CJHjrValid XHTML 1.0W3C: Valid CSS2

Alt+left-arrow to return from a link


Full-text: July 21 1971 hearing (pp.243-286)
Rigged elections, puppet dictator
CIA/DoD Phoenix Program:
Targeting non-combatants (civilians)
Also: Torture and murdering prisoners

CIS: 72 H401-3 SuDoc: Y 4.G 74/7:V 67/4

U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam








July 15 {a.m., p.m.}, 16, 19, 21; and August 2, 1971


Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

GPO mark




Chet Holifield, California, Chairman

Jack Brooks, TexasFlorence P. Dwyer, New Jersey
L. H. Fountain, North CarolinaOgden R. Reid. New York
Robert E. Jones, AlabamaFrank Horton, New York
Edward A. Garmatz, MarylandJohn N. Erlenborn, Illinois
John E. Moss, CaliforniaJohn W. Wydler, New York
Dante B. Fascell, FloridaClarence J. Brown, Ohio
Henry S. Reuss, WisconsinGuy Vander Jagt, Michigan
John S. Monagan, ConnecticutGilbert Gude, Maryland
Torbert H. MacDonald, MassachusettsPaul N. McCloskey, Jr., California
William S. Moorhead, PennsylvaniaJohn H. Buchanan, Jr., Alabama
Cornelius E. Gallagher, New JerseySam Steiger, Arizona
Wm. J. Randall, MissouriGarry Brown, Michigan
Benjamin S. Rosenthal, New YorkBarry M. Goldwater, Jr., California
Jim Wright, TexasJ. Kenneth Robinson, Virginia
Fernand J. St Germain, Rhode IslandWalter E. Powell, Ohio
John C. Culver, IowaCharles Thone, Nebraska
Floyd V. Hicks, Washington
George W. Collins, Illinois
Don Fuqua, Florida
John Conyers, Jr., Michigan
Bill Alexander, Arkansas
Bella S. Abzug, New York

Herbert Roback, Staff Director
Christine Ray Davis, Staff Administrator
James A. Lanigan, General Counsel
Miles Q. Romney, Associate General Counsel
J. P. Carlson, Minority Counsel
William H. Copenhaver, Minority Professional Staff



William S. Moorhead, Pennsylvania, Chairman

John E. Moss, CaliforniaOgden R. Reid, New York
Torbert H. MacDonald, MassachusettsFrank Horton, New York
Jim Wright, TexasJohn N. Erlenborn, Illinois
John Conyers, Jr., MichiganPaul N. McCloskey, Jr., California
Bill Alexander, Arkansas
Chet Holifield, CaliforniaFlorence P. Dwyer, New Jersey

William G. Phillips, Staff Director
Norman G. Cornish, Deputy Staff Director
Harold F. Whittington, Staff Consultant
Dale E. Moser, Supervisory Auditor, GAO
Martha M. Dott, Clerk
Mary E. Milek, Secretary




Richard S. Winslow
Theodore Jacqueney

July 21 1971 hearing, pages 243-286




U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam


Wednesday, July 21, 1971

House of Representatives,
Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the Committee of Government Operations,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, at 2:40 p.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William S. Moorhead (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives William S. Moorhead, Ogden R. Reid, Frank Horton, and Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.

Staff members present: William G. Phillips, staff director; Norman G. Cornish, deputy staff director: Harold F. Whittington, staff consultant; Dale E. Moser, supervisory auditor, GAO; and William H. Copenhaver, minority professional staff, Committee on Government Operations.

Mr. Moorhead.  The Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information will please come to order.

This afternoon the subcommittee will hear testimony from two former AID personnel. We will hear both witnesses together. I understand there is a message from a third witness who is too ill to appear.

We will first hear from Mr. Richard S. Winslow, who served at Binh Duong, a Province of South Vietnam, and following that we will hear from Mr. Theodore Jacqueney, who completed an 18-month tour of duty in Vietnam with the Agency for International Development, assigned to the CORDS program.

Mr. Winslow and Mr. Jacqueney, we normally swear the witnesses, but we do that when we have at least two members present, and so you can anticipate that you will be sworn retroactively and prospectively.

Mr. Winslow, would you like to proceed?

Statement of
Richard S. Winslow,
Former AID Employee

Mr. Winslow. This committee is responsible for a continuing review of the economy and efficiency of U.S. economic assistance operations in Southeast Asia. The most important factor in such a review is accurate information. Therefore, I would like to comment today on the quantity and quality of information which the committee receives. Since my experience is in Vietnam, I will refer specifically to information which is gathered at a low level by CORDS personnel in the field and to the eventual fate of that information. {p.244}

I will start off by saying that large numbers of the U.S. civilian and military officials in Vietnam laugh at the U.S. Congress. They laugh, because, in their words, “It’s so easy to fool the Congress.” They are referring to a variety of practices, the simplest of which is the changing of a word or phrase instead of the substance of a policy which has come under congressional criticism.

The most notable example is that of “free-fire zones,” areas where any Vietnamese seen moving were automatically considered Communist and could be bombed or shot on sight. Then came publicity over incidents such as Mylai and over large-scale civilian bombing casualties, and the whole concept of free-fire zones was heavily criticized for not taking into account the many legitimate reasons why non-Communists or noncombatants might be in a certain area. As a result of that criticism, I was told, there are still free-fire zones in Vietnam, but they are not called “free-fire zones” any more. Now they are called “specified strike zones,” or “restricted civilian access” areas. The U.S. Congress seems satisfied with this change.

There have been similar changes in the terminology of the Phoenix program, the now well-known United States/South Vietnamese effort to identify and destroy the Vietcong infrastructure. For instance, a Phoenix adviser explained to me how some Congressmen had complained about the Phoenix program’s “blacklist,” composed of the names of confirmed and suspected Vietcong in a given area. The critics, it seems, objected to the word “blacklist,” feeling that it carried the sinister meaning of being out to get individuals. Therefore, in documents, reports, and most conversations, pacification officials now use the term “special list of Communist offenders.” The new name, needless to say, has not prevented Phoenix personnel from “getting” whomever they suspect of being a Vietcong or a Vietcong-sympathizer. But, I was told, few Members of Congress have complained much lately.

Another CORDS Phoenix advisor enlightened me on the word “neutralization.” Previously, he explained, the major goal of Phoenix was the “elimination” of the VCI. “Elimination,” however, gave the unfortunate impression to some Congressmen and to the interested public that someone was being “eliminated.” Now the major goal is “neutralization” of the VCI. Of course, the same proportion of VCI are being killed in combat, and killed or captured by the mobile teams established for that purpose. But Congress seems mollified now that suspected Vietcong are “neutralized,” rather than “eliminated.”

Aside from verbal tricks such as these, I wish to speak about the two principal ways in which information gathered by CORDS personnel in the field does not reach the Congress. I will focus on the information collected on South Vietnamese corruption, such as that discussed by Los Angeles Times reporter, George McArthur, in his excellent article entitled, “Embassy Has Corruption File,” printed in the Washington Post on July 12, 1971.

First, information gathered by CORDS personnel goes through a sifting process as it passes up the U.S. hierarchy. Reports on topics ranging from community development to corruption in districts and Provinces are rewritten, and frequently made more optimistic, or softened, as they go up the line. {p.245}

As regards reports on the corrupt activities of GVN officials, what I mean by the word “softened” is, specifically, the deletion of material which is not fully provable. In Vietnam I wrote up a number of instances involving corruption of Binh Duong Province officials, basing my reports on information I collected from reliable Vietnamese and American sources. I was informed by my superiors that such reports. and the reports of dozens of others like myself, were interesting but were not substantiated with enough evidence from enough witnesses, and would therefore not get past the military region 3 office or, at most, the Saigon headquarters. In reply, I frequently asked if the CORDS and Embassy officials in Saigon and the State Department in Washington wanted legal briefs against specific South Vietnamese individuals, or if they wanted to know of the widespread unpopularity of the provincial GVN officials because of their corrupt financial activities, as reported to Vietnamese-speaking Americans by Vietnamese friends, acquaintances, and informants. In turn, I was told simply that the higher-ups did not wish to hear of corruption unless it was fully substantiated.

I found it hard to believe that high-ranking U.S. officials would not wish to hear of the probable extent of corruption and its effect on the attitudes of the Vietnamese populace toward their Government. So, in a long conversation I had with a political analyst working for the Embassy in Saigon, I asked: “How much of what the Embassy knows or suspects of GVN corruption gets sent on to State Department officials in Washington?” He replied, “Not much.” I then asked why high U.S. officials, with all we now know about our inadequate analyses of the Vietnamese situation during our involvement, would wish to ignore or downplay such a significant part of the Vietnamese reality. The analyst replied: “The capacity for self-deception should not be underestimated.”

It is quite possible, then, that our highest State Department and Defense Department officials in Washington have not read extensively from the Embassy’s “corruption file” and are therefore not as impressed with the seriousness of the problem as are the lower-ranking personnel in the field.

I would be outright surprised, however, if any U.S. Congressman has read the “corruption file” (as Reporter McArthur calls it). And this brings me directly to the second way in which information gathered by CORDS personnel fails to reach Congress.

For no matter how extensive the internal sifting process within CORDS, and I believe that it is extensive, a lot of solid, documented information on GVN corruption reaches the highest levels of U.S. officialdom in Saigon, if not Washington. Nonetheless, the simple truth. as you of the committee must know much better than I, is that the State Department and Defense Department do not go out of their way to give Congress the fullest and most accurate reports available. And there are indeed full and accurate reports with the U.S. mission in Saigon on hundreds of GVN officials and their involvement in corrupt activities.

There are good reasons, of course, why the Embassy would not make such files public: It would be difficult to deal with Government officials while publishing information on their reported corruption. But the information contained in such files is absolutely vital to an assessment {p.246} of the viability or nonviability of the present South Vietnamese Government.

Many so-called experts on Vietnam claim that the practice of corruption by officials is culturally acceptable to the Vietnamese people, and that we Americans, therefore, should not worry about it. That claim is very misleading, for in fact there are two kinds of corruption differing greatly in their acceptability to the Vietnamese. First there is the payoff routinely taken by a policeman, a clerk, or a low-ranking Government administrator, who quite literally do not receive a high enough salary to feed their families. This payment is made by the Vietnamese citizen who passes a checkpoint, or who needs a birth certificate, or who wants a vendors license. This kind of payoff is considered acceptable by the Vietnamese citizen, who understands that a man must feed his family, and that the salary of Government employees is not adequate for survival.

Secondly, however, there is the corruption engaged in by higher-ranking GVN officials — district chiefs, deputy district chiefs, Province chiefs, Province administrators, military corps commanders, and other military officers, and Saigon officials of all kinds throughout all the ministries. A large percentage of these officials are making an enormous financial killing off of the war. They get their money by several means: By taking a cut from the lower-ranking officials who have taken a payment from the ordinary citizen; by taking a healthy portion of money and materials meant for community development, refugee relief, or school improvement; by operating organized bands to steal from American PX’s and selling the items on the black market at high profit; even, unbelievable though it may sound, by selling supplies and weapons to the Vietcong, or taking a payoff from someone who does.

The profits of such activities are not necessarily kept discretely hidden. Many district chiefs and Province chiefs live in opulent dwellings, built with tons of U.S. cement originally meant for schools, health dispensaries, or local militia defense fortifications. It is not rare to see such officials driving around in a Mercedes-Benz or another expensive automobile, while the citizen, who, in the most profound sense, has paid for it, walks by the roadside carrying unclean water on a pole across her shoulders.

None of this is secret, none of this is news to the South Vietnamese people; they see the results of official corruption every day, and they do not like it. They know who the honest officials are, and who the dishonest ones are. They know that the Americans know, too, and they wonder why the Americans choose to continue unqualified support of those corrupt officials in power.

I can say this because, even during my 4 brief months in Vietnam, I was able to talk about such matters, in Vietnamese, with dozens of simple, urban citizens — taxi drivers, shop owners, clerks, low-ranking Government functionaries. I must concede that Vietnamese farmers are much more reserved and wary, and except for very rare occasions, I did not feel I could put them on the spot with questions of a political nature. But urban Vietnamese, who now account for perhaps 50 percent of the nation, do not fit the stereotype which Americans have of the Vietnamese people: That is, that of a quiet, soft-spoken man or woman, always concealing his or her true thoughts and feelings. {p.247}

Urban Vietnamese are frequently very outspoken and frank, and I learned from them immensely.

Because I was in South Vietnam for only 4 months, the specific tales of corruption which I could toll would be only a tiny fraction of 1 percent of the full story. However, I do wish to confirm, without reservation, that CORDS files and Embassy files do include a vast amount of specific, documented evidence on the subject of corruption. As George McArthur put it succinctly in his article:

Over the years American advisors have funneled into the Embassy a mountain of detailed charges, all labeled top secret in the interest of maintaining relationships with the Saigon Government. These have been compiled by military officers, civilians working in the police and pacification programs and representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency.

They include reports on everyone from district officials to generals in the joint general staff, and advisors to President Nguyen Van Thieu.

The reason why it is important for Congress to know the extent of corruption is much more than just to satisfy Its curiosity. The overriding reason is that the corruption of the present South Vietnamese Government is a main cause of its unpopularity and its consequent inability to govern effectively by rallying the populace to its cause. The key issue, then, is to decide if the current South Vietnamese governmental system has a realistic enough chance of surviving in the coming years to justify a continued substantial human and monetary sacrifice on the part of the United States.

I was told recently by a nationally-respected newsman that Dr. Henry Kissinger considers it likely that a Communist-dominated government will eventually rule South Vietnam. In that case, his goal, and the administration’s, is not to prevent such an event but rather to provide, in Dr. Kissinger’s words, a “decent interval” between the time of U.S. disengagement and the time a Communist-dominated government comes to power.

So perhaps the question which Congress must ask, and which this committee with its powers of review over U.S. foreign spending must ask, is this: Is it worth the additional enormous sums of money for military and economic assistance, to say nothing of American lives, in order to delay a Communist-dominated government in South Vietnam until, let us say, 1975 or 1976 instead of 1972 or 1973?

I would say urgently that the committee, in answering such fundamental and difficult questions, deserves access to a much fuller range of the information gathered by our pacification officials in the field. You, like the public, have been getting only a small, carefully sifted fraction of that information during the past several years. And if the Congress has in many ways been left behind in the Indochina decisionmaking process, it is in large part because the information gathered in the field, at great expense to the U.S. taxpayer, has simply not been passed on to Congress for its consideration.

Mr. Moorhead. Thank you very much, Mr. Winslow, for a very helpful statement.

Immediately following Mr. Winslow’s statement I should like to include in the record the article about the “corruption file” that he referred to as published in the July 12, 1971 issue of the Washington Post.

Without objection, it will appear immediately following your testimony.

(The article follows:) {p.248}


[From the Washington Post, July 12, 19711

Embassy Has Corruption File

(By George McArthur, Los Angeles Times)

SAIGON — The U.S. congressional charges that South Vietnam’s Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu is directly involved in drug trafficking has caused a severe case of the jitters among ranking Americans in Saigon.

The charges come at a time when, the Embassy is once again pushing a drive against corruption among South Vietnamese officials, high and low.

The Embassy is uneasy about the Dzu case — and all the rest — because U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and his military counterpart Gen. Creighton Abrams have detailed knowledge of enough hanky-panky to cause an uproar if it was published.

Among the most closely guarded secrets in the Embassy’s files are detailed reports covering the financial misdeeds of a vast array of South Vietnamese generals and civilian officials.

In an unguarded moment, one ranking American with many years in Vietnam once reported there were only two honest generals in the South Vietnamese army. One of them has since been killed and the other is Maj. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong who commands the IV Corps area comprising the Mekong Delta region.

And another American with access to the files added, “They are all in it and if they are not personally involved their wives are.”

While such sweeping statements are probably overdrawn, they do reflect accurately the views of knowledgeable people who have long grappled with the problem of corruption in South Vietnam.


Over the years American advisors have funneled into the Embassy a mountain of detailed charges, all labeled top secret in the interest of maintaining relationships with the Saigon Government. These have been compiled by military officers, civilians working in the police and pacification programs and representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency.

They include reports on everyone from district officials to generals working in the Joint General Staff and advisers to President Nguyen Van Thieu.

Privately, Americans will sometimes point the finger at individuals — such as the current chief of Baclieu Province in the delta who is a distent relative of the president and renowned for corruption.

Officially, however, the American establishment has refused to name names.

In the early days of the war the frequent excuse was that it was useless to get a man removed if his replacement would be worse — and that was frequently the case.

In later years it has become Embassy policy to avoid getting into any public discussions of corruption beyond admitting that it was a problem supposedly getting continuing study.

This policy was strengthened within the establishment by the belief that a public airing of corruption charges would upset the Saigon regime without necessarily getting rid of anyone.

President Thieu has been notably cautious in moving against any general on corruption charges and although some have been removed they have almost inevitably cropped up again somewhere else.


The mounting narcotics problems in Vietnam, however, has caused a notable stiffening within the U.S. Embassy and also within President Thien’s official establishment.

American officials say that the Saigon Government has been told that heroin trafficking is the one crime that cannot be tolerated. There is some evidence that the South Vietnamese generals and other officials have gotten this message.

One American official who admits that some generals may have been involved in past heroin smuggling says that they have now dropped it.

This official says that some Vietnamese officers, particularly in the air force, have always been involved in a certain amount of opium smuggling — which was more or less socially acceptable in Vietnam. They did not initially realize that raw heroin would eventually touch a very raw American nerve. {p.249}

About 6 months ago, one official says, the South Vietnamese also began to realize that heroin was a threat to their own people.

Now, the embassy claims it is getting full support from President Thieu and lesser officials in a major, nationwide drug crackdown.

This crackdown has been impressive in terms of heroin and other drugs seized and’ minor pushers and smugglers arrested. It has not, however, resulted in arrest or charges against anyone of importance.

Whether Dzu was involved in drug trafficking cannot be proved by any evidence made public, despite the charges made by Rep. Robert M. Steele (Republican from Connecticut).

Dzu, who commands the 12 Provinces making up what is known as H Corps {sic: II Corps?} in the Central Highlands area, denies the charges.

Dzu has been supported by his American adviser, John Paul Vann, who has more experience in South Vietnam than any other senior member of the American establishment. Vann said he had “every reason to believe he is innocent” of the drug charges.

It is a fact, however, that the city which is corps headquarters, Nhatrang, is the center of drug trafficking in South Vietnam. This is possibly because it is the major headquarters for the South Vietnamese air force — an item that has been used in the past to link Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the former air marshal who still retains de facto control of the air force, with the heroin traffic.

Though Ky has vehemently denied this, it is widely accepted in South Vietnam that he was involved in the old opium trade until he decided to brush up his public image.

Dzu was already on shaky ground when the drug charges cropped up. He was well aware of this and flew to Saigon to seek a personal meeting with President Thieu.

Only 3 weeks ago Dzu was the target of some widely publicized anonymous letters charging him with accepting bribes, looting U.S. supplies and making grandiose battle claims.

At that time, Dzu sent a transport plane 200 miles to Saigon to pick up a party of newsmen and fly them to Nhatrang for a news conference.

Flanked by his staff officers, Dzu denied everything.

Representative Steele, in making his charges, predicted that the Saigon Government would crack down on Dzu. Steele said his information came from intelligence reports that were also in the possession of Ambassador Bunker.

In Washington, State Department spokesman Charles Bray replied to this that the South Vietnamese were in possession of any information about drugs which the embassy had.

While making no direct comment about Dzu, Bray implied that it was now up to the Saigon Government to take action.

In Saigon, U.S. press spokesmen would say nothing beyond Bray’s noncommittal remarks.


Mr. Moorhead. Now, Mr. Jacqueney.

Statement of
Theodore Jacqueney,
Former AID Employee

Mr. Jacqueney. Before I begin, Gerald Roback, who worked with AID in the Binh Duong Province in 1960, who was also scheduled to testify at these hearings, telephoned me yesterday to explain that he was unable to send a telegram to the subcommittee regretting his inability to appear today because of the telephone workers’ strike. He asked me to read this statement on his behalf. This would have been his wire:

I regret that I am not able to testify at the hearings of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information on Wednesday, July 21. I am currently recovering from intestinal disease contracted in Vietnam and I am unable to travel. I have information concerning CIA intervention in Vietnamese presidential elections and I would be glad to testify concerning this information at some later date.

Mr. Moorhead. Before you proceed, Mr. Jacqueney, would you and Mr. Winslow arise and let me administer the oath to you retroactively and prospectively. {p.250}

(The witnesses were sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. Moorhead. You may proceed now, Mr. Jacqueney.

Mr. Jacqueney. I have recently completed an 18-month tour of duty in Vietnam with the Agency for International Development, assigned to the CORDS pacification and development program. I had responsibilities for community development programs, and for political reporting for the Danang City Advisory Group.

I resigned from AID this past February because I felt that U.S. policy in Vietnam supported President Thieu’s reelection. I felt then, and I continue to feel now, that, rather than upholding a particular candidate, American resources should support only the fairest possible elections in the lower house elections scheduled for August 29, and in the presidential election scheduled for October 3.

One important instance of American partisanship in the Vietnamese elections of which I am personally aware involves the Pacification Attitude Analysis Surveys run by CORDS in Vietnam. As the New York Times reported from Vietnam on February 2:

National surveys of Vietnamese public opinion are prepared and analyzed by the United States Mission here, are being used to assist President Nguyen van Thieu in his reelection campaign this year.

Mr. Moorhead. You quote the New York Times, but in an earlier sentence you say “of which I am personally aware.” Are you personally aware of the accuracy of the quotation?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes, and I am also aware of the situation as it exists.

Mr. Moorhead. Thank you, Mr. Jacqueney.

Mr. Jacqueney. The article disclosed that:

Special questions in the surreys are now being asked to enable President Thieu to measure more clearly his own appeal with the Vietnamese voters, the popularity of his political rivals, and what issues most concern Vietnamese.

Although I played no role in leaking this story, I can personally attest to its accuracy. Months before it appeared, I was told by the men who ran these surveys at the CORDS MACV Pacification Studies Group in Saigon that the only Vietnamese officials permitted to see the new political surveys were in the presidential office. The political survey results were for the eyes of Thieu supporters only.

Another example of American partisanship in Vietnamese domestic political affairs involves the political propaganda services lent the Saigon government by the U.S. Information Agency’s Vietnam organ, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, at a time when that government is denying freedom of the press to many Vietnamese nationalists. My Vietnamese friends often discussed the arrest or threatened arrest of newspaper publishers and the confiscation of newspapers. One of my closest friends — the best man at my wedding — was the Danang correspondent of a popular Saigon newspaper which often criticizes the Government. He had been jailed at least once for his journalistic activities. Although had long since stopped signing his real name to his articles, he lived under constant threat of return to prison. Another close friend was a prominent conservative political opponent to President Thieu who had repeatedly requested, and repeatedly been denied, permission to publish newspapers. Without that permission, he could publish only by pseudonym, in other papers, covertly, fearing Government retaliation all the while. {p.251}

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on March 19, 1970, Mr. Edward J. Nickel, Director of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon, stated that:

JUSPAO’s principal mission was to assist the Vietnamese Government in developing means of communicating with the electorate and to provide technical and professional advice.

To accomplish this mission, Mr. Nickel revealed, JUSPAO spent more than $12 million in fiscal 1970. According to official U.S. Government figures:

During 1968 the Government of Vietnam indefinitely suspended an average of six newspapers. Sixteen others were temporarily suspended, for an average of 35 days per suspension. During 1969, through March 23, 1970, the Government of Vietnam indefinitely suspended 12 newspapers. An additional 14 received temporary suspensions, ranging from a few days to almost 11 months, for an average of 46 days per suspension.

A few weeks ago, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky criticized President. Thieu’s corruption and suggested Communist participation in the coming elections as a possible peace concession to Hanoi. Fourteen papers carrying his speech were seized. In a Time magazine survey, 23 out of 25 editions of Ky’s newspaper, Lap Truong, were confiscated (Time, June 14, 1971). Thieu’s major presidential opponent, Buddhist-supported Duong Van “Big” Minh, has had the same problem with the press. He is endorsed by the liberal Catholic newspaper, Tin Sang, the most popular Saigon daily. According to a spot survey by the Washington Post, June 8, 1971, Tin Sang has been confiscated 141 times in the last 18 months. Its publisher is Ngo Cong Duc, Thieu’s most outspoken critic in Vietnam’s National Assembly.

Last month the Washington Post and the New York Times reported Deputy Duc’s arrest on trumped-up charges, at the time when the Thieu government was ramming through the Vietnamese Legislature a new law limiting possible presidential opponents. On July 8, the Washington Post reported from Saigon that Duc had been prohibited from running for reelection.

I wrote in my political report of the June 1970, Da Nang City Council election, that “arrest without warrant or reason” was a major local complaint by the people of Da Nang. I have personally witnessed poor urban people literally quaking with fear when I questioned them about the activity of the secret police in a past election campaign. One poor fisherman in Da Nang, animated and talkative in complaining about economic conditions, clammed up in near terror when queried about the police, responding that he “must think about his family.” After many personal interviews in Vietnam on this subject, I came to the conclusion that no single entity, including the feared and hated Vietcong, is more feared or more hated than the South Vietnamese secret police.

The U.S. funds the police, intelligence, and prison systems which — however the Saigon Government may use these against the Vietcong — are also used in the widespread arrest and detention of non-Communist critics of that government. During the month of April, 1971, the New York Times and the Washington Post reported that U.S. expenditures in advisory support to the Vietnamese police network will total $27.3 million for 1971, an increase of 25 percent over 1970. According to one article, this figure includes only the South Vietnam- {p.252} ese national police force, leaving unsaid the amount allotted by the CIA for special police force assistance. Through these programs national police strength has increased from 16,000 in 1960 to 97,000 today, with a goal of 120,000 for 1971, and 147,000 thereafter.

The American contract firm RMK-BRJ has received an AID contract for $400,000 to build 288 new isolation cells on Con Son Island prison. One year ago when Representatives William Anderson, Democrat, Tennessee, and Augustus Hawkins, Democrat, California, visited Con Son, they called these cells “tiger cages” and described what they termed “savage mistreatment” of prisoners in those cages. Political prisoners now are being transferred from prisons on the mainland to Con Son Island apparently to make them less accessible during the election campaign.

In every province in Vietnam there is a Province Interrogation Center — a PIC — with a reputation for using torture to interrogate people accused of Vietcong affiliations. These PICs have a CIA counterpart relationship, and in some cases also have a relationship with the AID police advisor. Not in all cases, however — last year the senior AID police advisor of the Da Nang City Advisory Group told me he refused, after one visit, to ever set foot in a PIC again, because “war crimes are going on in there.”

One wealthy old man I knew in Saigon was arrested and accused of being a Communist spy. Two American officials who knew this man intimately later told me that they believed that the man had actually been a VC. Both of them on separate occasions told me that once arrested, the old man had wanted to confess, but had been tortured horribly anyway, simply because it was standard operating procedure to torture prisoners.

One torture that both American officials described to me, on separate occasions, as having been administered to the old man is called “rock and roll” — huge quantities of rice and water are forced down a prisoner’s throat, and then a smooth stone is rubbed over his belly, producing days of intense pain and continual vomiting. Both men stressed, also separately that compared to some other tortures, this act was comparatively mild. Whether the old man was a Communist spy, a Vietcong soldier, or an innocent political critic, he deserved decent treatment at the hands of the police. The United States is supplying funds and advisors on a massive scale to a police force that commonly uses these methods.

In the fall of 1969, Allard Lowenstein, then my Congressman, visited Vietnam. I introduced him to a number of nationalist political figures. One of the men to whom I introduced Mr. Lowenstein was arrested soon afterwards. Kept incommunicado under house arrest for months, he later told me:

They accused me of being a Communist, but all they ever questions me about was how I knew “dove Congressmen.”

The celebrated Phoenix program is not at all successful in its American purpose of eliminating Vietcong political cadre, but it is widely used to arrest and detail {sic: detain?} non-Communist dissidents. I can remember, for example, one conversation with two Phoenix advisors in Da Nang, who had come to me for additional information about some Da Nang city councilmen who Phoenix was planning to arrest on what seemed to me to be very questionable knowledge. The plan was {p.253} scotched — but I am convinced that if I had not been available to spend that afternoon talking to those men, at least one more innocent critic of the Saigon government would have been arrested and abused. Another friend, himself a Phoenix adviser, was ultimately removed from his position when he refused to compile information on individuals who would, he felt, inevitably be “targeted,” however weak the evidence might be. While I was serving in Vietnam at least one Province senior adviser, in Thua Thien Province, was suggesting doing away with the Phoenix program altogether. I agree with him.


Some time ago a high official of the Vietnamese Government called U.S. Senator George McGovern a “Communist” and threatened to take action personally should Senator McGovern ever visit Vietnam. If George McGovern were a Vietnamese Senator instead of an American Senator, surely he would now be in a Vietnamese jail, accused as a “Communist” or “neutralist” under the kind of flimsy charges that have already permitted the arrest and detention of leading elements of the non-Communist opposition to the Thieu regime.

I am speaking about men like 1967 presidential runner-up Truong Dinh Dzu, who campaigned on an outspoken peace platform and denounced the military government of South Vietnam as corrupt and repressive. Shortly after denouncing the election results as a wholesale fraud, Dzu was arrested. The South Vietnamese Government frequently releases Vietcong political cadre captured under the Phoenix program after 1 year on good behavior, but the dangerous Mr. Dzu, a non-Communist who advocated peace, is still in jail.

I speak also of the distinguished An Truong Thanh, former Economics Minister in Nguyen Cao Ky’s Cabinet, who was disqualified from candidacy in the 1967 elections after he announced that his platform would be the word “cease-fire” and that his election campaign symbol would be a canceled-out bomb. Information was soon developed that Thanh was a “Communist.” He was jailed, then placed under house arrest incommunicado, and ultimately escaped to Paris, where he now lives.

Here in the United States, a Vietnamese Buddhist hero, General Nguyen Chanh Thi, has been living in exile since 1966, when Buddhists all over Vietnam rose up to protest his dismissal as I Corps commanding general.

As further publication of the Pentagon papers will reveal, the highest American officials counseled the Vietnamese to remove the popular general, just as the highest American officials played key roles in the downfall of Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, and, 3 months later, that of General Duong Van “Big” Minh Thi, a staunch anti-Communist critic of the current Saigon Government and an outspoken proponent of a speedy peace settlement, is now actively petitioning the Vietnamese and American Governments for permission to return to Vietnam. His name is frequently mentioned in Vietnam as a popular potential presidential candidate should “Big” Minh choose not to run and Thi be permitted to return — but this permission is unlikely to be granted.

The shabbiest case of direct American involvement in political prisoner questions is that of the former third-ranking member of the Vietnamese Lower House, Trail Ngoc Chau. In 1965, after years of separation, Chau had been contacted by his Communist brother, Tran {p.254} Ngoc Hien, and asked to provide introductions for meetings with high American officials. Chau reported his contacts and was asked to maintain his renewed relationship with his brother by prominent American officials, including high CIA officials. By 1969 Chau had become an outspoken advocate of a peace settlement that included political representation for the National Liberation Front. Chau argued that to make peace the Vietnamese Government would ‘’have to be realistic and make concessions.” John Paul Vann, presently director of the second military region in Vietnam, has stated publicly that Chau was not pro-Communist, but a dedicated nationalist. Nevertheless, Chau was arrested, literally dragged out of the Vietnamese National Assembly, early in 1970, on charges of being in contact with his brother, Hien. Vann testified last year before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Chan’s contacts with Hien were approved by Americans and reported to the Vietnamese Government as early as 1966. Only after Chau became a peace advocate was he arrested.

Three times the Vietnamese supreme court has ruled that the special military tribunal that charged Chau was unconstitutional, and three times the Vietnamese Government has ignored the court’s ruling. American officials in Saigon have consistently refused to acknowledge American responsibilities for encouraging Chau.

Shortly before his arrest, Tran Ngoc Chau said these words to an American official who has since become well known, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg:

The United States has to support the democratic system in Vietnam. It has to make clear to the generals and to the Government of South Vietnam that it will support the principle and practice of the current Constitution of South Vietnam. Right now there is some degree of danger in being a member of the legislature as I am and attempting to bring about reforms and changes in the central Government. You will recall the assassination of one leading figure of the constituent assembly. I will try, but I won’t try too hard because I realize that if I am arrested, I am not doing anybody any good, least of all myself. For me it is very important that I know that the United States will support, not me personally, but the principles of legislative government in Vietnam should anything happen to me. There are many other people like me who are more likely to be willing to take chances in attempting to reform the system if they believe that the United States will support the constitutional system.

Less than 1 day after the U.S. Senate voted not to send official observers to report on the Vietnamese elections, President Thieu, on June 23, signed into law the bill he designed to prevent opponents from running against him in the October 3 presidential election. With the critical eyes of the American Congress upon him, Thieu might have softened the restrictions. The defeat of the Stevenson-Mathias amendment to the draft bill, however, revealed that the Senate wished to take no action to encourage fair elections in Vietnam.

I ask the members of this subcommittee of the House of Representatives if this body will also be indifferent to the kind of government for which so many Americans have already been sacrificed. Separate resolutions regarding the Vietnamese elections have been introduced by Representatives Lester Wolff, Democrat, New York; Donald Fraser, Democrat, Minnesota; and Donald Riegle, Republican, Michigan. These proposals to encourage fair elections in Vietnam still languish in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Although some 50 Representatives of both parties have cosponsored the resolution which Congressman Wolff introduced on March 3, 1971, hearings have never even been held. {p.255}

Potential Vietnamese presidential candidate “Big” Minh has accused American Ambassador Ellsworth T. Bunker of supporting Thieu’s reelection. Thieu apparently thinks he has received the same message of support not only from the American Embassy, but from the American Congress as well: He can continue to rig the elections as he pleases; the United States will pay only lip service to fair elections in Vietnam, while continuing to prop up his government and fund his war.

Right now the Vietnam war is winding down only for Americans — the miseries of the war-weary Vietnamese go on and on. The present Vietnamese Government now opposes a political settlement because it expects unending U.S. support. The war will grind on as long as U.S. material, financial and air combat assistance continues, despite the desire of the Vietnamese people for peace. Vietnamese believe that the United States still wants a military victory, without U.S. troops fighting, and that it is trying to reelect the only presidential candidate willing to prosecute the war. As I have discussed, despite declarations of U.S. impartiality, U.S. resources have been diverted to assist President Thieu’s campaign.

During his recent trip to Vietnam, Presidential Advisor Henry Kissinger, went out of his way to confer with Vietnamese opposition leaders, as well as with Government officials. However, as these Vietnamese reportedly told Kissinger, such “gestures” are not enough. They told him — and I repeat — that the United States must take active measures to support the fairest possible elections in Vietnam, or shoulder the responsibility for fraudulent elections and years more needless war.

I have three specific suggestions which I respectfully submit for the Members of Congress to consider for purposes of legislation about Vietnam:

(1) A full-field congressional investigation of JUSPAO operations and press freedoms in Vietnam should be launched. If Congress finds non-Communist Vietnamese leaders cannot disseminate their views freely, then the United States ought not to be involved in helping the Government in Saigon disseminate its views either, and the entire JUSPAO operation should be dropped.

(2) The Vietnamese political prisoner and exile issue should also be thoroughly investigated. Every congressional effort should be made to urge President Nixon to use the full weight of U.S. persuasion in Vietnam to affect the release of non-Communist political prisoners and the return of non-Communist exiles in time to participate in the October 3 election. If this cannot be accomplished, Congress should cease to fund all aid to the Vietnamese police and prison systems, or the United States will be supporting the very sort of police state that we went to Vietnam to oppose.

(3) Most important of all, if Congress should determine that the Vietnamese elections are a fraud, then all U.S. military and economic assistance to the Government in Saigon should cease. For nearly a generation, the one consistent theme in American policy in Vietnam has been to assist the people there to choose their own Government freely. If, in these elections, opposition candidates are disqualified; if opposition political leaders are jailed; if opposition leaders are kept in exile; if opposition candidates are not permitted to campaign or organize or propagate their views freely; if press freedoms are {p.256} denied; if political parties are not permitted to hold public rallies; if opposition candidates are denied access to Government-controlled broadcast facilities or Government-controlled transportation; if representatives of opposition candidates are not permitted to be present when voter lists are drawn up and voter cards are validated; if these representatives are not permitted to witness ballot casting and counting procedures and the transportation of ballot boxes between the village and district and provincial and national levels — then there will be grounds to make reasonable judgments about whether an election fair enough to reflect the views of the Vietnamese people did occur.

I respectfully suggest, therefore, that Congress end American aid to a regime that comes to power through phony elections. A government that deprives the Vietnamese people of a fair election does not deserve our support. After more than 55,000 dead and the expenditure of $200 billion to support self-determination in Vietnam, the American people have a right to say that if the 1971 Vietnamese elections are a fraud, then the United States should not send another bullet or another dollar to the Government in Saigon.

Mr. Moorhead. Thank you both very much, Mr. Jacqueney, and Mr. Winslow. You have given us a horror story which is not pleasant to hear, but which this subcommittee, the Congress, and the American people are entitled to hear. We appreciate very much your coming forward to help us.

Mr. Jacqueney, do you speak Vietnamese?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes, I do.

Mr. Moorhead. Mr. Winslow made reference to that in his statement. Mr. Winslow, you made one statement — which I would say is the understatement of the year as far as this subcommittee has learned from its hearings — when you say:

The State Department and Defense Department do not go out of their way to give Congress the fullest and most accurate reports available.

The plain, simple fact of it is that they go just as far the other way to keep information from us, as is possible.

Mr. Winslow, you talk about corruption in Vietnam. How much do you know about the black market in currency? When you answer questions, if you can tell us when you are answering of your personal knowledge and when you are answering from generally accepted knowledge and reputation in the area, it would be helpful.

If I ask some questions that sound critical. I am trying to narrow down when it’s your personal knowledge and when it’s general gossip, you understand. Now, on the black market in currency—

Mr. Winslow. I never sold or bought money on the black market in Vietnam, nor did I try. as I know even some visiting Congressmen have done, to make a token purchase to show how easy it is to do.

I do personally know both Americans and Vietnamese who have bought or sold currency, be they American green dollars or the American military payment certificates, the MPC’s, which is what all of the personnel over there are paid in. I do know Americans and Vietnamese who — some of them occasionally, some of them frequently and some regularly — do deal in the black money market.

The exchange rate over the years has always been at a great disadvantage to a person holding American money or American—

Mr. Moorhead. You mean the official rate? {p.257}

Mr. Winslow. The official exchange rate has been at a great disadvantage and therefore allowing, of course, the black market to flourish. I don’t have any special personal revelations that I think would help you on that.

Mr. Moorhead. Is that a good device for a Vietnamese official, who wanted to make some money, to go about doing it?

Mr. Winslow. Yes.

Mr. Moorhead. Do you have any comment?

Mr. Jacqueney. No, I have nothing to add to that statement.

Mr. Moorhead. Mr. Winslow, have you ever seen this corruption file that you refer to in the Washington Post article?

Mr. Winslow. I myself have written a handful of reports which eventually ended up in the corruption file. In other words, there really are a large number of persons in the CORDS system who are charged with collecting from Americans and Vietnamese in their districts or Provinces information on corruption and sending it in to both the military region headquarters and corps and Embassy headquarters in Saigon.

So I have definitely not seen the Embassy files in Saigon. I have seen a very small number of the papers kept in military region three headquarters at Bien Hoa.

And I myself have formulated some of those kinds of reports at the very lowest level.

Mr. Moorhead. I think both of you in your testimony referred to unnamed American officials. I can understand why you wouldn’t want, in some instances, to repeat these names in public testimony. Would you be willing to give at least some of these names to the committee privately so that we could see if we could learn more information from these individuals?

Mr. Winslow. By that do you mean the names of American officials who know about what is going on, or do you mean the official who told us certain things?

Mr. Moorhead. Yes, where you referred to an official of AID who “told us” certain things, and you don’t name him. I understand why you wouldn’t want to name him publicly. Can you help us privately or is it so delicate you don’t want to do that?

Mr. Winslow. I could give you the names of a couple of people privately to whom it would be interesting for you to talk. Whether they would feel free to talk to you is a different thing. Needless to say, if I may add, the people with the greatest amount of information about all of this are some of the highest officials at the military region level and the Saigon level. Many of the types of people who have come in to testify before you previously.

Mr. Moorhead. Mr. Jacqueney, you describe yourself as having done political reporting for the Da Nang Citizens Advisory Group. What do you mean by political reporting?

Mr. Jacqueney. Every province in Vietnam has at least one officer designated as a political reporter. In I Corps, for example, we submitted spot reports, monthly reports. We had monthly meetings with the American consul in Da Nang to discuss political situations, problems that went on that month.

For example, we reported on the June 1970 city council and province council elections. We reported on the August 1970 senatorial elections. {p.258}

I submitted a number of other reports, for example, concerning student demonstrations in Da Nang, a war veterns demonstration in Da Nang and things like that.

Mr. Moorhead. In reporting on prospective senatorial elections, for example, did you report that Senator “X” stood a good chance of being elected and Senator “Y” not?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes.

Mr. Moorhead. So that the higher ranking people to whom you reported could decide whether they would back Senator “X” or Senator “Y”? — if they chose to do so? I am not saying they did, of course.

Mr. Jacqueney. I can’t make a judgment about what they did with that information. For example, I would report things such as in my opinion the government of Saigon is terribly unpopular in Da Nang and consequently the most anti-Government Buddhist-endorsed pro-peace senatorial candidate will come in first in Da Nang. That in my opinion at that time was Vu Van Mau. Actually, this was a common opinion, not just my judgment. Vu Van Mau in that election came in with 51,000 votes. The next highest vote after him was 26,000 votes. Again, the following slate was the second most anti-Government slate. The third slate of the candidates to come in in Da Nang was a moderately anti-Government slate. The fourth slate of candidates to come in in Da Nang was again a vociferously anti-Government slate. Finally, the fifth slate of candidates, accorded something like 17,000 votes, was a pro-Government slate. The approximation of 57,000 votes in comparison to 17,000 votes, or approximately three to one, was something that we generally said was going to happen and it did.

Mr. Moorhead. Mr. Jacqueney, have you received any commendations on your political reporting? Do you have any papers either your reports to superiors or their comments on your reports?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes, sir, I have a number of them. One that I have here of which I will give you a copy, is a commendation from Ambassador Colby. Would you like me to read it?

Mr. Moorhead. Is it classified?

Mr. Jacqueney. No, sir. It’s a commendation from Ambassador William Colby who at the time was the head of the CORDS pacification program for all of Vietnam. He wrote—

I wish to thank you for the outstanding job of reporting you did on the city council elections. It is obvious to anyone who reads your report that you devoted many, many hours to it. Such excellent work deserves commendation. Therefore, I am sending a copy of this letter to your personnel officer to be included in your file. ¶

With very best wishes, sincerely, ¶

William E. Colby, ¶

Mr. Moorhead. What was the subject of the report that he commended you for?

Mr. Jacqueney. This was my report on the June City council elections in Da Nang. Again, it was a report where I said the Government in Saigon was terribly unpopular and I explained why the city council elections were swept by the anti-Government Buddhist candidates.

Mr. Moorhead. Mr. Jacqueney, you state that you are personally aware of pacification attitudinal surveys run by CORDS in Vietnam. ¶

To your knowledge were there any similar surveys or polls run by JUSPAO or the U.S. Information Agency?

Mr. Jacqueney. I have heard that there were. ¶

I have also heard that there were CIA reports. Again, I have heard that those CIA {p.259} reports were done by the Quayle organization. How accurate this information is, I don’t know.

This is common Saigon table talk and table talk back here in Washington among people who talk about Vietnam and who have been there and know something about it.

Mr. Moorhead. I have served in this House for 12 years and I have never been able to afford a political poll. ¶

I would certainly like to have one in the future if you can arrange the financing for me.

Mr. Jacqueney. They take a partisan side, sir. ¶

In Vietnam, as you know, the CORDS poll is given only to one candidate and not others. ¶

Unless you are approved by the CIA and the pro-Government sources, you might not be able to get one.

Mr. Moorhead. Of your personal knowledge do you know the questions that were asked in this pacification attitudinal analysis survey?

Mr. Jacqueney. I do.

Mr. Moorhead. Can you summarize them or if its going to take some time, would you prefer to submit that for the record?

Mr. Jacqueney. Well—

Mr. Moorhead. Can you give us an example of a revealing question?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes. Frankly, sir, this seems almost silly. Now it looks like I am revealing something to you, and one of your subcommittee staff people-gave me the thing I am now giving to you. I will read it but I didn’t provide it.

Question No. 54 of the November Pacification Attitudinal Analysis Survey.

Mr. Moorhead. What date is that?

Mr. Jacqueney. November 1970. The question is: ¶

“What do the people of the community think about the quality and ability of the National Government?” ¶

And then the responses are supposed to be, ¶

“The government is strong and capable and strives hard to assist the people; the government strives hard to help the people, but is not yet strong or capable enough to do much; the government is capable and good, but cannot control lower echelon officials; the government is strong and capable; the people in it think about themselves before the people; the government is not yet strong and capable and the people in it think about themselves before the people; does not know; or does not want to respond?{”}

Another example, ¶

“What kind of man should he elected next September?” “A man capable of bringing unity to South Vietnam; an independently minded man, not subject to U.S. or VC/NVA influences; a neutralist; a man responsive to the needs of the people; a man who can restore peace to South Vietnam; a man who can solve the economic problems facing the nation; a man who can cure social problems and social evils in South Vietnam; does not know; or does not want to respond”

Question: “What issue will you consider most important in deciding who to vote for in the next elections?” ¶

Responses: National unity; social reforms; organization of construction and loyal opposition: stable economy; anti-communism; nationalism; coalition government; other; does not know; or does not want to respond.{”}

Question: “Which three of these people, are most likely to run for election in September?” ‘’Nguyen Van Thieu, Nguyen Cac Ky, Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Huong, Ha Thuc Ky, Vu Van Mau, Tran Van Don, other, does not know; does not want to respond.” {p.260}

Mr. Moorhead. Without objection the full questionnaire will be made a part of the record.

(The material follows:)



PAAS Questionnaire, November 1970



1. A.
2. B.
3. C.
4. D.

2. Hamlet locale

1. Isolated.
2. On line of communication.

3. Presence of police assigned to village

1. Present
2. Not present.

4. Presence of PF unit in hamlet

1. Present.
2. Not present.

5. Presence of RF unit in hamlet

1. Present.
2. Not present.

6. Presence of ARVN unit in area

1. Present.
2. Not present.

7. Presence of Allied Forces in area

1. Presence of US Forces.
2. Presence of Korean Forces.
3. Presence of Thailand Forces.
4. Presence of US and Korean Forces.
5. Presence of US and Thailand Forces.
6. Presence of Australian Forces.
7. Presence of US and Australian Forces.
8. No presence of the Allied Forces in area.

8. Presence of RD Cadre in hamlet

1. Present
2. Not present.

9. Organization of PSDF

1. Organized.
2. Not organized.

10. Education level

1. Illiterate.
2. No formal schooling, can read and write.
3. Some school, did not finish elementary.
4. Finished elementary.
5. Finished primary.

6. Little or no formal school, but had Technical training in skilled trade.

7. Attended high school, did not finish.
8. Finished high school or beyond.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

11. Age

1. Young (18-25).
2. Middle age (25-40).
3. Old (41-55). {p.261}

13. Ethnic composition

1. Vietnamese.
2. Vietnamese of Cambodian descent.
3. Montagnard.
4. Cham.
5. Vietnamese of Chinese descent.
6. Nung (North VN Highlander).

14. Religion

1. Buddhist
2. Catholic.
3. Hoa Hao.
4. Cao Dai.
5. Ancestor worship.
6. Other.

15. Profession

2. Fisherman.
3. Businessman.
4. Laborer.
5. Merchant.
6. Other.
7. Farm laborer.
8. Tenant farmer.
9. Small landowner.
0. Large landowner.

16. War status

1. Hoi Chanh (Returnee).
2. Unregistered Refugee.
3. Registered Refugee.
4. None of above.

17. Income level

1. Very low.
2. Living in want.
3. Average.
4. Well-off.
5. Rich.

18. How does security compare with last month?

1. Much better.
2. A little better.
3. Same.
4. A little worse.
5. Much worse.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

19. What accounts for the change?

1. Increased/decreased organization and ability of local officials.

2. Increased/decreased effectiveness of friendly forces.

3. Increased/decreased effectiveness of energy forces.

4. Increased/decreased effectiveness of PSDF.

5. Increased/decreased capabilities of VC Infrastructure.

6. The presence of the Allied forces in the immediate area.

7. The withdrawal of US Forces from Vietnam.

9. Does not know.

0. Does not want to respond.

21. What do the people of the community think of the ability of the PF?

1. Very effective; able to keep VC out of hamlet night and day.

2. Effective, but hampered by poor support (arms, supplies). VC able to operate to a limited degree.

3. Fair performance; VC still have a good degree of operating capability.

4. Poor performance; have little effect on activities of VC.

5. Avoids contact with the enemy.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond. {p.262}

22. What do the people of the community think of the behavior of the PF?

1. Well behaved.
2. Cause troubles to the populace.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

23. What do the people of the community think of the ability of the RF?

1. Very effective; able to keep VC out of hamlet night and day.

2. Effective, but hampered by poor support (arms, supplies) VC able to operate to a limited degree.

3. Fair performance; VC still have a good degree of operating capability.

4. Poor performance have little effect on activities of VC.

5. Avoids contact with the enemy.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

24. What do the people of the community think of the behavior of the RF?

1. Well behaved.
2. Cause troubles to the populace.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

25. What do the people of the community think of the ability of the ARVN?

1. Very effective; able to keep VC out of the area night and day.

2. Effective, but hampered by poor support (arms, supplies); VC able to operate to a limited degree.

3. Fair performance; VC still have a good decree of operating capability.

4. Poor performance; have little effect on activities of VC.

5. Avoids contact with the enemy.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

26. What do the people of the community think of the behavior of the ARVN?

1. Well behaved.
2. Cause troubles to the populace.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

27. What do the people of the community think of the ability of the US Forces?

1. Very effective; able to keep VC out of the area night and day.

2. Effective, but hampered by poor support (arms, supplies) VC able to operate to a limited degree.

3. Fair performance; VC still have a good degree of operating capability.

4. Poor performance; have little effect on activities of VC.

5. Avoids contact with the enemy.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

28. What do the people of the community think of the behavior of US Forces?

1. Well behaved.
2. Cause troubles to the populace.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

29. What do the people of the community think of the ability of the National police?

1. Very effective; able to maintain order and security, successful in identification and elimination of VC.

2. Effective in above tasks but have some difficulty.

3. Fair performance; able to maintain order in the community, but have little effect on VC or security situation.

4. Fair performance; effective in security and VC elimination, but not able to maintain order in the community.

5. Poor performance; give little or no assistance to the people.

9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond. {p.263}

30. What do the people of the community think about the behavior of the National police?

1. Well behaved.
2. Cause troubles among the populace (legal acts).
3. Cause troubles among the populace (illegal acts).
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

31. What do the people of the community think about the ability of RD Cadre?

1. Work well with the people, are able to motivate them, assist with Self Help and PSDF, assist in protecting hamlet and elimination of VC.

2. Try hard with some success; only able to achieve some of the above goals.

3. Of little benefit to the people of the hamlet.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

32. What do the people of the community think about the behavior of RD Cadre?

1. Well behaved.
2. Cause troubles among the populace.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

34. Does respondent take part in PSDF activities? If not, why not? (Feb-final).

1. Yes, issued weapon and stands guard regularly.

2. Yes, not issued weapon, but stands guard regularly.

3. No, but stays home at night on stand-by.

4. No, but has relative or other replacement stand guard.

5. No, does not stand guard but participates in other PSDF activities.

6. PSDF is organized but respondent is not a member because of sex.

7. PSDF is organized but respondent is not a member because too old.

8. PSDF is organized but respondent is not a member because of disability.

9. PSDF not yet organized; PSDF organized, but not operational.

0. Does not want to respond.

36. Does respondent think the people of the hamlet have the responsibility to help the Government keep the VC out of the hamlet, or is this the responsibility of the Government alone?

1. It is the responsibility of the people to assist the government.

2. It is the responsibility of the government alone.

9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

37. Is respondent aware of the Phuong Hoang program?

1. No.

2. Yes, it is the program to eliminate the enemy infrastructure.

3. Yes, it is the program against VC.

4. I think it is something to do with fighting the VC.

0. Does not want to respond.

38. Is Phuong Hoang effective? (Ask only if answers responses 2 and 3 of question 37).

1. Successfully eliminating the VC infrastructure.

2. Successfully eliminating the VC forces.

3. Some success.
4. Little or no success.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

39. What do the people of their community think about the spirit and capabilities of local officials in their role of insuring security?

1. Actively work with the people and armed forces to keep VC out of hamlet with good success.

2. Strive to improve security situation of the community, but not entirely successful or capable.

3. Have some decree of success in improving security situation.

4. Have little success in improving security situation.

9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond. {p.264}

41. If respondent is aware of Phuong Hoang Program how can he find out? (Ask only if respondent gave answer 2 and 3 on question 37.) (This question is asked after question 38).

1. VIS.
2. Radio.
3. TV.
4. Newspapers.
5. Local officials.
6. Friends, neighbors.

7. From a picture-book explaining Phuong Hoang that I have seen.

8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

42. Does respondent participate in PSDF activities (Women only)?

1. Active in combat, PSDF.
2. Some participation in combat PSDF.
3. Active in support PSUF {sic: PSDF}.
4. Some participation in support PSDF.
5. Does not participate in PSDF.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S200. Felt social standing (Asked after question 17).

1. Upper class (rich and well-educated).

2. Middle class (rich, not well-educated or not rich but well educated).

3. Working class (not rich or well-educated but skilled laborer or office worker having sufficient income to feed and clothe family and respected in community).

4. Lower class (no money, no education, semi-skilled or non-skilled laborer with no social standing).

9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

48. How well does the respondent know hamlet and village officials?

1. Knows both.

2. Knows hamlet chief, vaguely aware of village chief.

3. Vaguely aware of hamlet chief; does not know the village chief.

4. Vaguely aware of both.
9. Knows neither.
0. Does not want to respond.

49. How well does the respondent know the hamlet and village administrative structure?

1. Knows both well.
2. Knows hamlet well; has some knowledge of village.
3. Has some knowledge of both.
4. Has some knowledge of hamlet; none of village.
9. Has no knowledge of either.
0. Does not want to respond.

50. What do the people of the community think about the character and ability of local officials?

1. Active and capable; trusted and respected by the people.

2. Not very active or capable, but have trust and respect of the people.

3. Active and capable, but do not have respect of the people.

4. Not very active or capable, do not have respect of the people.

5. Corrupt and undesirable.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

52. If year after year a community found that an official was undesirable, what steps would they take to have him replaced?

1. Request district or provincial officials to replace him.

2. Request Saigon to replace him.

3. Vote for someone else in the next election.

4. Talk to the Press to have the situation publicized. {p.265}

5. Request elders in community to influence him.

9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

54. What do the people of the community think about the quality and ability of the National Government?

1. The Government is strong and capable, and strives hard to assist the people.

2. The Government strives hard to help the people, but is not yet strong or capable enough to do much.

3. The Government is capable and good, but it cannot control lower echelon officials.

4. The Government is strong and capable, but the people in it think about themselves before the people.

5. The Government is not yet strong and capable and the people in it think about themselves before the people.

9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

55. What are respondent’s aspirations for the future?

1. Security so that return to old hamlet is possible.
2. Security in respondent’s hamlet.
3. Peace for Vietnam.
4. Stabilization and moralization of social standards.
5. Better economic life.
6. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

56. Why do the VC continue to fight? (First response).

1. Because they believe their cause is just.

2. Because they are not yet able to accomplish their goal of seizing power in South Vietnam.

3. Because of the influence of the government of North Vietnam.

4. Because of the influence of other foreign powers.

5. Because they think the government will destroy them if they lay down their arms.

6. Because they are supported by too many people in South Vietnam.

7. Presence of US Force in Vietnam.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

57. How are the VC able to continue to fight?

1. They still can recruit manpower in South Vietnam.

2. Because the GVN is not yet capable or strong enough.

3. Because the government dues not yet have the support of all the people in South Vietnam.

4. Because the US Forces are starting to withdraw.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

58. How does respondent think war will end?

l. GVN armed forces will defeat VC in battle as they become stronger and VC weaker.

2. Peace talks in Paris.
3. Some participation of NLF in Government.
4. Division of South Vietnamese territory.

5. North Vietnamese invaders will withdraw and VC will collapse.

6. Siuation will become very dangerous due to US withdrawal.

7. Fighting will continue indefinitely.
8. Possibility of a VC victory.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S36. Has respondent’s confidence in the ability of the government to assist the people of Vietnam in the future increased or decreased in recent weeks?

1. Increased.
2. Remained the same. {p.266}
3. Decreased.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S147. Does respondent know any farmer who has already lost his land under the Land to the Tiller Law because he went into the military forces (ARVN, RF, PF)?

1. Yes, many.
2. Yes, some.
3. Yes, a few.
4. No.
5. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S148. Does respondent know any farmer who will lose his land under the Land to the Tiller Law because he went into the military forces (ARVN, RF, PF)?

1. Yes, many.
2. Yes, some.
3. Yes, a few.
4. No.
5. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S149. How does respondent feel about soldiers losing their land because they were in the military and not home to farm it?

1. Thinks the present tiller should get land even if soldiers get hurt.

2. Feels sorry for the soldiers.
3. Thinks the Law should be changed to favor the soldier.
4. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S150. What does respondent think the GVN should do to compensate the soldier for his loss?

1. Give back the same land to soldiers.
2. Give soldiers new land (in same area).
3. Pay soldiers for loss.
4. Help resettle family.
5. Nothing.
6. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S151. How does respondent feel about former tenants now owning the land they preciously rented from soldiers?

1. Fair for tennants — not fair for soldiers.
2. Fair for the tenants — fair for the soldiers.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S154. If respondent has member of family who does not farm anymore as he is in military, or knows of someone else in this situation, how long have they been away from the farm.

1. Knows of nobody.
2. Less than six months.
3. Six months to 1 year.
4. 1 year to 2 years.
5. 2 years to four years.
6. Four years to six years.
7. Over six years.
8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond. {p.267}

64. How do the amount and quality of essential commodities respondent consume, compare with six months ago?

1. More and better.
2. Somewhat more and better.
3. The same.
4. Slightly worse.
5. Much worse.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

65. How will respondent’s economic life change in the next six months?

1. Better due to increased security.

2. Better due to decreased costs and more goods available.

3. The same.
4. Worse due to security situation.
5. Worse due to economic causes.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S168. What kind of man should be elected next September?

1. A man capable of bringing unity to SVN.

2. An independently minded man, not subject to US or VC/NVA influences.

3. A neutralist.
4. A man responsive to the needs of the people.
5. A man who can restore peace to South Vietnam.

6. A man who can solve the economic problems facing the nation.

7. A man who can cure social problems and social evils in South Vietnam.

8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S169. What issues will you consider most important in deciding who to vote for in the next election?

1. National unity.
2. Social reforms.
3. Organization of construction and loyal oppositions.
4. Stables economy.
5. Anticommunism.
6. Nationalism.
7. Localition {sic: Coalition} government.
8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S167. Which three of these people are most likely to run for election next September?

1. Nguyen Van Thieu.
2. Nguyen Cao Ky.
3. Duang Van Minh.
4. Tran Van Huong.
5. Ha Khuc Ky.
6. Vu Van Mau.
7. Tran Van Don.
8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond,

S155. Is respondent aware of the Peace Proposals put by President Nixon and President Thieu?

1. Not aware of the proposals.
2. Vaguely aware that there have been proposals.
3. Yes. as announced by President Thieu only.
4. Yes, as announced by President Nixon only.
5. Yes. as announced by both.
6. Yes, other.
0. Does not want to respond. {p.268}

S156. Of those aware of the Peace Proposals (responses 3, 4, 5, 6) how did he learn of them?

1. Radio.
2. Newspapers.
3. Friends and relatives.
4. VIS.
5. Television.
6. Local officials.
7. Religious leaders.
8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S157. Of those aware, what do these proposals cover?

1. Ceasefire.
2. Peace.
3. Coalition.
4. International control.
5. US withdrawal.
6. NVN withdrawal.
7. POW exchange.
8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S158. Of those aware of the Peace Proposals, why were they made?

1. The GVN is strong and can gain more strength during a cease fire.

2. The GVN want to return peace to Vietnam.

3. The American people are tired of the war.

4. The American Government will have an election soon and they seek to influence their own internal politics.

5. The GVN is tired of the war.

6. The VC are strong enough to force concessions from the government.

7. The GVN was forced to do so by the Americans.

8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S159. Of those aware, are the VC likely to accept these proposals; if so why?

1. No, they are too strong militarily.

2. No, they mistrust the GVN and the United States.

3. No, their leaders cannot admit they were wrong.

4. Yes, they are weak militarily and need the cease fire.

5. Yes, they can take this opportunity to advance their political struggle.

6. Yes, by this means they obtain withdrawal of all US forces.

7. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S160. Of those aware, if these proposals are accepted by the VC what will be the result?

1. All US forces will return to the United States.

2. The Viet Cong will participate in peaceful political activity.

3. Government armed forces will cease to operate, but VC forces will continue to operate indefinitely.

4. The VC will win control of the government very soon.

5. A coalition government will be established.

6. NVA forces will withdraw permanently.

7. NVA forces will regroup and attack again.

8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S161. Of those aware, what would be the result of a cease fire in your hamlet?

1. Security would increase because the fighting will stop.

2. Security would decrease because the VC nearby would continue to operate.

3. VC would control this hamlet. {p.269}
4. The hamlet would be loyal to the GVN.
5. No change in situation.
6. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S162. Would anybody in your hamlet openly express support to the NLF after a ceasefire?

1. None.
2. Very few.
3. Some.
4. Many.
5. Most.
6. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S163. What kind of support would be expressed for the NLF? (Ask only of respondents who think there will be open NLF support in their hamlets)? (Responses 2, 3, 4, 5 of S163).

1. Openly contribute money and commodities to NLF.

2. Perform personal services for NLF.

3. Proselyties the uncommitted and GVN supporters as well.

4. Stop participating in GVN programs and organizations.

5. Actively oppose GVN programs and organizations.

6. All of above.

7. Vocal personal support of NLF, but no participation in support of NLF.

8. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S164. What would the rest of the people do and think?

1. Will not say anything as they don’t care who governs them if they are left alone.

2. Will be against the NLF supporters but will say nothing out of fear.

3. Vocal personal support of GVN but will not engage actively in pro-GVN activities.

4. Begin or increase participation in GVN programs and organization.

5. Actively proselyte against NLF with NLF supporters and those who say nothing.

6. Participate in non-GVN organizational activities directed against sup porters of NLF.

7. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

S165. Does respondent want a ceasefire?

1. Yes, under any conditions.
2. Yes, if GVN does not lose any territory.
3. Yes, if NLF does not lose any territory.
4. Yes, if I don’t have to live under NLF control.
5. Yes, if I don’t have to live under GVN control.
6. Yes, if both sides leave me alone.
7. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.

90. Which is the most severe problem facing respondent at the present time?

1. Increased prices.
2. Security.
3. Draft status.

4. Problems with my work. (If respondent answers with this response provide more details in special report).

5. Corruption.
6. Financial problems.
7. Other.
9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond. {p.270}

45. What is the security situation now?

1. VC armed forces, propaganda teams, tax collectors or other VC personnel cannot operate either night or day in the hamlet and village or in nearby hamlets and villages.

2. VC forces, propaganda, tax collectors or other VC personnel cannot operate night or day in the hamlet village, but there may be some difficulty in other villages.

3. VC forces cannot operate in or near hamlet during day, but propaganda forces, tax collectors or other VC personnel or sometimes small armed forces cannot operate during. {sic}

4. VC forces cannot operate during the day but can enter hamlet at night.

5. VC forces can enter hamlet day and night.

9. Does not know.
0. Does not want to respond.



Mr. Moorhead. I think my colleague, who also has to run for election every other year, would feel that a poll like that would be of unquestionable help. ¶

Do you have any questions. Mr. Reid?

Mr. Reid.  First. Mr. Jacqueney, and Mr. Winslow, I want to welcome you here. I am sorry I was delayed in getting here during the opening portions of your testimony, but I have read it. I think. Mr. Jacqueney, that your remarks are very much to the point and are clearly articulate. I hope that some exchanges here on the other developments can effect soft {sic} issues you so graphically portray.

Might I first ask you in connection with your testimony on page 1 to describe what these surveys in political science showed as far as Thieu’s position? ¶

I am not talking about a precise question, but what would be the evaluation of the material that was gathered in the field?

Mr. Jacqueney. I am sorry to report that as I left Vietnam, shortly after Christmas, I wasn’t aware of the full evaluation at the time. ¶

As I left Vietnam the reports had just been submitted and I was told that they have been marked for very special limited distribution. The only Vietnamese office that was permitted to see the surveys was President Thieu’s office.

Mr. Reid. Who gave that suggestion or that order?

Mr. Jacqueney. The information that I had was that the order came from the two Ambassadors, Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Colby.

Mr. Reid. That the material on the election survey was to go only — I repeat only — to the President. President Thieu’s office?

Mr. Jacqueney. To the President’s office and that the access for Americans was also going to be limited. ¶

The American officer involved at the time disagreed with this decision.

Mr. Reid. How comprehensive was this survey? How many people were involved in it?

Mr. Jacqueney. The surveys were taken in all provinces and autonomous cities in Vietnam. ¶

Every province in Vietnam has a survey team and the regions have survey teams to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Reid. Do you know the size of the sampling?

Mr. Jacqueney. No, sir. I am not sure the survey technique has that kind of sophistication. What they should use to get better results is having some of their survey technicians in coffee houses and bars and shops asking questions in a very informal way rather than going door to door the way Gallup or Harris take their polls. It is not precisely done the same way a comparable survey is taken in the States. {p.271}

Mr. Reid. What other positions are the Embassy or the CORDS organization taking that in your judgment facilitated a climate favorable to Thieu or which directly or indirectly aided him, including the facilities of JUSPAO, the radio and so forth?

Mr. Jacqueney. As you know, a very great amount of propaganda services were going on. It was going on in conjunction with things like this. ¶

Just for example, in Autumn of last year after the Vietnamese presidential election, Ambassador Bunker was accused by a Vietnamese legislator of having told him that the American Embassy was going to support President Thieu’s re-election. ¶

There was an angry denial by the press spokesman at the Embassy, but there was no effort made to disseminate this denial in Vietnam that I am aware of. ¶

The Vietnamese generally assume that whether that statement was true or not true in that particular context, that that was in fact the American position in the upcoming elections.

Mr. Reid. I think there is no question that there has been that concern expressed on more than one occasion. ¶

Let me ask you more specifically, were there certain American facilities such as radio, TV and so on, that were made available directly or indirectly to Thieu that were not made available to others?

Mr. Jacqueney. I left Vietnam before the presidential election or even before the campaign had even gotten started. Of course, General Minh hadn’t been on television or radio to campaign as President Thieu was campaigning.

Mr. Reid. Let me put the question a little differently. ¶

Was there any effort to the extent we were concerned with press facilities to ensure that all sides of the soft questions relevant in Vietnam were in fact reported? ¶

Indeed, you talk here of the arrest of a number of newspaper publishers and the confiscation of newspapers. ¶

In this regard did the Embassy over really seriously put their shoulder to the wheel against this kind of practice which was blatant and widespread?

Mr. Jacqueney. No, sir; not in any way. As a matter of fact, my impression has always boon that it never took such actions and it never wanted to promote the impression that it was in the least bit interested in taking such actions. As you know, in the Tran Ngoc Chau case, it never appeared terribly interested in this question. It never has appeared to be terribly interested in the question of press confiscations or censorship. It simply ignored them. This was considered a domestic Vietnamese question. ¶

On the one hand we can have Phoenix advisers going around killing Vietnamese people and that is not a domestic question but if they confiscate newspapers, that is a domestic question.

Mr. Reid. Yet we are spending x millions of dollars — I think you mentioned the figure of $12 million — knowing that the press is totally without any capacity to be free and is totally restricted. ¶

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes.

Mr. Reid. Might I direct your attention to your comments on page 5 wherein you talk about the province interrogation center or PIC’s.

How many of those PIC’s are then in South Vietnam?

Mr. Jacqueney. To the best of my knowledge, every province has one and cities have them as well.

Mr. Reid. Are there American officers still serving in PIC’s? {p.272}

Mr. Jacqueney. To the best of my knowledge, there is a CIA relationship with the PIC’s.

Mr. Reid. In each PIC?

Mr. Jacqueney. I can’t say in each PIC. To the best of my knowledge, there is a CIA relationship.

Mr. Reid. To the best of your knowledge, you are aware that there have been U.S. officers in some of them?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes, sir, most definitely.

Mr. Reid. Was there ever an order given that U.S. officers must be present during interrogation or torture?

Mr. Jacqueney. I am not aware that one was or wasn’t, sir.

Mr. Reid. Were U.S. officers present during torture, to your knowledge, in any case?

Mr. Jacqueney. I can’t say.

Mr. Reid. You have described one here that is called rock and roll, which involves stuffing an individual with rice and then using a stone. ¶

Was that witnessed by an American official? You said one torture that both American officials described to you was that one.

Mr. Jacqueney. I don’t know whether — first, both of these officials are senior — well, they are important people in the American hierarchy. Both of them have been in many Vietnamese jails. Both of them talked to General Hai, who was at that time chief of the Vietnamese National Police. I believe one — I am not sure of both of these men — actually interviewed the gentlemen in question afterward. Both of these men have extensive contacts with the national police, with the CIA, with people who could have seen this old man and probably did. I can’t state under oath that I am absolutely certain that these men saw this occur. ¶

But both of these men reported this incident to me so authoritatively that I had no doubt in my mind that what they were reporting was in fact true.

Mr. Reid. To the best of your recollection, they subsequently interviewed the man that had been tortured?

Mr. Jacqueney. At least one.

Mr. Reid. At least one of them did?

Mr. Jacqueney. I believe he talked to the man.

Mr. Reid. On the Phoenix program—

Mr. Jacqueney. I think also there was an American nurse who talked to this man afterward and reported other physical abuses to this man besides rock and roll.

Mr. Moorhead. Did you see this wealthy old man that you described after the events that happened to him?

Mr. Jacqueney. No, sir. I was in his home the night he was arrested, but I never saw him again. Incidentally, I might add that this man who was accused of being a Communist spy was given a 5-year prison sentence. It is kind of extraordinary in Vietnam for a man accused of being a Communist spy to be given only a 5-year sentence. The whole case is shrouded in mystery.

Mr. Reid. Let me turn next to the Phoenix program. Is it your assessment from what you know of the situation that the information developed for this program, for the dossiers, was very sketchy, in the main not subject to verification and hardly reliable?

Mr. Jacqueney. In the instances with which I had contact with the Phoenix advisers, when they were making out their information, what {p.273} they told me was hard information — they didn’t have some of the information that I had. ¶

For example, they were talking about one — I am trying to phrase this in such a way that the Vietnamese involved will not get into trouble in Vietnam. ¶

They had information on one particular individual who was accused of selling something to the Vietcong. It was an old story. It was a story that was well-known in Da Nang, that he had been accused of this, but had been exonerated and was probably innocent of those charges.


Moreover, I knew that he had a lot of political enemies and they were spreading all kinds of rumors about him. I knew the source of one of those rumors. It seemed to me that the rumor was making a circle, that I was hearing the same rumor that I knew one Vietnamese individual was spreading, coming back to me from the Phoenix advisor.

Mr. Reid. Let me put it this way: ¶

From what you know of it, you would not have great confidence in the accuracy of the information in some of the dossiers?

Mr. Jacqueney. The way you just phrased it. In some of the instances, certainly the ones that I am aware of, I think that the information upon which people are arrested and detained is questionable.

Mr. Reid. Ambassador Colby testified that there is a distinction between A, B, and C categories and that presumably the higher category, being A, had more information. ¶

Was that any more reliable, to your knowledge?

Mr. Jacqueney. My opinion is that you can’t believe a single number or a single letter that comes out of Vietnam. ¶

It is not that A, B, or C could be accurate or inaccurate. ¶

You simply don’t know. ¶

If it is something that is stated to you as a definite fact, or a definite statistic, it could be Alice in Wonderland or it could be an absolute fact.

Mr. Reid. Is it accurate to state that if someone gets into the Phoenix files and into the lists in a serious way, in material prepared in a district center, and if the information is then turned over either to the special branch police or to the South Vietnamese Army, that that is roughly, the equivalent of a death warrant for those individuals? ¶

That is to say, they have the chance of rallying between the point at which the information is turned over or a potential fire fight or assassination if that is to occur?

Mr. Jacqueney. I would say, sir, arrest and detention.

Mr. Reid. With very questionable trial, which I would tend to characterize as a drumhead trial?

Mr. Jacqueney. Arrest and detention with a drumhead trial would be accurate.

Mr. Reid. What I am saying is that once that information is passed on, it is a communication that will very likely circumscribe the liberty of that individual for a long time to come, if not permanently?

Mr. Jacqueney. If he makes his way into the file, he is in a lot of trouble and will probably be arrested.

Mr. Reid. It is your judgment that we should totally do away with the Phoenix program and we should insist that the South Vietnamese Government stop it.

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes, sir. {p.274}

Mr. Reid. Basically, it is fair to say that it is extremely difficult to tell one Vietnamese from another, and certainly we don’t have that skill?

Mr. Jacqueney. No, sir. Telling one Vietnamese from another is—

Mr. Reid. I am talking a little euphemistically. ¶

What I am saying is that we are not sophisticated in the ways of Southeast Asia and it is sometimes difficult for us to know what different individuals in this country stand for, let alone trying to make life-and-death decisions on Vietnamese who are fighting a civil war.

I was trying to put it simply.

Mr. Jacqueney. For us to be in a situation where a 22- or 23- or 24-year-old American lieutenant who has been in Vietnam for a year and who doesn’t speak Vietnamese can pass judgment to some considerable extent on the arrest and detention of people is wrong because so often it turns out that these people are quite innocent.

Mr. Reid. What percentages of our officers, either in the Embassy or the AID programs or in the agency or in Phoenix, speak fluent Vietnamese or the relevant difficult dialects?

Mr. Jacqueney. I can’t speak for Vietnam. I really don’t have those figures.

Mr. Reid. In the area that you were in, what impression do you have as to the percentages?

Mr. Jacqueney. In the area I was in. Let me just give you one example: ¶

I can’t think of a single Phoenix adviser who spoke Vietnamese. ¶

I know there was the Phoenix legal adviser in Saigon who spoke Vietnamese. There may be others. But the only Phoenix officer that I am aware of in Vietnam during my tour was the legal advisor in Saigon. I don’t think he could possibly have traveled and examined enough dossiers to give the situation the care that it needed.

I might add that I speak Vietnamese and Dick speaks Vietnamese and neither of us is qualified to make judgments about whether or not certain individuals should be arrested or not arrested, even in the city of Da Nang which I know something about. ¶

I wouldn’t for a minute presume to be involved in that situation.

Mr. Reid. You suggested on pages 7 and 8 of your testimony that there was American encouragement or complicity in the removal of General Thi?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes, sir.

Mr. Reid. My understanding is that he was one of the totally honest generals in Vietnam and had a certain rapport with people because of that.

Mr. Jacqueney. My information is the same. I served in Vietnam 3 years after he was removed. He continued to have a reputation as being the only honest and popular corps commander that had been in I Corps.

Frankly, in my experience in Vietnam it is rather extraordinary to find a Vietnamese general who is popular with the people over whom he once had power. He was regarded as a thoroughly honest man. I can’t, for a fact, comment further on that but he was regarded in Da Nang as a thoroughly honest man and an extraordinarily popular one.

To quote from a report that I did. I was told by some people in Da Nang that if General Thi were ever permitted to return to Vietnam and run for any office he would get over 80 percent of the votes. I don’t {p.275} know how accurate a political judgment that is, but my opinion is that it is not too far off. He was terribly popular.

Mr. Reid. Mr. Winslow, in connection with General Thi, was one of the reasons that he was asked to depart due to the fact that he did not go along with some of the prevailing corruption?

Mr. Winslow. I don’t know, frankly.

Mr. Reid. Let me return, Mr. Jacqueney, to your recommendations at the end of your testimony. You called for a full field congressional investigation of JUSPAO and press freedoms in Vietnam, the whole question of political prisoners and exiles, and the question of whether there is the slightest chance of having elections that are not a total fraud and completely rigged.

On the second of those points could you give me your estimate — and I appreciate it is an estimate that no one can answer precisely — as to how many political prisoners there are in South Vietnam and how many of them, in your judgment are, in fact, political as distinct from actual Communists? In other words, how many are prisoners who have espoused an end to the war or who have supported neutralism, who have believed in a broader based government, newspapermen who believed in a free press, individuals who fundamentally stood up for certain basic rights or fought corruption or done some of the things they should have done in a free society and for that privilege have been jailed by a corrupt government?

Mr. Jacqueney. Sir, I have heard figures that range anywhere from 20,000 to 100,000. I frankly don’t know how credible one figure is or how credible another figure is. The figures I do know something about involve widespread judgments made in Vietnam that when General Minh overthrew President Diem in 1963 he released something like 75,000 political prisoners. It said that when President Thieu was inaugurated after the election of 1967 that he released from jail some 6,000 minor political prisoners.

Mr. Reid. Is it accurate to say that with some exceptions — Mr. Chau obviously being a noted exception — that the intimidation by the Government of the press, the shutting down of newspapers, and the outright threatening of members of the legislature has been such that anything remotely resembling a free climate just doesn’t exist and that this has a pervasive effect on the governmental institutions that do continue to exist?

Mr. Jacqueney. I couldn’t agree more with that statement. It is very true.

Mr. Reid. How would you characterize the election if it was to take place under the ground rules that now exist?

Mr. Jacqueney. I think the election is going to be a fraud, sir. I think the election is not going to be, by any means, a fair election. Some of the criteria that I tried to outline in my paper are certainly not going to be met at the present time.

Perhaps with American congressional pressure and with international pressure some of those conditions could be met. Not to have an honest election in those kinds of idealistic terms but an election fair enough to reflect accurately the sentiments of the people of Vietnam.

Mr. Reid. Wouldn’t some of the principal criteria for a fair election consist of permitting exiles such as General Thi and other distinguished enemies in Paris to return, and secondly, be the release of truly {p.276} political prisoners, and third, be an opportunity for anyone to get on the ballot rather than having to get a large percentage of the legislature or provincial officials to certificate him, which even Vice President Ky might not be able to surmount? Wouldn’t those be minimum steps?

Mr. Jacqueney. Those and there are others. There should be freedom to publish newspapers, to communicate with their electorate, to organize their campaigns, to send their campaign workers into rural areas without having them arrested. Those certainly are some of the minimal conditions.

Mr. Reid. Is it possible for any candidate to advocate neutralism? By that I mean an end to the war and a broader base government willing to negotiate an end to the war?

Mr. Jacqueney. No, sir. As you are noticing at the present time, General Minh has to be extremely circumscribed in the way he puts forth his political program. I think there was an interview in the past few days — no, it was in the most recent Time magazine — where General Minh is quoted:

As you know, of course, I can’t advocate a coalition government. If I did I would be in jail. Consequently I advocate coexistence with the Communists.

Mr. Reid. From what I understand of General Minh’s comments, both to the press and to others, there is a real chance that he might decide not to run on the grounds that he could not run fairly and therefore if he did run he would give sanction to an unfair election.

Mr. Jacqueney. I have heard those same rumors. I certainly can’t comment on whether General Minh will run or won’t run. I have heard, frankly, very different views from that in Vietnam for the past 2 months, the last one, 2 days ago. I really don’t know but there is that possibility.

Mr. Reid. What is the impression of the average Vietnamese of the Government and of the United States and of the corruption? What do they think and what do they want?

Mr. Jacqueney. I think the average Vietnamese first of all wants peace. I think at the present time peace is the overriding issue in Vietnam. Other issues include the disastrous state of the economy, the fact that an average civil servant can barely support his family for a full week on his monthly salary.

Mr. Reid. Can he exist on fish sauce, which I understand is one of the things that goes along with the rice?

Mr. Jacqueney. Barely. The economic conditions of the people of Vietnam are very bad. It is a serious political issue.

Another serious issue involves the issue of repression, the issue of the Thieu government itself.

Another issue is the issue of corruption. All of those, particularly the peace issue, make the Thieu government at this time very unpopular.

Mr. Reid. Is the average man in the street aware that the police have been expanded from about 15,000 to 120,000 and it is on its way to 140,000 and, whether he is or not, is there any justification for almost a tenfold magnification of the police?

Mr. Jacqueney. To answer the first part of your question, I think the average man on the street is aware that there are more police. I think the average man would doubt the justification of their being {p.277} more police to create more repression. The police is another issue on which the Government is quite unpopular.

Mr. Reid. I will be happy to yield, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moorhead. I notice in your testimony you use the projected goal of 147,000 in the national police. It is my memory that we had testimony earlier that the high watermark was going to be 122,000. From what source do you get the 147,000 figure?

Mr. Jacqueney. A New York Times article in April. I don’t have the date but I can supply it.

(The article follows:)


[From the New York Times, Wednesday, Apr. 14, 1971]

South Vietnam’s Police Force Gaining in Size and Status as U.S. Increases Aid

(By Thomas C. Fox, Special to The New York Times)

Saigon, South Vietnam, April 13 — The South Vietnamese national police-force is quickly expanding in size and influence here, largely because of increased American financial support and an organizational change that moved the police command to the highest levels of the Government

The South Vietnamese police have long been rated as one of the weakest forces in the pacification program. Corruption among the police is considered to be widespread, and morale, because of low wages, is not good.

An independent report submitted to President Nixon last year cited South Vietnamese police ineffectiveness as a threat to the long-range stability of the Saigon Government.

U.S. officials continually stress that the national police must play a vital role in the program designed to track down and kill or capture Vietcong political officials. As the Americans leave, the American officials say, more and more of” the security programs will fall to the police, and they are being equipped with highly advanced technical devices with which they will attempt to track down Vietcong agents.


American funds funneled into the national police through the military-civilian advisory agency known as CORDS have been increased this year by more than 25 percent — from $20.9 million in 1970 to $27.3 million.

To coordinate police activities with the security work of the armed forces* and civilian defense forces, President Nguyen Van Thieu recently signed a decree establishing the office of National Police Command and then appointed Maj. Gen. Tran Thanh Phong to the post. It is considered by the South Vietnamese Government to be at a level equivalent to Secretary of State, according to a communique.

The change allows President Thieu to assume more direct control of the police.

General Phong, a former minister in the pacification program, is said by American officials to be aggressive and competent.


The national police have grown steadily in size during the last decade but never so fast as today. Strength in 1960 was 16,000 and now is 97,000; by the end of next year it is expected to be 120,000.

A goal of 147,000 is projected, but the number will decrease once the war ends, public safety officials say.

To train and lead the expanding organization, about 35,000 South Vietnamese Army officers are being transferred to the national police.

The United States advisory program to the national police has a staff of 225 men, more than half of them American Army officers attached to CORDS. This American agency, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program, supervises various pacification projects aimed at destroying the Vietcong and promoting self-government and development. {p.278}


One department in the police, the national police field forces, is expected to operate increasingly in rural areas as security allows the army to pull out. The field forces are being equipped with tanks and artillery.

The shift of military officers into the police and the supply of heavy armor have led some South Vietnamese critics of the war to write newspaper editorials on the “militarization of the police.”

A clause of the South Vietnamese Constitution allows the police to act against those who are considered a threat to national security. Critics of the war here already charge that the police interpret the clause too liberally and help to break up demonstrations by students and veterans.

Among the less-controversial programs of the national police is the identification one, introduced late in 1968 with American help. All South Vietnamese who reach the age of 15 are required to carry plastic identification cards, which are considered by American advisers to be part of the “most foolproof classification system yet developed.”

According to one high-ranking public safety adviser, more than 18,000 South Vietnamese are employed in the computerized classification program which is based on Federal Bureau of Investigation techniques.

The South Vietnamese police also carefully control the movement of people and resources throughout the country. Hundreds of police checkpoints are set up on the main arteries of the countryside and on city streets.

The checkpoints, some of which are permanent while others are mobile, annoy most Vietnamese. But as one public safety adviser said, “We are well aware that the Vietnamese dislike being checked so much, but we are still fighting a war here.”

The major problem for the national police, aside from public criticism and enemy activities, is corruption.

The policeman’s basic monthly salary is not enough to allow him to live without working at another job or taking bribes. A policeman without a family earns the equivalent of $12 a month in real buying power; a policeman with a family of four earns $18.


Mr. Moorhead. But it comes from the New York Times.

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes, sir.

Mr. Moorhead. Thank you.

Mr. Reid. Thank you very much, Mr. Jacqueney. I think your testimony is just excellent.

Mr. Winslow, could I ask you one or two questions about corruption and particularly direct your attention to your comments on page 4 in which you say a large percentage of these officials are making an enormous financial killing off the war.

Could you describe in simple terms how they do this?

Mr. Winslow. To my knowledge virtually all district chiefs and province chiefs in Vietnam pay in order to get their jobs. The amount they pay depends directly on the profitability of being the chief of that particular district or province. My Vietnamese informants told me, for example, that the province chief in Bien Duong Province, where I worked, paid 6 million piasters to be appointed in January of 1970 to his position.

Mr. Reid. And his position was what?

Mr. Winslow. Province chief. The reason that he can afford such an amount, which is, let us say, roughly $50,000 by the old exchange rate of 118 to 1, and the reason that other officials can afford to pay that kind of money to a number of officials above them such as the corps commander and people in Saigon, is that the province chief has at his disposal the power to grant concessions, for example, within the province to corporations who wish to farm thousands of hectares of land. The province chief in turn appoints the full range of other officials in the province, most of whom, according to my informants, {p.279} also pay substantial sums for their positions. Those officials in turn get their money by taking it from officials under them, who in turn may have taken it from the average citizen.

The kind of routine payoff that I described on page 4 is universal. It is not shocking although it is very irritating to an average Vietnamese. When ho goes in to get any kind of paperwork done, any kind of administrative work done, there is a theoretically illegal but in fact real, unofficial fee which he must pay. Part of this gets handled up the line. A restaurant owner, in order to run his restaurant, pays to the chief of police a given number of thousands of piasters per, month. The chief of police passes a certain portion of that on up the line. So it is really very institutionalized. There are loads of province chiefs and district chiefs who made loads of money:

For example, the province chief in my province made money by organizing a group of people who stole from the American PX in his area when he was district chief and selling that stuff on the black market at an excellent personal profit.

Aside from that kind of outright stealing which results in great profits, there is the very institutionalized kind of profittaking which is really on all levels throughout the entire administration.

Mr. Reid. Were you aware of corruption at a higher level including a discrete parceling out of some of it at the cabinet level?

Mr. Winslow. Not at a level that high. I was aware by informants of corruption engaged in by the then military corps commander of military region 2 who since has died in a helicopter crash.

Mr. Reid. Were you aware that any of the airline stewardesses were involved in gold smuggling?

Mr. Winslow. No.

Mr. Reid. Were you aware of any smuggling of hard narcotics?

Mr. Winslow. No, I wasn’t.

Mr. Reid. Were you aware of any major diversion of medicines and materials through the Port of Saigon?

Mr. Winslow. Not through the Port of Saigon. I was informed of the very thriving business which the late General Tri did in materiel and supplies which he had captured when he led the Vietnamese Armed Forces into Cambodia in April and May of last year and the kind of profits made from selling that materiel.

Mr. Reid. What was the average opinion of the Vietnamese in your area with regard to Government officials who bought and sold their offices and who obviously were indulging in corruption at a high level at the expense of many of these supplies reaching the people? Were they aware of it? Did they expect their government to be corrupt? Was this worse corruption than they had known before? What was their impression?

Mr. Winslow. A large number of my Vietnamese acquaintances were very definitely aware of this high-level corruption among their own GVN officials. They didn’t like it.

The very frequently stated and misleading comment about corruption in Vietnam — namely, that corruption is culturally accepted — does apply to a certain limited extent.

A person who is unable to support his family is considered a good breadwinner if he can get enough, oven through taking some kinds of payment, in order to keep his family alive and relatively comfortable. {p.280}

That kind of paymenttaking was not the subject of the kind of real hatred and condemnation that applied to the profitmaking, the enormous profitmaking, by district ana province officials who were becoming what even by U.S. standards would be considered incredibly rich.

Mr. Reid. If I may ask you a general question, which I know is subjective.

But in your evaluation of Vietnam today, is pacification going to make any sense, or will it disappear into the sands?

Mr. Winslow. I would hesitate to make a judgment on that. Even though I was there and wrote up some programs of which I was aware, I personally had such a small percentage of the total information about the pacification and the military situation that I am not qualified to say.

Mr. Reid. Let me put my question a little differently. This committee has been concerned for several years with the question of land reform.

On the very clear assumption that if a farmer did not own his own land, if he had to pay exorbitant rents to the landlord, and if he had no chance of ever getting in a position where he could harvest his own land for reasonable figures and insure some degree of economic independence for his family, if most of the land was held by the absentee landlord, quite obviously the agricultural or agrarian base would be very narrow, indeed.

Now, very belatedly — and perhaps too late — there has been some serious attempt at land reform. Do you feel this program is on the way to being an effective program so that the majority of the peasants and the farmers will, in fact, own their land unencumbered and be able to farm on a relatively free basis? Or is the system going to continue under new devices of landlordism?

Mr. Winslow. My feeling is that if there were no war going on in South Vietnam right now, the land-reform program would bring about a substantial redistribution of wealth. The war still is so omnipresent, even in the so-called pacified areas, that I think at this point there isn’t time for the average farmer to see how wonderful the current South Vietnamese Government is.

Mr. Reid. Do you think the reform is genuine?

Mr. Winslow. I am not as qualified to answer that question as I would like to be. But I would say that if the same kind and amount of land reform were taking place in another underdeveloped country today, there would be some reason to hope that some good things were coming about, yes.

Mr. Reid. Finally, would you comment about two or three questions that 1 think affect all of these?

One is the free-fire zones, the number of civilians that have been killed or hospitalized, the fact that there may be as many as 3 million — and some say 6 million, depending on how they add their figures — refugees basically without homes or, in some cases, even acceptable roofs over their heads.

I mention these because I think the fact that a large number of free-fire zones are still in existence in South Vietnam — and it must not be very reassuring to the populace and must result in continued killing of civilians. The fact that there are millions of refugees who have not been dealt with equitably and the fact that many civilians are in hospitals with inadequate facilities — this all raises very grave ques- {p.281} tions as to what is going on and, obviously, compromises our moral position, if we have any, and, quite obviously, must affect the future there.

Would you care to comment on any of those broad aspects?

Mr. Winslow; The South Vietnamese war has been a terribly destructive one for South Vietnam. There is no end in sight to the destruction unless some kind of compromise settlement is worked out.

Mr. Reid. How much of the area is in what could be called free-fire zones?

Mr. Winslow. To get a really accurate figure, you would have to consult someone much higher ranking than myself.

It is fair to say that the percentage of land area controlled by the Communists is very great as compared with the percentage of the population which CORDS charts show are controlled by the Communists.

Mr. Reid. Would you say 60 percent or more of the land area is controlled by the Vietcong?

Mr. Winslow. Yes, in the sense that it is forests or mountains and no allied people would venture in there except on a massive military operation.

Mr. Reid. In the area where you served was the majority of the land a free-fire zone?

Mr. Winslow. I am not qualified to say if it was a free-fire zone in the sense that allied airplanes were free to bomb it. I can say that the majority of the land area was “No Man’s Land.” No person, like myself, no ordinary South Vietnamese farmer, would venture into it.

Mr. Reid. And a substantial part of it was a free-fire zone?

Mr. Winslow. Some of it was. And I simply never saw the figures as to which part of it was.

Mr. Reid. In terms of the refugees, would you care to comment on the magnitude of that problem, whether it is 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 million? That is partly a question of how you evaluate it. But it is a question that is a major problem for a horrendous number of people. That seems to me rather clear.

Mr. Winslow. In Binh Duong Province, where I served, something over 20 percent of the population of the province within the last {-?-} years had been refugees. As you know, CORDS has its own set of definitions to describe refugees at different stages in their process of being refugees and being now resettled.

In Binh Duong Province, where I served, a very large portion of the refugees who were so-called resettled really had not been resettled in the sense that they had anywhere near the economic standard of living that they had before they became refugees. Of the total number, be it 3 million or 6 million, countrywide — and a 20-to-25 percent of the population is a good estimate — of that number who have been resettled according to CORDS briefing chart definitions, in fact most are not resettled to their own satisfaction. Their standard of living, their whole mode of life, is grossly inferior to what it was previously.

I think you and I would not say that these people have begun to lead a normal life again.

Mr. Reid. Let me just ask you to comment on a statement I am going to make, one I have made several times before. I think Phoenix is morally reprehensible and should bo totally stopped and that we should have nothing to do with it. {p.282}

Secondly, allegedly our purpose in Vietnam was in some relation to a free election, and the present one does not appear to be free, but is more thoroughly rigged than ever.

Finally, the human problems that we have been talking about, whether they come from a free-fire zone or the shifting of refugees, are very major ones. And, obviously, a great deal more must be done in this area, and that is a responsibility of our Government, to do much more.

Would you care to comment on those three comments of mine?

Mr. Winslow. As regards the Phoenix program, all I can say is that what has been going on in South Vietnam for the last decade has been a war.

If I were a commanding general, I have no idea how I would go about trying to defeat the enemy. In the case of South Vietnam, it has been apparent to all of us that in order to defeat the enemy, so many hundreds of thousands of people have had to be killed that even eventual “victory” will have been much too costly both for us and for the people of Vietnam.

As regards our responsibilities now vis-a-vis the elections, I would say, if I were in charge of U.S. policy, that I would tell President Thieu in no uncertain terms that he would have to win a fair election or we simply wouldn’t continue to support him.

It is not important just because it is nice to have a fair election, but because a person who is going to attempt to hold South Vietnam together in any viable way in the next few years has really got to have some public proof that he is supported by at least something approaching a majority.

Finally, as regards the refugees, I think that no matter what happens in Vietnam in the next 3, 5, or 10 years, that the United States does have a very definite responsibility to reconstruct and rebuild.

Mr. Reid. Finally, might I ask you this?

In your opening statement you said: ¶

I resigned when it became clear to me that my presence was not in the interest of the people of South Vietnam.”

Would you care to elaborate a little bit more on your reasoning?

Mr. Winslow. The specific issue which triggered my departure was the CORDS surveys which Mr. Jacqueney has referred to in his testimony.

It had become apparent to me in the last couple of months of my stay there that the political analyses which I and other people were handing in, although they were stamped with a classified marking known as “confidential, no foreigners” — meaning for American eyes only — at the higher levels of the American-Vietnamese counterpart relationship that information could be handed over from Americans to Vietnamese.

Since my responsibilities as a political reporter involved collecting the opinions of Vietnamese people in my province and writing them up and sending them in, I feared that the names of those people and those opinions we handed over to South Vietnamese authorities at a higher level could very well get my particular acquaintances or informants in trouble.

The most clear-cut evidence came to me when I was told that within the next few days I was supposed to supervise in my province these {p.283} political attitude surveys. In fact, I had a responsibility for supervising them during all of my time there.


The November surveys were to include these questions on the Presidency, and these questions on the Presidency had originated in a conversation between Ambassador Colby and President Thieu, with President Thieu specifically asking for this kind of assistance in his upcoming reelection campaign.

I felt that I was not being supported in Vietnam by the U.S. taxpayers in order to help one particular faction, or in order to gather information on decent Vietnamese citizens who had a legitimate gripe about the Government, when that information could be handed over to South Vietnamese officials who would take action against them.

Mr. Reid. Thank you very much, Mr. Winslow, for your excellent testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moorhead.  Thank you, Mr. Reid.

Mr. Jacqueney, I refer you to page 6 of your testimony, where on two occasions you use the words “Phoenix adviser” or “Phoenix advisors.” By that term do you mean U.S. personnel?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes, sir.

Mr. Moorhead. I want to be very careful about this.

You say that two Phoenix advisers had come to Da Nang for information about a Da Nang council member whom they were planning to arrest.

Do you mean the two U.S. Phoenix advisers were planning to arrest him?

Mr. Jacqueney. No. I meant that Phoenix was planning to arrest—

Mr. Moorhead. So it would not be the U.S. personnel that would do the arresting?

Mr. Jacqueney. No, sir.

The U.S. personnel had an advisory relationship rather than a command relationship with Phoenix. The two gentlemen were assisting and advising in planning this move, which they fortunately didn’t make.

Mr. Moorhead. Do you know from your personal knowledge whether the U.S. personnel would participate in the sense of being present at the time the arrest was made?

Mr. Jacqueney. Yes. There are times when U.S. personnel are present when arrests are made. But there are so many different kinds of arrests. There are Phoenix and police arrests.

I know of Americans that have actually battered down the door — so help me — in going in after people.

So Americans are present when arrests are made.

Mr. Moorhead. Both of you have testified to widespread corruption in South Vietnam. Are you aware of any U.S. personnel participating in this corruption, or is it all Vietnamese?

Mr. Jacqueney. It is not all Vietnamese.

Mr. Moorhead. I didn’t hear that.

Mr. Jacqueney. It is not all Vietnamese.

Mr. Moorhead. Mr. Winslow?

Mr. Winslow. There are a number of popular types of corruption which simply couldn’t take place without American complicity — {p.284} such as the selling of goods from American PX’s. You need U.S. personnel to be with you if you are Vietnamese if you going to do any of that.

The same applies to black-market operations. The MPC dollar equivalent or U.S. dollars is supplied to Vietnamese by Americans.

Mr. Moorhead. Do either of you have any personal experience with the drug traffic that you could tell the subcommittee?

Mr. Winslow. I don’t, no.

Mr. Moorhead. Mr. Jacqueney?

Mr. Jacqueney. No, I have no personal experience.

I did at one time make information available in Vietnam about specific locations that I had been informed were the headquarters of the heroin traffic.

“Heroin” translated into Vietnamese is “white opium.”

I knew of one district in Da Nang where there was a certain building that in both instances was a Korean-controlled enterprise. Nothing ever happened to it.

Mr. Moorhead. What year, if you can remember that?

Mr. Jacqueney. It was sometime between — I made the information available sometime between April and December of 1970.

Mr. Moorhead. I would like to ask you both about your opinions as to the validity of the hamlet-evaluation system.

I suppose the best way to ask it is whether you would willingly spend a night in any hamlet ranked “A,” “B,” or “C.”

If your answers are all “yes,” I will go on down to “D,” and so forth.

Mr. Winslow. I think, as CORDS officials must have testified before you, that the HES is valid in showing to a certain extent the relative progress over the past couple of years.

If you have looked at the unclassified definitions of, let’s say,” a “C” hamlet, you will see that although a “C” hamlet is considered to be in the “relatively secure” category, the kinds of things which can frequently happen in the “C” hamlet are not what would make you or me want to spend the night there.

There are some very brave and conscientious CORDS advisors, both military and civilian, who do spend nights in “A,” “B,” “C,” and, on occasion, even “D” hamlets. I admire their courage. Some of them have been killed, although only a small percentage, of course — or it would it be going on at all.

I am sure one of us could supply you — or you could just get it on an unclassified basis from CORDS or AID — the full description of what a “C” hamlet is like. It doesn’t strike a layman as being particularly safe to live in.

Mr. Moorhead. When I was there, the consideration I was faced with was that this place was all right to visit in the daytime, but you had better get out in the nighttime, even though it had received a rating which on the surface sounded not bad.

Mr. Winslow. For example, in a large percentage — and I can’t give you the exact percentage — of “C” hamlets or “C” villages, the hamlet chiefs and village chiefs will not spend the night because it is too dangerous for them.

This is not a piece of secret information, but is just common knowledge. {p.285}

Mr. Moorhead. I was just trying to get from your personal experience information to confirm what I thought was the situation.

Do you Have anything further?

Mr. Reid. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moorhead. Does the staff have any questions?

Thank you both very much for appearing before us and giving us your first hand knowledge. I think it is often so much more valuable than the knowledge that someone gets back in Saigon or Washington from reading the statistics that are, as you said, sifted through various levels. After they have been thoroughly sifted and the bad parts classified, the balance is given to us here in Congress.

The subcommittee will recess until 10 a.m., Monday, August 2.

If there are no further questions, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Monday, August 2, 1971.)

{Page 286 is blank} {p.287}



Source: The printed hearings (cited below).

By CJHjr: Photocopied at 141%, scanned, converted to text (OCR: FineReader 6.0), formatted (xhtml/css), links, text {in braces}, text beside a green bar |, text in yellow boxes, bold-face, bold-italics, highlighting, added paragraphing (for ease of reading) marked with this trailing paragraph symbol: ¶ .

This document (the second Phoenix hearings): July 21 1971 hearing (pages 243-286), U.S. Congress, House Hearings, U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 92-1, House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, Hearings, July 15 {a.m., p.m.}, 16, 19, 21, and August 2 1971, 4+362 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.G 74/7:V 67/4, CIS: 72 H401-3, OCLC: 235387, LCCN: 71616178 pf, DL, WorldCat}. Ensuing report: U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 92-2, House Report No. 92-1610, House Committee on Government Operations, October 17 1972, 5+107 pages) {SuDoc: [Y 1.1/8:]92-2:H.RP.1610, Serial Set: 12976-6, CIS: 72 H403-19, OCLC: 540690, LCCN: 72603272 pf, WorldCat} {Full text: pages 1-46 2.4mb.pdf, pages 47-97 2.8mb.pdf, pages 99-107 501kb.pdf, omitting page 98 and repeating page 107, instead, at the start}.

Next: August 2 1971 hearing (pages 287-362) {450 kb}.

See also:

The first Phoenix hearings: Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970 {58.4mb.pdf, source}, “Hearings on Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program” (U.S. Congress 91-2, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, February 17, 18, 19, 20, and March 3, 4, 17, 19, 1970, and Appendix, 7+750 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:V 67/17, CIS: 71 S381-2, OCLC: 119418, LCCN: 76610214 pf, DL, WorldCat}.

The third Phoenix hearings: Nomination of William E. Colby to be Director of Central Intelligence (U.S. Congress 93-1, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings, July 2, 20 {a.m., p.m.}, 25, 1973, 3+186 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:C 67/3, CIS: 73 S201-27, OCLC: 800312, LCCN: 73603022 pf, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: William E. Colby, Robert F. Drinan, Samuel A. Adams, Paul Sakwa, David S. Harrington, Kenneth B. Osborn.

Vietnam Policy Proposals: Hearings on nine proposed items of legislation to end the U.S. war in Vietnam (U.S. Congress 91-2, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, February 3, 4, 5, and March 16, 1970, 5+405 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:V 67/16, CIS: 70 S381-7, OCLC: 78825, LCCN: 74606991 pf, DL, WorldCat}.

National Veterans Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam (Citizens’ Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes, Washington D.C., December 1-3 1970), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 4238-4271 (U.S. Congress 92-1, March 1 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.4, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Robert Bowie Johnson Jr., Mike McCusker, Daniel K. Amigone, Greg Motoka, Kenneth Barton Osborn, Norman Kiger, Gail Graham, Steve Noetzel, Edward Murphy, Daniel Alfiero, Louis Paul Font, Robert Master, Peter Norman Martinsen, T. Griffiths Ellison, Ed Melton, Chuck Hamilton, Lee Meyrowitz, Gordon S. Livingston, Greg Turgeon, Richard Altenberger, Bob Connelly, Robert Lifton, Chaim Shatan, Donald Engel, Gary Thamer, Steven Hassett, Kenneth Campbell, Sam Rankin, Phillip Wingenbach, Tod Ensign, Larry Rottmann, Robert Osman.

Winter Soldier Investigation (Vietnam Veterans Against the War Inc., Detroit Michigan, January 31, February 1-2, 1971), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 9947-10055 (U.S. Congress 92-1, April 6 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.8, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}; 117 Congressional Record E 2825-2936 (U.S. Congress 92-1, April 6-? 1971, Daily Edition (green bound)) {SuDoc: X/A.92/1:117/???-???, ISSN: 0363-7239, LCCN: 80646573 pf, OCLC: 02437919, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1971 (U.S. Congress 92-1, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Hearings, March 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, April 1, 6, 20 {vvaw}, 1971, 9+583 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/1:P 93/4/971/PT.1, CIS: 71 H381-9, OCLC: 15634210, LCCN: 77612471 pf, WorldCat}, witness: Larry Rottmann (volunteer coordinator, Vietnam Veterans Against the War), April 20 1971 hearing, pages 353-423 {3.2mb.pdf}, at pages 406-423. CIS: “Description of charged mistreatment of prisoners in South Vietnam by American forces; report of receiving Officers Candidate School instruction on the use of torture.”


Legislative Proposals Relating to the War in Southeast Asia {44.14mb.pdf, source} “Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session, on S. 376, S. 974, S.J. Res. 82, S.J. Res. 89, S. Con. Res. 17, S. Res. 62, and S. Res. 66” (U.S. Congress 92-1, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, April 20-May 27 1971: “April 20, 21 and 22, 28, May 3, 11, 12, 13, 25, 26 and 27, 1971,” 7+726+12 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:AS 4/13, CIS: 71 S381-18, OCLC: 198272, LCCN: 79614140 pf, DL, WorldCat}, witness: John Kerry (VVAW: Vietnam Veterans Against the War), Thursday April 22 1971, 11:05am-1:00pm, pages 179-210 {3.1mb.pdf}.

House Ad Hoc Hearing for Vietnam Veterans Against the War (U.S. Congressmen Jonathon Bingham and Paul Findley, presiding, Friday, April 23 1971, Venue: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 13104-13118 (U.S. Congress 92-1, May 3 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.10, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Larry Rottmann, Forest Lindley, Les Johnson, Arthur Egendorf, Kip A. Kypriandes, Phillip Lowley, Vinny Giardina, Michael Paul McCusker, William W. Lemmer, Alex Prim, Robert McLaughlin, Jack Smith, David B. Maize.

Senate Ad Hoc Hearing for Vietnam Veterans Against the War (U.S. Senator George McGovern, presiding, Friday, April 23 1971, Venue: U.S. Congress, Senate, Room G-103 New Senate Office Building), transcript, 117 Congressional Record 15392-15405 (U.S. Congress 92-1, May 17 1971, Permanent Edition (red bound)) {SuDoc: X.92/1:117/PT.12, ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438 pf, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Scott Camil, Vinny Giardina, Melville L. Stephens, Basil Paquet, Joe Nielsen, Dale Granata, Everett Carson, Forrest Lindley Jr., Samuel Miller, David A. Lamenzo, Jon Bjornson, Ken Provan.

Ad Hoc Hearings on Command Responsibility for War Atrocities in Vietnam {copy} (U.S. Congressman Ron Dellums, presiding, April 26, 27, 28, 29, 1971, 9:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m., Venue: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building), transcript, The Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam: An Inquiry into Command Responsibility in Southeast Asia (New York, Vintage Books, 1972, 13+355 pages) {LCCN: 79039897 pf, ISBN: 0394717678, WorldCat}. Witnesses: Five West Point graduates (Fred Laughlin, Gordon Livingston {Iraq, copy}, Robert B. Johnson, Greg Hayward, Ron Bartek, Michael O'Mera), five former military intelligence special agents and POW interrogators {omitted from the linked source}, ten former Americal Division members (Gary Battles, Charles David Locke, Terry Mullen, Steve Padoris, Daniel S. Notley, John Beitzel, Guadalupe G. Villarreal, Daniel Barnes, Thomas Cole, William Toffling), overview of air war, pacification, and forced urbanization (John Sack, Kenneth Campbell, Randy Floyd, Elliot L Meyrowitz).

Bertrand Russell Tribunal, “International War Crimes Tribunal” (Stockholm Sweden, May 2-10 1967; Roskilde Denmark, November 20 – December 1 1967).

Tiger Force: “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths: Tiger Force, an elite fighting unit in Vietnam, left a trail of atrocities in that country that have been concealed from the public for three decades.” (The Blade, Toledo Ohio, October 22 2003, February 15, March 28, April 6, May 2, May 12 2004).

This document is not copyrighted and may be freely copied.


Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Posted Sept. 10 2004. Updated May 10 2009.


Visitors (all pages, from Feb. 10 2008):