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Ditto Iran?

Iraq WMD War: Timeline 2004, video/audio, sources


by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 2004 


Congress debates, votes
Iraq wmd war timeline: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005-2006, 2007
David Kay
Charles Duelfer
Iran uranium timeline
Israel/Palestine timeline:
Palestine Peace Not Apartheid
The Israel Lobby
Settlements
Blockade, reprisals

Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, George Perkovich, Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications {703kb.pdf} (CEIP: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 8 2004), press conference, C-Span video (request) {1:24:00, schedule, 537694553, 179842-1}, Carnegie audio {1:21:53}, Carnegie transcript {154kb.pdf}.

Charles A. Duelfer (Deputy Executive Chairman, UNSCOM, 1994-1999), quoted, Andrea Mitchell (NBC), Alex Johnson (MSNBC), Associated Press, “No proof links Iraq, al-Qaida, Powell says; Chief weapons inspector reportedly about to quit{pf} (NBC News, January 8 2004): Charles Duelfer: “I think Mr. Kay and his team have looked very hard. I think the reason they haven’t found it is, it’s probably not there.”

Charles Duelfer, Greg Thielmann (Director to September 2002, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department), interviewed by Margaret Warner, background report by Kwame Holman, “Weapons Search” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, January 9 2004, 7:00 p.m.), video bb {14:33 bb}.

Greg Thielmann, interviewed by John Humphrys (BBC Radio 4, Today, Tuesday January 13 2004, 6-9am at 8:14-8:22 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx4403}, audio {8:35}, copy {8:06, source}, reported, “Bush's Reasons For War” (BBC Radio 4, Today, January 13 2004): “Former Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill ... A retired top official from the US Government has accused President Bush of planning for an invasion of Iraq within days of coming to office. Exclusive interview with Greg Thielman.”

George W. Bush (U.S. President), “State of the Union Address{pf} (U.S. House of Representatives, January 20 2004, 9:12-10:05 p.m.) video {1:00:30}, retitled, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” 40:4 WCPD 94-101 {32kb.txt, 60kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:40/4}. State of the Union Message (Executive Office of the President, 2004) {SuDoc: PREX 1.2:ST 1/2004, OCLC: 54453217, GPOcat, LL: paper, DL, WorldCat}. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” 150 Congressional Record H20-H23 {pf} {32kb.txt, 44kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, daily edition 150:1, January 20 2004) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/1}. State of the Union Message (U.S. Congress 108-2, House Document 108-144, January 23 2004) {33kb.txt, 54kb.pdf, purl} {SuDoc: Y 1.1/7:108-144, Serial Set: None yet, LCCN: 2004356659, OCLC: 54507666, GPOcat (faulty), DL, WorldCat}.

 

“ George W. Bush: Already the Kay Report identified dozens of weapons of mass destruction-related program activities, and significant amounts of equipment, that Iraq concealed from the United Nations.

Had we failed to act.

The dictator’s weapons of mass destruction.

Would continue.

To this day.”

____________________

 

Query:Weapons”? “Continue”?

Can a weapon which did not exist?

Continue” to exist?

Obviously not.

What, then, is the only rational inference?

From George W. Bush’s assertion?

Here, George W. Bush is assuring Congress.

And the U.S. public.

And the worldwide public.

Watching on TV.

That weapons of mass destruction did indeed exist in Iraq, in 2003.

This assertion, following the day-long final debriefing by David Kay at the CIA.

And his interim report, on October 2 2003.

That no weapons had been found.

What can this mean?

Why this statement?

In this carefully crafted, vetted, 35-draft, speech.

Is this a slip of the tongue?

An inadvertent oversight?

Is the President a fool?

Blinded by zeal?

By arrogance?

By chemical substances?

Or is George W. Bush simply a common liar?

Surrounded by common liars?

Members of a criminal enterprise?

Hoping they can stonewall the deceit.

They perpetrated?

To mold the subsconscious feelings and opinions of the most of the public, who won’t notice?

And the most of the rest won’t care?  CJHjr

Dick Cheney (U.S. Vice President), interviewed by Juan Williams (senior correspondent), “Cheney: U.S. to Continue Search for Iraqi WMD: Vice President Also Cites Al Qaeda-Saddam Connection” (NPR: National Public Radio, Morning Edition, Washington D.C., January 22 2004), broadcast audio {8:29}, extended {8:13}, comment, editorial (anonymous), “Mr. Cheney, Meet Mr. Kay{pf} (The New York Times, Tuesday January 27 2004, page A22).

 

“ Dick Cheney: We’ve found a couple of semi-trailers, at this point, which we believe were, in fact, part of that program ...

And I would deem that conclusive evidence, if you will, that he did, in fact, have programs for weapons of mass destruction ...

I think there’s overwhelming evidence, that there was a connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government.”

Walter Pincus, Mike Allen, “Hunt for Iraqi Weapons May Get New Chief Soon{pf} (The Washington Post, Monday, January 22 2004), accord, Douglas Jehl, “Skeptic May Take Over Iraq Arms Hunt{pf, copy} (The New York Times, Tuesday January 23 2004, page A6).

 

“ Charles A. Duelfer, an experienced former U.N. weapons inspector, is likely to be named soon to succeed David Kay as head of the U.S. hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, a senior administration official said last night. ...

NBC News first reported last night that Duelfer was likely to replace Kay.

Duelfer told NBC in an interview aired Jan. 9:

“I think it’s pretty clear right now that they’re not going to find existing weapons in Iraq of either a biological or chemical nature.””

Jane Corbin (Amman Jordan) (BBC Panorama), interviewed by Bill Delaney (Boston), “Following an Arms Inspector” (WBUR, Here and Now, Boston University, Massachusetts, January 22 2004, 12:00 p.m. ET) (“Boston’s NPR news station”), audio {7:07}: “On the PBS program Frontline, {“Chasing Saddam's Weapons”}, BBC reporter Jane Corbin presents a report on David Kay, and his frustrating search. Corbin won extraordinary access to Kay and his team of some 1,400 weapons hunters.”

 

Re: David Kay, ISG (CIA Iraq Survey Group):

“ Jane Corbin: I filmed his progress.

And charted the ISG’s work ...

I’ve known David Kay for many years.

And made a number of films with him. ...

Bill Delaney: One person, they’ve been able to speak to, is Dr. Amer al-Saadi, who ran Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program.

Dr. Amer al-Saadi always said.

There were no weapons.

Tell us, who he is.

And what his situation is.

At this point.

Jane Corbin: Dr. Amer al-Saadi ... missile program ... chemical weapons program.

He always maintained.

And indeed, he said to me, before the war.

That the weapons, they had, were destroyed.

Back in 1991.

He’s very much stuck to that script.

Over the years. ...

David Kay, and indeed the ISG, have had this man in prison for many months.

And.

As far as I’ve been able to find out.

They haven’t actually discovered anything new.

He is still saying.

That they destroyed them.

In 1991.

Bill Delaney: Then, Jane, in December, David Kay issues a preliminary report {October 2 2003}, concluding Saddam Hussein had an intent to obtain weapons of mass destruction, but that no weapons of mass destruction had been found.

Then, a month later, in January {December}, David Kay tells the Bush administration, he wants to resign.

Even before a final report will be issued.

Jane Corbin: ... It’s almost the end of the story, for the Iraq Survey Group. ...

I think we’ve all noticed, the politicians talking less and less, about this issue of WMD.

In the President’s State of the Union address, the other night, barely a mention of it.

And, indeed, the President, himself, has recently given interviews, which seem to suggest, that it doesn’t matter any more.

And I think we’re going to quietly see, the whole issue, of weapons of mass destruction, pushed into the background.

Bill Delaney: I should add, that the person expected to replace David Kay ... Charles Duelfer, an experienced U.N. weapons inspector.

But listen to what he said, to NBC News, on January 9th.

Mr. Duelfer said:

“I think it’s pretty clear, right now, they’re not going to find existing weapons in Iraq, of either a biological or chemical nature.”

Jane Corbin: Yes.

And that seems to be the bottom line.

They are backing off this.

They are trying to let down the public gently.

On this whole question of WMD.

And to lower expectations, at this point.”

David Kay (Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group), Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), Greg Thielmann (Director to September 2002, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department), and others, interviewed by Jane Corbin, “Chasing Saddam’s Weapons” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline, January 22 2004) {transcript}.

George J. Tenet (U.S. Director of Central Intelligence), “DCI Announces Duelfer to Succeed Kay as Special Advisor” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs, Press Release, January 23 2004), reported, Walter Pincus, Dana Milbank, “Arms Hunt in Iraq to Get New Focus: Next Chief Named for Effort{pf} (The Washington Post, January 24 2004).

David Kay (resigned Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group), interviewed by Tabassum Zakaria, “Ex-Arms Hunter Kay Says No WMD Stockpiles in Iraq{copy} (Reuters, Friday, January 23 2004, 10:14 p.m. GMT), reported, “US chief Iraq arms expert quits{pf}, Michael Buchanan, “He was the man London and Washington hoped would find Iraq's banned weapons,” BBC video {1:09}, Matt Frei, “Kay led a team of 1,400 inspectors,” BBC video {2:02} (BBC News, January 23/24 2004), Richard W. Stevenson, “Iraq Illicit Arms Gone Before War, Departing Inspector States{pf} (The New York Times, Saturday January 24 2004, page A1).

Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State, Jan. 20 2001-2005 Jan. 26), “Press Briefing En Route to Georgia” (airborne, on approach to Tbilisi Georgia, January 24 2004), reported, “Powell Casts Doubt on Iraq WMDs{pf} (BBC News, January 25 2004, 6:49 a.m. GMT), Fiona Werge, “While this may not be a complete u-turn, it’s a close run thing,” BBC video {1:26}.

 

“ The BBC’s Jon Leyne, who is travelling with Mr Powell, says the secretary of state has made a significant concession on the weapons issue.

He says, Mr Powell’s language was very different from that of Vice-President Dick Cheney, who said, just two days ago, that it was too early to pass judgement, on whether weapons of mass destruction existed.

Our correspondent says, that with members of the Bush administration steadily backtracking from their earlier claims ...”

David Kay, interviewed January 24 2004 by Con Coughlin, “Saddam’s WMD Hidden in Syria, Says Iraq Survey Chief{pf} (Daily Telegraph, London, Sunday, January 25 2004). David Kay (next item): “I think that’s a compressed view of what I said.”

David Kay, interviewed by Liane Hansen, “Iraq Arms Inspector Casts Doubt on WMD Claims: Kay’s stance differs with White House view of situation in Iraq” (NPR: National Public Radio, Weekend Edition Sunday, Washington D.C., Sunday, January 25 2004), audio {13:52}, reported, “CIA under fire for Iraq failure{pf} (BBC News, January 26 2004, 11:22 a.m.).

 

“ David Kay: You know, if you talk before the war, the interesting thing is, there was very little difference in opinion, between US intelligence, French intelligence, German, even the Russians, with regard to whether they had weapons or not.”

____________________

 

Query: The French?  The Germans?  The Russians?

David Kay, interviewed January 24 2004 by James Risen, “Ex-Inspector Says C.I.A. Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program{pf, copy} (The New York Times, Monday, January 26 2004, page A1), follow-up, James Risen, “White House Shows Less Certainty Now on Iraq's Arms{pf} (The New York Times, Tuesday January 27 2004, page A1).

Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary), interviewed by John Humphrys (BBC Radio 4, Today, Monday, January 26 2004, 6-9am at 8:10-8:29 a.m.) {BBCcat 92sx0879}, audio {18:49}, copy {18:44}, FCO transcript {pf, source}, reported, “War 'more justified' now insists Straw{pf} (BBC News, January 26 2004, 10:10 a.m.).

Fred Kaplan, “The Art of Camouflage: David Kay comes clean, almost” (Slate, Monday, January 26 2004, 5:41 p.m. ET).

David Kay, interviewed by Tom Brokaw (NBC Nightly News, Monday, January 26 2004, 6:30-7:00 p.m. ET), MSNBC video, “Kay: No evidence of WMD{4:26, 3.4mb.wmv, 9.59mb.flv}, MSNBC transcript {pf}.

David Kay, interviewed by Matt Lauer (NBC News, The Today Show, Tuesday, January 27 2004, 7:00-10:00 a.m. ET), MSNBC video {7:03, 5.36mb.wmv}, transcript printed, “David Kay Interview,” 150 Congressional Record S315-S316 {pf} {12kb.txt, 38kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, daily edition 150:7, January 28 2004) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/7}.

 

“ David Kay: Before the war not only the U.S. administration and U.S. intelligence, but the French, British, Germans, the U.N., all thought Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.”

____________________

 

Query: The FrenchBritishGermansU.N.?

David Kay, interviewed by Walter Pincus, Dana Milbank, “Kay Cites Evidence of Iraq Disarming: Action Taken in ’90s, Ex-Inspector Says” {pf, copy, copy} (The Washington Post, Wednesday, January 28 2004).

David Kay (resigned Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group), testimony, Efforts to Determine the Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related Programs (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-678, Wednesday, January 28 2004, 11:00 a.m., Senate Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-678, LCCN: 2005414430, OCLC: 57070686, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, November 26 2004} (censored, from the internet, by the committee, or by others in the U.S. government), John W. Warner (Chairman), Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member) {11kb.html}, witness: David Kay (Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group, June 11 2003-2004 Jan. 23), C-Span video (request) {2:44:45, smil, schedule, 538818909, 180284-1}, broadcast video: part-1 {2:04:09, source}, part-2 {37:49}, transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH transcript {178kb.html, copy, source}, FNS transcript {130kb.pdf, copy}.

David Kay, interviewed by Wolf Blitzer, “Kay: No WMDs in Iraq” (CNN News, Wolf Blitzer Reports, Wednesday, January 28 2004, 5:00 p.m.) (transcript archive):

 

“ Wolf Blitzer: Among the experts.

The so-called experts.

Going into the war.

There was no doubt.

There were stockpiles.

Of chemical and biological weapons.

Forget about the nuclear, for the time being.

There’s a little bit more ambiguity about that.

But as far as chemical and biological weapons.

You had no doubt.

Did you.

David Kay: I had no doubt.

And not only American experts.

That was the general view of the intelligence communities around the world.

Including people who did not support us in the Security Council, in terms of military action.”

____________________

 

Query: The French?  The Germans?  The Russians?

David Kay, interviewed by Chris Matthews (MSNBC, Hardball, Washington D.C., Wednesday, January 28 2004, 5:00/7:00 p.m. ET), MSNBC video, “What U.S. intelligence missed” (player-video link expired) {12:27, 9.46mb.wmv, source}.

David Kay, interviewed by Jim Lehrer, “Newsmaker: David Kay” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Thursday, January 29 2004, 7:00 p.m.), video bb {15:02 bb}, audio {14:53}:

 

“ David Kay: There were intelligence reports from the British, the French, the Germans, and even the Russians, which painted a picture of Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction.”

____________________

 

Query: The British?  FrenchGermansRussians?

David Kay, interviewed by Ted Koppel, “The Inspector: A Conversation with David Kay{copy} (transcript) (ABC News, Friday, Nightline, January 28 2004).

Scott Ritter (UNSCOM inspector in Iraq, 1991-1998), interviewed by Wolf Blitzer, “Weapons Fallout: Interview with Scott Ritter” (CNN News Wolf Blitzer Reports, January 30 2004, 5:00 p.m.) (transcript archive).

David Kay, interviewed by Gary Thomas, “Former Inspector’s WMD Assertions Raise New Questions about US Intelligence Community{pf} (VOA: Voice of America News, January 31 2004, 8:05 a.m.), audio {4:18, 530kb.rm}.

Sunday
morning
interview
shows

David Kay, interviewed by Chris Wallace, “David Kay on ‘Fox News Sunday’{pf} (FNC: Fox News Channel, FOX News Sunday, Sunday, February 1 2004, 9:00 a.m.).

David Kay, interviewed by Wolf Blitzer (CNN, Late Edition, Sunday, February 1 2004, 12:00 p.m.), CNN transcript {archive}.

 

“ David Kay: Wolf, it’s hard for people ... to realize how broad the consensus was ...

It included the British, the French, the Germans.

And, yes, even the Russians.

Who held the view.

That Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. ...

“Does he have weapons?”

“Yes, he did.”

Was the consensus.”

____________________

 

Query:View”?

Some people may have held “views.”

But we don’t sentence people to death.

Based on “views.”

Except.

In a lynching.

Did they hold evidence?

To support their views?

And did they hold evidence?

To oppose their views?

Analysts are paid to analyze evidence.

Including credibility evidence.

Not to parrot each other’s unsubstantiated “views.”

And if they do not have sufficient evidence.

They are paid to say so.

Not pretend otherwise.

Query: The British?  FrenchGermansRussians?

If he’s not a liar, trying to minimize his own extensive complicity, and defend his political tribe, and his CIA paymasters—

What accounts for David Kay’s stubborn repetition of this erroneous assertion?

David Kay omits to acknowledge, that the intelligence of the Germans, French, and Russians, was assessed, by their government officials, and found to prove nothing.

And those officials repeatedly said so.

Loudly, and publicly.

Their intelligence raised suspicions.

But nothing more.

I’ll concede him the British.

But only on the premise, he may not have been in touch with their experts.

The British experts — like the French, the Germans, the Russians — knew, they too did not have evidence, to support the public claims, of the U.K./U.S. politicians.

But they were silenced, and cut out of the assessment loop, when their views became known to those politicians, and to their operatives.

Is David Kay still serving his masters?

The CIA and the rest of the criminal cabal?

Paid to promote this lie?

To obscure and diminish?

The lies?

Of the criminal enterprise?

If David Kay is not a liar, then he’s modeling the stubborn, wilful, blindness — and lack of critical thinking — of such of the U.S./U.K. intelligence analysts who may have been, honestly, incompetent.

Long bred into incompetence.

By corrupt managers.

Serving political agendas.

Or cowards, fearing for their jobs, to speak up.

Threatened, by members of the criminal enterprise, with power over their careers.

But there were plenty others.

Malicious liars.

Doing their best, to further the criminal conspiracy.

The goals of the criminal enterprise.

The crime against peace.

  CJHjr

Greg Thielmann (Director to September 2002, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department), Joseph Cirincione (Director, Non-Proliferation Project, CEIP: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Daryl Kimball (Executive Director, ACA: Arms Control Association), “Conference Call Briefing with the Arms Control Association, Topic: Iraq’s Weapons{pf} (Arms Control Association, Washington D.C., February 3 2004, 9:35 a.m.).

 

“ Bill Nichols: This is Bill Nichols, with USA Today, for anyone.

Other than on missiles.

Did Powell get anything right?

In what he said at the U.N.?

Joseph Cirincione: Not that I can see.

Secretary Powell was wrong on all his core assertions at the U.N.

There isn’t any major claim that has held up after over a year of searching Iraq.

And even on the missiles.

We knew, at the time, that Saddam had created missiles that were slightly over the 150-kilometer range; that is, they were going to 180-kilometer range. ...

He then makes the claim, of numerous intelligence reports ... indicate that Saddam retains a covert force, of up to a few dozen Scud-variant ballistic missiles. ...

So I’ve gone through this, and I’ve been looking at this very carefully, and I would say all of his major assertions we now know to be incorrect.”

Note: Iraq vountarily declared its missiles on December 7 2002, and their excess range during testing, and voluntarily destroyed them. Only two long-range Scud missles were ever in doubt (from the 1991 war). The accounting for them was uncertain.  CJHjr

Hans Blix (Stockholm), intervewed by Mark Davis (Syndey), Hans Blix Interview” (SBS News, Dateline, Sydney, February 4 2004, 8:30 p.m.), SBS video {8:48}, SBS transcript.

 

“ Mark Davis: When you analyze much of the so-called intelligence, that was being relied upon.

By George Bush and Tony Blair.

Much of that information seems to have been sourced from your organization, or that of your predecessors.

In your opinion, was that information misused?

For the purposes of war?

Hans Blix: Yes.

In many cases it was. ...

You see, if you take the case of anthrax, for instance.

Which probably was the one where we were the most suspicious.

UNSCOM made a calculation, that the Iraqis could have produced so and so much.

And if they had produced all that, what happened to all of it?

The Iraqis said, that they destroyed all of it, in the summer of 1991.

And I think that appears relatively plausible.

But if they had not—

There was no evidence, sufficient evidence, of that.

Then one would ask where? what happened? can you explain what really happened to it? have you any documentation?

There was a tendency, and clear, many statements, on the part of the U.S., that said that,

“Where is this anthrax?”

So.

They equated something unaccounted for with saying that it exists.

Mark Davis: Well, you give a very definite answer to that question now.

Were you as clear, and as definite, at the time?

When the world was really looking to you—

Hans Blix: Absolutely.

Mark Davis: —to give some clarity.

Hans Blix: Absolutely.

You will find statements by me, in the Security Council, where I said precisely what I said a moment ago.

That something that is unaccounted for is not the same thing as saying that it exists.

I said it in February last year.

Mark Davis: Well, you say the information, or the intelligence, that came from your organization was either misinterpreted or misused.

Who did the misusing?

Hans Blix: Well, you can read the statements in the—

Well, from the State Department, for instance.

There I find statements made, that they equate the quantities, which we hold are unaccounted for, by saying that they exist.

From February, for instance, in last year, you have examples of that.

* * *

Mark Davis: The impression given, or certainly the impression in the media, was that you were in fact being very ambiguous.

You were saying, there was no smoking gun, but there were these unaccounted-for materials. ...

Hans Blix: We said what we knew.

And we did not say more than that.

They maintain, they contended, that it existed.

We said, there are questions, whether it exists.

“We cannot exclude, that it exists.

But.

We do not maintain, that it exists.”

You call that ambiguity.

I call it clarity.”

Brian Jones (Head until January 2003 of the Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Branch; Scientific and Technical Directorate; Defence Intelligence Staff, 1987-2003; U.K. Ministry of Defense), “We Were Overruled, Says Former Intelligence Chief, and the Result Was a Dossier that Was Misleading About Iraqi WMD” (Independent, February 4 2004) {copy, copy}, reported, “Iraq dossier concerns 'overruled'{pf}, Polly Billington, “Brian Jones says everyone should see this intelligence,” BBC video {2:08} (BBC News, February 4 2004), discussed, (BBC Radio 4, Today, Wednesday February 4 2004) {BBCcat 90sx6668}: Norman Smith (BBC political correspondent), Frank Gardiner (BBC security correspondent), interviewed by John Humphrys (6:35-6:40 a.m.), audio {5:06}, David Owen, Doug Henderson (Labour Party MP, former Defense Minister), interviewed by James Naughtie (7:09-7:17 a.m.), audio {7:57}, excerpts from Brian Jones’ article, Michael Howard (Leader of the Conservative Party opposition), Simon Kellner (editor, Independent), interviewed by John Humphrys (8:10-8:26 a.m.), audio {16:02}, Kenneth Clarke (former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Conservative Party MP), interviewed by James Naughtie (8:40-8:45 a.m.), audio {5:29}.

 

“ Brian Jones: ... the translation of a probability into a certainty ...

We were told there was other intelligence.

That we — the experts — could not see.

And, that it removed the reservations, we were expressing.

It was so sensitive, it could not be shown to us.

It was held within a tight, virtual “compartment.”

Available only to a few selected people ...

I eventually found someone who was in the relevant compartment ...

I explained the reservations, that we had, about the draft dossier, and asked whether the compartmented intelligence resolved any of these concerns.

I was advised, they did not.”

Paul Waugh, “Intelligence Chief’s Bombshell: ‘We Were Overruled on Dossier’” (Independent, February 4 2004, Page 1) {copy, copy}.

Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), testimony {FNS pf, FDCH pf}, Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2005 (Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing, February 4 2004), C-Span video {3:07:00}, witnesses: Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense) {66kb.pdf, copy, WMD}, Peter Pace (USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) {114kb.pdf}, Dov Zakheim (Comptroller, Department of Defense), David S.C. Chu (Under-Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness), Steve Cambone (Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence), transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH transcript {copy, 188kb.html, pf}, FNS transcript {185kb.html, pf, FNS archive}, printed in part-1 of, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005 (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-440, Armed Services Committee, part-1 (military posture, service chiefs, service secretaries, etc.) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-440/PT.1}: February 4, 10, March 2, 4, 11, 23, 25, April 1, May 13 2004, part-2 (seapower): March 3, 10 2004, part-3 (readiness and management support): March 9, 23, April 1, May 13, 2004, part-4 (airland): March 11, 24, 30, 2004, part-5 (emerging threats and capabilities): March 3, 10; April 2, 2004, part-6 (personnel): March 2, 4, 31 2004, part-7 (strategic forces): February 25 March 24, 25, April 7, 2004) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-440/PT.-, LCCN: 2006415145, OCLC: 58677259, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, December 21 2005}.

 

“ Carl Levin: On the WMD issue.

In September of 2002.

The Defense Intelligence Agency.

Produced a classified study.

Called.

Iraq — Key WMD Facilities — An Operational Support Study.

Part of that study has now been declassified.

It included the following statement:

There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has — or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.”

That’s September.

DIA.

Which was classified.

Until recently.

Now, on September 19th of 2002.

The same month of that classified DIA assessment.

You publicly stated.

That Saddam has—

Quote {pf} {83kb.pdf}:

“amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons

And that {March 11 2003} {pf}:

We know he continues to hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different locations, as often as every 12 to 24 hours, and placing them in residential neighborhoods.”

How do you explain the contrast.

Between the DIA-reported intelligence—

That said there was “no reliable information” about production or stockpiling of chemical weapons—

And your public statements—

That you “knew” that Saddam has such weapons.

What explains the discrepancy there?

Donald Rumsfeld: ... I don’t—

Needless to say, I’m sure I never saw that piece of intelligence. And whether or not it was the DIA’s view overall or an analyst’s view. I can’t tell from the way you’ve presented it.

I have relied not on any one single intelligence entity, like the DIA or the CIA. I’ve relied on the intelligence community’s assessments. And the intelligence community’s assessments were what they were. And they were as I stated them.

Carl Levin: Do you see a difference?

Between saying, with certainty, that “we know” something?

And saying, that there is “some evidence” of something?

Donald Rumsfeld: I do.

Carl Levin: That was not the way in which the public statements the administration were made.

It wasn’t that, “There’s evidence.”

Or that, “There is belief.”

Or—

It was the statements of great certainty.

That, “We know that there are mass stockpiles of weapons.”

We know where they are.”

Everything was stated with certainty.

And what is not part of any of those investigations — those six that you’ve mentioned — is a review of the policy-makers’ certainty in their statements.

And what was the basis in intelligence for those statements of certainty.

So that’s one of the issues here.

As to whether or not those statements, made with certainty, by many members of the administration, should be reviewed, in terms of what the intelligence was that did — or did not — back up such certain statements.

I’m not asking you the question.

I just want to let you know, that that is not being looked at, by any of the investigations that you, I think, referred to.

The investigation or inquiry that I am attempting to make, at the Armed Services Committee, with my staff, is attempting to look at that issue, as well as all the other issues.

But here’s my question for you.

It relates to the operation of Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith.

He made an analysis of the links between Al Qaida and Iraq and apparently presented a briefing to you on that analysis of the intelligence.

Apparently, the briefing that he made to you was then made {pf} to the Director of Central Intelligence, the intelligence community staff, the National Security Council, and then to the Office of the Vice President.

Was the Feith operation supposed to look at intelligence through a different prism from the rest of the intelligence community?

Why was it formed other than for that?

And why did it bypass the usual channels with the product of his analysis?

It’s, kind of, a two-part question.

Donald Rumsfeld: There was something that the press has characterized as an intelligence cell in the Office of Policy: Mr. Feith’s office. It had two people in it. At any given time, the people changed. And there may be two more. Or maybe there were four or five at some point.

And all they did was to try to—

As I understand it, and I talked to Mr. Feith about this—

Their task was simply to read the intelligence.

Not to gather intelligence.

To read the intelligence that existed and to assist him in developing policy recommendations in his role as Under-Secretary for policy.

At one moment, you’re quite right: He— Two people who’d been looking at this, thought they had an interesting approach to it. He asked me to be briefed. I sat there and listened to them. I said, “Gee, that’s interesting. Why don’t you brief the people at CIA?”

They did.

Carl Levin: And the vice president.

Donald Rumsfeld: I didn’t say that.

I said exactly what I said.

I asked them to brief the people at the CIA.

And they did that.

I do not know if they briefed anyone else besides that.

But they did do what I asked.

And the implication that this two-person — or four or five over time — was gathering intelligence, or doing something unusual is just not correct.

As I understand it.

Carl Levin: But my question, though, was:

Was it intended, that they look at intelligence through a different prism?

Donald Rumsfeld: No, as I understand it, just what I said.

Their task was to take the intelligence that existed and look at it and see what they could figure out about it.

Just as I do, when I read it, and you do, when you read it.

And in this case, Doug Feith asked a couple of people — there’s mountains of this stuff.

And it is a big task to integrate it in your mind.

And so he had this small group doing that.

And they looked at terrorist networks.

Which seems to me to be a perfectly logical thing to do, after September 11.

Carl Levin: Thank you.

My time is up.

* * *

Senator Edward Moore Kennedy Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski.

Recently retired Air Force intelligence officer.

Served in the Pentagon.

During the buildup to the war.

Said {copy}:

“It wasn’t intelligence.

It was propaganda.

They take a little bit of intelligence, cherry-pick it, make it sound much more exciting, usually by taking it out of context, usually by juxtaposition of two pieces of information that don’t belong together.”

We’ve seen in the examples that were mentioned this morning—

For example, just on the issues of stockpiling on chemical weapons, as mentioned by Senator Levin.

2002.

DIA said.

“No reliable information.”

On whether producing and stockpile.

You said.

In 2002.

Before this committee:

“We do know that.”

“We do know that.”

I understand the intelligence community never says, “We know.”

But.

You said.

In September,

“We do know that.” ...

Donald Rumsfeld: I am told by Dr. Cambone, sitting behind me {Stephen A. Cambone, Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence}, that the document you read from, and possibly the same document that Senator Levin read from also, has a paragraph in it that says the following.

And I quote:

“Although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possesses CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets, artillery shells, aerial bombs, ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent and stabilized VX.”

That’s in the same document, I am told.

Last—

Edward Kennedy: Well.

The—

You said:—

“Probable”

And:—

“Possible.”

“Probable”

and

“Possible.”

Rather than:—

“We know.”

It’s a big difference.

Donald Rumsfeld: I’m coming to “We know.”

I could be wrong—

I’m asked a lot of questions. I use a lot of words. And I’m sure from time to time I say something that, in retrospect, I wish I hadn’t.

However, I remember—

I think I remember the moment I said, “We know” something.

And it was this:

The forces had gone in out of Kuwait into Iraq, and they were moving up, and they had gotten in a day or two, possibly, and they were a long way from Baghdad. And as everyone on this committee will remember, the “suspect sites” for — which is what they generally call them — for WMD, that the intelligence community produced, the suspect sites tended to be north. And they tended to be in the Baghdad and north area.

Our troops were a long way from even Baghdad.

And I was asked,

“Where’s the weapons of mass destruction?”

And I may have said—

I think I said {copy, copy} {0:20 bb}{March 30 2003} :

“We know where they are.

They’re up north.

They’re not down here.”

And I was referring to the suspect sites.

And you’re quite right.

Shorthand.

“We know where they are.”

Probably turned out, not to be exactly what one would have preferred, in retrospect. ...

Edward Kennedy: I’d just say, that—

In your September 19th 2002

Testimony {83kb.pdf}

To the committee,

You said five times,

That—

“Iraq has”

Or—

“We know”

They have—

“Weapons”

Of mass destruction.

Thank you, Chairman.

Donald Rumsfeld: I’m not going to go back and quote the comments from the previous administration and President Clinton and Vice President Gore—

John Warner: Mr. Secretary—

Donald Rumsfeld: —Secretary Cohen and all of that the way you have. I can just say that the stream of intelligence over a period of a long time in both administrations led the same people in similar jobs to the same conclusions.”

 

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a):

“ (a)  Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully —

(1)  falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;

(2)  makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or

(3)  makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”

 

18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(3)(B):

“ (3)  the term “misleading conduct” means — ...

(B)  intentionally omitting information from a statement and thereby causing a portion of such statement to be misleading, or intentionally concealing a material fact, and thereby creating a false impression by such statement ...”

 

18 U.S.C. § 371:

“ If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

David Kay, speech, question/answers, panel discussion, “Examination of Global Proliferation Strategy” (CEIP: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 5 2004, 12:15-2:00 p.m.), C-Span video {1:26:54, February 5, 538426120, 180446-1}, Carnegie audio {20mb.mp3}.

George J. Tenet (U.S. Director of Central Intelligence), speech, CIA Director Defends Iraq Intelligence {pf} (Georgetown University, February 5 2004). Prepared speech, prior to delivery (CIA, Feb. 5 2004).

David Kay, interviewed by Alan Murray, Gloria Borger (CNBC, Capital Report, Washington D.C., February 5 2004, 9:00-10:00 p.m. ET), MSNBC video, “Kay: Independent commission needed” (player-video link expired) {7:27, 5.66mb.wmv, source}.

Scott Ritter (UNSCOM inspector in Iraq, 1991-1998), “Not Everyone Got it Wrong on Iraq’s Weapons” (Houston Chronicle, February 6 2003; The International Herald Tribune, Paris, February 6 2003 {copy}) “The Kay remarks appear to be an attempt to spin potentially damaging data to the political advantage of President George W. Bush.”

George W. Bush (U.S. President), interviewed Saturday by Tim Russert (White House, Oval Office, February 7 2004), broadcast Sunday (NBC News, Meet the Press, February 8 2004, 9:00 a.m. ET), video {part-1 69mb.mov, source, source, part-2 35mb.mov}, audio (excerpt) {0:31}, NBC transcript {pf, copy, menu}, FDCH transcript {pf}, Reuters transcript {pf}, reported, Dana Milbank, “Bush Was Surprised at Lack of Iraqi Arms{pf} (The Washington Post, February 9 2004). This interview is omitted from the White House website, and omitted from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. It’s mentioned, in the “Digest of other White House announcements” {5kb.txt, 11kb.pdf}: “February 7: During the day, in the Oval Office, the President participated in an interview with Tim Russert of NBC television’s “Meet the Press” for broadcast on February 8.” Otherwise, in the archives of the U.S. Government, this interview never happened, and does not exist. There must be some good reason for this omission.

Hans Blix, (Stockholm) intervewed by David Frost (London) (BBC TV-1, Breakfast with Frost, Sunday, February 8 2004, 9-10am) {BBCcat b:andw011j}, video {9:26, search, search, search, a/v, a/v}, BBC transcript {pf}, reportedBlix doubts on Iraq intelligence{pf} (BBC News, February 8 2004) (“Former UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix has said Britain and the US dramatised intelligence information to bolster the argument for the Iraq war”), “Blix: Blair Dramatized Some Iraq Evidence{pf} (AP: Associated Press, USA Today, February 8 2004), “Blix: Iraq Evidence 'Dramatized'{pf} (AP: Associated Press, CNN, February 8 2004), Sarah Hall, Richard Norton Taylor, “Blix Says War Leaders Acted Like Salesmen{pf} (Guardian, February 9 2004), “Blix: Iraq Evidence 'Dramatized' {pf} (AP/CBS News, February 8 2004), Gretchen Carlson, “Hans Blix's 'Told You So' (CBS News, The Early Show, February 8 2004), video {1:37}.

 

“ Hans Blix {0:04, 1:00}:

Simply a statement.

That Intelligence has found something out.

That is not evidence for us.”

Hans Blix, interviewed by George Jones, “Blix Charges Blair and Bush with 'Dramatising' the Threat of WMD{pf} (Daily Telegraph, February 9 2004).

David Kay, speech and question/answers, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: What’s There, What’s Not, and What Does it All Mean?” (USIP: United States Institute of Peace, February 10 2004, 10:00-noon), video {speech 71mb.mov, Q/A-1 38mb.mov, Q/A-2 36mb.mov}, audio {speech 9.3mb.mp3, Q/A-1 4.9mb.mp3, Q/A-2 4.7mb.mp3}, transcript {574kb.pdf}.

 

“ David Kay: Work the chain back:

You look for the production processes, where they would have been produced.

You look for the people that would have been involved in that production.

You look for the records — both records internal, as well as records external of imports into the country — that would have supported such a process.

And pretty soon you’ve done that about as thoroughly as you can. And you reach the conclusion: They really didn’t exist. ...

The fact of the matter is, almost everyone believed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, whether you were in the U.S., whether you were in France, the U.K., Germany; and yes, even the Russian Intelligence Service. ...

The fact of the matter is, you’ve even got statements by Jacques Chirac in which he said,

“Yes, obviously, Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.””

____________________

 

Query:The fact of the matter”?

The fact of the matter is:

Jacques Chirac never said any such thing.

Nor did the Germans.

Nor the Russians.

They said the exact opposite:

That Iraq did not obviously have WMD.

Yes, some may have believed it.

But, they had no evidence of it.

Not everybody ignored the abundant evidence of destruction and the abundant evidence of absence.

Not everybody suspended rational thought, and critical thinking, in the service of dishonorable political schemes.

If the U.S. officials won’t tell the truth about something as well documented as what French, German, and Russian officials said, it’s little wonder they decided to lie, or blind themselves, about their secret “intelligence”— the stronghold of all government liars.

  CJHjr

David Kay, interviewed by Associated Press, reported, Barry Schweid (Associated Press), “Ex-inspector: Abandon hope to find Iraq weapons stores{pf} (USA Today, Friday, February 13 2004): “A 90-minute session Thursday with AP editors and reporters.”

Ahmad Chalabi, interviewed in Baghdad, Jack Fairweather (Baghdad), Anton La Guardia, “Chalabi Stands By Faulty Intelligence That Toppled Saddam's Regime{pf} (Daily Telegraph, February 19 2004).

 

“ Ahmad Chalabi: We are heroes in error.

As far as we’re concerned we’ve been entirely successful.

That tyrant Saddam is gone.

And the Americans are in Baghdad.

What was said before is not important.

The Bush administration is looking for a scapegoat.

We’re ready to fall on our swords.

If he wants.”

____________________

 

Query:That tyrant Saddam is gone”?

And the 200,000 innocent souls?

Lying molding in their graves?

Hundreds of thousands—

Maimed, bereaved, orphaned, widowed?

Fled for their lives, into exile?

Worldly belongings, government services, jobs, trashed?

Rushed into war on a WMD lie?

Without a regime-change war-plan?

Backed by the neighbors?

The biggest mass murders of the 21st century—

U.S. officials.

They agree entirely with Ahmad Chalabi.

This is nothing to do with them.

All the death and destruction they decreed.

They didn’t pay for it.

They didn’t suffer any consequences.

A matter of supreme indifference.

It doesn’t touch them.

This is role of the noose and the gallows.

To touch them.

And deter their successors.

  CJHjr

Hans Blix (Chairman, WMD Commission; Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC, March 1 2000-2003 June 30; IAEA Director General, 1981-1997), “Means of Reducing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Edinburgh University, Montague Burton Lecture 2004, McEwan Hall, February 24 2004), video {bb} {1:07:56 bb}: “Speaking to a packed audience of over 1200 students and members of the public in the McEwan Hall, Dr. Hans Blix — former chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq — described his work as the policy of the UN towards Iraq shifted from containment to direct action.”

 

“ Hans Blix {1:18 bb}: Another feature that should have raised some doubts, in the minds of analysts, was that UNSCOM and the IAEA had not identified and destroyed any prohibited weapons, after the early years, up to around 1994.

I think that this has escaped public attention, quite a lot.

But it emerges clearly from our documentation.

That the destruction took place, by the Iraqis, or such weapons as were kept at declared sites, were destroyed by UNSCOM.

Before 1994.

After that, no weapons were found.

Infrastructure. Yes. Growth media. Yes. Chemical precursors. Yes.

But weapons.

No.

Until, we ordered destruction of Al-Samoud-2 missiles, which was in February of the past year.

We destroyed about— or supervised the destruction of about 70 big missiles.

Indeed, I think I can say, that neither UNSCOM nor UNMOVIC, ever found arms that were hidden.

We found some warheads.

But they were not hidden.

They were at a site that was declared.

UNSCOM destroyed large quantities of chemical weapons, which were not among those Iraq had destroyed in ’91.

But they were, again, at sites which had been declared.

And they could thus not be characterized as “hidden.””

video (bb) {1:07:56 bb, at 21:45-23:03 bb}

Hans Blix, “Lessons of Iraq?” {62kb.pdf, source} (Cambridge University, Cambridge Union Society, Cambridge England, February 25 2004, 7:30 p.m.), 8 photos, 1 photo.

Demetrius Perricos (Acting Executive Chairman), UNMOVIC, Sixteenth Quarterly Report (U.N. Doc. S/2004/160, February 27 2004) {155kb.pdf, copy, also via this, or ODS}.

 

“ 8.  Iraq purchased or produced more than 100,000 empty 122-mm rocket warheads suitable for use with chemical weapons agents. ... The Special Commission supervised the destruction of thousands of those warheads that had been filled with the nerve agent Sarin. Iraq declared that it had unilaterally destroyed thousands more.

9.  Eighteen 122-mm rocket warheads designed for use with chemical agents were either declared by Iraq in January 2003 or were discovered by UNMOVIC inspectors. ... All of the warheads were examined and no indication of prohibited chemicals was found. ...

13.  In February 2003, Iraq invited UNMOVIC to witness the excavation of the remains of R-400 series bombs that had been unilaterally destroyed. ... As noted in earlier reports to the Security Council, subsequent laboratory analysis of liquid samples collected by UNMOVIC from two of the intact bombs revealed evidence of fragments of the DNA of Bacillus anthracis and of the chemical compounds Iraq used to neutralize the biological agent.”

Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Australia Parliament, Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, March 1 2004) {786kb.pdf}.

David Kay, interviewed by Julian Borger, “The Inspector’s Final Report{pf} (The Guardian, March 3 2004). “I had millions of dollars of reward money that I could have paid for information on weapons. And believe me, if someone had come in and said this is where they’re hidden, we would have taken care of them for the rest of their life. The fact that no one came forward for it was a worrying concern.”

David Kay, interviewed by Miles Pomper, Paul Kerr, “Searching for the Truth About Iraq’s WMD: An interview with David Kay{pf} (Arms Control Association, Washington D.C., March 5 2004).

Hans Blix, intervewed by Anne Penketh (Stockholm), Andrew Grice, Blix: Iraq War Was Illegal (Independent, March 5 2004) {copy}.

 

“ Hans Blix: I don’t buy the argument the war was legalized by the Iraqi violation of earlier resolutions. ...

It’s the Security Council, that is party to the ceasefire, not the UK and US individually.

And therefore it is the council, that has ownership of the ceasefire, in my interpretation.”

Hans Blix, intervewed by Richard Norton-Taylor, David Leigh, “Blair lacked critical thinking, says Blix{pf} (The Guardian, March 6 2004).

Hans Blix, intervewed by David Frost (BBC TV-1, Breakfast with Frost, Sunday, March 7 2004, 9-10am) {BBCcat b:andw011j}, BBC transcript {pf, search, search, search, a/v, a/v, search}.

David Kay, interviewed by Joe Scarborough, “David Kay: Admission of error needed on Iraq: WMD as a basis for war, "simply turned out to be wrong" {pf} (MSNBC, Scarborough Country, Washington D.C., March 8 2004, 10:00 p.m. ET), MSNBC transcript {pf}, MSNBC video, “Should Pres. Bush apologize for Iraq?” (player-video link expired) {3:41, 2.79mb.wmv}.

Lois Ember, “UN Inspectors Found No Iraqi Weapons After 1994{pf} (Chemical & Engineering News, March 8 2004, Volume 82, Number 10, page 10): “Iraq or UN inspectors had destroyed most if not all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction by the end of 1991 ... Tucked away in the UN report is a chart showing that UN inspectors found or destroyed no chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons after 1994.”

George J. Tenet (U.S. Director of Central Intelligence), Lowell E. Jacoby (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), testimony, Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-863, March 9 2004, Senate Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-863, OCLC: 62239981, LCCN: 2006360652, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. John W. Warner (Chairman), Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member) {13kb.html, copy}. Witnesses: George J. Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence) {82kb.html, 80kb.pdf, copy}, Lowell E. Jacoby (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) {139kb.pdf, copy}. C-Span video {3:02:00}. Transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH transcript, FNS transcript {copies: 215kb.html, 151kb.pdf}. Articles: Washington Post {pf}, New York Times, Los Angeles Times.

 

“ Lowell E. Jacoby: “Support for America has dropped in most of the Muslim world. Favorable ratings in Morocco declined from 77 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in spring of last year and in Jordan from 25 percent in 2002 to only 1 percent in May 2003. The percentage of Saudi’s expressing confidence in the United States dropped from 63% in May of 2000 to 11% in October 2003.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Washington’s perceived pro-Israeli bias, was cited in some polls as a leading reason for anti-US sentiment. These conditions and increasing anti-US sentiment provide sustenance for radical political Islam at the expense of moderate elements.”

____________________

 

Query: The “Israeli-Palestinian conflict”?

What a relief.

No mention of the U.S. war on Iraq.

Obviously, Mr. Jacoby’s written statement, submitted under oath, means we can’t trust nonpartisan, non-governmental, organizations to tell us the truth {pf} (poll):

“In 2002, the American image began to slip around the world, and it plummeted in 2003 in response to the war in Iraq. ...”

“... opposition to the war remains nearly universal ... view the U.S. as less trustworthy as a consequence of the war. ...”

Large majorities in almost every country surveyed think that American and British leaders lied when they claimed, prior to the Iraq war, that Saddam Hussein’s regime had weapons of mass destruction.”

  CJHjr

Karen Kwiatkowski (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, retired), “The new Pentagon papers: A high-ranking military officer reveals how Defense Department extremists suppressed information and twisted the truth to drive the country to war” (Salon.com, March 10 2004).

Hans Blix, interviewed by Matt Lauer (NBC News, The Today Show, March 15 2004), MSNBC video, “Blix looks back” (player-video link expired) {7:30, 5.69mb.wmv, source}, copy {7:28, 19.0mb.rm}, “Iraq and the search for WMD {pf}: New book by Hans Blix details what happened during the months leading up to the declaration of war against Iraq in March 2003” (excerpts from Disarming Iraq, by Hans Blix).

C-Span Book-TV

March 20-21 2004

March 27-28 2004

C-Span 3

March 1 2007

March 5 2007

Hans Blix, interviewed by Richard Grayson (Bureau Chief, Senior Correspondent, British Television News), “Disarming Iraq: Hans Blix’s Story,” A Vernon Center Conversation and Spring Break Special Event (NYU: New York University, School of Continuing and Professional Studies, Lillian Vernon Center for International Affairs, NYU Skirball Center for Performing Arts, corner of Washington Square South and LaGuardia Place, Greenwich Village, New York City, March 15 2004, 6:00 p.m.) (“the largest private, not-for-profit university in the United States”), photo, photo, NYU video {1:32:55, source} (dead link), video broadcast, “Disarming Iraq, Hans Blix” (C-Span, Book TV, Sunday/Monday March 21/22, Sunday March 28 2004), rebroadcast, (Thursday March 1, Monday March 5, 2007), C-Span video (request) {1:32:55, schedule, 540209263, 181033-1, rss, archive, search, library}, reported, Warren Hoge, “Ex-U.N. Inspector Has Harsh Words for Bush{pf, 20kb.pdf} (The New York Times, Tuesday March 16 2004) (“a crowd of 1,200 people”), Ed Gold, “At N.Y.U., Blix Blasts Bush and Company on Iraq War” (The Villager, volume 73 number 46, March 17-23 2004), Sasha Damouni, Nadia Damouni, “Assessing the Reason Behind the Iraq War” (New York News Network, March 19 2004), Caroline Sellke (U-Wire), “Hans Blix to NYU crowd: 'There were no WMD in Iraq' {pf, copy} (Washington Square News, Monday March 22 2004), Shakera Khandahar, “Hans Blix Discusses Iraq, Inspections, and Motives for War in Skirball Conversation” (NYU Today, “NYU Snapshots,” volume 17 number 11, Friday March 26 2004, page 8) {1.9mb.pdf}.

Hans Blix, David Kay, intervewed by Chris Matthews (MSNBC, Hardball, Washington D.C., March 15 2004, 5:00/7:00 p.m. ET), NBC transcript {pf}.

Hans Blix, intervewed by Bill O'Reilly (FNC: Fox News Channel, The O'Reilly Factor, “Unresolved Problem” segment, New York City, March 15 2004, 8:00/11:00 p.m. ET), transcript.

Hans Blix, interviewed by Bob Edwards, “Blix: Lack of 'Critical Judgment' Led to Iraq War: Former Top U.N. Weapons Inspector Blames U.S., U.K. Leaders” (NPR: National Public Radio, Morning Edition, Washington D.C., March 16 2004), broadcast audio {8:25}, extended {24:20}.

Hans Blix, interviewed March 16 2004, by Richard Roth, “Current Events at the United Nations” (CNN, Diplomatic License, aired March 19 2004).

Hans Blix, interviewed March 16 2004 in New York City by Warren Hoge (The New York Times, U.N. correspondent), Ian Williams (The Nation), Mary Alice Williams (moderator), “Disarming Iraq” (U.N. World Chronicle, DPI: Department of Public Information, News & Media Division, Programme No. 933), video {27:33, source}, transcript {67kb.pdf}.

Hans Blix, speech (Lehigh Uiversity, Zoellner Arts Center, Baker Hall, 420 East Packer Avenue, Bethlehem Pennsylvania, March 16 2004, 7:30-9:00 p.m.), reported, Linda Harbrecht, “Blix details hunt for WMDs in Iraq” (Lehigh Uiversity, UR News, March 17 2004), Hans Blix interviewed by Linda Harbrecht, “Ten Minutes with Hans Blix” (Lehigh Alumni Bulletin, Spring 2004).

Hans Blix, interviewed by Terry Gross, “Former U.N. Weapons Inspector Hans Blix” (Radio WHYY, Fresh Air, Philadelphia, March 17 2004, 3:00 p.m. ET), audio {33:06}, broadcast by more than 400 U.S. radio stations (205 listed here) of the 800 {110kb.pdf, source} affiliated to NPR: National Public Radio, and by NPR itself, by satellite radio in North America (Sirius channels NPR Now 134, NPR Talk 135), by NPR Worldwide (schedule), via satellites (audio channel on TV tuners and feeds to cable radio and some broadcast radio) and satellite radio (NPR, WorldSpace channel 301) (Afristar-1 east beam, parts of western Africa and Europe, footprint), by AFN Radio: American Forces Network (base cable radio schedule).

Hans Blix (Berkeley), interviewed by Jim Lehrer (Washington D.C.), “Newsmaker: Hans Blix” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, March 17 2004, 7:00 p.m.), video bb {15:29 bb}, audio {15:21}.

Hans Blix, interviewed by Christiane Amanpour, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Truth and its Consequences: A conversation between journalist Christiane Amanpour and former chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix” (UCB: University of California, Berkeley, Zellerbach Auditorium, Berkeley, Alameda County California, Wednesday March 17 2004, 7:30 p.m. PT) (sponsors: Graduate School of Journalism, Human Rights Center, Office of the Chancellor, Western Knight Center for Specialized Journalism Training, Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco Chronicle, World Affairs Council), UCB video {1:31:47, 110.32mb.rm, source, archive}, audio {1:31:48, 21.5mb.mp3}, part ofThe Media At War Conference: Understanding the U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Iraq” (UC Berkeley, March 16-18 2004), audio copy, transcripts, “Mass Destruction: Truth & Its Consequences” (CCC: Commonwealth Club of California), audio {1:30:18, 24.5mb.rm, source}, transcripts: speech, Q&A, broadcast, Larry Bensky, Sunday Salon (Radio KPFA Berkeley, KPCF Fresno, Sunday, March 21 2004, 10:00-11:00 a.m.), audio (edited) {1:59:58, at 1:07:24, 20.59mb.mp3} (and other broadcasts, e.g., Radio KQED, April 3 2004, 2:00 a.m.), “From the Commonwealth Club: Hans Blix” (transcript) {copy} (ABC Radio National, Big Ideas, April 25 2004), UCTV video {58:34, source} (omits about 30 minutes of interior content, but I don’t know what) (UCTV, May 15 2004).

Hans Blix, lecture and discussion, “Disarming Iraq” (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Millennium Knickerbocker Hotel, Chicago Illinois, March 18 2004, 6:30 p.m.) (no posted video/audio/transcript), reported, Andrew Stern, “Blix Says Iraq War May Have Worsened Terror Threat” (Reuters, March 19 2004).

Hans Blix, interviewed by Jerome McDonnell (Radio WBEZ, Worldview, CPR: Chicago Public Radio, March 19 2004), audio {29:24, source}, extended (broadcast April 1) {52:59, source}.

Hans Blix, interviewed by Steve Cochran (Radio WGN, The Steve Cochran Show, Chicago, March 19 2004, 2:40 p.m. CT), audio {13:16, source}.

Jay Garner (Director, Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Iraq: April 21 – May 11 2003, CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority), interviewed by Greg Palast (BBC 2 TV, Newsnight, March 19 2004, 10:30 p.m.) {BBCcat f:andx051d}, video bb {5:25 bb, source}, copy {5:55}, BBC transcript {pf}.

Hans Blix (New York), Mohamed ElBaradei (Vienna), interviewed by Wolf Blitzer (CNN, Late Edition, Sunday March 21 2004, 12:00 p.m.), CNN transcript {copy, archive}.

David Kay, speech, questions/answers, “Iraq, WMD: Lessons Learned and Unlearned” (Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Institute of Politics, March 22 2004), video {1:09:33}, transcript {230kb.pdf}, reported, Sarah Abrams, “Former Weapons Inspector David Kay: ‘We Got It Very, Very Wrong’” (Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, KSG News, March 22 2004). Ryan M. Donovan, “Kay Addresses U.S. Intelligence Failures” (The Harvard Crimson, March 23 2004). Alvin Powell, “Kay: Intelligence failure, not deception, led to Iraq war. Former weapons inspector says Iraq is better off now” (Harvard University Gazette, March 23 2004). Last question of the evening:

 

“ Nick Smith: I’m Nick Smith, a Junior at the College ...

Why haven’t you been tougher on the Bush people? ...

For exaggerating the threat.

To the extent that they’ve sent people to die.

For a threat.

That really wasn’t there.

David Kay: Well, let me say—

I have read the intelligence from the U.S.

I have read the intelligence from the British.

From France.

From Germany.

From Russia.

The intelligence reports that were written throughout the ’90s, up until the war, from all of these sources, pointed to weapons of mass destruction being created in Iraq.

The evidence was there.

The evidence turns out to be wrong.

I think—

It’s—

You know, there is a thin line, in politics.

Between what’s acceptable and what’s not acceptable.

I’m waiting for the headline in The Washington Post which says, “Secretary of Agriculture picks worst arguments to support policy”.

Voice from the audience: I did that frequently.

David Kay: {Laughs} Yeah.

But you never intended to.

Ahmm—

You know—

There is a thin line between—

What some refer to “cherry-picking.”

And others refer to “picking intelligence.”

To absolutely distorting, and lying.

About what the intelligence said.

I do not believe—

Although, I think it’s a perfect subject for the inquiry, the Independent Commission, to see in fact if the politicians distorted, lied, about the—

What the intelligence—

It clearly is across that line, if you say,

“The intelligence says this.”

And it doesn’t say that. ...

I think the real problem, that threatens us, is failed intelligence, not lying about it.”

____________________

 

Query:Evidence”?

What evidence?

100% of the tips, leads, queries, stories, theories, opinions, suppositions, imaginings—

Which U.S./U.K. Intelligence gave to Hans Blix, to investigate.

100% of them, his inspectors, on the ground in Iraq, investigated.

100% of them, produced no evidence.

Of any banned items or activities.

What Hans Blix’s investigators did.

And what they found.

And what they did not find.

That, is “evidence.”

Tips, leads, queries, stories, theories, opinions, suppositions, imaginings—

These are not “evidence.”

Intelligence reports” are not “evidence.”

They’re opinion.

Which may — or may not — be based, in part, on evidence.

In this case, they were obviously based mainly on inferences:

That Iraq possibly had WMD, or probably had WMD, because they once did, and had used it, and because the abundant evidence of destruction did not add up to 100% certainty.

Though the evidence of destruction was rapidly getting very close to 100%. With excavations at “a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous, for excavation, in the past” (Blix). And, with a plan to interview several hundred people, who participated in the destruction of the biological weapons program, in the summer of 1991, weapons, documents, and materials.

U.S. and U.K. officials were obviously alarmed.

That Hans Blix would soon, publicly, destroy their pretext for war.

And so they abruptly terminated inspections.

And attacked Iraq.

Defying their solemn agreement (S/Res/1441), to not attack unilaterally, without Security Council approval.

Inferences are not “evidence.”

Possibly,” and “probably,” and “pointed to”:—

These inferences are also not certainty.

And it’s certainty, which U.S. and U.K. officials asserted.

To my mind, beyond all doubt, that’s—

Absolutely distorting and lying.”

Beyond all doubt, a prima facie crime.

Beyond all doubt, a prima facie criminal conspiracy.

 

Query:Thin line”?

Lines may be thick and they may be thin.

But this, is a bright line.

Established, to safeguard the integrity of government:

That s/he who decides to lie, in governmental matters, has earned 5 years in prison.

And so too, each helper, a principal.

And s/he who decides to conspire with others, to so lie, has earned 5 years in prison.

And s/he who decides to do both has earned 10 years in prison.

And s/he who decides to lie, as an overt act, in a violent criminal conspiracy, to wage a criminal war of aggression, or a war in violation of a treaty (S/Res/1441), has earned a noose, on the gallows.

The crime against peace.

History is written in criminal prosecutions.

Of pernicious government officials.

Who decide to cross that bright line.

CJHjr

 

Query: Is this an honest answer?

To Nick Smith’s question?

Or is David Kay blinded by his own complicity.

In exaggerating the threat.

Or mindful of it.

And.

Is that why they appointed him?

Head of the CIA Iraq Survey Group?

A voice of authority?

Compromised?

Complicit with them?

A voice they could trust?

Precisely, to not be “tough on the Bush people”?

A voice to fabricate history?

To pretense a cloud of dust and mist?

Uncertainty and ambiguity?

Destroyed documents?

Hundreds of cases” of programs, lies, and violations?

To mask their mutual deceit?

To justify the war?

As best they can?

A war, David Kay helped them incite.

  CJHjr

Hans Blix, interviewed by Bill Thompson, “Hans Blix: Disarming Iraq” (Eye on Books, Washington D.C., March 22 2004), audio {7:02}, interview photo.

 

“ Bill Thompson: There are persistent reports, that Saddam moved his weapons of mass destruction.

He sent them by convoy into Syria.

Or, he put them on some rogue ship, and set them out to sea.

Was there anything to indicate, that either of those senarios could have been true?

Hans Blix: No.

I would like to see any shred of evidence of all that.

I mean, you can’t exclude it, per se.

It could happen.

However, we have not seen any evidence.

This is all—

These are all speculations.

I doubt very much, that the Syrians would have been keen, to have any of the stuff.

Bill Thompson: Nor any of their other neighbors, I would’t think. I would’t think Iran would be real anxious to have this.

Hans Blix: No.

Bill Thompson: But your task really almost became, in President Bush’s eyes, to prove a negative.

To prove— It’s— You—

At one point, was it Dick Cheney?

Or was it — I’m losing my train of thought here — who said, that,

“The absence of evidence...”

Hans Blix: That was Rumsfeld.

Bill Thompson: Yeah. There you go. I knew you would know the quote.

Hans Blix: Yah, Rumsfeld said, that,

“The absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence.”

And—

I didn’t often agree with him.

But on that occasion I did.

Yes. It’s true.

That, if you don’t see something, you cannot exclude, that there is something, after all.

But I felt, that he probably, however, had an inclination to say,

“If there’s no evidence, it must exist.”

And, I would not go along with that.

They were a little like the mentality of witch-hunters, of past ages.

That they were so absolutely convinced, that this stuff was there, that they just looked for evidence confirming it.

But they were not really interested in something that would not confirm it.

* * *

Bill Thompson: Did we go to war for no reason?

Hans Blix: Essentially, yes.

At any rate, we did not go to war for the reasons that were advanced.

And the major reason advanced was weapons of mass destruction.

That there are weapons.

I mean, Colin Powell would say, that,

“These are real weapons.

It’s real anthrax.

It’s real VX.”

Etcetera.

Now that was, was wrong.

And I think their—

We must judge them, not against, exclusively against, what we know today.

But what did they know, in March, when they went to war.

That’s the fairer comparison.

And as I said, that—

I think that the evidence had been shaken already by then.

Now, there were other reasons, that they advanced.

Such as, saying that,

They would like to create a democracy, in Iraq.

And that would set an example.

Fine.

That was a little theorethical,

That they were able to do it,

And it’s not so easy.

They were also talking about,

Taking-out Saddam.

Who was a terror.

Which was true.

He certainly was.

But the objection I have to this is, that if the U.S. and U.K. had gone to Congress, and to Parliament, and said, that,

“We want to go to war.

To set up democracy.

And to end the terror.

And we are uncertain about the weapons.”

They would not have gotten authorization.

It was only weapons of mass destruction that they really could sell it on.

And they chose on that one.

And they were not sufficiently, had not sufficiently evidence to do it, really.”

Hans Blix, interviewed by Diane Rehm, “Hans Blix” (Radio WAMU, The Diane Rehm Show, Washington D.C., March 23 2004, 10am-noon at 10-11:00 a.m. ET) (“Hans Blix, who headed the United Nation’s weapons inspection team in Iraq, takes us behind the scenes during the months leading to the US-led invasion, and shares his views on the events of the past year since the war began”), audio {52:30}, broadcast by 110 U.S. radio stations (61 also listed here) of the 800 {110kb.pdf, source} affiliated to NPR: National Public Radio, and by NPR itself, by satellite radio in North America (Sirius channels NPR Now 134, NPR Talk 135), by NPR Worldwide (schedule), via satellites (audio channel on TV tuners and feeds to cable radio and some broadcast radio) and satellite radio (NPR, WorldSpace channel 301) (Afristar-1 east beam, parts of western Africa and Europe, footprint), by AFN Radio: American Forces Network (base cable radio schedule).

Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq (Swedish-American Chamber of Commerce of Washington D.C., Mayflower Hotel, Washington D.C., March 23 2004, 12:30-2:00 p.m.) {source}.

David Kay, “Why and How We Were Almost All Wrong{invitation, 48kb.pdf} (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington Virginia, March 26 2004, 12:30-2:00 p.m.), C-Span video {53:48, 50.4mb.rm}.

Hans Blix, intervewed by Deborah Solomon, “Questions for Hans Blix: What Weapons?{pf} (The New York Times Magazine, Sunday March 28 2004) {copy}.

Charles Duelfer (Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group, from Jan. 23 2004), prepared statement (not “testimony”), “Testimony to the US Congress by Mr. Charles Duelfer (Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs)” (CIA: Central Intelligence Agency, March 30 2004) {copy, copy}.

 

“ Senator Carl Levin: I am deeply troubled by the contents of the declassified testimony of Mr. Charles Duelfer, the Director of Central Intelligence’s Special Advisor for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, that has been released by the CIA this afternoon.

The public statement, in a number of instances, contains material that, when compared to the contents of the underlying classified status report from Mr. Duelfer that was submitted to the Armed Services Committee for the hearing this morning, includes material that suggests that Iraq had an active weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program while leaving out information that would lead one to doubt that it did.

I am therefore calling for the CIA to declassify, to the extent possible, the whole report so the public can reach their own conclusions.

Mr. Duelfer’s public statement is written to express the author’s “suspicions” as to Iraq’s activities relating to possible weapons of mass destruction programs or activities while leaving out information in the classified report which points away from his suspicions.

Mr. Duelfer’s statement raises the same issues of selective use of information in public statements of the CIA that have been such a problem for the credibility of the Intelligence Community’s pre-war estimates related to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.”

Carl Levin (U.S. Senator, Michigan), “Statement of Senator Carl Levin Relating to Public Release of Testimony of Mr. Charles Duelfer DCI’s Special Advisor for WMD in Iraq” (March 30 2004) {copy}

Hans Blix (Stockholm), interviewed April 2 2004 by Brian Lehrer, “Not Found” (Radio WNYC, The Brian Lehrer Show, April 2 2004, 10:00 a.m. ET), audio {10:11}.

Hans Blix (Stockholm), intervewed April 2 2004, by Mimi Geerges, Disarming Iraq (The Mimi Geerges Show, Focal Point Radio, Fairfax Virginia, April 4 2004, 8:00 a.m.), audio {14:02, source, source, rss}.

Hans Blix, intervewed by Jesper Stein Larsen, Blix: Krigen et Større Onde End Saddam” (Jyllands-Postens, Copenhagen, April 5 2004), reported, Blix: Iraq Worse Off Now Than With Saddam{pf} (AP: Associated Press, Boston Globe, April 6 2004); “Blix Claims The War Is Worse Than Saddam” (AFP: Agence France-Presse, TV 2 Nettavisen, Oslo, April 6 2004); War worse for Iraq than Saddam: Blix” (CBC News, April 6 2004).

 

“ Hans Blix: It’s good that Saddam and his terror regime is gone.

But when you have to settle the accounts, the negative things are heavier.

Due to the many people who have been killed in the war.

And the many who will die.

Due to the terrorism, the war fueled ...

President Bush claims, this war is a part of the American fight against terror.

But, instead of restricting the phenomena, the war has created more terrorism.

The conflict has created more instability.

AFP: He also stressed, that Iraq was more stable under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, than it is today.

And, he said, he thinks many Iraqis would have preferred his regime, instead of the terrorism, which haunts the country today.”

Hans Blix (studio), interviewed by Jeroen Pauw (presenter), “Oud-Wapeninspecteur Hans Blix Over Zijn Boek” (en: Former weapons inspector Hans Blix about his book) (NPO: Netherlands Public Broadcasting, NPS, Nova, Nova/Den Haag vandaag, Nederland 2 TV, Tuesday April 6 2004, 10:00pm CET), Nova video (nb, bb) {41:27, 29.19mb.rm, 149.89mb.rm, 9:11 at 16:24-25:37, nb: 6.5mb.rm, bb: 33mb.rm, search, search, archive}. “Hij speurde namens de VN naar Iraakse massavernietigings-wapens, maar vond niets. Door Amerika werd hij vervolgens opzij geschoven. Hans Blix, diplomaat in rust, schreef er een boek over: 'Missie Irak'. Een mislukte missie, want hij kon de oorlog niet voorkomen. Een gesprek met Blix.” (en: On behalf of the U.N., he searched for WMD in Iraq, but found nothing. Then, America shoved him aside. Hans Blix, retired diplomat, wrote a book about Mission Iraq. A failed mission, because he could not prevent the war. An interview with Blix.)

Hans Blix, “IRAQ: Untraceable Weapons” (l’Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, April 7 2004), reported, Olivier Da Lage, “L’implacable réquisitoire de Hans Blix” (en: The relentless indictment of Hans Blix) (RFI News: Radio France Internationale, April 8 2004), Marion Heilmann, “Hans Blix: retour sur l'engrenage qui a mené à la guerre d'Irak{pf, 4kb.pdf} (en: Hans Blix: Back on the spiral that led to the war in Iraq) (Newropeans Magazine, April 14 2004).

Hans Blix, intervewed by Noëlle Velly (Radio France Internationale), Alain Louyot (Rédacteur en Chef du Service Monde, L'Express), “Invité de la semaine: Hans Blix s'explique sur RFI” (en: Guest of the week: Hans Blix explains himself on RFI) (RFI: Radio France Internationale, Paris, April 10 2004), audio {18:58, source} (French), reported, “Hans Blix: «Les Etats-Unis ont commis une faute»” (en: Hans Blix: “The United States made a mistake”) (L'Express, April 12 2004).

Hans Blix, “Disarming Iraq” (Virginia Commonwealth University, School of World Studies, Stuart C. Siegel Center, Richmond Virginia, April 22 2004, 7:30 p.m.).

Hans Blix, “Disarming Iraq” (Texas A&M University, Memorial Student Center Wiley Lecture 2004, Rudder Auditorium, College Station Texas, April 23 2004) (no posted video/audio), reported, Craig Kapitan, “Former U.N. Weapons Inspector Blix Compares WMD Search to Witch-Hunts” (Eagle, April 24 2004).

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC, 2000-2003; author, Disarming Iraq), interviewed April 27 2004 by Ross Reynolds, and separately, Raymond Zilinskas (UNSCOM inspector in Iraq, June and October 1994; author, Biology Warfare: Modern Offense & Defense; Director, CBWNP: Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, MIIS: Monterey Institute of International Studies), “Hans Blix & WMD” (Radio KUOW, The Conversation, Seattle, Wednesday April 28 2004, 1-2pm PT), audio {59:59, 27.95mb.rm, 9.23mb.mp3, rss, search}.

Hans Blix, “Lessons of Iraq?” (WAC: World Affairs Council of Seattle and Tacoma, venue: University of Washington, Hogness Auditorium, Health Sciences Center, Seattle, Tuesday April 27 2004, 7pm PT), TVW audio {1:10:29 at 9:00, ram, 3.45mb.rm, search} (TVW: Washington State Public Affairs Network), reported, Sam Skolnik, “U.N.'s Blix: War wasn't justified. Ex-arms inspection chief likens Bush team to 'witch hunters' {pf} (Seattle Post-Intelligencer, April 28 2004).

David Kay, speech (AACC: American Association of Community Colleges, annual convention, Minneapolis Minnesota April 27 2004), broadcast, “David Kay” (MPR: Minnesota Public Radio, Midday, April 28 2004, 12:06 p.m., 9:06 p.m.), audio {54:00}, reported, Mike Larose, “Kay: National Security at Stake in Changing World: Former U.N. weapons inspector speaks at AACC annual convention” (Community College Times, May 11 2004).

David Kay, speech, “Working with the Enemy: Intrusive Inspections” (University of Delaware, Global Agenda 2004, Mitchell Hall, Newark Delaware, April 28 2004, 7:30 p.m.), video (bb) {1:26:49 bb}, reported, Jerry Rhodes, “Top Iraq Weapons Inspector Draws Full House” (University of Delaware, UDaily, April 29 2004).

Hans Blix, “Disarming Iraq and the Future of Arms Inspection” (University of Texas at Austin, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library Auditorium, Austin Texas, April 28 2004, 6:30 p.m.) (no posted video/audio), reported, Lee Nichols, “Blix in Austin: Why the War Wasn't Necessary{pf} (Austin Chronicle, May 7 2004) (lengthy transcript, no Q&As), “Lady Bird Johnson in the front row.”

David Kay, “Iraq and WMD: Lessons Learned and Unlearned” (University of Virginia, Miller Center of Public Affairs, Forum, Charlottesville Virginia, May 4 2004), video {1:26:49}, audio {96.8mb.mp3}, transcript, David Kay, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons Learned and Unlearned” {729kb.pdf} (Miller Center Report, Volume 20, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2004, pages 6-14), interviewed by Bob Gibson, “Occupation of Iraq: David Kay Speaks About Abuse, Weapons” (The Daily Progress, May 5, 2004).

Hans Blix, online chat (in English), “Die Welt belogen{pf, source} (“The world deceived”) (Die Zeit, Hamburg Germany, May 12 2004), reported, “«Es ist die einzige UNO, die wir haben»{pf} (“It’s the only U.N. we’ve got”) (Die Zeit, May 13 2004).

Hans Blix, intervewed by Habib Belaïd, “Interview de Blix” (RTCI: Radio Tunis Chaîne Internationale, May 19 2004, rebroadcast May 24 2004), audio (French) {3.7mb.mp3, 1.9mb.mp3}.

David Kay, interviewed by Sarah Montague (BBC Radio 4, Today, Saturday June 5 2004, 7-9am at 7:32-7:37 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx6751}, audio {5:21}, reported, US expert slams WMD 'delusions' {pf} (BBC News, June 5 2004, 11:25 a.m.).

 

“ Sarah Montague: What did you think, when you heard, that George Tenant had told the President, that the case for weapons of mass destruction was a “slam dunk” case {pf, copy}.

David Kay: Well, I—

It was after I resigned, when the Woodward book came out.

{Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, April 19 2004}.

I was just absolutely flabbergasted.

And I’m not particularly one that believes sports analogies make much sense in politics.

He engaged in that sort of overstatement.

It’s just a part of his character.

Fundamentally, George is an expert in the craft of politics.

Not in the craft of intelligence.

He’s a creature of something that’s uniquely American, that you don’t have.

And that’s the Congressional staff system, in which you really learn, that your career, and your future, is based on pleasing those who are above you, and keeping them happy.

And, he’s probably the best I’ve ever seen.

In terms of latching onto people above him.

And understanding how to scratch their itch.

And keep them happy.

That’s just his way.

And, you know, he was talking to a President who actually enjoys sports.

And, you know, that was a lot about him.

I was appalled, based on the evidence I had seen, that anyone would think that was a “slam dunk.””

Hans Blix (studio), interviewed by John McLaughlin, “The mother of all misjudgements” (John McLaughlin's One On One, Washington D.C., interviewed June 17 2004, broadcast Saturday-Sunday June 19-20 2004), FNS transcript {copy}.

 

“ John McLaughlin: Two years ago, his team of international inspectors was spending about $80 million a year, to contain the threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

Instead of continuing the United Nations inspections at a cost of $80 million a year, the United States chose to invade Iraq, at a cost of $80 billion a year.

Was the Iraq war necessary?

We’ll ask the former director of the UN Inspection Commission, Hans Blix.”

Hans Blix, interviewed by Miles Pomper, Paul Kerr, Daryl Kimball, “Getting It Right The Next Time: An Interview with Hans Blix” (Arms Control Association, Washington D.C., June 19 2004) {pf}.

Hans Blix, “Remarks by Hans Blix{FNS} (CEIP: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Ronald Reagan International Trade Center, Washington D.C., June 21 2004), Carnegie video {34:26}, Carnegie audio {34:31}, C-Span video {3:55:06, at 3:19:56, June 21, 143453959, 182351-1}.

Hans Blix (Chairman), “The Challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction” {79kb.pdf, source} (WMD Commission, Second Meeting, DA: Vienna Diplomatic Academy, Vienna Austria, June 28 2004) {52kb.pdf}.

David Kay, “New Threats to U.S. National Security” (CCC: Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, June 28 2004, 12:00 p.m.), audio: speech {35:57}, Q&A {22:08}, transcripts: speech, Q&A, broadcast, “David Kay at the Commonwealth Club” (MPR: Minnesota Public Radio, Midday, July 6 2004, 12:06/9:06 p.m.), audio {54:00} (and other broadcasts, e.g., Radio KQED, July 3 2004, 2:00 a.m.), earlier, David Kay, interviewed by Michael Krasny, “Developments in Nuclear Security” (Radio KQED, San Francisco, Forum, June 28 2004, 9:00 a.m., 10:00 p.m.) (“the most-listened to public radio station in the United States”), also broadcast on Sirius Satellite Radio (NPR: National Public Radio, NPR Talk 135), audio {51:53, archive, search}.

U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq {purl, copy, html} (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Report No. 108-301, July 9 2004, Select Committee on Intelligence) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/5:108-301, LCCN: 2004356402, OCLC: 55948335, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, July 15 2004}, submitted, “Reports of Committees,” 150 Congressional Record S7896 {1kb.txt, 42kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, daily edition 150:94, July 9 2004) {SuDoc: X/A.107/2:150/94}. A partisan report.  CJHjr.

Brian Jones (Head until January 2003 of the Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Branch; Scientific and Technical Directorate; Defence Intelligence Staff, 1987-2003; U.K. Ministry of Defense), John Morrison (Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, 1995-1999), Michael Herman (former Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee), interviewed by John Ware, “A Failure of Intelligence{BBCcat ance842x} (BBC 1 TV, Panorama, July 11 2004, 10:15 p.m.), video (excerpt) {2:11}, video (excerpt) {1:57}, BBC transcript {copy}, reported, “Blair accused over WMD evidence{pf}, “MI6 'retracted' Iraq intelligence{pf} (BBC News, July 11 2004), editorial comment, “What the Papers say — A failure of intelligence{pf} (BBC News, August 11 2004).

Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction {1.1mb.pdf, copy, 1.1mb.pdf} (“Butler Report” “Butler Review” “Butler Inquiry”) (U.K. Cabinet Office, Privy Council, Butler Committee, Report to the U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, HC 898, July 14 2004), later reply, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implementation of Its Conclusions {37kb.pdf, source, copy} (U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6492, March 23 2005), published, Robin Butler (Lord Butler of Brockwell) (Secretary, U.K. Cabinet Office, 1988-1998), press conference, 12:30-1:20 p.m. BST, C-Span video {49:58, July 14, 136043331}, Robin Butler’s opening statement {105kb.pdf, source}, previewed, “Iraq inquiry findings published{pf} (BBC News, July 14 2004, 5:03 a.m.), reported, “The Butler Report”, (BBC 2 TV, July 14 2004, 11:30-2:15 p.m.) {BBCcat anpk431p}, 'Serious flaws' in Iraq intelligence{pf} (BBC News, July 14 2004).

 

“ John Kampfner: John Kampfner, New Statesman.

Lord Butler, you say in the report, that the JIC {Joint Intelligence Committee} made no further assessments, following Saddam’s statement in December.

Between then and the beginning of war, in March.

How do you account for that?

And how do you account for the fact that.

As suggested in the report and as suggested by others, including Robin Cook subsequently.

The intelligence — far from getting stronger from the end of 2002— was actually going away, was actually getting weaker.

Robin Butler: The point, I think, about that is, that the British Government was then relying, to a large extent, on what was being found by the inspectors, and by intelligence that was coming in, about Iraq’s program of deception and concealment.

We are surprised, that — when so few of the leads were leading to actual finds — the British Government didn’t reassess its sources of intelligence, during that period.

The real answer to your question is, that I think during that period, the Joint Intelligence Committee’s attention was turning to other things, and the government was relying on reports that were coming in from other sources.

Neil Tweedy: Lord Butler, Neil Tweedy, from the Daily Telegraph.

You say, there was no intention by the Government to mislead.

If you’re making a case.

And you overstate, the quality, and value, of the evidence you are using, to make that case, i.e., the intelligence.

You’re misleading somebody.

Aren’t you.

Robin Butler: What I said is, that the government believed the judgments, that it was putting before the British people.

Our criticism is, that it should have made clearer the warnings, in the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments, about the thinness of the intelligence that it was based on.

But I think that there is one—

The clearest evidence, that the British government hadn’t got an intention to mislead, is that it would have been a very foolish thing to do, to say that these weapons were there, when, as a result of the war, the fact — that whether they were or not — was going to be established, so soon.”

Hans Blix, interviewed in Stockholm by Tim Sebastian (BBC World, BBC News 24, HARDtalk, July 14 2004) {BBCcat anz1991x}, BBC video (deleted), video excerpt, James Robbins, “Hans Blix is still angry about Tony Blair's dossier,” video {2:14, at 1:16, source, rss, menu, search, search, a/v, a/v, search, rss} (BBC News, July 14 2004), BBC partial transcript, “Butler Report{pf}, reported, “The Lessons of the Butler report{pf}, “Iraq 'legal' despite flawed case{pf} (BBC News, July 15 2004): Peter Goldsmith (U.K. Attorney General): “The attorney general has said attacking Iraq was legal despite an inquiry finding intelligence used to justify the war was "seriously flawed".”

 

“ Hans Blix {0:12}: I think it was a spin.

That was not acceptable.

They put exclamation marks.

Where there had been question marks.

And I think that is—

Is—

A hyping.

A spin.

That leads the public.

To the wrong conclusions.”

____________________

 

Query:Spin”?

Spin is a willful attempt.

To induce a desired inference.

In the mind of a listener.

The daily fare of human discourse.

But.

A bright line separates spin from deceit.

If the spinning speaker—

Willfully conceals facts material to the inference.

And believes, or has reason to believe, those facts do not reside, undisputed, in the public domain the listener inhabits.

Or.

If the spinning speaker—

Believes, or has reason to believe, the listener cannot feel certain.

From what is said.

That the assertion is mere—

Argument.

Or opinion.

Or supposition.

Or assumption.

Or belief.

Or inference.

Then the spinning speaker is asserting a fact.

And.

If the spinning speaker knows.

For a fact.

S/he does not know it to be a fact.

Then the assertion is a willful “lie.”

And.

In my opinion.

On U.S. government business—

A criminal lie.

If the lie is “material.”

A lie is “material.”

If it contributes.

To death and destruction.

A spinning speaker can also be a listener.

To other spinning speakers.

A listener, with power to deal death and destruction.

In this case.

In my opinion.

A jury is entitled to decide.

Beyond reasonable doubt.

That the person(s) responsible.

For the decision.

To deal death and destruction.

That person(s) is not entitled—

To accept.

And to endorse.

As unassailable fact.

The hearsay assertions of others.

But, instead.

Has the legal duty.

To investigate the evidence.

If any.

On which that hearsay is based.

Because the consequences.

Of endorsing that hearsay.

Are serious.

And foreseeable:

Death and destruction.

And.

That jury is entitled to decide.

Beyond reasonable doubt.

That failure to investigate.

Is wilful blindness:

A wilful.

Malicious.

Criminal.

Intent.

To lie.

When asserting that hearsay.

To be unassailable fact.

And.

When deciding to deal death and destruction:

A wilful.

Malicious.

Criminal.

Intent.

To commit.

Murder and arson.

And.

In the case of offensive war—

The crime against peace.

____________________

 

A lawyer, Hans Blix might agree with this.

But, he has said, he is not prepared to level serious accusations, of violent crime, without serious proof.

A prominent voice, on a world stage, Hans Blix has chosen, instead, to use this formulation, “spin,” to raise this issue:

The state of mind, and wilful intent, of the members of the prima facie criminal conspiracy.

And, what they did.

In my mind, the evidence is abundant, their state of mind is criminal.

It may — or may not — be true, as he has asserted, from time to time, to be his own belief (on the dates of his assertions), that this or that person believed, Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.

As Hans Blix has said, he himself believed, at the outset.

But.

What they believed, this is not the issue.

What they did, this is the issue (their “overt acts”).

In order to sell their supposed belief, they knowingly and willfully lied, about numerous facts they certainly — beyond all doubt — knew to be untrue.

In other cases, they knowingly and willfully asserted to be unassailable fact, assertions they certainly — beyond all doubt — knew, they did not know to be facts, assertions they knew to be substantial secret disagreement about, among experts, assertions they knew were supported by scant, or no, evidence, and contested, by contrary, weighty, innocent, explanations and evidence.

This is a knowing and willful lie about their own state of mind, a “fact,” material to the death and destruction they dealt. Because they were leaders, inviting trust, citing secret intelligence, they knew the public and other government officials could not evaluate.

And, the additional evidence, of the criminal intent, of this or that particular individual— Willful blindness, their failure to investigate the evidence, as an honest person would, and their overt acts, to discourage others from confronting them, with contradictory evidence. This evidence, of wilful blindness, is prevelant but generally opaque to the public, at present.

But the abundant prima facie evidence, which is not opaque, is already ample, in my opinion, for a criminal court jury to convict many individuals, beyond reasonable doubt.

All this adds up to compelling evidence, of indifference, to the facts they asserted. Indifference, to whether or not Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.

And hence, compelling evidence, of their criminal intent, to attack Iraq, in violation of their own Security Council resolution (S/Res/1441) (a “treaty”), which they themselves drafted and submitted, the stated object of which was, solely, to allay their suspicious, and satisfy themselves, that Iraq was disarmed, of prohibited weapons, not to overthrow Saddam’s regime by force.

As for his own state of mind, Hans Blix made it abundantly plain, in real time, on the timeline, as the aftermath of this drama unfolded, that he, himself, did not expect, that leaders of the United States of America, and the United Kingdom, would lie, about matters of life, death, and destruction.

And that he assumed, they had specific intelligence, of some sort, they had not disclosed to him and his inspectors.

But, that he was feeling accelerating doubts, about their honesty.

This is not the way Hans Blix has phrased it.

He has said, he was feeling accelerating doubts, about the quality of their intelligence.

Because his inspectors found no prohibited weapons or activities at any of the sites U.S./U.K. officials secretly asked him to search, which those officials allowed him time to search. Sites those officials told him were their highest priority suspect sites.

But I do believe Hans Blix would agree, that leaders making bold, unequivocal assertions, of unassailable fact—

These leaders are dishonest, if their unequivocal assertions are not matched to unequivocal evidence.

As Hans Blix himself said, at the outset (November 15 2002):

____________________

 

“ Hans Blix: Now if, as you say, a declaration comes, and it maintains the position of the past.

Then, I think it will be the moment, for those who consider, that they have evidence, to consider, whether they put that evidence on the table.

I don’t think they can simply—

Or anyone can simply say,

“This is wrong.”

And.

“We all know it is wrong.”

I think, one would have to present evidence.

And we’ve seen it, as our task, at any rate, always to deal with evidence.

We are performing inspections.

And I said, also, that if I have solid evidence, that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, then I would put that on the table of the Security Council.

I do not have that.

But others may have such evidence, and, I think, that would be the moment, to possibly present it.”

____________________

 

This amounts to a statement of protocol. A professional discipline. To guard against negligence and all species of dishonesty, malicious lies, recklessness, and willful blindness, by leaders who have the affirmative legal duty to first investigate the evidence, if they want to kill people.

That Hans Blix did not express his doubts, forcibly, and publicly, and entertain them sooner, and prominently report, and emphasize, plainly, on the public stage of the Security Council chamber, with the cameras rolling, what his inspectors did not find, at 100% of the intelligence sites they inspected — as Amer Al-Saudi publicly asked him to do (March 2 2003) — and publicly challenge U.S./U.K. officials, to produce evidence, to support their assertions—

This is, in my opinion, a negligent violation by Hans Blix of his own protocol, the discipline he explained was necessary, and duty he undertook, “To inspect effectively, and to report objectively.”

His thorough evaluations and reports of the open accounting questions on the Iraqi side, he did not balance at the same time, on the same public stage, with a thorough objective report, that U.S./U.K. officials had failed to produce a single piece of evidence to support the bold assertions their leaders loudly trumpeted.

This is, I presume, the result of Hans Blix’s lamentable ignorance, and resulting deadly naivete, about the long history of extensive violent crimes, and lies, by U.S. government officials, all around the world, this past 6 decades.

In his defense, Hans Blix has plenty of ignorant company.

Due, mostly, to the activities of the longest running, continuous, U.S. government criminal conspiracy— criminal liars, with the task of lying, destroying evidence, and selling myth, many of them (including Members of Congress) active participants in the violent crimes themselves, others of them accessories after the fact, and members of criminal conspiracies to obstruct justice (including U.S. Attorneys-General, other officers of the U.S. Justice Department, and lawyers for the CIA, NSA, and Defense Department).

  CJHjr

Hans Blix (Stockholm), John Prescott (U.K. deputy prime minister), interviewed by James Naughtie (BBC Radio 4, Today, Thursday July 15 2004, 6-9am at 8:10-8:30 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx4612}, audio {19:54, search, search, a/v, a/v, search, rss}, “on the Butler report.”

Hans Blix (Stockholm), Tony Benn (London), interviewed by Tom McGurk (RTÉ Radio One, Summer Days, Dublin, July 15 2004, 9:06 a.m.), audio {2:01:12, Blix/Benn 15:29 at 6:00}.

Brian Jones, interviewed by James Naughtie (BBC Radio 4, Today, Tuesday July 20 2004, 6-9am at 8:10-8:24 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx8481}, audio {14:44, source}, “Dr Brian Jones, former head of nuclear biological and chemical intelligence analysis at the Defence Intelligence Staff, on the Iraq dossier and Butler report.”

U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, debate on the Butler report, “Iraq” (Tuesday, July 20 2004, 2:29-8:00 p.m., Hansard, House of Commons, bound volume edition, 6th series, volume 424, columns 195-287), opposition motion defeated 41/255 (Division No. 234, column 285), reported, “Blair pressed over case for war{pf} (BBC News, July 20 2004, 10:55 p.m.).

Greg Thielmann (Director to September 2002, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department), interviewed by Kent Bye, “Interview with Greg Thielmann, Ret. State Dept INR” (Echo Chamber Project, Winterport Maryland, July 27 2004).

Brian Jones, “Spies, Lies and Blowing Raspberries: The Prime Minister has quoted intelligence sources that just don't exist” {pf} The Observer, London, Sunday August 1 2004).

David Kay, interviewed by Lois R. Ember, “David A. Kay: America's weapons sleuth talks about his experiences searching for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction” {pf} (Chemical & Engineering News, August 2 2004, Volume 82, Number 31, pages 28-33).

Bill Clinton (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1993-2001 Jan. 20), interviewed in Toronto by Peter Mansbridge, “Indepth: Clinton Interview” (CBC News, The National, Mansbridge One on One, August 5 2004), video {21:44}.

 

“ Peter Mansbridge: Do you disagree on Iraq?

Bill Clinton: I disagreed with attacking them.

Before the UN inspectors had finished their jobs.

Peter Mansbridge: That’s not to say that you wouldn’t have—

Wouldn't have attacked—

Bill Clinton: If Hans Blix had said.

Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.

And won’t give them up.

Or.

If Hans Blix, the UN inspector, had said,

“I will never be able to certify.

Because he won’t co-operate.”

Then I would have supported attacking.

Strongly.

So, I would have voted for that resolution, in the Senate, to give him the authority.

But the whole idea was—

The whole premise.

For those of us who cared about weapons of mass destruction.

Was that—

We didn’t know. ...

Peter Mansbridge: I don’t mean to interrupt, but what if Hans Blix had said, “I can’t see any evidence of weapons of mass destruction”?

Would you have believed him?

Over your own intelligence agencies?

Bill Clinton: Yeah, I would have.

It’s not a question of believing him.

Over the intelligence agencies.

But.

The intelligence was ambiguous.

On the point, really.

The British intelligence had all that business about him having yellow-cake to use to make a nuclear weapons from Niger.

But the CIA told the White House, it wasn’t true.

So I would have.

Basically, I certainly would have believed it.

Enough to put it off.

And try to build more support.

I mean—

What was the hurry?”

Howard Kurtz, “The Post on WMDs: An Inside Story: Prewar Articles Questioning Threat Often Didn't Make Front Page{pf} (The Washington Post, August 12 2004, page A1). Excerpts:

 

“ Assistant managing editor Bob Woodward ...

“We did our job but we didn’t do enough, and I blame myself mightily for not pushing harder,”

Woodward said in an interview.

“We should have warned readers we had information that the basis for this was shakier” than widely believed. “Those are exactly the kind of statements that should be published on the front page.” ...

Woodward, for his part, said it was risky for journalists to write anything that might look silly if weapons were ultimately found in Iraq.

Alluding to the finding of the Sept. 11 commission of a “groupthink” among intelligence officials, Woodward said of the weapons coverage:

“I think I was part of the groupthink.”

Given The Post’s reputation for helping topple the Nixon administration, some of those involved in the prewar coverage felt compelled to say the paper’s shortcomings did not reflect any reticence about taking on the Bush White House.

Priest noted, however {national security reporter Dana Priest}, that skeptical stories usually triggered hate mail “questioning your patriotism and suggesting that you somehow be delivered into the hands of the terrorists.”

Instead, the obstacles ranged from editing difficulties and communication problems to the sheer mass of information the newsroom was trying to digest during the march to war. ...

But sources, even suspect ones, were the only game in town.

We had no alternative sources of information,” Woodward said.

“Walter [Pincus] and I couldn’t go to Iraq without getting killed.

You couldn’t get beyond the veneer and hurdle of what this groupthink had already established”—

The conventional wisdom that Hussein was sitting on a stockpile of illegal weapons.

In October 2002, Ricks, a former national security editor for the Wall Street Journal, who has been covering such issues for 15 years, turned in a piece that he titled “Doubts.”

It said that senior Pentagon officials were resigned to an invasion but were reluctant and worried that the risks were being underestimated.

Most of those quoted by name in the Ricks article were retired military officials or outside experts.

The story was killed by Matthew Vita, then the national security editor and now a deputy assistant managing editor.

“Journalistically, one of the frustrations with that story was that it was filled with lots of retired guys,” Vita said. But, he added, “I completely understood the difficulty of getting people inside the Pentagon” to speak publicly. ...

On Sept. 19, 2002, reporter Joby Warrick described a report “by independent experts who question whether thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes recently sought by Iraq were intended for a secret nuclear weapons program,” as the administration was contending. The story ran on Page A18.

Warrick said he was—

“Going out on a limb ... I was struck by the people I talked to — some on the record, others who couldn’t be — who were saying pretty persistently that these tubes were in no way suitable for uranium enrichment.

On the other side were these CIA guys who said, ‘Look, we know what we’re talking about but we can't tell you.’”

Downie said {Executive Editor Leonard Downie Jr.} that even in retrospect, the story looks like “a close call.” He said the inability of dissenters “to speak up with their names” was a factor in some of his news judgments.

The Post, however, frequently quotes unnamed sources.

Not all such stories were pushed inside the paper.

A follow-up Warrick piece on the aluminum tubes did run on Page 1 the following January, two months before the war began.”

____________________

 

Query: No alternative sources of information”?

And the U.N. inspectors?

Hans Blix’s inspectors was an $80 million per year fact-finding operation (UNMOVIC).

Independent of any government.

Paid for by a percentage of Saddam Hussein’s oil revenues, collected by the U.N.

A sharp departure from the corrupt UNSCOM inspection regime, financed and staffed by governments.

Which corrupt, dishonest, U.S. government officials, thoroughly discredited.

Converting UNSCOM into a hostile spying operation.

To create a bombing encyclopedia database.

And, likely, planting incriminating evidence (a VX nerve gas trace on a laboratory item).

Nothing to do with inspections.

Why didn’t The Washington Post editors assign a reporter, to cover what these new, honest, inspectors had to say?

Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA) was trashing the U.S. Government’s aluminum tubes allegation, from day-one, reporting the results of his research, citing hard facts.

Did The Washington Post report this?

And, from day-one, he was asking the U.S. government to give him the documents, which purported to show, Iraq sought uranium from Niger.

And the U.S. government refused.

Until very late in the proceedings (February 2003).

Because those documents were forged.

As U.S. officials long-before knew.

Did The Washington Post report this?

The U.S. refusal to give him the documents.

The hard facts, Mohamed ElBaradei reported, about the aluminum tubes, reinforced what The Washington Post had already learned, from authoritative sources.

Mohamed ElBaradei’s reports posed — in stark relief — this question, to The Washington Post editors:

“Are CIA officials lying to the Post?”

As they plainly were.

Directly.

Or indirectly, by lying to those speaking to the Post.

(The usual technique of government liars.)

This dispute was a reportable fact.

A very important fact.

But The Washington Post editors concealed this dispute.

Because they didn’t know what the answer was.

The remedy for this was simple:

Publish the dispute.

Flush out the liars, to justify their claims, let the audience judge the credibility of the contending sources.

And thereby empower the audience.

To be alert.

To watch that particular dispute develop.

And, to question other such assertions, by U.S. officials.

Hans Blix publicly asserted, many times — for 3 long months — that the U.S. and U.K. refused to give him leads, or evidence, to back up their bold assertions, that Iraq had WMD.

A violation of their legal obligation, they voluntarily undertook, in S/Res/1441, their own resolution, which they themselves drafted.

Because they had no evidence to give him.

Did The Washington Post report this?

And report it again, each time he said it?

To remind the audience, that something is fishy.

When U.S./U.K. officials finally began to give him leads to investigate (“stories,” not “evidence”), in late January, or early February 2003, Hans Blix publicly reported, his inspectors found nothing at those sites.

Did The Washington Post report this?

If they had assigned a reporter to this valuable, and free, source of information, The Washington Post editors would very likely have reported these things, and reevaluated the other reporting they already had, but did not publish, which supported what the inspectors were saying.

And what of the sayings and doings of Amer al-Saadi?

The Iraqi official spokesman, on the WMD dispute.

What he said, and did, were reportable facts, the official Iraq response to U.S./U.K. accusations.

Within hours of Tony Blair’s assertion, that a factory had been built, housing a nuclear weapons program, Amer al-Saadi had organized a busload of journalists, in Baghdad, to travel to the site, and see for themselves, that nothing could be further from the truth. (I haven’t yet included such events in this timeline).

A devastating assault, on the Bush/Blair credibility, and U.S./U.K. Intelligence (their pretended source).

Did The Washington Post report this?

And, he gave lengthy explanations, and responses, down the road, as inspections proceeded, at public press conferences.

Where he repeatedly challenged U.S. officials, to produce evidence, to support their bold assertions.

Alerting listeners, that U.S. assertions were based on no evidence.

And he repeatedly informed the audience, that U.N. inspectors had inspected this, or that, site mentioned by U.S. officials, and found nothing.

Did The Washington Post report this?

The U.N. inspectors themselves, in Baghdad, both UNMOVIC and IAEA, published, on the internet, a daily account of their inspections, where they went, and what they saw. And didn’t see.

And this corroborated what Amer al-Saadi said.

Did The Washington Post report this?

So long as The Washington Post editors continue to blind themselves, to sources of information, independent of the U.S. Government — and independent of CIA financed, and Israel-Jew Lobby financed, “independent” think tanks — that’s how long this will continue to be its reputation:

The Washington Post is a reliable source, mainly for learning what U.S. Government officials want the public to believe.

A mere fragment of available truth.

This is useful information, to be sure.

But a woeful reputation.

  CJHjr

David Kay, interviewed by Dave Pignanelli, Renita Jablonski, “Former U.S. Weapons Inspector David Kay” (WCPN News, Cleveland Public Radio, 90.3 at 9, Cleveland Ohio, August 20 2004, 9:06-10:00 a.m.), audio: part-1 {14:18}, part-2 {18:04}, part-3 {16:26}.

Robert Greenwald (producer/director), “The Director’s Introduction,” Uncovered: The War on Iraq (Brave New Films, 87-minute film, released August 20 2004, in New York City, Boston, Washington D.C.) (video clips of U.S. government officials, their pre-war assertions, post-war rationalizations, deconstructed, in analytical interview commentaries, by retired CIA and other government officials), film transcript {146kb.pdf}, developed from, Uncovered: The Whole Truth About The Iraq War (56-minute video, released November 3 2003, via the internet), video {56:08, 45.6kb.wmv} {56:08, Google video}, discussed, “A Buzzflash interview: Robert Greenwald, Producer/Director of Uncovered: The Whole Truth About the Iraq War, a new documentary that reveals how the Bush administration lied the nation into war” (BuzzFlash, November 3 2003).

Brian Jones, interviewed by Glenn Frankel, “From Inside Skeptic To Public Dissident: Analyst Exposed by Defense Ministry Assesses Damage of Blair WMD Claims” {pf, copy} (The Washington Post, August 27 2004).

Charles Duelfer (Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group), testimony, The Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs {report, html} (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-855, October 6 2004, Senate Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-855, LCCN: 2006361858, OCLC: 61718189, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, September 23 2005} (censored, from the internet, by the committee, or by others in the U.S. government), John W. Warner (Chairman), Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member), witnesses: Charles A. Duelfer (Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs), Head (from January 23 2004), CIA Iraq Survey Group) {105kb.pdf}, Joseph J. McMenamin (Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps; Commander, CIA Iraq Survey Group) {223kb.pdf}, C-Span video (request) {3:06:01, smil, 3:05:00, schedule, 142566567, 183823-1}, transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH and FNS {copy}.

Hans Blix (Stockholm), David Kay (Washington D.C.), interviewed by Ian Pannell (Washington D.C.) (BBC News 24, October 6 2004), video bb {6:03 bb, source}.

David Kay, interviewed by Matt Lauer (NBC News, The Today Show, October 7 2004, 7:00-10:00 a.m. ET), MSNBC video, “Kay on WMD” (player-video link expired) {4:19, 9.03mb.wmv, source}.

Hans Blix, ‘Will President Bush Apply the Lessons from Iraq to Iran, Libya and North Korea?{copy} (Independent on Sunday, London, October 10 2004), reported, “Blair 'clinging to straws'—Blix{pf} (BBC News, October 10 2004, 2:47 a.m.).

 

“ Both Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group, and David Kay, his predecessor, were hawks who favored the Iraq war.

But while they try to give the administration some straws to cling to, they are professionals.

After inspecting many sites, examining the voluminous documentation that has become available and interviewing many individuals, including Saddam Hussein and others in detention, they admit that the spin — to which they themselves had gladly contributed — was wrong.

Duelfer seems to contradict some points made by Kay in his interim report, which were seized upon by governments.

For example, Kay said his group had discovered dozens of “weapons of mass destruction-related programme activities.” ...

Duelfer believes that Iraq destroyed its WMD in the summer of 1991, and finds nothing to document any programs after that time. ...

Binding resolutions foresaw a “reinforced system of monitoring and verification” without any fixed end.

Even if economic sanctions were to have been lifted, any “breakout” by Saddam would have caused loud alarm bells to ring. ...

Thus, while George Bush has been maintaining that Saddam was a “growing threat” he was a diminishing danger to his neighbors and the world. ...

Duelfer underlines the vital importance of having inspectors on the ground.

Hardly surprising, considering that most of the correct information available to US and British intelligence came from UN and IAEA inspectors.

And that most of the things they got wrong were the results of their own work and contacts with Iraqis in exile.

Can one hope that this will be remembered in future cases?

When supervision and verification will be needed?

For example, in Iran, Libya and North Korea?”

Hans Blix (Independent on Sunday, October 10 2004).

U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, Oral Answers to Questions, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, “Iraq” (Tuesday, October 12 2004, 12:31-1:36 p.m., Hansard, House of Commons, bound volume edition, 6th series, volume 425, columns 151-168), BBC video (bb) (excerpt) {2:05 bb}, reported, “Straw withdraws 45 minutes claim{pf} (BBC News, October 12 2004, 5:17 p.m.), Nick Assinder (online political correspondent), “Straw's low key 45 mins send-off{pf} (BBC News, October 12 2004, 3:42 p.m.), “Timeline: The 45-minute claim{pf} (BBC News, October 13 2004), Gordon Corera (security correspondent), “Analysis: Death of the 45-minute claim{pf} (BBC News, October 14 2004).

David Kay (Washington D.C.), interviewed by Tavis Smiley (KCET/PBS TV, Tavis Smiley, Los Angeles, October 12 2004, 11:00 p.m.), distributed by PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, video (deleted), audio {13:43}, PBS transcript. “Dr. David Kay, former chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, discusses what he found and why he resigned.”

U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, Prime Minister’s questions (Wednesday, October 13 2004, 12:00-12:30 p.m., Hansard, House of Commons, bound volume edition, 6th series, volume 425, columns 276-284), No. 10 video {30:22, source}, BBC video (bb) {30:23 bb}, reported, “Blair under fire on Iraq claims{pf} (BBC News, October 13 2004, 11:31 p.m.).

John Morrison (Deputy Director, 1995-1999, Defence Intelligence Staff, U.K. Ministry of Defense; Investigator, 1999-2004, Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, a U.K. Cabinet Office committee, comprising House of Commons Members, appointed by the Prime Minister), interviewed by Edward Stourton (BBC Radio 4, Today, Thursday October 28 2004, 6-9am at 7:32-7:44 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx8599}, audio {10:32}, BBC transcript {pf}: “Axed spy expert John Morrison says he has no regrets about speaking out against the “misuse of intelligence” in the run-up to the war in Iraq — even though it cost him his job,” reported, Gordon Corera, “Was intelligence used as 'a PR tool'?{pf} (BBC News, October 28 2004): “When John Morrison appeared on the BBC Panorama's programme this summer, he thought there was only a 10% chance he would lose his job as an investigator for the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee.”

Hans Blix (Chairman, WMD Commission; Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC, March 1 2000-2003 June 30; IAEA Director General, 1981-1997), “The United Nations and Iraq—Reflections on the Use of Force, on International Inspections, and on UN Reform” (Cambridge University, Faculty of Law, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture 2004, Cambridge England, November 22-24 2004, 7:00-8:00 p.m.): “The Use of Force in the International Community” {106kb.pdf} (November 22), “International Inspection in Iraq and Elsewhere” {98kb.pdf} (November 23), “Iraq, Use of Force, and Reform of the UN” {103kb.pdf} (November 24), Open Forum (November 24, 3:00-4:00 p.m.) (no posted video/audio), reported, “Dr Hans Blix: Hersch Lauterpacht Lecturer 2004” (Cambridge University, Faculty of Law, Cambridge LawLink, Issue 5, December 2004, page 1) {2.33mb.pdf}: “The lectures were the most popular so far in the lecture series. Each lecture was attended by well over 500 people — students and practitioners alike — filling two video-linked lecture theatres at the Law Faculty.” Hans Blix, interviewed in Cambridge by Paolo Natali (The Talent, November 24), 3 videos: “Blix 1/3Bush and New Threats{7:18, 5.7mb.wav}, “Blix 2/3Future: Energy & Environment{2:37, 2.0mb.wav}, “Blix 3/3War on Terror in the Long Term{5:33, 4.3mb.wav}.

Hans Blix, interviewed by Bill Heine, “Hans Blix at BBC Oxford” (BBC Radio Oxford, Weekdays, Oxford England, November 25 2004, 4:00-7:00 p.m.), audio {8:14}.

Hans Blix, “Lessons from Iraq” (Oxford University, Oxford Union Society, Oxford England, November 25 2004, 8.30 p.m.).

Hans Blix, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarmament and Security” (Oxon: University of Oxford, St Antony's College, Fifth Elliott Lecture, Oxford England, Friday November 26 2004) (“the oldest university in the English-speaking world”), reported, “Hans Blix Speaks Bluntly on Terrorism and the UN” (Oxford University, Blueprint, December 9 2004), Alex Pravda, “Fay and Geoffrey Elliott’s Support for Russian Studies” (St Antony's College Newsletter, Spring 2005, page 5) {451kb.pdf}.

 2005-2006 

 

 

Bush/Cheney Doctrine on pre-emptive offensive war

We’re going to attack you.

Not because we’re certain you deserve it (beyond all doubt). And not because we’re satisfied you deserve it (beyond reasonable doubt). And not because you probably deserve it (more likely than not), or possibly deserve it (less likely than not), or even might deserve it (a hint of evidence, an unsubstantiated hypothesis, a theory).

We’re going to attack you, because we are not certain you don’t deserve it.

We have lingering doubt.

We’re not certain (beyond all doubt) you are innocent.

We’re going to attack you, to be on the safe side.

It’s prudent.

And, we’re going to conceal our uncertainty, and assert “conclusive evidence,” because disclosing uncertainty might provoke assertions about our true motives:— That we want permanent military bases in your country. That our friends want to rake-off your oil profits. And reward us, in due course.

And because public debate might disquiet our armed forces, and instill doubt in their minds, that our orders might be unlawful.

Indeed, criminal:

____________________

 

“ Suspicion is a state of mind of the accuser and not a state of mind or an act by the one accused.

It is a monstrous proposition containing the very essence of license that the state of mind of the accuser shall be the determining factor, in the absence of evidence of guilt, whether the accused shall or shall not be summarily executed. ...

The orders to execute such persons and mere suspects on suspicion only and without proof, were criminal on their face.

Executions pursuant thereto were criminal.

Those who gave or passed down such orders must bear criminal responsibility for passing them down and for their implementation by the units subordinate to them.”

The High Command Case, 11 N.M.T. 462-697 (opinion), at 531 (U.S. Military Tribunal 5, Nürnberg Germany, trial, 5 February-August 13, judgment, October 27-28, 1948), volumes 10-11, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (“Nuernberg, October 1946–April 1949”) (15 volumes, U.S. GPO, Washington D.C., 1949-1953) (“the green series”) {SuDoc: D 102.8, ditto, LCCNs: 49045929, 97071903, OCLC: 12799641, UC, WorldCat}, volume 10 (1951, 31+1308 pages) {55.9mb.pdf, source}, volume 11 (1951, 31+755 pages) {58.5mb.pdf}, also reported, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (“Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission”), volume 12, page 86 (15 volumes, U.K. HMSO, London, 1947-1949) {LCCNs: 47022747, 97080284, OCLC: 45912266, UC, WorldCat}.

____________________

 

“ John Warner: You said, on NBC’s Today Show, on Tuesday, that it was, quote:

“Absolutely prudent.

For the U.S. to go to war.”

Dr. Kay, I concur in those conclusions.

I believe a real and growing threat

has been eliminated.

And a coalition of nations.

Acted prudently.

In the cause of freedom.”

John W. Warner (Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee), Senate Hearing 108-678, January 28 2004, addressing and quoting David Kay, interviewed by Matt Lauer (NBC News, The Today Show, Tuesday, January 27 2004, 7:00-10:00 a.m. ET), MSNBC video {7:03, 5.36mb.wmv}, transcript printed, “David Kay Interview,” 150 Congressional Record S315-S316 {pf} {12kb.txt, 38kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, daily edition 150:7, January 28 2004) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/7}.

____________________

 

If they do not fear.

The rule of law:—

All violent criminal enterprises.

Do their killings.

Because.

It’s prudent.

To protect their interests. Achieve their objectives. Deter law-enforcement. Banish the rule of law. Install the rule of force:

The Law of Empire.

And, if they feel the need to persuade anybody, the public for instance, all violent criminal enterprises do the exact same thing:

They lie.

About the facts.

About their motives.

Advancing, for justification, whatever comes to hand, which sounds plausible.

____________________

 

“ Gustave Mark Gilbert (U.S. Army military intelligence, assigned to the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Germany):

“We got around to the subject of war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I did not think that the common people are very thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction.”

Hermann Wilhelm Goering (prisoner and defendant):

“Why, of course, the people don’t want war,” Goering shrugged.

“Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war, when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece.

Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany.

That is understood.

But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy.

And it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”

Gilbert: “There is one difference,” I pointed out.

“In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives.

And in the United States only Congress can declare wars.”

Goering: “Oh, that is all well and good.

But, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders.

That is easy.

All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger.

It works the same way in any country.””

Hermann Wilhelm Goering, interviewed by Gustave Mark Gilbert, April 18 1946, printed in Nuremberg Diary, pages 278-279 (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947) {LCCN: 47004157}, (reprint: New York: Da Capo Press, 1995) {LCCN: 95020429}.

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 

 

Liar Glossary

A willful liar knows, or believes correctly, what s/he asserts is untrue. In U.S. executive, legislative, or judicial proceedings, this lie is prima facie criminal, if it’s “material”.

A reckless liar does not know, or believe, what s/he asserts is untrue. But s/he does know that s/he doesn’t know it is true. S/he pretends s/he knows. This lie is likewise prima facie criminal (as I suppose). S/he’s not willful as to the asserted fact (because s/he doesn’t know, or believe, it’s untrue). But s/he is willful as to a material omission: That s/he’s ignorant. And merely guessing, hoping, supposing, inferring it’s true, perhaps concealing ambiguities, contrary evidence, credibility issues, and such. Asserting certainty, and concealing ignorance, or uncertainty:— A willful, deceitful, coupling.

A willfully blind liar has a reasonable basis, ostensibly, for believing what s/he asserts is true but, secretly, doubts it, or questions it, or fears it may not be true. And decides to not investigate further, as a reasonable person would, because s/he wants it to be true. This too is a criminal lie (as I suppose), if the jury believes, beyond reasonable doubt, s/he had the opportunity and resources to investigate those doubts, and decided not to, because s/he feared a proper investigation might substantiate those doubts.

A negligent liar believes what s/he asserts is true, but omits to first inquire properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances. This lie is not criminal, if the jury is not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the failure to investigate was willful.

For example: The claim by Condoleezza Rice, that she did not read the National Intelligence Estimate, submitted to her office, precisely to inform her about her about a topic central to her legal duties. This document contained caveats, and language of uncertainty, concealed from Congress, and from the public, in the unclassified version published by the CIA, four days later.

A recklessly negligent liar can reasonably foresee, that deadly or other serious consequences will likely result, if the assertion is untrue. And yet, s/he still omits to first inquire properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances, in light of these heightened consequences. This lie too is not criminal (absent willfulness, as with negligence). But the reckless nature of it supplies the criminal intent for any underlying crime of recklessness (the deadly or other serious consequences which follow from it). For example, involuntary manslaughter. Or “depraved indifference”.

A grossly negligent liar has been put on notice, that the assertion is likely untrue, or possibly untrue. And yet, s/he persists, in later repeating the assertion, without first inquiring properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances, prompted to do so, by the notice. This lie too is not criminal (absent willfulness).

But, notice can be so significant, in focusing the liar’s mind on the issue, that a jury can feel satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that what previously may have been non-willful negligence, constitutes willful intent to deceive, afterwards, in later assertions, following the notice, or in failing to correct previous assertions, thus elevating the liar to more a culpable category. This depends on how the jury feels about the quality of the notice, the authority of its basis, the competing authority of whatever basis the liar might have, if any, for the assertion, and the opportunity and resources s/he had available, and decided to not use.

For example: The decision by U.S. officials to repeat assertions, and to not correct previous assertions, on the basis of information provided by Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei, that intelligence targets, which U.S. officials supplied, proved to be entirely innocent.

For example: David Kay’s numerous assertions, that Jacques Chirac and Russia said, they believed Iraq had WMD. David Kay was put on notice, by Carl Levin, face to face, in the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing (January 29 2004), that David Kay’s assertions were likely untrue, quoting documents. And yet, David Kay, in the days, weeks, and months after this hearing, repeated these assertions, many, many, times.

An innocent liar reasonably believes, without doubts, what s/he asserts is true, because s/he was lied to by others, and tricked by them into voicing their lie. S/he’s an “innocent agent” of the actual liar(s), blameless, without criminal or moral turpitude.

It’s an honest mistake, if s/he reasonably believes, without doubts, what s/he erroneously asserts is true, if neither s/he, nor anyone one on whom s/he may have relied, was willful, reckless, or negligent in formulating the erroneous assertion. Likewise, if s/he misspeaks:— If s/he says, without realizing it, what s/he did not intend to say, or would not have said, if s/he had thought about it more carefully in context. For example, if s/he was thinking about some other aspect of what s/he said, instead, and was not mentally focused on the erroneous assertion, if it was merely incidental, for example, and not “material” to what s/he was talking about. Or, if s/he forgot what s/he once knew. Or was confused about what s/he thought s/he was talking about.

A simple cure, to all issues about assertions, is to disclose the basis of the assertion: “I believe this, because so-and-so told me so. Because this document seems to prove it.” Et cetera. Such disclosures validate an honest intent, and alert listeners how to investigate the assertion further, if they question it.

But the absence of such disclosures does not necessarily indicate dishonest intent, as people normally facilitate conversation by omitting diversions from the main theme into subsidiary issues about substantiation.

But, on important assertions, on which lives depend, an honest person would normally disclose the basis for a belief, if s/he has any reason to suspect there is any conceivable possibility it may not be true.

The reliability of hearsay is always suspect. Even if the hearsay source is honest, and knowledgeable, the speaker might have misunderstood, or misremembered, what the hearsay speaker actually said. Or the subtleties of it. Its nuances and caveats. And the fact that it too might, in turn, be based on yet further hearsay.

For example: This is the mistake Brian Hutton made in his flawed, inquiry judgment, accepting a hearsay assertion as true, instead of calling for an examination of the source of that hearsay.

I presume Hutton was afraid of what he would find out. In which case, he was willfully blind.

If not, then he was grossly negligent, at the very least, because he well knows, being a judge, the unreliability of hearsay: His experience constitutes “notice,” that he cannot make reliable findings of fact based on hearsay, particularly when the credibility of the witnesses, asserting the hearsay, is at issue.

Brian Hutton was willfully blind, or grossly negligent. He might have been lucky, and be right. But his finding of fact is disputed by Brian Jones, the U.K. expert, who did what Hutton declined to do, and actually investigated the source of the hearsay, as best he could.

But Hutton was not a liar as to the supposed “fact” he found. Because he disclosed the basis for his finding (unreliable hearsay) and, hence, did not represent it to be more authoritative than it is (unauthoritative).

Though he may have lied about his opinion, willfully, recklessly, or negligently (that he believed the fact he found, or that it deserved the dignity of the label “fact,” or “finding,” despite the unreliable hearsay evidence of it).

He made no effort, as far I know, to ask for the intelligence.

His duty was to ask for the underlying intelligence — the “best evidence” of the supposed fact.

And, if the government refused to give it to him, his duty was to report, that he was unable to form an informed, reliable, opinion, and to decline to make any finding of fact on that point.

______________________

Note: All species of lies include material omissions, which are necessary to be stated in order to prevent a truthful assertion from inducing a material erroneous inference, in the mind of the listener. Material omissions are the principal technique of deceit, employed by CIA and other government liars.

For example: The Bush/Blair lie, that Jacques Chirac said he would vote against war, “under any circumstances.” An incendiary lie. A vivid display of criminal intent. An overt act, in a violent criminal conspiracy. Omitting to mention, what he was talking about:— Not war generally, but only about the particular second resolution, then-tabled by the U.S./U.K. (authorizing war after March 17 2003), and a technical explanation of the “circumstances” of the vote, that a “no” vote is not a “veto,” unless there are also 9 “yes” votes, and a majority of the 15-member Security Council had already indicated they too would vote “no,” not “yes,” on that particular resolution, at that particular time. And, what he was not talking about:— The “circumstances” of the inspections. He plainly said (concealed by Bush/Blair in their lie), he would vote for war later, if Saddam frustrated the inspections (then producing promising results). While the assertion is true (he said, “under any circumstances”), the omissions induce an erroneous inference, namely that inspections were fruitless because Saddam knew he could frustrate them without consequences. The truth — which both Bush and Blair chose to conceal, by their material omissions — is the exact opposite.

Another example: David Kay’s assertion, that a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) was tested “out” to a range of 500 km. Omitting to mention (if it was the case), that the test was on a circular course, and that its associated radio equipment would not operate beyond a range of 150 km, suggesting its fuel capacity was merely to provide dwell-time over the target area, if it was for photo-reconnaissance. (I don’t know the truth of these UAV issues, merely that Mr. Blix identified them as issues, and that the U.S./U.K. prevented him from investigating them, by attacking Iraq.)

Another example: David Kay’s unequivocal assertions — grooming the public for war, on the BBC’s Newsnight (September 13 2002) and Panorama (September 23 2002) news programs — that the aluminum tubes were “centrifuge tubes.” This was either a willful or reckless lie, if he knew of the contrary opinion of the centrifuge experts (which he is not). Or else a willfully blind lie, or negligent lie, if he had available to him an easy way to discover the opinion of those experts and did not seek it. But, on the topic of material omissions, even if he disagreed with the opinion of the experts (which he is not), their expert opinion is a material “fact,” though they may be mistaken. Hence, it was a separate willful or reckless lie, by him, to omit to mention their expert opinion (if he knew about it) and, as well, the innocent plausible explanation of other experts (which he is not): That the tubes met the specifications for Iraq’s 81mm artillery rocket program. This, if he knew about that possibility, and their opinion, as I presume he did.

  Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 

Citations

WCPDWeekly Compilation of Presidential Documents {purl} (Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office) {SuDoc: AE 2.109: (1986-), GS 4.114: (1965-1985), ISSN: 0511-4187, LCCN: 65009929, OCLC: 1769543, GPOCat, GPOCat, LL: paper, paper, DL, WorldCat}.

PPPUSPublic Papers of the Presidents of the United States {purl, purl} {ucsb, umich} (Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office) {SuDoc: AE 2.114: (1984-), GS 4.113: (1929-1933, 1945-1983), ISSN: 0079-7626, LCCN: 58061050, OCLC: 1198154, GPOCat, GPOCat, LL: paper, paper, DL, UC, WorldCat}.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush {gpo, ucsb} (January 20 2001-2009 January 20) {OCLC: 52344983, WorldCat}.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton {gpo, ucsb, umich} (January 20 1993-2001 January 20) {OCLC: 31268646, WorldCat}.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush {gpo, ucsb, umich} (January 20 1989-1993 January 20) {OCLC: 2235199, WorldCat}.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan {ucsb, umich} (January 20 1981-1989 January 20) {OCLC: 22427819, WorldCat}.

Cong. Rec.Congressional Record {purl} (daily edition) (annual pagination in 4 sections: S:Senate, H:House, E:Extension of Remarks, D:Daily Digest) (U.S. Government Printing Office) {SuDoc: X/A, ISSN: 0363-7239, LCCN: 80646573, OCLC: 02437919, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, WorldCat}.

Cong. Rec.Congressional Record (permanent edition) (annual pagination as a single whole, hence, different page numbers from the daily edition) (U.S. Government Printing Office) {SuDoc: X., ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

Serial SetUnited States Congressional Serial Set {purl} (volume list: Congresses 15-91 (1817-1970), 85-108+ (1957-2004+) (volumes for each session, compiled several years later, containing a duplicate original of all Congressional committee reports, and House and Senate documents, but not committee hearings or serial prints, except when rarely exhibited to a report) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/2:Serial, OCLC: 5866454, 8396583, LCCN: 92643101, GPOCat, DL, WorldCat} (selected online volumes, Congresses 23-64, 1833-1917), previously, American State Papers (1789-1838).

 

 

Related documents:

Efforts to Determine the Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related Programs (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-678, January 28 2004, Senate Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-678, LCCN: 2005414430, OCLC: 57070686, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, November 26 2004} (censored, from the internet, by the committee, or by others in the U.S. government), John W. Warner (Chairman), Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member) {11kb.html}, witness: David Kay (Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group, June 11 2003-2004 Jan. 23), C-Span video (request) {2:44:45, smil, schedule, 538818909, 180284-1}, broadcast video: part-1 {2:04:09, source}, part-2 {37:49}, transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH transcript {178kb.html, copy, source}, FNS transcript {130kb.pdf, copy}.

The Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs {report, html} (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-855, October 6 2004, Senate Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-855, LCCN: 2006361858, OCLC: 61718189, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, September 23 2005} (censored, from the internet, by the committee, or by others in the U.S. government), John W. Warner (Chairman), Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member), witnesses: Charles A. Duelfer (Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs), Head (from January 23 2004), CIA Iraq Survey Group) {105kb.pdf}, Joseph J. McMenamin (Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps; Commander, CIA Iraq Survey Group) {223kb.pdf}, C-Span video (request) {3:06:01, smil, 3:05:00, schedule, 142566567, 183823-1}, transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH and FNS {copy}.

Background: The pretexts for war: WMD + France’s veto: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/iraq-2003d.html

 

Source:This document is not copyrighted, and may be freely copied.

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

CJHjr

Posted Feb. 1 2004. Updated Dec. 1 2007.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/iraq-wmd-timeline-2004.html

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