It seems to me that we face a situation which I have experienced before in Vietnam, where the official report is always positive. Intelligent people like you are always more optimistic, whether it is on the military side or the civilian side, than the information we get from independent observers like newspaper reporters.

On page 12 of your testimony, you talk about the traffic on the roads, the bustling marketplaces. This article gives a much less optimistic picture.

I looked also at your supplementary statement about the number of persons killed through VC terrorism. If my arithmetic is correct, if they keep on in 1971 at the rate that they have for the first 5 months, we have approximately the same number killed in 1971 as were killed in 1970. That is a statistic which indicates to me that progress toward pacification is at a slower rate than your general testimony would indicate.

Would you care to comment on this?

Ambassador Colby.  I was very interested in the headline there, Mr. Chairman, referring to a fragile situation. About a year ago, a journalist who had been there a while threw up to me the question whether the security situation there was still fragile. We had made quite a point over the previous year or so that the situation was quite fragile. I had to think back and say that I didn’t think it was fragile anymore in that sense.

What you have there, I believe, quite frankly, is a situation we have had in our own staff to a considerable degree. The fellow who has been there a little while looks back on the situation a couple of years ago and has a great sense of how different the situation is from what it was a couple of years ago in terms of the security situation and the ability of the people to circulate, the markets work and so forth.

So he is inclined to tell his successor that the situation is good compared to what it was when he came. The new man looks around and realizes you can still get killed by a mine on the road, by a grenade in that very marketplace. Not many of those occur, but some do. He begins to think it is pretty bad.

I think the thrust of that article, Mr. Chairman, was that the security situation is really quite a bit better than it was, and is quite substantially in hand, but that the political problem is yet to be faced. I think that is what the writer of that article was essentially saying, that the political problem of the relationship of the people to the Government has not really been solved to that degree.

I would be inclined to agree that certainly the political identification of the people with the Government has not proceeded as fast as the security situation has, but this is a sequential development. This is the design of the plan. First you produce a reasonable climate of security in which the people dare to participate and maintain security, and then you develop the programs which invite the people’s participation in a political sense and involve them in that sense. I think this has been done at the village level to a considerable degree, although it has not in every village, I hasten to say.

The process is building a new political base of this Government from the bottom up. This is just beginning at the local level and it is being gradually moved up the scale from the village to the province to the national level. {p.186}

I think the sequence of elections at the village hamlet level in 1969 and 1970, and then in the Province councils in 1970, and later in 1970 for the Senate and this year for the National Lower House and the Presidency, shows this sequential development from the bottom up.

This is political development which is quite a different kind of political base than the former governments used to have where power went down to the people. I am well aware that spokesmen such as myself, and probably including myself, have stated a more positive view of the situation than some of our independent observers have. I do believe, though, that a full evaluation of the situation in Vietnam today shows that the momentum of the strengthening of the Government in security terms, in political terms, and in development terms, is continuing, and will continue in the near future.

Mr. Moorhead.  Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I still point out that the rate of VC killings seems to be at practically the same rate as last year.

Mr. Ambassador, a question with respect to the Phoenix program. That is the same thing as the Phung Hoang program?

Ambassador Colby.  It is, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moorhead.  You mentioned that there have been some abuses. Have any of your subordinates reported to you instances of torture being used under the Phoenix program?

Ambassador Colby.  We have had reports of a few through our channels. We have also had allegations to the National Assembly and in the Vietnamese press of this kind of thing. We have looked into these. On occasion we have found abuses, as I say, unjustifiable abuses, and in collaboration with the Vietnamese authorities we have moved to stop that sort of nonsense.

Mr. Moorhead.  It bothers me, Mr. Ambassador, that the pacification program by its very nature, includes the killing, torture, imprisonment, moving of people, destruction of villages, and the conscious creation of refugees. They may create new hatreds among the people in opposition to the Saigon government.

Have any studies been made on this point? There are certain aspects of the pacification program which make me wonder if we are making friends or enemies. If we are making enemies by this program, our assistance is not only wasteful from a dollar point of view, but in direct contravention of our goals and objectives in Vietnam.

Ambassador Colby.  I think, Mr. Chairman, that your characterization of the nature of the program is not quite the same as I would give it. I think the program is one of an expanding defense of the people against the rockets and raids such as were described in the New York Times this morning and some of this sort of thing. I think the purpose is to provide protection to the people and to give the people a voice in their own future and their own Government.

Thus, I believe that there have been a few cases of abuses, as I have mentioned, most people have been killed as the enemy attacked some of these places, either by the local forces or the self-defense forces, and in the course of active operations against the enemy units out, in the jungle.

There have been a very few movements of people from areas where they could not be defended. {p.187}

This is in accordance with the Government’s overall policy that security will be brought to the people and not the people brought to security, whenever it is possible. I think the trend of the program over the past several years, in terms of the millions of people it has protected more than overcomes the occasional unjustified abuse.

Mr. Moorhead.  Mr. Ambassador, what has happened to the 35-member cadre teams that were trained? Are they under Phoenix or CORDS? What has been their success or failure?

Ambassador Colby.  These were developed and were supported directly by the United States. CORDS took over their management and direction and control in collaboration with the Vietnamese Government in 1969. We have since worked with the Vietnamese Government through the Ministry of Rural Development, to which Ministry they were assigned for management and control, in the process of bringing them more up to date with the changing situation. The reason you had a 59-member team in 1969 was that you needed 59 men to defend themselves while they operated out in the countryside. Otherwise, they would be killed by VC attacks.

As the program proceeded, however, it became less and less necessary that they be a self-defending, self-contained unit. They could rest their defense upon the local forces, the self-defense forces that have been developed. Consequently, the teams were reduced to 30 men.

They have in this year’s program been reduced to 10-man teams and a substantial number of the cadre have been assigned as individuals to serve with different services. For instance, the land reform program took about 2,000 of them, and they have been assigned to various other programs in order to help those programs produce the results desired. The total number of the cadre has reduced from about 50,000 to about 31,000 currently. This is part of a deliberate plan on our part to phase out U.S. support of this program. The Vietnamese Government is going to pick up on their budget continued support at some level. I don’t think they have decided what the level will be. It will probably be less than the current level. They are currently debating the exact level and how they should be organized in the future.

Their function was one, initially, of supplying local security and local government in an area which had neither. As local security improved and local government has grown up from the communities themselves, that function of the cadre has been lost. But newer functions of giving the people an idea of what the programs of the governments are, helping these various programs to be implemented at the local level, this is a continuing job of a cadre of the Government to help carry out the land reform, the veterans’ benefits programs, and so forth.

Mr. Moorhead.  Mr. Ambassador, could you tell us when the Government of Vietnam first began to support the Phoenix program financially and what percent of the cost of that program is now borne by the United States and what percentage by the GVN?

Ambassador Colby.  This is the usual difficulty, Mr. Chairman, in describing these things. The Vietnamese Government has assigned a lot of people to the Phoenix program.

Mr. Moorhead.  When did they first support the Phoenix program financially? {p.188}

Ambassador Colby.  By assigning people and paying the salaries of those police or military personnel they began to support it at its outset. In terms of direct contribution of funds, the first contributions were last year, some small amount — 11 million piasters — this year it is intended that a larger amount be supplied. .

Mr. Moorhead.  Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I will say that the Chair took 11 minutes and we will proceed under an expanded 5-minute rule.

Mr. Reid.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Mr. Ambassador, I certainly want to welcome you back. We appreciate your courtesy in testifying.

You will recall the conversation we had in my office a few weeks ago. In an attempt to be as fair and objective as possible, over the weekend, I reread some 600 pages of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, including your testimony therein. I would like to ask a few general questions about Vietnamization and also would like to talk a little bit on Phoenix.

On the very clear conviction that candor is the best medicine here and that there are some aspects that are not totally clear to this subcommittee, I would like to ask a few questions.

First, could I ask what is the status of the VCI individual who has been captured? Is he then considered a prisoner of war?

Ambassador Colby.  In most cases no, Mr. Chairman, unless he also was a member of a guerrilla group or had some military or paramilitary function.

Mr. Reid.  In those cases he would be a prisoner of war and otherwise not?

Ambassador Colby.  In those cases he would be a prisoner of war. We have extended the direct definition of a prisoner of war to include a considerable number of people who would technically not fall under that.

Mr. Reid.  Does the Vietcong infrastructure include women or children?

Ambassador Colby.  It certainly includes some women, the leaders of some of the women’s groups, women members of village and district and Province committees and so forth. Madam Binh would be a member, for instance, of the VCI. I would say it probably does not include many children, if any.

Mr. Reid.  What age range?

Ambassador Colby.  I would say that for instance a VCI would have to be either a leader or a cadre in the organisation. The 12-year-old or 13-year-old boy who is picked up and given a thousand piasters to throw the grenade into the restaurant would not be categorized under either of those. He would not be a VCI in that sense. He would be a terrorist and would be subject to punishment under that category.

Mr. Reid.  The reason I asked about prisoners of war is that in your testimony on pages 318 and 319 of the Senate report you were asked by Senator Fulbright, ¶

Your answer was no.

Your answer was ¶

Basically what I am asking is whether you consider the law which permits detention for a period up to 2 years under the an tri law is on all fours with the Geneva Convention.

Ambassador Colby.  I think it is. It is not what I would frankly prefer and I think the Government is moving toward changing it in that direction. It has not occurred yet and I would quite frankly say that he does not have a hearing today. His case is reviewed and he is interrogated and his case is looked at.

Mr. Reid.  Does he have any right to counsel?

Ambassador Colby.  No, not under the present situation.

Mr. Reid.  Then is it not a kangaroo trial?

Ambassador Colby.  It is an administrative proceeding, not a trial.

Mr. Reid.  Whether it is called a trial or an administrative proceeding, is that important in international law? There might be some concepts under which we would relate it to due process.

Ambassador Colby.  I think there are two different things. I think it probably meets the technicalities of international law but it certainly does not meet our concepts of due process.

Mr. Reid.  Does it meet the spirit of international law?

Ambassador Colby.  I think as it has gradually improved it does. I think it did not some time ago and I do not think it entirely meets it yet.

Mr. Reid.  Would his rights be protected?

Ambassador Colby.  Not adequately under our concept of due process.

Mr. Reid.  The reason I am pursuing this a little bit is that the testimony before the Senate is replete with some indications and some explicit reports that at times the district coordinating center or the senior advisors have admitted they have made mistakes or are not certain of their information.

My question is: Are you certain that we know a member of the VCI from a loyal member of the South Vietnam citizenry?

Ambassador Colby.  No; Mr. Congressman, I am not.

Mr. Reid.  The answer to that seems to be no, at least in some cases. Therefore there is the possibility, that someone will be captured, sentenced, or killed, who has been improperly placed on a list without adequate verification. If it is inadequate my question goes back to the first point: Isn’t that a reason for making sure that legal proceedings are totally fair?

Ambassador Colby.  I certainly would like to see them improved and we have been working to see them improved. I think they are considerably improved. As I said, I do not think they meet the standards I would like to see applied to Americans today.

Mr. Reid.  Another point, Mr. Ambassador, that I would like to place in as clear perspective as possible is the question of an assassination. ¶

Repeatedly it has been said that the Phoenix program does not involve assassination. It does involve either neutralization or elimination, to use some of the descriptive phrases here. ¶

There are reports in the Senate testimony, however, of a VCI official being hauled out of bed and stabbed and killed. ¶

There is another newspaper report in the hearings that relates to a roundup of individuals, two or them being Vietcong suspects. ¶

One was then interrogated and shot. ¶

What I would like to ask is this: ¶

The testimony refers to an early period where {p.190} there was a counter terrorist organization. ¶

Both you and others testified to that and you also said it was relatively short-lived, as I recall, in your testimony. ¶

Were these the PRU’s and did they involve Nungs and others who had been hired for the purpose of working in the program you described?

Ambassador Colby.  It was a predecessor of the PRU, yes, Mr.

Mr. Reid.  And that did include mercenaries?

Ambassador Colby.  It included people who were hired by the United States; yes.

Mr. Reid.  And part of their purpose was counterterror and assassination, perhaps? Am I correct there?

Ambassador Colby.  I would not say that that was the — not assassination; no.

Mr. Reid.  Did it involve some of that?

Ambassador Colby.  I think some occurred; yes. That is why I said that. I think some occurred.

Mr. Reid.  That is what I was not totally clear about from your testimony.

Ambassador Colby.  I thought I tried to make it clear that I think some did occur at that time.

Mr. Reid.  So, in other words, the forerunner of this program did involve some assassinations, inadvertent or otherwise.

Ambassador Colby.  As I said at that time, Mr. Congressman, Vietnam was a pretty wild place at one period when the Government was very unstable and almost not there. The enemy was very much at the gate. A lot of things were done that should not have been done. We have been trying to fix them up and stop that sort of thing ever since.

Mr. Reid.  Now let me go from that period of 1969 to the present. Here I refer to the Wall Street Journal of 1969. In this story the reporter said that a man identified as a Vietcong was leaning against a tree trunk. Several PRU had gathered around him and wanted to know where ammunition was hidden and where the Vietcong went. And then subsequently in the story, it said from behind a nearby house two shots occurred. The narrow-shouldered prisoner had been executed and his body was dumped into a bunker.

Are you familiar with that story?

Ambassador Colby.  I was in 1969, yes, sir.

Mr. Reid.  Was that in essence accurate testimony?

Ambassador Colby.  I am prepared to accept the testimony of that reporter, whom I consider very reliable.

Mr. Reid.  That would be called summary treatment.

Ambassador Colby.  That was an unjustifiable offense which we have been trying to work against. If you want to get bad intelligence you use bad interrogation methods. If you want to get good intelligence you had better use good interrogation methods. You will get what the fellow thinks you want to hear if you use the wrong methods. This is the lesson we have been trying to put over with the people with whom we work.

Mr. Reid.  There was another instance reported in 1970 in an account of True Magazine. It talks about an instance in 1968. The PRU had captured the highest VC official, a province chief. It says one PRU suddenly noticed a Vietcong trying to run away and wrestled with {p.191} him a few minutes until the PRU stabbed and killed him. There are various current instances of this in the record.

My problem then becomes a more general one. If we are not certain as to who are the VCI and who are not, if we are a good deal less than enthusiastic about the procedures, legal or otherwise, following their capture, if it is quite clear that the total is now, according to figures provided this morning, 20,587 people who have been killed, is this, in your judgment, a program that the United States should be associated with at all at this point due to what it seems to me you have stated, namely that this is far from ideal in the protection of certain rates {sic: rights}, even though it is a wartime situation. ¶

Is this something you feel irrespective of the Vietcong or Hanoi terror or assassination that has been done, is this the kind of program, which I think is unique in U.S. history, that we should have anything to do with and if so why? ¶

What would you state as the reason?

Ambassador Colby.  Yes, I think we should be associated with it because it is an essential part of the war effort. ¶

I also believe there are a number of other things which are not ideal in Vietnam that we are associated with that do not work the way we would like them to. ¶

However, I think that by our association and by our working on it we have substantially improved a great number of this kind of programs or a variety of other programs by the efforts we have made.

Mr. Reid.  Do you think it is humanly possible, Mr. Ambassador, for the United States through our programs to reliably, beyond the peradventure of reasonable doubt, identify 1,200 or 1,400 suspects a month? ¶

Once they are on that list is not that a ticket to possible oblivion for an individual on that list?

Ambassador Colby.  I believe there are steps we can take to insure that the evidence is very, very reliable. ¶

I would not say beyond a reasonable doubt because that would get you into a court trial.

Mr. Reid.  Let me ask you this. It is my understanding, Mr. Ambassador, that there are some DSA’s, individuals who served in this program, who have resigned on the grounds that they could not morally be satisfied that they were identifying the right individuals, quite aside from what they may have thought about the program inherently. ¶

Have you talked with some of the DSA’s who have resigned?

Ambassador Colby.  They have not talked to me about that as a reason for resigning, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Reid.  I think the subcommittee is in a position to bring witnesses before this committee who will testify that they did resign because they were not satisfied at all, or they asked for transfer.

Ambassador Colby.  We have in our directive the right of any individual in the Phoenix program to request relief from it. ¶

We have relieved certain members, although not DSA’s. We have relieved individuals from the Phoenix program. ¶

I cannot recall of any who have resigned from the service for that reason. ¶

At least they have not spoken to me about it.

But to get back to the point, Mr. Congressman, I think that by our work with a program or this nature we can improve it and bring it into the standards which we can accept. ¶

When the blacklists and things like that were originally developed, I agree that they were inaccurate in a substantial number of cases. ¶

I think that we have helped to produce forms for dossiers, requirements for proof, more professional intel- {p.192} ligence operations which give more reliable information. ¶

We have stressed capture and interrogation rather than killing a man when you are out after him, if you possibly can, and I think there are very few cases today that fall below the standards.

Mr. Reid.  Let me ask you one other question. ¶

As I read the current report, there is a quota or goal, if you prefer, relative to sentencing which is roughly half of the total by each military region that are supposed to be captured. ¶

How can you as a concept, administratively, legally or otherwise, set up a quota for what we might think are some kind of judicial proceedings? ¶

If you set a quota, is not that almost automatically saying we are setting a quota irrespective of the facts, the evidence or justice?

Ambassador Colby.  We have opted on a number of goal systems in Vietnam, Mr. Congressman. ¶

The goal is one of reducing the enemy force.

Mr. Reid.  I understand that, Mr. Ambassador, and I respect what you say but how on earth can you set a quota — and I think I am quite correct — for sentencing?

Ambassador Colby.  The reason for putting in the 50 percent sentencing was to put a greater pressure on officials to do a more professional job of capturing and interrogating and then sentencing as a result of the information gathered professionally than by filling the quotas by those who happened to be killed in the course of a battle. ¶

As I mentioned earlier, there are some individuals who are both military commanders or guerrilla commanders and VCI. ¶

In the course of the military fights with a lot of those troops, a lot of people are killed who are revealed as, and identified as, VCI.

Mr. Reid.  If I put your three statements together, you say there is a possibility and you would guess in some cases those captured are, or should be, properly considered prisoners of war. Secondly, you expressed—

Ambassador Colby.  Are captured and then treated as prisoners of war.

Mr. Reid.  Yes, that is correct. ¶

Secondly, you have expressed a good deal less enthusiasm for the an tri law. You expressed today, and I think you expressed a year ago, that that ought to be changed. ¶

And third, the fact that there may be, and I am sure there are, instances where there is incorrect identification. ¶

How can you possibly put that together with a quota for sentencing? ¶

In fact, what you are saying is that there is a chance that some may be improperly identified and if he is dealt with under the an tri there is a very good chance he will have no counsel and finally, you are putting more heat on the local entities to sentence a certain number and stay within the quota. ¶

It seems to me if that is the program it throws out the window any basic rights or any real verification. ¶

Isn’t the pressure all on one side here to procure a certain number of sentences by quota?

Ambassador Colby.  There is additional pressure in the assignment of public prosecutors to the Province security committees, in the activation of the role of the chairman of the Province counsel, in the program to publicize the results of the Province security committee hearings so that these can be subject to check by the population, by the review made by the legislature of the Phoenix program there and a variety of other things that I think we have had something to do with {p.193} helping to push. ¶

We have created a pressure on the other side as well. ¶

I just didn’t want to be in the situation of saying that nothing bad ever happens because that is not true.

Mr. Reid.  Thank you, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moorhead.  Mr. McCloskey?

Mr. McCloskey.  Mr. Ambassador, is there anything about the Phoenix program that can’t be fully disclosed at this time?

Ambassador Colby.  It is a part of the Vietnamese war effort. ¶

The Vietnamese pacification plan has certain portions of it classified and certain portions of it unclassified. ¶

As far as disclosure to the Congress here in a classified form, I think we have been as responsive as we could be to the congressional inquiries on it.

Mr. McCloskey.  Witnesses that have preceded you have indicated that nothing is classified “secret” which would be withheld from the Congress.

Ambassador Colby.  No. I think we can give you classified material if it is handled as such.

Mr. McCloskey.  In your judgment is there anything about the Phoenix program that must be classified at the present time?

Ambassador Colby.  I think there are certain aspects of it. ¶

It is a part of the Vietnamese plan for action against a clandestine operation in their country. ¶

I think that classification assists them to some degree in the way they go at their problem.

Mr. McCloskey.  If I touch on anything in my questions that requires classification, will you call it to our attention so that we may make appropriate arrangements for protection. ¶

I want to quote first from article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, Mr. Ambassador. ¶

In that connection, no court ever sits for those accused of being members of the VCI, does it?

Ambassador Colby.  Occasionally, but only if they happen to be sent to a court instead of to the Province security committee.

Mr. McCloskey.  Let me try to quote from one of your Phoenix documents. ¶

isn’t that right?

Ambassador Colby.  Right.

Mr. McCloskey.  If there is sufficient evidence to satisfy a court that the man is a member of the VCI he goes to the military court, does he not?

Ambassador Colby.  Generally that is true.

Mr. McCloskey.  But the great bulk of people apprehended under the Phoenix program are never tried by the court?

Ambassador Colby.  No.

Mr. McCloskey.  I note from a letter to the International Red Cross by Ambassador Rinestad, he says in part as follows: ¶

If article 3 of the Geneva Convention requires a trial by court, how are we working with the Government of Vietnam to see that these civilians are receiving the proper attention under the Geneva Convention? ¶

Can you tell me?

Ambassador Colby.  I think the answer, Mr. Congressman, is that we are trying to put in the standards of due process, if you will, and we have achieved a number of them. As I stated to Congressman Reid, I am not satisfied that we have completed our effort yet.

Mr. McCloskey.  Then when Ambassador Rinestad says in his letter of December 7 that we are working to do something, we are still talking here in July of 1971 about something in the future. ¶

Under the law, no court ever sits on the person accused of being a Vietcong, isn’t that correct?

Ambassador Colby.  I think you are right.

Mr. McCloskey.  Have we so advised the Red Cross?

Ambassador Colby.  I don’t know.

Mr. McCloskey.  Shouldn’t we?

Ambassador Colby.  I think here in article 42 they refer to the difference between the court conviction and the internment or placing in residence of persons. ¶

I think the Vietnamese Government’s theses on this, quite frankly — and I say to you that we still have to work on this — is that these people are being interned or placed in assigned residences. ¶

That does not fit the standards of what we are talking about. We are working to improve the treatment and the procedures here so that they do meet the standards of due process.

Mr. McCloskey.  I understand that; but, as I understand the Geneva Convention — and I would like you to correct me if I am wrong — the Geneva Convention requires that there be no passing of sentences without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court. ¶

Regardless of how they are treated or whether they are put in administrative detention, no court ever sits on them, and the Geneva Convention requires that court. ¶

We have told the Red Cross we are working to achieve the protection of the Geneva Convention. ¶

The fact of the matter is that we have not achieved the protection of the Geneva Convention. ¶

The South Vietnamese citizens picked up under this program don’t get that, do they?

Ambassador Colby.  I don’t want to discuss this in a highly legal forum but I would like to make two points. ¶

First, in article 3 it does refer to persons taking no active part in hostilities, as the people they are talking about. ¶

Second, I think that the Geneva Convention is rather general: it does not apply to the citizens of a country if action is taken by that country. I think article 4 gives an indication that the persons protected are people to be protected from action by a power of which they are not nationals.

Mr. McCloskey.  Let’s clear this up. ¶

I saw some cases over there when Frank Scotton was showing us around in some of the Provinces. ¶

We looked in some of those dossiers. We found one of an individual who was accused of being a potential VCI because while his village was occupied by the Vietcong he had paid taxes to the Vietcong and his son had been drafted into the Vietcong forces. ¶

There was nothing that would indicate that this man was engaged in making war against his own country. These were articles of suspicion. ¶

I will quote from the Vietnamese document that describes searches for in- {p.195} formation against potential suspects. ¶

You are familiar with SOP3 and that is a Vietnamese document, isn’t it?

Ambassador Colby.  Yes.

Mr. McCloskey (reading). 

All of those are reasons to fill out a dossier and label a man as a potential VCI, are they not?

Ambassador Colby.  This part of the document was advice on how to collect intelligence and what kind of intelligence might be collected. ¶

This was not the basis for conviction or detention. ¶

I think the case that you described pretty clearly would fall into a category-C case which does not come under the Phoenix program. ¶

It did originally, but it does not now.

Mr. McCloskey.  Let’s assume a dossier is prepared. ¶

The dossier essentially is a lot of hearsay evidence. ¶

A neighbor can report that he saw the man down the road carrying an M-16. That would be one item of evidence against him. Another person can participate in a search where you have a hidden informer inside the thing that looks like a chemical toilet. As people pass by he identifies them as potential VC, is that correct?

Ambassador Colby.  Yes, it is.

Mr. McCloskey.  And the defendant informed against, or identified, has no right to appear in his own defense, no right to counsel, no right to confront his accuser, no right to see his dossier; is that correct?

Ambassador Colby.  That is correct, but in that case he has not done anything that gets him into category A or B.

Mr. McCloskey.  But information in those categories can be fixed as such by items collected from three or more people, can it not?

Ambassador Colby.  From a variety of intelligence sources.

Mr. McCloskey.  It can be military, a policeman, or his neighbors down the block. ¶

If there are three items against him which are sufficient as a burden of proof, although there is no real burden of proof, to satisfy the security committee that he is possibly a threat to the national security, then he can be sentenced to life imprisonment, isn’t that correct?

Ambassador Colby.  No, he can’t be sentenced to life. He can be detained for, depending on which category, up to 2 years. His case then has to be reviewed to see whether it should be continued.

Mr. McCloskey.  Let me try to clarify it. ¶

He can’t be sentenced for more than 2 years. ¶

But once he is sentenced for 2 years, he cannot be released unless the Province chief releases him, isn’t that correct?

Ambassador Colby.  His case is reviewed every 2 years, and in the {p.196} majority of cases, Mr. Congressman, it is our understanding that the majority are released, rather than continued.

Mr. McCloskey.  Do we know that? Do we have those statistics?

Ambassador Colby.  We do not have those as solidly as I would like. That is why I would not like to state it flatly at this point. We are in the course of getting these and they may even have them by now.

Mr. McCloskey.  I wonder, Mr. Ambassador, if those figures could be furnished to this committee by letter following this hearing, to include the number of people sentenced to 2 years who have ultimately been released and those whose detention has been ended?

Ambassador Colby.  I think we can give you that. This is one of the things we are trying to do to make this system work better, Congressman, and that is to get an accurate inventory of who is in the jails, how long they have been in there, why they have been in there, and to review in considerable detail the justification for their being there.

Mr. McCloskey.  Mr. Ambassador, you understand my specific request, for the list of those detained for 2 years, those that have been released upon completion of their sentence and those held over.

Ambassador Colby.  I don’t think you want the names, but the summary of numbers.

Mr. McCloskey.  Yes.

Ambassador Colby.  We will give you as good as we can. I wouldn’t want to promise it flatly because we may not be entirely satisfied with the accuracy of the figures for a while, but we will give you what we have as well as we can get it.

(The information follows:)

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AN TRI CASES

[During the period January-June 1971, the following An Tri cases were reviewed for extension of original term with disposition as indicated)

Category	Total reviewed	Extended	Released
A	215	215	0
B	1,441	738	703
C	3,963	1,060	2,903
Total	5,619	2,013	3,606

 

Note: The length of the original terms is not available but current directives call for the following normal terms by category: A, 2 years; B, 1 to 2 years; C, 1 year maximum.

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Mr. McCloskey.  Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate that because I think it bears directly on this question whether a man is indeed sent up for life when he gets this 2-year sentence or whether it is, in reality, a 2-year sentence. ¶

The only case that I know where this occurred was where I interviewed a lady who had been so sentenced. ¶

My understanding was that at the end of the 2-year period she had not been released.

Ambassador Colby.  Mr. Congressman, I recall one figure. The figures do show that over the past 5 years 100,000 Communist offenders have been released from the correction centers. That is not just temporary detention. That is from the correction centers. That is a very substantial number of people that have been released.

Mr. McCloskey.  Mr. Ambassador, I have a document in front of me indicating that interrogation statements or confessions are admissible and used extensively in an tri hearings. ¶

Is that correct? {p.197}

Ambassador Colby.  Yes. ¶

Quite frankly, Mr. Congressman, they used to be used exclusively, which was one of the major problems. ¶

They are not used exclusively any more.

Mr. McCloskey.  That also appears in the document, the American advisers to the Phoenix program should try to require a quantum of proof, other than by confession and interrogation. ¶

That brings me to the real problem that I saw personally with the Phoenix program when I was there. ¶

If the evidence is insufficient to convict a man, and also insufficient to show a reasonable probability that he may be a threat to security, then he may still be sent to the Province interrogation center. ¶

When I first met with the American personnel in Saigon, I understood that these secret prisons were under the control of the CORDS personnel. ¶

As we went out to the field, however, we found the Province interrogation centers were not operated by CORDS; is that correct?

Ambassador Colby.  The Province interrogation centers are actually operated by the special branch of the national police.