounded this past week, which is a very substantial number. The cost in dollars is still very great. The effect of the drain of the war on our resources, not only material but mental resources in the sense that it preoccupies the minds of some of our most important leaders, seems to me to indicate that we are not dealing and coming to grips with the fundamental {p.169} causes of the social and economic disruption here at home. Do you agree?

Senator McCarthy. Yes; I agree.

The Chairman.  It worries me very much, but I don’t know what to do about it.

Senator McCarthy. I hope your hearings may again stir interest. As I said, it was the hearings this committee held back in 1965 and 1966 that called the attention of the country to what was happening by way of escalation of the war and I know of no better way than the way you are following now of again trying to stir the country to a concern over the war and of trying to lay before the Senate and the Congress the facts. Not just the facts of the situation but what we seem to be accepting as a kind of way of life for America, continuation of the war, a military position in Southeastern Asia, despite the fact that spokesmen for this Administration and the last repeatedly said we don’t intend to maintain any bases there.

WHAT PREVENTS UNITED STATES FROM NEGOTIATING?

The Secretary of State some time ago said that the decision to withdraw troops was irreversible. It is difficult for me to understand why we can’t negotiate a withdrawal of troops if what has been said reflects their real position. If they were going to take the troops out, why not negotiate? But we can’t negotiate that because that would give away our position, they say. But it seems to me if they believe what they said and are sincere about the troop withdrawal, they have already given away their position, and that the better part of wisdom would be to talk about the conditions under which the withdrawal would take place and see what could be negotiated by way of a response to that withdrawal.

The Chairman.  I want the other members to have an opportunity to discuss this with you. I am not sure this is really a question that can easily be answered, but is there any one single consideration, as you see it, in the minds of the Administration that stands in the way of a negotiated peace such as you suggest? Can you isolate it? Can you identify a single consideration that people can understand and that this committee can understand as to why we do not do whatever it takes to get a negotiated peace? The Vice President, if I may say so, has accused me of saying that all we want to do is to surrender and to turn everything over to the Communists. This is, of course, a very pejorative statement on the part of the Vice President. It is not the way to characterize either what you said or what I said. That is one of the obstacles of course to giving rational consideration to this kind of problem.

In view of your long thought about it, what it is that stands in the way of a negotiated settlement to conclude this war, which seems to me to be so eminently in our national interest.

All kinds of programs of a domestic nature in which the Congress and the people are interested, all the way from pollution to inflation controls, are very much influenced by this enormous military expenditure. If that is true and if it is standing in the way, what do you think prevents us from negotiating?

Senator McCarthy. I think that the practical decision that has to be made is one of a willingness to accept a new government in South {p.170} Vietnam and there never really has been any indication of a willingness to accept that.

CONTINUING THRUST OF PAST POLICIES

The action in Vietnam is not very different from what was urged upon President Truman at the end of World War II when there were those who said we had to go into China. And that policy was turned down. A similar policy was urged upon President Eisenhower at the time the French failed, but he said “no” to it. But the thrust was there and the pressure for it, I think, is built into the State Department and built into the Defense Department and built, in a way, into the thinking of this country. It is not rational any more to accept China as a great threat to the United States or to have an idea of putting Chiang Kai-shek in power on the mainland. But we are still carrying on a program which is unrelated to any basic belief or policy of Asia; it is a kind of madness. There ought to be some relation between a program and what we believe and what our objectives are. But in this case we have a program which really has become a policy and it ought to be the other way — the policy determining the program.

The ideological base, if we can call it that, or the historical judgments that were made and accepted, I think, in the State Department by John Foster Dulles, in World War II and at the end of it — these are no longer accepted, but the momentum of the State Department and of the Defense Department is such that we are carrying on a program which is unrelated to a policy or which relates to a policy which we no longer accept.

The Chairman.  I thank you very much. You know you have a way of being very provocative in the way you put things. You immediately raise, intentionally or otherwise, a revival of the concept of Manifest Destiny as Breckenridge and others used to talk about it at the turn of the century. I don’t want to go into it right now, but I refer to what you say about this continuing thrust. Even though a policy is turned down, still it comes back again.

Senator Sparkman?

Senator Sparkman.  Mr. Chairman, Senator McCarthy has given a very full statement and you have certainly quizzed him at such point that there is not much left for me. But I will ask one or two things.

CEASE-FIRE AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS

For instance, in your statement you say the task of the interim government would be to arrange a cease-fire and to assure the orderly withdrawal of foreign forces. Haven’t the North Vietnamease {sic: Vietnamese} repeatedly stated that they would not negotiate for a cease-fire or anything else until all of the American troops were gone?

Senator McCarthy. I don’t think that is their position, as I gather. They would want an agreement about withdrawal of troops, but they are prepared to negotiate, I am quite satisfied, following such an agreement but before they are withdrawn.

Senator Sparkman.  Why should not the cease-fire be negotiated at the conference table before the setting up of an interim government?

Senator McCarthy. Well, you get into a question of military tactics at that point, Senator Sparkman, and the question is not very {p.171} different from what happened in Korea. There was fighting going on even while they were negotiating. I think that rather than talk about an incidental thing like stopping the bombing, for example, that you have to go beyond that and I think the first step should be a significant one rather than one that is incidental.

I don’t mind, I think, if we can get an agreement on a cease-fire first, but I think an agreement on a cease-fire is much less important than an agreement on troop withdrawals and the establishment of a new government.

STEPS UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE

Senator Sparkman.  I wonder if you could state in a sentence or two what steps you advocate the United States should take.

I believe actually you enumerated them in your statement.

Senator McCarthy. Yes, pretty much those two points, I think.

Senator Sparkman.  Yes.

Senator McCarthy. One, as Administration spokesmen — both President Johnson and spokesmen in his Administration and spokesmen in this Administration — have said, we don’t want a permanent base in Southeast Asia and Secretary Rogers has said that the decision to withdraw troops is irreversible, that we could be prepared to negotiate conditions under which we would withdraw troops. We could be prepared to talk about them. But I don’t believe we are. We have to talk at the same time, I think, about a new government in South Vietnam which would be reasonably representative of the factions that were there before Ky and Thieu came in and which I think are still there.

COALITION GOVERNMENT

Senator Sparkman.  I am not completely clear on this because it seems to me there have been several statements made on both sides that indicate to me a kind of indecision. It seems to me that the suggestion has been made, whether at the conference table or elsewhere, that an agreement could be made on some kind of coalition government and that from time to time President Thieu has indicated that he would be willing to see such a coalition government. It may be that the difference was that he felt that that coalition government should come about as a result of free elections. Is that right?

Senator McCarthy. Well, I don’t know that he has ever — I am sure he has never made any serious proposition about a government to replace him. I think early in this Administration someone did use the word “coalition,” but only once and they never have come back to it again. There is no indication in Paris that coalition is being very seriously talked about or proposed at the discussions there. At present, elections are the big offer that we are making and that offer is entirely unacceptable.

EXTENT OF DESTRUCTION IN VIETNAM

Senator Sparkman.  In your paper you quote a part of the report from the staff of this committee, from which you point out that “Rural Vietnam today * * * ” — “Gardens are plowed by either bombs * * * ” I don’t believe you read this. {p.172}

Senator McCarthy. I didn’t read it into the record. I assumed the committee had heard it in other testimony.

Senator Sparkman.  I wanted to ask you a question about it. ¶

In the testimony by Ambassador Colby, he stated: ¶

Can you explain the difference between the two statements?

Senator McCarthy. I think the report of the committee said there were some areas that were not devastated. This was not a total description of Vietnam but a description of some part of Vietnam and I took it on the authority of the committee staff who made that report to include it in mine, not saying it was my observation at all, but I think it is generally agreed there are areas that have been devastated seriously and there are others which people say appear to be unmarked. But you have to believe that if we have dropped as many bombs with such destructive weight on the country as we are reported to have, it has to have some effect.

Senator Sparkman.  I am sorry that in neither statement do I find any estimate as to how much of the country may be subject to the conditions described in each statement.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

EXTENT OF DEFOLIATION

The Chairman.  I have seen recently figures about the extent, but I don’t recall them. For example, the defoliation is many thousands of acres. I have forgotten just how many, whether it was 10 percent of the arable land or not.

Let me read it. I knew I had seen it somewhere. Since you have brought it up, I think the record should be complete. This is from a reporter-at-large on defoliation. It is written by a reporter for the New Yorker, Thomas Whiteside. He says:

I thought Massachusetts was larger than that. It seems to loom larger.

Senator McCarthy. It is a rather small State.

The Chairman.  It seems to loom larger. That is a very substantial area and would be, I am sure, much of the land where people live.

I think that would be interesting to include in the record. {p.173}

PRESIDENT THIEU’S CONDITIONS FOR ENDING VIETNAM WAR

If the Senator will allow me on another question, the staff has handed me an article from the Star of last September, and I quote the pertinent language to the question that the Senator just raised.

I think the whole article ought to go in. But here President Thieu directly contradicts the idea.

Senator Sparkman.  I said it has been an on-and-off proposition. He also has been quoted at times, I believe, saying he would accept it. I don’t think there is anything on which we can rely. I am not urging that.

Senator McCarthy. I think his condition is pretty consistent. He may have slipped once, but that is what he said.

(The information referred to follows:)

______________________

[From the Washington Evening Star, Sept. 27, 1969]

THIEU CONTRADICTS NIXON’S STATEMENT ON VIET ELECTIONS

The president of South Vietnam took indirect issue with President Nixon today over conditions for ending the war and for withdrawing American troops.

President Nguyen Van Thieu said his country “will not stop short of victory, no matter what happens in Washington.” He defined victory as “no Communist domination and no coalition with the Communists.”

Nixon told a news conference yesterday that the United States favors internationally supervised elections in South Vietnam. “We will accept the result of those elections and the South Vietnamese will as well, even if it is a Communist government,” Nixon said.

Thieu’s apparent denial of this was quoted by United Press International from a news conference he held at Vung Tau, a coastal resort where he spoke to village official trainees.

WITHDRAWAL PLANS

Thieu said he was “promoting national reconciliation (with the Communists) through free elections.” But his remarks indicated that he was not prepared to accept a pre-election coalition with the Communists or an election result favoring them.

The South Vietnamese president also outlined what he expects from the United States as it withdraws troops.

If Washington tells him how many troops it wants to withdraw in 1970, he will submit a plan saying what he needs to cover that, Thieu said.

“It’s very reasonable to replace the bulk of your infantry if you provide us equipment, enough funds, and material to achieve the strengthening and modernization of Vietnamese troops, at the same rate and same speed,” he went on.

“If you help me adequately, all right,” he added.

The discussion involves only U.S. infantrymen. Both Thieu and the Nixon administration seem to assume that American soldiers will remain in Vietnam to provide logistical, artillery and air power support for South Vietnamese foot soldiers.

In Washington yesterday, high South Vietnamese sources said that Saigon planning is based on the assumption that these U.S. support forces will remain at least “through the end of 1972, should the war last that long.

At his news conference today, Thieu did not specify figures. His vice president, Nguyen Cao Ky, said last week that 150,000 to 1200,000 American troops could be withdrawn by the end of 1973. {p.174}

After the currently planned reduction of 35,000 men by Dec. 15, there will be 484,000 American troops authorized for Vietnam. Ky’s figures suggested some 300,000 might still be there at the end of next year, and Thieu’s comments seemed to support this.

Thieu said he “has no wish” to replace all American forces in 1970. “What we’re asking for is a reasonable time for us to provide training and leadership,” he said.

NIXON’S HOPE

Nixon has said he hopes to beat the timetable set by former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford, who has urged that all American ground combat troops be pulled out of Vietnam by the end of 1970.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has said that an all-volunteer force to serve in Vietnam would not be possible until the American troop level had dropped to no more than 250,000. He has denied, however, that the administration plans to create such a force and to go on fighting indefinitely.

South Vietnamese sources here echoed Nixon’s belief that the only way now to end the war is to convince Hanoi that it has nothing to gain by waiting for further concessions from the allied side.

The South Vietnamese now have a military force of about 863,000 men. This includes army, navy, marine, air force and airborne units as well as regional and popular forces. It does not include about 182,500 in the national police and other paramilitary units nor more than a million villagers organized in self-defense units.

Present plans call for raising the 863,000 figure by 90,000 — to 953,000 — by the end of 1972, the sources said.

______________________

SIGNIFICANCE OF TIN ROOFS

The Chairman.  I have one other comment. Whenever you see a tin roof there, that is an indication that the house had been destroyed, because most of them didn’t have tin roofs. These are roofs the Americans have come along and replaced. I think that is the significance of the tin roof. We had a big argument, you remember, by the Senator from Indiana, whether Indiana or Korea should supply the tin roofs and at what price, in our discussion of the aid bill.

SOURCE OF EXCERPT FROM COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT

Senator Sparkman.  Mr. Chairman, may I add this. Regarding the excerpt from your statement, Senator McCarthy, which is from this committee’s staff report, my attention has been called to the fact that it was not their own observation that the staff members were giving.

Senator McCarthy. That is right.

Senator Sparkman.  It is a quote from a pamphlet that had been previously published there. I see nothing that would show to what time it relates.

Senator McCarthy. I say that in my paper. It was out of a handbook or guide.

Senator Sparkman.  I am told a pamphlet was published in 1969.

The Chairman.  By whom?

Senator Sparkman.  It was used at the Vietnamese training center.

Senator McCarthy. That is right.

The Chairman.  At Vung Tau?

Senator McCarthy. That is right.

The Chairman.  Where Revolutionary Development Cadre, village and hamlet officials, People’s Self Defense Force personnel and others are trained. {p.175}

Senator McCarthy. It was supposed to be reasonably official from our point of view, I understand.

The Chairman.  Senator Case.

Senator Case.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS

I, on this side of the table, welcome you back to the committee. We have missed you, but you have been engaged in important work elsewhere. I think the contribution that you have made in this regard in 1968 was a tremendous one.

Senator McCarthy. I think the committee has done well without me.

Senator Case.  The committee has limped along under the disability that it suffered at that time, but seriously, the committee and you were engaged in the same general process, and the role which you assumed at that time, I think, was peculiarly adapted to your qualifications.

MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE AND U.S. ROLE

I wonder if I may, leaving aside the immediate suggestion that you make here — and I hope your optimism is right; I have not, myself, seen any signs of negotiation as likely to produce anything better than we have now — ask you to give me for our general guidance your conception of the role of the United States broadly in international affairs now? I was very much struck by the article that foreign affairs carried a few months ago by John Patton Davies, the thrust of which was we had gotten away from the only real possible principle on which peace can be based on this world — the balance of power. Is this a conception on which broadly you agree? What is the basic thrust of your view as to the way peace can be maintained in the world and the role of the United States in it?

Senator McCarthy. Senator, I am not pessimistic about the overall possibility of some order in the world among the great powers. I think there is a kind of balanced power relationship now as between the United States and Russia, with the Chinese not really a power but simply a force or a presence, and that the war in Vietnam is really not part of any great power struggle. If it were, one might say in some kind of great historical judgment you could justify what we were doing. But I don’t think that is the case.

Therefore, it is unrelated and you have to judge it really in itself. And, in that case, I don’t think it is defensible on any grounds, and certainly to the extent that it might cause some kind of confrontation with the great powers. It is dangerous even apart from whatever judgment you might pass on it as a separate problem.

It is my opinion that we can maintain this relationship between Russia and the United States if we are reasonably careful. The two nations, I see as probably being the most positive force for order in what they do and how they develop are the Japanese in the Far East and Germany in Europe. They seem to have accepted their responsibility to be restrained and to avoid military buildups and to avoid confrontation. If that relationship, if this status, can be maintained in Europe and the Japanese develop as they are developing in Asia. {p.176} then the only uncertainty would become that of China and I don’t think anyone can make a judgment as to how that nation will go. You asked me a rash question and it is a rash judgment, more or less.

Senator Case.  You have generally accepted the idea of a balance of power in being?

Senator McCarthy. I think it does exist.

Senator Case.  And what is your view as to the relevance of Vietnam?

Senator McCarthy. It is a different kind of balance, a different kind of power and a different kind of politics from the day of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It would seem to be the language in which some people talk about the language of power today.

Senator Case.  The world is different, of course. There are two powers now of great consequence and the others have various subsidiary roles, and more minor ones. But the general concept is one which you accept as perhaps the only, so far as there can be a rationale, the only basic rationale, for international relations, and our role in this is an important one, I take it, and has to be in some degree an active one; is that correct?

Senator McCarthy. Yes, I quite agree. I am not an isolationist.

Senator Case.  I think this is terribly important because your views on these matters are followed with avidity by a large number of people.

RUSSIAN VIEWS

Have you any revelations to bring us from Moscow; you have been there as well as Paris?

Senator McCarthy. No, I don’t think that I really learned anything particularly there that hasn’t been said publicly. They expressed deep concern over developments in the Middle East, but they have said more since I left than they said at the time that I was there. They had nothing in particular to say about Vietnam, the particular problem that we are dealing with here today.

Senator Case.  Mr. Chairman, I think that is all that I would like to say now. Thank you very much.

The Chairman.  Senator Church.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS

Senator Church.  Senator McCarthy, I want to say that no one man in American politics had more to do with changing our war policy in Southeast Asia than you by your activities in 1968. I think you rendered the Nation a great service.

DIFFERENCE IN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AT PARIS PEACE TALKS

You have just recently returned from Paris where you had discussions with representatives of the North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. What fundamental difference between the two sides would you ascribe as the basic reason for the stalemate at the conference table.

Senator McCarthy. Senator Church, our position there, so far as our spokesman. Mr. Habib, presents one, is that we are for elections. And this is totally unacceptable to the other side. Their position is, {p.177} it gets a little bit confused, but the two points are, as I understood their position: an agreement about withdrawal of troops, which should be acceptable, because, as I said earlier in response to a question by another Senator, both the Johnson and the Nixon administration (spokesmen for them) said they had in mind to withdraw troops and not to establish any permanent bases. So it would seem to me that the proposition should be open. And the other point is a new government in South Vietnam. In my opinion, both of these should be subject and are subject to negotiation. But we don’t respond to either of these.

Generally, we reject their 10-point program saying this is all or nothing and it is not all or nothing. I am sure that these two propositions are subject to very serious negotiations if we are really prepared to begin to talk about them.

U.S. PROPOSAL OF ELECTIONS AS BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT

Senator Church.  Isn’t it curious at this late stage that we now stress elections as the basis for a settlement, even though there is little evidence that either Saigon or Hanoi want elections? The present laws and constitution of South Vietnam prevent free elections, as we Americans would define them, and there is no indication that Hanoi is interested in free elections. Is it not the case that we have put forward a proposition that has little appeal to either side?

Senator McCarthy. I think practically no appeal.

Senator Church.  Then why have we pursued that course?

Senator McCarthy. Well, I don’t — I can give a general judgment that we more or less believe in free elections in this country and it sounds like a fair proposition. Most people would say that is a good offer.

It was difficult to hold free elections in some places in this country, to say nothing of what might happen in South Vietnam, but it is just not a viable proposition for negotiation. After a war has been going on for 25 years to say: “Look, we have been fighting for 25 years for free elections.” They don’t respond very actively to that proposal.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIETCONG VIEW OF ADMINISTRATION POLICIES

Senator Church.  Based upon your conversations with the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong’s representatives in Paris, how does, in their eyes, the policy of the Nixon administration differ from the policy of the closing days of the Johnson administration?

Senator McCarthy. They didn’t talk about it, particularly in terms of that kind of contrast, but it was obvious that they thought it was a continuation of the same policy.

Senator Church.  Basically the same policy.

Senator McCarthy. Basically the same policy. Nothing new had been offered for negotiation with the change of Administration, and if anything they felt, I think, that the failure to replace Ambassador Lodge was a further indication that possibilities of these negotiations were very slight.

Senator Church.  Do they view their own situation as growing stronger, growing weaker, or simply stalemating? {p.178}

Senator McCarthy. I couldn’t speculate as to what they really think in terms of the trends. The only indication I received was that they were not on the verge of surrender certainly, and that they were not moved to believe that Vietnamization was going to be a significant success.

Senator Church.  Do they view Vietnamization with alarm?

Senator McCarthy. I didn’t get that impression; no.

U.S. NEGOTIATION FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT

Senator Church.  I visualize the withdrawal of American troops creating a situation whereby it becomes necessary for all Vietnamese factions to begin to negotiate a Vietnamese settlement. How would you envision the United States undertaking to negotiate directly for this coalition government in Paris? In regard to your position of a coalition government, how can we proceed to negotiate on any basis that would of necessity dispose of or replace the present government in Saigon?

Senator McCarthy. Well, I think it is a difficult test of statesmanship, but I think we must acknowledge that, unless things have changed significantly, we have a great deal of control in South Vietnam at the present time and control over the South Vietnamese Government. Certainly, before the Ky-Thieu administration was established, we were effective in changing governments reasonably often in South Vietnam. In my judgment that is still an open possibility and it ought to be tried. We really haven’t tried it. You say it is difficult and I think it is difficult. If you suggest it could not take place, I think that must be taken to be on the side of pessimism. The alternative is simply just pull our troops out and see what happens or else the only way to settle any kind of international disagreement is by the application of more force. I hope we would not reach the point where we would accept those as the only two possibilities in Vietnam or any other part of the world.

ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL SUGGESTED

Senator Church.  I deeply believe we lack the capacity to be the principal architect for a new political structure in South Vietnam. We have given the present government everything that can be given them in the way of military and material support. The only sensible course now is to proceed with an orderly withdrawal. This may very well result in the formation, ironically, of a much more broadly based South Vietnam Government, due to the negotiations among the Vietnamese themselves. The end of the road would, thus, be the same as the start.

Senator McCarthy. I would be prepared to accept that as an alternative to the war in any case, take a chance on what might happen.

Senator Church.  Thank you. I have no further questions.

The Chairman.  The Senator from Kentucky.

Senator Cooper. I wish to join with all the members in saying we are glad to welcome you. You have been complimented, and correctly, for your leadership in the past, but I would say, too, I do not assume that denies your leadership in the future.

Senator McCarthy. Thank you. {p.179}

LACK OF PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS AFTER CESSATION OF BOMBING

Senator Cooper. I would be happy, too, if we could find some way to quickly end this war and stop the killing and the wounding. You know we have sought negotiations and I agree with you that it would be much better if the war could be settled by negotiation, and the future of the entire area could be settled at least for a time by negotiation.

You remember that you and many of us advocated the cessation of bombing in the belief that it would lead to negotiations. I know you will recall it was intimated by Mr. Kosygin and other leaders of the Soviet Union that it would bring negotiations. I think you will agree with me that there have been no substantive negotiations to settle any of the issues in Paris. Is that your view?

Senator McCarthy. Yes, of course, that is right. The proposition, at the time the bombing halt was under consideration, is they said they wouldn’t even sit down and talk unless we stopped bombing North Vietnam. It was a precondition really to their even coming to the negotiating table.

Senator Cooper. Don’t you agree, we thought, you thought, every one of us thought, if there could be a cessation of bombing, the results would be more than sitting down and talking, but substantive negotiations.

Senator McCarthy. Yes, I certainly hoped for it.

Senator Cooper. I have talked with Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Lodge, as I am sure you have.

Senator McCarthy. Yes.

Senator Cooper. And they told that nothing of substance was ever discussed.

Senator McCarthy. No.

VIETNAMIZATION AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS

Senator Cooper. I believe this lack of substantive progress in negotiations is one of the reasons that led the Administration to try this policy of Vietnamization. Some have stated that they do not think it is a change in policy, that it is essentially the same policy that was followed under the administration of President Johnson. I disagree, and I must challenge this viewpoint. All of us remember that for years the United States had become more and more involved in Vietnam: economically and militarily. You will remember that in 4 or 5 years our forces were increased from 17,000 to about 550,000. Would you consider that the withdrawal of troops and the promised withdrawal of an additional hundred thousand is a change?

Senator McCarthy. Well, Senator, I think if the numbers withdrawn reach a point where it necessarily sets in motion a policy of change in government in South Vietnam, a shifting of degree of responsibility for that government to South Vietnam itself, at that point the quantitative change would result in a policy change. ¶

I don’t think we have reached that point yet and I don’t think the withdrawal of another hundred thousand troops is necessarily going to do it. First, because there are more troops there than we need even now; and secondly, as you will recall when we were criticizing the escalation, the protest against sending in troops arose long before there were {p.180} 300,000 American troops in South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, when it got to 50,000 and 60,000 and it looked as though it was going to a hundred thousand, it was protested. At that time General Gavin talked about the enclave theory, which he was never really allowed to explain, and I think we have come back to something closer to that if it is not necessary to control the whole countryside. ¶

But I don’t see a policy change yet reflected in the prospective and the present and past withdrawals of troops. ¶

The basic policy is still military domination and continued support of the military government of South Vietnam.

Senator Cooper. Many have talked about the government in Saigon, and it is correct that anything the United States does in Vietnam is in a sense in support of the government. As in this country, if good is done under a Democratic or Republican administration, it supports that administration.

SEARCH AND DESTROY STRATEGY AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS

But I go back to my point of a change in policy. On the military side there has been a change in the search and destroy strategy.

Second, the President is withdrawing troops, and Secretary of State Rogers has said this is irreversible. I assume it means a continuing removal of troops. I think it is irreversible because once you start on a program of withdrawal there would be no way to secure the support of the Congress and the American people to increase troops in Vietnam. Do you think I am correct?

Senator McCarthy. Well, you describe what has happened. I just say it is a question of how far it goes. I mean there are not as many search and destroy missions as there were, and we are not bombing in quite the same places, but they are bombing Laos, so that it is more at this point, as I see it, a question of some changes in tactics rather than a change of policy.

PRESIDENT NIXON’S STATEMENT AT GUAM

Senator Cooper. You have said you thought our programs dictated policy rather than having the programs applicable to a policy.

Do you not think the statement of President Nixon at Guam that, as I consider its substance, we would not become involved again in the land mass of Asia, but leave the burden of protection, to those countries, a policy?

Senator McCarthy. There are hardly any countries for us to get into except China.

Senator Cooper. The United States is in Southeast Asia.

Senator McCarthy. Laos.

Senator Cooper. We are in Southeast Asia, and I believe that the President’s policy is a change. It means getting our forces out of Southeast Asia.

Senator McCarthy. Well, President Johnson said that, too.

Senator Cooper. I know, but President Johnson was increasing troops all the time, and bombing North Vietnam. It seems so long ago, but I remember the bombing of Hanoi, and when we went to the White House and heard the President describe it in great detail. Our policy is changing. I would agree if we could negotiate with the North Viet- {p.181} namese it would be a better means, but I assume our present course is taken because we haven’t been able to negotiate.

NEGOTIATION AND TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Senator McCarthy. I would say all the changes you have described have not encouraged negotiations. It would seem to me it would make it easier to negotiate, because we are doing this thing or the Administration is, they should not negotiate. It seems to me that that doesn’t follow. That they could negotiate and continue, in fact; the fact that withdrawals were taking place it would seem to me would make it easy to negotiate.

Senator Cooper. I think you said that the North Vietnamese always insisted on the withdrawal of our troops before any substantive —

Senator McCarthy. On an agreement. I don’t think they were insistent upon withdrawals of troops before there was a settlement. That would be preposterous.

U.S. ALTERNATIVES

Senator Cooper. You have said, and many of us have said, that if we can negotiate a cease-fire and orderly withdrawal of troops it would be best. I assume that the substance of your statement, and it is a good statement, is that we should make a choice between the present policy of Vietnamization or an immediate withdrawal of troops. Would you say that is its substance?

Senator McCarthy. I didn’t hear you.

Senator Cooper. I would assume that the substance of your proposal is we should make a choice between the present policy of Vietnamization or immediate withdrawal of troops.

Senator McCarthy. No, I say that is not the choice. That is what is proposed to us. But I think there is a place between that for a negotiated settlement now; that the alternatives are not simply Vietnamization as described by the Administration or the withdrawal of troops. We can negotiate.

COALITION GOVERNMENT AND TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Senator Cooper. You couple with it, then, the installation of a coalition government?

Senator McCarthy. I think that is the critical point of difference between my position and the Administration’s.

Senator Cooper. Senator Church asked this: Do you think the United States should force or coerce the South Vietnamese to establish a coalition government?

Senator McCarthy. Well, I think Senator Church indicated if we continued to withdraw troops it will have the same effect. It will create a vacuum in which they will have to work out something. Maybe that is the only way we can do it, but I think we ought to try to do it in any kind of a rational or orderly way to see if we can arrange it. If we can’t, then to let the policy — let it happen.

It seems to me I am somewhat more optimistic that reasonable order could be agreed upon than simply create conditions out of chaos in the hope that some good may come. {p.182}

Senator Cooper. Withdrawal of troops, then, in your view is the essential element to achieve a coalition government.

Senator McCarthy. Agreement upon withdrawal of troops, not necessarily the withdrawal, is the beginning of negotiation. I think the two come together — an effort to set up a new government and an agreement on withdrawal of troops. I think they can be worked out almost simultaneously.

COULD COALITION GOVERNMENT RESULT IN MINORITY TAKEOVER?

Senator Cooper. We have talked about self-determination and free elections and all that, but practically, it seems to me, the people of South Vietnam have, the majority have not wanted to be under the domination of a minority. Do you believe that a coalition government would result in a minority in South Vietnam taking over against the will, whatever that will is, of the majority? This has happened in many coalition governments.

Senator McCarthy. I know. I don’t think you are going to be able to determine quite what the majority wants. The cult of the silent majority is taking over in this country, so I don’t know as I could read it in South Vietnam. I haven’t been able to read it here. But I think you deal with the forces that you can identify in South Vietnam without trying to claim for them either majority support or lack of that support, as we have attempted to do before we supported the Thieu-Ky government.

DESIRABILITY OF REAL NEGOTIATIONS

Senator Cooper. I certainly am glad to hear you. I agree if there is any possible way of getting real negotiations, we should try. But I must say that I do disagree with you that there has been no change in policy.

Senator McCarthy. It would be almost better to break off negotiations than to pretend we are negotiating as we have been for nearly 2 years.

Senator Cooper. Thank you.

The Chairman.  Is the Senator through?

Senator Cooper. Yes.

The Chairman.  Senator Williams?

Senator Williams.  Just a brief question first. I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you back to the committee.

FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT

I notice that you do not believe that free elections are the answer. You are suggesting that we abandon that recommendation. Assuming that we withdraw our support for free elections today and express a willingness to enter into an agreement for withdrawal of the troops as you recommend, how would you form this coalition government? That is who would make the appointments for the respective sides? I ask that question because I know here in this country we have many coalition commissions between the Republican and Democratic Parties, but usually the man who makes the appointments makes all the appointments that would coincide with his views. {p.183}

In the forming of a coalition government, if we enforce such a proposal today, how would we form that coalition? Who would make the designations of the respective positions and where would the balance of power lay and how would it be worded?

Senator McCarthy. I don’t know how that could be worked out. That is what we should determine in Paris. We are supposed to have people there who are supposed to be talking about the four principal parties involved in the war and it would be a discussion among them out of which an agreement on a new government could come.

Senator Williams.  What would be your views if you were a negotiator and making the recommendation? What recommendation would you make as to the forming a coalition government? Just how would we go about it? I asked you for your views because you have given it a lot of study.

Senator McCarthy. I think everyone has thought about it a great deal and there is no set formula. You are not going to pull them out of a hat, but sit down as they have done before in setting up coalition governments and done in other cases where we negotiated. We did something like this in Laos where we settled. So it is a question of reasonable people sitting down saying, “We will take a chance on this kind of government as an alternative to a continuation of the war.” And you pick your people and name them and it is generally agreed that there are people in South Vietnam, some of them in the Ky-Thieu government, who would be acceptable. But there is no magic formula for it. It is like working out the leadership of the Democratic Party.

Senator Williams.  As you state, there are some in the present government that would be acceptable. Acceptable to whom — the present government? Or would you let each one of the various opposing forces select their own representatives?

Senator McCarthy. It would be negotiated. You know how these things are done, John. It is not a formula. You are not going to take 2 percent proportionate representation. We are not going to take that. We know what the forces are running in South Vietnam. At least we should know by now. We have been there roughly 10 years. And I hope we would be expert enough to know what the various groups are and forces and how some kind of reconciliation could be worked out. ¶

The alternative is just to withdraw troops, either do it themselves or continue support of a kind of military dictatorship; these are the choices we have.

Senator Williams.  This is one solution and I was wondering what your views are as to how we should form such a coalition government. That is all.

EXCERPTS FROM VUNG TAU TRAINING CENTER PAMPHLET: CONDITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman.  Previously there was reference made to the excerpt from the document which was cited by you. Senator Sparkman read the part which you cited. I have been handed the document. It is entitled “Revolutionary Development Cadre Program, Contribution to the Vietnamese People’s Struggle or Solution to the Vietnam War.” It is apparently used in Vang Tau Training Center which was set up by American funds and advisers, but, as I understand it, is actually run by Vietnamese now with the advice of Americans. There {p.184} has been called to my attention the following language, following the part that you cited, which seems to me to be interesting enough to read into the record. It is very short. The very next sentence following your excerpt reads:

It was such a colorful statement, that I asked the staff why they didn’t put it all in their report. They said they thought it would be so extreme it might be offensive to members of the committee and to the public; so they stopped just short of putting that in.

U.S. PURPOSE IN VIETNAM

I want to ask one last question of you if I may. In the hearings that have been going on and in previous hearings, it seems to me, if there is any recurring reason given as the purpose of this war, it is to prevent the spread of the Communist social and political system. This goes back to the days of Secretary Rusk. Is that your impression? Would you agree that, although other reasons have been given, this is the recurring and most central one?

Senator McCarthy. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, as the American commitment for troops and power increased there was a kind of escalation of the stated objectives as it went along, simply protecting the South Vietnamese from Communist domination, then the larger question of the national honor and the credibility of the American commitment, and Secretary Rusk finally began to talk about the potential danger of a billion Chinese in the year 2000. So the rather limited objective which I think was first set has been greatly expanded as time has passed and as the American presence has increased in South Vietnam.

You see, with reference to the reported description of conditions in Vietnam, in the manner in which you did, I don’t know as you really can look at it from outside and make a very positive judgment. If you tried to judge it simply within the terms of the policies that have been announced and the reports that have come out from those making the policies at least since 1965, the members of this committee know that it won’t stand the test of internal criticism. We could hope that what’s being said now will turn out to be the right judgment and things may work out as the Administration spokesmen say they are working out. But the record of the past is such that I think we have to be most skeptical. ¶

There is the further consideration that there is very little said about what things are going to be like after victory, {p.185} and it seems to me that should always be the first question that one should raise and attempt to answer before he becomes involved in military action.

The Chairman.  I am not sure that I gathered your answer to this. I realize that in the days of Secretary Rusk there did occur this escalation. However within the last 2 days one of the witnesses of the present Administration, who is working in Vietnam, in response to the question of what we really expect to achieve and what is the purpose, if I understood it correctly, said it was to prevent the spread of the Communist system by force. I have found no other central theme from the beginning, although there have been variations, as you pointed out. Occasionally, it is said our purpose is to give them the right to free elections, but when I ask why we are so interested in free elections in Vietnam as opposed to free elections in Panama or Spain or Greece or Brazil, I find no answer. We don’t seem to be the least concerned about the fact that there are no elections in Greece. We give them assistance and encouragement; we give it to many others and I have never understood. So it seems to come back to this matter of containing communism.

CENTRAL MOTIVATING FORCE FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

I wondered if you would agree that that has been the central motivating force unless you assume the manifest destiny urge that, somewhat like the lemmings, forces us on regardless of what our reason tells us.

Senator McCarthy. Yes, I think that was the primary motivation of those who first advocated our becoming involved in South Vietnam.

The Chairman.  Aren’t they still recurring to that if they are pressed?

Senator McCarthy. We have two points, I think: One, President Nixon has said if you have free elections and it turned out to elect Communists that we would accept that. ¶

So the question then that must be asked is: Are we there because we object to the process, the spreading of communism by force, and not to communism itself? It would seem to me that this is the position that they hold. If it is then the question you raised, if it is the process, then we ought to be opposed to the establishment of military dictatorships or military democracies by force also. ¶

If it is the process that is our concern and not the consequence, that should be our general concern in Greece and in Latin American countries too.

But as you know, Mr. Chairman, contradictions are present in so many areas that it would be better to just try to work on negotiating a settlement in South Vietnam today.

EFFECT OF CONDUCT OF WAR ON U.S. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The Chairman.  Of course, what interests me as the result of this question is the last question which grows out of this. Is the war, the way we have conducted it, actually promoting the strength of the democratic system as we conceive of it, either political or the private enterprise system in the economic sense, or is it weakening it? In other words, is this policy and what we have done actually strengthening those concepts in which we say we believe and undertake to put into {p.186} effect here or does it weaken them? ¶

In view of the attitude of so many people around the world in many advanced societies who so thoroughly disagree with this policy, I have the terrible feeling that we are undoing our own house, you see, by this misguided policy. ¶

It simply is not strengthening those very things we think we are strengthening by this enormous extravagance in a monetary way and loss of lives. ¶

There is a rather haunting feeling that we are our own undoing in this kind of policy, that the objective is not at all being accomplished.

Senator McCarthy. Well, I think we are weaker at home because of the war and I think we have less influence in the world because of the involvement in Vietnam than we would have if we were not involved.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/listenagain/listenagain_20040609.shtml

The Chairman.  Today we have the declining interest rates, the decline in business, the layoff of workers in the automobile and construction business. What is this doing to the economy and to the system which we say we support? The continuation of a military influence far greater than any other influence always leads to the decline of the democratic processes in any country; doesn’t it? Hasn’t that been so? You are a great student of history.

Senator McCarthy. Generally so.

The Chairman.  Generally so.

Thank you very much. Do you have anything further to say?

Senator McCarthy. No, I think not; thank you.

Senator Cooper. Mr. Chairman, may I say one thing?

The Chairman.  Oh, yes.

BASIS OF PRESENT ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY

Senator Cooper. It is obvious that conditions which you described in Vietnam are the result of the war. We wouldn’t have the material, human situation there if we hadn’t had a war. ¶

It seems to me that the inquiry we are making is to see how we get out of the war the best possible way. Whatever these policies, purposes were in the past, and we have used all kinds of words, such as “defense against Communism,” “self-determination,” and other such terms, but whatever those reasons were, I do not believe the policy of this Administration is based on the policies of the past. I think it is saying it is getting out, and that is the basis of their policy. I think the process of withdrawal is irreversible.

Senator McCarthy. All right, we will let that judgment stand.

Senator Cooper. And we will talk later.

Senator McCarthy. We will talk later.

QUESTION OF URGENCY AND INFLUENCES ON PRESIDENTIAL POLICIES

The Chairman.  I would say to the Senator I agree with that. The question is one of urgency and also the influence of some who have a more powerful Messianic spirit than others. ¶

When I read a speech by Admiral Sharp or General Ciccolella, it gives me the impression they have no idea of getting out at all. Their idea is to Christianize and civilize. Their speeches read almost like McKinley’s when he took on Aguinaldo in the Philippines. That is what it sounds like. I will leave it up to you to read the speeches. I grant it is not the Administration. These are important military leaders and these are influences in our {p.187} system. I am very pleased that the President has made no such speech. I personally only would like to urge him to carry on, as the Senator from Kentucky has so well said on many occasions, to the irreversible conclusion of complete withdrawal. ¶

But there is always a little bit of reservation. I have never heard him say complete withdrawal; nor have I heard the Secretary of Defense, say complete withdrawal. ¶

It is withdrawal of combat ground troops and in yesterday’s hearing the witnesses went into some detail, explaining that a gunship, a helicopter with powerful weapons, is not combat ground troops. ¶

There is a question whether there is any intention of withdrawing in this sense at all. ¶

These are the questions I raise simply in an effort to try to create, insofar as I can, a feeling of urgency that it is against the interests of the people of the United States to continue this war and simply to urge the President to follow what he has announced as his policy and not to allow other influences to divert him.

When we read about the previous Administration, it is quite obvious that that President followed what I think was a disastrous policy.

There were elements, influences, some pushing him one way and some another, and he finally, in my view, took the wrong turn because of the power of persuasion of certain of his advisers. ¶

There were others, such as yourself and others, who gave him different advice, but he didn’t follow that.

All Presidents are human beings. These two both happen to have been Members of the Senate. We know how we are pushed and pulled on all kinds of issues from day to day and I think that is the way this is.

QUESTION OF IMPLEMENTING POLICY STILL REMAINS

I agree with the Senator from Kentucky. I am not trying to say that the President has not said any of the things he has said. There still remains the question of implementing the policy of getting the job done, of getting the war over and then getting down to trying to attack the problems that are threatening to undermine the stability of our own country. That is all this is about.

QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, leaving out all questions of principle, purely in self-interest, I think one can argue that we should get out.

The Chairman.  I am not leaving it out — only in the sense that it doesn’t seem to have much appeal to many people. They respond more to the practical effects than principle. The principal {sic: principle} argument has been made by you and others very persuasively and I haven’t seen much effect.

Senator Case.  May I say just a word on this question of principle. I am not sure just what you mean, because if you mean a course of action, and I don’t think you do, which because of some divine revelation requires us to get out of there and leave to their fate millions of people, then I don’t think that principle is worth following, and I don’t think there is any such principle that guides us or should guide us. It is a practical problem of getting out with the least damage and the best chance for this country and for that part of the world to rehabilitate itself, and that is what we are all for. {p.188}

Senator McCarthy. Yes.

The Chairman.  Thank you very much.

That last statement brings up a very interesting subject. I had thought this country was based upon certain principles beginning with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, but I think that goes too far. I personally think we have far departed from our basic principles, as enunciated in certain of those basic documents.

Senator Case.  Mr. Chairman, we are in a different age and this is a different country. A little struggling 2 or 3 million people on the fringe of a wilderness outside the main world is a different country, with different responsibilities, from a country which is the most powerful Nation in the world.

The Chairman.  Are you suggesting, then, that the Declaration of Independence is obsolete as Mr. Katzenbach did with the Constitution?

Senator Case.  I don’t think I want to—

The Chairman.  I don’t think you are. I don’t want to argue with my colleague here or get into this at this time. Maybe we ought to do that on the floor of the Senate.

Senator Case.  I agree w