Alt+left-arrow to return from a link
Ditto Iran?
by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
• Congress debates, votes
• Iraq wmd war timeline: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005-2006, 2007
• David Kay
• Charles Duelfer
• Iran uranium timeline
• Israel/Palestine timeline:
• Palestine Peace Not Apartheid
• The Israel Lobby
• Settlements
• Blockade, reprisals
• Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), “Briefing the Security Council, 9 January 2003: Inspections in Iraq and a Further Assessment of Iraq's Weapons Declaration” {copy, copy, pf} (U.N. Security Council, January 9 2003) (closed meeting, SC/7628), reported, “Security Council Voices Full Backing for Work of UN Arms Inspectors in Iraq” (U.N. News, January 9 2003).
• Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), “Status of the Agency's Verification Activities in Iraq as of 8 January 2003” (U.N. Security Council, January 9 2003) (closed meeting).
• Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, “Press Encounter with Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of IAEA” {pf} {copy, source}, media stakeout with them and others, following a closed Security Council briefing (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 9 2003, 1:10 p.m.), reported, “Many Holes in Iraqi Arms Declaration but No 'Smoking Gun,' UN Inspectors Say” {pf} (U.N. News, January 9 2003), U.N. video (dead link), CBC video {11:46, source}, PBS audio {11:57, source}, C-Span video (request) {36:09, smil, 8 speakers: 48:37, 57:44, schedule, 6 speakers: 172719880, 174551-1, U.K. Greenstock: 172721378, 174553-1, Russia Lavrov: 172723006, 174556-1, rss, archive, search: Blix, ElBaradei, Greenstock, Lavrov, library: Blix, ElBaradei, Greenstock, Lavrov}, reported, “U.N. Inspectors Say They've Found No "Smoking Gun" In Iraq,” “Inspecting Iraq” (PBS NewsHour, January 9 2003), earlier, “Hans Blix Comments on Entering the Building” {pf} (U.N. building, elevator/lift lobby, media stakeout before the briefing, January 9 2003), BBC video {3:59}, reported, “'No Smoking Guns' in Iraq Arms Search” (BBC News, January 9 2003).
Hans Blix: Mr ElBaradei and I have briefed the Council. And, for my part, I said, that we still get prompt access from the Iraqi side; that the inspections are covering every wider areas, and ever more sites, in Iraq; that in the course of these inspections we have not found any smoking gun.
Mohamed ElBaradei: We are getting access to all the sites ...
We need more actionable information.
On the part of the governments ...
We believe, at this stage, that these aluminum tubes were intended for manufacturing of rockets.
• Ari Fleischer (White House Press Secretary), “Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer” {pf} (White House, January 9 2003, 1:07-1:45 p.m. ET).
Question: Can we presume?
That the President is very happy?
That Mr. Blix says,
“There is no smoking gun.”
In the search for weapons in Iraq.
Ari Fleischer: Well, the problem with guns that are hidden is you can’t see their smoke.
And so we will still await to see, what the inspectors find in Iraq, and what events in Iraq lead to ...
Question: But it wouldn’t be disappointing.
Would it?
If there were no weapons there?
Ari Fleischer: We know for a fact.
That there are weapons there.
And so—
The inspectors also went on—
Question: What’s the search all about?
If you know it, so factually?
Ari Fleischer: ... So while they’ve said that there’s no smoking gun, they said the absence of it is not assured.
And that’s the heart of the problem.
The heart of the problem is, Iraq is very good at hiding things.
• Hans Blix, interviewed by Lyse Doucet (BBC World Service, Newshour, January 13 2003, 9.00 p.m. GMT) (broadcast overseas, by satellite, and by U.S. radio stations (broadcast times of 168 listed here), audio {11:07, search, search, a/v, a/v, search}, copy {11:05}, transcript (faulty), reported, “Iraq Inspectors 'Need Time'” (BBC News, January 14 2003, 12:36 GMT).
Lyse Doucet: Colin Powell has said.
They have vital intelligence.
Have they given it to you?
Hans Blix: We had fairly good co-operation.
Both with the Americans, and British.
And other sources of intelligence.
And we are beginning to make more use of it.
Lyse Doucet: How can you say you have good relations?
If they haven’t given you all the intelligence, so far?
Hans Blix: Well, they have given a lot of, shall we say, information, about how they calculate their programmes, what size they are, and so forth.
But we need — what my friend Mohamed ElBaradei called — “actionable evidence.”
That’s indications of where we can go.
What places that we can inspect.
That will also be coming.
Lyse Doucet: So.
While you race around Baghdad.
And its environs.
You’re acutely aware.
That the Americans.
And the British.
Have intelligence.
Which could make your job easier.
But they haven’t given it to you, yet.
Hans Blix: What I am saying is.
That it is coming.
And we are going to act on it.
I don’t think I can go into any more detail.
Lyse Doucet: But, how do you explain the fact.
That they haven’t given it to you?
What is their game?
You’re supposed to be on the same side.
In principle.
Hans Blix: Well.
I think you’d better ask them the question.
Lyse Doucet: What about you?
You’re the man.
Who’s supposed to find the evidence.
And if you don’t get the intelligence.
To do it—
Hans Blix: I’ve felt in the past, at some time, that they were a bit like librarians, who had books, that they didn’t want to lend, to the customer.
But I think that is changing.
Lyse Doucet: But it’s not just a library.
We’re talking about here.
We’re talking about a potential war.
Which could have devastating consequences.
And.
They are not giving you full co-operation.
Hans Blix: Well.
I am not saying, that they are not giving us adequate co-operation.
At the present time.
It is changing.
• Mark Gwozdecky (Vienna) (IAEA Director of Public Information and Spokesperson), intervewed by Mark Davis (Syndey), “Mark Gwozdecky Interview” (SBS News, Dateline, Sydney, January 15 2003, 8:30 p.m.), video (none posted), transcript (mistakenly posted with the wrong video).
Mark Davis: To date.
Is there any evidence.
Whatsoever.
Of an Iraqi nuclear capacity?
Mark Gwozdecky: To date, Mark, we haven’t found such evidence.
When we last were in Iraq in 1998, we had completed a process of dismantling his nuclear weapons program.
To date, we haven’t seen evidence, that he’s rebuilt any component of that.
It’s possible that there may be some small bit of research going on here or there.
But it’s very difficult to hide a complete nuclear program.
And, to date, unless he’s acquired it from abroad, we haven’t seen evidence of any indigenous nuclear capability.
Mark Davis: Well, Hans Blix, the Chief UN Weapons Inspector, has had a similar reaction, with his now famous “There’s no smoking gun in Iraq” comment.
President Bush’s spokesman responded that,
“We know for a fact.
That there are weapons there.”
Have those so-called “facts.”
Been shown to your organization?
Mark Gwozdecky: Not yet.
We’ve gotten some information.
But we really haven’t got what we would call “actionable information.”
Information that leads us to people and places where illegal activities are taking place.
So, if any country has information, that there is a weapons program, we need to hear about it.
The resolution calls on member states, to provide that kind of information, to the inspectors.
We’ll be very keen to see it.
We expect to get more of this information in the weeks to come.
And we’ll be looking very extensively.
Into every lead that we get.
• Jacques Chirac (President of France) and Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei (enroute to Baghdad), press conference (Elysée Palace, Paris, Friday, January 17 2003), TF1 video (excerpt) {3:35, 1:10:39, at 12:45}, French transcript {pf, source}, transcript audio {16:16} (reading the French transcript).
• Charles J. Hanley (AP: Associated Press), “Inspectors Have Covered CIA's Sites of 'concern' and Reported No Iraqi Violations” (January 18 2003).
• David Kay, “It Was Never About a Smoking Gun” {pf} (Washington Post, January 19 2003).
• Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, returning from Baghdad, press conference {pf, copy, pf}, “Meeting of G. Papandreou with the UN Weapons Inspectors on Iraq” (Greece Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, January 20 2003).
• David Kay, interviewed by Liane Hansen, “Powell: Time 'Running Out' For Iraq” (NPR: National Public Radio, Weekend Edition Sunday, Washington D.C., January 26 2003), audio {5:52}, NPR transcript, “Interview: David Kay, former chief U.N. weapons inspector, discusses what can be expected when the current inspectors report to the Security Council tomorrow.”
• U.N. Security Council Meeting 4692, transcript, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692 {70kb.pdf, also via this, this, or ODS} (Monday January 27 2003, 10:40-11:35 a.m., 12 pages, SC/7644), reported, “After Briefing By Inspectors, Security Council Plans to Consult on Iraq Wednesday” {pf} (U.N. News, January 27 2003), U.N. video archive (dead link) {56:00}, C-Span video (10:28 a.m.) {1:05:00} (deleted).
•• Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), “Security Council Briefing: An Update on Inspections” {copy, copy, pf} (U.N. Security Council Meeting 4692, January 27 2003), reported, “Iraq Cooperating But Needs to Do More on 'Substance,' Blix Tells Security Council” {pf} (U.N. News, January 27 2003), BBC video {53:02, at 0:00-33:41, source}, excerpt {4:05}, CBC video {34:14, source}, CBS video (excerpt) {6:09, source}, PBS audio {33:24, source/transcript}.
•• Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), “Security Council Briefing: The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq” {copy} (U.N. Security Council Meeting 4692, January 27 2003), reported, “IAEA Chief: No Evidence So Far of Revived Iraqi Nuclear Arms Programme” {pf} (U.N. News, January 27 2003), BBC video {53:02, at 33:26-53:02, source}, CBC video {17:23, source}, PBS audio {19:19, source/transcript}.
•• Mohammed A. Aldouri (Iraq U.N. Ambassador), media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 27 2003), CBC video {6:02, source}, C-Span video (11:52 p.m.) {4:00} (deleted).
•• Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 27 2003, 12:22 p.m.), U.N. video (dead link), PBS video (excerpt) {10:26 bb, at 2:48-3:31 bb}, Ray Suarez, “The Reaction” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, January 27 2003), C-Span video (request) {0:04, schedule, 173042051, 174791-3}.
Sergei Lavrov {0:43 bb}: All these new finds — documents and physical evidence — do not change the basic assumption, on which UNMOVIC and IAEA are working.
Namely, that they don’t have any evidence.
That Iraq has resumed its WMD programs.
Nor can they assert, that all these programs have been stopped.
Flowing from this is the need for inspections to continue.
Reporter: The U.S. says that time is running out.
What does their pressure due to the process?
Sergei Lavrov: I think—
I think—
If somebody feels that time is running out, the question “why” should be asked from that particular country.
Not from me.
•• Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), press conference, “Briefing on the Iraq Weapons Inspectors' 60-Day Report: Iraqi Non-cooperation and Defiance of the UN” (U.S. State Department, Washington D.C., January 27 2003, 3:00 p.m.), DoS video (bb) {20:22 bb}, audio {20:22}, CBC video {19:02}, C-Span video (3:01 p.m.) {21:00, 174792-1}.
•• Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary), statement, “Jack Straw's Response to UN Weapons Inspectors' Report” {pf, source} (January 28 2003).
• Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), interviewed by Gwen Ifill, “Newsmaker: Mohamed ElBaradei” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, January 28 2003, 7:00 p.m.), video bb {12:31 bb} audio {12:24}.
• George W. Bush (U.S. President), “President Delivers "State of the Union"” {pf} (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, January 28 2003, 9:01-10:08 p.m.) video {59:52}, audio {59:52}, retitled, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” 39:5 WCPD 109-116 {34kb.txt, 50kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:39/5}. “The State of the Union Address by the President of the United States,” 149 Congressional Record H212-H215 {pf} {34kb.txt, 60kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-1, daily edition 149:15, January 28 2003) {SuDoc: X/A.108/1:149/15}. State of the Union Message (U.S. Congress 108-1, House Document 108-1, January 29 2003) {35kb.txt, purl, 52kb.pdf, purl} {SuDoc: Y 1.1/7:108-1, Serial Set: (none yet), LCCN: 2004356659, OCLC: 51721875, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}, BBC “News Special: State of the Union Address” (BBC 1 TV, January 29 2003, 1:50-3:30 a.m.) {BBCcat andf033d}, BBC video {59:45, source, source}.
George W. Bush: It is up to Iraq—
To show exactly where.
It is hiding its banned weapons.
Lay those weapons out.
For the world to see.
And destroy them.
As directed.
Nothing like this has happened.
The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons.
Sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax.
Enough doses to kill several million people.
He hasn't accounted for that material.
He's given no evidence, that he has destroyed it.
The United Nations concluded, that Saddam Hussein had materials.
Sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin.
Enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure.
He hasn't accounted for that material.
He's given no evidence, that he has destroyed it.
Our intelligence officials estimate, that Saddam Hussein had the materials, to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard, and VX nerve agent.
In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands.
He's not accounted for these materials.
He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.
U.S. intelligence indicates, that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions, capable of delivering chemical agents.
Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them, despite Iraq's recent declaration denying their existence.
Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions.
He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them.
From three Iraqi defectors, we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs.
These are designed to produce germ warfare agents and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors.
Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities.
He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them.
The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed, in the 1990s, that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon, and was working on five different methods, of enriching uranium, for a bomb.
The British Government has learned, that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium, from Africa.
Our intelligence sources tell us, that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes, suitable for nuclear weapons production.
Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities.
He clearly has much to hide.
The dictator of Iraq is not disarming.
To the contrary, he is deceiving.
From intelligence sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work—
Hiding documents and materials from the U.N. inspectors.
Sanitizing inspection sites.
And monitoring the inspectors themselves.
Iraqi officials accompany the inspectors in order to intimidate witnesses.
Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by the United Nations.
Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as the scientists inspectors are supposed to interview.
Real scientists have been coached by Iraqi officials on what to say.
Intelligence sources indicate—
That Saddam Hussein has ordered—
That scientists, who cooperate with U.N. inspectors, in disarming Iraq, will be killed.
Along with their families.
Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons of mass destruction. ...
Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal—
That Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists.
Including members of Al Qaida.
Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists.
Or help them develop their own.
* * *
We seek peace.
We strive for peace.
And sometimes peace must be defended.
A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all.
If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause, and by just means, sparing, in every way we can, the innocent.
And if war is forced upon us, we will fight, with the full force and might of the United States military.
And we will prevail.
And as we and our coalition partners are doing in Afghanistan, we will bring to the Iraqi people food, and medicines, and supplies, and freedom.
• Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), and others, media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 29 2003, 11:20 a.m.), U.N. video (dead links), C-Span video (request) {0:49, schedule, 173078626, 174820-1 (all speakers)} (deleted), partial transcript, “Press Conference by Russian Ambassador to U.N.” (CNN, Live Event/Special, January 29 2003, 11:22 a.m.) {archive}, reported, “U.N. Security Council confers on Iraq; U.S. ambassador: 'Diplomatic window is closing'” (CNN News, January 29 2003, 9:56 p.m. ET).
Question: Did the president made a compelling case last night?
In the State of the Union?
Do you think?
Sergei Lavrov: Well, we have heard the accusations, based on the paper which the United States circulated last December, based on the questions which still remain unanswered from UNSCOM times, and which were repeated by UNMOVIC, and these questions are well-known.
Question: —President Bush to go to war?
Sergei Lavrov: Well, we have not seen any reason, so far, to undercut the inspection process.
The inspections are useful.
They are efficient and effective.
And they should certainly continue.
* * *
Question: What evidence would Colin Powell have to present to convince you, that war is warranted?
Sergei Lavrov: Convincing.
Question: How convincing?
What exactly?
Sergei Lavrov: You know—
Are you seriously asking me this question?
I have—
{Crosstalk}
We would like to see undeniable proof.
OK?
Question: Ambassador, President Putin said yesterday that Russia might change its position.
Are you taking any action to encourage—
Sergei Lavrov: He did not say this.
{Crosstalk}
You reported this.
He did not say this.
You reported, that he was apparently ready to change his position.
Which is wrong.
He said, that we believe, that inspections must continue.
And that, if Iraq stops cooperating with inspectors, and starts blocking the inspectors, then certainly the Security Council would have to look into it.
We have been saying this all along.
That we are not in favor of inspections.
In spite of Iraqi’s cooperation.
But.
As long as Iraq cooperates.
They must continue.
So there is no change.
In Russian position.
• John Bolton under secretary of state for arms control and international security (T), DoS: U.S. State Department), interviewed in Washington D.C. by Gavin Esler (BBC 2 TV, Newsnight, January 29 2003, 10:30 p.m.) {BBCcat c:andt257d}, video {6:18}, BBC transcript.
Gavin Esler: Now, let’s cross over live to the State Department where we are joined by John Bolton.
One phrase, from the President, that really leapt out at me last night, was when he said,
Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as the scientists that inspectors are supposed to interview?
Do you have evidence?
That the Iraqis are really trying to dupe the inspectors in this way?
John Bolton: I think we have known, since the time of UNSCOM, the predecessor U.N. agency, that Iraqi intelligence, and its denial and deception mechanism, is intimately involved with all aspects of Iraq’s programs and weapons of mass destruction.
So I don’t think we should find this surprising at all.
It’s part of the very sophisticated Iraqi effort, to keep the inspectors from finding the critical evidence.
Gavin Esler: Well, are we getting to the point, where the United States would be able to declare publicly, that you believe, Iraq is in material breach of the UN resolution?
John Bolton: I think, Secretary Powell already said.
In response to the Iraqi December 7th declaration.
That that constituted a material breach.
And I think that the evidence we have had for quite some time.
At least some of which the Secretary will lay out next week.
Will demonstrate, convincingly.
One, that Iraq still has extensive programs, and weapons of mass destruction, and long-range ballistic missiles.
That would be a breach of the resolutions.
And second, that Iraq continues to engage in this extensive program of covering up and camouflaging the effort.
Which is a second breach of the resolution.
So.
I think, that is the mission that he has.
That the President has given him.
And that he will fulfil.
In quite convincing detail.
Gavin Esler: Well, a lot of people, as you know here, have been speculating, that this an Adlai Stevenson moment, rather like that moment in 1962, when Adlai Stevenson laid out the case against Cuba.
I mean, is it going to be in this great detail.
That there will be intelligence reports, perhaps pictures, and so on?
John Bolton: Well, it hasn’t been written yet, so I don’t want to foreshadow what exactly it might contain.
But I believe the essence of what the secretary will do, as the President said, in his State of the Union message, is detail the extent of Iraq’s programs of weapons of mass destruction.
And show how the Iraqis have been attempting to cover those programs up.
I think that’s what the President committed to, when we negotiated resolution 1441.
And it’s what I think will be important, in convincing even those who currently may not support taking this matter to the next step.
To show that Iraq has simply not accepted, that it has an obligation to disarm.
This is precisely the point that Hans Blix made on Monday.
Gavin Esler: Do you accept, though, that Colin Powell really has a lot of convincing to do?
Here, at home, as well?
I noticed the ABC poll yesterday, saying two-thirds of Americans want the inspectors to be given more time.
Kofi Annan wants more time.
Mohamed ElBaradei wants more time.
The French, and Germans, and Russians want more time.
John Bolton: I think the polls also show, overwhelmingly, that if Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, the American people would support the use of force.
Now that is not our preference.
And there is still time.
And this presentation by Secretary Powell is one further effort, to see if we can’t achieve the objectives of this 12-year series of U.N. resolutions, by peaceful means.
I mean, this is not a case of allowing the inspectors another few days, here or there.
We have been waiting for Iraq to be disarmed for 12 years.
That’s a long time.
Gavin Esler: The Russians saying today, that they want, quote “undeniable proof.”
Do you think, whatever the details that General Powell will release next week, you will have that?
You have undeniable proof.
That the Iraqis still have, or are working on, weapons of mass destruction?
John Bolton: There is absolutely no doubt.
That any fair minded person.
Listening to what the Secretary will say.
Has to come to the conclusion.
Both that,
The Iraqis have ongoing programs.
Involving chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
And that,
They have exerted a massive effort.
To cover all this up, and hide it.
From the U.N. inspectors.
Gavin Esler: I wondered, if you agreed with your colleague Donald Rumsfeld, over at the Pentagon, that the French and the Germans, in trying to be a brake on all this, are “old Europe.”
John Bolton: Well. I am not going to get into characterizations like that.
But I think one thing that is important, of course, is that not even the top leadership of those, and many other countries in Europe, have the kind of intelligence that we have.
We will be making available, in ways that have not been made available before.
Information.
Very specific.
Very concrete level.
That has convinced us, and the British, and others, over the months.
Just how serious the threat that Iraq still poses.
I hope that will be enough to persuade them.
Gavin Esler: Can we talk a little bit, in the couple of minutes we’ve got left, about these links that the President said last night.
We were discussing there with Arnaud De Borchgrave {Editor-at-Large, Washington Times, United Press International}.
“Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists,” the President said, “including members of Al-Qaeda.”
What have you got on this that we don’t already know?
John Bolton: Well, I think the President was referring in part to the fact Iraq has been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, for years.
And this isn’t speculation.
This has been documented, and released publicly, in the reports we file with Congress every year, and there’s a long record of it.
And I think the points that he made about Al-Qaeda, last night, are also subject to that kind of documentation.
Now how much will be part of the Secretary’s presentation, I don’t know.
I believe the presentation, though, will focus on what has been of particular importance, in the U.N. context, beginning with the cease-fire resolution 687, going back to 1991, that Iraq has been violating for 12 years.
Gavin Esler: The President also said, as he concluded his speech, last night.
He said.
“We will bring freedom to the Iraqi people.”
As well as medicines, supplies, and food.
“Bringing freedom to the Iraqi people.”
Again sounds like a slight shift of emphasis.
From resolution 1441.
Which talks about the arms issue.
This does sound again like a different agenda.
Which is regime-change.
John Bolton: I think that, if you have a regime like Saddam Hussein’s, whose very identity, for decades, has been bound up with its imperative to have weapons of mass destruction, that the consequences of eliminating the country of those weapons may well involve eliminating it of Saddam Hussein as well.
And if that comes to pass, and there is no final decision, I believe American and other coalition forces will be greeted as liberators.
Gavin Esler: Thank you very much.
• Hans Blix (New York City), interviewed Friday January 31 2003 by John Humphrys (London), “Iraq” (BBC Radio 4, Today, Saturday February 1 2003, 7-9am at 8:10-8:20 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx5403}, audio {10:21, rss rss menu, search, search, a/v, a/v, search, rss}, copy {10:05}, reported, “Iraq 'Only Weeks From War'” (BBC News, February 1 2003).
• Jimmy Carter (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1977-1981 Jan. 20), “An Alternative to War” (Carter Center, Atlanta Georgia, January 31 2003) {copy, copy}, reported, “Carter: Iraq Threat Does Not Justify War: Former president calls for 'sustained' inspection team” (CNN, Inside Politics, January 31 2003, 6:29 p.m.).
• U.N. Security Council Meeting 4701, transcript, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 {75kb.pdf, copy, also via this, this, or ODS} (Wednesday February 5 2003, 10.35-2:10 p.m., 39 pages, SC/7658), reported, “Powell Presents US Case to Security Council of Iraq's Failure to Disarm” {pf}, “Refuting US Charges in Security Council, Iraq Reaffirms Commitment to UN Inspections” {pf}, “Time Running Out for Iraqi Compliance With Demands to Disarm, Security Council Told” {pf} (U.K., Bulgaria, Spain), “Security Council Hears Repeated Calls for More Time for UN Inspections in Iraq” {pf} (France, China, Russia, Germany, Pakistan, Syria, Mexico, Chile, Cameroon, Angola, Guinea), “War Not Inevitable But Iraq Must Meet Security Council Demands — Annan” {pf} (U.N. News, February 5 2003), U.N. webcast archive (faulty link) (this link is to the meeting of March 7 2003).
•• Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State, Jan. 20 2001-2005 Jan. 26), “Remarks to the United Nations Security Council” {780kb.html with images, image menu} (U.N. Security Council, New York City, February 5 2003), DoS video {1:16:25, 239mb.wmv}, White House text {pf}, video {1:16:25}, audio {1:16:25}, BBC video {1:25:58, source}, CBC video: Powell-1 {28:49, source}, Powell-2 {10:00}, Powell-3 {10:00}, Powell-4 {16:36}, Powell-5 {10:00}, Powell-6 {10:00}, Powell-7 {10:15}, NPR audio {1:27:02, source}, PBS audio: Powell-1 {28:49, source}, Powell-2 {28:50}, Powell-3 {21:34}, China {4:29}, U.K., FCO transcript {pf, source} {10:49}, Russia {11:36}, France {10:38}, Syria {12:13}, Germany {6:17}, Iraq {12:39}.
“Powell was wrong on all his core assertions at the U.N.”
Powell cited almost no verifiable sources.
Many of his assertions were unattributed.
The speech had more than 40 vague references such as “human sources,” “an eyewitness,” “detainees,” “an al-Qaeda source,” “a senior defector,” “intelligence sources,” and the like. ...
Anonymity can be a license.
To exaggerate.
Or even lie ...
Powell embroidered.
One of the two {allegedly} intercepted conversations ...
Here is the relevant portion of the State Department’s translation of a Jan. 30 {alleged} conversation between Iraqi Republican Guard headquarters and an officer in the field:
Headquarters: They are inspecting the ammunition you have—
Field: Yes ...
HQ: —for the possibility there is, by chance, forbidden ammo.
Field: Yes.
HQ: And we sent you a message to inspect the scrap areas and the abandoned areas.
Field: Yes.
HQ: After you have carried out what is contained in the message, destroy the message.
Field: Yes.
HQ: Because I don’t want anyone to see this message.
Field: O.K., O.K.
In recounting this exchange.
Powell changed it.
Significantly.
In Powell’s version.
The order from headquarters.
To “inspect” for ammunition.
Became an order to—
“Clean out all of the areas.
The scrap areas.
The abandoned areas.”
Powell also claimed.
That headquarters told the field officer—
“Make sure there is nothing there.”
This instruction appears nowhere in the transcript.
When I asked the State Department’s press and public affairs offices, to explain the discrepancy, between its transcript, and Powell’s retelling, they referred me to the department’s Web site.
The material there simply confirmed, that Powell had misrepresented the intercept.
Gilbert Cranberg, “... Bring Back the Skeptical Press” {pf} (Washington Post, June 29 2003) {copy}.
____________________
Query: “Intercepted conversations”?
Sounds like a man who doesn’t want any paper record, Saddam could use, to accuse him later, of doing something Saddam didn’t like.
In case the people who told him to send the message, themselves fell out of favor, later, with Saddam, or were acting contrary to Saddam’s desires.
An SOP in Iraq, I imagine.
(Standard Operating Procedure).
And.
It sounds like a man.
Who wants his people.
To make sure.
That his people.
And the inspectors.
Search everywhere.
So the U.S. can’t later accuse the inspectors, of doing an inadequate job of inspection, by neglecting to search the scrap areas and the abandoned areas.
What is the striking—
Shocking—
Significance?
Of this conversation?—
This is the best they’ve got?
The most suspicious thing they can find?
From tens of thousands.
Or hundreds of thousands.
Of hours, of intercepted conversations?
This intercept is a 5-bell alarm.
That the U.S. has no evidence.
To back up its inflammatory, incendiary, baseless, allegations.
I guess that’s why.
Colin Powell.
And his large entourage.
Took such great care.
To lie.
About what it said.
This pathetic piece of evidence.
(If it’s even authentic).
Which proves nothing.
–CJHjr
My reaction was:
“That’s interesting stuff. Here’s a prosecutor putting something on the table. Let my experts assess the value of this.”
And I did that.
And they came back with comments, on a couple of cases, several cases, which they could judge, about sites where we had been.
And where they did not draw the same conclusion.
So, I became increasingly skeptical, about the evidence.
And then came Mohammed ElBaradei.
And he revealed, that this contract.
About the import of uranium oxide from Niger.
That it was a forgery.
And that, I thought, was really a bombshell.
If you allow the expression.
And so, we were very skeptical about it.
Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video {1:31:47, at 27:34}, audio {1:31:48, at 27:48}.
• Amer al-Saadi (Iraq scientific adviser, and liaison with UNMOVIC), press conference (Baghdad, February 5 2003), BBC video (excerpt) {1:14}, reported, “US Demands Action on Iraq” (BBC News, February 5 2003), transcript, “Iraqi Scientific Adviser Responds to Powell” (CNN, Live Event/Special, February 5 2003, 2:13 p.m. ET) {archive}.
Amer al-Saadi: ... Security Council Resolution 1441.
Paragraph 10 of the resolution calls upon member states to submit all evidence in their possession to the proper authority, that is, the two agencies, the IAEA and UNMOVIC.
Anything, any information, relevant to their mandates, in accordance with that resolution, should be handed over to them.
Because they are the proper channel to process and verify and assess these claims.
What we had today was for the general public, and mainly the uninformed, in order to influence their opinion, and to commit the aggression on Iraq.
• Amer al-Saadi (Iraq scientific adviser, and liaison with UNMOVIC), press conference (Baghdad, February 6 2003), BBC video (excerpt) {1:38}, reported, “Iraq Scorns US Arms Charges,” “Iraqi Rebuttal: Key Points” (BBC News, February 6 2003). Press conference transcript, in two parts, Amer al-Saadi, “Iraqi Rebuttal: Arms Allegations,” Said al-Musawi (Head, Organisation Department, Iraqi Foreign Ministry), “Iraqi Rebuttal: Terror Links” (BBC News, February 7 2003), partial transcript, “Al-Saadi Responds to Powell Remarks” (CNN, Live Event/Special, February 6 2003, 12:03 p.m. ET) {archive}.
• Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, press briefing (London, 10 Downing Street, February 6 2003), BBC video {2:24}, reported, “Inspectors Put Iraq on Week's Warning” (BBC News, February 6 2003, 17:01 GMT).
Hans Blix: We have had excellent access.
Everywhere we want to go.
And also prompt access.
And so, this has worked.
• Joschka Fischer (German Foreign Minister), Donald Rumsfeld (U.S. Defense Secretary), colloquy, Saturday February 8 2003, at the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy (Munich, February 7-9 2003), CBS video {1:53, at 0:57, source}, Mark Phillips, “U.N. Brass Returns to Baghdad,” (CBS News, February 8 2003), PBS video bb {4:15 bb, at 1:34 bb (Paris), 1:47 bb (Munich), 2:32 bb (Rumsfeld), 3:28 bb (Fischer)}, audio (includes a panel discussion) {20:33, at 1:33 (Paris), 2:17 (Munich), 2:31 (Rumsfeld), 3:27 (Fischer)}, Kwame Holman, “Background: Deepening Divide” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Monday February 10 2003, 7:00 p.m.), transcripts, Rumsfeld’s speech {copy}, press conference {copy}.
Donald Rumsfeld {0:32} {1:47 bb, audio}:
It’s difficult to believe.
That there still could be questions.
In the minds of reasonable people.
Open to the facts before them.
The threat is there to see.
* * *
The likely effect would be, that,
Germany and France would isolate themselves.
Rather than isolate the United States.
* * *
Joschka Fischer: {German} In this democracy, my generation has learned:
{English} You have to make the case.
And to make the case.
In a democracy.
You must convince by yourself {be convinced yourself}.
And, excuse me—
I am not convinced.
This is my problem.
And I cannot go to the public.
And say:
“Well.
Let’s go to war.
Because there are reasons.”
And so on.
And I don’t believe in that.
• Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, “Press Conference by the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix, and the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, in Baghdad, Iraq” {pf} {14kb.pdf, source} (transcripts) (Baghdad, February 9 2003), BBC video {15:05}, audio {15:53}, reported, “'Good Progress' at Iraqi Talks” {earlier} (BBC News, February 9 2003), CBC video (68%, higher resolution): Blix {4:23}, ElBaradei {