Iraq WMD War: Timeline 2004, video/audio, sources

The BBC’s Jon Leyne, who is travelling with Mr Powell, says the secretary of state has made a significant concession on the weapons issue.

He says, Mr Powell’s language was very different from that of Vice-President Dick Cheney, who said, just two days ago, that it was too early to pass judgement, on whether weapons of mass destruction existed.

Our correspondent says, that with members of the Bush administration steadily backtracking from their earlier claims ...

David Kay: You know, if you talk before the war, the interesting thing is, there was very little difference in opinion, between US intelligence, French intelligence, German, even the Russians, with regard to whether they had weapons or not.

David Kay: Before the war not only the U.S. administration and U.S. intelligence, but the French, British, Germans, the U.N., all thought Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.

Wolf Blitzer: Among the experts.

The so-called experts.

Going into the war.

There was no doubt.

There were stockpiles.

Of chemical and biological weapons.

Forget about the nuclear, for the time being.

There’s a little bit more ambiguity about that.

But as far as chemical and biological weapons.

You had no doubt.

Did you.

David Kay: I had no doubt.

And not only American experts.

That was the general view of the intelligence communities around the world.

Including people who did not support us in the Security Council, in terms of military action.

David Kay: There were intelligence reports from the British, the French, the Germans, and even the Russians, which painted a picture of Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction.

David Kay: Wolf, it’s hard for people ... to realize how broad the consensus was ...

It included the British, the French, the Germans.

And, yes, even the Russians.

Who held the view.

That Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. ...

Was the consensus.

Bill Nichols: This is Bill Nichols, with USA Today, for anyone.

Other than on missiles.

Did Powell get anything right?

In what he said at the U.N.?

Joseph Cirincione: Not that I can see.

Secretary Powell was wrong on all his core assertions at the U.N.

There isn’t any major claim that has held up after over a year of searching Iraq.

And even on the missiles.

We knew, at the time, that Saddam had created missiles that were slightly over the 150-kilometer range; that is, they were going to 180-kilometer range. ...

He then makes the claim, of numerous intelligence reports ... indicate that Saddam retains a covert force, of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. ...

So I’ve gone through this, and I’ve been looking at this very carefully, and I would say all of his major assertions we now know to be incorrect.

Mark Davis: When you analyze much of the so-called intelligence, that was being relied upon.

By George Bush and Tony Blair.

Much of that information seems to have been sourced from your organization, or that of your predecessors.

In your opinion, was that information misused?

For the purposes of war?

Hans Blix: Yes.

In many cases it was. ...

You see, if you take the case of anthrax, for instance.

Which probably was the one where we were the most suspicious.

UNSCOM made a calculation, that the Iraqis could have produced so and so much.

And if they had produced all that, what happened to all of it?

The Iraqis said, that they destroyed all of it, in the summer of 1991.

And I think that appears relatively plausible.

But if they had not—

There was no evidence, sufficient evidence, of that.

Then one would ask where? what happened? can you explain what really happened to it? have you any documentation?

There was a tendency, and clear, many statements, on the part of the U.S., that said that,

So.

They equated something unaccounted for with saying that it exists.

Mark Davis: Well, you give a very definite answer to that question now.

Were you as clear, and as definite, at the time?

When the world was really looking to you—

Hans Blix: Absolutely.

Mark Davis: —to give some clarity.

Hans Blix: Absolutely.

You will find statements by me, in the Security Council, where I said precisely what I said a moment ago.

That something that is unaccounted for is not the same thing as saying that it exists.

I said it in February last year.

Mark Davis: Well, you say the information, or the intelligence, that came from your organization was either misinterpreted or misused.

Who did the misusing?

Hans Blix: Well, you can read the statements in the—

Well, from the State Department, for instance.

There I find statements made, that they equate the quantities, which we hold are unaccounted for, by saying that they exist.

From February, for instance, in last year, you have examples of that.

* * *

Mark Davis: The impression given, or certainly the impression in the media, was that you were in fact being very ambiguous.

You were saying, there was no smoking gun, but there were these unaccounted-for materials. ...

Hans Blix: We said what we knew.

And we did not say more than that.

They maintain, they contended, that it existed.

We said, there are questions, whether it exists.

You call that ambiguity.

I call it clarity.

Brian Jones: ... the translation of a probability into a certainty ...

We were told there was other intelligence.

That we — the experts — could not see.

And, that it removed the reservations, we were expressing.

It was so sensitive, it could not be shown to us.

It was held within a tight, virtual “compartment.”

Available only to a few selected people ...

I eventually found someone who was in the relevant compartment ...

I explained the reservations, that we had, about the draft dossier, and asked whether the compartmented intelligence resolved any of these concerns.

I was advised, they did not.

Carl Levin: On the WMD issue.

In September of 2002.

The Defense Intelligence Agency.

Produced a classified study.

Called.

Iraq — Key WMD Facilities — An Operational Support Study.

Part of that study has now been declassified.

It included the following statement:

That’s September.

DIA.

Which was classified.

Until recently.

Now, on September 19th of 2002.

The same month of that classified DIA assessment.

You publicly stated.

That Saddam has—

Quote {pf} {83kb.pdf}:

And that {March 11 2003} {pf}:

How do you explain the contrast.

Between the DIA-reported intelligence—

That said there was “no reliable information” about production or stockpiling of chemical weapons—

And your public statements—

That you “knew” that Saddam has such weapons.

What explains the discrepancy there?

Donald Rumsfeld: ... I don’t—

Needless to say, I’m sure I never saw that piece of intelligence. And whether or not it was the DIA’s view overall or an analyst’s view. I can’t tell from the way you’ve presented it.

I have relied not on any one single intelligence entity, like the DIA or the CIA. I’ve relied on the intelligence community’s assessments. And the intelligence community’s assessments were what they were. And they were as I stated them.

Carl Levin: Do you see a difference?

Between saying, with certainty, that “we know” something?

And saying, that there is “some evidence” of something?

Donald Rumsfeld: I do.

Carl Levin: That was not the way in which the public statements the administration were made.

It wasn’t that, “There’s evidence.”

Or that, “There is belief.”

Or—

It was the statements of great certainty.

That, “We know that there are mass stockpiles of weapons.”

“We know where they are.”

Everything was stated with certainty.

And what is not part of any of those investigations — those six that you’ve mentioned — is a review of the policy-makers’ certainty in their statements.

And what was the basis in intelligence for those statements of certainty.

So that’s one of the issues here.

As to whether or not those statements, made with certainty, by many members of the administration, should be reviewed, in terms of what the intelligence was that did — or did not — back up such certain statements.

I’m not asking you the question.

I just want to let you know, that that is not being looked at, by any of the investigations that you, I think, referred to.

The investigation or inquiry that I am attempting to make, at the Armed Services Committee, with my staff, is attempting to look at that issue, as well as all the other issues.

But here’s my question for you.

It relates to the operation of Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith.

He made an analysis of the links between Al Qaida and Iraq and apparently presented a briefing to you on that analysis of the intelligence.

Apparently, the briefing that he made to you was then made {pf} to the Director of Central Intelligence, the intelligence community staff, the National Security Council, and then to the Office of the Vice President.

Was the Feith operation supposed to look at intelligence through a different prism from the rest of the intelligence community?

Why was it formed other than for that?

And why did it bypass the usual channels with the product of his analysis?

It’s, kind of, a two-part question.

Donald Rumsfeld: There was something that the press has characterized as an intelligence cell in the Office of Policy: Mr. Feith’s office. It had two people in it. At any given time, the people changed. And there may be two more. Or maybe there were four or five at some point.

And all they did was to try to—

As I understand it, and I talked to Mr. Feith about this—

Their task was simply to read the intelligence.

Not to gather intelligence.

To read the intelligence that existed and to assist him in developing policy recommendations in his role as Under-Secretary for policy.

At one moment, you’re quite right: He— Two people who’d been looking at this, thought they had an interesting approach to it. He asked me to be briefed. I sat there and listened to them. I said, “Gee, that’s interesting. Why don’t you brief the people at CIA?”

They did.

Carl Levin: And the vice president.

Donald Rumsfeld: I didn’t say that.

I said exactly what I said.

I asked them to brief the people at the CIA.

And they did that.

I do not know if they briefed anyone else besides that.

But they did do what I asked.

And the implication that this two-person — or four or five over time — was gathering intelligence, or doing something unusual is just not correct.

As I understand it.

Carl Levin: But my question, though, was:

Was it intended, that they look at intelligence through a different prism?

Donald Rumsfeld: No, as I understand it, just what I said.

Their task was to take the intelligence that existed and look at it and see what they could figure out about it.

Just as I do, when I read it, and you do, when you read it.

And in this case, Doug Feith asked a couple of people — there’s mountains of this stuff.

And it is a big task to integrate it in your mind.

And so he had this small group doing that.

And they looked at terrorist networks.

Which seems to me to be a perfectly logical thing to do, after September 11.

Carl Levin: Thank you.

My time is up.

* * *

Senator Edward Moore Kennedy Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski.

Recently retired Air Force intelligence officer.

Served in the Pentagon.

During the buildup to the war.

Said {copy}:

We’ve seen in the examples that were mentioned this morning—

For example, just on the issues of stockpiling on chemical weapons, as mentioned by Senator Levin.

2002.

DIA said.

“No reliable information.”

On whether producing and stockpile.

You said.

In 2002.

Before this committee:

“We do know that.”

“We do know that.”

I understand the intelligence community never says, “We know.”

But.

You said.

In September,

“We do know that.” ...

Donald Rumsfeld: I am told by Dr. Cambone, sitting behind me {Stephen A. Cambone, Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence}, that the document you read from, and possibly the same document that Senator Levin read from also, has a paragraph in it that says the following.

And I quote:

That’s in the same document, I am told.

Last—

Edward Kennedy: Well.

The—

You said:—

“Probable”

And:—

“Possible.”

“Probable”

and

“Possible.”

Rather than:—

“We know.”

It’s a big difference.

Donald Rumsfeld: I’m coming to “We know.”

I could be wrong—

I’m asked a lot of questions. I use a lot of words. And I’m sure from time to time I say something that, in retrospect, I wish I hadn’t.

However, I remember—

I think I remember the moment I said, “We know” something.

And it was this:

The forces had gone in out of Kuwait into Iraq, and they were moving up, and they had gotten in a day or two, possibly, and they were a long way from Baghdad. And as everyone on this committee will remember, the “suspect sites” for — which is what they generally call them — for WMD, that the intelligence community produced, the suspect sites tended to be north. And they tended to be in the Baghdad and north area.

Our troops were a long way from even Baghdad.

And I was asked,

“Where’s the weapons of mass destruction?”

And I may have said—

I think I said {copy, copy} {0:20 bb}{March 30 2003} :

“We know where they are.

They’re up north.

They’re not down here.”

And I was referring to the suspect sites.

And you’re quite right.

Shorthand.

“We know where they are.”

Probably turned out, not to be exactly what one would have preferred, in retrospect. ...

Edward Kennedy: I’d just say, that—

In your September 19th 2002

Testimony {83kb.pdf}

To the committee,

You said five times,

That—

“Iraq has”

Or—

“We know”

They have—

“Weapons”

Of mass destruction.

Thank you, Chairman.

Donald Rumsfeld: I’m not going to go back and quote the comments from the previous administration and President Clinton and Vice President Gore—

John Warner: Mr. Secretary—

Donald Rumsfeld: —Secretary Cohen and all of that the way you have. I can just say that the stream of intelligence over a period of a long time in both administrations led the same people in similar jobs to the same conclusions.