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Full-text: July 2 1973 hearing (pages 1-30)
CIA/DoD Phoenix Program:
Targeting non-combatants (civilians)

CIS: 73 S201-27 SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:C 67/3

Nomination of William E. Colby {3.64mb.pdf, 3.62mb.pdf}










July 2, 20 {a.m., p.m.}, and 25, 1973


Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

GPO mark

99-275 WASHINGTON : 1973



John C. Stennis, Mississippi, Chairman

Stuart Symington, MissouriStrom Thurmond, South Carolina
Henry M. Jackson, WashingtonJohn Tower, Texas
Sam J. Ervin, Jr., North CarolinaPeter H. Dominick, Colorado
Howard W. Cannon, NevadaBarry Goldwater, Arizona
Thomas J. McIntyre, New HampshireWilliam Saxbe, Ohio
Harry F. Byrd, Jr., VirginiaWilliam L. Scott, Virginia
Harold E. Hughes, Iowa
Sam Nunn, Georgia

T. Edward Braswell, Jr., Chief Counsel and Staff Director

John T. Ticer, Chief Clerk





William E. Colby, to be Director of Central Intelligence 2, 119
Robert F. Drinan, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts 31
Samuel A. Adams 55, 71
Paul Sakwa 84
David Sheridan Harrington 95
Kenneth Barton Osborn 101


{July 2 1973 hearing, pages 1-30}



Nomination of William E. Colby


Monday, July 2, 1973

United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 318, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Stuart Symington (acting chairman).

Present: Stuart Symington (presiding).

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director;

Senator Stuart Symington. The hearing will come to order.

We regret members are absent because of the recess. Inasmuch as Director Schlesinger has now become Secretary of Defense we thought it advisable to have Mr. Colby here at the earliest opportunity to consider his confirmation as the new Director of Central Intelligence.

[Nomination reference and report follow:]



In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
May 24,1973.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

William Egan Colby, of Maryland, to be Director of Central Intelligence, vice James R. Schlesinger.

July 26, 1973.

Reported by Mr. Jackson with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed, subject to the nominee’s commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate. {p.2}


Senator Symington. Mr. Colby has had a long career in Government service, chiefly in intelligence and related matters. He served for a number of years in Vietnam on various assignments in one of which he held the rank of Ambassador.

The Chair would emphasize that today’s hearings will not only be an examination of Mr. Colby’s qualifications and background, but will also review a number of policies relating to the Central Intelligence Agency itself.

There has been so much discussion about the structure and functioning of the Agency, Mr. Colby, and because of your long connection with it, we are going to take this opportunity to try to get a better understanding for ourselves and for the people as to just what the CIA is and what it is supposed to do.

Statement of
William Egan Colby, Nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Colby. I welcome that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. We believe this the appropriate time to examine in some depth a number of issues that have been the subject of Consistent recent public attention with respect to the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Colby, do you have any preliminary statement you would like to make?

Mr. Colby. No, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the chance to explain to you to the committee, and to the Senate, what my qualifications, I hope, are, for this important challenge ahead of me, and I thought the most useful thing is to answer the questions in your mind, sir.

Senator Symington. Very well.

As you know, the Senate Democratic Caucus has adopted a policy with respect to every nomination which requires that every nominee be asked, do we have your commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly-constituted committee of the Senate.

Would you respond?

Mr. Colby. I will, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. You will what?

Mr. Colby. I will testify.

Senator Symington. Thank you. ¶

We will provide for the record at this point a biographical sketch, of your long and effective record as a Government servant.

[Mr. Colby’s biographical sketch follows:]


William Egan Colby

Mr. William E. Colby was born in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1920. The son of an Army officer, his early life was spent In various posts, including a three-year period in Tientsin, China.

In 1940 he was graduated from Princeton University and in 1941 joined the United States Army, serving in the Parachute Field Artillery. When the Office of Strategic Services put out a call for French sneakers in 1943, Mr. Colby volunteered and in 1944 was parachuted behind enemy lines in north central France to work with a resistance unit. Shortly before the end of the war in 1945, he led a team dropped in northern Norway to destroy a rail line used for transporting German reinforcements.

Following the war, Mr. Colby obtained his law degree from Columbia Law School and joined a New York law firm headed by William J. Donovan, former head of OSS. He is a member of the New York State and U.S. Supreme Court bars. {p.3}

In 1949 Mr. Colby accepted his first U.S. Government position as an attorney far the National Labor Relations Board in Washington. In 1951 he joined the staff of the American Embassy in Stockholm and from 1953 to 1958 served in the American Embassy in Rome, Italy.

Mr. Colby became First Secretary of the American Embassy in Saigon in 1959, leaving in 1962 for an assignment as Chief of the Far East Division of the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C.

In March 1988 Mr. Colby joined the Agency for International Development and was posted to Saigon to assume the post of Assistant Chief of Staff and in November 1968 of Deputy to the Commander of MACV for the CORDS program of support to the Government of Vietnam’s pacification campaign, with the personal rank of Ambassador. He was reassigned to the Department of State on 30 June 1971.

On 10 January 1972 Mr. Colby was appointed Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Colby was appointed Deputy Director for Operations effective 3 March 1973.

Mr. Colby is married to the former Barbara Heinzen. They have four children and reside in Bethesda.


Senator Symington. In the paper Sunday was an article “London Paper Asserts CIA Engineered the Coup in Greece.”

I will read the first sentence of that article in the New York Times on Sunday, July 1.

The Observer said today that it has found evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency engineered the 1967 military coup in Greece and is using secret knowledge of Premier George Papadopoulos “war-time collaboration with the Nazis”, to maintain control of the regime.

Is there any justification for these assertions?

Mr. Colby. I had that researched, Mr. Chairman. The CIA did not engineer the coup in Greece in 1967. Secondly, I think we are not in possession of that kind of information about Mr. Papadopoulos that is alleged there. And we did not train him in this country as alleged there.

Senator Symington. At any time has Mr. Papadopoulos been an agent for the CIA?

Mr. Colby. He has not been an agent. He has been an official of the Greek Government at various times, and in those periods from time to time we worked with him in his official capacity.

Senator Symington. Did we pay him any money at any time?

Mr. Colby. I cannot answer that now, Mr. Chairman. I just do not know. I can say that we did not pay him personally.

[The following statement was provided for the record:]


The CIA never paid Mr. Papadopoulos any money.

The only association the Agency ever had with Papadopoulos of any kind was in his capacity as an officer of the Greek Intelligence Service, with which we have maintained a liaison relationship since the Greek civil war in the late 1940’s.


[The article from the New York Times follows:]


[The New York Times, Sunday, July 1, 1973]


LONDON, Sunday, July 1— The Observer said today that it has found evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency engineered the 1967 military coup in Greece and is using secret knowledge of Premier George Papadopoulos’s “wartime collaboration with the Nazis,” to maintain control of the regime.

The Sunday newspaper said that at the Athens headquarters of the joint United States Military Aid Assistance Group, Mr. Papadopoulos is known among senior staff members as “the first C.I.A. agent to become premier of a European country.” {p.4}

Mr. Papadopoulos has now proclaimed himself provisional President and declared Greece a republic.

The Observer’s writer, Charles Foley, quoted an unidentified American military adviser in Athens as having said: “George gives good value because there are documents in Washington he wouldn’t like let out.”

The British paper said that the Greek secret service, built up after the 1945-49 civil war, was formed by the United States, and that, according to Andreas Papandreou, minister of state in charge of intelligence in the Government brought down by the coup, it “was in reality a financial and administrative appendage of the C.I.A.”


Mr. Papadopoulos, a former colonel, was among hundreds of secret-service agents sent to the United States for training, the Observer said. His anti-Communist credentials were stringently investigated at the time.

The newspaper said that a comrade of Gen. George Grivas, wartime leader of an anti-Communist guerrilla organization, had confirmed reports that Mr. Papadopoulos had served as a captain in a security battalion organized by the Nazis to hold down partisans during the war.

The current Government stand portraying Communism as Greece’s only enemy and minimizing the German occupation “clearly reflects the dictator’s concern at the danger that the gap in his official biography may some day be filled in,” The Observer said.

It said that the composition of the cabal of officers who carried out the 1967 coup suggested C.I.A. involvement. Four of the five officers, it said, were closely connected with United States forces or intelligence, and the fifth was brought in because of the armored units he commanded.

The newspaper also suggested that American influence at the time of the coup prevented the carrying out of a contingency plan, drawn up by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for use if Greece faced war or revolution.


Senator Symington. In a hearing of this character, if you would like to defer the question for an executive hearing, we will be glad to do so.

Mr. Colby. I am prepared to provide every detail in executive session, as you know, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. This article was a flatout assertion. ¶

I thought we should know.

Mr. Colby. I can equally say that the CIA did not engineer the coup in Greece in 1967.

Senator Symington. There is a book somebody has given me called “My War with the CIA”, the memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk {Cambodia} as related to Wilfred Burchett, Australian journalist. ¶

Have you read the book?

Mr. Colby. I have not had a chance to read the book, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. I have not read it all myself, only some of it.

Mr. Colby. I know a little about our relationship with Prince Sihanouk over the years because I have been involved in Southeast Asia. ¶

And I know the thrust of his allegations that the CIA was trying to unseat him at various times. ¶

First. I can say that we did not have anything to do with his ouster in 1970. That was conducted within the Cambodian Government at that time.

In reference to an earlier incident, we did not conduct an attempted coup against him, although we did have certain information as to the people who were so doing.

Senator Symington. At any time have we worked in conjunction with Lon Nol or Sirik Matak?

Mr. Colby. As officials of their Government we have, of course, been in contact with various people, but we have not conducted any private relationship with Prime Minister Lon Nol. {p.5}

Senator Symington. They were never paid employees of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Colby. No.

Senator Symington. You are familiar with the controversy over the Phoenix program in Vietnam, which we understand you supervised as Deputy U.S. Commander in Vietnam for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support from 1968 to 1971. ¶

There have been allegations, in effect, that the Phoenix program was an “assassination” program. ¶

What are the facts?

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, I have testified in extenso on this subject before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1970, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Subcommittee on Refugees in early 1971, and before the House Committee on Government Operations in July 1971. ¶

Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970, “Hearings on Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program” (U.S. Congress 91-2, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, February 17, 18, 19, 20, and March 3, 4, 17, 19, 1970, and Appendix, 7+750 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:V 67/17, CIS: 71 S381-2, OCLC: 119418, LCCN: 76610214 pf, DL, WorldCat}.

War-Related Civilian Problems in Indochina, Part 1: Vietnam (U.S. Congress 92-1, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Hearing, April 21 1971, 3+154 pages, U.S. GPO, 1971). Witnesses: William E. Colby, Dennis J. Doolin, Malcolm E. Phelps, Johannes U. Hoeber. {SuDoc: Y 4.J 89/2:In 2/8/PT.1, CIS: 71 S521-50, LCCN: 70613733} {full text: menu, pp.4+1-36 (2390 kb pdf), pp.37-75 (2457 kb pdf), pp.76-114 (2807 kb pdf), pp.115-154 (2717 kb pdf)}.

U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 92-1, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, Hearings, July 15 {a.m., p.m.}, 16, 19, 21, and August 2 1971, 4+362 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.G 74/7:V 67/4, CIS: 72 h301-3, OCLC: 235387, LCCN: 71616178 pf, DL, WorldCat}CJHjr

In each of those hearings I have made the statement, and I was under oath and am prepared to repeat it, if necessary, that the Phoenix program was not a program of assassination. ¶

The Phoenix program was a part of the overall pacification program which was designed to strengthen the Government of South Vietnam and its people against the assault, led against them by the North Vietnamese through a program of subversion, guerrilla warfare, and military operations. ¶

The pacification program dealt essentially with the first two of those, subversion and guerrilla warfare.

The Phoenix program was developed in order to bring some order into the fight between the subversion of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, and the Government. During the mid-1960’s in South Vietnam, there was a great deal of anarchy and confusion. ¶

Now, a large number of activities went on then that are quite frankly, reprehensible.

The Phoenix program was designed in late 1967 and essentially began to operate in mid-1968 with a view to bringing some order into the Government side, if not the Communist side, of this problem. ¶

The Communists, as you know, were conducting a campaign of terrorism against the people of South Vietnam, against local officials, and against National Government officials. ¶

In the process the comamnd {sic: command} and control structure of this terrorist campaign was run by an apparatus of the Communist Party of North Vietnam, the Lao Dong Party, and in 1961 there was formed the People’s Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam as a front to pretend a separation between those two parties. This apparatus was the controlling body and staff of the overall program. ¶

In order to struggle against this apparatus it was necessary to bring together the various intelligence, police forces, and local security forces to begin to identify who the people were in this apparatus, because they were sophisticated, clandestine operators. They used aliases, used cutouts, and used a variety of intelligence procedures in order to conceal themselves.

In the course of the Phoenix program we looked at the situation and it was apparent that too many people in very minor contact with the rebellion were being captured or otherwise affected by the counteraction against this apparatus. ¶

The Phoenix program was designed to make this a regular program so that the attention could be given to the main people that were involved in the command structure on the Communist side.

For example, a form of dossier was established by which the evidence could be carefully collected on the names of the people who {p.6} were involved. ¶

A procedure was set up that three independent reports had to be collected in order for a man to be named as a member of the apparatus by the Government. ¶

The Phoenix program set up categories of these different people on the Communist side. These were in the three categories of A, B, C. ¶

The A category were the leaders, and the members of the People’s Revolutionary Party; ¶

the B category were the cadre, the ones who helped to make it operate. ¶

The C category were other people who were somehow involved in supporting the apparatus and the campaign.

The three categories were set up in order to distinguish the important enemy individuals from the ones who were really not so important. ¶

For example, the Phoenix program was addressed only to the A and B categories, and said to the people who were in the police and intelligence services that the C category was not part of the Phoenix program because it was desired to leave those people as much alone as possible and focus the effort against the leaders on the other side.

There were a variety of other programs instituted over the course of time to improve the legal basis and structure under which the program operated. ¶

The Province Security Committee which had the authority to detain individuals for security purposes used to be made up primarily of police and intelligence officials.

Senator Symington. I do not mean to interrupt you but was this part of the Komer plan for pacification, or part of the Yung Tau school operation?

Mr. Colby. There was a continuum, Mr. Chairman, which Mr. Komer started and which I then continued.

Mr. Komer left, as you know, in November 1968, so most of the developments of the Phoenix program were my own after that. ¶

But a variety of other legal procedures and practical procedures were instituted in the Phoenix program. We tried to improve the accuracy of the information and, secondly, to improve the treatment given to the individuals captured. ¶

The thrust of the program was to capture people who were on these lists or to get them to defect or rally to the Government. ¶

But in the situation, in the middle of a war like that, a lot of people were killed in the process of the incidents and the attacks. ¶

I think some 87 percent, as I remember, of the people killed under the program who were named members of the apparatus were killed by military forces, and only 12 percent were killed by the police and local forces of that nature.

Query:  “Capture”?

“ The Viet Cong have a bounty on snipers. But this doesn’t scare “Tropic Lightning” soldiers from the 25th Inf. Div. who are taking a new intensive sniper training course. ...

The theory behind the instruction is that good, accurate, long-range snipers can prove demoralizing to the enemy. ¶

Carefully deployed, the hidden rifleman can observe enemy troop movements and interdict Viet Cong tax collectors, mail runners and propaganda agents.”

“Top Shot Sniper School at Academy,” Tropic Lightning News, June 19 1967. “The Tropic Lightning News is an authorized publication of the 25th Infantry Division. It is published weekly for all division units in the Republic of Vietnam by the Information Office, 25th Infantry Division, APO San Francisco 96225.”


Tax collectors, mail runners, and propaganda agents” are “Vietcong Infrastructure”: Non-combatant South Vietnamese civilians. They are not lawful targets in warfare and ambushing them with snipers is prima facie murder.

William E. Colby’s order reconfirmed that U.S. soldiers were “entitled to use” “military force” (e.g., snipers) to target these noncombatant civilians.

Colby here attempts to pass off — to pretend it was collateral damage in combat — the purposeful, wilful, intentional, targeted, killings of people who they knew to be, and knew to be documented to be, non-combatants.

That’s the definition of “assassination,” its common name is “murder,” and its fancy name implies a political motive. Targeted killings of civilians today, for a political motive, we term “terrorism,” unless legalized by the law of reprisals, such as Hamas rockets launched from Gaza targeting civilians in Israel, intended to deter future Israeli war crimes.

This Phoenix order is criminal order — criminal on its face — authorizing the murder, assassination, of noncombatants, as a tool of United States military doctrine, and U.S. foreign policy, to reduce political opposition to its war-making, to teach its victims, by killing them, to suffer in silence, to take no action to assist an armed opposition to an invading, occupying, foreign, military force (the U.S.).

Because it was approved at the highest levels of the United States Government, and by the U.S. military commanders of the U.S. military occupation of South Vietnam, this order, and the killings it blessed, is also a “crime against humanity” (state-sponsored murder), as defined in the charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg).

Colby said, he personally drafted the order, which the U.S. military command in Vietnam issued (MACV Directive No. 525-36, May 18 1970)

It’s small wonder U.S. soldiers were vilified, confused, angry, about their participation in the Vietnam war and the hatred they attracted, from their fellow citizens.

A war with a criminal war aim:

To prevent the people of Vietnam from electing the government of their choice in 1956, a fundamental human right, says the U.N. Charter, a right the U.S. promised, in writing, it would not subvert.

And then proceeded to do exactly that, ensuring the 1956 election would never happen, because 80% of the voters would have elected Ho Chi Minh, a national hero. That’s what U.S. President Eisenhower said, the CIA told him, when he published his memoirs.

And, a war waged by criminal methods.

Ambushing civilians — a very great consequence to the victims — was a very small part of the criminal war methods, authorized, approved, and condoned, by a criminal U.S. Military chain of command.

Implemented, for the most part, by U.S. officers who were themselves confused for want of instruction in the laws of war:

A deliberate decision by the highest U.S. commanders which continues to this day.

A continuing “war crime,” by a sequence of individual U.S. high commanders — participating in a continuous criminal conspiracy, and a continuous RICO criminal enterprise — who continue this policy of non-instruction, because the laws of war require commanders to teach the laws of war, including the targeting laws of war.

And this, they did not do in Vietnam. And do not do today.

On purpose, because they desire to utilize violent crime as a tool of warfare. It’s useful.

Crime pays, when it’s not punished.

And because U.S. officials will not do so, it falls to “terrorists” to punish the violent crimes and torts of the U.S. Government in self defense, “countermeasures,” to persuade the United States to abandon its course of lawlessness, and submit to peaceable remedies in a court of law.

This, the United States will not do.

September 28 2004  CJHjr

Senator Symington. In 1970 you testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Phoenix program was designed initially to eliminate the Vietcong infrastructure by capturing its members, “rallying” them — that is, persuading them to defect — or by eliminating them. ¶

How many, roughly, would you estimate were eliminated?

Mr. Colby. Well, the elimination was all three categories because the word eliminate referred to the entire program against the apparatus.

Senator Symington. Kill them?

Mr. Colby. We said kill, the figure we used was people who were killed. There was no euphemism applied to it at all. ¶

The overall word “neutralize was applied to the apparatus whether it was neutralized by the individuals being captured, rallying or being killed. [See also p. 149.] {p.7}

Senator Symington. And you were operating this program under instructions from higher authority during the course of the war, is that correct?

Mr. Colby. It was part of the war, and I was operating it — to answer your question directly, Mr. Chairman. ¶

I believe that the figures in mid-1971 that were testified to at the time were that some 28,000 had been captured, some 20,000 had been killed, and some 17,000 had actually rallied by that time. ¶

Obviously, the program has been going on since then, and those figures are larger today.

Senator Symington. There were statements in some congressional hearings that South Vietnamese could be stigmatized as Vietcong infrastructures by their enemies without hard evidence of such infrastructure affiliation. ¶

Were you satisfied with the quality of the intelligence on which these Vietcong infrastructure determinations were made?

Mr. Colby. I was not, and we made considerable efforts to improve it and to improve the procedure so that only better evidence would be used in the legal proceedings against these people. ¶

I would not pretend to you that we were always successful, and there were certainly abuses in that situation.

Query:  “Legal proceedings”?

Death by sniper.

Is that a “legal proceeding”?

One of those civilians, with poor paperwork, not really adequate evidence, less than satisfactory identification?

A bureaucratic irregularity?

Oh. I get it, “better evidence.”

You want better evidence, for legal proceedings.

And when you don’t have it, you give those names to the snipers.

For execution.

On suspicion, of being a civilian, with insurgent sympathies.

A non-crime, and a non-detainable offense, in a legal proceeding.

So, your ready solution is murder.

The verdict is certain.

But there is an uncertainty.

Do you have allies.

Powerful political allies.

Complicit partners, in your violent criminal enterprise.

Will s/he prosecute.

A prosecutor with jurisdiction and with a duty.

A duty, to deter violent crime, to vindicate human rights.

April 30 2009  CJHjr

Senator Symington. What about charges made that South Vietnamese authorities abused the Phoenix program — that suspected VCI simply disappeared while under interrogation, and so forth?

Mr. Colby. Well, I think the figures there about the number of captured and the number rallied indicates that very large numbers were interrogated and did contribute to the intelligence base. ¶

Again, certainly, abuses took place but I think in the record we also included the directive issued by MACV which, frankly, I drafted, which called upon any American who was in the presence of something which did not meet the laws of war, first, not to participate, of course. Second, to indicate his displeasure and his rejection of it to the people involved and, third, to report it to higher authority. ¶

I did receive some reports of this kind of misbehavior, and I took these up with the Government and I am very happy to say in those cases I saw action taken against the individual doing it.

Senator Symington. According to earlier testimony, a suspected VC could be imprisoned without trial under the “an tri” law, and held for 2 years. ¶

What do you know about this?

Mr. Colby. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. ¶

Like many other countries Vietnam had a procedure for detention as a threat to national security, and a suspected VC could be held under that provision or he could be passed to the regular courts for sentencing.

That particular provision permitted his detention for up to 2 years, but that period could be extended, and in a number of cases was. ¶

One of the purposes of the Phoenix program was to distinguish the length of time of detention of the three categories of individuals I mentioned, the A, B, and C. The A category, the senior leaders, were to be held for 2 years. The B category, the cadre, were to be held between 1 and 2 years. The C category hopefully, were to be let go or at the most held, in the absence of other circumstances, to 1 year.

Senator Symington. Did such absence of due process, in your opinion, result in the protracted detention of innocent people? {p.8}

Mr. Colby. There were certainly people who were detained improperly. I think the Phoenix program’s objective was to reduce that to the minimum possible.

Senator Symington. Under such circumstances, could the Phoenix program be used by unscrupulous individuals to put away their political enemies — without any hard evidence of subversive intent?

Mr. Colby. It became more and more difficult for that to happen, Mr. Chairman.

Early in the mid-1960’s I am sure that happened quite generally. But after the Phoenix program and the regularization of the procedures it was less likely. For instance, under the regular procedures any case would have to be referred to the village chief of the home of the individual concerned to get his view of the popular attitude toward the man.

Second, he was required to be given a copy of the charges against him. which had not been the case prior to that time. He was required to have a hearing and to actually appear. This was only instituted in 1971, but part of the program was to make improvements of this nature in the procedures.

Senator Symington. Some critics of the Phoenix program have charged that, as an intelligence program, it was both clumsy and ineffective. Would you comment on those assertions?

Mr. Colby. I do not think the enemy thought that. I think the enemy thought that it was a major threat to the style of war they were trying to run. Certainly it was bureaucratic and it had a lot of problems in it, but I think it made a contribution to the struggle against the Communist effort to overthrow the government there.

Senator Symington. Now the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency reports directly to the President of the United States. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. Colby. He does, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Including the Phoenix program, did you, or do you know of any action taken by the Agency that was taken without the approval or against the wishes of any President?

Mr. Colby. I do not know of any such.

Senator Symington. On November 5, 1971, President Nixon directed a reorganization of the intelligence community. We are interested in your concept of, and how you intend to implement your authority tinder that reorganization; also what is the role of the White House staff and the National Security Council staff; and what they should be with respect to the functioning of your Agency.

For example, this directive establishes a National Security Council Intelligence Committee. Could you tell this committee what you believe the role of that National Security Council?

Mr. Colby. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I believe the purpose of that committee is to give general guidance as to what kinds of intelligence are needed and what kinds of intelligence, perhaps, are really not all that useful to the customer agencies, if you will, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the White House itself, of course. In other words, to give guidance as to the interests of the customers of intelligence as to what things they are concerned about, what things they think perhaps we do too much of, and so forth. I would propose to work very closely with that committee and to try to define, as the {p.9} Agency has, the major subjects of intelligence interest so we can reduce activities which are perhaps marginal.

Senator Symington. Who is the chairman of that National Secu- {sic: Security} Council Intelligence Committee?

Mr. Colby. The chairman of that committee is Dr. Kissinger, and the members are the Undersecretary of State, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Senator Symington. If you report directly to the President of the United States, and Dr. Kissinger is the chairman of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, do you take orders from Dr. Kissinger or do you take orders from the President?

Mr. Colby. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Kissinger is a staff officer for the President and he then indicates subjects that he thinks will be of interest to the President but in terms of a direct order the authority has to be the President alone, and I am prepared to insist on that in any case in which it appears dubious —

Senator Symington. I do not want to labor it but we want to know how it is handled. We have been having increasing problems finding out just where and what is the authority of these various agencies. If Dr. Kissinger came in and said, it is the wish of the President that you do such and such, would you consider that an order?

Mr. Colby. It would depend on what such and such was, Mr. Chairman. If it was to write an estimate of developments in China or something I would probably go ahead and write the report. If it were something questionable, beyond the proper charter of the Agency, I would object and insist on talking to the President about it.

Senator Symington. You report to the President; have you discussed your appointment with him?

Mr. Colby. I have only met him once since my appointment, and I did not have much chance to discuss it.

Senator Symington. Have you gone into any detail as to where authority lies or does not lie?

Mr. Colby. No, we have not, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Some things worry me with respect to the functioning of your Agency. You have already stated you would come up here and report to us and give us the facts.

Mr. Colby. I will indeed, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Are there any other members, besides the ones you mentioned, of this National Security Council Intelligence Committee?

Mr. Colby. Those are the only members, sir.

Senator Symington. Are there any working groups that support this National Security Council Intelligence Committee?

Mr. Colby. There are officials who help work on the problem, yes.

Senator Symington. Who do they work for?

Mr. Colby. Of course, there is a National Security Council staff itself that works for Dr. Kissinger.

Senator Symington. The national security staff is an advisory body to the President under the law.

Mr. Colby. Right.

Senator Symington. The working group of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, who do they report to?

Mr. Colby. To the chairman of the committee, to Dr. Kissinger, in other words. {p.10}


Senator Symington. Do you feel you are hemmed in, in any way, in functioning on this job?

Mr. Colby. I do not, sir. I have had a talk with Dr. Kissinger about it and I have had the fullest assurances of support and help in this job.

Senator Symington. If there is any development which changes your mind, will you feel free to come to this committee and so state?

Mr. Colby. If I cannot resolve it in any other way, I will.

Senator Symington. These questions are asked in you interest.

Mr. Colby. I appreciate it.

Senator Symington. It has been my experience you should never give a man responsibility without authority and vice versa. You never have had, in the Central Intelligence Agency, the kind of public relations developed by the late J. Edgar Hoover in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time there has been a CIA hearing of this character. Everybody realizes, the way the world is today, we need an agency like the Central Intelligence Agency. Some of us have been quite surprised, however, that additional assignments have been given to an intelligence agency. Now is the time to get these matters clarified.

You are satisfied based on what you know about this to date, correct?

Mr. Colby. I am satisfied, Mr. Chairman, that I have the amount of authority I need to do the job that I will be asked to do.

Senator Symington. What is the role of the Net Assessment Group?

Mr. Colby. The Net Assessment Group is a staff which works with the National Security Council to come to conclusions as to the relative strength of ourselves and certain other countries that might be a threat to the security of the United States.

Senator Symington. Who is the chairman of that group?

Mr. Colby. I do not — I am not sure right now. I will supply that, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Is there anyone here who can get that information. That must be a matter of general knowledge, is it not, Mr. Maury? Do you know who is the chairman of the Net Assessment Group?

Mr. Maury. No, sir.

[The following information was provided for the record:]


The chairman of the Net Assessment Group is Andrew W. Marshall.


Senator Symington. Do you know if they have any working group that supports their efforts?

Mr. Colby. The Net Assessment Group is an interagency group, a group which consists of individuals from different intelligence agencies, and the other departments of the Government who have worked out a common understanding of the relative balance between ourselves and other nations. There will be a number of officials who will participate in this.

Senator Symington. What is the role of the Net Assessment Group?

Mr. Colby. To try to determine whether some other country has a particular advantage over us or vice versa in some particular situation. The reason for that, Mr. Chairman, is that the intelligence community is focused on foreign intelligence and we do not focus on the strength of the United States. This is a matter for the National Se- {p.11} curity Council, the Department of Defense and so forth and, consequently, if you are going to draw a net balance as to the situation between ourselves and another country, you need the intelligence contributed on one side and the American side of the equation contributed on the other. The intelligence community and the CIA would contribute the foreign intelligence to that net assessment.

Senator Symington. What is the function of the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee?

Mr. Colby. The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee is an advisory group to the Director of Central Intelligence to assist him in an examination of the resources devoted to intelligence throughout the Government and to assist him in making a recommendation to the President once a year for a budget for the entire foreign intelligence activity of the U.S. Government.

Senator Symington. Who is the chairman of that board?

Mr. Colby. The Director of Central Intelligence would be the chairman of that.

Senator Symington. You are the chairman?

Mr. Colby. That is right.

Senator Symington. I am glad it is planned for you to be the chairman of some advisory committee.

Mr. Colby. I am going to be the chairman of quite a few things, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Who will be on this working group with you?

Mr. Colby. On the Advisory Committee on Resources you have the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State,

Senator Symington. Under this machinery, who will have control over the budgets of the intelligence agencies, including the CIA? If you, for example, recommended a reduction in DIA personnel, do you think you could make it stick under this committee structure?

Mr. Colby. Well, the actual authority for the appropriation concerned is in the hands of that department head, whoever it is, to whom that appropriation was given. The responsibilities of the director under this instruction are to look at how those resources are allocated even though it is not his direct responsibility to control those funds: As you can see, there is a chance for a difference of opinion, as to how many people should be used on a certain topic or how many resources should be allocated to it.

In that situation the Director is required to submit his view to the President for resolution after listening to this advisory committee, but there is no vote in the advisory committee. It is the directors view as to what the allocation of resources should be even though some of those resources, as a matter of fact, the great majority of them, are not his direct responsibility.

Senator Symington. Do you believe that any of the intelligence committees of which you are not chairman will be able to influence the substance of intelligence estimates?

Mr. Colby. They will certainly help us choose the topics. They will not affect the assessment made because the procedures are that the intelligence estimates submitted to the National Security Council are the Director’s appreciation of what is going on. ¶

That is a very personal {p.12} and single responsibility.

And I propose to exert every effort I can, and I plan to be successful or not continue the effort, to make those objective and straightforward assessments.

Senator Symington. More specifically, Mr. Colby, I read a speech by a General Graham who recently joined the Central Intelligence Agency, and then called the Director and asked, “What is going on”, because, in effect, the speech the general made stated the Defense Department should appraise the military posture of the possible enemy, when it came to weapons systems, their operations, the number of troops, and so forth. In the years I have been on the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee, I have never seen an estimate by any of the services which did not estimate the possible enemy’s capacity higher than the estimate of the Central Intelligence Agency. With one conspicuous exception, the Central Intelligence Agency’s were always lower, and ultimately found always to be more on target.

Senator Symington. Does General Graham work for you?

Mr. Colby. He does.

Senator Symington. Have you straightened out his thinking on this matter?

Mr. Colby. Well, it is very clear to us as to how our relationship on military intelligence will work.

Senator Symington. You say “to us.” Does that include him?

Mr. Colby. Yes. I talked to him about this in some depth.

Senator Symington. Several years ago, as chairman of a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, I had two able staffmen. Walter Pincus and Roland Paul. They went around the world and reported back there was a great deal of duplication in our hundreds of large bases and thousands of small bases all over the world. They said the most duplication they found was in the intelligence field. I have been around myself and corroborate that finding.

In that speech this General said all intelligence, in effect, should be concentrated in the Defense Department. I do not think the American taxpayer who already has mounting tax problems, would support that type of conclusion. There is no use belaboring it, but would you agree now. if you have problems along these lines you would report them back to this committee?

Mr. Colby. I do not anticipate having any problems.

Senator Symington. I know you do not so anticipate. Nobody anticipates a car wreck until they have it; but if you do get into that kind of trouble, will you so report back to this committee?

Mr. Colby. I will report back to the committee anything I cannot handle, Mr. Chairman.

I would say that on that subject of military intelligence, I have worked in a military headquarters and I think I know some of the strengths and some of the weaknesses of such an apparatus. I believe that we can use the military intelligence agencies for a number of the things that are necessary to accomplish in the intelligence business.

However, as I said before, when the Director gives his assessment of what is going on to the President it has to be his personal assessment, and he has to have a conviction that it is accurate, and he has to have, and I will insist on, every liberty to conduct independent research, review, whatever, in order to assure myself of the accuracy of what he says. {p.13}

Senator Symington. In the years I have been on this committee we have had incorrect bomber gaps and missile gaps, and have built against them; later found they were wrong. We would have built more if it had not been for independent CIA estimates.

Today we are winding down the war, but asking for many millions of dollars more because of what the possible enemy has. ¶

I think it important we have a man in Government, totally independent, reporting to the President, who also has an obligation under the Constitution to tell us what his opinion is without being forced to present something he does not believe correct.

Mr. Colby. I take that obligation very, very sincerely, Mr. Chairman. I think that one of the contributions that intelligence can make to a peacetime world is to bring more accuracy to our preparations against possible threats to national security so that we do not operate only against what a possible enemy is capable of but rather that we know precisely what he is planning and doing to the extent we can find that out.

Senator Symington. I am interested in your independence. ¶

I spent some years in the Pentagon and have spent some years in the Senate and think the Central Intelligence Agency important the way the world is today; but its importance is almost completely nullified if its best judgment can be subordinated to that of somebody else who is not in the intelligence business.

Mr. Colby. I think the structure is such that the Director has to give you his very personal opinion and I assure you that it is going to be a straightforward one.

Senator Symington. Will intelligence estimates, as previously, be made through the U.S. Intelligence Board?

Mr. Colby. Yes; they will be coordinated with the board but again, that is not a vote, it is a consultation, and the estimate will be the result of the Director’s view and assessment. ¶

He is required under the rules to indicate a substantial dissent by any member of the U.S. Intelligence Board to an estimate in order to give the customer the benefit of the fact that there is disagreement on some important point. ¶

And that procedure will be continued.

Senator Symington. You would agree, would you not, that a sound economy with a sound dollar is just as important to true national security as the latest weapons system?

Mr. Colby. I very strongly believe that, Mr. Chairman. I think the security of the United States depends upon a lot more than just guns.

It depends upon our economy and a lot of other things.

Senator Symington. And you would also agree that there is no position in Government more important than yours from the standpoint of weighing what is necessary for security and what is not, based on what is the position of the possible enemy.

Mr. Colby. Let me say I think this is a very important position, Mr. Chairman. I will not engage in comparatives.

Senator Symington. As we understand it, there has been a committee over the years one which went by different names — The 303 Committee; the 40 Committee; et cetera — which approves certain operations of the CIA. Is this correct, and, if so, who is on this committee at the present time, and what is its function?

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, the National Security Act of 1947 says that the Agency will do various things, and then in the last sub- {p.14} paragraph it says that the Agency will conduct, perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

Now, that particular provision of law is the authority under which a lot of the Agency’s activities are conducted.

The National Security Council has set up, as we discussed a little while ago, the Intelligence Committee and it has also set up some other committees. I believe on this matter since I am talking about the National Security Council, that I would prefer to respond fully to you in detail in executive session, because I think some of these matters are still classified, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Very well. What is the name of the latest committee of this character?

Mr. Colby. Forty Committee.

Senator Symington. Who is the chairman?

Mr. Colby. Well, again, I would prefer to go into executive session on the description of the Forty Committee, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. As to who is the chairman, you would prefer an executive session?

Mr. Colby. The chairman, all right, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Kissinger is the chairman as the assistant to the President for national security affairs.

Senator Symington. Do any of the committees we have discussed so far have any role in evaluating, coordinating, or otherwise dealing with domestic intelligence, or intelligence which is targeted at U.S. citizens?

Mr. Colby. No, the function of the Agency is foreign intelligence, Mr. Chairman, and that is its function. In the course of our foreign intelligence activities obviously, we have to employ people, we have to investigate the people we employ. We deal with a number of Americans who help us in a variety of ways. In that respect we have information about those citizens but we do not target them for intelligence operations.

Senator Symington. And you will issue instructions to your people that under no circumstances are they to participate in any domestic efforts?

Mr. Colby. That has been a very strong principle in the Agency. I have every intention of reinforcing that principle and insisting on it very vigorously.

Senator Symington. We understand that Dr. Schlesinger brought to the CIA two military officers, Major General Allen and Major General Graham, to serve on his staff. Do you intend to use these two officers on your staff?

Mr. Colby. At the moment I do, Mr. Chairman. I obviously have not developed my entire staffing plan at this point. But at the moment I do plan to do so because I think that they are working on the intelligence community staff which is the staff that helps the Director in his community responsibilities as distinct from his Agency responsibilities.

Senator Symington. What will their function be?

Mr. Colby. General Allen is the head of that community staff, and again, since most of the community resources are in the Defense Department, it is perhaps appropriate that a military officer be a part of {p.15} that. His deputy is a civilian at the moment and it is my intention that that will still be the case.

Senator Symington. That is General Allen?

Mr. Colby. Yes — General Graham is in charge of a program of product review as to what kinds of intelligence products we have and how good they are, and so forth, and again, since he has familiarity with the sweep of the intelligence community effort from his prior experience, I would propose to continue him for the time being in that role.

Senator Symington. This is important. We have been hearing about a steady reduction of the gross national product total that goes to defense, but a recent report made by a group of able and experienced men would appear to blow that concept out of the water. Instead of being 31 percent of the budget it is 57-plus percent, $98.1 billion. That includes such things as atomic warheads for missiles, over $12 billion for veterans and so forth, all part of defense; so in addition to the some $80 billion 600 million, being asked for you can add another $18 billion or so to the true defense costs. This is one reason why it would appear important we get these estimates right.

Do you believe, in general, that the military services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, should have a more dominating role in the intelligence estimating process than in the past?

Mr. Colby. I do not believe they should have a dominating role. I believe they should have a contributory role.

Senator Symington. Your former chief has just become Secretary of Defense. He is able and persuasive. Naturally he is going to be interested in the Joint Chiefs position. Do you think you can hold up?

Mr. Colby. I think so, Mr. Chairman. As a matter of fact, my former chief, as you know, was associated with the drafting of the November 1971 letter and the decisions that the President made about strengthening the hands of the Director of Central Intelligence and I believe he has a very strong intellectual commitment in this regard. I propose to work with him very closely in that role but, at the same time, I propose to take my own responsibilities very firmly.

Senator Symington. Once you are over in that building it is pretty hard to have independent judgment, as we all know from past experience, but I will say that Dr. Schlesinger, when he was Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, he did more in less time to clarify the overall position of that Agency, which has been operating under totally unnecessary excess secrecy, at a cost to the taxpayers of many billions of dollars.

Mr. Colby. Well, he had a very short but, I think, an exceptionally effective tenure in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Symington. What he started out to do is being interpreted now. It is a more healthy situation, in my opinion.

Mr. Colby. Yes, and I propose to continue many of those programs.

Senator Symington. I was talking about the AEC.

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Symington. What primary problems of efficiency and cost in the intelligence community do you believe should take first priority in your attention?

Mr. Colby. Well, we have a very serious problem, Mr. Chairman, which is developing — which is the total amount of dollars required for intelligence, and the increasing percentage of that which is necessary {p.16} to pay the personnel involved, and these curves have been going up for a long time and if you project the curves very far you end up with all people and no program and I do not think that is a satisfactory outcome. Therefore, we are going to have to figure put ways to conduct the important intelligence activities at a lower price than we have in the past.

Senator Symington. Do you believe we tend to collect more intelligence than we can efficiently process and disseminate to the appropriate Government authorities. Do you believe we sometimes overwhelm ourselves with data we cannot analyze?

Mr. Colby. I think in any large-scale activity, Mr. Chairman, you will find corners of it that cannot bear close scrutiny but I think in general, the intelligence effort of the United States is focused on the main things. There has been a very substantial reduction of the total intelligence effort over the past several years partly reflecting the drawdown from Southeast Asia but also reflecting other very substantial reductions around the world. Some of this is a result of better technology, and some of it is a result of just selective pruning of things that may have been nice to have but cannot meet the test of these times.

Senator Symington. It is sometimes said that it is valuable in intelligence work to have more than one organization analyze a problem and make an estimate. We can all see why some competition in analysis and estimation would be valuable. Do you believe it is also necessary, however, to have duplication in the collection of intelligence?

Mr. Colby. In certain situations it may be. Mr. Chairman. In certain situations one particular source for collection may not be reliable at a particular time of attention or it may not be all that believable and, consequently, you might have to develop a redundant system, as the scientists would say. But certainly, I think this is a value decision. If intelligence is satisfactory through one channel it should not be duplicated. We cannot afford it in this day and time.

Senator Symington. Within the next 6 months, will you make a report on this and submit it to this committee, with respect to collection, after you have had a good look at it from the top?

Mr. Colby. I am in the course of developing a presentation on the budget of the entire intelligence community to the appropriations committees of the Senate and of the House. I assure you I will look at this very, very severely, plus the fact that I also have to submit my recommendations to the President on the fiscal year 1975 budget later on.

Senator Symington. We would appreciate reviewing what you give to the appropriations committees. No one has more respect for that committee than we do, but this is the Legislative Committee involved if we are going to make any changes in the law; and some for clarification after Watergate, would appear desirable.

Mr. Colby. I certainly will report fully to this committee, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Turning now from the management of the intelligence community itself to the management of the CIA,s the committee understands that Dr. Schlesinger initiated a vigorous program of personnel reductions in the CIA. How far has this gone, and what are your future plans in this regard? You can answer that briefly now and supplement it.

Mr. Colby. Yes. {p.17}

We have determined that quite a substantial number of individuals were excess to our needs and our total strength has dropped in the neighborhood of 7 or 8 percent, I think, in the past 4 months. As to the future, as I indicated, the problem of the cost of personnel and the cost, of operations now are going to require, I believe, some additional pruning of activities that may not be able to stand the competitive situation for resources that we have and, consequently, it is possible that other reductions will ensue.

Senator Symington. You will continue this program of involuntary retirements, particularly CIA personnel with overseas assignments?

Mr. Colby. I do intend to continue a program of identifying the individuals who stand lowest on the scale of performance among their fellows and arranging a situation where they can be helped to leave Government service early rather than having them wait around too long.

Senator Symington. Several Members of Congress have called for the overall budget of the intelligence community to be made public, so the American people can see at least the general amount which is spent for intelligence functions. In past years, and despite the increasing desire of the American people to know what is going on in their Government, the furnishing of intelligence information has been further restricted.

Do you see any reason why overall budget information, or even a breakdown of the intelligence budget into its major categories, would endanger national security if it were made public?

Mr. Colby. I would propose to leave that question, Mr. Chairman, in the hands of the Congress to decide. I think there are considerations pro and con on all sides of that question. But I have found that the Congress is at least as responsible on this as our friends elsewhere in Government, and we have, as you know, shared with the Congress some very sensitive material which has been successfully protected by the Congress.

On the other hand, there are situations in which an American intelligence service will have to be much more exposed than the intelligence services of other countries. We are not going to run the kind of intelligence service that other countries run. We are going to run one in the American society and the American constitutional structure, and I can see that there may be a requirement to expose to the American people a great deal more than might be convenient from the narrow intelligence point of view.

Senator Symington. What would be your views regarding the requirement for an annual authorization of the budget of the intelligence community prior to appropriation, as is required for a portion of the Department of Defense budget?

Mr. Colby. That would be up to the Congress again, Mr. Chairman. I think that in that circumstance we would explain our plans to the appropriate oversight committees in the same way we do to the appropriations committees. We would give a full description of what we have in mind to do.

Senator Symington. I do not want to belabor this. After some years on the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, where I have been a member of the CIA Subcommittee, I came to realize that many concepts of policy were being made by foreign relations without accurate information. Under the so-called Kennedy let- {p.18} ter, the Central Intelligence Agency man in the country in question reports to the Ambassador, but when he comes back here, CIA is light years away from any review by State of its functioning. So it was only a question of time before we would run into some of the problems we have now run into.

It is one of the reasons the CIA has had such recent unfortunate publicity; for example, this recent Chilean episode. Sometimes secrecy may be justified; other times, to my certain knowledge, it could never be justified.

There is information, intelligence, which, of course, cannot be made public in the interest of national security; but people believe excessive secrecy can give rise to unwarranted suspicion that intelligence agencies are engaged in sinister activities. That is what they are saying. Would you favor a policy of more open disclosure regarding intelligence activities than we have had in the past?

Mr. Colby. I think it is probably essential in America today, Mr. Chairman, and I would favor a greater degree of exposure of what we are doing. We have already had some matters which we do expose. Some of the exposure that we have quite frankly, gives us problems abroad in our relationships with other intelligence services and even in our relationships with individuals who secretly agree to work with us who are somewhat freightened {sic: frightened} at the prospect of their names coming into the public and things happening to them as a result. But I think that there are ways in which the intelligence community and the CIA in particular, can reassure the appropriate committees and also the Senate as a whole and also the people as a whole as to the activities we are engaged in. I think we are going to have to draw that line. It is going to be a difficult one in many situations but it is obvious that again we have to run an American intelligence service.

Senator Symington. What would be your position regarding the provision of written intelligence reports to the Congress, similar to those reports which are provided to high level officials in the executive branch?

Mr. Colby. I plan to look into this very precisely. Mr. Chairman, and do what I can in this regard. As you know, the Agency has always come up and given executive session briefings to various committees on the substance of what is happening in the world, and the Director’s assessment as to what he thinks is going on. I would propose to continue that activity and look very, very seriously at whether there are improvements that could be made by which the appropriate committees, Congressmen, Senators, could be given the actual documents where they are important.

Senator Symington. We understand some limitations on, and directives to the intelligence community, are included in classified documents called National Security Council Intelligence Directives. NSCID’s. Would you describe in general the subject matter of these directives; and, if you believe they should remain classified, would you tell the committee why you think so?

Mr. Colby. These directives are the application of the provision of the law that I cited, Mr. Chairman, in such matters as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. They include some general directives which describe the functions of the different members of the intelligence community and there is certain sensitive information in those. Those are National Security Council documents, {p.19} Mr. Chairman, and I do not have the authority for the declassification since they originate with the National Security Council,

Senator Symington. Would you, as Director of Central Intelligence, have the authority to declassify National Security Council intelligence directives, or to provide them, classified or unclassified, to the Congress?

Mr. Colby. No, I do not believe I do. Those belong to the National Security Council, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Would you report to this committee who would have this authority, what the reasons are for this policy regarding these documents?

Mr. Colby. I will let you know.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Now we turn to the National Security Act of 1947, which, for reasons that are not important, I was involved in at that time, as a member of the executive branch.

The 1947 act directs the Agency to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time, direct,

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Symington. Is this the provision of the 1947 act which gives the CIA the authority, under the NSC’s direction, to engage in military-type operations abroad, such as the war in Laos?

Mr. Colby. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is the legal, statutory authority because many of the activities of that nature do relate to intelligence since intelligence techniques are an essential part of running a covert operation of that nature.

Senator Symington. Mr. Colby, you and I have had discussions when you were in Saigon in the past. Are you saying that the war conducted in Laos under the direction of the Ambassador, with the full support of the CIA, primarily was an intelligence matter?

Mr. Colby. No, no, not primarily, Mr. Chairman. I would say that the initiation of CIA’s activity in Laos was a matter which did require the use of intelligence techniques because it was felt to be important at that time that the United States not be officially involved in that activity, and this was done over many years, as you well know, in an unofficial way.

Senator Symington. Yes, and that is one of the principal reasons why the CIA has had a lot of unfortunate, in many cases unmerited, adverse publicity.

Mr. Colby. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, no activity of this nature is done without the proper reviews, instructions and direction of the National Security Council, each such —

Senator Symington. The National Security Council is an advisory board to the President. So what you are saying is no activity of this kind is done without instructions from the President?

Mr. Colby. Correct.

Senator Symington. What you really can call the CIA then, is “the King’s men” or “the President’s army.”

Mr. Colby. I do not think that is the case, Mr. Chairman. I think the CIA is an intelligence agency, which has the capability of using intelligence techniques as directed by the President and by the Congress — by the National Security Council. {p.20}


Senator Symington. We worry about that Laotian operation which we have watched over a period of years, have been there often, have sent staff people out. Let us hope that in the future, inasmuch as the CIA is fundamentally an intelligence agency, not an agency designed to conduct a war, you would try to keep out of this type and character of operation. It has done nothing to improve the stature of the CIA. You would agree with that.

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, I think the name of the Agency is intelligence, and that is its primary responsibility and focus. Obviously, the Agency will follow national policy but I think it is clear that under the present direction of U.S. policy it is very unlikely that we would be involved in such an activity.

Senator Symington. This President did not start it so it is not necessarily a criticism of this administration. But when you justify a war of this character on the grounds it is “related to intelligence”, you are stretching your assigned role and running into potential trouble.

Mr. Colby. I do not think it was a war when it began, Mr. Chairman. I think we were giving some assistance to the people in Laos who were resisting the North Vietnamese coming into their country.

Senator Symington. In any case by August 15 we will be out, let us hope.

Do not large-scale operations, such as this unending war in Laos, go considerably beyond what Congress intended when it provided for “other functions and duties related to intelligence”?

Mr. Colby. I think it undoubtedly did, and I think also that as a practical matter a covert operation cannot be a very big one because it stops being covert when it gets too big. I think this was the lesson of the Bay of Pigs, among other things.

Senator Symington. If you operate this Agency in accordance with the philosophy you are now expressing, we may have a new day coming up.

Mr. Colby. Well, I will try to keep it out of the kind of exposure that some of these larger activities got us into.

Senator Symington. Do you believe all CIA overseas operations should support its basic objective of intelligence collection and analysis?

In other words, if Congress would wish to limit CIA overseas operations to those which clearly support intelligence collection, would it be necessary to redraft the 1947 act?

Mr. Colby. I think the interpretation of the act to date is that it is a bit beyond pure intelligence operations and analysis. I think that it would be appropriate to leave the act as it is in that respect because I think that the Agency might be fettered in some respect which would be of importance to the United States by some kind of a broader proscription than is perhaps necessary. I think the basic point is that the Agency overseas is going to follow U.S. policy. And that you have a tool in the Agency to use in support of U.S. policy if it is so desired. I think it might be appropriate to limit the Agency’s function to foreign intelligence and that in every case in the act in which the word intelligence appears in the responsibilities of the Agency that the word foreign could be inserted. {p.21}

Senator Symington. I know you know that much of the CIA operation in Laos had as much to do with intelligence as the production of carpets in the United States. It was the operation of a war conducted, at least in some cases, by the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency to cover up what we were actually doing. That is what worries the American people, they find something going on for years, killing a lot of people, about which they had no idea.

Turning now to domestic activities the 1947 act provides: “The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions.” I would ask you about several recent events, some connected with the Watergate case, involving the CIA. The purpose of these questions is not to elicit your opinion about decisions made by your predecessors or other CIA officials, right or wrong, good or bad; rather, to clarify the meaning of these statutory restrictions on domestic activity as expressed in the 1947 act.

Do you believe the prohibition against the CIA having police or law enforcement powers, or internal security functions, would prohibit the preparation of a psychological profile on a U.S. citizen?

Mr. Colby. Not in every case, Mr. Chairman, because, for instance, we prepare a psychological profile on our applicants, on our applicants for employment, and I think we consequently have a legitimate function for some of these. But I think I agree with the thrust of your question, which is with reference to Mr. Ellsberg. It is not our function to use this capability in that case.

Senator Symington. That was my next question. Would it prohibit the preparation of a psychological profile on a U.S. citizen who was under indictment for crime, as was the case with Mr. Daniel Ellsberg in August 1971?

Mr. Colby. Let us say that I do not intend to do this, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. If anybody asks you to do it would you come back here and protest?

Mr. Colby. If I cannot handle it any other way.

Senator Symington. If you cannot handle it any other way?

Mr. Colby. Right.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Would these provisions of the 1947 act prohibit the Agency from providing a camera, tape recorder, disguises and alias documentation to a White House employee if the Agency was informed that that employee was to use these materials to conduct an “interview,” as was apparently the case with Mr. E. Howard Hunt, in 1971?

Mr. Colby. This is a very complicated question, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Simplify it for us.

Mr. Colby. For example, the Secret Service Act calls for the full collaboration of other agencies of the Government in the protection of the individuals designated for protection by that service. The question as to whether we should give the Secret Service certain assistance comes up. I propose to draw the distinction between —

Senator Symington. This was not Secret Service. The White House called the Deputy Director of the CIA requesting all of this apparatus be given Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Colby. Right. I was using this as an illustration of the complexity of the problem, Mr. Chairman. In other words, I find it very {p.22} difficult to say here that we will never give any other agency of the U.S. Government help which they might use in their responsibilities because, for instance, we provide a considerable amount of intelligence to the FBI, and there are other ways in which we help the other agencies of the Government.

The fact is, however, that I think in that particular case a mistake was made and it will not be made again.

Senator Symington. A good answer.

Would the provisions of the 1947 act prohibit the use of a so-called safe house to provide such materials to a White House employee?

Mr. Colby. I think the same answer applies to that question, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Would these provisions of the 1947 act prohibit the developing of a film for such a White House employee?

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, that depends. I mean, if one of the White House employees has a film of some particular thing or even needs a safe house for some perfectly legitimate purpose I really see no problem in the Agency helping him with that particular function. I think it is really a matter of what he is doing and whether the Agency participates by helping him in some improper activity, and I assure you that the Agency is not going to participate in any improper activity, although I can envisage a situation in which it would be appropriate for the Agency to help not Mr. Howard Hunt but a White House official to meet somebody without coming to public notice.

Senator Symington. In the CIA’s interest, it is proper to state that when the Deputy Director, General Cushman, found out the nature and degree of this operation he notified the White House staff member who had requested it that he would no longer approve it.

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Symington. So I would not think you would have any problem with this question.

Mr. Colby. I think that is exactly it. When it began to be indicated that the Agency would begin to participate in the activity in the United States in that regard the Agency withdrew from that participation.

Senator Symington. Would these provisions of the 1947 act require the Agency to insure materials loaned to a White House employee for one function were not used for another illegal function?

Mr. Colby. Let us say I think we are going to be very careful with some of our unique equipment, Mr. Chairman, and we are not going to let it out without control.

Senator Symington. Is there any practical way the CIA can monitor the use of materials it provides to various employees in Government, including those in the White House?

Mr. Colby. It depends on the equipment. With certain equipment we can, and frequently do, insist on knowing precisely what is done with that equipment, and that it is used in a legitimate purpose by the Agency in question.

However, I think that it is possible in most cases for us to do this, and we propose to do it.

Senator Symington. Is there any agreement between the FBI and the CIA regarding what is to occur if one agency, in the course of its operations, comes across the operations of the other?

Mr. Colby. There is an agreement between the two agencies which was drawn up some years ago. I have not had a chance to review this {p.23} in detail but I propose to now that there is new leadership in both agencies.

Senator Symington. When you review it, will you submit to this committee your conclusions?

Mr. Colby. I would be glad to.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Does either the CIA or the FBI have the authority to tell the other not to continue with, or conduct, certain investigations; or, is there merely an agreement to notify the other agency in case of a potential conflict?

Mr. Colby. I think the latter is correct. I do not think the CIA has the authority to direct the FBI to suspend an investigation. We do not. We do have the ability to explain to them that some activity has another explanation which they might not have known and as a practice we always do this.

Senator Symington. Nor would they have a right to do so to you?

Mr. Colby. They do not have the authority to give me an order to suspend any activity, except, I suppose, in the area of domestic law if they told me I was doing something improper, they might have authority to direct me not to do it or arrest me.

[The following additional statement was provided for the record:]


We have an agreement that CIA’s foreign intelligence operations in the United States will be coordinated with the FBI and terminated if the FBI determines them prejudicial to their activities.


Senator Symington. They would appeal to the President through the Attorney General, and you would appeal to the President direct, correct?

Mr. Colby. I would go to the President, right.

Senator Symington. Aside from protecting the physical security of CIA property, such as the headquarters in Langley, Va., and conducting security investigations of its own employees, does the CIA need to have authority to provide direct or indirect support to any domestic law enforcement agency?

Mr. Colby. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do in terms of support to, for example, the FBI. If we learn that a certain agent of another country is coming here, I think it is important we be allowed to pass that information to the FBI and not be prohibited from doing so.

Senator Symington. Does the authority of the CIA to collect intelligence outside the United States extend to collecting intelligence on U.S. citizens abroad who do not appear to be involved with the activities of foreign governments or foreign institutions?

Mr. Colby. No; it does not.

Senator Symington. Your answer is “No?”

Mr. Colby. My answer is, “No,” who were not involved with foreign institutions.

Senator Symington. Do you subscribe to Ambassador Helms statement in his published address of April 1971 that “We do not target on U.S. citizens?”

Mr. Colby. I do subscribe to that. We target on foreign intelligence, Mr. Chairman, foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence services. There is occasionally some incidental mention of American citizens in this regard. That kind of information, if it indicates something improper, is turned over by us to the FBI. It is not handled by our Agency. {p.24}

Senator Symington. Now, the so-called Watergate Committee, the one chaired by Senator Ervin, has recently released a set of documents dealing with the plan during the summer of 1970, apparently approved by the President, to establish an Inter-Agency Committee on Intelligence, which would include the Director of the CIA, and would deal with domestic intelligence operations. Do you believe that the prohibition in the 1947 act against the Agency having any police or law enforcement powers, or any internal security functions, would prohibit the Director of Central Intelligence from participating in the evaluation of intelligence on domestic groups?

Mr. Colby. No; I do not, Mr. Chairman. I think that in that respect the Agency has an obligation to provide to the Government the results of its foreign intelligence activities and collection and if this can contribute to the Government’s knowledge of some problem in the United States that this can properly be passed by the Agency to an interagency group but the Agency would not itself be engaged in those functions or exert those powers. It would merely pass the results of its activities abroad to that interagency effort and to the appropriate authorities of the Government.

Senator Symington. Well, it is my understanding that when the Central Intelligence Agency was created the most difficult problems that they had in writing the law were the objections of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation because of his apprehensions about interference in domestic activities. You have no intention of doing anything of that character?

Mr. Colby. Absolutely not, Mr. Chairman. I repeat that I read the word “foreign” before the word “intelligence” in the authority under this act.

Senator Symington. Based on some papers we received we have the right, I think, to believe that Attorney General Mitchell did not know of this so-called plan presented by Mr. Charles Tom Huston, a lawyer in the White House at that time. Perhaps Mr. Hoover in reporting to his boss, the Attorney General, requested that the plan — the request, be put in writing. If he did that, Mr. Mitchell, being a lawyer, unquestionably would have felt that higher authority was requesting Mr. Hoover to break the law. It may well be that is what happened and the reason the plan, after a few days, was abandonded {sic: abandoned}. In any case, the people that I have discussed this matter with, who are far greater authorities on the Constitution than I am, feel that it was in effect a request to circumvent the Constitution, violate the Constitution. I am not asking for your opinion on that fact or lack of accuracy but I would hope that you would be very careful about this in the future because now everybody will be considering this from the standpoint of your operations. As I understand it, you do not intend to participate in any way in my domestic intelligence, is that correct?

Mr. Colby. I do not, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. Would this prevent you from helping to make policy regarding the collection of intelligence on domestic groups?

Mr. Colby. I believe it would, yes, Mr. Chairman. I do not see that as within my responsibilities at all.

Senator Symington. Would the 1947 act prohibit the CIA from collecting, or providing the support necessary for collecting, intelligence within the United States on domestic groups? {p.25}

Mr. Colby. I believe that is the same question, essentially.

Senator Symington. Yes.

Mr. Colby. And it would prohibit me from doing that.

Senator Symington. Would it clarify your responsibilities, Mr. Colby, and the responsibilities of the CIA under the 1947 act, if it were made clearer that your responsibilities extended only to foreign intelligence — namely, intelligence about or related to foreign governments, groups, or individuals?

Mr. Colby. I would certainly have no objection to that. If it would relieve any concern that anybody feels about CIA, I would fully recommend that that be done. I think the easiest way for it is just to use the words “foreign intelligence.”

Senator Symington. Ambassador Helms testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the requirement for the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods has sometimes led to the existence of a “gray area,” using his words, of CIA responsibilities by implication verging on the requirement to be involved in domestic activities.

Do you know of any way to clarify or correct this situation?

Mr. Colby. My interpretation of that particular provision, Mr. Chairman, is that it gives me a charge but does not give me authority. It gives me the job of identifying any problem of protecting sources and methods, but in the event I identify one it gives me the responsibility to go to the appropriate authorities with that information and it does not give me any authority to act on my own. So I really see less of a gray area in that regard. I believe that there is really no authority under that act that can be used. If, on the other hand, there is some concern over the matter I would have no problem because I do not view it as giving me any authority.

Senator Symington. Do you believe that some other Government official should have the overall responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods in order to make it clear, for example, that it is not the CIA’s responsibility to get involved in domestic law enforcement functions?

Mr. Colby. I think, in a sense, Mr. Chairman, we all have the responsibility of protecting national security information, and that most intelligence sources and methods fall into that category.

Senator Symington. Well, if I understand, if there is a Government official that should have such responsibility, it should be yourself?

Mr. Colby. For the intelligence field, I think it is myself no question about it.

Senator Symington. Right.

In general, what do you consider to be the proper scope of your agency activities within the United States?

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, we obviously have to run a headquarters here; we have to recruit people for our staffs, and so forth; we have to conduct investigations on those people; we have to protect our own intelligence sources and methods within the Agency; we have to contract with a large number of American firms for the various kinds of equipment that we might have need for abroad. We also, I believe quite properly, can collect foreign intelligence in the United States, including requesting American citizens to share with their Government certain information they may know about foreign situations. {p.26}

We have a service that does this, and I am happy to say, a very large number of American citizens have given us some very important information. We do not pay for that information. We can protect their proprietary interest and even protect their names if necessary, if they would rather not be exposed as the source of that information.

We also, I believe, have certain support activities that we must conduct in the United States in order to conduct foreign intelligence operations abroad. Certain structures are necessary in this country to give our people abroad perhaps a reason for operating abroad in some respects so that they can appear not as CIA employees but as representatives of some other entity. Lastly, I think that there are a number of activities in the United States where foreign intelligence can be collected from foreigners, and as long as this is foreign intelligence. I think it quite proper that we do so. I can certainly go into more detail on this in executive session any time you would like. Mr. Chairman, but I reiterate that the focus should and must be foreign intelligence only, and that all the other activities are only supportive of that major function.

Senator Symington. If you should receive an order in the future which appears on its face to be illegal, what would you do?

Mr. Colby. I would object to it and, if necessary I am quite prepared to leave this responsibility if it came to that.

Senator Symington. I did not hear you.

Mr. Colby. And I am quite prepared to leave this job if it comes to that.

Senator Symington. Do you believe that CIA officials should refrain from making policy, or explicitly making recommendations about policy, and, if so, what steps can you take to insure that the CIA maintains its role as solely an intelligence organization?

Mr. Colby. I do indeed believe that the CIA’s role is to try to call what is happening abroad very accurately and precisely, and incidentally, to show two or three different interpretations if these legitimately exist. But the action that should be taken about that is a larger question dealing with the interest and policies of the United States and the various capabilities of the United States. These are not within the responsibilities of the intelligence community and, therefore, I think that the intelligence community should stick to its own business and not get into recommending what should be done.

Senator Symington. What would be your position regarding CIA collaboration with private American corporations overseas?

Mr. Colby. Well, I think that in many respects there are perfectly legitimate ways in which we can collaborate with American corporations overseas in terms of the exchange of information and in some situations corporations overseas can help the intelligence activity and mission.

However, I think your reference is rather to the situation that developed with ITT in Chile and I think that our position there is that we are not going to be a conduit for corporate policies and that we will not allow ourselves to be controlled by some corporation.

Senator Symington. There would appear no reason, from the standpoint of logic that prevents you utilizing American citizens in a foreign country to the best of your ability to obtain information. You would agree, would you not? {p.27}

Mr. Colby. Right.

Senator Symington. On the other hand, you would not want that corporation to take advantage of your request by in turn obtaining special favors from the Government?

Mr. Colby. Right. I think we have only one source of our authority and that is the statute, and the President, and that we should make decisions on what we do overseas based on the best interests of the United States as articulated by the Congress and the President, and not by any individual company.

Senator Symington. As a member of the Subcommittee on Multi-National Corporations of the Foreign Relations Committee, I was impressed with the obvious lack of coordination with other committees and I think much of that trouble could have been avoided if there had been closer cooperation between the various interested committees.

I have some questions here, Mr. Colby, that Senator Hughes would like you to answer for the record. Many of them cover ground we have already discussed this morning.

Mr. Colby. I will be glad to provide those answers, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Hughes. Can you tell us publicly the budget totals for the CIA and for the rest of the intelligence community? If not, how are we to judge whether these amounts are appropriate in view of the intelligence product and the competing claims for Government resources?

Mr. Colby. The budget totals for the Central Intelligence Agency and the members of the intelligence community have traditionally been maintained on a classified basis and revealed only in executive session. I defer to the appropriate congressional authorities for any change in this procedure. Budget requests are reviewed in detail in the Agency’s annual budget hearings with the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Senator Hughes. In order for the responsible committees of Congress to do their work on national security matters in a better informed way, would you accept legislation requiring the CIA to furnish these committees regular and special reports on matters within their purview, subject, of course, to proper security measures? Would this not be a valuable addition to the infrequent and wide-ranging briefings now given the committee?

Mr. Colby. The Director of Central Intelligence traditionally has given briefings on the world situation and on specific topics to a number of Senate and House committees. I will review the matter and report to the Armed Services Committee on the possibility of supplementing such briefings by appropriate written materials, provided these can be maintained on a classified basis. I think this can be accomplished without legislation.

Senator Hughes. What steps have been taken or will you take to insure that the CIA never again will be involved in domestic American activities, as it was in the training of police personnel from several U.S. cities and in the assistance to Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy?

Mr. Colby. A careful review has been made of all possible Agency involvement in domestic American activities, and instructions are being issued to ensure that no violation of the limitations of CIA’s statutory authority takes place in the future. With respect to the training of local police personnel, I reiterate Dr. Schlesinger’s assurance {p.28} that, despite the fact that its legality might be defended, any further such action will be taken only in the most exceptional circumstances and with the Director’s personal approval. Regulations are being developed with respect to CIA assistance to other U.S. agencies and personnel to ensure that any such assistance raises no question of CIA involvement in domestic American activities.

Senator Hughes. Mr. Colby, published reports say that your experience has been in the plans and operations side of the CIA rather than in intelligence or science and technology. Because of the availability of new technical intelligence gathering means, not to mention the backlash and suspicion in many areas of the world regarding agents, do you believe that the time has come to reduce some of our overseas operations in order to put greater stress on intelligence analysis and science and technology?

Mr. Colby. Over the past 15 years great stress has been placed on scientific and technological intelligence gathering, which has made a great contribution to accurate knowledge of important foreign developments. Overseas intelligence operations must only be conducted in circumstances fully justifying the risks involved and in situations which cannot be covered by more normal methods. Analysis has made a substantial contribution to intelligence and is being improved and refined to the greatest degree possible.

Senator Hughes. Published reports also give you a key policy role in decisions to involve the United States in clandestine operations in Laos in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s — operations which grew into a secret, CIA-run war.

(a)  On reflection, do you believe that it was wise for the Agency to get involved in such military operations?

(b)  Do you believe that it is proper under our Constitution for such military operations to be conducted without the knowledge or approval of the Congress?

(c)  Where should the line be drawn between CIA and Defense Department activities involving the use of armed force?

Mr. Colby. The Agency’s activities in Laos were undertaken in direct response to Presidential and National Security Council direction in order to carry out U.S. policy and at the same time avoid the necessity for uniformed U.S. involvement in Laos. These activities grew in size over the years to meet greater North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao pressure. The size to which these operations grew made it difficult to maintain normal intelligence procedures. Despite the difficulties for CIA, I submit that the Agency fulfilled the charge given it efficiently and effectively.

The appropriate committees of the Congress and a number of individual senators and congressmen were briefed on CIA’s activities in Laos during the period covered. In addition, CIA’s programs were described to the Appropriations Committees in our annual budget hearings.

In general, the line should be drawn between CIA and the Defense Department with respect to armed force at the point in which the United States acknowledges involvement in such activities. As a practical matter, however, the scale of the activity will, in many cases, also affect whether the United States is revealed as engaged in the activity.

Senator Hughes. Where do you — and should we — draw the line {p.29} between simply gathering intelligence and manipulating events or interfering in the internal affairs of other countries? In particular, why should the CIA play any role in nations of the underdeveloped world which pose no conceivable threat to us?

Mr. Colby. As indicated above, the use of intelligence techniques should be reserved to cases of importance in which no other means will serve. This same approach is even more stringently applied to any activity which could be construed as interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, and such activities are only conducted under the specific direction of the National Security Council. With this approach, it would be unlikely that CIA would play a role of this nature in any nation whose policies pose no conceivable threat to U.S. interests.

Senator Symington. I am impressed with your answers, and look forward to voting for your confirmation, hoping you will carry out the philosophy you have expressed this morning. If you do, your Agency will perform an important function incident to the security and prosperity of this country.

Thank you, and good luck.

Mr. Colby. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Symington. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] {p.30}

{Page 30 is blank} {p.31}



Source: The printed hearings (cited below).

By CJHjr: Photocopied at 141%, scanned, converted to text (OCR: FineReader 6.0), formatted (xhtml/css), links, text {in braces}, text beside a green bar |, text in yellow boxes, bold-face, bold-italics, highlighting, added paragraphing (for ease of reading) marked with this trailing paragraph symbol: ¶ .

SuWho? SuDoc CIS   DL

This document (the third Phoenix hearings): July 2 1973 hearing, pages 1-29, U.S. Congress, Senate Hearings, Nomination of William E. Colby to be Director of Central Intelligence (U.S. Congress 93-1, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings, July 2, 20 {a.m., p.m.}, 25, 1973, 3+186 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:C 67/3, CIS: 73 S201-27, OCLC: 800312, LCCN: 73603022 pf, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: William E. Colby, Robert F. Drinan, Samuel A. Adams, Paul Sakwa, David S. Harrington, Kenneth B. Osborn.

See also:

The first Phoenix hearings: Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970: Hearings on Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program (U.S. Congress 91-2, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, February 17, 18, 19, 20, and March 3, 4, 17, 19, 1970, and Appendix, 7+750 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:V 67/17, CIS: 71 S381-2, OCLC: 119418, LCCN: 76610214 pf, DL, WorldCat}.

The second Phoenix hearings: U.S. Congress, House Hearings: U.S. Congress, House Hearings, U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 92-1, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, Hearings, July 15 {a.m., p.m.}, 16, 19, 21, and August 2 1971, 4+362 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.G 74/7:V 67/4, CIS: 72 h301-3, OCLC: 235387, LCCN: 71616178 pf, DL, WorldCat}. Ensuing report: U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 92-2, House Report No. 92-1610, House Committee on Government Operations, October 17 1972, 5+107 pages) {SuDoc: [Y 1.1/8:]92-2:H.RP.1610, Serial Set: 12976-6, CIS: 72 h303-19, OCLC: 540690, LCCN: 72603272 pf, WorldCat} {Full text: pages 1-46 2.4mb.pdf, pages 47-97 2.8mb.pdf, pages 99-107 501kb.pdf, omitting page 98 and repeating page 107, instead, at the start}.

Vietnam Policy Proposals: Hearings on nine proposed items of legislation to end the U.S. war in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 91-2, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, February 3, 4, 5, and March 16, 1970, 5+405 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:V 67/16, CIS: 70 S381-7, OCLC: 78825, LCCN: 74606991 pf, DL, WorldCat}.

National Veterans Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam (Citizens’ Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes, Washington D.C., December 1-3 1970), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 4238-4271 (U.S. Congress 92-1, March 1 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.4, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Robert Bowie Johnson Jr., Mike McCusker, Daniel K. Amigone, Greg Motoka, Kenneth Barton Osborn, Norman Kiger, Gail Graham, Steve Noetzel, Edward Murphy, Daniel Alfiero, Louis Paul Font, Robert Master, Peter Norman Martinsen, T. Griffiths Ellison, Ed Melton, Chuck Hamilton, Lee Meyrowitz, Gordon S. Livingston, Greg Turgeon, Richard Altenberger, Bob Connelly, Robert Lifton, Chaim Shatan, Donald Engel, Gary Thamer, Steven Hassett, Kenneth Campbell, Sam Rankin, Phillip Wingenbach, Tod Ensign, Larry Rottmann, Robert Osman.

Winter Soldier Investigation (Vietnam Veterans Against the War Inc., Detroit Michigan, January 31, February 1-2, 1971), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 9947-10055 (U.S. Congress 92-1, April 6 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.8, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}; 117 Congressional Record E 2825-2936 (U.S. Congress 92-1, April 6-? 1971, Daily Edition (green bound)) {SuDoc: X/A.92/1:117/???-???, ISSN: 0363-7239, LCCN: 80646573 pf, OCLC: 02437919, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1971 (U.S. Congress 92-1, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Hearings, March 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, April 1, 6, 20 {vvaw}, 1971, 9+583 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/1:P 93/4/971/PT.1, CIS: 71 H381-9, OCLC: 15634210, LCCN: 77612471 pf, WorldCat}, witness: Larry Rottmann (volunteer coordinator, Vietnam Veterans Against the War), April 20 1971 hearing, pages 353-423 {3.2mb.pdf}, at pages 406-423. CIS: “Description of charged mistreatment of prisoners in South Vietnam by American forces; report of receiving Officers Candidate School instruction on the use of torture.”


Legislative Proposals Relating to the War in Southeast Asia {44.14mb.pdf, source} “Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session, on S. 376, S. 974, S.J. Res. 82, S.J. Res. 89, S. Con. Res. 17, S. Res. 62, and S. Res. 66” (U.S. Congress 92-1, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, April 20-May 27 1971: “April 20, 21 and 22, 28, May 3, 11, 12, 13, 25, 26 and 27, 1971,” 7+726+12 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:AS 4/13, CIS: 71 S381-18, OCLC: 198272, LCCN: 79614140 pf, DL, WorldCat}, witness: John Kerry (VVAW: Vietnam Veterans Against the War), Thursday April 22 1971, 11:05am-1:00pm, pages 179-210 {3.1mb.pdf}.

House Ad Hoc Hearing for Vietnam Veterans Against the War (U.S. Congressmen Jonathon Bingham and Paul Findley, presiding, Friday, April 23 1971, Venue: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 13104-13118 (U.S. Congress 92-1, May 3 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.10, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Larry Rottmann, Forest Lindley, Les Johnson, Arthur Egendorf, Kip A. Kypriandes, Phillip Lowley, Vinny Giardina, Michael Paul McCusker, William W. Lemmer, Alex Prim, Robert McLaughlin, Jack Smith, David B. Maize.

Senate Ad Hoc Hearing for Vietnam Veterans Against the War (U.S. Senator George McGovern, presiding, Friday, April 23 1971, Venue: U.S. Congress, Senate, Room G-103 New Senate Office Building), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 15392-15405 (U.S. Congress 92-1, May 17 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.12, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Scott Camil, Vinny Giardina, Melville L. Stephens, Basil Paquet, Joe Nielsen, Dale Granata, Everett Carson, Forrest Lindley Jr., Samuel Miller, David A. Lamenzo, Jon Bjornson, Ken Provan.

Ad Hoc Hearings on Command Responsibility for War Atrocities in Vietnam {copy} (U.S. Congressman Ron Dellums, presiding, April 26, 27, 28, 29, 1971, 9:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m., Venue: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building), transcript, The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam: An Inquiry into Command Responsibility in Southeast Asia (New York, Vintage Books, 1972, 13+355 pages) {LCCN: 79039897 pf, ISBN: 0394717678, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Five West Point graduates (Fred Laughlin, Gordon Livingston {Iraq, copy}, Robert B. Johnson, Greg Hayward, Ron Bartek, Michael O'Mera), five former military intelligence special agents and PoW interrogators {omitted from the linked source}, ten former Americal Division members (Gary Battles, Charles David Locke, Terry Mullen, Steve Padoris, Daniel S. Notley, John Beitzel, Guadalupe G. Villarreal, Daniel Barnes, Thomas Cole, William Toffling), overview of air war, pacification, and forced urbanization (John Sack, Kenneth Campbell, Randy Floyd, Elliot L Meyrowitz).

Bertrand Russell Tribunal, “International War Crimes Tribunal” (Stockholm Sweden, May 2-10 1967; Roskilde Denmark, November 20 – December 1 1967).

Tiger Force: “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths: Tiger Force, an elite fighting unit in Vietnam, left a trail of atrocities in that country that have been concealed from the public for three decades.” (The Blade, Toledo Ohio, October 22 2003, February 15, March 28, April 6, May 2, May 12 2004).

This document is not copyrighted and may be freely copied.


Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Posted July 22 2004. Updated April 30 2009.


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