Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970

Since security is so much a part of pacification, it was decided to place overall responsibility for pacification on the Commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, General Westmoreland, and to establish my predecessor, Ambassador Robert W. Komer, as his Deputy for CORDS — Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. CORDS in the field took responsibility for the local military aspects of pacification, the Territorial Security Forces, and the civilian aspect of pacification, for example, the programs of the USAID Mission and the Information Agency or Joint U.S. Public Affairs, office — JUSPAO. At the Saigon level, these two civilian agencies maintain their independence for certain national programs, but their field operations are now under the single chain of command of the Commander U.S. Military Assistance as a part of CORDS.

Thus today CORDS has teams at the national, regional, provincial and district levels. It is a part of the military command structure, in Saigon fully under General Abrams, and in each of the corps zones it is under the senior U.S. military commander.

PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURE OF CORDS

It consists of 6,361 military personnel, 2,395 officers and 3,966 enlisted, and 948 civilians — authorized. Added to these are 188 third country personnel and 7,600 local Vietnamese nationals. There is complete military and civilian integration at all levels of CORDS. The staffs in Saigon are partly military and partly civilian.

At the corps level, there also are civilians and military working together on the staffs. In 25 provinces a military officer, a colonel or lieutenant colonel, is the province senior adviser, and in 19 provinces and four independent cities, a civilian, a Foreign Service officer or a Foreign Service Reserve officer, is the province senior adviser. The civilian province senior advisers have military deputies. The military province senior advisers have civilian deputies. In 190 districts, the district senior adviser is a major, but in 33 he is a civilian, and at the district level there are 96 civilians serving in all. The normal district level team has about eight members; the teams at province level vary from 30 to 70; the staffs at region number about 150 and the staff in Saigon numbers about 600, all levels including civilian, as well as military personnel.

In addition to these advisory teams, there are two special groups of personnel who participate in the pacification mission. Some of these are in mobile advisory teams, or MAT’s. These are Army teams of two officers and three NCO’s whose job is to live, work with, and assist in the improvement of Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons. Another type of team involved in similar work is the U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon or CAP.

This consists of a squad of U.S. Marines led by their squad leader, assigned to work with a Vietnamese Popular Force platoon, living in the same area, patrolling and generally helping them with their job and to improve their performance. There are 353 MAT teams which include 1,985 U.S. Army personnel. There are 114 CAP teams which include approximately 2,000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen. {p.11}

Both of these teams are used in certain areas for a period, with a special emphasis on. upgrading the local regional or popular force units with which they are working. When they reach a satisfactory position, the team is moved to another area to repeat the process with another unit. The planning, of course, is that they will gradually complete this job of upgrading and that the program will then be phased out, leaving the Vietnamese local force unit to continue without direct American involvement.

OTHER U.S. PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS

These are the American personnel who work directly in the pacification program and with CORDS. In addition, of course, many American units conduct pacification activities in their assigned areas. You have recently heard of the activities of the 173d Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province. This is matched by a number of other American units which collaborate directly with regional and popular force units to increase the effectiveness of these units and improve the territorial security of the area.

The pacification program also profits from the many projects carried out by U.S. units in the form of civic action. Many doctors from the Army, Navy, and Air Force serve on special teams in province hospitals, and the Navy Seabees carry out many programs which both support pacification and train Vietnamese in skills for the future.

FUNDING OF CORDS

The funding of the CORDS operation comes from four sources, DOD’s and AID’s appropriations, AID’s counterpart funds generated by imports, and the GVN’s own budget from taxes, customs and deficit financing. The greater portion of the expenditures by both the United States and the GVN is used for the territorial forces and the police, with AID supporting development and refugee programs.

Both the United States and GVN have substantially increased their investments in pacification over the past several years, which is certainly a major reason for its improvement. The 1970 contributions are: DOD, $729 million; AID, $48 million; Counterpart, $114 million (equivalent); and GVN, $627 million (equivalent).

As can be seen, in funding as in personnel, CORDS is an integration of the programs of several agencies. It was designed to meet a new situation on the ground and it cuts across many of our familiar civil-military or departmental distinctions. It has been called a Rube Goldberg creation and I suppose in many respects it is. The key point, however, is that it is working and that it works with the Vietnamese.

CORDS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. RELATIONSHIP

Because it is the relationship with the Vietnamese which will decide whether the program will work or fail, it cannot be American. Americans can assist the Vietnamese temporarily and can help them take over the full program. Our resources are important. Our imagination and our energy are also important. But we must address these to helping Vietnamese to do the job themselves. {p.12}

This process will be described in detail by the officers who are accompanying me: Mr. John Vann of Colorado, the senior CORDS officer for IV Corps in the Delta; Mr. Hawthorne Mills of California, a foreign service officer, the province senior advisor in Tuyen Duc Province; Maj. James Arthur of North Carolina, the district senior advisor in Binh Chanh District in Gia Dinh Province; Capt. Armand J. Murphy of Florida, RF/PF Advisor, Long An Province; Capt. Richard T. Geck of New Jersey, who is the leader of a Mobile Advisory Team presently located at My Lam Village, Kien Thanh District, Kien Giang Province; and U.S. Marine Sgt. E5 Richard E. Wallace of California, the leader of Marine Combined Action Platoon 2-1-5 whose present assignment is at Phu Son Hamlet in Hoa Luong Village in Hieu Duc District of Quang Nam Province.

At each of these levels the Americans work closely with their Vietnamese counterparts. They discuss problems; they visit the field together; they approach the job as a joint effort. At the same time, each has his own responsibilities to his own government. The Vietnamese chain of command has complete authority over the subordinate levels. No commands can be given through American channels to Vietnamese. The relationship must be one of mutual exchange, trust, and respect.

At the same time, the Americans have responsibilities to their own Government to report difficulties, to criticize where weaknesses exist and cannot be overcome locally, and to submit reports on their view of the situation in the area. These reports are in many cases made available to the Vietnamese counterpart, so he can see how he looks to his companion, and in some cases are made available to their superiors.

CHANGES PRODUCED IN VIETNAM SINCE 1968

The combination of the Vietnamese Pacification and Development Program and American assistance to it have produced the change in Vietnam since 1968. This change did not occur in 1 year; rather it culminated the changes which had been occurring over several years.

In 1967 a constitution was promulgated and a national assembly and a president were elected. This was a beginning of political stability in Vietnam after years of turbulence. In 1968, it can now be said in retrospect, the enemy made a major military effort to crack the shield which was gradually being built by the Vietnamese and Americans learning how to fight the people’s war.

In his attacks at Tet in May and in August, he threw his battalions, regiments and divisions into a major effort to shatter the Vietnamese army, seize the centers of government power and spark a general uprising. Despite the real psychological impact of his attacks, the fact is that he did not achieve any of these three goals.

On the government side a new resolution and drive showed itself in such developments as the General Mobilization Law, the increase of the regular and territorial forces and the beginning of the People’s Self Defense Program. By autumn it had become clear that the enemy’s massive military assault had not succeeded and new strategies began to be applied.

In November 1968 President Thieu launched the accelerated pacification program, the first integrated civil-military program to move into the country, establish security, attack the Vietcong ap- {p.13} paratus and begin the process of national mobilization under a comprehensive and integrated pacification plan.

Its critical feature was the movement of territorial forces into the areas from which they had been driven during the Tet attacks. This actually occurred without substantial enemy opposition. This 3-month campaign was followed by the 1969 pacification and development plan. The key development of 1969 was further expansion in the new areas throughout the countryside. The government set very venturesome goals in early 1969, goals which gave many of its advisors doubts that it could meet them. In fact, it met most of them although not all. As a result of these developments, the nature of the war has changed. The enemy began a People’s War of insurgency and ended by conducting primarily a North Vietnamese Army invasion. The government and its allies first tried to meet the attack with conventional forces and tactics but are now utilizing all the techniques and programs of a People’s War.

As a result of this long process, in early 1970 the change in the countryside is there to be seen. Except in one or two areas, the large enemy battalions, regiments and divisions are in the border sanctuaries. The roads are open to many markets and, from the air, tin roofs sparkle throughout the countryside where families are once again tilling their long-abandoned farms.

We have statistical measures of all of these changes, imperfect but the best we could develop. But the real difference can only be experienced by driving on the roads, by visiting the markets, and by talking to a 12-year-old school girl who informs you that she is again attending school in her village after a 3-year period in which none existed. A friend once complained that the pacification program does not produce dramatic results. From day to day it does not, but the difference in Vietnam from Tet of 1968 is certainly dramatic to the Vietnamese peasant.

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

There is more work to be done. At night there are still guerrillas in Vietnam, and the roads open in the day are deserted and dark, occasionally criss-crossed by contending local forces. The grenades still go off in the theaters or tea shops as the terrorist demonstrates his continued presence. Some officials have by no means caught the spirit of the village community and endeavor to assert their Mandarinal privileges of dictation from above. There are still refugees and others whose lives have been blighted by the war who must be helped to a decent place in society. Most of all, North Vietnamese divisions are over the border or in. jungle redoubts, and prepare for other sallies against South Vietnam.

At the beginning of 1970, however, there is a vast difference in the situation. The government is organized to conduct a people’s war and is showing the leadership and drive to create a better and a safer society for its citizens. Its 1970 Pacification and Development Plan is in many respects more venturesome and ambitious than the 1969 plan. Its key also lies in consolidation of the admittedly thin layer of security established in many areas. It also sets high goals in political, economic and social development, not all of which may be reachable. {p.14}

In response to its leadership and its policies, however, its citizens are beginning to participate in self-defense, self-government and self-development. And the army has repelled North Vietnamese assaults at Bu Prang and Ben Het. It is by no means inevitable that this process must continue, as several developments could arrest or even reverse it.

The enemy is still in the field, and while we may have determined some of the tactics and techniques of this people’s war, the lessons must be reflected in new kinds of action in every hamlet and village in the land. This process has begun, but the future will include some dark days and even some local disasters. I believe, however, that a satisfactory outcome can be achieved so the Vietnamese people will have a free choice as to their future.

The outcome will depend more and more upon Vietnamese leadership, upon Vietnamese commitment and even upon Vietnamese resources. We Americans have played a substantial role in learning about this new kind of war, but one of the lessons is that it must be waged by the people and not merely the Government of Vietnam.

The American contribution in personnel and in resources will gradually reduce, to be replaced by full mobilization of people willing to sacrifice to remain free and to carry out the programs to make these sacrifices meaningful.

The Vietnamese people and Government are shouldering more of the load today than they did last year, and their plans and programs envisage a greater effort tomorrow. This is true in the military field; it is also true in the field of pacification and development.

The lessons learned and applied about this new form of war are making the Vietnamese effort pay greater dividends in terms of local security, political support, and hopes for peace. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the future of this program and of Vietnam, nor do I offer any pat solutions to difficult situations. I prefer to rely upon the determination of the Vietnamese people and Government and of the Americans who are now assisting them to take over this job.

I am privileged to present to you today several representative Americans with this determination, and I invite you to hear from them what we have learned about the people’s war and how it must be fought.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

MR. COLBY’S ATTITUDE TOWARD FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Your last paragraph puzzled me a bit. You said you were neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Up to that point I thought you were very optimistic.

Mr. Colby.  No, sir. I know there are going to be a lot of bad moments ahead from time to time, but I am determined.

The Chairman.  What do you have in mind? What bad moments?

Mr. Colby.  There will be local defeats, Mr. Chairman. There will be local incidents which will occur in which things won’t go right.

The Chairman.  They would not be very significant in view of the overall resurgence of democracy in the country. We have all our local defeats. That is no reason to be pessimistic.

Mr. Colby.  No, sir. I am not pessimistic. {p.15}

The Chairman.  You say you are not either one. I thought you were optimistic up to that moment. It is not important. It sort of struck me.

U.S. OVERALL OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

There are one or two things you said that I would like to put in perspective. You are so familiar with the subject. Yours is an extremely well-prepared arid very thoughtful statement. What would you say is the overall objective of our effort in Vietnam? Could you state it a little differently than you did in your statement?

Mr. Colby.  Of our national effort or of this program, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman.  Is there any difference? Aren’t they consistent?

Mr. Colby.  Very much so. This program’s objective is to build up the strength of the people there, to participate in their defense and development.

The Chairman.  What is the justification? Why should we be so especially concerned about the welfare of these particular people in South Vietnam as opposed to the people in any African or South American country? What is the special reason that we are devoting this extraordinary effort, using some of our ablest men, such as yourself and your colleagues?

Mr. Colby.  Well, this is an overall national decision that has been made over several years, Mr. Chairman, to send us out there to do what we can for this—

The Chairman.  Don’t you yourself have any feeling of purpose there other than that you are ordered to do it? What is your own feeling? I know of no one better to enlighten us. There is some uncertainty.

We had a remarkable witness before the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs the other day. I read the testimony and it said that one of the things bothering a number of our young men who do the actual fighting and, particularly, those who suffer the loss of their arms and legs, is “what is this about?” What is it for and what is the objective? It was on this I thought you might enlighten us a bit. We are far away from the scene and do not have the advantages you have. What do you feel is the real objective that justifies the effort not only that you put in but that the Army and the young men put in?

U.S. SECURITY INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. Colby.  Well, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is related to the security of our own country, the future security of our own country.

The Chairman.  I wondered about that. This is what I wish you would make clear to us and to the public.

Mr. Colby.  This is not a missionary effort, Mr. Chairman, but rather a program which must be conducted in this particular manner because it is faced with a particular challenge that can only be met by a program which involves the people.

The Chairman.  You said the security of this country is involved. Did you not?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, sir. {p.16}

The Chairman.  Could you elaborate a little more. This is a rather elusive concept. Make it a little more clear to us how the security of this country is involved. I assume you mean physical security?

Mr. Colby.  The overall political and physical security of the Nation.

The Chairman.  How is it involved in this particular area known as South Vietnam?

Mr. Colby.  I think over the years, Mr. Chairman, our Presidents have reviewed the situation and felt that the outcome in Vietnam was related to the security of our country.

The Chairman.  I do not wish to downgrade our Presidents, but I did not ask you what our Presidents thought. We all know about that. What do you think? You are the Ambassador there. Don’t you have your own views? Presidents come and go. It is not surely because President Johnson said our security is involved. Is that the best reason you have?

Mr. Colby.  No, sir.

We all come from our upbringing? Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  Quite right.

Mr. Colby.  And I recall a period during my early years when Manchuria was very, very far away.

The Chairman.  Yes.

Mr. Colby.  At another period a little later in my youth the Sudetanland was very, very far away. Both of these later turned out to be very closely related to the security of our country. I am not citing this as a precise example.

The Chairman.  I do not recall. Did we do in Manchuria or in Sudetanland what you are doing in South Vietnam?

Mr. Colby.  No, we did not, sir.

The Chairman.  What is the relevance of mentioning those two places?

Mr. Colby.  Well, those things were far away in the early, and even in the late 1930’s, and by not joining with our allies and facing up to some threats at that time, I think we paid a terrible price.

The Chairman.  Then you are suggesting that we would have been better off if we had done in Manchuria what we are now doing in South Vietnam. Is that what you are suggesting?

Mr. Colby.  A great number of my classmates would still be alive, I believe, sir.

The Chairman.  If we had done that?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, sir.

The Chairman.  And also in the Sudetanland?

Mr. Colby.  I think it is generally accepted that some action, if it had been taken at that time, might have avoided a very large conflagration later.

The Chairman.  Do you think this country is capable of carrying on in Manchuria and Sudetanland and elsewhere the kind of program we are financing and carrying out in South Vietnam?

Mr. Colby.  Given the things we have learned over the years, Mr. Chairman I think we can carry on a much more modest program and an effective program than if we wait for the situation to become so bad that it can only be met by very serious investments. {p.17}

JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman.  I would not want to pursue that too long. I thought perhaps you could clarify, if only for my own purposes, some purpose which would justify the extent of this involvement and the extent of the expenditures, not only of money but the efforts of such people as yourself and your colleagues, who are obviously extremely capable people, whose efforts might be directed even at conditions here at home.

At the end of your statement you remarked what a great change there was between the past and today in Vietnam. I only wish you could say that about the United States.

I wish we had made the remarkable progress in the last 2 or 3 years that you have made with CORDS in South Vietnam.

COUNTERPART FUNDS

In reference to the financing of CORDS, you mentioned some of the basic figures, for instance, the U.S. contribution of $891 million, including counterpart funds.

I wonder if you would be very precise in explaining the counterpart funds. Are they what some of my colleagues call funny money or do they represent dollars?

Mr. Colby.  They represent, in origin, dollars. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  There is no difference in cost to the taxpayer.

Mr. Colby.  No.

The Chairman.  This is a term that leads some people to believe this does not cost us anything.

Mr. Colby.  Oh, no.

The Chairman.  That is not so.

Mr. Colby.  This costs the taxpayers money. The program sends property over to Vietnam through commercial channels to importers who pay for it in piasters which are put in a special fund and handled in a special way. But the origin of it is certainly money from the United States.

U.S. PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PACIFICATION BUDGET

The Chairman.  Could you tell us what percentage of the South Vietnamese budget for pacification is derived directly or indirectly from U.S. assistance?

Mr. Colby.  I cannot give you that answer directly Mr. Chairman. I can find the answer to that and give it to you, perhaps tomorrow.

(The information referred to follows.)

______________________

Twenty-three percent of the Vietnamese budget for pacification is derived directly or indirectly from U.S. assistance.

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U.S. PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE BUDGET

The Chairman.  Relevant to that, perhaps you could tell us what percentage of the budget of the Government of South Vietnam is derived directly or indirectly from U.S. assistance.

Mr. Colby.  It is a very complicated subject, Mr. Chairman.

I believe that the current percentages are something in the neighborhood of 15 percent of the Government’s military budget is provided {p.18} directly by the United States. The remainder is provided by the Government of Vietnam.

The Chairman.  Does the Government of South Vietnam tax any of the activities of the Government of the United States in Vietnam? Is there a tax on the imports or any of our activities?

Mr. Colby.  There is a tax on the imports that is paid by the importer, the Vietnamese importer. It is not paid by the United States.

The Chairman.  But the tax on that import is paid into the Government of Vietnam. All I am trying to get is some perspective for the benefit of the committee and the country as to whether this is relatively an American effort or are we a minor partner in this effort. Are the Vietnamese doing most of it and we are helping them out a little bit?

Mr. Colby.  No, sir.

The Chairman.  Are you suggesting that only 15 percent of the overall effort is ours?

Mr. Colby.  No, sir; by no means.

The Chairman.  Would you give us some idea of what we do?

Mr. Colby.  We provide a very substantial amount of the equipment, rifles and so forth, and a very substantial amount of money.

The Chairman.  Yes.

Mr. Colby.  But in any particular program, Mr. Chairman, the Vietnamese do by far the greatest amount in terms of the people involved in the program.

COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM

The Chairman.  How does this commodity import program, which you referred to in your statement, fit into the budget picture of South Vietnam?

Mr. Colby.  This is held in a special fund, Mr. Chairman. The piasters collected from the importers who pay for the imports are held in a special fund which is only spent by joint agreement by the United States and the Government of Vietnam.

Senator Cooper.  Mr. Chairman, would you yield at that point?

The Chairman.  Yes.

Senator Cooper.  May I ask if this kind of transaction is similar to those which occur in other countries? Is this correct: The United States exports to South Vietnam commodities of various types. South Vietnam pays the United States in its currency; is that correct?

Mr. Colby.  Yes; I believe that is correct.

Senator Cooper.  The currency is then placed in a trust fund and it is used according to agreement between South Vietnam and the United States. So actually the local currency is the product of our dollars, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  That is right.

I was trying to get some idea of the proportionate costs to the two countries of the overall effort and of pacification.

U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PACIFICATION PROGRAM

Would you say the pacification program itself is supported primarily by the Americans? {p.19}

Mr. Colby.  Over the past 3 or 4 years, Mr. Chairman, the division between the American and the Vietnamese Governments’ contribution to pacification programs has been about 50-50. The sum has, however, more than doubled over the past 3 years. As a result of this, both the American contribution and the Vietnamese Government contribution have increased.

The Chairman.  Can you say from your statement how much will be spent per capita on the pacification program, including all the military programs?

Mr. Colby.  Per capita Vietnamese or per capita American?

The Chairman.  Per capita Vietnamese.

Mr. Colby.  I cannot answer that directly, sir. I can tell you the costs of various of the programs.

A popular force soldier, for instance, costs about $2,000 for his first year of service. A national policeman costs the United States about $120 and costs the Vietnamese Government about $1,000 a year.

A regional force soldier costs about $4,500 for his first year and about $2,000 a year thereafter.

The Chairman.  The staff says it is about $90 per capita on the basis of the amounts in your statement.

DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. ADVISERS IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Could you give a little further detail about the advisers and how they are distributed. In what government ministries and offices are there U.S. advisers? Are they in all of them or most of them?

Mr. Colby.  In most of them there are some advisers at various levels. Some of them specialize in limited programs; others have a limited relationship.

The Chairman.  Are there any advisers in the office of Prime Minister?

Mr. Colby.  A couple of my junior officers have a small liaison office down there. They do not advise the Prime Minister in that sense, but they have an office there which we can exchange papers through.

The Chairman.  How many U.S. advisers work in the ministry primarily responsible for the pacification program?

Mr. Colby.  Well, our total Saigon staff, Mr. Chairman, is 600.

Of that, I would say not more than 100 or so would be involved in the different ministries, 100 to 200.

The Chairman.  Is there a ministry of the Saigon Government primarily responsible for the pacification program?

Mr. Colby.  There is not one ministry, Mr. Chairman. There is a council which includes all of the ministries, the President is the chairman of it, and the Prime Minister is the secretary general.

It does have a small staff of about 20-odd people. We have an officer, Mr. McManaway, here who meets frequently with the head of that staff, and we have other officers who work with the other officers in that staff.

The Chairman.  Are there any ministries where you do not have any U.S. advisers?

Mr. Colby.  Well, certainly Mr. Chairman, there are several of them in which we do not have any advisers who come under my direction. I would say that there are probably a couple of ministries {p.20} without U.S. advisers. For instance, I do not believe that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has one.

The Chairman.  It has no American advisers.

Mr. Colby.  I do not believe so. I would not be sure of that, but I just do not believe so.

HOW LONG WILL U.S. ADVISERS BE NEEDED?

The Chairman.  Could you make a guess as to how long you think U.S. advisers will be needed in the pacification program?

Mr. Colby.  Mr Chairman, we are planning to reduce various advisers at various places and levels gradually, as we think the situation permits it. I do not have a specific timetable that I would offer at this time.

COST OF PACIFICATION PROGRAM OVER NEXT 5 YEARS

The Chairman.  Would you care to guess how much it will cost over the next 5 years?

Mr. Colby.  I think our costs will go down in the next year or so because a substantial percentage of our costs in the past couple of years have been in hardware for the increased size of the territorial forces, M-16’s, M-79 grenade launchers, mortars, and so forth. These were pretty much one-time expenditures and so, consequently, I would believe that the overall costs will go down for the next few years.

RETIRED MILITARY MEN ACTING AS U.S. CIVILIAN ADVISERS

The Chairman.  In your statement, you said there were 6,361 military personnel, and 948 civilians. You said there are a total of 215 military men as senior province and district advisers and 52 civilians.

Do you know how many of the 948 civilians are retired military men?

Mr. Colby.  I do not know the exact figure, sir, but about 25 percent of the province and district senior advisers who are civilians are retired military.

The Chairman.  Would it be out of line to say that of the 948 civilians you mentioned, about 25 percent are military men?

Mr. Colby.  I think that would be a little high, Mr. Chairman. I think that would be a little high.

The Chairman.  What would you say?

Mr. Colby.  If I may correct this figure later, I can give you a very precise answer, but I would guess in the neighborhood of 100, 150, something like that.

(The following information was later submitted.)

______________________

The precise answer is a total of 180 retired military against 1,190 civilian spaces authorized.

______________________

The Chairman.  Would it be fair to describe this program as a quasi-military government?

Mr. Colby.  No, sir; I don’t think so because it has no authority. It is an advisory effort. The decisions are made by the Vietnamese Government. The President of the Republic makes the critical policy decisions about this program. {p.21}

NEW ELEMENTS IN VIETNAM WAR

The Chairman.  I was struck by your mentioning two or three different times that this is a new kind of war. We have always heard there is nothing new under the sun. I wondered in what respect, for example, does this war differ from our Revolutionary War or our Civil War? What is new about this war that has never occurred in other wars?

Mr. Colby.  Some of the various elements are familiar to us from our background. But the way the doctrine developed by Mao, Lenin, and Ho Chi Minh, and some of the others had been put together is a new technique, a strategy of combining various factors together to make a new attack on the problem.

I think that they looked at the power facing them in several of the nations of the world. They felt they could not go through the power, could not go around it, could not go over it, but they thought they could go under it, grab hold of the people and pull them out from under.

They tried this in China during the early days there. They tried it during the first Indochina war against the French and worked it out to a fairly good system. Now this, I think, was a new technique. This is not a novel situation—

The Chairman.  I should have warned you in the beginning that I am not as fully aware and knowledgeable about the background of all this as you probably assumed I am.

When you say they applied it against the French, who applied what against the French? Would you make it plain.

Mr. Colby.  Ho Chi Min, Giap, and some others.

The Chairman.  What did they apply against the French that was new? What is new about this as opposed to other wars that have occurred? We have had many different kinds of wars.

Mr. Colby.  One new factor, for instance, is a new military tactic which we have to face in Vietnam. We are familiar in our country with what we call a logistical tail of an army, the logistics support.

The Chairman.  I am not familiar with it. Frankly, I do not know what you are talking about.

Mr. Colby.  That a soldier goes out and faces the enemy and is pretty much alone as he goes. Behind him, come various things to help him do his job. There are supporting arms, the ordnance, the quartermaster, the food, and all the rest.

HOW DOES VIETNAM WAR DIFFER FROM OTHER WARS?

The Chairman.  I was not thinking so much about military tactics in the field. The French really, for practical purposes, were driven out of Vietnam and Indochina by the Japanese. Were they or weren’t they?

Mr. Colby.  They came back in after World War II.

The Chairman.  Then the war began between the Vietnamese and the French.

Mr. Colby.  Yes.

The Chairman.  What was new about that and different from other wars?

Mr. Colby.  The organization of the population, the conduct of a mass political effort among the population to support the effort, the {p.22} combination of organizers, terrorists, the guerrilla and the main force units.

The Chairman.  You mean there had never been guerrillas before? Was this the first war in which the guerrillas operated?

Mr. Colby.  No, sir. I have been a guerrilla, but there are other levels of this war.

The Chairman.  Didn’t Tito have guerrillas against the Germans in Yugoslavia?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, sir.

But his was an experiment which led toward this final technique which they have developed.

The Chairman.  Didn’t the Maquis have a war against the Germans in France? It was a very effective war. What is new about that?

Mr. Colby.  Well, I participated in that particular effort, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  In France?

Mr. Colby.  I did, sir, and it was not as effective as this one because we did not not have the same techniques.

The Chairman.  It succeeded in the end; didn’t it? I thought the Germans were defeated.

Mr. Colby.  They were defeated with the help of the resistance, but not through the technique that has been developed in the Far East, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  Perhaps I am too limited in my background to follow this, but I do not see anything particularly new or different between this war and other wars of a colony seeking its independence of its colonial master. There are new guns. It is true George Washington did not have M-16s, but his army had squirrel rifles and they made the same use of them, I do not see the difference. The difference between the military hardware and a few other things does not seem to me a significant difference.

Mr. Colby.  No. The military hardware is not the difference, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  What is the difference?

Mr. Colby.  The real difference is the involvement of the people in the war.

During the first Indochina war, the Viet Minh aimed at organizing the people to participate fully in the war as a part of the war effort.

The Chairman.  Against the French.

Mr. Colby.  Against the French.

The Chairman.  Why was that very different? Didn’t George Washington and Benjamin Franklin and the rest try to do the same thing here with great difficulty. They had many people who did not think much of it, but they finally succeeded; didn’t they?

Mr. Colby.  Yes.

The Chairman.  We had Tories who did not agree.

Mr. Colby.  But there was a different style of organization.

The Chairman.  What is the difference?

Mr. Colby.  The organization, of these people, the indoctrination of the people, mobilization in the Communist sense of the word of the people, which means regimented participation in an organized manner in the effort and then supplementing this with guerrilla efforts, and supplementing this again with main force efforts. {p.23}

DOES U.S. POSITION MAKE VIETNAM WAR DIFFERENT?

The Chairman.  Could it be the only difference between this and Yugoslavia and France, the guerrillas who helped George Washington against those dreadful Hessians and others, is that this is one time we are not on the side of the guerrillas? We are on the other side with the guerrillas against us. Is that the new kind of war that you had in mind?

Mr. Colby.  I think the lesson we have learned out there, Mr. Chairman, is that we cannot fight it by Hessians; that we have to involve the people of the nation the effort.

The Chairman.  We have tried to fight it with Hessians; haven’t we?

Mr. Colby.  I don’t think with Hessians, Mr. Chairman, but we have tried—

The Chairman.  What does Hessians mean to you?

Mr. Colby.  Foreign elements, mercenary, elements.

The Chairman.  That is right, you don’t think we have had any mercenaries?

Mr. Colby.  We have had a few, a very few, but I would not characterize the American Army as mercenaries, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  No, no, not the American Army. It is a conscripted army. It is far from being mercenary. It is the opposite.

Mr. Colby.  I would not characterize the American Army as Hessians.

The Chairman.  I never have. No one else has. However, there are more than Americans there. There are some that are called allies. They are not Americans.

I do not see the great difference in this war that you seem to see other than that this is the only time I know of in our history that we have tried to help a colonial power in trying to maintain control of a colony. Do you know of any other instances?

Mr. Colby.  We have participated in that kind of an effort in other times.

The Chairman.  What is another example?

Mr. Colby.  The Philippine insurrection in which the United States helped put down that insurrection.

The Chairman.  We helped Spain keep control of the Philippines?

Mr. Colby.  No, we helped suppress an insurrection.

The Chairman.  Against us?

Mr. Colby.  Yes.

The Chairman.  It is odd that you would give this as an example.

My impression was that we had told the Philippines we were there to deliver them from the colonial power then known as Spain. Is that not right?

Mr. Colby.  I believe the explanation was a little more imperialist at that time of the turn of the century, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  What was the origin of the war? Was it not to deliver both Cuba and the Philippines from Spanish domination?

Mr. Colby.  Some people said that and some people said other things like “manifest destiny”, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  Didn’t that come a little later? Manifest destiny developed after we changed our objective, didn’t it? I do not want to pursue this too long, but I think it is really very odd that you would {p.24} use the Philippines experiment as a precedent for our actions in helping the French maintain their power over the Vietnamese.

Mr. Colby.  No. I think you have turned the question slightly, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  I wish you would clarify it.

Mr. Colby.  I think you asked me whether there was any occasion in which the United States had helped to put down a rebellion and the answer was yes, there had been.

The Chairman.  I do not believe I put that question. I said it was the only case I knew of in which the United States tried to help a colonial power maintain control of a colony. I think it is perfectly logical, having been a colony ourselves, that we have always helped the colony achieve its independence of the colonial power until Vietnam. In case of the Philippines it seems to me we began to deliver the Philippines from Spain, but after we became acquainted with the Philippines, Mr. McKinley said the Lord had directed him to Christianize and civilize the Philippines. So we took them by brute force. Is that correct?

Mr. Colby.  I think that association—

The Chairman.  That is right and we killed a great many of them in the process.

LENGTH OF TIME UNITED STATES INTENDS TO REMAIN IN VIETNAM

Do you think there is any possibility that we might decide to stay in Vietnam for quite a while?

Mr. Colby.  I think our policy is fairly clear. We are trying to end our participation there and remove ourselves from Vietnam.

The Chairman.  That is the announced policy. The announced policy in the Philippines was to free them from the domination of Spain.

I only ask you that as sort of an historical byline. It has occurred to some people that things change in the course of doing good to people. We fall in love with them; don’t we?

Mr. Colby.  I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the Vietnamese would not fall in love with us if they thought we were going to stay.

One of the factors of this particular effort today is that the Vietnamese are convinced that we are intending to move out, that we do not intend to stay there and retain authority there, and that they are fighting a truly nationalist effort and not a colonial effort.

The Vietnamese leadership, the Vietnamese people who participate in the self-defense program, the Vietnamese who vote in their local communities for their own leadership, are looking to a day in which Vietnam is theirs.

PHOENIX PROGRAM

The Chairman.  Are you familiar with a man named Robert G. Kaiser, Jr.?

Mr. Colby.  I have met him from time to time, yes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  Did you see this article appearing in this morning’s Washington Post?

Mr. Colby.  I did, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman.  Do you consider it reasonably accurate? {p.25}

Mr. Colby.  I would have a few problems with minor aspects of it, but I think, in general, it states the fact that we have a difficult problem of making the Phoenix program work, and that we are working at it. It has been no great success but we are working at it.

It is not the kind of a program that it has sometimes been thought to be, by misunderstanding of some of the terms used.

The Chairman.  I will ask to put it in the record for reference and I will yield to my colleagues for questions at this time.

(The information referred to follows.)

______________________

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1970]

U.S. Aides in Vietnam Scorn Phoenix Project

(By Robert G. Kaiser, Jr.)

SAIGON, February 16.— The program to neutralize the Vietcong infrastructure in South Vietnam is called Phoenix, and it is a bird of several feathers.

Some war critics in the United States have attacked Phoenix as an instrument of mass political murder. Such sinister descriptions are not heard in Vietnam, where Phoenix has the reputation of a poorly plotted farce, sometimes with tragic overtones.

The contradiction between Phoenix’s lurid reputation as a sort of Vietnamese Murder, Inc., and the scorn with which it is widely regarded here typifies one of the most popular grievances of American officials in Vietnam: “They don’t understand at home what’s going on out here.”

The gulf between homefront and battlefront is likely to appear Tuesday in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing room, when American pacification officials are expected to be questioned closely about the Phoenix program.

Because Phoenix is an offspring of the CIA and because its operations have always been obscured by the cloak of official secrecy, the Foreign Relations Committee may discuss the program in a closed session. But Phoenix’s secrets are not well kept in Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese-run program does involve killing. American statistics on Phoenix results (which are radically more conservative than the Vietnamese figures) show 19,534 members of the so-called Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) “neutralized” during 1969 — 6,187 of them killed.

The rest were captured (8,515) or rallied to the government cause (4,832).

But several officials involved in the program, including some who are sharply critical of Phoenix, note a fact that is not tabulated in official statistics: A small fraction, probably one tenth to one fifth, of the VCI neutralized are captured or killed on purpose. The overwhelming majority are rounded up in military operations, killed in battles, ambushes or other military action, and described afterward as infrastructure. Only a handful are targeted, diligently pursued and captured or killed.

PHOENIX NOT WORKING

“The most important point about Phoenix,” said one official who had access to all the program’s statistics and records, “is that it isn’t working.”

That view is repeated by official and confidential U.S. establishments here, and official and confidential studies, including recent reports by the CIA and the deputy under secretary of the Army, James V. Siena, Phoenix has failed to neutralize a significant number of important Vietcong officials.

“We are not bothering them now, that’s for damn sure,” one of the senior Americans in Vietnam said not long ago.

A common description of Phoenix one hears from officials in Vietnam is of a program without substance. A share of the killing and capturing that goes on in the war is attributed statistically to Phoenix, but — many officials say — most of Phoenix’s share could easily be attributed to something or somebody else.

Phoenix’s unsavory reputation apparently stems from its clandestine nature, its connections with some deliberate assassinations, and accusations made by several public figures and army veterans about its activities.

AN IDEA OF THE CIA

Phoenix was the idea of the CIA, and until last July it was run by the agency. Phoenix operations conducted by Provincial Reconnaissance Units have in- {p.26} volved assassinations. These units, another CIA organization composed of Vietnamese troops and U.S. advisers, were organized primarily as a counter-terror group to operate behind enemy lines. Assassination of Vietcong officials was one of their assignments.

But the units are now under local Vietnamese control, and have lost much of their ferocious reputation. “They’ve lost 50 per cent of their effectiveness,” according to one U.S. official.

“There’s some killing, but this is a war. There are no organized bump-off squads,” one official with no brief for Phoenix insisted recently. Efforts to find contrary evidence were unsuccessful. Many of the accusations against Phoenix cannot be verified here. Some seem to be based on misunderstandings of Phoenix terminology and statistics.

Officials in Vietnam are critical of Phoenix on many other counts. In recent interviews with several officials involved in the program, a reporter heard these points:

Phoenix is potentially dangerous, for it could be used against political opponents of the regime, whether they were Vietcong or not. However, there is no evidence that this has happened yet.

Phoenix contributes substantially to corruption. Some local officials demand payoffs with threats of arrests under the Phoenix program, or release genuine Vietcong for cash.

Phoenix is helping the Vietcong more than hurting it. By throwing people in prison who are often only low-level operatives — sometimes people forced to cooperate with the Vietcong when they lived in VC territory — the government is alienating a large slice of the population. “We should not jail people,” said Ho Ngoc Nhuan, chairman of the rural development committee of the Vietnamese House. “That makes them enemies of the government.”

A CAMPAIGN IS NECESSARY

All the officials interviewed were persuaded that a concerted campaign against the Vietcong organization is necessary if South Vietnam is to have any chance of independent survival in the long run, but all also agreed that the Phoenix program had failed to hurt the VC organization so far.

Phoenix was adopted by the Vietnamese government, at American urging (or perhaps insistence), in December 1967. It is supposed to unify the fragmented intelligence agencies in Vietnam, and share the best information among all operating units. Provincial security committees, part of the Phoenix structure, also have the power to try and sentence suspects to prison for up to two years.

There are 441 Americans attached to Phoenix, all as advisers. Americans play no direct role in Phoenix operations.

Phoenix offices in the 44 provinces and most of the 242 districts of South Vietnam (all with U.S. advisers) are supposed to maintain dossiers on Vietcong officials in their area and a “blacklist” of wanted men and women.

Ideally, Special Branch Police (an intelligence unit of the National Police, advised and financed by the CIA), local troops and Provincial Reconnaissance Units are supposed to conduct operations to arrest these wanted persons. Arrested individuals are interrogated. When there is some evidence of a Vietcong connection, they are brought to trial before the provincial security team. High-level suspects are supposed to be bound over to a military field court.

REALITY DIFFERS FROM MODEL

As so often in Vietnam, reality bears small resemblance to this ideal model. Interviews with officials and observations in the countryside reveal deviations from the ideal.

The main problem is that Vietnamese don’t seem interested in really prosecuting the program.

“They just aren’t interested,” said one official. “They don’t want to be caught trying to get the VCI if they think maybe next year the VCI will be in control.”

Some local officials have made private accommodations with the Vietcong, U.S. and Vietnamese officials say. They are unwilling to upset these arrangements by chasing VCI.

Only in the last few months has the central government put strong emphasis on Phoenix. Some officials think this new pressure may improve performance.

Largely because of Vietnamese disinterest, the local Phoenix offices simply do not work. Many keep no records. Others mount no operations. Phoenix is often run by poor-quality personnel, chosen for their jobs by local officials who {p.27} don’t want to waste their good people on the program. Most district offices are run by junior army officers who have little sense of the sophisticated political problems of hunting down Vietcong officials.

NEUTRALIZATION QUOTAS

Perhaps to prod recalcitrant local officials, the central government assigns Phoenix quotas to the provinces. Thus a province chief has to report neutralization of a certain number of VCI every month to stay in good. “They will meet every quota, that’s established for them,” one American adviser noted.

But meeting the quotas often means disregarding any standards. Officials often count every man arrested, even if he is released immediately for lack of evidence. American advisers refuse to confirm many of these alleged neutralizations, accounting for much of the difference of almost 100 per cent between U.S. and South Vietnamese Phoenix statistics.

Quota-conscious district and province chiefs also pad their Phoenix figures with any number of citizens captured or killed in military operations, whether genuine VCI or not.

“Vietnamization” of Phoenix has, in a sense, already been completed — the only Americans involved are advisers. But some officials think most of the advisers should now be withdrawn.

“We’ve done all we can,” one official said. “If they want to get the VCI, they can do it. We can’t do anything more.”

______________________

The Chairman.  Senator Symington.

Senator Symington.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Colby, it is good to see you, sir.

Mr. Colby.  It is nice to see you again, Senator.

MR. COLBY’S EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM

Senator Symington.  In my opinion, you are one of the outstanding public servants that I have known, and I have always gotten a lot of information from you when we have discussed matters.

When did you first go to Vietnam?

Mr. Colby.  In February 1959, Senator.

Senator Symington.  In what capacity?

Mr. Colby.  I was the deputy to the Special Assistant to the Ambassador, American Embassy.

Senator Symington.  You were a CIA representative at that time?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  And when did you leave?

Mr. Colby.  I left there in the summer of 1962, Senator, and came back to the United States where I became the Chief of the Far East Division of the CIA.

Senator Symington.  Did you go back?

Mr. Colby.  I visited Vietnam once or twice a year in those years when I was in that job.

Senator Symington.  When did you leave the CIA to take this job?

Mr. Colby.  I left the CIA at the end of January 1968, and went out to Vietnam, first to take a job as assistant chief of staff of CORDS and later to succeed to the position of deputy to the commander for CORDS.

Senator Symington.  Mr. Robert Komer had this job once, didn’t he?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, sir; he left in early November 1968.

Senator Symington.  And he was sent out by the President?

Mr. Colby.  By the President; yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  Who sent you out? {p.28}

Mr. Colby.  Well, my assignment came up in the course of a discussion between Mr. Helms and the President, I believe.

Senator Symington.  President Johnson?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  And, as a result of that, you went out in the early part of 1968?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  And you have been on this job ever since?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, sir.

LESSONS LEARNED IN VIETNAM

Senator Symington.  In your statement, you say—

Would you enlarge on your thinking on that?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, sir.

I think the lesson we have learned is that we must involve the people in a war and that they will not support or assist an effort unless it is something that they believe in, that they have a part of. This lesson — that it must trust its people — is one which, I believe, the Vietnamese Government has learned also. The best example of that, I think, was the distribution of weapons to the Self Defense forces which are composed of ordinary citizens in local communities.

It is also represented by the Vietnamese Government’s decision to make the Phung Hoang or Phoenix program a public program, to expose it so that the whole public could know about it, and participate in it to protect themselves against terrorists. The foundation of the effort has to be a mass, popular effort.

Senator Symington.  With great respect, when I was out there in early 1967 and late 1967 there was the same amount of optimism about the program, but it did not work out that way, and I imagine that is one of the reasons they sent you.

Mr. Colby.  I would not say that, Senator, by any means. But I think the point that my statement makes is that we have not found any solution at the end of the trail. We have been gradually learning more and more about this.

REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES

Senator Symington.  In your statement you say:

Et cetera, et cetera, and then you say—

Mr. Colby.  Since early 1968, that is.

Senator Symington.  So they now total approximately 475,000 men. What did they total before then?

Mr. Colby.  They were about 30,000, a little over. They have been increased about 150,000 in the past couple of years.

Senator Symington.  Then you say the Communists have identified it clearly as a major threat, a start toward a true people’s army.

Mr. Colby.  This is a people’s self-defense force. In their resolution No. 9 of the central office, South Vietnam, for instance, the Commu- {p.29} nists singled this out as a very dangerous program that could be a threat to them in the future.

Senator Symington.  Inasmuch as the Ky government, now the Thieu-Ky government, was fighting for its life all during these years, why do you think it took them so long to understand that this should be done in order to handle the problem?

Mr. Colby.  Well, I think it began to be learned in 1967, Senator. Some of the programs began to be put together in 1968. Prior to 1967, of course, things were pretty confused out there, with the changes in governments and that sort of thing.

POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Symington.  During my visit out there in 1966, there were three people who were highly talked about by our people. One was a general, one was a village chief south of Danang, and the other was a Major Mai. Did you know him?

Mr. Colby.  I did; yes.

Senator Symington.  I went back there a year later and the general and Major Mai had been removed for political purposes, and the village chief had been killed. Has that type and character of opposition stopped?

Mr. Colby.  I think we have not had similar problems of that nature in recent times. I am not saying that political difference might not arise in the future between some of them, It could happen.

Senator Symington.  As I remember, Major Mai was in charge, in effect, of Vung Tau.

Mr. Colby.  He was; yes.

Senator Symington.  And he was removed by General Ky and ended up as an interpreter with us for the Korean Army.

Mr. Colby.  Yes.

Senator Symington.  Is he still there?

Mr. Colby.  He is still there.

Senator Symington.  If a man has that obvious ability, why don’t they use him, instead of keeping him, in effect, in exile?

Mr. Colby.  I don’t know the basis for it, but I think they thought that he was developing a political apparatus of his own with the cadre there. His successor, Lieutenant Colonel Be, has been there since. He has been a very forceful speaker against corruption and against many other things in the national government. He has been the leader of a very strong policy for those people.

He is trusted by the Government despite the kinds of remarks he makes, which do not sound like just praise for the Government, by any means. He has been fully supported in the position by the President and by the Prime Minister. He was given full authority to run the training program of village chiefs.

Senator Symington.  Did he replace Mai?

Mr. Colby.  He replaced Mai.

Senator Symington.  And is Colonel Be still there?

Mr. Colby.  He is still there.

Senator Symington.  Thank you. {p.30}

SELECTIVE ASSASSINATION, 1967 AND 1968

You say in your statement that during 1969, for example, over 6,000 were killed in terrorist incidents, and over 1,200 in selective assassination. What were the figures in 1968 and 1967 of selective assassinations?

Mr. Colby.  I cannot answer the questions right offhand. I think I might be able to find it for you.

Senator Symington.  Will you please supply it for the record.

(The information referred to follows.)

______________________

Selective assassinations for 1967 are only available from 1 Oct. to 31 Dec. The total for this three-month period is 624. For 1968 there were 1,743; however, no figures were available during February.

______________________

Mr. Colby.  The 1968 figures are incomplete because we do not include the period of Tet, the February figure. There is 1 month for which the figure was just not obtainable.

Senator Symington.  Are those the times when they went into a village, and picked people and killed them? Is that what selective assassination means?

Mr. Colby.  Yes, a directed assassination against a specific official rather than a grenade going off in a marketplace.

ABILITY TO DEFEAT GUERRILLA WARFARE

Senator Symington.  In the fall of 1966, General Dayan went out to Vietnam for some weeks, and then wrote several articles, one of which I read in the paper here. In it he said if the North Vietnamese and Vietcong turned to guerrilla warfare it would not be possible for us to defeat them — this from one of the most experienced and able guerrilla fighters in the world today, based on the record.

Why do you think he felt that way about it?

Mr. Colby.  I think he was referring at that time to the fact that most of our efforts were in the conventional warfare field, and he was making the usual criticism that a guerrilla force is very difficult for regular forces to stop.

I think that is one of the real changes in the situation. The government is developing its own guerrilla force with mass popular participation in the effort by the self-defense and other groups in the country and strong advocacy of local government, letting people elect their own leadership.

TRAN NGOC CHAU

Senator Symington.  Didn’t Tran Ngoc Chau replace Mai?

Mr. Colby.  Tran Ngoc Chau replaced Mai. He did for a time, yes. He had the overall charge of the cadre program.

Senator Symington.  You mentioned that Be did.

Mr. Colby.  Be is now the chief. He came in very shortly thereafter.