Nomination of William E. Colby

 

I have a few questions to ask you, sir.

As you know, we are glad to have you here. The question that is before us is the qualifications of Mr. Colby to be Director. He reports to the National Security Council, but the National Security Council is an advisory council to the President — that is, if he is confirmed he would report to the National Security Council. In fact, the President is the chairman of the advisory council that is his. So, therefore, in fact, Mr. Colby reports directly to the President of the United States if he is confirmed. And the Acting Director today, General Walters, therefore reports directly to the President.

When your study team made its trip to Vietnam the war was in full swing, was it not?

Representative Drinan. It was in 1969, yes, it was one of the worse years, after the Tet offensive.

Senator Symington. Putting aside what you felt were his inhibitions on your team, do you believe that Mr. Colby’s own efforts could have remedied the situation in Vietnam which you have criticized in your statement, in view of the policies and in the face of the policies that had been set and were being set in Washington?

Representative Drinan. Yes, I do. And we made it very clear in the report, which is in the Congressional Record, that he could have insisted on the fundamental right to a trial, and that he did not. We pointed out to him in June 1969 that these people who were being swept into prison by the U.S. forces didn’t have a hearing, didn’t even know the charges against them. And he admits himself — and this is in my testimony — I didn’t read it — he admits himself that it was not until 1971 that every Vietnamese person accused of being with the Vietcong, it was not until 2 years after that that they had the basic right to be presented with the testimony against them or the charges against them and to be present personally at a hearing. So I do insist that despite the orders that he had, he was responsible for the sweeping injustices done to thousands of individuals who were South Vietnamese.

Senator Symington. As you know, the Phoenix program was not a program of the United States, it was a program of the South Vietnamese which we supported.

Representative Drinan. With U.S. military advisers in every hamlet.

Senator Symington. He was sent out there with instructions to support the South Vietnamese Phoenix program. That I think we have established.

Do you know about what might be called the pre-Colby policy incident to Phoenix and what was being done prior to his arrival?

Representative Drinan. I think I do, Senator. I think it is fair to say, though, that Mr. Colby was the architect of the Phoenix program, of the pacification program. Something like that existed prior to that time, and apparently was ineffective. Some people say that the Phoenix program was ineffective. I think it was tremendously ineffective in that it jailed the very people who alone could form some coalition that might oppose in a genuine election the present president.

Senator Symington. Now, on page 10 you say: “The CIA for the first time in the history of this Nation has introduced a secret agency into our Government.” Would you say that the CIA created the CIA or that the Congress created the CIA? {p.42}

Representative Drinan. No, I have the basic law here created by the Congress in 1947. And as you know, this was for the first time the creation of any agency that did in fact have secret powers. And it may have been required at that time, but I think all the Members of Congress at this moment in history have the right and the duty to re-ask the basic question of whether or not any secret agency of this type can or should exist.

Senator Symington. Would you say, with the way the world is, that we should abandon an agency that was created primarily to obtain intelligence about the enemy and enemy actions in all other countries?

Representative Drinan. I can’t answer that, Senator, as long as they are holding from me and other Members of Congress the basic information. I don’t know about the CIA. I don’t know about its budget; I don’t know what it is doing. And I say this is a fundamental denial of my rights as a Member of Congress and I say that that question is therefore impossible to answer.

Senator Symington. You have a CIA subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee —

Representative Drinan. We do.

Senator Symington. Have you discussed this matter with that subcommittee?

Representative Drinan. I have and I commend Congressman Nedzi of Michigan for doing a very fine job in this newly revised subcommittee of the CIA. But I am sure that Mr. Nedzi would agree with me that the Members of the House and the Members of the Senate still know virtually nothing about the CIA. The only time I hear about the CIA is when it does something foolish and makes the headlines, like the ITT in Chile and the Bay of Pigs, and so many other scandals.

Senator Symington. Let me say, the rules of this committee are to get the testimony in 24 hours ahead if possible, so that we can study it and establish answers against it, and we only got your testimony a short time ago. So there are perhaps other questions that I would like to ask you based on it. And with your approval, I will submit these for the record.

When you say that the senior Members of the House and of the Senate have conspired to prevent the younger Members of the House and Senate, knowing anything about the CIA, that I think is a little strong.

Representative Drinan. I meant it to be strong, Senator.

Senator Symington. Would you tell us a little more about that?

Representative Drinan. I meant it to be strong. And I am not retreating from it. But all I can say is that the small subcommittees of the House and of the Senate that know something about the budget of the CIA have agreed to keep this information from other Members of the Congress. And I think that is fundamentally wrong. They want us to make judgments on their knowledge and to have an act of faith in them. And many months ago this came up on the floor of the House. And the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee at that time, rather than to allow us to go forward with an amendment to delete all funding in this bill for the CIA, said that he would reactivate the committee on the CIA, which he has done. But we have never had a vote on how much money the CIA gets, we don’t know where {p.43} that money is buried, or for what purposes. So I just think it is fundamentally wrong.

Senator Symington. On page 10, Mr. Congressman, you say that Mr. Colby did not disclose the nature of the makeup of the so-called Forty Committee. He gave us the details of that in executive session. And therefore we understand the nature of that committee.

Let me say that I believe that the CIA has been instructed by higher authorities to do things that it should not do and that its original charter, you might say, did not justify us doing, like, for example, running a war over a period of years in Laos. Perhaps some of us have been instrumental in trying to bring all that problem to light, so that the Agency contains itself as to what it was originally created for, namely, an intelligence agency, an intelligence-gathering agency. On the other hand, the people who ran the Agency were under instructions from higher authority to do that.

One of the interesting things — and I submit to you that you might consider discussing with Congressman Nedzi and others — is that whereas in the country in question, like Laos, under the so-called Kennedy letter, the head of the CIA reports to the Ambassador, and the Ambassador directs his operation. But when you got back here to Washington, there was no relationship carried on, and the CIA was independent of the Foreign Relations Committee. You see my point. So there seems to be a paradox, if not a dichotomy, you might say, that there is a change of command as to congressional review.

Representative Drinan. I think it is contrary to the statute. I think they go far beyond their functions. And I think they go far beyond what the National Security Act of 1947 provides for. And I might add that when Mr. Colby was asked about that in the letter or the question posed by Senator Hughes, he would not concede, and I have it before me — that the activities of the CIA in Laos were improper, or inappropriate, or illegal. And I therefore think that this is a very key point, that he will not concede that the CIA made any error in that escapade in Laos.

Senator Symington. You know the clause, which I do not have before me, in the CIA charter, which the administration says justifies its functioning.

Representative Drinan. They will do anything that the National Security Council directs them to do. I have it here, Senator. I think that is the operative word, is it not, that they will do anything that the National Security Council mandates them to do?

Senator Symington. What worries me is that I have felt for some time that our military budget was too high in cost. And I am depressed with recent reports, such as that report that Mr. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, presented before our committee in an open session earlier this week, where there was a savings estimated at $14 billion. And then I saw the Brookings Institute Report yesterday which stated that there could be a savings anywhere from $10 to $25 million in the military budget if we moved more toward modernity, you might say, in weapons as against tradition. And yet invariably the military budget will be decided on in the long run on the basis of what any possible enemy has capable of attacking in the United States. And without an agency of this character, I don’t see how we could be fairly {p.44} sure that we know what the enemy has. That is one point I submit to you with great respect.

Another point is that everytime {sic: every time} that the services come up to justify the billions of dollars that each service wants each year, we always get an analysis from the Central Intelligence Agency as well as an analysis of the possible enemy from the DIA. And with one conspicuous exception, invariably the estimate of the CIA as to the possible enemy ground strength has been considerably less than that submitted by our own people in the Army. Invariably the estimate of the CIA as to the actual strength of the possible enemy naval forces has been less than that of our Navy. And the same thing is true of the Air Force. And the record will show that over the years the CIA has been much more accurate in its estimates than the services have, and therefore I do feel in that field that it has performed a worthy function, which it could only do if it operated as an intelligence agency.

Representative Drinan. That is one of the reasons, Senator, why I want to get more credibility for our intelligence activities. And in the “Pentagon Papers” it was revealed that the CIA was less wrong than everybody else.

Senator Symington. The clause that we are told justifies running the war in Laos is in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended:

For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interests of national security, it shall be the duty of the agency under the direction of the National Security Council ...

And that gives five major duties. The fifth is:

To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

May I say I agree with you, that I think the functioning of the war in Laos over a period of years does not come under that heading, and I have so stated on the floor of the Senate a number of times.

Representative Drinan. I know you have, Senator.

Senator Symington. Senator Cannon.

Senator Howard Walter Cannon Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Congressman, on page 4 of your statement you say that there are now some 200,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. Is that a factual statement?

Representative Drinan. Yes.

Senator Cannon. If so, how reliable do you think it is?

Representative Drinan. I think that is quite reliable, sir, from everything we know. President Thieu disputes that and says that some of these are not merely card-carrying Communists but dangerous. But virtually none of those 200,000 have committed an overt act. I have followed this situation over the last 4 years, I spoke most recently to two French citizens who have been there for sometime and who were in prison and who reported reliably on this situation. And it is very clear that President Thieu has in fact consciously or otherwise imprisoned those who could form a coalition against him. I think that is well documented. And the figure 200,000 may in fact be conservative. Some people say it is 300,000 or more.

These people are in prisons made by the United States. And last year or this year, $21 million was appropriated by the Congress or in the military budget for the creation and maintenance of prisons in South Vietnam. {p.45}

Senator Cannon. You said just then that President Thieu has had these political prisoners put in, and then on page 7 you say the United States has put all of the potential political opponents of President Thieu in jail. How do you equate that with the United States has put them in jail? Have we in fact been jailing those people?

Representative Drinan. Under the pacification program there was an American adviser in almost every hamlet. And we went up to the hamlets and saw the military field tribunals. And if a local person said that this particular citizen is dangerous, the American adviser would acquiesce in the jailing of this individual, and would not insist upon fundamental rights of a hearing. The American advisers were a party to this lawlessness, and they acquiesced in it; they cooperated in it. And to some extent they initiated it in the sense that they wanted to get rid of the substructure of the Vietcong.

Senator Cannon. So that by their acquiescence then, of our advisers, you are saying that the United States has jailed all of those political opponents?

Representative Drinan. We visited with these individuals in jail. We spoke —

Senator Cannon. How many did you visit with?

Representative Drinan. Dozens, hundreds. In our report we mention name after name. And we had eight members of the team. Some went to Konson; others went out to the highlands. And I saw dozens, hundreds of people, including children 12 to 14 years old, suspected Vietcong. At least one-third or more, Senator, were there without any hearing whatsoever at that time, 1969.

Senator Cannon. You blame Mr. Colby for being, as you say. unable or unwilling to guarantee to South Vietnamese citizens the basic provisions of due process? How can you blame that on Mr. Colby — who is outside of the governing structure of South Vietnam?

Representative Drinan. He conceded that he would prefer it that way, he conveyed that he would like to have more lawyers. He assumed the” responsibility as the director of the Phoenix program for the jailings that were going on as the American advisers, aided by functionaries of the Thieu government, moved into the countryside and jailed those who were associated with the Vietcong, the infrastructure, as they called it. And I think it is fair to say that Mr. Colby felt that he was in fact responsible for this. He admitted that he preferred more due process. And in 1971, he changed the rules, so that at that time every individual who was a South Vietnamese citizen had a right to the charges against him, and had a right to a hearing before he would be sent to jail prior to that time during most of the life of the Phoenix program. In other words, the South Vietnamese citizens did not have those fundamental rights.

Senator Cannon. Are they being guaranteed those rights at the present time?

Representative Drinan. I doubt it. Most of our advisers, of course, have left. We are no longer in charge of it. I don’t know the answer to that question. Senator, I know that those 200,000 remain in jail, sometimes for an indefinite period. There is a very serious problem of political suppression. I don’t konw {sic: know} how many new individuals are going to jail or what guarantees they might have.

Senator Cannon. My own personal feeling is that you are blaming Mr. Colby for a number of things that he had no control over; actually, {p.46} he was sent there to do certain things and carry out certain policies. I think that blame ought to lie with the people over Mr. Colby rather than a man who is carrying out what he is told to do.

Representative Drinan. We spoke with any number of officials. Senator, here and in the State Department, and in Saigon. And they all said that the Phoenix program is carrying out this pattern. We went there precisely for the purpose of investigating the number of political prisoners. This was a privately sponsored group, funded by the churches and citizens of America to find this out, what is our Government doing. And I am not saying that Mr. Colby is exclusively responsible, I say that we found many American officials who were also implicated in the lawlessness. But the question is, should he be confirmed as the Director of the CIA? And in my judgment, his operation of the Phoenix program does not justify confidence in him.

Senator Cannon. You also said that he made no firm commitment that the CIA under his direction would not become involved in another operation such as the CIA conducted in Laos. I would say that if he made such a commitment as that he would not be a person to put in charge of the CIA, because he would have no say whatsoever as to whether the CIA would or would not become involved in a situation such as Laos. That again would be a policy decision of the U.S. Government, whoever is over the CIA. And if he is told by his superior authority to conduct the type of activity in Laos that has been conducted in some other location, I would presume that he would have to carry out his orders, wouldn’t he?

Representative Drinan. I don’t think that even the Director of the CIA has to be obedient to every command that is given to him. He must live within the mandate of the Agency. And it is an intelligence agency. And as the chairman has said, this goes far beyond anything by way of intelligence, when the Embassy itself is in Laos conducting an air war without the knowledge or consent of Congress or the people. So I think there is a point in time when the Director of the CIA would have to say, that is not within the jurisdiction of the CIA, and those functions would not be lawful.

Senator Cannon. I would say that if he had been told to do that by his appointing authority and failed to do it, he wouldn’t be Director of the CIA very long. I am sure he would be removed by the appointing authority if he didn’t carry out the policies that he was directed to carry out.

I, too, raise the question about your statement on page 10. You said you stood by it, and you admitted it was harsh. I think it is not only harsh, but I think it is not factual. I don’t think that you have said one thing here that indicates that any Members of the House or of the Senate have entered into any conspiracy to prevent the younger Members of the House and Senate from knowing anything about the CIA. I think that is a very unfair statement. I don’t know whether I would be considered one of the senior Members in that category, but I certainly have had no part in any conspiracy to deprive any Member of the Congress of the right to know what they ought to know about the operations of the CIA. As a matter of fact, I have tried to find out myself on many occasions what actually the CIA was doing. And I have been unsuccessful on occasions. But I certainly don’t contend that that is the result of any conspiracy on the part of anybody. {p.47}

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. I would add that the same thing is true of me. And when you say:

I think that is a very unfavorable statement to the House of Representatives. ¶

As I understand it, most Members of the House considered that their body has a full and equal position under the Constitution, and certainly in responsibility, that the Senate has, should be shared by the House in a matter of this character, although the Senate does confirm the Director of the CIA, as I am sure you know; under the Constitution the House itself is responsible, and is the only body that can originate the appropriations that at least by inference you are criticizing this morning. ¶

Senator Nunn.

Senator Sam Nunn Mr. Chairman, before I get into questions I would just like to say that as one of the younger Members of the Senate and one of the youngest members of this committee, 34, and having just arrived, I have had absolutely no problem in this committee or as a Senator in securing information that I desire as far as the CIA operations were concerned. ¶

And Chairman Stennis, Chairman Symington, Senator Cannon, Senator Jackson, and Senator Thurmond, everyone that I have ever asked for any kind of help in securing information, has not only been cooperative, but they have arranged briefings and done whatever is necessary. ¶

I personally cannot speak for the Members of the House, but I can speak for the Senators. And I can also say that as late as yesterday afternoon I talked to Senator Jackson, and he suggested that I have a briefing, and ask another freshman Senator to come, about the CIA on the threat that we have on strategic weapons now. ¶

So, as far as I am concerned, Congressman, as one Senator I can say that I have had no difficulty.

Representative Drinan. First, let me say that this is rather new, to have briefings.

And secondly, Senator Cannon says he doesn’t have enough information about the CIA. Maybe I should have stated that nobody in the whole Congress knows enough about the CIA. And I hope that you learn more and more. This is a welcome development

Senator Nunn. I am not sure that even the Director of the CIA has all the information about the CIA.

Representative Drinan. A very good point.

Senator Nunn. And I do think we have obligations, I completely agree with you, to monitor more and more carefully not only the CIA but any other agency that we give this kind of power to.

I would like to ask you a few questions, Congressman.

This statement on page 7 that Senator Cannon was asking about seems to me to be pretty far-reaching where you say:

If we had an American in either the CIA or military who was guaranteeing the South Vietnam citizens due process, would he not in effect {p.48} have to be a dictator of South Vietnam also? ¶

Wouldn’t he have to take over the Government of South Vietnam? ¶

And isn’t this directly contrary to your conception of America’s role?

Representative Drinan. One good argument, Senator, is that we have done that. Mr. Colby did keep insisting that we cannot interfere in the internal matters of South Vietnam. We, were involved, of course. ¶

All I can say is that when we directed a program like the Phoenix, in which we were directly responsible for building the jails, and going out in the Highlands and helping the elected government or the appointed government to destroy the infrastructure of the Viet Cong, that we are in effect acquiescing and cooperating in this denial of basic due process.

Senator Nunn. Do you recall the statute which was a period in 1971 — which was in our American law passed by Congress and signed by the President which says:

Representative Drinan. I helped to remove that. ¶

That is the Japanese Detention Act. ¶

One evil doesn’t justify another.

Senator Nunn. No, sir. But we had that on our books at the same time that we were running the Phoenix program in South Vietnam. ¶

So, in effect, we didn’t have due process, under this analogy, guaranteed to our own citizens, and yet you would impose the burden on the Director of the CIA in wartime, in a country that had never had democratic principles, to guarantee due process to those citizens. ¶

Is that what you are saying?

Representative Drinan. That is what I am saying; one evil does not justify another. ¶

And if we do what we did in South Vietnam, the least that we could do is to carry out the constitution of South Vietnam itself. I am not asking them to impose American standards. ¶

And I quoted the constitution of Vietnam, and that constitution provides for wartime and emergency, but it goes on and says that nonetheless the basic fundamental guarantees must remain under all circumstances.

Senator Nunn. Under that theory he should have been back home trying to get this law off the books, shouldn’t he, instead of being in South Vietnam trying to guarantee that due process?

Representative Drinan. Maybe all of us should have been back home.

Senator Nunn. But you do feel that he should have been able to, and you would think he was disqualified if he was not guaranteeing that due process.

Representative Drinan. I think it is very clear, Senator, and I pointed out in the testimony that we pointed this out to him in June 1969, that these individuals that we met in prison were swept there not knowing the charges against them, having no hearing, being detained for months or years without any reason given to them. ¶

And it was not until 2 years later that Mr. Colby issued a directive that every South Vietnamese citizen must have the charges against him, must have a hearing at which he can appear, before his liberty can be taken away. {p.49}

Senator Nunn. So he did do that 2 years later?

Representative Drinan. He certainly did.

Senator Nunn. Do you know the situation prior to Phoenix in South Vietnam? ¶

Did the Phoenix program itself have — was it directly responsible for taking away any kind of due process, or was there anything such as this before Phoenix?

Representative Drinan. It wasn’t as well organized. Phoenix was designed as a so-called falsification — later called Vietnamization. ¶

It means that in effect that we are the surrogates of the Thieu government, and that we do the work of the Thieu government, and are suppressing or opposing these political dissidents.

Senator Nunn. I would like to ask you one other question relating to your statement on page 11. You state here: “Mr. Colby has done ‘intelligence’ work for most of his adult life.” And in the third sentence of that second paragraph on page 11 you state: “He believes in sending American citizens to other nations who will pretend that they are not employees of the CIA.” ¶

Now, are you saying that that is a reason for not confirming him as head of the intelligence operations?

Representative Drinan. May I go back and quote what I omitted when I read my testimony. Directly from the questions that were raised on July 2 with Mr. Colby, and Mr. Colby was asked: “Would you collaborate with corporations in your work abroad?” And he said — and this is at the bottom of 9 — he said: “Certain structures are necessary in this country — America — to give our people abroad perhaps a reason for operating abroad in some respect so that they can appear not as CIA employees, but as representatives of some other entity.” ¶

And I just raise this question: If the American people in the Congress are going to finance James Bond types like Mr. Colby suggests, I think that the elected Members of the Congress have a right to know about it. ¶

And I am just raising that question — how many people, American citizens, are there now abroad or will be abroad pretending that they are not employees of the CIA when in fact they are?

Senator Nunn. Getting back to my original question, are you saying that our intelligence network should in effect go up and have badges on or uniforms saying that we are members of the CIA; here we are, folks; we are in Germany; we are members of the CIA?

Representative Drinan. I did not say that, Senator, I simply said that if this is going to go on I think that the Congress should know about it.

Senator Nunn. Let me ask you a question on that point. ¶

According to that, did you think that every Congressman and every Member of the Senate should have all the top secret information that relates to CIA on demand? ¶

Is that the logic of your contentions?

Representative Drinan. The military trusts a lot of people and the State Department trusts a lot of people. ¶

They all have clearance, and there is no reason in my judgment why 535 men and women could not be given clearance.

Senator Nunn. So your answer is “Yes” on that, that every Member of Congress and every Member of the Senate on any day they wanted to find out any top secret information, no matter how crucial —

Representative Drinan. I didn’t say that. {p.50}

Senator Nunn. Where would you draw the line?

Representative Drinan. I am sorry. ¶

All I can say, Senator, is that I have not been able to learn anything about the CIA as a Member of Congress. ¶

And all I can say is that when I know what the CIA is doing and how much money they have and how they spend it, then I could make some judgment on that question.

Senator Nunn. Do you think there ought to be a line drawn somewhere? ¶

Is that the point?

Representative Drinan. I would say so.

Senator Nunn. In other words, there is some point — you wouldn’t say that every Member of the Congress should know everything going on on a day-by-day basis?

Representative Drinan. No.

Senator Nunn. There has to be a line, and the question comes to the judgment of Congress as to where that line should be drawn. ¶

Would you agree that Congress does make that judgment, and you are really lodging a complaint against Congress rather than the CIA?

Representative Drinan. I thought I made that clear.

Senator Nunn. I just want to make that clear. ¶

You are saying that we ourselves are derelict, you are not criticizing Mr. Colby or the CIA when you say that every member couldn’t get all the information they should?

Representative Drinan. No, the Congress has been derelict, I think that is my word, in its oversight function.

Senator Nunn. Congressman, if you were convinced that the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee in the Houses and Senate which have the supervision over matters relating to our national security were indeed formed — I am not saying they were, and that was hypothetically the case — and there was a balanced representation in these committees of the entire Congress, do you think that under those conditions, numbers, that they were informed, and that they did have the proper supervision, and that they were balanced committees? ¶

Do you think at that point that we could draw a logical line on the crucial information” as it relates to international security?

Representative Drinan. I am not certain of that, because there is no track record to go on. ¶

And as I mentioned, two distinguished Senators conceded that they never heard of the CIA operation in Laos. ¶

Consequently, I would have to say, I would have to have faith in that committee that they did have sufficient information.

Senator Nunn. But under that hypothetical — if they never did exist — and we could get it to exist, your opinion might change, wouldn’t it?

Representative Drinan. It might.

Senator Nunn. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of this witness.

Senator Symington. Before, calling on Senator Hughes, I would like to read into the record, Mr. Congressman, the testimony in open session. Mr. Colby says: ¶

And I said: “Well, in any case, by August 15 we will be out of it, we hope.” And then is asked, ¶

 

That is part of that previous — and Mr. Colby’s reply was, ¶

So that, I think, you and I would both agree with.

Representative Drinan. I might point out that he is less direct than that in his answers to the inquiries of Senator Hughes, and I read from them.

Senator Hughes asked, “On reflection, do you think that it was wise for the CIA to get involved in such military operations in Laos?”

Answer:

And then he adds, and concludes, “Despite the difficulty for the CIA, I think that the Agency fulfills the charge given it efficiently and effectively.” In effect, contradicting what he said in open session.

Senator Symington. No, I can’t agree with that.

Representative Drinan. In effect —

Senator Symington. In effect — you have a problem that if he is given instructions, he has one or two things to do, based on my judgment. I spent many years in the Pentagon, and I have been on the CIA subcommittee for many years. ¶

In his case you either have to obey the orders or resign. We even decided what we would have done in a particular case. ¶

But obviously he can no longer be constructive and function if he had refused to obey his superiors. ¶

And we do have a problem in turn — for example, we have had three Secretaries of Defense since the first of the year. We went for many, many weeks without a Secretary of Air, and I don’t believe we have had an Assistant Secretary of Air for several years now. And the same thing is true of the Army. ¶

We have an Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a general, who was not in the Agency until he came in as Deputy Director. And this Government, in spite of all its problems around this time, has to continue functioning. ¶

What worries me is whether or not we are discussing here the functions of the CIA. And I am the first to agree, I think they have gone beyond what could be called their charter. ¶

On the other hand, I don’t want to see it taken out on an individual if he is able and experienced and understands the functioning of the Agency. ¶

I agree with you that we can hope for more thorough review of the Agency in the future. And I can say that the chairman of this committee believed that the matter should be reviewed more thoroughly than it has been in the past.

Representative Drinan. Thank you, Senator.

May I suggest, however, that it is not certain from the testimony, which I have read and reread very carefully, that Mr. Colby does understand and appreciate and will live by the mandate of the CIA. ¶

And in another question Senator Hughes asked him, “Would yon abide {p.52} by the directive of the CIA that you must keep out of all local domestic American activities?”

And Mr. Colby responded that in general he would do that. ¶

However, he goes on and says “such actions will be taken only in the most exceptional circumstances, and with the Director’s personal approval.”

The statute says that they can’t get involved, and yet he weasles like that.

Senator Symington. Of course we will have to have Mr. Colby back now and discuss the matters that in a democratic fashion are now being laid out before the Congress and the people.

Senator Hughes.

Senator Harold E. Hughes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Drinan, you have obviously spent a great deal of time in analyzing the record, the background, and before your time in Congress you visited Vietnam as part of the study mission, and are very concerned about what is happening.

I apologize for being late, Mr. Chairman; I was tied up on other matters that were related to the committee work in another way.

But I would like to ask if the Oversight Committee of the Senate on the CIA has been placed into the record? ¶

Who knows in the Senate what is going on in the CIA? I have been told ever since I have been here that there is a committee composed of several people who actually serve as an Oversight Committee on the CIA. ¶

Is there someone other than the Armed Services Committee that does that? ¶

Does anyone on the staff know?

Representative Drinan. The actual funding of the Central Intelligence Agency has to go through the Appropriations Committee, of course. And the five or seven senior members of the Appropriations Committee get in detail the requests for and the justifications for the money that goes to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Hughes. As the chairman knows, both he and myself are members of the Democratic Policy Committee, and we have frequently discussed some of what is happening. And I want to compliment the chairman, because he is pressed constantly and consistently for more openness and any information than at any time in the 4-1/2 years that I have been in the Senate. He is continuously pressed for that, and I certainly think the record should show it.

I am concerned, however, because I think I heard a former chairman of the Appropriations Committee say in debate on the floor of the Senate that he himself did not want to know the actual facts, because he was afraid he might talk in his sleep. If I recall, that is the statement he made. ¶

And I think that if the chairman of the Appropriations Committee and the responsible people don’t know the facts, somewhere on this Hill, I thing something is wrong.

We have recently seen a very broad display of what I consider deception and deceit in relationship to this committee in the Pentagon. ¶

And I am concerned that this may permeate other areas of the governmental structure also, as I know every member of this committee must be.

Father Drinan has pressed very hard in this statement, and in many cases it is a very harsh statement, which reflects what he must feel deep within himself about a system that tolerates things like the Phoenix {p.53} program, for whatever reason. ¶

But I do believe, and I am not testifying, Father Drinan, I apologize, but I do believe that somehow we must improve the oversight of the CIA and what is happening over there, and how the money is being spent.

And, again, I compliment the chairman, because in the last Congress he pressed very hard to get the appropriations out into the open, and what we were doing with them. ¶

And I might add that we did not succeed too well with that. I supported the chairman in this.

Father Drinan, do you believe that there should be some side, some view of the facts that we are probably not going to get 535 Members of the Congress — and I agree with you — if we can trust thousands of personnel with all kinds of secret information, are we in fact saying that they are more trustworthy than the men and women the people have elected to represent them in this Government?

Representative Drinan. I heard you make that point before, Senator, and give security clearance or deny it to Members of the Congress and make them accountable.

Senator Hughes. I wish that could be done. ¶

Because I don’t believe myself that certain members of the committee should be given information that other members are not given unless we specifically set up some sort of oversight subcommittee or special committee in the Congress of a cross-section philosophically that can be cleared to know the total of what is going on in the CIA.

Representative Drinan. If I may say so, Senator, that was proposed way back in 1955 by Senator Mansfield. He introduced a bill for a joint committee of the House and the Senate on the CIA. He had 34 cosponsors for the bill, and it came to the Senate floor on April 9, 1956. The result was negative. The Members did not vote for it. ¶

But it seems to me that that would be a very good idea, to have Members of the House and the Senate picked and selected according to their ideology, a balanced committee, and I would be satisfied with that.

Senator Hughes. That would satisfy your needs?

Representative Drinan. I would assume so — the ordinary joint committee — and they would be responsible and accountable for the operations of the CIA.

Senator Hughes. I personally feel that the people of Iowa elected me to represent their interests with the CIA as well as every other facet of Government, and that I have an entitlement to be informed. ¶

And if I am untrustworthy, then I feel the CIA ought to tell the people of Iowa and the country why I am untrustworthy and on what they base it. ¶

I would be satisfied also if the Joint Committee would be picked on such a basis to serve as an oversight committee that would have straight information on everything that we are doing in the CIA. ¶

I share your concerns about what we might be involved in around the world right now, and in the future, as well as what we have been involved in in the past. I am not relating this particularly to Mr. Colby. ¶

I am relating it as a common concern on the need to know of the American people, at least by a group of their elected representatives.

I know this is not an easy thing for you to do in testifying this way and expressing your concerns, but I commend you for having the courage to do it.

Representative Drinan. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Hughes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. {p.54}

Senator Symington. Thank you, Senator.

First let me thank you very much for your gracious remarks.

Based on recent events in recent months on this committee, as far as my colleague, Senator Hughes, is concerned, I am reminded of an old phrase, “They laughed when he sat down at the piano.” ¶

Now, as to the joint committee, I sit on a joint committee of the Senate and the House that you might look at at your discretion. And if you think there has been any excessive secrecy around this program, I wish you would take a look at the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, where, for example, even though they supply the warheads and pay for them, they will not allow me as a member of this committee, and acting chairman in a hearing before the Military Appropriations Subcommittee of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee which I chair, they will not allow me to bring into that Committee not only a member of my staff, but the chief of the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, even though the discussion is entirely about whether or not we need these weapons which will cost many billions of dollars, nor will they allow any members —

Representative Drinan. Excuse me, Senator, who is “they?”

Senator Symington. The majority of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, good question.

Nor will they allow my members to appear at any hearing of that committee except the open hearings — and I have never seen an open hearing when it comes to military appropriations — to bring any staff member in.

So we have a lot of things to clean up from the standpoint of not only the public’s right to know but of our own right to know. ¶

They will not allow any members of my staff or any members of the Armed Services Committee staff to go over and read classified data incident to weapons unless the Senator in question or some Senator and Congressman go over and read the books while they read the memoranda in the vault of the Joint Committee. ¶

How this grew I don’t know, but it was started years ago. But it is an unfortunate situation. ¶

I say that because I do believe in all honesty that we have the right setup here if we will go to work and make it work. ¶

And Senator Hughes is right, and in time I hope that more information can be obtained about just how this setup functions.

Now, back to the problem. ¶

I have known Mr. Colby for a good many years, and I do think he is an honest, dedicated, good American. ¶

I do think there are forces in the world which could endanger the security of the United States. ¶

And therefore I do think we need an agency like the Central Intelligence Agency in order to assess to the best of its ability what our possible enemies around the world are doing. ¶

If we don’t, then for the first time in the history of the modern world, you might say — and I would go back several hundred years on that — it would be the first time that it was felt that such an agency was not needed.

So what I believe we are talking about now is the capability of the gentleman in question to handle the Agency in an efficient and appropriate fashion and report what he should back to the Congress what he is doing.

I would like to say to the committee that Father Drinan wrote me a letter which I was much impressed with — I don’t know whether to call him Congressman Drinan or Father Drinan — the letter was im- {p.55} pressive, and I called him and asked him if he would like to testify. ¶

And, of course, we welcome his testimony here this morning.

And we are very grateful that you have come to give us your position, sir.

Are there any further questions?

Senator Nunn. I have one thing.

Senator Hughes. I would like to make a statement in the light of what you have said.

I want to go on record as a member of this committee as saying that I am not willing to trust any one man in this country in any position without an oversight committee of some sort by this Congress being totally informed as to what he is doing and what and how he is doing it.

Representative Drinan. I fully agree, that was the precise point of my testimony, and that now at this moment in history we should delay his confirmation until the Congress has the apparatus that we can supervise —

Senator Hughes. Excuse me, Senator Nunn.

Senator Nunn. That is all right. This is not a question; there is something that I don’t have an answer for and don’t intend to, but I want to share it with you. ¶

Senator Hughes and I talked about it the other day. I think in this situation of classification, secret and so forth, we start off with perhaps overclassification, or a degree of classification that even the people involved don’t have very much confidence in. ¶

And then we get to an Ellsberg situation where we have disclosure which hits the front pages, leaks, and then we have a loss of confidence all through the branches of Government, particularly the executive, in the classification system, top secret, and so forth. ¶

Then we get into a situation which is extremely dangerous, and perhaps the most dangerous part of the system, as Senator Hughes has pointed out in recent days, and that is a situation where there is so little confidence in the classification system that we do away with that and start falsifying and omitting information, which deprives even key people at the very top of the chain of command from the very essential information relating to our role in our policy. ¶

And the question is, you can’t have it all ways on all parts of the circle — and it is a circle, in my opinion. ¶

And how do you draw the line, and at what point in the circle do we really start, and where does the circle end? ¶

I just leave that with you as an observation and a frustration that I have.

Representative Drinan. Thank you, Senator. Let’s begin to unravel it.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I appreciate your kindness.

Senator Symington. We are very grateful to you for appearing.

The next witness is Mr. Sam Adams.

Mr. Adams, will your rise and raise your right hand, please?

Do you swear that the information you give this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Adams. I do, sir.

Senator Symington. Have you a statement prepared?

Testimony of
Samuel A. Adams

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. Will you read it? {p.56}

Mr. Adams. I will, sir.

First I would like to apologize for appearing so late, but I didn’t realize that I was going to testify before this committee until relatively a short time ago.

Senator Symington. I think sometime back you said you would be ready to testify, and we said we would always be willing to hear you. Is that correct?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Would you read your statement, please?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

My name is Samuel A. Adams. I resigned from the Central Intelligency {sic: Intelligence} Agency on June 1, 1973. My resignation stemmed from dismay over what I thought was the sloppy and often dishonest way U.S. intelligence conducted research on the struggle in Indochina. An example of the shortcomings, I believe, was the manner in which U.S. intelligence produced reports on the political and administrative agencies of the Vietcong. These agencies, sometimes called the infrastructure, were the target of the allied Phoenix program. The Phoenix program was overseen at one time by Mr. Colby, a candidate to receive the CIA’s directorship.

Seven of my 10 years at the Agency were devoted to research on our adversaries in Indochina. My reports included an extensive study on the Vietcong police system, a treatise on Communist subversive agents in the South Vietnamese Army and police, and an examination of the Vietcong’s covert structure in South Vietnamese territory. In 1970, I wrote a lengthy study entitled “Guide to a Viet Cong Province” which the CIA uses as its standard field handbook on the Communists in South Vietnam. For about 5 years I gave the Agency’s training course on the Vietcong to CIA case officers bound for Vietnam.

The Phoenix program is an example of a sound concept gone awry. It was meant to destroy the Communists’ political apparatus, but it has not done so, and the Vietcong are in the middle of a resurgence throughout South Vietnam. Although the country’s surface looks peaceful enough — at least compared to the last few years — the appearance is deceiving. Beneath the surface of the South Vietnamese Government, the unraveling is well along.

Phoenix was conceived when the Allies’ main weapons in South Vietnam were American warplanes, and heavily armed battalions whose mission was to “search and destroy.” The weapons were bludgeons, which all too often failed to discriminate between the enemy soldier and the innocent bystander. More important, they were virtually useless against the Vietcong political cadre, who, it came to be realized, was just as dangerous as the Vietcong warrior.

Phoenix was designed to fill the gap. Copied from a British concept which had succeeded in Malaya, the Phoenix program was meant to replace the bludgeon with a scalpel. The key to the operation was precise targeting. Instead of bombs — which killed large numbers of civilians in addition to the occasional political operative of the Vietcong — Phoenix’s main tools, theoretically, were good intelligence and good files. The object of the program was to find out who among the Vietnamese population were Vietcong cadres, and to arrest or kill them. In theory, arrests were preferable to assassinations, because a {p.57} prisoner could lead to further arrests, and a cadaver led nowhere. In order to work, the Phoenix program had basic needs. These are five of the most important:

1.  A clear perception of the nature and organization of the target.

2.  Good intelligence concerning the names, the whereabouts, and the activities of the people who belong to it.

3.  A tight, well-run police organization, with secure files, with the ability to keep close track of the population, and with a high state of training and morale.

4.  An efficient and fair judicial system, with stout prisons and a rehabilitation program which could turn rebels into citizens. 5. Most important, popular support.

The trouble with Phoenix, however, and the reason it did not work, was that its needs, although recognized in theory were never fulfilled in practice. The divorce between hope and reality became so wide that the program degenerated into a game of statistics, in which numbers were paramount, and the object of the exercise — the crippling of the Communist Party — was never even approached. I will deal with the needs listed above, and unfulfilled, one by one.

When U.S. troops first landed in force in Vietnam in early 1965, we were abysmally ignorant of the nature of the threat. It was thought that the application of enough military force by the United States would eventually compel the Communists to lay off. But they didn’t, and the introduction of each new American battalion only seemed to get us in deeper than we already were.

Finally, the Tet offensive demonstrated the Vietcong’s ability to get large numbers of troops into the South Vietnamese urban areas without detection, and jarred U.S. intelligence into the realization that the Communists had something there besides an army. The Phoenix program — which had existed in one form or another for several years — began to take serious shape.

The initial problem was that the basic research on the nature of the adversary and of his organization was either undone or misunderstood. When the time came to designate a target for the Phoenix organization to aim at the most readily available entity was something U.S. intelligence called the infrastructure, a catchall phrase long used to describe the nonmilitary portion of the Vietcong organization. Unfortunately, the Communists themselves had no such term, and U.S. intelligence has no precise definition of what it included. It did have a number, however, 39,175, which had remained the same from June 1965 up until the eve of the Tet offensive. Although the number changed after Tet — it has ranged since then from 60,000 to 90,000 — the definitional problem was never cleared up. As a result, no one knows even now who belongs to the infrastructure, and the number given out officially is the sum of the guesses from the field, made by people who have varying ideas of what they are counting. It is conceivable, using the loosely defined official criteria, that we could say the infrastructure was anywhere from 10,000 to a quarter of a million strong.

A salient problem of who to count arose from the fact that for some time the Vietcong’s convert operatives in South Vietnamese territory were not included in the official lists. Thus a spy in Thieu’s office — there was one — would be excluded from the infrastructure because he failed to fit the official U.S. definition. The problem was compounded {p.58} because of the reluctance on the part of U.S. intelligence to look into the matter of Vietcong subversion. For example, in May 1969, the CIA Chief of Station for Saigon indicated on a visit to Washington his belief that the Vietcong had only 200 agents in the South Vietnamese Government. He spoke from ignorance. An indepth research study going on at the same time suggested the real number of such agents was more like 30,000.

The question of the Communists’ covert presence in South Vietnamese territory became particularly vexing after the coup in Cambodia in March 1970. When it occurred, most of the Communists’ army in the southern half of South Vietnam left for duty next door, and large numbers of Vietcong cadres in Vietnam’s Delta shifted from Vietcong to South Vietnamese territory, often by false defection through Chieu Hoi Centers. The ensuing quiet in the Delta — along with an apparent increase in the enemy’s defection rates — gave rise to optimism among American officials in Vietnam, including those who manned the Phoenix program.

Although hard intelligence on the names, whereabouts and doings of Communist cadres is much sought after, it is very hard to come by. Allied files bulge with information of this sort, but in the vast majority of cases it is either false or incomplete. Things have improved since the early days of Phoenix when operations against specific targets were almost nonexistent. But the improvements have been marginal, and the latest reports from the field suggest the situation is getting worse instead of better. In any case, the type of person neutralized by Phoenix is about the same as it always was; they are mostly low-level and of little consequence. The hardcore party member is still uncaught.

The South Vietnamese national police and Military Security Service — both of which work for Phoenix — are better now than they were, say, in 1966. But the base was so low that it is difficult to conceive that they could have gotten worse.

The problem here is much more complicated than simply low morale — which recent reports suggest is endemic among the South Vietnamese constabulary. The most trying aspect of the situation is the Vietcong’s continued penetration of the South Vietnamese security apparatus. Captured documents indicate that many hundreds of South Vietnamese policemen are in reality Vietcong agents. The penetrations occur at all levels. A government rollup which took place in northern South Vietnam in 1971, show the dimensions of the problem. Among those reportedly apprehended as Vietcong agents were the chief of police of Da Nang City. The chief of the police special branch, and his assistant for operations, and the chief of police for I corps. The first three were jailed. The last, after evidence proved insufficient for conviction, was reputedly transferred to Saigon as a police adviser to the Phoenix program.

Although the American advisory effort to Phoenix contained no Vietcong agents, it often was of questionable help. One of its main shortcomings was the ignorance of most advisors of the Vietcong target. Prior to August 1968, the average CIA case officer received no training whatsoever in the organization and methods of operations of the Communist structure. Then, in late 1968, a training program started up which by the end of the year gave those bound for Vietnam. 24 hours of instruction. This was rapidly cut back. The number of {p.59} hours in the Vietcong target now given to CIA case officers going to Saigon is four.

An ancillary problem is the one of population control. Despite many attempts over the last 5 years, there is still no adequate ID card system in Vietnam, and large numbers of persons, particularly in the slums, roam about without the police knowing who they are. Likewise, the Phoenix system has yet to devise as mundane a thing as a catalog of fingerprints. If, say, the U.S. Ambassador was killed tomorrow, and the gun was found which accomplished the killing, there would be no way to trace the assassin, from the prints on the gun.

South Vietnamese prisons continue to leak, although not as badly as a few years ago. Still, the average Vietcong captive — unlike the common criminal — will likely go free within a very few months. Again, one can point to improvements, but the basic problem remains that the accounting system which comes into play after a suspect’s arrest is so loose that it is often very difficult to tell what happens to him shortly thereafter. In several areas of Vietnam, at present, the system, has broken down completely, so that Communist prisoners in these areas frequently fail to go to prison at all.

Furthermore, there is an almost complete lack of a rehabilitation system. The old saw that the most dedicated Vietnamese Communists have usually done time, continues to have a ring of truth. Captured documents still show that those who leave South Vietnamese prisons frequently rejoin the Vietcong organizations after their release from jail.

But the biggest single drawback to the Phoenix program is that except in a few areas it lacks popular support. What this boils down to is the reluctance of the average South Vietnamese citizen to turn in a Vietcong cadre when he encounters one. Whether the reluctance stems from fear or admiration of the Vietcong, it amounts to the same thing; that is, the extraordinarily large Vietcong apparatus continues its covert existence in South Vietnamese territory.

In connection with my statement to your committee, I respectfully put forward three conclusions:

1.  The Phoenix program largely failed to come to grips with basic problems, and claimed improvements were so marginal as to be of little consequence. Perhaps doomed from the start by built-in flaws, the program’s problems were worsened by such shortcomings as woefully insufficient training.

2.  The game of statistics into which Phoenix plunged allowed the U.S. Government to conjure a picture of progress arose from such factors as the exit from South Vietnam in 1970, of most of the Communist army, and the transfer of large numbers of Vietcong cadre to so-called government territory, where even today they operate unrecorded by Phoenix statisticians.

3.  The faulty execution of the program, which was expensive and didn’t work, demonstrates once again the need for congressional scrutiny of the CIA. Until Congress begins to inspect closely what the CIA is up to, we may expect further questionable programs such as Phoenix.

That is the end of my prepared statement, sir. I have another codicil that I would like to add to it if I might.

Senator Symington. How long is it? {p.60}

Mr. Adams. Two of these pages.

Senator Symington. Didn’t they tell you the rules of the committee, that when it comes to prepared statements we would like 24 hours’ notice?

Mr. Adams. Yes, they did, but I had such short notice.

Senator Symington. Do you have a copy of it?

Mr. Adams. It is still handwritten.

Senator Symington. If you only had a short notice, we had short notice too, because we didn’t know you wanted to testify.

Who asked you to testify?

Mr. Adams. Senator Kennedy’s office, sir.

Senator Symington. He is not a member of this committee.

Mr. Adams. No sir, he is not, sir. But on the other hand, I didn’t find out —

Senator Symington. I understand, I am not being critical but the short notice had nothing to do with the staff of this committee.

Mr. Adams. Absolutely not, no sir.

Senator Symington. How long is your additional statement?

Mr. Adams. It is three of those pages.

Senator Symington. Will you proceed?

Mr. Adams. Thank you very much, sir.

I would like to attach this codicil to my main statement. It has to do with Cambodia, and what I believe was the deliberate fabrication of statistics of the Khmer Communist order of battle by the CIA. I made allegations concerning the fabrication to the CIA Inspector General in December 1972, and I was told that Mr. Colby was aware of the allegations. As far as I can determine, no attempt was made to investigate the charges.

The circumstances of the fabrication are as follows:

I would respectfully like to lay out the circumstances of what I believe was a fabrication.

Senator Hughes. Would you restate that again clearly? You are talking about a fabrication of CIA statistics?

Mr. Adams. Yes sir, that is correct.

Senator Hughes. I want to make sure I understand what you say.

Mr. Adams. On the Khmer order of battle, that is, how many Khmer Communist soldiers are in Cambodia?

As I said, I would like to lay out briefly what I believe is the circumstance of the fabrication.

Between April 1970 and June 1971, was a range of from 5,000 to 10,000. The range remained constant during this period because no one within the U.S. Intelligence Community was looking at the problem or investigating how large the Khmer Communist Army was.

A memo written by the CIA in May 1971 in fact gave us this range of 5 to 10,000 as the official number.

In June 1971 I wrote a memorandum of approximately 40 pages based on a review of all available evidence on the matter of the Khmer Communist army. Within a week or so the paper was killed, I was threatened with firing, and told to work on weekends for the foreseeable future, I did so, that is, I worked a 7-day week throughout the summer of 1971.

Senator Symington. Who told you that?

Mr. Adams. My immediate supervisor, sir. {p.61}

 

Senator Symington. What was his name?

Mr. Adams. Harold Ford, sir.

Senator Symington. What was his position?

Mr. Adams. He was head of the special research staff to which I belonged, sir.

Senator Symington. In Washington?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir — well, largely.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Mr. Adams. In 1971 I would respectfully submit, sir, that this was one rare instance in which an intelligence analyst was punished during time of war for finding an enemy army.

Right after the paper was removed from my control the job of researching the order of battle was assigned to an analyst who had never worked on Cambodia, and who had never worked on combat order of battle. I would put in parenthetically, sir, that I had worked on Cambodia for a long time, and on orders or battle for several years, often as the CIA’s only order-of-battle analyst.

The day the new analyst was given the jab of researching the order of battle for the Khmer Communists, he was also given a range to come up with, that is, a range of from 10 to 30,000. He was instructed to come up within that range.

The new analyst took 5 months to devise a way to come up with the assigned range. In November 1971, that is, 5 months later after this analyst was told to do this, the CIA finally released its official order of battle. The number in the official order of battle was a range of 15 to 30,000, that is almost precisely the range given the analyst 5 months before.

The present Khmer Communist order of battle, approximately 50,000, is derivative of the old number, that is, the 15 to 30,000. I respectfully submit that it understates it. And I would make the observation that U.S. Intelligence currently asks us to believe that the Cambodian Government Army of 200,000 outnumbers the Khmer Communist Army about 4 to 1 since Phnom Penh seems about to fall. I would suggest that the order put forth by U.S. Intelligence are something of an anomaly.

I would also like to note that I am in the process of laying out a much more detailed account of what happened, which will include names, dates, and who did what to whom.

In any case, I submitted the detailed oral complaint to the CIA Inspector General on the matter. The Inspector General, or rather his assistant, took lengthy notes on what I had to say. A day or so later — in December 1972 — I was told that Mr. Colby, the Executive Director, had been informed of my complaints, and that he had said concerning the complaints, let the chips fall where they may.

Senator Symington. Who said that now?

Mr. Adams. I was told that Mr. Colby said that.

Senator Symington. Who told you that?

Mr. Adams. It was another — it was either Mr. Breckenridge or a Mr. Greer of the Inspector General’s Office, I forget which one it was.

Senator Symington. Inspector General’s Office of where?

Mr. Adams. The CIA, sir.

Senator Symington. Will you find out who told you that and report to this committee? {p.62}

Mr. Adams. I will.

Senator Symington. Check your memory. You see, that is a personal attack against a nominee by hearsay.

Mr. Adams. Well, this isn’t an attack against the nominee.

Senator Symington. I think it is. We just have a difference there. But as long as you mentioned that somebody told you what he said, I would like to know who it was, so that we can question him.

Mr. Adams. Fine. Thank you, sir. It was either Mr. Breckenridge or Mr. Greer.

Senator Symington. You find out who it was and let us know.

Mr. Adams. Yes sir. Thank you very much.

As far as I can tell, only two things happened concerning my complaint, which as far as I was able to determine was never looked into. The first time was during my testimony before the Defense of the Ellsberg trial in March 1973. The matter of my complaint over the Khmer Communist order of battle was brought up by the prosecution. The prosecutor, Mr. Nissen, used my trip to the CIA Inspector General in order to impeach my testimony as a witness. He said that this showed that I was a chronic cornplainer.

The second time — and I cannot be sure that this is directly connected — was after my return from the Ellsberg trial. I was told that my employment at the CIA was about to be terminated, although eventually the Agency backed down. I have reason to believe that persons who proposed my termination, that is, fired me, were those who were responsible for fabricating the Khmer Communist order of battle.

That is the end of my codicil.

Senator Symington. Will you repeat that about the people being fired?

Mr. Adams. Right after I came back from the Ellsberg trial, sir, I was told that my employment with the Agency was about to be terminated. I made several attempts to try to find out who it was that was putting me on the list to get fired. I was unable to find out. But I believe that it was probably the people who had been responsible in my opinion for fabricating the Khmer Communist order of battle.

Senator Symington. You said in your statement — you were reading from a supplementary statement — that you got up in the last few hours —

Mr. Adams. That is right, sir.

Senator Symington. You said in your statement that you resigned in the Central Intelligence Agency on the first of June.

Mr. Adams. That is correct, sir.

Senator Symington. So whoever attempted to fire you did it before that time; is that correct?

Mr. Adams. That is correct, sir.

Senator Symington. Why did they fail? Didn’t they have the authority to discharge you?

Mr. Adams. Oh, yes, they did have the authority to discharge me.

Senator Symington. Why did they change their minds?

Mr. Adams. I have never really been able to find out. I tried to find out and couldn’t.

Senator Symington. How did you try to find out?

Mr. Adams. I wrote a number of memoranda asking why. {p.63}

Senator Symington. You see, in the years that I have been connected with the CIA in one way or another I have had many what you call disgruntled employers of the CIA get in touch with me. And that is also true in business, and it is also true in any governmental agency. And I was just wondering if you were saying that you were notified that you were fired. But in your previous statement you said you resigned.

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir; I was notified that I was fired, and I was unable to find out who was trying to give me the sack. And then I threw in the sponge and quit.

Senator Symington. You testified before the Foreign Relations Committee; did you not?

Mr. Adams. That is correct, sir.

I get these confused. Does that mean House or Senate?

Senator Symington. Senate.

Mr. Adams. No, sir, I haven’t. I testified in front of the House.

Senator Symington. Somebody told me that you testified before the House.

Is it fair to say that the thrust of your testimony is that the Phoenix program is not particularly effective for good or for ill?

Mr. Adams. That would be the thrust of my testimony, yes, sir; that it was ineffective.

Senator Symington. Was one important objective of the Phoenix program to coordinate various types of legitimate intelligence activities?

Mr. Adams. That is correct, sir.

Senator Symington. Was the Phoenix program more successful in acquiring intelligence not subject to abuses in some regions of Vietnam to a different degree than in other regions?

Mr. Adams. I think that is a correct statement; yes, sir.

Senator Symington. If so, what accounted for those differences if they occurred during Mr. Colby’s tenure?

Mr. Adams. I suspect it is the same as you can say about anything, some people in some areas are better than others in other areas. Also there is the matter of degree of penetration in the Da Nang area, where the Viet Cong in essence ran the cops; things didn’t go very well. And in other areas where they didn’t run the police things went better.

Senator Symington. Do you have any specific evidence about Mr. Colby’s conduct of the Phoenix program?

Mr. Adams. No, sir; I do not, except insofar as the reports came back from the Phoenix program which I read.

Senator Symington. You have been in Vietnam yourself quite a lot?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. I have been on four temporary duty assignments in Vietnam, yes, sir.

Senator Symington. One thing that worries me about all this is that I still believe we need an intelligence agency.

Mr. Adams. So do I, sir.

Senator Symington. Do you agree with that?

Mr. Adams. Absolutely.

Senator Symington. And whereas the FBI over 30 years has been very successful in building up a superb public relations department, it is difficult if not impossible for the Central Intelligence Agency to {p.64} have such a department based on the nature of its work. You agree with that; don’t you?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. And therefore when something happens like the killing of an agent, or perhaps the finding out about the raiding of a doctor’s office, everybody looks around and says, well, there is only one place we believe we can dump this, and that is the CIA. Would you agree with that, that that has happened in the past?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. And it is very difficult for the Agency itself to answer such criticism as against the public relations departments of the Services, you would agree with that, would you not?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, it is easier than the Services.

Senator Symington. I am thinking about the assassination of an agent. And the story was given to the American people through the press that the CIA did it. And being a member of this subcommittee, I went to work to find out what actually happened. And I found out that the CIA recommended urgently that the agent in question not be killed. Do you remember that incident?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator Symington. Do you know the details of it?

Mr. Adams. Not the absolute details, but more or less as you put it.

Senator Symington. If you had said yes, I would ask you, because I am confident — I don’t remember what you just said, the staff said something to me, but I know that your answer would have been what you stated if you did know the details of it. You have no reason to doubt that?

Mr. Adams. I have no reason to doubt either as you said it or what I remember at the time.

Senator Symington. Do you know of any domestic intelligence checks by the Central Intelligence Agency specially against any Member of Congress? This question is being asked for Senate or House.

Mr. Adams. I know that the CIA has people such as businessmen or missionaries that are coming back from foreign countries.

Senator Symington. I didn’t hear that.

Mr. Adams. The CIA has people to question, say, businessmen or missionaries or something that come back from foreign countries. But as I understand your question, I think it has to do with whether they spy on Senators — I don’t know.

Senator Symington. Let me repeat the question. Do you know of any domestic intelligence by the CIA especially against any Member of Congress.

Mr. Adams. I know of no domestic intelligence against Congressmen, nor do I know of any domestic intelligence in the sense that it is trying to find out something that is going on in the United States. However, there is an intelligence processing going on locally within the country.

Senator Symington. You wouldn’t object to an intelligence agency questioning American citizens who have returned from a foreign country?

Mr. Adams. No, sir, not at all.

Senator Symington. Under the organization in South Vietnam at the time did the man who was the head of the position held by Mr. Colby have operational control over American military units? {p.65}

Mr. Adams. I don’t believe he did, sir, in the sense that he could tell the First Division to move in a certain area, no sir.

Senator Symington. You see, that is a very important question to me. because I happen to know in a case that I just saw that when they got caught they dumped it on the CIA, and they dumped something that was exactly against what the CIA recommended. And ultimately the agent in question was allowed to leave the Services, but he was not dishonorably discharged, the one who carried it out. I think that you probably know what I am talking about now.

Mr. Adams. I know what you are talking about.

Senator Symington. Will the killing of prisoners or other atrocities committed by military units be the type of thing which the Commander of the Corps could just order to be stopped and it would be stopped.

Mr. Adams. Yes, I am sure that he could order that not to occur and could not.

Senator Symington. If he ordered it not to occur do you think that the South Vietnamese would have obeyed that order?

Mr. Adams. No, sir.

Senator Symington. Are you primarily critical of the Phoenix program because it was ineffective or because it was cruel?

Mr. Adams. Primarily because it was ineffective. But also I suppose you could say that I would criticize it for cruelty as well. And that has to do with its ineffectiveness. But the cruelty, I think, was accomplished mostly by the South Vietnamese rather than the Americans.

Senator Symington. Now, in your first statement that you presented, Mr. Adams, you did not take a position for or against the nomination of Mr. Colby to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, but in the second statement my impression is that you have taken that position, is that correct?

Mr. Adams. No, sir. As a matter of fact, I don’t think I am taking a position on whether I think Mr. Colby should be nominated or should not be nominated. I have certainly heard good things of Mr. Colby as well as bad things of Mr. Colby.

Senator Symington. That is the purpose of this hearing.

May I say that with much that you say I am in agreement?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Symington. And I think that the program is very badly handled, and I think much too much of it was kept unnecessarily secret from the American people by the administrations that were involved.

I turned against this war many years ago, long before the President. And I have so stated in speeches to the Senate. So we don’t have that problem about the conduct of the war. The purpose of this hearing is the qualifications of this man who has been nominated to be Director. Among them and much of the testimony — we have had many people commend this recommendation. And we have also had other people who opposed it. And I was just wondering how you felt about it, because that is the basic purpose of this hearing.

Mr. Adams. I suppose vis-a-vis that question, I really feel unqualified as to Colby, whether he is a good or bad man. However, I would tend to agree with what I was told of Senator Kennedy’s position; namely, that a matter of this importance needs a good deal of looking {p.66} into, more than I think he felt was being done in those hearings on Mr. Colby’s nomination. It is my opinion, for what it is worth, that something which is as keen as the Director of Central Intelligence needs a great deal of looking into, a job like that, and that very often people tend to be glib either in their recommendations or in their disapproval of the candidate in question.

Senator Symington. You constantly refer to Senator Kennedy. May I say that I have the greatest respect for Senator Kennedy. But he was not in the executive hearing that we had on Mr. Colby after we had the open hearing. And I was much influenced by Dr. Schlesinger’s unqualified recommendation of Mr. Colby. Because Dr. Schlesinger became Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee and did more in less time to put that committee under proper civilian control in my opinion than anybody, he did more in a few months than anybody had done in many years. And after that he went into the Central Intelligence Agency, and he reorganized it, and he let a good many people go that he felt were unnecessary. And he was in the process of attempting to do a job from the standpoint of the taxpayer. And it was his recommendation of Mr. Colby that had a great deal to do with my believing that he would be a proper man for the job.

And I would ask you this question. Do you know of anything specific against Mr. Colby that you think disqualifies him for the position?

Mr. Adams. I know of nothing specific, no sir. I threw in that codicil to show that I have heard something. And I, of course, can’t tell what Mr. Colby had to do with any of that business, so I can’t say one way or the other whether he is at fault. I have submitted a number of complaints over the years — this is the problem I have had — I have submitted a number of complaints over the years to the Agency. And usually what happens is that that very little occurs. So no so-called facts are ever established.

Senator Symington. And then as I understand it anybody in the Agency who would be in a position to be Director you would be worried about because of the past activities of the Agency, is that correct?

Mr. Adams. That is correct, sir. Over the years I have seen, particularly concerning Indochina and South Vietnam, a great many instances of what I believe are fabrications of statistics, and very questionable practices having to do with research. And I have grown over the years to have a very uneasy feeling about the hierarchy of the CIA. And this included Mr. Helms.

Senator Symington. So you would say that there is nobody in the CIA who is fit to be Director?

Mr. Adams. No. I wouldn’t say that at all.

Senator Symington. Who have you got in mind that you prefer?

Mr. Adams. I have no one in mind that I would prefer. And I say I don’t believe that is a direct attack on Mr. Colby. But it is my belief that I think the Congress should be very careful about the person that they put at the top.

Senator Symington. Then this hearing gives us the opportunity to investigate your apprehensions about past functions of the Agency, is that correct, more than it has to do with confirmation or lack of confirmation of Mr. Colby?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir. But I think the two matters are not unrelated, that because Mr. Colby was for a long time right close up to the top — {p.67}

Senator Symington. How many years have you been with the Agency?

Mr. Adams. I was there 10 years, sir.

Senator Symington. And in all of the 10 years you can’t remember anybody that you think would be a good director?

Mr. Adams. For all I know, Colby might be a good one, sir.

Senator Symington. I just thought maybe you had somebody else in mind.

Mr. Adams. No, sir; I am not running for the job myself.

Senator Symington. I have been asked by the staff to ask this question and clarify a previous question. Could the Director of CORDS directly give orders to U.S. soldiers, and would he have to make a recommendation to the U.S. military commanders?

Mr. Adams. I would imagine that he would have to make a recommendation to the U.S. military command.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Senator Nunn.

Senator Nunn. Mr. Adams, were you here a little while ago when Congressman Drinan was testifying? Did you hear Congressman Drinan’s testimony immediately preceding your own?

Mr. Adams. I wasn’t listening, sir, I was scribbling this stuff down.

Senator Nunn. He made a couple of statements based on your past experience that I would just like to ask you about, based on your statement. On page 2 of his statement he says that many political prisoners under this program did not receive trial, and that many of them remained for months and years in prison merely because of the petition of local officials. And also I believe in one of your statements one of the criticisms of the Phoenix program is that the jails leak, they come out as soon as they go in.

Mr. Adams. Yes sir, but they leak the wrong people. Whereas a hardened Communist cadre had a whole system pulling for it, the Vietcong program apparatus, the average poor guy that was thrown in there for political reasons usually didn’t, and it would be more likely these guys that might end up in the pokie for years, whereas the hard core Communist would be more likely let loose.

Senator Nunn. Was that under the jurisdiction of the South Vietnamese primarily, when they got out of prison?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn. The CIA didn’t have any jurisdiction over that, did they?

Mr. Adams. The CIA had no direct jurisdiction, no sir.

Senator Nunn. One other question relating to the Congressman’s testimony. Although he didn’t directly state it, he implies — and he later altered this to some degree — that there should be a committee that would have some supervision over the CIA in Congress. But based on your experience do you think that every Member of the Congress should be briefed at their request on every kind of top secret information in the CIA?

Mr. Adams. That is a very broad question, sir. I think on most things of substance, yes. What I mean by substance, if a Senator or Congressman is interested in knowing how many missiles the Russians have, and how we came about the estimates, I think that any Senator or Congressman should have every right to get that type of information. However, if the way we got the information was from some hypothetical spy in {p.68} the Kremlin, and the Senator asked the guy’s name, I don’t think that that is the kind of thing that should be released.

Senator Nunn. You are drawing the line between the method of procuring the information and the information itself?

Mr. Adams. That is right.

Senator Nunn. I would like another comment from you on the Congressman’s statement. And I quote directly:

I do not want to have a Director of the CIA who for whatever reason by his own admission was unable or unwilling to guarantee to South Vietnam citizens the basic due process.

Is that also your criticism, or do you agree with that?

Mr. Adams. No sir, I think I tend to agree with some of the comments that were made, or at least the way the questions were put, from the committee, namely, that it is very hard for us to control what the South Vietnamese are going to do. We can plug for it, but there is not much we can do when a man is deprived of his rights.

Senator Nunn. So you wouldn’t criticize Mr. Colby on the ground that he should have guaranteed everybody due process in South Vietnam?

Mr. Adams. I think one could make the criticism, although I wouldn’t be the one to do it, that maybe he didn’t pull hard enough for that type of thing. But he hasn’t the ability to get a South Vietnamese cop to stop hitting a guy over the head with a truncheon.

Senator Nunn. One other question on this particular testimony. Do you think it is necessary for the CIA agents throughout the world to have a cover, so to speak, or should they identify themselves as CIA?

Mr. Adams. I think you have to have cover. You mean with a CIA sweatshirt?

Senator Nunn. You wouldn’t agree that they should wear badges or uniforms or identify themselves as CIA?

Mr. Adams. It would make it very difficult to be a spy that way.

Senator Nunn. You wouldn’t agree with that criticism that the Congressman had of the CIA agents of Mr. Colby?

Mr. Adams. I wouldn’t agree, if that is how it was put.

Senator Nunn. I get the impression throughout your testimony — and correct me if I am wrong — that your major criticism of the Phoenix program was the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of it. Is that generally the right impression that I have?

Mr. Adams. I don’t think I would put it that narrowly. I think when it was conceived it was a great idea and everything. But it wasn’t looked into, what we were trying to do there. And a great deal more thought should have been given to it, even whether the darned thing should have been started up at all, or whether it was worth a candle. In other words, my criticism wouldn’t be simply that we weren’t good enough in putting away Vietnamese in the pokie, but that maybe we should have given a great deal more thought to what the problem was. And I would again bring out what to me is an astonishing piece of information, that the CIA chief of station in May 1969 only thought that there were 300 agents in the South Vietnamese Government, he had never looked. And that blew my mind then and it blows it now.

Senator Nunn. I notice somewhere here, I don’t know where it is, you said that instead of 300 that later estimates were about 30,000 in the government, is that right? {p.69}

Mr. Adams. Yes sir.

Senator Nunn. They have got a big government, then. What percentage of the government would that be?

Mr. Adams. That always includes the Army, which would be part of the government.

Senator Nunn. It would be a large percentage, though, wouldn’t it?

Mr. Adams. It would be over 1 percent.

Senator Nunn. And that was an estimate that was made?

Mr. Adams. Yes, sir; it was an estimate based on extrapolations from captured documents.

Senator Nunn. Do you have any idea what year that estimate was? How close was that to the original 300 estimate in time period? Was that recently?

Mr. Adams. It was practically contemperaneous {sic: contemporaneous}. The CIA Chief of Station made the statement in May 1965. The estimate was come up with within a couple of months. But the material on which the estimate was based of 30,000 has been available for years.

Senator Nunn. So that was a criticism basically of whoever was the head of the station had estimated it, that would be a criticism directed at him?

Mr. Adams. It would be a criticism directed at him. But also a criticism of the Agency at large.

Senator Nunn. Lack of coordination?

Mr. Adams. And again that is narrowing the criticism. The overall criticism is that we were in a war in which our allies’ government was so penetrated with Communist spies and subversive agents that it was practically ineffective. And we had not looked into the matter of whether these guys existed; nobody had done a study before that at all.

In this connection I would bring up one other matter, that in February 1966, when I was doing a study on the Viet Cong police, I was in Saigon. And I asked the head of the CIA counterintelligence apparatus — I was inquiring of the head of the CIA’s counterintelligence apparatus in Saigon about the Communist security service. The Communist security service is the VC’s equivalent of the KGB, that is the Soviet Union Secret Police. And this guy, the head of the CIA staff, the counterintelligence staff in Saigon station, had not heard of this. And this was the CIA’s principal enemy in South Vietnam — again, to me a mind-blowing episode which illustrates the lack of research and forethought.

Senator Nunn. I notice in here that you imply very strongly that they should have had a fingerprint system and much tighter police security in South Vietnam. How would we have implemented a fingerprint system at that time?

Mr. Adams. We tried to do it, but I think it never got off the ground because there were so many Communist agents in there trying to screw it up. Everybody that has an ID card in South Vietnam, as I understand it, has his prints on it. And yet there was no central filing system back in Saigon where those prints could be retrieved.

Senator Nunn. Basically your testimony is not that we had a cruel, tough, efficient Phoenix program, but that we really had a weak, clumsy, inefficient Phoenix program; isn’t that about it?

Mr. Adams. Well, without trying to say that we should have a cruel — I forget you put that first business — but I would agree with the {p.70} second part of your statement, that we had a very ineffective, very clumsy, very badly managed system going, and it didn’t work.

Senator Nunn. The real gist of it is that your criticism of the propram is almost exactly opposite of Congressman Drinan’s, isn’t it?

Mr. Adams. Not necessarily, sir.

Senator Nunn. You wanted a tighter police system of fingerprints, ID cards, and so forth and so on, which is certainly a tighter system and much more dictatorial in a police state than the program was itself. And he criticized it on the basis of the detention. I might just ask you the question: Do you believe in this detention method that was used?

Mr. Adams. I certainly think it is better than killing the guy. However, I wouldn’t like to put myself in opposition to what he said, because I think a great deal of what he did say made an enormous amount of sense.

Senator Nunn. Have you all coordinated your testimony?

Mr. Adams. I have never met the man, and I don’t know what he looks like. I passed him in the hall.

Senator Nunn. The first page of your statements indicates that you know that the Phoenix program was implemented as a scalpel rather than a bludgeon.

Mr. Adams. That is right.

Senator Nunn. And it was implemented as an alternative to what you described —

Mr. Adams. It was the alternative to the passive search to destroy where you just herded everybody; it was more of a selective thing.

Mr. Adams. Yes, I think that is the case.

Senator Nunn. And do you consider it as an alternative to that kind of a search to destroy, that it was in effect less cruel than the search-and-destroy type?

Mr. Adams. Yes; it killed a lot less people, and certainly it was less cruel than the bombing.

Senator Nunn. Both of them were cruel, but the degree of cruelty were less than the alternative?

Mr. Adams. That is correct. I think as it came to be implemented there were many of the problems which arose which the Congressman was complaining about.

Senator Nunn. Mr. Chairman, I am through with this line of questioning. But I would like to go into some of his supplement statement, although I haven’t had a chance to examine it.

Senator Symington. Would you leave us the supplemental statement and come back at 2:30?

Mr. Adams. You mean have it typed up?

Senator Symington. No, you can give it to us the way it is and we handle that part of it.

Mr. Adams. All right. What I said in the record was not precisely what was here. I was using this as a copy.

Senator Symington. Let’s do it anyway you would like to do it. But let us know what you think in the supplemental statement. Thank you. We will recess and at 2:30 we will return.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee went into executive session.] {p.71}