Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970

Mr. Colby.  It is not that so much, sir. It is programs conducted by a unit in some area. It might be supported by some local funds or it might be supported from central level funds.

The Chairman.  I remember Secretary McNamara told the committee once that on their off hours most of the soldiers built Sunday schools.

Mr. Colby.  Well, they do lots of things.

The Chairman.  That is what he said. That would cost a lot of money, of course. That would cost some money that is not included in this.

Mr. Colby.  A considerable amount of it is included, Senator. I wouldn’t say it was all Sunday schools, but they do a certain amount of civic action work around the bases, the airbase areas and so forth.

The Chairman.  I have not only an interest in knowing about this program, but by coincidence I have four constituents here in the room this morning who are architects and engineers. Having you and Mr. Vann describe the program there, gives them a much more persuasive reason as to why they can’t get any money for building in Arkansas than I can give them. I was very pleased to have you prepared to give it this morning so I won’t have to burden them now with my own story as to why there is so little money for construction of houses or for Government operations or for anything else, for that matter, because here in 1 year there is $891 million, almost $900 million. It is a very dramatic figure if you could translate it into what they do in these smaller communities of this country.

PURPOSE OF CORDS

Coming back to you, Mr. Vann, I can see you have a very great interest in this work. You have been there since 1962.

Mr. Vann.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  I take it you like this work.

Mr. Vann.  I consider the work very important, sir.

The Chairman.  It is very interesting to you; isn’t it?

Mr. Vann.  I also find it very interesting; yes, sir.

The Chairman.  I think I detected that from your manner and the way you spoke. I would assume that you have requested a continued tour of duty in Vietnam. Is that correct?

Mr. Vann.  I am scheduled to stay there until February of next year, sir.

The Chairman.  By that I mean you do it willingly and voluntarily.

Mr. Vann.  All civilians in Vietnam are there voluntarily, sir.

The Chairman.  Do you feel that you are creating a bastion of strength for our country in Southeast Asia?

Mr. Vann.  A bastion of what, sir?

The Chairman.  Strength.

Mr. Vann.  I don’t look upon it in that manner, sir.

The Chairman.  How do you look upon it?

Mr. Vann.  I look upon it as one of helping, as an agent of my Government, to fulfill an obligation that my Government considers important.

The Chairman.  Would you clarify that a bit. Of what obligation are you speaking? {p.98}

Mr. Vann.  I believe, sir, that based upon previous decisions made by several administrations the United States has deemed that it has an interest in that area of the world, an interest in preventing that area of the world from being involuntarily absorbed by other political ideologies.

The Chairman.  What other political ideologies?

Mr. Vann.  Specifically communism.

The Chairman.  Do you feel that most of the people in the delta are very strongly motivated by ideological considerations?

Mr. Vann.  I do not, sir. But I feel that the leaders of the enemy are very strongly motivated by Communist ideology.

The Chairman.  What is the attitude of the people who are under your charge?

Mr. Vann.  Sir, the only people who are under my charge are the American advisers and I think most of them share my views as to our commitment there.

MR. VANN’S ATTITUDE TOWARD VIETNAM WAR

The Chairman.  There was a recent article in the Chicago Tribune that said that you were once quite pessimistic — I believe it uses the words “a confirmed pessimist” — but that you are now an optimist. Is that correct? Were you ever a pessimist about this area?

Mr. Vann.  I prefer to think, sir, that I have been realistic about Vietnam, that I was not pessimistic from 1962 until 1968 and that I have not been optimistic from 1968 until now. Up until 1968 I was highly dissatisfied with the manner in which the war was being conducted in Vietnam, and I did not anticipate that it was going to be successful.

Since 1968 I have become increasingly convinced that, with the changes that have been made not only by our side but by the enemy side, our objectives in Vietnam and, coincidentally, the objectives of the majority of the Vietnamese people, will be achieved.

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

The Chairman.  You come back again to the objectives. I don’t like to belabor this matter, but you bring it up. What are these objectives that are going to be achieved?

Mr. Vann.  The objectives, as I understand them, sir, exist first of all because of our past involvement in not only our SEATO organization there in Southeast Asia, but all over the world. In many parts of the world we have to some extent been committed to assist people who are now free to remain free from Communist aggression or aggression of any other sort that is externally imposed on their country.

I realize that these commitments may have been made at a time when the environment of the world was much different than it is now.

I am quite aware that as time goes on the justification that once may have existed may have to some extent evaporated.

I consider that we did go to Vietnam for two purposes: First, to help the people there in response to their plea not to be overrun by communism. And, secondly — and this is my own interpretation, {p.99} nothing I have been told — to prevent further Communist expansion into Southeast Asia.

CHANGES CONTRIBUTING TO SUCCESS OF PRESENT PROGRAM

The Chairman.  And the way to prevent that is the program that you are now following, and it is successful.

Mr. Vann.  I think, sir, that the program we have been following for the last 18 months has been the most successful that we have had in Vietnam. I think it has been successful through a combination of a change on our part and, quite possibly more significantly, a change in the nature of the war and in the nature of the enemy.

This was a war, sir, which at one time, in my judgment, was an insurgency, a civil war. That has largely gone by the board. It is largely now a war of invasion. It was originally a very difficult war for us to become involved in or to assist because at one time, certainly in 1965, a goodly percentage, possibly even a majority, of the rural population was supporting the National Liberation Front.

Today, not only in my judgment but in the judgment of people I have often relied upon — missionaries and long-term residents in Vietnam, Vietnamese, ex-Vietminh, people not now in the Government — the National Liberation Front enjoys the support of less than 10 percent of the population of South Vietnam.

This doesn’t mean that 30 to 40 percent switched sides. It merely means that 30 to 40 percent that did support the other side no longer support them. It means that they are much more susceptible to the Government’s approach than they had been in the past.

However, I don’t think we deceive ourselves into thinking that there is going to be any enthusiastic following of the Government, just as there never was really an enthusiastic following of the NLF. People want a better government. That is why the majority of them joined the other side. It is not that they believed in communism. They wanted better government.

Since 1965, through a series of steps, they have been gradually getting better government from the Government of Vietnam and less of a basis for thinking they would get it from the NLF. From Tet of 1968 on — because Tet was very definitely a turning point in this war — it became very obvious to the majority of the population that they had no opportunity at all to get the type of things that they wanted — which, as I understand them, are peace and prosperity — from the Communists. They did in large numbers, from Tet of 1968, reject the enemy. They rejected him because of something that had been changing since 1965, when he decided to escalate the war. They rejected him because he had changed from being a South Vietnamese ofttimes a relative, to being a North Vietnamese invader. That happened in I, II and III Corps, like a red flag coming down the peninsula. I could watch the change because I was there.

It started happening in 1969 in IV Corps. It has made our job infinitely easier. It is just so much easier now to fight a North Vietnamese enemy who doesn’t have support of the population, who is totally relying upon a line of supply and communications, who is an alien in the area, who does not have intelligence penetrations and who fights in a conventional manner. This is infinitely easier than it {p.100} is to fight a population supporting a soldier who is a farmer by day and an enemy by night.

That part of the war is largely behind us. We are now involved primarily in a conventional war on the other side and conversely we have essentially stolen the enemy’s thunder by engaging in a people’s war on our side. This is what has made such a difference in Vietnam. That is why for the last 18 months I have been called an optimist in Washington.

RESULTS OF TET ATTACK

I came back here in July of 1968 and said I recognized that a lot of bad things happened as a result of Tet. I know the tremendous psychological defeat, the traumatic shock it was to the American people. But a lot of good has come out of it. It has made the war much more black and white. It has caused the Government of Vietnam to consider much more seriously that its very survival is at stake. It has caused them to have mobilization. It has gotten them to take the programs and the actions and the steps that we have been advocating for years. Suddenly I began to see the prospect of a really tremendous breakthrough.

I might say, sir that officials in our Government were almost incredulous that between December of 1967, when I was back here and was considered quite pessimistic, and July of 1968, after the Tet attack, I had suddenly changed and said there was an opportunity to achieve our objectives. But it was quite sincerely the first time that I saw that opportunity during the more than 7 years I have been involved in it.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLE CONCERNING MR. VANN’S VIEWS

The Chairman.  I think that is very encouraging.

Do you think it would be useful to insert in the record an article about you in the Chicago Tribune of November 10, by Samuel Jameson, simply enlarging upon your views as to why you are more optimistic? Are you familiar with that article?

Mr. Vann.  Mr. Chairman, I believe I have read it, but I don’t remember the details; I am certainly agreeable if the chairman says it is all right, sir.

The Chairman.  It really, I think, confirms and enlarges upon what you said; so we will insert it. The basis for my questions was that you had changed your views, which you confirmed in a very eloquent manner.

(The article referred to follows:)

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[From the Chicago Tribune, Nov. 10, 1969]

PACIFICATION HEAD IN VIET SEES HOPE

Samuel Jameson, chief of the Tokyo bureau of The Tribune, has traveled to South Viet Nam to assess the situation there at a time when momentous steps affecting that country’s future are being discussed and taken. Here he reports on the pacification program in the Mekong delta.

(By Samuel Jameson)

CAN THO, Viet Nam, Nov. 9 — John Paul Vann, who heads the 3,400-man pacification advisory team in the Mekong delta, once was a confirmed pessimist concerning the progress of the war in Viet Nam. {p.101}

In 1963, Vann, then a lieutenant colonel serving as chief adviser to Vietnamese troops in the delta, resigned from the army to criticize the late President Ngo Dinh Diem’s conduct of the war.

In 1965, Vann, who returned to Viet Nam as an American aid adviser in Hau Nghia province west of Saigon, told this reporter that the Vietnamese government’s efforts to extend its control and promote economic progress in the countryside were a total failure. He estimated at the time that less than 5 per cent of Hau Nghia province had been pacified.

“There is such a credibility gap that many of us are gun shy about saying anything optimistic,” he said in an interview here. “Nonetheless, there has been quite a change.”

Vann’s title is deputy director of the fourth corps Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support [C. O. R. D. S.] team, which is headed by an army major general. Vann bears primary responsibility for directing 94 American pacification advisory teams, while the general devotes most of his time to advising Vietnamese army troops. No American combat troops are stationed in the delta.

“In 1965 it was a safe bet that as many people supported the Communists as supported the government,” Vann said.

“If an election had been held at that time, the Viet Cong probably could have won more than 35 per cent of the votes and become the dominant group in South Viet Nam.”

TELLS OF CHANGE

In an election today, the Communists would not get more than 15 per cent of the vote, he asserted.

Vann qualified his optimism by saying that the change represented only a marginal upturn for the government after years of sliding downhill. The big difference came from a drastic decline in the popularity of the Communists, he said.

“Despite the obvious international propaganda victory the Communists won with their 1968 Tet offensive, they suffered a defeat in South Viet Nam,” he said.

Not only did they violate a religious holiday, thus alienating a majority of the population, but they also lost about half of their combat leadership, he said.

“All of the critics who yell ‘doomsday’ talk about the government abandoning the countryside to defend itself in the cities. That is true,” Vann said. “But the enemy also abandoned the countryside to attack the cities.”

Vann said he wanted to see the government move its forces back into the countryside as early as the summer of 1968. Even tho Saigon failed to act until November, 1968, it found communist forces far below expectations. As a result, government control of the countryside was shot up in unprecedented way,” he said.

The pacification expert admitted the claim that the government controlled 90.5 per cent of the population was misleading.

“It is absolutely wrong to look at the statistics in that way,” he said. Favorable biases built into the American conducted hamlet evaluation survey make it impossible to look at the statistical findings as absolutes, he said.

“In the delta, you can say accurately that the government now controls 2 million more people, or 38 per cent more of the population, than it did in February, 1968.”

Nationwide, control has gone up 20 per cent in the last year, he added.

Vann said he relied on the accuracy of the trends shown in the evaluation system because “for the first time the Vietnamese can’t write their own report card.”

“In all of the other program? since 1961, it was possible for the Vietnamese province chief to certify that he had completed his objectives by just going thru the motions. Nothing really substantial had to be done,” he said.

Vann said the upswing in the delta — where 5 million people, or 35 per cent of South Viet Nam’s population, live — has produced these results:

1. For the first time in this decade road travel to every provincial capital is possible without a military escort.

2. A still classified action, which will be announced eventually, has set a milestone in terms of nation-wide defense.

3. The Vietnamese 21st division is now engaging the Communists in the U Minh forest in the southernmost portion of the delta, which has been a communist stronghold for 25 years.

4. The numbers of people from whose ranks the Viet Cong can recruit guerrillas and seek support has diminished by about three-fourths, from 2-1/2 million to 700,000. “Since May the Communists have been importing North Vietnamese into the delta, whereas they used to be able to export guerrillas from the delta to other areas of South Viet Nam,” Vann said. {p.102}

5. A village development program, unknown in previous years, has trained 17,000 village officials in the delta since the beginning of 1969 — more than all village level training ever conducted thruout South Viet Nam in all previous years.

As an example of the increased security, Vann pointed to a trip made on Nov. 2 — by Ambassador William Colby, director of the nation-wide C.O.R.D.S. program. The ambassador drove from Saigon, then joined Vann in a road canal river trip to My Tho, and returned to Saigon by automobile. The trip lasted five hours, Vann said.

Vann’s opinions on the efficiency of the Vietnamese bureaucracy have changed less drastically than his outlook on the progress of the war in general.

“All of the things they do are still going wrong, but they are going wrong by American standards,” be said.

Vann said the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu has proved itself more capable than any of its predecessors since at least 1959. It has survived.

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REASONS FOR PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman.  Then the objective of preventing the NLF or the Communists from prevailing is being achieved and you attribute it largely I assume, to the pacification program and the change in our strategy. Did you mean the stopping of the bombing in the north or what did you mean by the change we went through that was significant?

Mr. Vann.  Two things, sir; if I might refer to the first part of your question. One of the reasons that we have had the opportunity to achieve progress is because the bulk of the NLF, although headed by Communists and serving Communist purposes, by very great good fortune are not Communists. They are followers. In other words, the NLF Communist leadership enlisted in the countryside for their soldiers a large number of people who were simply unhappy with the government and used this as a way to express it. So right there was the base which we could always tap. About 95 percent of the people in South Vietnam we have recognized since 1962 were potentially our friends and allies if they could get what they were fighting for, which was better government.

CHANGE IN STRATEGY

If I may, I will address myself to the second portion of your question as to change in our strategy. The change essentially has come about by the recognition that to provide security for a population you have to do it 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and 31 days a month.

In all pacification programs in which I participated from 1962 up until Tet of 1968, we would start off every year with about 4,500 hamlets under government control. Each year we would program, depending on how optimistic we were, a thousand to 2,000 additional hamlets to be brought under government control. Each year we would go out and would achieve 59 to 75 percent of that objective, but amazingly at the end of each year we would still have only 4,500 hamlets. The reason for that was quite obvious. The reason for it can be compared to the air in the balloon. If you expand a balloon in one direction you do it only at the cost of contracting it in another. The reason that we were not being successful on pacification is that we were going out and occupying a hamlet for 2 or 3 months, going through the routine of pacifying it, but then moving on to another hamlet and leaving the first one empty. {p.103}

In 1968 that fact was brought home very startlingly by Tet. From that time on as we began our pacification, we did so with the recognition that you had to leave permanent security in the hamlet.

For example, in the Delta in 1969 we pacified 1,000 additional hamlets in a 12-months period. Coincidentally, we recruited and trained 1,000 additional RF and PF platoons and put them in those hamlets. They are still there. That also, sir, is why, unlike any other pacification program, this one cannot be rolled back by sudden political reversal. This is one in which the enemy, if and when he begins to react to it — I don’t really think he can, but if and when he does — can’t come in and overrun two or three hamlets and then have the whole province or whole series of provinces collapse. He is going to have to eat those hamlets up platoon by platoon and this is going to be awfully costly to him.

This is the great difference now. We occupy those hamlets; the government has control there. We are there 24 hours a day. We are staying there and we intend to stay there.

On all other pacification programs, sir, we went in there for 3 months and then we left it, ofttimes with nothing more than a string of barbed wire around it.

Senator Case.  I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me to ask the Colonel to say whom he meant by, “we.”

Mr. Vann.  Sir, I apologize.

Senator Case.  This is not —

Mr. Vann.  I have been an adviser to the Government of Vietnam so long that when I say, we, I am talking about the Government of Vietnam with American advice.

Senator Case.  Thank you.

The Chairman.  I don’t wish to take too long. There is one line of questioning I would like to get into and then I will yield to you.

Senator Case.  Please go on.

TIME REQUIRED UNTIL GVN CAN TAKE COMPLETE CONTROL

The Chairman.  In your capacity as adviser how long do you think we will have to stay before they can be allowed to take complete control of the situation? Do you have any estimate of it?

Mr. Vann.  Sir, I am sure that all of us have our private estimates.

As you are well aware, our Government’s official policy is to stay in accordance with the situation in Vietnam and the United States.

I would answer your question in this way, sir. There is definitely some time limit on our involvement. If you make the assumption that progress continues as it has been, I can see in the next several years this Government of Vietnam largely gaining enough strength to go it alone. However, when we are talking, say, over the next 5-year time period — and I just use that for lack of anything more definite — the quicker you go out the less the chance that they are going to be successful. The longer you stay the greater the chance they will be successful and that they will remain non-Communist.

I would say that if we went out on a very accelerated basis, there is still better than a 50-50 chance that the Government would make it. If we go out on a gradual basis under the criteria that the President of the United States has laid down, I would consider it a very high {p.104} probability, a three sigma probability, that the objectives in Vietnam will be achieved.

MR. VANN’S CONTACT WITH TRAN NGOC CHAU

The Chairman.  Mr. Vann, did you read an article in this morning’s Washington Post by Mr. Robert Kaiser about Mr. Trail Ngoc Chau?

Mr. Vann.  I did, sir.

The Chairman.  He quotes Mr. Chau as saying you were among the first Americans whom Mr. Chau told about contacts with his brother, who was a North Vietnamese intelligence agent. He also quotes Chau as saying you went to see either Ambassador Lodge or Ambassador Locke about Chau’s contacts with his brother and then told Chau to continue those contacts and that throughout 1968 Chau continued to keep Americans and especially you informed of his talks with his brother.

I don’t know whether you have seen the statement on the story of Mr. Chau, which I made on February 5.

Mr. Vann.  I have seen it, Mr. Chairman.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND TRAN NGOC CHAU

The Chairman.  Have you?

Since then I have received a letter from Mr. Chau, which I have before me, saying that he had heard press reports which said that I had called him a CIA agent in my statement.

I am writing Mr. Chau to point out that I said in my statement that he had been nominated by the CIA to be head of a cadre retraining program in 1966 and has worked closely with the CIA in that capacity. I also said in that statement that I knew that he had reported his contacts with his brother to a number of U.S. officials in Vietnam, including CIA officers with whom he had daily contact. I will put Mr. Chau’s letter and my reply in the record just for clarification, together with Mr. Kaiser’s article.

(The letters and article referred to follow:)

_______________

[Telegram]

To: H. E. U.S. Senator Fulbright, Washington, D.C.

From: Congressman Tran Ngoc Chau, Member of Special Court, Vietnam.

Text: Please accept my thankful regards for your most valuable statement on my case as of a political persecution in Vietnam. I would rectify only one point in your statement as released by UPI here. Which makes very harmful to my nationalist reputation. For a CIA agent has been considered in Vietnam as the most detested enemy much more than a Communist or any type of criminals. It is true that I had cooperated with CIA for many years in developing foundation of present Pacification and Revolutionary Development in capacity of Province Chief and Director RD cadres. But I have never been a CIA agent. I strongly ask your consideration for a U.S. Senate Investigation on American officials and CIA operations in Vietnam which have been destroying both Vietnamese Nationalist Ideology and Patriots and American image.

Present political persecution on me is consequence of combined action taken by US officials and CIA and Vietnamese officials. In an attempt to sabotage Vietnamese and Communist direct talks for Peace Settlement. I did have contacts with my communist brother with agreement of U.S. Ambassador through Mr. John Paul Vann. Complete dossier on my case on the way to your office. Many notable Vietnamese has expressed their comment on my case. Witnesses and persons to testify my accusation are Ambassadors Bunker, Locke, Colby. Misters {p.105} John Vann, Baumgartner, O’Donnell, Robert Moellen, Jacobson, State Department. Georgesen, Thomas Donahue, Stuart Methven, O’Reilly, CIA; General Wyand, Lt. Col. Scoles, Major Sauvage of Defense Department. Drs. Ellsberg, Hickey, Rank, and others I would name later if you agree. My highest consideration.

_______________

February 17, 1970.

Congressman Tran Ngoc Chau,

The National Assembly, Saigon, Vietnam.

Dear Mr. Chau: Thank you for your letter which I received through the good offices of a third party.

I am sorry that UPI has reported that I called you a CIA agent. I am enclosing a copy of the statement I made on February 5 at a hearing of the Committee which I later that day inserted in the Congressional Record. I think that you will see from reading the statement that I never alleged that you had been a CIA agent. I simply stated that you had worked closely with the CIA in connection with the cadre training program and that you had reported your contacts with your brother to a number of U.S. officials in Vietnam, including CIA officers, with whom you had daily contact.

I found your letter most interesting and appreciated your taking the trouble to write.

I assure you that I will continue to follow your case with sympathetic interest. Sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

_______________

STATEMENT BY J. W. FULBRIGHT

THE STORY OF TRAN NGOC CHAU

In this morning’s Washington Post, Joseph Kraft tells us the story of Trail Ngoc Chau. It is a story that does not reflect credit on the United States or on the South Vietnamese regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu. I have known about the story for several months, and I know that the facts that Mr. Kraft recites are accurate. There are, of course, many other facts that have not been reported in the press.

To set the story in context, as Mr. Kraft writes Chau is an old friend of President Thieu and once shared quarters with him when both were junior officers. From 1960 to 1966 he was Province Chief in Kien Hoa and Mayor of Danang. In both positions, he had an outstanding record. In 1966 he was nominated by CIA to be head of the cadre training program at the Vungtau Training Center where he obviously worked closely with the CIA as that agency had the responsibility for the Center. In the 1967 National Assembly elections, he was elected a deputy from Kien Hoa with the second highest plurality in the country. He then became head of the opposition bloc and was elected Secretary-General of the Assembly.

In 1965, Chau contacted by his brother, Tran Ngoc Hien, a North Vietnamese intelligence agent. By Chau’s own admission, he did not report these contacts to the South Vietnamese government. Kraft says that whether he reported these contacts to the CIA is in dispute. Chau says that he did, as Keyes Beech reported in the Washington Evening Star on February 2. I know for a fact, from private sources, that he did report his contacts with his brother to a number of U.S. officials in Vietnam, including CIA officers with whom he had daily contact. I should add that I also know for a fact that he had, and still has, many close friends in the American official community.

At any rate, to return to the story told by Mr. Kraft, Chau began last year to advocate a cease-fire and direct negotiations between the South Vietnamese government and the NLF. He also began to attack Nguyen Cno Thang, a rich Saigon pharmacist and member of President Thieu inner clique, who is described by Kraft as President Thieu’s “political bag man.”

Chau’s brother was arrested in April and interrogated in July. No charges were lodged against Chau at the time of his brother’s arrest and interrogation. I am told, in fact, that relations between Chau and Thieu were not broken until some weeks or months thereafter. It appears that Thieu’s open attacks on Chau began only after Chau denounced the pharmacist Thang.

Thus it appears that the real reason for Thieu’s attack on Chau was not his contact with the communists but rather Chau’s growing power as an opposition {p.106} figure and as a critic of Thieu’s attempts to pressure and corrupt the Assembly as evidenced by the activities of Thang.

Thieu began his campaign against Chau by denouncing him publicly on a number of occasions. According to the Saigon press, in a speech on December 10 at the Vungtau Training Center, Thieu said that if the Assembly would not see justice done to Chau, and to two other accused deputies, “the people in the armed forces will cut off the heads of these deputies” and he added: “Our duty is to beat such dogs to death.” Thieu organized demonstrations, including a march on Parliament, in connection with his efforts to lift Chau’s parliamentary immunity. Failing to secure the votes of three-quarters of the members of the Assembly necessary to lift Chau’s immunity, Thieu resorted to the legally questionably tactic of having a petition lifting Chau’s immunity circulated among Assembly members. According to a report in this morning’s Washington Post by Robert Kaiser from Saigon, the 102 necessary signatures on the petition have now been obtained, and President Thieu is free to prosecute Chau.

I know that the U.S. Mission in Saigon did not expect Thieu to obtain the necessary number of votes to lift Chau’s immunity. But they obviously underestimated Thieu’s determination and his ability to obtain the result he desires through threats and bribery. I have very persuasive evidence on this point. Mr. Kraft tells us that Ambassador Bunker was directed to intervene with President Thieu on Chau’s behalf but that “the Embassy has not bestirred itself.” Given the attitude of certain high Mission officials toward Chau, and their unwillingness to incur President Thieu’s displeasure, I am not surprised. Nor am I surprised that Chau is disenchanted with Americans because of their refusal to intervene, as Keyes Beach reported after his interview with Chau.

Chau is now in hiding. I hope for his sake that he will be able to escape Thieu’s persecution. But even if he does, the story of Tran Ngoc Chau will not have a happy ending. The South Vietnamese Assembly has been intimidated, while the U.S. Government has shrugged its shoulders. And those in Vietnam who favor negotiation and compromise, or who dispute President Thieu, will speak at their peril from now on. Perhaps the story of Tran Ngoc Chau will prove to be the last chapter in the history of representative government in Vietnam.

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[From The Washington Post, Feb. 18, 1970]

ACCUSED SAIGON DEPUTY BLAMES U.S.

(By Robert G. Kaiser)

SAIGON, Feb. 17 — Tran Ngoc Chau, the outspoken House deputy, today blamed American pressure for President Thieu’s decision to prosecute him for “activities helpful to the Communists.”

Chau claimed the United States feared that Thieu would use him to initiate direct talks with the Communists and bypass the Americans. Now, he charged, Thieu is prosecuting him in order to impress the Americans that this was never Thieu’s intention.

Chau has long been a favorite of U.S. officials in Vietnam, and has many American friends. In an interview in his Saigon “hideout” today, however, Chau spoke bitterly of the U.S. government, which he said was trying to “clean their hands” of him.

Chau, whose American friends have been unable to protect him from the wrath of Thieu, said that he has “lost all faith” in U.S. policy. He warned other Vietnamese who have cooperated with the Americans to prepare for betrayal like the one he claims to have suffered.

The Chau case is the main attraction in Saigon’s center ring these days. It combines — in one unruly package — three of the issues that concern this capital most: the American role in Vietnam, Thieu’s feuds with his opponents and the status of Vietnamese democracy. This case may have important and lasting effects on the last two issues.

And the Chau case is resplendant with the little touches of Vietnam that boggle the Western mind. For example, the political gossips have been saying that Chau is sleeping in a different house every night, stealthily dodging Thieu’s police. In fact, as this reporter discovered when he visited Chau this morning, he is living quite openly in a house that is elaborately staked out by some quite unsubtle plainclothesmen.

Very briefly, this is the story of Tran Ngoc Chau: {p.107}

Now 46, he fought for the Vietminh until 1949, when he left the revolutionary movement to join the forces of the Emperor Bao Dai. He became an officer, rose quickly through the ranks and was soon immersed in a distinguished career.

He went to infantry school at Ft. Benning, Ga., in 1955-56, where he learned English, and also American ways. Thereafter Chau seemed always to get along well with Americans in Vietnam. His success as chief of Kienhoa Province in the early 1960s brought him to the attention of high American officials, who saw to it that he was promoted to important administrative jobs.

In 1967 he ran for the National Assembly from Kienhoa, and won an impressive victory. He was elected an officer of the House of Representatives, and began to establish a name for himself.

MEETS WITH BROTHER

From 1965 onward, Chau was also leading a secret life — a life he shared only with a few Americans. In 1965 his brother and former Vietminh comrade, Tran Ngoc Hien, came secretly to Chau and announced he was a high-ranking North Vietnamese agent.

From then until early 1969, Chau and Hien met quite regularly. According to the testimony of both, each tried to convert the other. At the same time, they discussed possible approaches to a settlement of the war. According to Chau, he was trying to arrange talks among the warring Vietnamese factions, excluding the Americans, that might lead to a political settlement. He admits he pursued this idea without informing the Vietnamese government.

Hien was arrested last April. He confessed his intelligence activities in the South, and gave a detailed account of his talks with Chau. (The Washington Post published excerpts from Hien’s confession on Jan. 5.)

Chau, meanwhile, began to speak critically of the Thieu government’s policies. He called publicly for direct negotiations with the Viet-cong before Thieu had accepted that idea. He also proposed a form of coalition government that would have given the Communists a share of power in the provinces and the National Assembly, but not in the executive branch.

Last July, Thieu told a group of legislators that Chau had had illegal contacts with the enemy. That began a complicated series of events — dominated by an emotional anti-Chau campaign conducted by Thieu himself — that has now ended with Chau formally accused of “activities helpful to the Communists.”

He was protected by the Vietnamese equivalent of congressional immunity, but the government overcame this obstacle by promoting a petition in the House to withdraw the immunity in this case. The petition was allegedly signed by 102 members — exactly the three-fourths required by law — and a trial is expected soon.

CALLS CHARGES RIDICULOUS

Today the accused man contended that the charges against him were ridiculous. Chau admitted that he talked to his brother, showed him some courtesies and failed to betray him to the government. But he denied giving him any significant help, and insisted that his contacts with Hien were intended only to try to convert his brother, and to bring an end to the war.

Chau admits that he did not inform any Vietnamese officials that he was talking secretely {sic: secretly} with his brother, a Communist spy. He defended this today on the ground that when his talks with Hien began, the South Vietnamese government was chaotic, run by generals whose “war sentiment was very strong.” In recent times, Chau said, he thought he had the right to conduct independent talks as a member of the National Assembly.

But, he added, he did think he should tell some Americans about his brother. Chau gave these details of his dealings with U.S. officials:

U.S. OFFICIALS INFORMED

According to all the rules of diplomatic or military practice, contacts of this sort would have to be reported by such men to higher authority. If men as prominent as John Vann and a CIA station chief were involved, it seems certain all top U.S. {p.108} officials in Vietnam must have been informed. Chau said as much in today’s interview:

Chau said two U.S. officials — Col. Mike Dunn, now a White House military aide who worked for Lodge, and a Mr. Adam, described by Chau as a CIA man — came to see him to find out what he was hearing from his brother.

During mid-1967, Chau related, his conversations with Hien and other factors persuaded him that the Vietcong would try to create uprisings in populated areas. In August 1967, he said, he gave a three-hour briefing on his theory to Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and Locke and several military officials, including Lt. Gen. Frederick Weyand.

Five months later the Communists launched the Tet offensive.

Throughout 1968, Chau said, he continued to keep Americans — especially Vann — informed of his talks with Hien. The Americans “seemed pleased just to get more of the Communist assessment,” Chau said today.

VANN INTERVENES

After Hien was arrested last April, Chau said, he went to see Vann at his headquarters in Cantho, the largest city in the Delta. According to Chau, “At the time, Ambassador [William] Colby [currently head of the U.S. pacification program] was in Sadec Province. Vann called him and got approval on the phone to see [Minister of the Interior Tran Thien] Khiem. The next day Vann saw Khiem.” Vann’s intervention on Chau’s behalf, he added, “seemed to delay the whole affair for some time.”

According to Chau, this was the last overt cooperation he got from his American friends. Ambassador Bunker refused to meet him, Chau claimed. Then, he added, the ambassador ordered all American officials to cease dealing with Chau.

“Bunker and the CIA believed Thieu would use me and my brother to make a secret arrangement for direct talks between the Vietnamese, without letting the Americans know about it,” Chau claimed.

He noted that he and Thieu had been friends since the time both were young lieutenants. But now, Chau said, Thieu responds primarily to Bunker. Chau said he believes he is being prosecuted to demonstrate to Bunker that Thieu has no plans for a secret deal.

NEW AMERICAN POLICY

Chau charged that there is a new American policy in Vietnam, intended to impose a minority government on the country that will be utterly dependent on U.S. aid, and therefore unable to negotiate its own end to the war.

The U.S. mission here is familiar with most of Chau’s claims that he was betrayed by the American government and abandoned in time of need. But the embassy has made no comment on Chau’s accusations, the first of which were published ten days ago. This unusual silence suggests orders from Washington not to talk.

Well before Chau’s accusations began, however, many embassy officials privately expressed displeasure with Thieu’s attempt to prosecute Chau and two other members of the House. The degree of displeasure these Americans have expressed has been unprecedented in the friendly American relationship with Thieu.

It was learned today that Bunker has told Thieu that the U.S. expects a variety of unfavorable consequences if Chau is sentenced to prision {sic: prison}. Some of Bunker’s staff believe much damage has already been done by Thieu’s public campaign against the House.

If the Chau case opened a door on interesting aspects of the U.S. role in Vietnam, it has also provided an intriguing glimpse of Vietnamese democracy under pressure.

The legal issues in the case are complicated, though the basic facts of the alleged crime are simple and apparently agreed by all parties: It is against the law to give any help to Communists, and by Chau’s own admission he gave his brother some assistance — though he claims it was insignificant. For this reason, hawks among Saigon’s politicians are prepared to condemn Chau.

SYMBOLIC CASE

But there is some question as to whether this technical violation of the law is the real issue. An authoritative source in the presidential palace, for instance, {p.109} said today that although Chau’s transgressions were not serious, the case against him would be pressed because “it symbolizes the anti-Communist spirit of the government.”

Phan Thong, a House member who chaired a committee that investigated the charges against Chau and found them justified, said in an interview today that he too saw more than legal issues behind the prosecution. Thong said the chief of the Special (intelligence) Police told his investigating committee that Chau was “too ambitious in politics.” Thong suggested that Chau would have been left alone if he had not made his proposal for a coalition government.

Another complication involves the petition that the government says stripped Chau of his immunity. Many lawyers and legislators have challenged the theory that the House can substitute a petition for actual floor action. It is widely assumed that the government could not win a three-fourths vote on the floor, if only because attendance at the House is so poor.

Some politicians think Thieu’s petition ploy will do permanent damage to the procedures of the Assembly.

Deputy Thong said he thought the petition might not have been completely fair. But then, he added, Chau had ignored one article of the constitution by helping a Communist, so how could he expect protection from other articles of the constitution that stipulate proper parliamentary procedures?

It is hard to find a Vietnamese who really expects the government to follow strictly any prearranged set of laws and regulations. That is a Western notion.

TALK OF POLITICS

So the talk among politicians about the Chau case tends to center more on politics and personalities than legalities. Some, including Chau himself, think Thieu is trying to intimidate all his opposition by his crackdown on Chau and the other two House deputies.

Those who subscribe to this theory deplore the president’s high-handedness and warn of more repression of the opposition, but the theory is hardly universal. Many of the most outspoken opponents of Thieu don’t accept it.

Another school theorizes that Thieu is damaging himself more than Chau or any other opponent by making such a big issue out of a small incident.

“It is like with Sen. Tran Van Don,” said an articulate member of the House, referring to another Thieu critic who has lately incurred presidential ire. “Thieu is building up Chau and other opponents by attacking them fiercely.”

Chau himself is the issue with some politicians. His critics call him vain, a self-promoter with an exaggerated sense of his own importance. Others say he just isn’t worth all the fuss.

Chau’s connection with the CIA has become an issue — several papers have attacked him as an American lackery. “Many Vietnamese think if Chau is so close to the CIA, he deserves some punishment,” a thoughtful editor said tonight.

_______________

The Chairman.  You are not the only public official Mr. Chau has publicly identified as a contact. The Washington Post article has many other names and so does Mr. Chau’s letter to me, but since you happen to be testifying here today, I did want to ask you a few questions relating to this rather complicated and apparently now a significant case according to the papers.

RELATION OF CIA TO CHAU’S NOMINATION AND VUNG TAU CENTER

Did Mr. Chau develop many of the concepts of the current pacification program?

Mr. Vann.  Sir, let me go back for a moment just in the interest of the letter that you are sending to Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau. I would interpret that your statement saying that the CIA nominated him is where he got the impression that you were calling him an employee of the CIA. Actually, sir. the CIA has not been in a position in Vietnam to nominate a GVN official from one job to another.

The job that Lt. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau was nominated to take was Director of the RD Cadre Directorate. That was a nomination by the Government of Vietnam and approved by the Minister of RD. {p.110} That would be the one area in which he might have interpreted your having suggested he was in the CIA employ.

Mr. {sic: The} Chairman.  Then it was an error to say that the CIA had anything to do with that Vung Tau center.

Mr. Vann.  It would be an error, sir, to say that they nominated Colonel Chau for the position as the Director of the RD cadre program.

The Chairman.  Did the CIA have anything to do with that center?

Mr. Vann.  The CIA, sir, was in an advisory capacity to the Vung Tau training center.

Mr. Colby.  And it also supported it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Vann.  It also supported it financially.

The Chairman.  But, of course, it had no authority to pass upon any of the personnel.

Mr. Vann.  That is correct, sir.

Mr. Colby.  The job that Colonel Chau was nominated to was not just of that center, Mr. Chairman. It was also that of overall responsibility for the cadre effort of that particular ministry throughout the nation.

The Chairman.  Is it the usual practice of the CIA when they pay the expenses and organize the advisers not to have anything to do with the personnel problems of their activity? Is this a common occurrence?

Mr. Vann.  Sir, I am not qualified to answer that because I have never worked for that agency.

The Chairman.  I had heard that the CIA has on occasion taken a hand in some of these matters. I don’t know about that. I was relying upon my staff’s advice as to that statement and they believed that to be correct at the time. “Nominated” is perhaps an unfortunate word. Would “approved” or “confirmed” be a better or more accurate word or would you say they had nothing whatsoever to do with them?

Mr. Colby.  I think they worked with him.

The Chairman.  What’s that?

Mr. Colby.  I think they worked with him on that job. This was a job in the Vietnamese Government. The Vietnamese Government accepted and named this officer as the director of this directorate. They worked with him.

The Chairman.  Was the CIA given an opportunity to disapprove an appointment of this kind?

Mr. Vann.  I don’t believe so, sir. I would certainly say from the standpoint of the way things happened in Vietnam that of times the Government of Vietnam discusses appointments with the advisory officials for any program in which we are heavily involved financially. I frequently had a Vietnamese official discuss with me whether or not a district chief should be continued in office because he knows I have an adviser there who observes him on a daily basis and they would like to have our opinion on it.

Mr. Colby.  I think if the CIA had real objection to him in that job, that could have been made very clear and would have had the effect of having him not take that job.

IS TRAN NGOC CHAU REGARDED AS NATIONALIST OR COMMUNIST?

Mr. {sic: The} Chairman.  Mr. Vann, is Mr. Chau regarded by his colleagues in the National Assembly and by knowledgeable American officials as {p.111} a Nationalist or as a Communist? How would you characterize him?

Mr. Vann.  Sir, first of all, he has so many acquaintances with whom I have not had personal contact that I wouldn’t be qualified to answer that.

I would say, sir, that it is quite probable, in satisfying what I detect to be your desire for information on Tran Ngoc Chau, that we will get into some areas which could possibly prejudice one way or the other the outcome of a court case that is currently being planned in Saigon by the Government of Vietnam involving Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau.

On the basis, sir, I would be happy to provide all the information that I have on this subject to the committee, but I would much prefer to do it in an executive session so as not to jeopardize either pro or con the judicial action that is underway in Saigon.

Mr. {sic: The} Chairman.  I would certainly respect that. Although this story goes very far in discussing the matter, you simply don’t wish yourself to confirm or not to confirm. Is that correct?

Mr. Vann.  That is correct, sir. As I interpreted it, that story represents Mr. Kaiser’s interview with Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau, and—

The Chairman.  Mr. Chau seems to be in no way reluctant to talk to the press about this matter. Of course, I would gather that he believes he is about to be, in the parlance of the old days, railroaded [laughter] because his immunity has been lifted, not by a vote in the assembly, but by a petition with 102 names. It is a very odd situation, but if you do not wish to discuss it in open session, I will not pursue the matter.

The Senator from New Jersey.

Senator Case.  It is nice to see you again.

Mr. Vann.  Thank you, sir.

Senator Case.  It is also very pleasant to see the change in the attitude you now have from that which I saw in 1967 in May and June.

Mr. Vann.  The situation has changed, sir.

Senator Case.  Well, it is very clear that you feel this strongly.

REASONS FOR CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OF AVERAGE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

You mentioned, I think, as one of the chief reasons for the change, the change in the attitude of the average South Vietnamese toward the Government, and you said that his willingness to join the Liberation Front or follow its leadership was based upon his dissatisfaction with his Government.

Mr. Vann.  Yes, sir.

Senator Case.  Could you elaborate a little bit on that and also upon the change? Specifically, for example, when you say “government,” is he thinking about who is sitting in power in Saigon or is he thinking about his province chief or commander or his district or his village government or just what? In what respect has this improved? Would you develop this a little?

Mr. Vann.  I think, sir, that the peasant about whom we are talking, the man who either is or is not in revolt, considers the government to be the village and hamlet officials with whom he must have contact in his daily work. It might extend on occasion to the district chief. Although he seldom has contact with the district chief, he would become aware as to whether there is a good district chief or a {p.112} bad district chief, good and bad in terms of his own future, and his own opportunity to pursue what he wishes to in his life.

As you may be aware, I was convinced in 1962 and 1963 that there was no way for the Government of Vietnam, with Ngo Dinh Diem pursing the course he was following, to win the war. I felt it was inevitable that the National Liberation Front was going to win. I felt strongly enough about that to retire from the Army so as to be able to publicly express my disagreement with the policies we were then following by supporting President Diem.

Over the years a series of different governments came in. I think that between November 1 of 1963 and the beginning of constitutional government in 1967, we had approximately 14 different heads of government in Vietnam. There was a game of real musical chairs. And there was so much instability that there was little impact down in the countryside, little change in the life of the average peasant other than a great deal more unpleasantness than he had ever had before.

In 1967, when a Constituent Assembly was held, when an election was conducted to elect, not by a majority, but by the most votes in a field of 10 candidates, a president and a vice president, when an assembly, upper and lower house, were elected, there began what has been since then a stability of government at the upper level. This stability was severely shaken by the Tet attack, an attack which was obviously well-designed and which was very nearly successful.

Some of the assumptions the enemy made proved to be erroneous and fortunately he was not successful. But once the elected Government of Vietnam, which was then a very new government overcame this, they could address their time and attention to the long-standing and long-ignored needs of the peasant. Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight became first a year of recovering from Tet, getting the enemy back from the cities, and then addressing the problem of how do you respond to the peasant.

Nineteen hundred and sixty-nine became a year of execution. We conducted a large number of elections, with the number going from less than 50 percent to well over 90 percent of the villages and hamlets in the country having elected government.

We conducted training for these village and hamlet officials. Literally for the first time in the history of Vietnam we gave a budget to the village and a procedure wherein the people participated on how that budget was spent. This was something very novel to these people.

In 1969 there was more participation by peasants in the government that most affected them, the village and hamlet government, than, to my knowledge, at any time in the last 100 years history in Vietnam.

CHANGE IN ENEMY FORCE STRUCTURE AND TET

We have gotten a tremendous response. We were aided and abetted during this period by the enemy changing the nature of his force structure from being primarily South Vietnamese to being primarily North Vietnamese. We were also aided by the fact that in the military attacks at Tet, which were largely by South Vietnamese units, the casualties were absolutely enormous. These casualties were not very meaningful from the standpoint of the numbers of bodies involved because the enemy has long shown an ability to remove bodies out of a {p.113} rice paddy with no regard to whether he was killed or not. But there was the matter of the leadership that was lost. In my judgment, more than half, possibly two-thirds of the leadership, particularly the field combat leadership, that the enemy had developed for his South Vietnamese forces over a period of two decades was lost in 1968.

You can’t produce leaders in a year or even 5 years. It takes a long time to produce this kind of leadership.

This provided the enemy with a difficulty of continuing combat actions from which he has not yet recovered. I am not only a civilian there. I was for 21 years a professional soldier, with a total of 14 years in combat in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. My hobby is analyzing military operations. As an analyst, I have become acutely aware that the leadership of the enemy today is a far cry from, far less qualified than the leadership that he had prior to Tet of 1968.

A combination of this drop in leadership, the change of the enemy from being a South Vietnamese to being a North Vietnamese, the beginnings of village and hamlet government, the participation of the population, the stability at the central level, getting enough Americans with long-term experience in Vietnam not to go down any more dead end alleys—

Senator Case.  Excuse me, I didn’t hear what you said, to not go down—

CHANGE IN EXPERIENCE OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Mr. Vann.  Not to go down one-way streets that end in a deadend. In other words, one of our big problems in Vietnam up until people like Ambassador Colby, who had had long-term experience, or Clay McManaway who has been there 5 years, were assigned and a lot of people got into positions of determining advisory policy in Vietnam who knew something about Vietnam, has been people who have had just 1 year in Vietnam. When this changed, we were able to prevent the pitfalls. Year after year I had known programs were going to fail, because I knew we had tried that sort of thing before and I knew the deficiencies that existed.

Finally when enough people with that type of experience got into positions of leadership, then the advisory assistance too became very constructive. Up to that time it sometimes was counterproductive.

Senator Case.  Thank you very much.

It is impressive, and I think the most impressive thing is the change in your view, if I may put it in that fashion and not overstate the matter.

PRESENT POSSIBILITY OF REASONABLE SOLUTION IN VIETNAM

Our concern here, for the most part, has been with a situation that seemed constantly to deteriorate while we didn’t have the firsthand evidence that you did because of your daily contact with it and your long knowledge of what was really going on. All of us sensed that things were going constantly from bad to worse and that unless there was a change there would be no end to a bad situation except a disastrous one, and to many people this more and more indicated that the quicker we put an end to the whole thing, the better. {p.114}

Your own judgment, I take it now, and you have already said this, is that as things are going now they are on the upgrade and a reasonable solution is possible and the one that we ought to continue to try to pursue.

Mr. Vann.  Sir, I have become so confident that we are going in the right direction now that since July of 1968, I have within my own organization been advocating a unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam consistent exactly with the three criteria which the President enunciated in July of 1969 as official U.S. policy. In other words, for a year prior to the time it became our official policy I had the utmost confidence that that was the right direction to go in Vietnam.

Senator Case.  Mr. Chairman, I think most of the rest of the questions I have would better be asked in executive session and I shall defer for the moment.

The Chairman.  Senator Cooper.

Senator Cooper. Thank you.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Mr. Vann, I certainly appreciate your very forthright and, I think, precise statement. I respect you too for your statement of your views of our objectives there. Some may disagree, but as I recall at least until about 1966 that was the generally accepted view of what our objectives in Vietnam had been since our first intervention there.

You brought a side of testimony to the committee we don’t often hear and I think whatever the views of anyone as to whatever the war may be that it is good to have testimony like that. I must say I haven’t heard that side since I have been on this committee.

MR. VANN’S COMMANDING GENERAL AND PRIOR SERVICE

Who is the commanding general under whom you serve?

Mr. Vann.  Maj. Gen. Hal McCown, sir, who formerly served as the II Corps adviser in Vietnam 1962 and 1963.

Senator Cooper. You have stated that your prior service had been with the military. Is that correct?

Mr. Vann.  Yes, sir; I was a military officer and enlisted man for 21 years.

Senator Cooper. You were in World War II?

Mr. Vann.  Yes, sir; I flew B-29’s in World War II in the Army Air Corps and I went back to the infantry as a paratrooper after World War II.

Senator Cooper. As you said, your experience has made you very interested in the military policy in South Vietnam.

Mr. Vann.  Yes, sir; I served in that type of warfare. I was commander of a Ranger unit in Korea in 1950 and 1951. Then of course in 1962 and 1963 I served as a senior adviser to ARVN 7th Division with advisory responsibility for the area from Saigon to Can Tho.

Senator Cooper. Where did you serve in World War II?

Mr. Vann.  In the Southwest Pacific in World War II, sir, with the 485 Bomb Group on Guam. {p.115}

CORDS AND WORLD WAR II MILITARY GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

Senator Cooper. Listening to your explanation of the organization and also to this chart, it would seem to me it is quite similar to the military government organization that the United States had along with its armies in World War II. Is that correct?

Mr. Vann.  Not exactly, sir.

The thing that makes this—

Senator Cooper. Similar, I said.

Mr. Vann (continuing).  The thing that makes this so different is the tremendous involvement we have in things such as social and economic development, whereas the military government organizations were largely related to control of the population.

Senator Cooper. And to gradually transfer responsibility to the civilian government.

Mr. Vann.  Yes, sir.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

Senator Javits.  Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield to me for 30 seconds. I must go to the floor because the morning hour is over. I didn’t want to ask any questions. I wanted to express my pleasure at seeing Colonel Vann here and Ambassador Colby, both of whom were so generous and cooperative at that time in Vietnam. As Senator Cooper said, many of us may think about the overall nature of American policy, but one can only be glad the United States has such servants as yourself in such a difficult atmosphere and such a difficult problem abroad.

Thank you.

Senator Cooper. I certainly join in what you said, Senator Javits.

FACTORS INFLUENCING INCREASED SECURITY

You have testified about the development of the local forces. In your statement you say this: “The significance of this, of course, is the overwhelming importance of providing security of the population. Without security, it is doubtful that the remaining pacification objectives can be achieved.”

How would you compare the security which has been improved because of the strengthening of the local forces by arms? How would you relate that to the fact that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese have withdrawn from the area? Which is the greatest influence on the providing of security?

Mr. Vann.  The Government’s having a physical presence. I would like to point out, sir, that the withdrawing only refers to North Vietnamese units. Most of the North Vietnamese units are now along the Cambodian or Laotian boundaries or in these adjacent countries. The Vietcong, the South Vietnamese enemy forces, have not withdrawn per se from the general area. However, there is a significant difference in the guerrilla operations of today as compared to. say, pre-Tet 1968. The great difference is this: Most of the guerrillas, prior to Tet of 1968, lived in the hamlet and did their farming during the daytime. Most of the guerrillas today must live in a base area outside of the hamlet. They have no traffic with the hamlet except {p.116} on those very rare occasions when they run the risk of coming in clandestinely, quite possibly at night, particularly if it is in an area where the Government forces are not really alert. There is a vast difference in the way guerrillas operate today from the way guerrillas operated before.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY AS UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS

Senator Cooper. As you said, major North Vietnamese forces are along the Cambodian border. Now assume that the program, which you have described so well, continues in a successful manner and the United States gradually withdraws its forces. What would you say then about the possibility of the North Vietnamese coming in from the Cambodian border and renewed activity on the part of the Vietcong? Would the South Vietnamese apparatus which you have described be able to maintain the security which you say is imperative for pacification?

Mr. Vann.  First of all, sir, let me disqualify myself from answering as Deputy CORDS IV Corp and just go to a role in Vietnam as a military analyst.

I consider that the North Vietnamese represent far less of a threat and one which is far more easily handled than the threat we had before from the National Liberation Front which was primarily a political guerrilla type threat.

The reason I believe this is that in nearly every given set battle that I have reviewed in Vietnam wherein a conventional ARVN force met a conventional North Vietnamese force or a conventional U.S. force met a conventional North Vietnamese force, the winner was always our side. The reason was that our side had air and artillery and the other side did not.

These are the most decisive factors in a conventional battle.

It is expected that the Vietnamese regular forces will continue to have air and artillery support. They now provide all their artillery support and they are increasing the amount of air support that they are providing. On this basis, I look forward to the day when all of the fighting can be done by South Vietnamese even if there continues to be a North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam.

Senator Cooper. Well, your answer is directed chiefly, I think, to military aspects of Vietnamization. You consider the pacification program as a necessary element of the Vietnamization program, don’t you?

Mr. Vann.  I do, sir. I see a very low probability of the enemy being able to substantially roll back the pacification program that has been achieved. The reason is that, although on any given night at any given area he masses forces and has a local success, to do it on a widespread basis would mean he would have to pay at least a hundred men dead for every hamlet that he wants to reestablish control. He does not have anywhere near the men to even make a dent in pacification.

Senator Cooper. I will pose this question: If the Administration’s plan for withdrawal continues, and I believe it will, and U.S. forces are withdrawn from Vietnam in 2 or 3 years, will the Vietnamese be {p.117} able to maintain the security which you say is essential for the pacification program in the absence of U.S. military forces?

Mr. Vann.  Sir, that again depends upon factors such as the political stability within the country. If things continue as they have gone for the last 18 months, the answer quite clearly is “Yes.” If for some reason there gets to be some internal fighting among our friendly Vietnamese, if the political struggle within Vietnam goes in such a way as to affect the stability of the government and all of the attention of the Vietnamese gets diverted toward a struggle among themselves, that could put an entirely different light on the situation 2 or 3 years hence. Right now all expectations are that the current stability will continue.

NECESSITY OF U.S. PRESENCE FOR SUCCESS OF VIETNAMIZATION

Senator Cooper. Well, in your view is the American presence necessary for the success of the Vietnamization program?

Mr. Vann.  The American presence today is necessary. How long it will be necessary is obviously the question that the Administration debates on a continuing basis. On a continuing basis we are examining it ourselves. As one example, I have 95 district advisory teams in the Delta. I have determined that pacification has proceeded so well in 18 of these districts that I have reduced the advisory effort to less than 30 percent of what it was. In one province we have achieved such a high level of security that the military advisory efforts have been reduced to about 25 percent of what it was just about a year ago. I would see no reason for that trend not to continue, assuming that progress continues the way it has been going.

CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

Senator Cooper. There have been a number of these pacification programs, as you know so well, and bearing a number of different names — revolutionary program, national building program. But I gather from what you say that you believe there has been a change in the attitude of the people of South Vietnam, that the present program marks a distinct success in its objectives, compared to the prior programs.

Mr. Vann.  I think the biggest difference, the biggest asset we have is the changed attitude of the population of South Vietnam. But certainly complementing that is what, is, in my judgment, the first well-organized pacification effort that we have had in Vietnam.

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Senator Cooper. I will go to the political side for just a moment. You said just a moment ago that you thought the success was conditioned also on stability of the government. I assume you mean to be successful a government must have the support, general support, of the people. Is that correct?

Mr. Vann.  Yes, Senator, I believe so.

Senator Cooper. In your wide range of activities in South Vietnam do you consider that the present government has the support or the {p.118} acceptance — any way you want to put it — of the people of South Vietnam?

Mr. Vann.  I consider, sir, that the present government is the most efficient government that I have seen in Vietnam since 1962, has more real de facto support today than any government since 1961 and, third, is taking the steps through the village development program and through the people’s self-defense force organization to achieve a much wider popular following and popular base than any other government has either achieved or even sought to achieve.

Senator Cooper. It has been said many times that, both in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh was considered the leader because of his long record of opposition to the intervention and colonialism of other countries. I don’t know whether that is correct or not, but assuming it is, is there any leader in North Vietnam or the Vietcong who attracts the people of South Vietnam, in your judgement?

Mr. Vann.  Sir, we certainly have reviewed that, those of us who are students of that history. There appears not to be one now. As I think all members of this committee are aware, the previous leader, Mr. Ho Chi Minh, did represent a father image to a large number of South Vietnamese as well as North Vietnamese. To some extent his death indirectly facilitated the government of Vietnam winning more support among the peasant population than before, because Mr. Ho Chi Minh’s image there in Vietnam was primarily as a nationalist, as opposed to being primarily as a Communist.

I go back a little bit. Even though I personally felt that the Ngo Dinh Diem government was not on a road that could lead to success, I personally deplored the passing of Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem himself because he represented another father image, a man whose image was as a nationalist and as a longtime fighter for freedom in his country.

Now that both of those gentlemen have passed from the scene it is a kind of an open field as to who can achieve that sort of an image in the future on both sides.

WHAT TYPE ORGANIZATION IS PHOENIX?

Senator Cooper. I will ask two questions in another field. I left yesterday just before the hearing ended, but I read in the newspapers questions about the organization called Phoenix. With your wide range of activity there, you must be familiar with this organization. Aren’t you?

Mr. Vann.  Sir, I am responsible for supervising the advisory support of the Phung-Hoang operation, in IV Corps tactical zone and those 16 provinces.

Senator Cooper. Yesterday in response to my questions to Ambassador Colby, I placed in the record a statement of the assassination, wounding, and the abductions or kidnapings {sic: kidnappings} of South Vietnamese people by the Vietcong. Is the Phoenix organization a counterterrorist organization or is it an organization designed for use in a war for war action against enemies. What is it?

Mr. Vann.  I would like to comment on this, sir, because I have been quite familiar with the organization of Phoenix and the various types of organizations that preceded Phoenix, none of which were anywhere near as extensive and none of which had the overall central corps, {p.119} province, and district support that the Phung Hoang or Phoenix program has.

First of all, there was at one time in Vietnam an organization, very small, that was called a counter terrorist organization. As Ambassador Colby mentioned, any time you have a secret type organization you get a lot of fairy tales.

Now, all of my service in Vietnam, with the exception of 9 months, has been spent outside of Saigon essentially as a field adviser.

First of all, regrettably from my standpoint, the counterterrorist organization was never as effective as people thought it was or as the fairy tales about it said it was.

Secondly, it bore and bears no resemblance at all to the organization that we began in 1967, which now bears the name of Phung Hoang or Phoenix.

FORMATION OF PHOENIX O