Nomination of William E. Colby

 

Nomination of William E. Colby to be Director of Central Intelligence

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Friday, July 20, 1973

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:35 p.m., in room 235, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington (acting chairman).

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), and Nunn.

Also present: John T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; John A. Goldsmith, Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; Doris Connor, clerical assistant; and Katherine Nelson, assistant to Senator Symington.

Senator Stuart Symington.  The hearing will come to order.

Is Mr. Adams here?

Senator Nunn, you said that you had some questions.

Senator Nunn.  I just have a few more, Mr. Chairman.

I just got a copy of the supplemental statement.

Mr. Adams.  Sir, I wonder if in deference to the committee I might clear up three points that I think came up in this morning’s testimony, sir, very briefly.

Senator Symington.  Let’s see what you have to say first. ¶

Have you got any statement there you would like to make? ¶

That is our standard rule.

Mr. Adams.  Scribbled notes.

Senator Symington.  No volunteer statements; you have to show it to us 24 hours before.

Mr. Adams.  Scribbled notes.

Senator Symington.  Then will you just supply it for the record, because we have other witnesses that we want to question.

Mr. Adams.  Very well.

Senator Sam Nunn.  In the supplementary statement which I have now gotten, you say:

Who told you that?

Mr. Adams.  The paper was killed about a day or so after I handed it in. In other words, I was told that the typed paper would never see the light of day. ¶

That came from several sources. ¶

The threat of firing {p.72} came the day after I handed the paper in. ¶

It was by Mr. Harold Ford, I believe.

Senator Nunn.  Harold Ford?

Mr. Adams.  That’s right.

Senator Nunn.  Why was he going to fire you? Did he say?

Mr. Adams.  The way it was phrased, he said, ¶

Senator Nunn.  What was that 40-page report? I am not at all clear on it from your statement. ¶

Was it taking issue with the previous report that the Agency had made?

Mr. Adams.  Well, the previous Khmer Communist order of battle, as I mentioned in paragraph 1 there, was a ring of 5,000 to 10,000. ¶

And where that had originally come from was the Cambodian G-2, that is, the Cambodian Government intelligence. And they came up with this ring right after the coup which overthrew Sihanouk in March 1970. ¶

And the U.S. intelligence when asked how many Cambodian Communist soldiers there were, we said there were 5,000 to 10,000. ¶

Nobody ever questioned or even looked at the number. ¶

And what happened was that I sat down in May of 1971 and discovered that this number had never been looked at before, and thereupon drew together all available evidence concerning the size of the Cambodian Communist military structure. ¶

I wrote this 40-page paper which came to the conclusion that the number was not 5,000 to 10,000 as the official order of battle put it but 100,000 to 150,000.

Senator Nunn.  What I don’t understand, are you saying that the CIA doesn’t want their analysts to in any way critique previous reports?

Mr. Adams.  I am saying that it happened in this particular case, they didn’t like the finding that I had come up with.

Senator Nunn.  Has that ever happened to you before?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn.  You mean you simply submit a finding, and if they don’t like it they say they are going to fire you?

Mr. Adams.  Well, that is the first time they have ever said they were going to fire me. ¶

In August 1966, I looked for the first time at the Vietcong order of battle, which at that time was listed as 275,000 men. ¶

I discovered that the Vietcong order of battle was divided into four parts, and that three of the four parts had not been looked at for a period of some years. ¶

I looked at the three neglected parts and came to the conclusion that the overall order of battle was not 275,000, but 600,000. ¶

And I discovered in the last part of 1966, that is, from August on, that every paper I wrote on the subject was killed. ¶

So I had had some previous experience with this kind of business. ¶

And then eventually the CIA came to accept the findings I had made in 1966.

Senator Nunn.  Who was pushing the 10,000 to 30,000 figure? Do you know anybody that had a reason for pushing it? What is the motive behind this? I don’t seem to know what the motive would be.

Mr. Adams.  I believe that there was a motive — of course, I can’t really tell the motive, because I am not the person that did this, but my suspicion is that, point one, there was embarrassment on the part of the CIA research hierarchy that they had not looked at the size of the Cambodian Communist structure for a period of some 15 months, never even looked at it. And the reason that they assigned this number {p.73} of 10,000 to 30,000 was that it is not that much dissimilar from the old number, the 5,000 to 10,000, it just looks like there is a gradual rise.

Senator Nunn.  Who was the person that said they were going to fire you now because of this report?

Mr. Adams.  His name was Mr. Harold Ford.

Senator Nunn.  Is he still with the agency?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir. I don’t think, however, that he was the one who—

Senator Nunn.  Initiated that? Who do you think was the one who initiated that? Do you have any way of knowing?

Mr. Adams.  I have no way of knowing that. I have had a number of run-ins with the research hierarchy. ¶

My suspicion was that it would be Mr. Edward Proctor, who runs the research department of the CIA, or his deputy, Mr. Paul Walsh.

Senator Nunn.  On the other subject, on page 3 of this — of course you don’t have the same page number, I suppose — you say:

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn.  A day or so later he told me that Mr. Colby, then the CIA Executive Director, had said vis-a-vis my complaint, ¶

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn.  I don’t know whether that is good or bad. I don’t know what he meant by that. ¶

Do you have any idea what he meant? Did you put that in here? Does that mean he wants another investigation?

Mr. Adams.  I believe that they intended, or at least the idea was, that this was going to be some kind of an investigation. But as far as I am concerned it never came about.

Senator Nunn.  It sounds like to me Mr. Colby ordered an investigation, and let the chips fall where they may.

Mr. Adams.  The way I put it in, it sounds very good, let the chips fall where they may.

Senator Nunn.  This is in effect complimentary to him.

Mr. Adams.  It would be complimentary to him if something happened after that. ¶

But apparently there was no investigation which transpired after he made this remark.

Senator Nunn.  Are you saying that is his fault, if he gives an order and it is not carried out? ¶

With the details he has on his mind, do you think that he can follow through that closely on everything? ¶

I am just wondering whether this is an overall criticism of him or whether it is complimentary. ¶

I am a little puzzled.

Mr. Adams.  I am saying, what I meant to portray here was, he had made this remark, let the chips fall where they may, but there was no investigation of what I was trying to get investigated as far as I could tell, and the only two chips that fell were on me. ¶

First, the report of my having a complaint went out to the prosecution and they tried to portray me, the prosecution did, as a chronic complainer. ¶

And second, in March of 1973, I was told that I was about to get the sack.

Senator Nunn.  That was how long after the first time you were told you were going to be fired? {p.74}

Mr. Adams.  Let me see. The first time—

Senator Nunn.  June of 1971.

Mr. Adams.  June of 1971.

And then it came around again in March of 1973.

Senator Nunn.  Which was about 2 years later.

Mr. Adams.  About 2 years later. There were a couple of interim threats, however.

Senator Nunn.  What were they related to? Was that some other document you submitted?

Mr. Adams.  They seemed to be closely related to this whole matter of the Khmer Communist order of battle. I kept complaining that the things had been, the way I put it, hoaxed or fabricated.

Senator Nunn.  But you are not saying that Mr. Colby had anything to do with that?

Mr. Adams.  No, sir. I am not. I am making the observation, however, that he was aware that at least somebody had made allegations concerning the fabrication, and that nothing happened thereafter except those two chips falling.

Senator Nunn.  Was Mr. Helms the head of the CIA then?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, he was until February 1973.

Senator Nunn.  Was he aware of that, do you think?

Mr. Adams.  I think he probably was, yes. Helms had also been involved—

Senator Nunn.  What was your exact job?

Mr. Adams.  Primarily just analyzing, sir.

Senator Nunn.  And how many people did you have under you?

Mr. Adams.  It ranged — ordinarily I was working by myself, but I had at one time as many as three people working for me.

Senator Nunn.  How many were over you? Were you at the bottom of the pole?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, I was at the bottom of the heap.

Senator Nunn.  How many people would be on your level in the CIA?

Mr. Adams.  Most of the CIA would be on my level, I mean Indians.

Senator Nunn.  How many of them submitted these counter memorandums? Was this an unusual thing?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir; it is very unusual. I would point out that when I wrote the memorandum which said that the CIA order of battle was not 5,000 to 10,000 but 100,000 to 150,000, that suggested an error of between 1,000 and 3,000 percent, which is pretty big.

Senator Nunn.  Was that your responsibility? Was that part of your responsibility, to review that?

Mr. Adams.  It would have come within the charter I had for the paper I was writing at that time. If somebody asked me, why the dickens were you doing that, I would wave a piece of paper about and say, here is why.

Senator Nunn.  Did you have any discussions with your superior about this? Did you tell us you were frustrated because obviously there was an error being made?

Mr. Adams.  Yes sir.

Senator Nunn.  That is what the memorandum said?

Mr. Adams.  Frequently, yes, I pointed out a number of times—

Senator Nunn.  What was his response to that? Did he say, mind {p.75} your own business, did he say go ahead and write a memorandum? Was this memorandum written contrary to the wishes of your superior?

Mr. Adams.  No, sir. It wasn’t necessarily contrary to the wishes of my superior. He didn’t know I was writing it until I handed it in.

Senator Nunn.  To him?

Mr. Adams.  To his deputy, who was also above me.

Senator Nunn.  To the Ellsberg trial for a minute. As I read your statement:

Mr. Adams.  That is correct.

Senator Nunn.  Were you suggesting here that it was the previous conflict 2 years prior to that that was still kindling that was causing the possibility of your being terminated?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir. I am suggesting that. ¶

The reason is that this memorandum I wrote in June of 1971 was really an opening gun, because I wrote several other memorandums after that which indicated exactly the same thing. ¶

For example, when this analyst who had been assigned the number 10 to 30,000 came out with a memorandum in November 1971 indicating there was 15 to 30,000—

Senator Nunn.  Who was this? Have you got his name?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir, I do. I would prefer if I could, because I am not sure whether he is under cover or not, to give you—

Senator Nunn.  Would you furnish that, and we can determine whether it ought to be a matter of the public record or not.

Mr. Adams.  Fine, I will, sir.

Senator Nunn.  Thank you.

Mr. Adams.  After he came out with this paper I wrote a lengthy criticism of his official paper which became the official order of battle, pointing out that he had used many of the same techniques in devising the order of battle that the military assistance command — that is, MACV, had used prior to the Tet Offensive. ¶

I had been in a considerable fight at that time before the Tet Offensive, pointing out that the enemy order of battle then was way too low, and in fact when the offensive hit, large numbers of units which showed up in the middle of Saigon and other South Vietnamese cities had never been in the order of battle. ¶

Then I was afraid that that kind of thing was going to recur.

Senator Nunn.  Was this analyst that gave this 15,000 to 30,000 figure on your level, so to speak?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir, so to speak.

Senator Nunn.  So you were two at the same level challenging each other, is that right?

Mr. Adams.  I wouldn’t say challenging each other, but we were both at the same level, yes, sir.

Senator Nunn.  Do you think he was the one that was instigating your termination or firing?

Mr. Adams.  Oh, absolutely not, sir. He is a good friend.

Senator Nunn.  Someone up the line was? {p.76}

Mr. Adams.  Somewhere up the line, I imagine it would probably be either the head of research or his deputy.

Senator Nunn.  And the reason that you would surmise that is because they had been using this erroneous information, and they didn’t want to correct it because it would be admitting that they would be wrong?

Mr. Adams.  I think that is part of it. And one of the reasons that they could get away with this thing, I think, is that I feel that the administration perhaps — I don’t want to lay too much blame on the administration — would not—

Senator Nunn.  They are accustomed to it, I think.

Mr. Adams.  At any rate, if an analyst comes out with a low number, the administration is not to go about beating him on the head and have him raise the number. ¶

In other words, administration policy vis-a-vis Cambodia is — at least at that time, and I think it continues more or less this way — the bad guys in Cambodia are Vietnamese, and if you come up with a big Cambodian army, this tends to disapprove the underpinnings of our policy. ¶

Are you with me?

Senator Nunn.  I am with you.

Mr. Adams.  Thank you, sir.

Senator Nunn.  On this Ellsberg trial, then your testimony there didn’t really have much to do with the fact that you were threatened to be fired, is that right?

Mr. Adams.  No, sir, it had to do with my questioning of or rather my doubts about the honesty of some testimony of a prosecution witness, one General Deputy. And he was saying that release of certain statistics by Ellsberg was detrimental to the national security of the United States. The statistics included the order of battle statistics of the 1967 period. And I knew, because I had worked on this at the time, that those had been fabricated, too. And my question was whether it was a Federal crime on the part of Ellsberg to release fabricated statistics.

Senator Nunn.  You said they had been fabricated. You mean they are erroneous, or did you know that someone with a motive had falsified them?

Mr. Adams.  I believe that someone with a motive had falsified them. I have been trying ever since then to find out who was.

Senator Nunn.  You don’t know?

Mr. Adams.  No, sir, I have been trying to get an investigation going to see who it was before the Tet Offensive that was the case of fabricating the statistics. I tried in December 1972 to get an Army investigation going and failed.

Senator Nunn.  Is this due to the CIA analyst again, or is it primarily the military intelligence?

Mr. Adams.  It is primarily the military intelligence, yes, sir. The CIA was conscious of the fabrication and went along with it at the time.

Senator Nunn.  You say they were conscious of the fabrication. How do you know?

Mr. Adams.  Because I told them.

Senator Nunn.  You told them?

Mr. Adams.  The CIA hierarchy.

Senator Nunn.  So if they believed you they were conscious of it. {p.77}

Mr. Adams.  Well, they came to believe me, because after the Tet Offensive they used my figures.

Senator Nunn.  So what you are telling us is that in your opinion if the CIA is convinced that they are wrong, even if one of their own people tells them, that they are not willing to make any changes because they would be saying that they were wrong, and it would be contrary to policy?

Mr. Adams.  I wouldn’t say that of the whole CIA, but perhaps to some individuals in the CIA. My problem is, I don’t know who is responsible for this kind of stuff, so I find it very difficult to make a broad statement on it.

Senator Nunn.  You said a minute ago you thought it was someone in the research division.

Mr. Adams.  That’s correct. Yes.

Senator Nunn.  Mr. Colby is not in this division, is he?

Mr. Adams.  No, sir. But it could be — and I could never find out about things like this — it could be that the director himself was aware of this. Now, I know that Helms had been aware of the fabrication that went on of statistics back in 1967.

Senator Nunn.  How do you know that?

Mr. Adams.  Because I was working in his office at the time.

Senator Nunn.  You might tell us a little bit about that. It is a pretty serious charge. He is not here.

Mr. Adams.  In 1967 I was working in the CIA under an officer called Special Assistant to Vietnamese Affairs, which is an office directly under Helms. And I was an analyst within this office. It is a small one, and perhaps has a dozen or so people. From 1966, until a few days before the Tet Offensive. I had been pushing for higher numbers to describe the size of the Viet Cong Army. In other words, I thought it was bigger than the official statistics said it was. There was a series of order of battle conferences over findings that I had made in August 1966, which suggested that the OB was a larger figure. Starting, I believe, somewhere around June or July 1967, the order came down from the MAV hierarchy to its order of battle section that they were to try and keep the order of battle willy-nilly under the number of 300,000.

Senator Nunn.  The order came from where?

Mr. Adams.  This I have never been able to ascertain, where it came from.

Senator Nunn.  Did you see the order?

Mr. Adams.  I heard about the order. I saw it reported in a cable within the CIA, that the Army wanted to keep the number below 300,000.

Senator Nunn.  The Army gave the directions for this to be kept?

Mr. Adams.  Yes; the Army was responsible.

Senator Nunn.  The Army was telling the CIA what they wanted to report?

Mr. Adams.  In essence, yes. And the question was, it seems to me, whether the CIA was willing to accept the Army’s number.

Senator Nunn.  What month was this?

Mr. Adams.  Well, there was a series of fights, and it was really June 1967 through September 1967. And in September 1967, we threw in the {p.78} sponge and said, yes, we would accept the Army number, or something very close to it, not exactly it.

Senator Nunn.  Did you go along with that?

Mr. Adams.  No: I raised the roof.

Senator Nunn.  To whom?

Mr. Adams.  To, first, in a series of memoranda that went to the Director, to the head of the research, to the head of Economic Research, and a number of other offices, and to the head of the Board of National Estimates. I later went to the CIA Inspector General. I also complained to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. And I also complained to the National Security Council staff. And then in, I think it was February or March of 1969, they threw in the sponge.

Senator Nunn.  You did a lot of complaining?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn.  Did anybody agree with you in the whole CIA?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn.  And have you got names?

Mr. Adams.  I have. But I would like to submit them if I could—

Senator Nunn.  You do have people that agree with your analysis?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn.  And agree with your allegation of falsification and fabrication. I think that you said?

Mr. Adams.  I don’t know whether they would characterize it as that, but I think that they would certainly go along with the facts — a lot of people, would go along with the facts as I present them; yes, sir.

Senator Nunn.  And is there a reason you don’t want to give it in public?

Mr. Adams.  Well, I hesitate to do that, because I am on the hook with a secrecy agreement, and I don’t want to put my neck on the chopping block now.

Senator Nunn.  Are some of these people still with the CIA?

Mr. Adams.  Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn.  When did you terminate with the CIA?

Mr. Adams.  June 1973, was when my resignation became effective.

Senator Nunn.  And were you not fired?

Mr. Adams.  I was not fired; no, sir.

Senator Nunn.  But you were still under the threat of being fired, or had that threat subsided?

Mr. Adams.  No, sir. It was on the 19th of March 1973, when I was told that I was going to be terminated, orally, that I would get a written notification shortly thereafter.

Senator Nunn.  And who told you that?

Mr. Adams.  A Mr. Maurice Ernst told me that. And he said that I would get a written notification shortly thereafter, and the notification never showed up. In the meantime I was raising quite a stink, because I said that I thought that the reason I would be fired was because of the Cambodian Communist order of battle. Also, it occurred to me — and this was almost a form of paranoia — that after the Ellsberg break that maybe somebody in the White House had sent the word to put the whammy on me. And so I sent a memo to the Director asking him, hey, was it the White House—

Senator Nunn.  How many people sent these memos? I don’t know how the Director had time to read all your memos. {p.79}

Mr. Adams.  He very seldom got memos from me. He did for a little bit after I was trying to find out who put me on the termination list. What he did generally was to send it over to the legal counsel’s office; in fact, the guy that used to write me is sitting right back there, his name is — I don’t know, he was there this morning — his name is John Green. And he had my account. And I would send a memo to the Director. And I said something to the effect, Director, was it the White House or was it you that put me on this list? And the first memo I got back, not from the Director but from the legal counsel’s office, said, you are not on the list at all.

Senator Nunn.  And you kept trying to find out who was trying to fire you?

Mr. Adams.  And then I said, that wasn’t the question I asked. I asked who put me on the list. And he kept saying, you are not on it anymore.

Senator Nunn.  I am a little bit puzzled. If you were going to be fired and that threat subsided, how did you find it out? Everytime you sent a memo asking who was firing you it looks like it would jeopardize your job that much more.

Mr. Adams.  I was annoyed, because I don’t like to be threatened as I was, and I wanted to find out who did it. So the next time I went to the Inspector General.

Senator Nunn.  So you had sort of a corollary investigation going as to who was trying to fire you for almost 2 years, didn’t you?

Mr. Adams.  No; I didn’t really start trying to find out directly until May 1973, this year. I think it was April or May 1973, asking who it was that was sticking me on this list all the time, or had stuck me on the list.

Senator Nunn.  What made you finally decide to leave?

Mr. Adams.  I think it was — as I put it in my letter of resignation — a sort of longstanding dismay over the fact that I thought that those statistics were being faked all the time.

And, incidentally, I would like to mention something, if I could, at the moment, that Senator Symington in questioning me brought up the term “disgruntled employee.” I don’t consider myself a disgruntled employee, because I think the CIA performs a very useful mission. I wouldn’t even mind going back there, as absurd as it sounds. But I simply got sick of faked statistics. And I was hoping that the CIA would get back to its job, what I think, of telling the truth.

Senator Nunn.  None of this relates directly — you don’t have any direct criticism of Mr. Colby, you are talking really about the whole CIA basically?

Mr. Adams.  Yes; but this morning’s testimony, and particularly my statement this morning, was about Phoenix—

Senator Nunn.  I know that part of it. But these memoranda you were sending back and forth, and so forth, you are not alleging Mr. Colby tried to get you fired, because you were bringing them out?

Mr. Adams.  I could never find out who it was. Mr. Colby at the time was Executive Director.

Senator Nunn.  It could have been anybody from your level, right on up to the top?

Mr. Adams.  Yes; I tend to think it was more in the hierarchy than the lower-archy. {p.80}

Senator Nunn.  The hierarchy?

I would like very much if you could give counsel those names that you referred to. I’ve got to go vote.

The hearing will resume when either Senator Symington or I get back.

Mr. Adams, we appreciate very much your coming and testifying. And that will be all. We will have the next witness when we got back.

Mr. Adams.  Thank you.

Senator Nunn.  Mr. Sakwa will be the next witness. And that will be in approximately 15 or 20 minutes.

[Recess.]

[Mr. Samuel A. Adams’ statement follows:]

______________________

INTRODUCTION

My name is Samuel A. Adams. I resigned from the Central Intelligence Agency on 1 June 1973. My resignation stemmed from dismay over what I thought was the sloppy and often dishonest way U.S. intelligence conducted research on the struggle in Indochina. An example of the shortcomings, I believe, was the manner in which U.S. intelligence produced reports on the political and administrative agencies of the Viet Cong. These agencies, sometimes called the “infrastructure”, were the target of the Allied Phoenix Program. The Phoenix Program was overseen at one time by Mr. Colby, a candidate to receive the CIA’s Directorship.

Seven of my ten years at the Agency were devoted to research on our adversaries in Indochina. My reports included an extensive study on the Viet Cong police system, a treatise on Communist subversive agents in the South Vietnamese Army and police, and an examination of the Viet Cong’s covert structure in South Vietnamese territory. In 1970, I wrote a lengthy study entitled “Guide to a Viet Cong Province.” which the CIA uses as its standard field handbook on the Communists in South Vietnam. For about five years I gave the Agency’s training course on the Viet Cong to CIA case officers bound for Vietnam.

I respectfully submit the following statement to your committee.

PREFACE

The Phoenix Program is an example of a sound concept gone awry. It was meant to destroy the Communists’ political apparatus, but it has not done so, and the Viet Cong are in the middle of a resurgence throughout South Vietnam. Although the country’s surface looks peaceful enough (at least compared to the last few years) the appearance is deceiving. Beneath the surface of the South Vietnamese government, the unravelling is well along.

THE THEORY OF PHOENIX

Phoenix was conceived when the Allies’ main weapons in South Vietnam were American warplanes, and heavily-armed battalions whose mission was to “search and destroy”. The weapons were bludgeons, which all too often failed to discriminate between the enemy soldier and the innocent bystander. More important, they were virtually useless against the Viet Cong political cadre, who, it came to be realized, was just as dangerous as the Viet Cong warrior.

Phoenix was designed to fill the gap. Copied from a British concept which had succeeded in Malaya, the Phoenix Program was meant to replace the bludgeon with a scalpel. They key to the operation was precise targetting. Instead of bombs — which killed large numbers of civilians in addition to the occasional political operative — Phoenix’s main tools, theoretically, were good intelligence and good flies. The object of the program was to find out who among the Vietnamese population were Viet Cong cadres, and to arrest or kill them. In theory, arrests were preferable to assassinations, because a prisoner could lead to further arrests, and a cadaver led nowhere.

In order to work, the Phoenix Program had basic needs. These are five of the most important:

1. A clear perception of the nature and organization of the target. {p.81}

2. Good intelligence concerning the names, the whereabouts, and the activities of the people who belong to it.

3. A tight, well-run police organization, with secure flies, with the ability to keep close track of the population, and with a high state of training and morale.

4. An efficient and fair judicial system, with stout prisons and a rehabilitation program which could turn rebels into citizens.

5. Most important, popular support.

The trouble with Phoenix, and the reason it didn’t work, was that its needs, although recognized in theory, were never fulfilled in practice. The diverse between hope and reality became so wide that the program degenerated into a game of statistics, in which numbers were paramount, and the object of the exercise — the crippling of the Communist Party — was never even approached. I will deal with the needs one by one.

THE PERCEPTION OF THE TARGET

When United States troops first landed in force in Vietnam in early 1965, we were abysmally ignorant of the nature of the threat. It was thought that the application of enough military force by the U.S. would eventually compel the Communists to lay off. But they didn’t, and the introduction of each new American battalion only seemed to get us in deeper than we already were. Finally the Tet offensive demonstrated the Viet Cong’s ability to get large numbers of troops into South Vietnamese urban areas without detection and parred U.S. intelligence into the realization that the Communists had something there besides an army. The Phoenix program — which had existed in one form or another for several years began to take serious shape.

The initial problem was that the basic research on the nature of the adversary and of his organization was either undone or misunderstood. When the time came to designate a target for the Phoenix organization to aim at the most readily available entity was something U.S. intelligence called the “infrastructure”, a catchall phrase long used to describe the non-military portion of the Viet Cong organization. Unfortunately, the Communists themselves had no such term, and U.S. intelligence had no precise definition of what it included. It did have a number, however, 29,173. which had remained the same from June 1965 up until the eve of the Tet offensive. Although the number changed after Tet — it has ranged since then from 60,000 to 90,000 — the definitional problem was never cleared up. As a result, no one knows even now who belongs to the “infrastructure”, and the number given out officially in the sum of guesses from the field, made by people who have varying ideas of what they are counting. It is conceivable, using the loosely-defined official criteria, that we could say the “infrastructure” was anywhere from 10,000 to a quarter of a million strong.

A salient problem of who to count arose from the fact that for some time the Viet Cong’s covert operatives in South Vietnamese territory were not included in the official lists. Thus a spy in Thieu’s office — there was one — would be excluded from the “infrastructure” because he failed to fit the official U.S. definition. The problem was compounded because of the reluctance on the part of U.S. intelligence to look into the matter of Viet Cong subversion. For example, in May 1969. the CIA Chief of Station for Saigon indicated on a visit to Washington his belief that the Viet Cong had only 200 agents in the South Vietnamese government. He spoke from ignorance. An in-depth research study going on at the same time suggested the real number of such agents was more like 30,000.

The question of the Communists’ covert presence in South Vietnamese territory became particularly vexing after the coup in Cambodia in March, 1970. When it occurred, most of the Communists’ army in the southern half of South Vietnam left for duty next door, and large numbers of Viet Cong cadres in Vietnam’s Delta shifted from Viet Cong to South Vietnamese territory, often by defection through Chieu Hoi centers. The ensuing quiet in the Delta — along with an apparent increase in the enemy defection rates — gave rise to optimism among American officials in Vietnam, including those who manned the Phoenix program.

PRECISE INTELLIGENCE

Although hard intelligence on the names, whereabouts and doings of Communist cadres is much sought after, it is very hard to come by Allied files bulge with information of this sort, but in the vast majority of cases it is either false or incomplete. Things have improved since the early days of Phoenix when opera- {p.82} tions against specific targets were almost nonexistant. But the improvements have been marginal, and the latest report from the field suggest the situation is getting worse instead of better. In any case, the type of person “neutralized” by Phoenix is about the same as it always was; they are mostly low-level and of little consequence. The hard-core Party member is still un-caught.

WELL-RUN POLICE

The South Vietnamese National Police and Military Security Service — both of which work for Phoenix — are better now than they were, say, in 1966. But the base was so low that it is difficult to conceive that they could have gotten worse.

The problem here is much more complicated than simply low morale, (which recent reports suggest is endemic among the South Vietnamese constabulary). The most trying aspect of the situation is the Viet Cong’s continued penetration of the South Vietnamese security apparatus. Captured documents indicate that many hundreds of South Vietnamese policemen are in reality Viet Cong agents. The penetrations occur at all levels. A government roll-up which took place in northern South Vietnam in 1971 show the dimensions of the problem. Among those reportedly apprehended as Viet Cong agents were the chief of police of Da Nang city. The chief of the police Special Branch, and his assistant for operations, and the chief of police for I Corps. The first three were jailed. The last, after evidence proved insufficient for conviction, was reputedly transferred to Saigon as a police advisor to the Phoenix program.

Although the American advisory effort to Phoenix contained no Viet Cong agents, it often was of questionable help. One of its main shortcomings was the ignorance of most advisors of the Viet Cong target. Prior to August, 1968, the average CIA case officer received no training what so ever in the organization and methods of operations of the Communist structure. Then, in late 1968, a training program started up which by the end of the year gave those bound for Vietnam 24 hours of instruction. This was rapidly cut back. The number of hours in the Viet Cong now given to CIA case officers going to Saigon is four.

An ancillary problem is the one of population control. Despite many attempts over the last five years, there is still no adequate ID card system in Vietnam, and large numbers of persons, particularly in the slums, roam about without the police knowing who they are. Likewise, the Phoenix system has yet devise as mundane a thing as a catalogue of fingerprints. If, say, the U.S. ambassador were killed tomorrow, and the gun was found which accomplished the killing, there would be no way to trace the assassin, from the prints on the gun.

THE MATTER OF PRISONS

South Vietnamese prisons continue to leak, although not as badly as a few years ago. Still, the average Viet Cong captive — unlike the common criminal — will likely go free within a few months. Again, one can point to improvements, but the basic problem remains that the accounting system which comes into play after a suspect’s arrest is so loose that it is often very difficult to tell what happens to him shortly thereafter. In several areas of Vietnam, at present, the system has broken down completely, so that Communist prisoners in these areas frequently fail to go to prison at all.

Furthermore, there is an almost complete lack of a rehabilitation system. The old saw that the most dedicated Vietnamese Communists have usually done time continues to have & ring of truth. Captured documents still show that those who leave South Vietnamese prisons frequently rejoin the Viet Cong organization after their release from jail.

POPULAR SUPPORT

But the biggest single drawback to the Phoenix program is that except in a few areas it lacks popular support. What this boils down to is the reluctance of the average South Vietnamese citizen to turn in a Viet Cong cadre when he encounters one. Whether the reluctance stems from fear or admiration of the Viet Cong, it amounts to the same thing. That is, the extraordinarily large Viet Cong apparatus continues its covert existence in South Vietnamese territory. {p.83}

SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT
BY SAMUEL A. ADAMS

NOTE

I would like to attach this supplement to my main statement. It has to do with Cambodia, and what I believe was the deliberate fabrication of statistics of the Khmer Communist Order of Battle by the CIA. I made allegations concerning the fabrication to the CIA Inspector General in December 1972, and I was told that Mr. Colby was aware of the allegations. As far as I can determine, no attempt was made to investigate the charges.

The circumstances of the fabrication are as follows:

1. The Khmer Communist Order of Battle, as put forth by U.S. intelligence between April 1970 and June 1971. was a range of from 5,000 to 10,000. The range remained constant during this period because no one within the U.S. intelligence community was looking into the matter.

2. In June 1971, I completed a memorandum, about 40 pages long, which was based on a review of all available evidence. Shortly after I handed the paper in, it was killed; I was threatened with firing, and told to work on weekends for the foreseeable future. I did so — that is I worked a seven-day week — throughout the summer of 1971. I would respectfully submit that this was a rare instance in which an intelligence analyst was punished during time of war for finding an enemy army.

3. Right after the paper was removed from my control, the job of researching the Communist OB in Cambodia was assigned to an analyst who had never worked on Cambodia, and who had never researched a combat OB. (By contrast, I had worked on Communist strength estimates for several years, often as the Agency’s only analyst on the matter.) The day the new analyst was given the job, he was also given a range to come up with — namely, 10,000-30,000. The analyst took five months to devise a way to come up with the assigned range. In November 1971, the CIA finally released its official OB. The number it came up with was a range of from 15,000-30,000, almost precisely the number the analyst had been given the previous June.

The present Khmer Communist (KC) Order of Battle approximately 50,000 — is derivative of the old number. I respectfully submit that it is extremely misleading, and greatly understates the strength of the Communist military organization in Cambodia. I would make the observation that U.S. intelligence currently asks us to believe that the Cambodian Government army of 200,000 outnumbers the KC army by four to one. Since Phnom Penh seems about to fall, I would respectfully suggest that the odds, as put forth by U.S. intelligence, are something of an anomaly.

I would note that I am in the process of laying out a more detailed account of what happened, which will include names, dates, and who did what to whom.

In any case, I submitted in December 1972 a detailed oral complaint to the CIA Inspector General (IG) on the matter. The IG official took lengthy notes on what I had to say. A day or so later, he told me that Mr. Colby, then the CIA’s Executive Director, had said vis-a-vis my complaint, “Let the chips fall where they may.”

As far as I can determine, only two things appeared to happen as a result of my complaints.

1. First, the Prosecution, during my testimony for the Defense at the Ellsberg trial brought the matter up to impeach my credibility as a witness. My trip to the CIA Inspector General was portrayed as the act of a chronic complainer.

2. Second, upon my return from the Ellsberg trial, I was informed orally that my employment at the CIA was about to be terminated. Although eventually the Agency backed down, I have reason to believe that the persons who proposed my termination were the same ones who were responsible for the fabrication of the Khmer Communist Order of Battle in 1971.

______________________

Senator Nunn [presiding].  The committee will reconvene.

And we have Mr. Sakwa, who will be our next witness.

Senator Symington will be back in just a few minutes.

Do you swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? {p.84}

Mr. Sakwa, do you want to be sworn in?

Mr. Sakwa.  I do.

Senator Nunn.  I believe you do have a prepared statement.

Statement of
Paul Sakwa,
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, I do, Senator.

Senator Nunn.  We would be delighted to have that.

Mr. Sakwa.  This is very brief. I have submitted a number of documents to the committee, and I didn’t want to spend the whole day reading them to you since you have them here.

My name is Paul Sakwa. I reside at 825 New Hampshire Avenue NW., in Washington, D.C. I was a CIA employee, in the clandestine services, from 1952 until 1962. At our Washington headquarters, from February 1959 until August 1961, I had responsibility for political, psychological, and paramilitary warfare operations, in the Far East Division, for Vietnam. When I left this position to join the staff of Deputy Director (Plans), my title was Chief, Covert Activity, Vietnam.

I ask, respectfully, that my memorandum of July 4, 1973, addressed to Mr. Woolsey of this committee staff on the subject of Mr. William E. Colby, be made a matter of record.

In this memorandum I state:

In the same memorandum, I cited the number identifications of 38 documents, plus the dates and titles of five memoranda which I wrote and addressed to the DDP, who then was Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

When I was informed by the committee staff that CIA could not locate my memoranda, addressed to Mr. Bissell, I gave copies to the committee. I ask, respectfully, that these memoranda be placed in the record. Names of those not involved in this hearing should be deleted, if I have not already done so.

Although I have indicated to Mr. Bissell that I could not account for Mr. Colby’s strange performance in Saigon, there is a possible explanation. I have no proof of this: An unofficial effort on the part of senior CIA officers to worsen the situation in South Vietnam so that a greater military presence would be justified and an early nuclear confrontation with Communist China might take place. Among others, Charles S. Whitehurst (Chief VCL) and possibly Desmond FitzGerald (Chief FE) were of this mentality.

I would like to add that regretfully Mr. FitzGerald is no longer alive, and of course cannot counter my interpretation of what he felt about Vietnam. I regret that.

I also submitted to the committee a critique of CIA which I wrote in 1962 and edited a bit in 1964.

I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to testify. And I would be happy to answer any questions.

[The document referred to follows:] {p.85}

______________________

PROBLEMS OF A CLANDESTINE AGENCY

(An Inside Critique by Paul Sakwa)

(Author’s note: Since the author has had extensive experience in the area discussed by this article he is writing under a pseudonym in order to avoid any possible embarrassment to the U.S. Government. Although this is a critique of a certain federal agency, it does not contain classified information. It was written in early 1962 and elaborated on slightly in 1964.)

INTRODUCTION

Inspired by the conviction that no outside group or individuals could obtain an accurate view of a certain Agency’s workings and problems without operational experience within the Agency itself, this article seeks to provide an inside critique.

In the Agency the arts of security, concealment and deception have been so highly refined and made almost instinctual that some of these practices have manifested themselves on official levels where truth and accuracy are a command necessity. The natural hostility of the other agencies which operate more openly compounds the universal bureaucratic tendency to thwart criticism. Psychological factors incline those totally absorbed with secret information to disdain other information. Ambitious men, driven to obtain more intelligence and more agents, become blinded to the purpose of operations. The compartmentation and secrecy required for very sensitive activities perverts personnel policies so that there is a tendency to offer assignments only to one’s friends.

Lacking a public record of achievement, a clandestine employee can hardly avoid becoming a prisoner of his job. In some instances the internal mechanism for handling grievances functions as does a Soviet trade union — promises are broken and discipline is enforced. This is a closed society if not a sealed one. Technical and craft requirements and the hypnotic fascination of clandestine (James Bond) techniques have given the technicians a predominant role, displacing men of political judgment in an activity where mistakes have the gravest policy consequences.

It could be maintained that any critique of the Agency can be refuted on the grounds that the author does not know all the facts. The reply to this is that no one knows all the facts, there has often been confusion between what constitutes absurdity or intelligence and those presently in control can hardly be expected to point the accusing finger at themselves. Facts exist and can be found by those who have access to the files and the persons concerned.

Until recent years there was in the Agency an atmosphere that encouraged daring, new ideas and objectivity. A residue of daring remains, a majority of the better men have left, and much of the remaining talent is busily engaged in avoiding responsibility and in ossifying their minds. Inter-agency struggles, internal political conflicts and an over-extended involvement in matters of foreign policy (a process begun during the Eisenhower Administration when there was a lack of policy) have made some men giddy with power and imbued them with self-righteousness. In 1962 about half the operations were useless if not counter-productive or just plain not worth the expense.

Paying for misinformation has consequences more serious than a mere waste of money. Those holding responsible positions on the middle and senior levels know that the present situation protects them from embarrassing inquiries and they naturally prefer the status quo. As a consequence many of them have not only lost some degree of objectivity but they have also become inordinately sensitive to the kind of criticism contained herein.

The Agency performs most of its operational functions with admirable professionality; its personnel are probably the most devoted if at times most misguided men in our government. Its deficiencies result in large measure from its very rapid growth, the pernicious byproducts of secrecy, the lack of coordination with other agencies and with the White House, and the lack of effective Congressional review. Cultural personal and operational factors influence political judgment; a ranking official with an old-fashioned banana company mentality simply will not cooperate in promoting peaceful social revolution in Latin America — and may even thwart such policies; a commander in the Cold {p.86} War with a counter-espionage mentality frequently cannot distinguish between a Democratic Socialist and a Marxist Communist. Even so-called positive operations are corrupted by the participation of professional anti-Communists who know what they are against but not what they are for. Granting that all agencies make mistakes, the task is to discover if the propensity to error has become a habit and also to create the checks and mechanism whereby most of the avoidable mistakes are indeed avoided.

Inasmuch as this article concentrates on the errors and mistakes inherent in the very nature of a clandestine agency to the exclusion of its accomplishments, it might produce the impression that the Agency is a bureaucratic morass devoid of any saving grace. This is not the case. The Agency still contains a high percentage of dedicated men and women whose main concern is the welfare of their country. In some areas pleasant informality persists. Moreover, the Agency treats its employees who suffer personal calamities — service or otherwise induced — with a humanity and consideration which might well be emulated elsewhere. Woe the heretic, however, who renounces this religion and leaves this order.

A CLOSED ORGANIZATION IN AN OPEN SOCIETY

By its very nature, a clandestine agency conceals its activities, including its mistakes. And all bureaucrats tend to avoid blame and responsibility, curry favor and, on occasion, accept credit for the work of others. However, since there is often more than a fair amount of resentment and official criticism directed at the Agency, the recipients of this antagonism are understandably reluctant to compound possible unfairness. In addition, any valid external criticism (valid only because it cites examples) suggests the possibility of a security leak. In this way security considerations, self-defense and misguided self-righteousness become unavoidably intermingled.

The pursuit of secret knowledge develops a “keyhole” frame of reference in the mind of the pursuer which severely limits his perspective. The narrow task of cultivating or handling an intelligence source allows little time for reflection or the assessment of an overall political situation. In the newer nations, where there may be close liaison relationships with high ranking members of a friendly government, biased reporting may result from adopting the political bias of one’s opposite numbers, and some foreign officials may come to believe that the Agency is a quicker and more effective channel to action in Washington. If the Agency concludes that there is no alternative to a particular policy or regime (suggesting some leader’s immortality and thus placing him and his regime in mortal jeopardy), there is an element of career risk involved in submitting reports or evaluations which contradict Agency policy.

The procurement and handling of secret knowledge fosters a feeling of omniscience and promotes an attitude of disdain for material from overt sources which could implement, support or question intelligence reports. The procedures designed to prevent outride scrutiny have become reverse barriers which in important instances screen out truth, objectivity and the possibility of sound judgment. Documents stamped SECRET tend to be regarded as necessarily true. Those charged with carrying out political operations also supervise the procurement of intelligence, which may reflect on the purpose and success of the same political operations. Even men of high dedication cannot easily allow the accuracy and thus the success of one activity to announce the failure of the other.

Here the lack of effective Executive and Congressional scrutiny prompts irresponsibility which results in initiating and continuing unnecessary operations. Empires are sometimes judged by their wealth, and a sensible reduction in a unit’s budget may complicate the obtaining of adequate funds at a later date. The performance of junior officers is evaluated on the basis of the number of agent recruitments and the number of intelligence disseminations. There is no record of an officer being promoted because he recommended the termination of a useless project.

Agency links with certain communications media may tend to influence American public opinion in both their operational and advertising functions.

Extreme security measures, overclassification of sensitive material, exaggerated use of compartmentation, the creation of special inter-agency units for the handling of sensitive material and composed of men who have not done their homework promote a kind of bureaucratic chauvinism and paranoia which, in turn, complicate or even prevent coordination in areas where responsibilities overlap. New channels often frustrate and block established and tested channels of policy formulation and action. The aura of secrecy induces an enjoyable {p.87} conspiratorial flavor while, at the same time, it breeds suspicion of capable officials who have the necessary clearance but are strangers. The keepers of secrets are not necessarily wise. At times they are even corrupted by them.

Clandestine operations involve modes of behavior which would be considered immoral within national boundaries. Such behavior becomes “realism” beyond our borders and, in the process, tends to promote indifference to moral and democratic values: there is a compulsive delight in activities wherein the breach of ethical behavior can be justified on patriotic grounds. Given a common enemy, the character and deportment of foreign contacts become almost unimportant considerations. Certain that the honor of Americans cannot be corrupted by foreign currencies, it is assumed that the services of foreigners — who have stature and integrity — can be purchased with dollars. The doctrinal procedures for hiring an intelligence source would present any intelligent foreigner With evidence of a lack of mutual trust, and working bonds of mutual interest become rather crude business relationships. The man who can be purchased works only for himself.

PERSONNEL: TECHNICIANS AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT

A clandestine technician is one who knows the mechanics of espionage according to established doctrine. His skill in this area is usually compensated by his inability to anticipate the political or other consequences of operational failure or success. He is to the Agency what a diesel engineer is to a steamship company: his services are essential, but bis perspective is limited. A petty security infraction may enrage him, while a blunder of some magnitude may evoke little concern provided that doctrinal requirements have been followed. A technician has an insatiable appetite for intelligence (sometimes propelled by unlimited requirements levied by other agencies). Quality must surrender to quantity, since he cannot judge the former. The process of identifying a useful piece of intelligence has been compared to the task of gleaning a diamond chip from a pile of broken glass. When everything has been reported, the Agency cannot lose.

To a considerable degree the need for covert political action is reduced in proportion to the improvement in the quality and consistency of American foreign policy. Even prior to this happy development, many political operations became merely a means of payment for the “intelligence” received from liaison sources. If the liaison source represented a corrupt, inefficient and unpopular government, subsidies and close relationships helped to sustain the regime in its disastrous direction, making the United States a partner in corruption and complicating later efforts at reform. If such regimes are under pressure by the American Ambassador to institute reforms, high level officials of the regime may find a sympathetic ear in the person of the ranking Agency officer present. In addition to the obvious confusion, some very weird intelligence reporting may result from the maintenance of this “vital” liaison.

Since the Cold War was the main justification for the creation and rapid expansion of the Agency and since the end of the Cold War (a prospect not easily exacted in 1962) would remove its raison d’être, there appears to be an unconscious bias favoring action which could aggravate what is mostly a political problem to the point where there is no choice but to adopt paramilitary measures. Impatience with sophisticated diplomacy and indirect political action follows from the fact that the enemy has many advantages in this game, as he has in conventional diplomacy. War is war, and in a war one does not question the character of one’s allies. What is often missing, however, is an understanding of the political and social factors which make internal subversion and warfare successful. The halo of strident anti-Communism blinds the cold warrior to the fact that his ally may have created and fostered the preconditions for successful internal conflict. In the process of buying affection we lose the respect of our allies and they may lose their territories.

The Agency’s operational area resembles the baronial system of 11th Century France: changes in command are referred to as a game of musical chairs. Senior officers who filled important slots ten years ago still retain the same or similar positions, interrupted at times with ours to the desirable foreign posts. In contrast, the Foreign Service retires some sixty to ninety men a year, mostly from the senior level. Perpetuating themselves in office and cultivating personal ties for over a decade, these officers inevitably develop proprietary attitudes and the assumption that longevity in a senior position makes for unassailable judgment. Incentive is reduced, new ideas are not encouraged and stereotyped operations result. Old friendships tend to supersede operational necessity in a closed {p.88} society, and the game of baronial polities more than adequately fulfills the gossip requirements of the Agency.

When incompetents achieve positions of authority (as they will in any agency), security procedures can conceal their incompetence and errors. Such individuals become adept at noisily anti-Communist — and often useless — operations. (Surely no one will criticise the production of anti-Communist propaganda even if it is dull and unreadable.) New ideas and imaginative minds are justifiably regarded as a threat to incompetents. Assignments are made by the operating units, and when an officer returns from a field post he may walk the halls for months if the old school tie fails to meet similar colors. This procedure may be contrasted with the one in effect in the Foreign Service.

The Agency blithely assumes that clandestine training produces labor experts and officers with political judgment; whereas no one would dream of expecting the same process to produce attorneys and violinists. Clandestine expertise is confused with proficiency in other fields. Disdain for external criticism and discouragement of internal dissent prevents anyone from saying that the emperor or operational baron has forgotten his clothes.

CRITICISM AND LOYALTY

The lack of understanding and appreciation on the part of other agencies plus the time-consuming struggle to gain at times their acquiescence for even the most necessary and obvious operations has created a mentality which is supersensitive to any kind of criticism. This includes constructive criticism, the function most needed. Outside committees and groups with authority to monitor Agency activities are inevitably regarded as a potential threat Since required security practices are best obtained from extensive training and conditioning, there is an understandable reluctance to impart vital and controversial secrets to visiting scholars and military types. There is the real possibility that some personality will be unduly shocked by this experience. Inasmuch as the Agency specializes in the arts of deception it is not difficult to dazzle the uninitiated visitors with a couple of good spy stories. It is relatively easy to mute all criticism by adopting the pious posture of lonely and selfless dedication against a diabolical enemy whose evil is only imperfectly understood elsewhere in the government.

The inverse pride in anonymity and the extreme dedication required for this profession forces the Agency to act like a state within a state. Joining the Agency is like taking holy orders for life. Higher loyalty to it rather than to the government is a reflex phenomenon. Clandestinely operating personnel have no public record (although there exists an office to help with this problem), there can be no appeal for outside understanding. There are severely lessened opportunities for employment elsewhere since one cannot describe previous employment experience. Resignees are stamped as renegades. These mostly inherent conditions discourage daring and dissent. Officers with family responsibilities who lack a private income and are not identified with the original OSS and FBI elements, tend to degenerate into the drones Stewart Alsop once claimed that he discovered in the Department of State.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Those who are acquainted with the Agency’s responsibilities, accomplishments and dedicated personnel will not question the vital role it must continue to play in the national security. Other spokesmen for the Agency will continue to justify or even glorify it. This article is a critique, hopefully an honest and constructive one. The Agency’s difficulties are built into the system and go back some fifteen years. If bureaucracies have their own laws, logic and purpose, a clandestine bureaucracy would challenge even Mr. Parkinson’s description.

The weaknesses of the Agency result from its very rapid growth in an area where expertise had to be acquired the hard way — by accepting risks and by acting swiftly where other agencies were unable or unwilling to act.

This rapid expansion placed many young men on upper professional levels where they have remained too long.

Necessary security procedures in the clandestine operation area have all but sealed openings to the healthy sunlight of outside criticism and to important realities. The receipt of some unwarranted criticism has eliminated receptivity to any criticism.

The lack of outside scrutiny and the absence of a court of appeal requires that the internal mechanism for handling grievances — where so much can be {p.89} concealed for so long — function with the highest integrity. While this machinery has performed many useful functions, it has also lied and exerted great power to protect its immediate master, the Agency.

Technical requirements of an unusual profession have placed a premium on clauuestiue expertise, relegating to a very secondary place the foreign policy requisite of foresight, anticipation, and sound political judgment. The Agency makes policy by the simple expedient of submitting a proposal for approval in an area where policy is unclear or non-existent. Its Director, who plays a Merlin-like role, sits in the highest councils. An Assistant Secretary of State will not contradict him. The Agency, like any agency which helps to carry out foreign policy, is capable of modifying it and of thwarting it.

The reorganization of the Agency, undertaken by those who have perfected the game of musical chairs, results only in a variation of the same game — musical offices or other units — leaving the main problems unresolved.

All these factors have combined in such a way that the Agency’s capacity to make mistakes has become institutionalized. Any attempt to remedy this grave situation must take into account the enormous power wielded by this Agency. Secret knowledge is secret power. Other agencies must continue to coordinate with it and maintain its cooperativeness. It has vast legal, political and institutional links and power. It has sought and gained (with no evil intent) the cooperation of a large number of important individuals and organizations, in a response to patriotic needs. These patriots are naturally reluctant to see friendships, idols, past activities and even the liberal establishment questioned. In any event, it appears that sentiment is growing in the Congress for a stronger review function. Such efforts might find some guidance in the following recommendations:

Senior Agency officers must have unqualified loyalty to the President and should have demonstrated foreign policy views which are in concert with if not identical to the views of the President. In turn, these officers should have full Presidential support in fending unjustified attacks from other agencies, the press and the Congress. Since it claims to be a clandestine agency, it should not seek publicity. If senior officers are permitted to lecture, write and release papers concerning the Agency, then every present and former employee is justified in doing the same, including the author.

Since clandestine activity and its inevitable failures are of crucial concern to the success of foreign policy, an objective monitoring element should be introduced. Three functions are required: supervision by a Killian-type committee under the Executive, a permanent physical link with the Department of State, and the creation of a Joint Congressional “watchdog” Committee to oversee its operations.

(a) The new Executive Committee would consist of 9 member of the White House Staff (with access to all Agency facilities at any time), experienced officers from sister agencies and two non-governmental representatives (avoiding local institutions having links with the Agency) who reside in or near Washing-ton, D.C., so as to permit frequent inspections.

(b) The link with the Department of State would consist of twelve carefully chosen officers from State who would have desks in both agencies, covering identical geographical or functional areas, who would have access to all Agency material in the areas of their assignment This would be a two year assignment, without prejudice to considering the officers for promotion by State in the normal lapse of time. This bridge would provide a secure window to and for a closed support organization, and it would facilitate cooperation between two agencies which waste much time thwarting and detesting each other. Present liaison arrangements cannot perform these functions and these functions would not be a substitute for all present liaison links. This secure non-Agency scrutiny in depth would produce automatic pressures on the most serious existing deficiencies.

(c) It should be made clear that the Agency is a foreign support agency of the Department of State and that the Director of this Agency is of lower rank and power than the Secretary of State.

(d) Agency operations in the U.S. territories should be reviewed by the Executive before possible illegality is exposed by the Congress.

(e) Although the Agency falls under the authority of the President, this responsibility can be a political and policy liability. The Agency tends to be a power unto itself and U.S. Presidents have felt obliged to select as its directors — admirals, generals, individuals who are not always best qualified in the areas of foreign policy. President Kennedy failed to control this Agency because he and {p.90} his advisors failed to appoint to it and protect within it the men who were loyal to him and dedicated to his foreign policy objectives.

______________________

Senator Symington (presiding).  Mr. Sakwa. I understand you voluntarily contacted the committee, office and then met with two staff members and left the memorandum that suggested we obtain certain documents pertaining to the period in which Mr. Colby was station chief in Saigon; is that correct? At that time — we are particularly interested in 1961 — you were a CIA employee supervising covert activities in South Vietnam?

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  Did you have prior experience in Indo-China?

Mr. Sakwa.  No, sir.

Senator Symington.  Among the materials you suggested we request from the CIA are 31 documents which can he described as incoming intelligence reports from the field; is that right? Those documents are classified; are they not? Have you requested a declassification of them?

Mr. Sakwa.  I don’t know how I will go about it, but I think it is a good idea.

Senator Symington.  Do you have copies of them yourself?

Mr. Sakwa.  No, I don’t.

Senator Symington.  Did you submit them to the committee?

Mr. Sakwa.  I submitted a number so the committee could obtain the documents and review them.

Senator Symington.  The CIA has furnished all those reports to us now. In addition you suggested the file numbers of 70 other documents, both incoming and outgoing traffic. And in three instances you suggested that we also request replies; am I correct?

Mr. Sakwa.  That is right, sir.

Senator Symington.  Two of the documents supplied in response to your numbers refer to other countries, and one could not be found. It is possible that some of your reference numbers were in error?

Mr. Sakwa.  That is possible; yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  In addition, you suggested that we request five memos which you wrote as a CIA employee in the June-December period of 1961; is that correct?

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  The CIA was able to supply only one of those memos, and officials believe they may have been hand-carried or handled in such a way that they were not lost. Do I correctly understand that when the staff advised you of this you were able to supply the five memos?

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  You left one additional 14-page paper with our staff when you met with them?

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  Does this summarize fairly the materials you have suggested for our review?

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  We may have some difficulty here in open session, because each of those documents, with the exception of your undated 14-page paper, is classified. In your covering memo to our staff you say that this collection of documents which we have now obtained to prove, “Mr. Colby is an uncontrollable agent.” {p.91}

What do you mean by that?

Mr. Sakwa.  I mean by that, sir, that he acts with a certain flamboyance which is perhaps typical of the older OSS group, who were undoubtedly very talented and brave men, but who form a kind of clique in the Agency. They go way back. And they were performing these functions during World War II. And they do free wheel. I know there were times when I would address a cable to the Chief of Station, Saigon, that is, to Mr. Colby, and all the cables went out from Washington had a DIR number, that is, they have the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence—

Senator Symington.  Do you know Mr. Colby personally?

Mr. Sakwa.  No, I met him once in Roger Hillman’s office in State years ago, and I think that is the only time. I have nothing personally a gainst him.

Senator Symington.  You have nothing personally against him?

Mr. Sakwa.  No, sir.

Senator Symington.  Why did you leave the CIA?

Mr. Sakwa.  I was forced to leave.

There is another circumstance which I have not yet presented to the committee. I don’t think it would be proper, as you pointed out, unless I give you a few days warning on this, but I would be happy to relate that to you, because it is similar to this. There were two stories involved. One was the Vietnam story—

Senator Symington.  Go ahead, whatever you have in your mind, let’s have it.

Mr. Sakwa.  Well, I wasn’t prepared to come out with this at this time.

Senator Symington.  You say that Mr. Colby, who has been nominated for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is an uncontrollable agent. And that is a pretty serious indictment.

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  You have made it, and you have made it publicly. And therefore I ask you if you are in effect a disgruntled discharged employee, or if you have resigned and you want to help. Because it takes a long time to build a reputation, and you can destroy it overnight. I would just like to know your background and why you left the CIA, inasmuch as you have asked repeatedly and talked to a lot of people around town about this situation, and you asked to testify, and you are here.

Mr. Sakwa.  Okay, sir; if you want me to I will be very happy to explain that.

Senator Symington.  You would know whether it violates security or not. But I just asked you why you left the CIA.

Mr. Sakwa.  All right.

I don’t have the exact dates, but perhaps around — when I was still working in the Far East division I had previously worked in the International Organizations division for Cord Meyer, Jr., who is now in London at our Embassy there.

Senator Symington.  I didn’t hear you.

Mr. Sakwa.  Cord Meyer, Jr. I had worked for what they call IO division.

Senator Symington.  You say he is now where? {p.92}

Mr. Sakwa.  He is now in London in our Embassy there. And I had been engaged in certain kinds of operations where I feel that too much injection of CIA money and control would be detrimental to U.S. policy, and would in effect benefit the Soviet economy.

Senator Symington.  In other words, you were in covert operations, is that what you were saying?

Mr. Sakwa.  Oh, yes.

Senator Symington.  What did that have to do with your leaving the Agency?

Mr. Sakwa.  I brought my impression of those operations to the attention of two White House aides, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Ralph Dungan, who was special assistant to President Kennedy. And I said, what can be done about this?

Senator Symington.  Done about what?

Mr. Sakwa.  I am not going into detail, Senator, but I can sort of give you the picture.

Senator Symington.  For whom were you working at that time?

Mr. Sakwa.  I was working for the Far East division at that time.

Senator Symington.  And who headed up this division?

Mr. Sakwa.  Desmond FitzGerald.

Senator Symington.  And Mr. FitzGerald is dead, yes? And he is the one that gave you your instructions?

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  Of course, he is not here to discuss the matter with us—

Mr. Sakwa.  Unfortunately that is so.

Senator Symington.  Did you think that he was the same kind of a person as Mr. Colby?

Mr. Sakwa.  Senator, he was in charge of the Far East division, and he made policy.

Senator Symington.  Would you call him an uncontrollable agent?

Mr. Sakwa.  I don’t know that. I know about Mr. Colby, because I used to send Mr. Colby dispatches and cables. Now, I didn’t have a close relationship with Mr. FitzGerald.

Senator Symington.  You worked for Mr. FitzGerald, and you only saw Mr. Colby once, and you met in the State Department, but you knew him better than Mr. FitzGerald, is that right? I am just trying to get the story straight.

Mr. Sakwa.  No, I wouldn’t say I knew him better. I knew of his performance, or nonperformance.

Senator Symington.  I thought I saw something about Mr. FitzGerald in your statement here, but I guess I was wrong.

Mr. Sakwa.  If you want me to continue, sir, on why I left the agency, I will be happy to complete that story.

Senator Symington.  All right. Why don’t you go ahead?

Mr. Sakwa.  At the request or permission of two White House aides during the administration of President Kennedy, I drafted a memo on certain kinds of international operations which, in the process of being typed by my secretary on a Sunday afternoon, was intercepted by one of my superiors in the Far East Division. The memo was addressed to the President of the United States. I don’t think it has been done very often. And it caused a bit of a furor.

Senator Symington.  Your memo to the President? {p.93}

Mr. Sakwa.  I had addressed a memo to the President.

Senator Symington.  And it was intercepted?

Mr. Sakwa.  It was intercepted by one of my superiors.

Senator Symington.  Who intercepted it?

Mr. Sakwa.  I think it could have been Bill Jones.

Senator Symington.  Bill Jones?

What was he doing?

Mr. Sakwa.  Well, we worked odd hours sometimes in the Agency, and he happened to be in on Sunday when my secretary was typing this up for me.

Senator Symington.  How did you know he intercepted it?

Mr. Sakwa.  My secretary told me.

Senator Symington.  That he took it from her?

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes.

Senator Symington.  How did he know you had written it?

Mr. Sakwa.  My name was on it, and she was my secretary.

Senator Symington.  Did he come and ask for it, or did he get it in the mail, or how did he do that?

Mr. Sakwa.  No, she was typing it at the time. I don’t know how much she had been able to type, but he took the draft that had already been typed—

Senator Symington.  He asked her for it and she gave it to him?

Mr. Sakwa.  Sir, he was my boss, and there was no question that he could ask for it and get it.

Senator Symington.  Did you have the same office space together?

Mr. Sakwa.  We were rather crowded in temporary buildings at the time, and I think my secretary was in my office — we had the same space. I was not there, at the time.

Senator Symington.  What I am trying to get at, then, did he look at your mail or did he just happen to see this particular item that he wanted?

Mr. Sakwa.  He was in that day, and he heard a typewriter going, and he opened the door, and my secretary was typing a memorandum for the President.

Senator Symington.  How did he know it was for the President?

Mr. Sakwa.  It was addressed that way.

Senator Symington.  Did he go and look at what she was typing?

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, sir.

Senator Symington.  Is that the first time he ever did that?

Mr. Sakwa.  As far as I know, yes.

Senator Symington.  And it was just by coincidence that he happened to look at what your secretary was typing?

Mr. Sakwa.  I do think it was by coincidence, yes, there is no reason to believe otherwise.

Senator Symington.  Thank you. Now, will you proceed?

Mr. Sakwa.  Well, when I learned about this I guess — my secretary told me that day — and when I came in Monday morning I must say it was a very strange day in my life. It was very quiet. No one would drop a pin.

Senator Symington.  Did you generally drop — I am trying to follow you there — did you generally drop pins every morning?

Mr. Sakwa.  Usually when it is quiet you do that, I understand.

Senator Symington.  Did you keep some pins in your pocket? {p.94}

Mr. Sakwa.  Paper clips.

I was called into the office of the Inspector General. And that was Lyman Kirkpatrick at the time. And he questioned me about this.

And he called me in, I think, a few days later and told me that the memo had been given to an Allan Dulles, and that Mr. Dulles thought it was not a bad memo.

Senator Symington.  How do you know that?

Mr. Sakwa.  This is what Mr. Kirkpatrick told me.

Senator Symington.  That Mr. Dulles thought the memo was all right?

Mr. Sakwa.  He thought it was a pretty good memo, there were some inaccuracies. And as we always say, I didn’t have all the facts. This is the big excuse everywhere, no one has all the facts. Someone suggested earlier today that the Director of Central Intelligence doesn’t have all the facts. In any event, Mr. Kirkpatrick told me that Mr. Dulles thought it was important enough and worthy enough to be sent over to the White House. But since it was a classified document, it would be sent through CIA channels. And I was enormously flattered by this. And I called Ralph Dungan, and I said. I have a little trouble here, my memo got intercepted. But the memo will be sent over to your office.

And so Ralph began to wait for it. He waited week after week after week. I recall from time to time I insisted that he had received it. The secretary tore the office apart and couldn’t find it.

Finally, I got in touch with Mr. Kirkpatrick, and asked him what had happened. And then in an offhand way he said, we decided not to send it to the White House.

I had a certain opinion of Mr. Kirkpatrick, but I don’t want to take up the valuable time of this committee.

Senator Symington.  Is that the Mr. Kirkpatrick who is at Brown University now?

Mr. Sakwa.  Yes, sir. That is him all right. I know where he is.

Senator Symington.  I am beginning to think from your testimony that you don’t approve of Mr. Kirkpatrick.

Mr. Sakwa.  Sir, you are correct there, yes. You are very discerning.

Of course, I was in trouble then. So Mr. Bissell, who was then Deputy Director of Plans, called me down to this office, and we had a little discussion about this. And while we were going through this he asked me, he said, “I understand you’ve been working on Vietnam. How are things there?”

And I said, “Sir, things there are a disaster.”

And he said. “What?”

And I said, “Yes, they are a disaster.”

And he said, “Well, golly, if you feel that way, we’ll have to take you out of the FE division.” And he said, “Did you ever see Des FitzGerald?”

And I said, “Only, sir, in the john.”

And he said. “Well, with your attitude on Vietnam — ”

And I indicated that I was a good soldier, carried out my orders—

Senator Symington.  You see, the reason I’m asking these questions — and I am sure you were a good soldier — is that you have talked about a lot of people so far, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Bissell, and Mr. Jones. But what we are here for now is to discuss the confirmation or possible confirmation of a recommendation for the Direc- {p.95} tor of the Central Intelligence Agency. And during all this period did you have any connection with Mr. Colby?

Mr. Sakwa.  Only the dispatches and cables.

Senator Symington.  I beg your pardon.

Mr. Sakwa.  Only by sending cables to the field and receiving reports from the Saigon station.

Senator Symington.  And as I understand it, you felt that those cables were incorrect, is that correct?

Mr. Sakwa.  I wouldn’t say they were all incorrect, sir. I think that there is a pattern there of misinformation or slanting of intelligence. When Mr. Colby’s lesser reports came to Washington that indicate—

Senator Symington.  You just felt he was supplying this information, is that correct?

Mr. Sakwa.  Sir, I refer to CS3/475063. And I quote: “It was clear that the President wanted a solid majority everywhere on his own merits.”

This refers to President Nguyen Diem.

Senator Symington.  The reason I remember Mr. FitzGerald’s name, the Chief of the Far East, as you pointed out. for whom you worked and who is now deceased, you said in your statement:

Although I have indicated to Mr. Bissell that I could not account for Mr. Colby’s strange performance in Saigon, there is a possible explanation. I have no proof of this: an unofficial effort on the part of senior CIA officers to worsen the situation in South Vietnam so that a greater military presence would be justified and an early nuclear confrontation with Communist China might take place. Among others. Charles S. Whitehurst (Chief VCL) and possibly Desmond FitzGerald (Chief FE) were of this mentality.

Mr. Sakwa.  That’s right, sir.

Senator Symington.  We, may have some more questions that we would like you to answer for the record, Mr. Sakwa.

Senator Nunn, any questions?

Senator Nunn.  No questions.

Senator Symington.  Thank you for your testimony.

Mr. Sakwa.  I want to thank the committee for this opportunity.

Senator Symington.  It is a privilege to have heard you, sir.

The next witness is Mr. David Harrington.

Mr. Harrington, do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. Harrington.  Yes, sir.

Do you want to swear me in first, sir?

Senator Symington.  Yes, I would like to swear you in first.

Will you raise your right hand.

Will you swear that the information you give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Harrington.  I do.

Senator Symington.  Will you proceed?

Statement of
David Sheridan Harrington,
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Harrington.  My name is David Sheridan Harrington, and I reside at 105 Ferry St. NW., Washington, D.C.

The events I am about to describe occurred in early 1969 while I was assigned to CORDS/Vietnam as a program officer at the I Corps regional headquarters. At that time I was a first lieutenant in the U.S. {p.96} Marine Corps and on a voluntary extension of an initial 13-month tour in Vietnam. My selection into CORDS was based on my combat infantry experience, my fluency in Vietnamese and French, and my training in psychological operations. Since then, I completed my 3 years of active duty in March 1970, and resigned my commission at the end of my 6-year service obligation.

The possible confirmation of Ambassador William E. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence disturbs me because I have believed for a long time that he has never explained fully the Phoenix program at its operation level. Furthermore, he has never, to my knowledge, offered anything more than vague statements on his efforts either to cease the widespread killings occurring under the Phoenix program or to divest the United States of any involvement in the assassination of Vietnamese civilians.

Specifically, in testimony before the Committee on Government Operations in 1971, Ambassador Colby answered questions on the Phoenix program by resorting to evasive and misleading bureaucratic language to distinguish Phoenix policy from operations, and to claim that only a few abuses occurred at the local level, and those without the approval of Phoenix administrators.

However, I attended a meeting in 1969 at which Mr. Colby was told directly about the operational problems of Phoenix, and the many abuses occurring at the local level. ¶

From this briefing, he could only conclude that large gaps existed between Phoenix policy in Saigon and operations in the field. ¶

Until Mr. Colby provides a complete report of the Phoenix program and his role in it, I believe that Mr. Colby’s involvement in Phoenix raises a serious question as to his suitability for high Government office.

Not long after my assignment to DaNang, either in late February or early March 1969, I was informed by the Deputy for CORDS in I Corps, Mr. Alexander Firfer, that Mr. Colby was coming up for a high level briefing on the status of pacification. ¶

Since I had prime responsibility for all statistics and briefing materials, this important meeting stands out in my mind. ¶

I was invited to attend the meeting to provide backup information as needed and to take notes. This opportunity pleased me because I was very interested in meeting officials from Saigon and hearing a discussion on pacification.

The meeting was held in the second floor conference room of CORDS regional headquarters at 22 Bach Dang, DaNang. ¶

Present at the meeting from Saigon were Ambassador Colby, Mr. George Jacobson, and Colonel Montague; from DaNang, Mr. Firfer, his deputy Mr. Fritz, myself, and Mr. Harry Mustakos, the regional CIA Director. Two other senior DaNang staff, Robert, K. Olson and Robert Mills, attended portions of the briefing.

The initial phase of the meeting lasted about 1-1/2 hours, and included a briefing by my boss and subsequent questions, answers, and discussion of the presentation. ¶

Mr. Colby had prepared thoroughly for the briefing, and asked pointed questions on all phases of the pacification program. ¶

Mr. Mustakos was in turn to make a presentation. I knew very little about Mr. Mustakos besides his position and the fact that many CORDS people, myself and my boss included, had serious questions about the known CIA agents who carried luger pistols and folding stock automatic rifles. ¶

Rumors were fairly widespread that these {p.97} covert operators were engaged in a very dirty war with the Vietcong and their sympathizers.

Mr. Mustakos appeared quite defensive from the beginning of his presentation. After a few moments I learned that it was due to complaints from Saigon about I Corps’ poor quality intelligence and low neutralization rate of quality Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI). ¶

Mr. Colby nodded in such fashion that he was acknowledging his concern and his desire to hear Mr. Mustakos’ defense. ¶

Mr. Mustakos focused on three areas of discussion in responding to Saigon’s criticisms: One, the low quality of operational groups such as Provisional Reconnaissance Units (PRU’s); two, the high number of VCI killed before possible interrogation; and three, a criticism of Saigon pressure for high quality VCI. ¶

Mr. Mustakos was drawing a clear picture of the Phoenix program at the local level in order to ward off what he considered bureaucratic harassment.

The logic of Mr. Mustakos’ presentation moved very clearly toward a sound defense for his efforts in I Corps. ¶

He began with the fact that the ill-disciplined nature of the PRU’s resulted in very poor operational control over these PRU’s by his agents. ¶

As a result of the poor discipline and lack of control, many alleged VCI were killed instead of captured. ¶

These killings took place away from CIA supervision and consequently, Mustakos could not guarantee who was killed and certainly could not collect more information on the VCI from these dead Vietnamese. ¶

Mr. Mustakos gave the general example of a nervous PRU unit out on assignment in Vietcong territory killing a struggling Vietnamese suspect with a silencer-equipped pistol for fear of attracting attention. ¶

At this point, Colby interjected that killing was not CORDS policy regardless of breakdown at the local level.

Senator Symington.  Let me interrupt you there.

Who were member’s of the Provisional Reconnaissance Unit?

Mr. Harrington.  This was not outlined completely in this particular briefing. That is why I did not mention it. ¶

But as I understand it, the Provisional Reconnaissance Unit — the members of the Provisional Reconnaissance Unit were recruited by the national police from hoodlums or thugs or people who were at least willing to engage in covert activities against the Vietcong.

Senator Symington.  Were there any Americans in those units?

Mr. Harrington.  No; I stated that, I believe, earlier in my testimony.

Senator Symington.  I just want to be sure that the Provisional Reconnaissance Units were Vietnamese.

Mr. Harrington.  That’s correct, although I will add that in 1971 testimony, Ambassador Colby did acknowledge the fact that Americans did on occasion accompany groups such as the PRU’s on covert operations, but that is the extent — the extent of my knowledge.

Mr. Mustakos found the quota system from Saigon particularly vexing in that he considered himself an operations type and had little use for bureaucratic demands. ¶

He used the allegory from Mao about the sea and the fishes to present his view on the status of guerrilla warfare in I Corps. ¶