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Ditto Iran?

Iraq WMD War: Timeline 2003, video/audio, sources


by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 2003 


Congress debates, votes
Iraq wmd war timeline: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005-2006, 2007
David Kay
Charles Duelfer
Iran uranium timeline
Israel/Palestine timeline:
Palestine Peace Not Apartheid
The Israel Lobby
Settlements
Blockade, reprisals

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), “Briefing the Security Council, 9 January 2003: Inspections in Iraq and a Further Assessment of Iraq's Weapons Declaration” {copy, copy, pf} (U.N. Security Council, January 9 2003) (closed meeting, SC/7628), reported, “Security Council Voices Full Backing for Work of UN Arms Inspectors in Iraq” (U.N. News, January 9 2003).

Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), “Status of the Agency's Verification Activities in Iraq as of 8 January 2003” (U.N. Security Council, January 9 2003) (closed meeting).

Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, “Press Encounter with Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of IAEA” {pf} {copy, source}, media stakeout with them and others, following a closed Security Council briefing (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 9 2003, 1:10 p.m.), reported, “Many Holes in Iraqi Arms Declaration but No 'Smoking Gun,' UN Inspectors Say” {pf} (U.N. News, January 9 2003), U.N. video (dead link), CBC video {11:46, source}, PBS audio {11:57, source}, C-Span video (request) {36:09, smil, 8 speakers: 48:37, 57:44, schedule, 6 speakers: 172719880, 174551-1, U.K. Greenstock: 172721378, 174553-1, Russia Lavrov: 172723006, 174556-1, rss, archive, search: Blix, ElBaradei, Greenstock, Lavrov, library: Blix, ElBaradei, Greenstock, Lavrov}, reported, “U.N. Inspectors Say They've Found No "Smoking Gun" In Iraq,” “Inspecting Iraq” (PBS NewsHour, January 9 2003), earlier, “Hans Blix Comments on Entering the Building{pf} (U.N. building, elevator/lift lobby, media stakeout before the briefing, January 9 2003), BBC video {3:59}, reported, “'No Smoking Guns' in Iraq Arms Search” (BBC News, January 9 2003).


“ Hans Blix: Mr ElBaradei and I have briefed the Council. And, for my part, I said, that we still get prompt access from the Iraqi side; that the inspections are covering every wider areas, and ever more sites, in Iraq; that in the course of these inspections we have not found any smoking gun.

Mohamed ElBaradei: We are getting access to all the sites ...

We need more actionable information.

On the part of the governments ...

We believe, at this stage, that these aluminum tubes were intended for manufacturing of rockets.”

Ari Fleischer (White House Press Secretary), “Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer{pf} (White House, January 9 2003, 1:07-1:45 p.m. ET).

 

“ Question: Can we presume?

That the President is very happy?

That Mr. Blix says,

“There is no smoking gun.”

In the search for weapons in Iraq.

Ari Fleischer: Well, the problem with guns that are hidden is you can’t see their smoke.

And so we will still await to see, what the inspectors find in Iraq, and what events in Iraq lead to ...

Question: But it wouldn’t be disappointing.

Would it?

If there were no weapons there?

Ari Fleischer: We know for a fact.

That there are weapons there.

And so—

The inspectors also went on—

Question: What’s the search all about?

If you know it, so factually?

Ari Fleischer: ... So while they’ve said that there’s no smoking gun, they said the absence of it is not assured.

And that’s the heart of the problem.

The heart of the problem is, Iraq is very good at hiding things.”

Hans Blix, interviewed by Lyse Doucet (BBC World Service, Newshour, January 13 2003, 9.00 p.m. GMT) (broadcast overseas, by satellite, and by U.S. radio stations (broadcast times of 168 listed here), audio {11:07, search, search, a/v, a/v, search}, copy {11:05}, transcript (faulty), reported, “Iraq Inspectors 'Need Time' (BBC News, January 14 2003, 12:36 GMT).

 

“ Lyse Doucet: Colin Powell has said.

They have vital intelligence.

Have they given it to you?

Hans Blix: We had fairly good co-operation.

Both with the Americans, and British.

And other sources of intelligence.

And we are beginning to make more use of it.

Lyse Doucet: How can you say you have good relations?

If they haven’t given you all the intelligence, so far?

Hans Blix: Well, they have given a lot of, shall we say, information, about how they calculate their programmes, what size they are, and so forth.

But we need — what my friend Mohamed ElBaradei called — “actionable evidence.”

That’s indications of where we can go.

What places that we can inspect.

That will also be coming.

Lyse Doucet: So.

While you race around Baghdad.

And its environs.

You’re acutely aware.

That the Americans.

And the British.

Have intelligence.

Which could make your job easier.

But they haven’t given it to you, yet.

Hans Blix: What I am saying is.

That it is coming.

And we are going to act on it.

I don’t think I can go into any more detail.

Lyse Doucet: But, how do you explain the fact.

That they haven’t given it to you?

What is their game?

You’re supposed to be on the same side.

In principle.

Hans Blix: Well.

I think you’d better ask them the question.

Lyse Doucet: What about you?

You’re the man.

Who’s supposed to find the evidence.

And if you don’t get the intelligence.

To do it—

Hans Blix: I’ve felt in the past, at some time, that they were a bit like librarians, who had books, that they didn’t want to lend, to the customer.

But I think that is changing.

Lyse Doucet: But it’s not just a library.

We’re talking about here.

We’re talking about a potential war.

Which could have devastating consequences.

And.

They are not giving you full co-operation.

Hans Blix: Well.

I am not saying, that they are not giving us adequate co-operation.

At the present time.

It is changing.”

Mark Gwozdecky (Vienna) (IAEA Director of Public Information and Spokesperson), intervewed by Mark Davis (Syndey), Mark Gwozdecky Interview” (SBS News, Dateline, Sydney, January 15 2003, 8:30 p.m.), video (none posted), transcript (mistakenly posted with the wrong video).

 

“ Mark Davis: To date.

Is there any evidence.

Whatsoever.

Of an Iraqi nuclear capacity?

Mark Gwozdecky: To date, Mark, we haven’t found such evidence.

When we last were in Iraq in 1998, we had completed a process of dismantling his nuclear weapons program.

To date, we haven’t seen evidence, that he’s rebuilt any component of that.

It’s possible that there may be some small bit of research going on here or there.

But it’s very difficult to hide a complete nuclear program.

And, to date, unless he’s acquired it from abroad, we haven’t seen evidence of any indigenous nuclear capability.

Mark Davis: Well, Hans Blix, the Chief UN Weapons Inspector, has had a similar reaction, with his now famous “There’s no smoking gun in Iraq” comment.

President Bush’s spokesman responded that,

“We know for a fact.

That there are weapons there.”

Have those so-called “facts.”

Been shown to your organization?

Mark Gwozdecky: Not yet.

We’ve gotten some information.

But we really haven’t got what we would call “actionable information.”

Information that leads us to people and places where illegal activities are taking place.

So, if any country has information, that there is a weapons program, we need to hear about it.

The resolution calls on member states, to provide that kind of information, to the inspectors.

We’ll be very keen to see it.

We expect to get more of this information in the weeks to come.

And we’ll be looking very extensively.

Into every lead that we get.”

Jacques Chirac (President of France) and Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei (enroute to Baghdad), press conference (Elysée Palace, Paris, Friday, January 17 2003), TF1 video (excerpt) {3:35, 1:10:39, at 12:45}, French transcript {pf, source}, transcript audio {16:16} (reading the French transcript).

Charles J. Hanley (AP: Associated Press), “Inspectors Have Covered CIA's Sites of 'concern' and Reported No Iraqi Violations” (January 18 2003).

David Kay, “It Was Never About a Smoking Gun{pf} (Washington Post, January 19 2003).

Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, returning from Baghdad, press conference {pf, copy, pf}, “Meeting of G. Papandreou with the UN Weapons Inspectors on Iraq” (Greece Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, January 20 2003).

David Kay, interviewed by Liane Hansen, “Powell: Time 'Running Out' For Iraq” (NPR: National Public Radio, Weekend Edition Sunday, Washington D.C., January 26 2003), audio {5:52}, NPR transcript, “Interview: David Kay, former chief U.N. weapons inspector, discusses what can be expected when the current inspectors report to the Security Council tomorrow.”

U.N. Security Council Meeting 4692, transcript, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4692 {70kb.pdf, also via this, this, or ODS} (Monday January 27 2003, 10:40-11:35 a.m., 12 pages, SC/7644), reported, “After Briefing By Inspectors, Security Council Plans to Consult on Iraq Wednesday{pf} (U.N. News, January 27 2003), U.N. video archive (dead link) {56:00}, C-Span video (10:28 a.m.) {1:05:00} (deleted).

•• Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), “Security Council Briefing: An Update on Inspections{copy, copy, pf} (U.N. Security Council Meeting 4692, January 27 2003), reported, “Iraq Cooperating But Needs to Do More on 'Substance,' Blix Tells Security Council{pf} (U.N. News, January 27 2003), BBC video {53:02, at 0:00-33:41, source}, excerpt {4:05}, CBC video {34:14, source}, CBS video (excerpt) {6:09, source}, PBS audio {33:24, source/transcript}.

•• Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), “Security Council Briefing: The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq{copy} (U.N. Security Council Meeting 4692, January 27 2003), reported, “IAEA Chief: No Evidence So Far of Revived Iraqi Nuclear Arms Programme{pf} (U.N. News, January 27 2003), BBC video {53:02, at 33:26-53:02, source}, CBC video {17:23, source}, PBS audio {19:19, source/transcript}.

•• Mohammed A. Aldouri (Iraq U.N. Ambassador), media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 27 2003), CBC video {6:02, source}, C-Span video (11:52 p.m.) {4:00} (deleted).

•• Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 27 2003, 12:22 p.m.), U.N. video (dead link), PBS video (excerpt) {10:26 bb, at 2:48-3:31 bb}, Ray Suarez, “The Reaction” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, January 27 2003), C-Span video (request) {0:04, schedule, 173042051, 174791-3}.

 

“ Sergei Lavrov {0:43 bb}: All these new finds — documents and physical evidence — do not change the basic assumption, on which UNMOVIC and IAEA are working.

Namely, that they don’t have any evidence.

That Iraq has resumed its WMD programs.

Nor can they assert, that all these programs have been stopped.

Flowing from this is the need for inspections to continue.

Reporter: The U.S. says that time is running out.

What does their pressure due to the process?

Sergei Lavrov: I think—

I think—

If somebody feels that time is running out, the question “why” should be asked from that particular country.

Not from me.”

•• Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), press conference, “Briefing on the Iraq Weapons Inspectors' 60-Day Report: Iraqi Non-cooperation and Defiance of the UN” (U.S. State Department, Washington D.C., January 27 2003, 3:00 p.m.), DoS video (bb) {20:22 bb}, audio {20:22}, CBC video {19:02}, C-Span video (3:01 p.m.) {21:00, 174792-1}.

•• Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary), statement, “Jack Straw's Response to UN Weapons Inspectors' Report” {pf, source} (January 28 2003).

Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), interviewed by Gwen Ifill, “Newsmaker: Mohamed ElBaradei” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, January 28 2003, 7:00 p.m.), video bb {12:31 bb} audio {12:24}.

George W. Bush (U.S. President), “President Delivers "State of the Union"{pf} (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, January 28 2003, 9:01-10:08 p.m.) video {59:52}, audio {59:52}, retitled, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” 39:5 WCPD 109-116 {34kb.txt, 50kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:39/5}. “The State of the Union Address by the President of the United States,” 149 Congressional Record H212-H215 {pf} {34kb.txt, 60kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-1, daily edition 149:15, January 28 2003) {SuDoc: X/A.108/1:149/15}. State of the Union Message (U.S. Congress 108-1, House Document 108-1, January 29 2003) {35kb.txt, purl, 52kb.pdf, purl} {SuDoc: Y 1.1/7:108-1, Serial Set: (none yet), LCCN: 2004356659, OCLC: 51721875, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}, BBC “News Special: State of the Union Address” (BBC 1 TV, January 29 2003, 1:50-3:30 a.m.) {BBCcat andf033d}, BBC video {59:45, source, source}.

 

“ George W. Bush: It is up to Iraq—

To show exactly where.

It is hiding its banned weapons.

Lay those weapons out.

For the world to see.

And destroy them.

As directed.

Nothing like this has happened.

The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons.

Sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax.

Enough doses to kill several million people.

He hasn't accounted for that material.

He's given no evidence, that he has destroyed it.

The United Nations concluded, that Saddam Hussein had materials.

Sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin.

Enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure.

He hasn't accounted for that material.

He's given no evidence, that he has destroyed it.

Our intelligence officials estimate, that Saddam Hussein had the materials, to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard, and VX nerve agent.

In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands.

He's not accounted for these materials.

He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

U.S. intelligence indicates, that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions, capable of delivering chemical agents.

Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them, despite Iraq's recent declaration denying their existence.

Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions.

He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

From three Iraqi defectors, we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs.

These are designed to produce germ warfare agents and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors.

Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities.

He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed, in the 1990s, that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon, and was working on five different methods, of enriching uranium, for a bomb.

The British Government has learned, that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium, from Africa.

Our intelligence sources tell us, that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes, suitable for nuclear weapons production.

Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities.

He clearly has much to hide.

The dictator of Iraq is not disarming.

To the contrary, he is deceiving.

From intelligence sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work—

Hiding documents and materials from the U.N. inspectors.

Sanitizing inspection sites.

And monitoring the inspectors themselves.

Iraqi officials accompany the inspectors in order to intimidate witnesses.

Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by the United Nations.

Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as the scientists inspectors are supposed to interview.

Real scientists have been coached by Iraqi officials on what to say.

Intelligence sources indicate—

That Saddam Hussein has ordered—

That scientists, who cooperate with U.N. inspectors, in disarming Iraq, will be killed.

Along with their families.

Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons of mass destruction. ...

Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal—

That Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists.

Including members of Al Qaida.

Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists.

Or help them develop their own.

* * *

We seek peace.

We strive for peace.

And sometimes peace must be defended.

A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all.

If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause, and by just means, sparing, in every way we can, the innocent.

And if war is forced upon us, we will fight, with the full force and might of the United States military.

And we will prevail.

And as we and our coalition partners are doing in Afghanistan, we will bring to the Iraqi people food, and medicines, and supplies, and freedom.”

Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), and others, media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 29 2003, 11:20 a.m.), U.N. video (dead links), C-Span video (request) {0:49, schedule, 173078626, 174820-1 (all speakers)} (deleted), partial transcript, “Press Conference by Russian Ambassador to U.N.” (CNN, Live Event/Special, January 29 2003, 11:22 a.m.) {archive}, reported, “U.N. Security Council confers on Iraq; U.S. ambassador: 'Diplomatic window is closing' (CNN News, January 29 2003, 9:56 p.m. ET).

 

“ Question: Did the president made a compelling case last night?

In the State of the Union?

Do you think?

Sergei Lavrov: Well, we have heard the accusations, based on the paper which the United States circulated last December, based on the questions which still remain unanswered from UNSCOM times, and which were repeated by UNMOVIC, and these questions are well-known.

Question: —President Bush to go to war?

Sergei Lavrov: Well, we have not seen any reason, so far, to undercut the inspection process.

The inspections are useful.

They are efficient and effective.

And they should certainly continue.

* * *

Question: What evidence would Colin Powell have to present to convince you, that war is warranted?

Sergei Lavrov: Convincing.

Question: How convincing?

What exactly?

Sergei Lavrov: You know—

Are you seriously asking me this question?

I have—

{Crosstalk}

We would like to see undeniable proof.

OK?

Question: Ambassador, President Putin said yesterday that Russia might change its position.

Are you taking any action to encourage—

Sergei Lavrov: He did not say this.

{Crosstalk}

You reported this.

He did not say this.

You reported, that he was apparently ready to change his position.

Which is wrong.

He said, that we believe, that inspections must continue.

And that, if Iraq stops cooperating with inspectors, and starts blocking the inspectors, then certainly the Security Council would have to look into it.

We have been saying this all along.

That we are not in favor of inspections.

In spite of Iraqi’s cooperation.

But.

As long as Iraq cooperates.

They must continue.

So there is no change.

In Russian position.”

John Bolton under secretary of state for arms control and international security (T), DoS: U.S. State Department), interviewed in Washington D.C. by Gavin Esler (BBC 2 TV, Newsnight, January 29 2003, 10:30 p.m.) {BBCcat c:andt257d}, video {6:18}, BBC transcript.

 

“ Gavin Esler: Now, let’s cross over live to the State Department where we are joined by John Bolton.

One phrase, from the President, that really leapt out at me last night, was when he said,

Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as the scientists that inspectors are supposed to interview?

Do you have evidence?

That the Iraqis are really trying to dupe the inspectors in this way?

John Bolton: I think we have known, since the time of UNSCOM, the predecessor U.N. agency, that Iraqi intelligence, and its denial and deception mechanism, is intimately involved with all aspects of Iraq’s programs and weapons of mass destruction.

So I don’t think we should find this surprising at all.

It’s part of the very sophisticated Iraqi effort, to keep the inspectors from finding the critical evidence.

Gavin Esler: Well, are we getting to the point, where the United States would be able to declare publicly, that you believe, Iraq is in material breach of the UN resolution?

John Bolton: I think, Secretary Powell already said.

In response to the Iraqi December 7th declaration.

That that constituted a material breach.

And I think that the evidence we have had for quite some time.

At least some of which the Secretary will lay out next week.

Will demonstrate, convincingly.

One, that Iraq still has extensive programs, and weapons of mass destruction, and long-range ballistic missiles.

That would be a breach of the resolutions.

And second, that Iraq continues to engage in this extensive program of covering up and camouflaging the effort.

Which is a second breach of the resolution.

So.

I think, that is the mission that he has.

That the President has given him.

And that he will fulfil.

In quite convincing detail.

Gavin Esler: Well, a lot of people, as you know here, have been speculating, that this an Adlai Stevenson moment, rather like that moment in 1962, when Adlai Stevenson laid out the case against Cuba.

I mean, is it going to be in this great detail.

That there will be intelligence reports, perhaps pictures, and so on?

John Bolton: Well, it hasn’t been written yet, so I don’t want to foreshadow what exactly it might contain.

But I believe the essence of what the secretary will do, as the President said, in his State of the Union message, is detail the extent of Iraq’s programs of weapons of mass destruction.

And show how the Iraqis have been attempting to cover those programs up.

I think that’s what the President committed to, when we negotiated resolution 1441.

And it’s what I think will be important, in convincing even those who currently may not support taking this matter to the next step.

To show that Iraq has simply not accepted, that it has an obligation to disarm.

This is precisely the point that Hans Blix made on Monday.

Gavin Esler: Do you accept, though, that Colin Powell really has a lot of convincing to do?

Here, at home, as well?

I noticed the ABC poll yesterday, saying two-thirds of Americans want the inspectors to be given more time.

Kofi Annan wants more time.

Mohamed ElBaradei wants more time.

The French, and Germans, and Russians want more time.

John Bolton: I think the polls also show, overwhelmingly, that if Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, the American people would support the use of force.

Now that is not our preference.

And there is still time.

And this presentation by Secretary Powell is one further effort, to see if we can’t achieve the objectives of this 12-year series of U.N. resolutions, by peaceful means.

I mean, this is not a case of allowing the inspectors another few days, here or there.

We have been waiting for Iraq to be disarmed for 12 years.

That’s a long time.

Gavin Esler: The Russians saying today, that they want, quote “undeniable proof.”

Do you think, whatever the details that General Powell will release next week, you will have that?

You have undeniable proof.

That the Iraqis still have, or are working on, weapons of mass destruction?

John Bolton: There is absolutely no doubt.

That any fair minded person.

Listening to what the Secretary will say.

Has to come to the conclusion.

Both that,

The Iraqis have ongoing programs.

Involving chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

And that,

They have exerted a massive effort.

To cover all this up, and hide it.

From the U.N. inspectors.

Gavin Esler: I wondered, if you agreed with your colleague Donald Rumsfeld, over at the Pentagon, that the French and the Germans, in trying to be a brake on all this, are “old Europe.”

John Bolton: Well. I am not going to get into characterizations like that.

But I think one thing that is important, of course, is that not even the top leadership of those, and many other countries in Europe, have the kind of intelligence that we have.

We will be making available, in ways that have not been made available before.

Information.

Very specific.

Very concrete level.

That has convinced us, and the British, and others, over the months.

Just how serious the threat that Iraq still poses.

I hope that will be enough to persuade them.

Gavin Esler: Can we talk a little bit, in the couple of minutes we’ve got left, about these links that the President said last night.

We were discussing there with Arnaud De Borchgrave {Editor-at-Large, Washington Times, United Press International}.

“Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists,” the President said, “including members of Al-Qaeda.”

What have you got on this that we don’t already know?

John Bolton: Well, I think the President was referring in part to the fact Iraq has been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, for years.

And this isn’t speculation.

This has been documented, and released publicly, in the reports we file with Congress every year, and there’s a long record of it.

And I think the points that he made about Al-Qaeda, last night, are also subject to that kind of documentation.

Now how much will be part of the Secretary’s presentation, I don’t know.

I believe the presentation, though, will focus on what has been of particular importance, in the U.N. context, beginning with the cease-fire resolution 687, going back to 1991, that Iraq has been violating for 12 years.

Gavin Esler: The President also said, as he concluded his speech, last night.

He said.

“We will bring freedom to the Iraqi people.”

As well as medicines, supplies, and food.

“Bringing freedom to the Iraqi people.”

Again sounds like a slight shift of emphasis.

From resolution 1441.

Which talks about the arms issue.

This does sound again like a different agenda.

Which is regime-change.

John Bolton: I think that, if you have a regime like Saddam Hussein’s, whose very identity, for decades, has been bound up with its imperative to have weapons of mass destruction, that the consequences of eliminating the country of those weapons may well involve eliminating it of Saddam Hussein as well.

And if that comes to pass, and there is no final decision, I believe American and other coalition forces will be greeted as liberators.

Gavin Esler: Thank you very much.”

Hans Blix (New York City), interviewed Friday January 31 2003 by John Humphrys (London), “Iraq” (BBC Radio 4, Today, Saturday February 1 2003, 7-9am at 8:10-8:20 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx5403}, audio {10:21, rss rss menu, search, search, a/v, a/v, search, rss}, copy {10:05}, reported, “Iraq 'Only Weeks From War' (BBC News, February 1 2003).

Jimmy Carter (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1977-1981 Jan. 20), “An Alternative to War” (Carter Center, Atlanta Georgia, January 31 2003) {copy, copy}, reported, “Carter: Iraq Threat Does Not Justify War: Former president calls for 'sustained' inspection team” (CNN, Inside Politics, January 31 2003, 6:29 p.m.).

U.N. Security Council Meeting 4701, transcript, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 {75kb.pdf, copy, also via this, this, or ODS} (Wednesday February 5 2003, 10.35-2:10 p.m., 39 pages, SC/7658), reported, “Powell Presents US Case to Security Council of Iraq's Failure to Disarm” {pf}, “Refuting US Charges in Security Council, Iraq Reaffirms Commitment to UN Inspections” {pf}, “Time Running Out for Iraqi Compliance With Demands to Disarm, Security Council Told” {pf} (U.K., Bulgaria, Spain), “Security Council Hears Repeated Calls for More Time for UN Inspections in Iraq” {pf} (France, China, Russia, Germany, Pakistan, Syria, Mexico, Chile, Cameroon, Angola, Guinea), “War Not Inevitable But Iraq Must Meet Security Council Demands — Annan” {pf} (U.N. News, February 5 2003), U.N. webcast archive (faulty link) (this link is to the meeting of March 7 2003).

•• Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State, Jan. 20 2001-2005 Jan. 26), “Remarks to the United Nations Security Council{780kb.html with images, image menu} (U.N. Security Council, New York City, February 5 2003), DoS video {1:16:25, 239mb.wmv}, White House text {pf}, video {1:16:25}, audio {1:16:25}, BBC video {1:25:58, source}, CBC video: Powell-1 {28:49, source}, Powell-2 {10:00}, Powell-3 {10:00}, Powell-4 {16:36}, Powell-5 {10:00}, Powell-6 {10:00}, Powell-7 {10:15}, NPR audio {1:27:02, source}, PBS audio: Powell-1 {28:49, source}, Powell-2 {28:50}, Powell-3 {21:34}, China {4:29}, U.K., FCO transcript {pf, source} {10:49}, Russia {11:36}, France {10:38}, Syria {12:13}, Germany {6:17}, Iraq {12:39}.

Powell was wrong on all his core assertions at the U.N.

 

“ Powell cited almost no verifiable sources.

Many of his assertions were unattributed.

The speech had more than 40 vague references such as “human sources,” “an eyewitness,” “detainees,” “an al-Qaeda source,” “a senior defector,” “intelligence sources,” and the like. ...

Anonymity can be a license.

To exaggerate.

Or even lie ...

Powell embroidered.

One of the two {allegedly} intercepted conversations ...

Here is the relevant portion of the State Department’s translation of a Jan. 30 {alleged} conversation between Iraqi Republican Guard headquarters and an officer in the field:

Headquarters: They are inspecting the ammunition you have—

Field: Yes ...

HQ: —for the possibility there is, by chance, forbidden ammo.

Field: Yes.

HQ: And we sent you a message to inspect the scrap areas and the abandoned areas.

Field: Yes.

HQ: After you have carried out what is contained in the message, destroy the message.

Field: Yes.

HQ: Because I don’t want anyone to see this message.

Field: O.K., O.K.

In recounting this exchange.

Powell changed it.

Significantly.

In Powell’s version.

The order from headquarters.

To “inspect” for ammunition.

Became an order to—

“Clean out all of the areas.

The scrap areas.

The abandoned areas.”

Powell also claimed.

That headquarters told the field officer—

“Make sure there is nothing there.”

This instruction appears nowhere in the transcript.

When I asked the State Department’s press and public affairs offices, to explain the discrepancy, between its transcript, and Powell’s retelling, they referred me to the department’s Web site.

The material there simply confirmed, that Powell had misrepresented the intercept.”

Gilbert Cranberg, “... Bring Back the Skeptical Press{pf} (Washington Post, June 29 2003) {copy}.

____________________

 

Query: Intercepted conversations”?

Sounds like a man who doesn’t want any paper record, Saddam could use, to accuse him later, of doing something Saddam didn’t like.

In case the people who told him to send the message, themselves fell out of favor, later, with Saddam, or were acting contrary to Saddam’s desires.

An SOP in Iraq, I imagine.

(Standard Operating Procedure).

And.

It sounds like a man.

Who wants his people.

To make sure.

That his people.

And the inspectors.

Search everywhere.

So the U.S. can’t later accuse the inspectors, of doing an inadequate job of inspection, by neglecting to search the scrap areas and the abandoned areas.

What is the striking—

Shocking—

Significance?

Of this conversation?—

This is the best they’ve got?

The most suspicious thing they can find?

From tens of thousands.

Or hundreds of thousands.

Of hours, of intercepted conversations?

This intercept is a 5-bell alarm.

That the U.S. has no evidence.

To back up its inflammatory, incendiary, baseless, allegations.

I guess that’s why.

Colin Powell.

And his large entourage.

Took such great care.

To lie.

About what it said.

This pathetic piece of evidence.

(If it’s even authentic).

Which proves nothing.

  CJHjr

 

“ Hans Blix {0:37, audio}:

My reaction was:

“That’s interesting stuff. Here’s a prosecutor putting something on the table. Let my experts assess the value of this.”

And I did that.

And they came back with comments, on a couple of cases, several cases, which they could judge, about sites where we had been.

And where they did not draw the same conclusion.

So, I became increasingly skeptical, about the evidence.

And then came Mohammed ElBaradei.

And he revealed, that this contract.

About the import of uranium oxide from Niger.

That it was a forgery.

And that, I thought, was really a bombshell.

If you allow the expression.

And so, we were very skeptical about it.”

Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video {1:31:47, at 27:34}, audio {1:31:48, at 27:48}.

Amer al-Saadi (Iraq scientific adviser, and liaison with UNMOVIC), press conference (Baghdad, February 5 2003), BBC video (excerpt) {1:14}, reported, “US Demands Action on Iraq” (BBC News, February 5 2003), transcript, “Iraqi Scientific Adviser Responds to Powell” (CNN, Live Event/Special, February 5 2003, 2:13 p.m. ET) {archive}.

 

“ Amer al-Saadi: ... Security Council Resolution 1441.

Paragraph 10 of the resolution calls upon member states to submit all evidence in their possession to the proper authority, that is, the two agencies, the IAEA and UNMOVIC.

Anything, any information, relevant to their mandates, in accordance with that resolution, should be handed over to them.

Because they are the proper channel to process and verify and assess these claims.

What we had today was for the general public, and mainly the uninformed, in order to influence their opinion, and to commit the aggression on Iraq.”

Amer al-Saadi (Iraq scientific adviser, and liaison with UNMOVIC), press conference (Baghdad, February 6 2003), BBC video (excerpt) {1:38}, reported, “Iraq Scorns US Arms Charges,” “Iraqi Rebuttal: Key Points” (BBC News, February 6 2003). Press conference transcript, in two parts, Amer al-Saadi, “Iraqi Rebuttal: Arms Allegations,” Said al-Musawi (Head, Organisation Department, Iraqi Foreign Ministry), “Iraqi Rebuttal: Terror Links” (BBC News, February 7 2003), partial transcript, “Al-Saadi Responds to Powell Remarks” (CNN, Live Event/Special, February 6 2003, 12:03 p.m. ET) {archive}.

Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, press briefing (London, 10 Downing Street, February 6 2003), BBC video {2:24}, reported, “Inspectors Put Iraq on Week's Warning” (BBC News, February 6 2003, 17:01 GMT).

 

“ Hans Blix: We have had excellent access.

Everywhere we want to go.

And also prompt access.

And so, this has worked.”

Joschka Fischer (German Foreign Minister), Donald Rumsfeld (U.S. Defense Secretary), colloquy, Saturday February 8 2003, at the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy (Munich, February 7-9 2003), CBS video {1:53, at 0:57, source}, Mark Phillips, “U.N. Brass Returns to Baghdad, (CBS News, February 8 2003), PBS video bb {4:15 bb, at 1:34 bb (Paris), 1:47 bb (Munich), 2:32 bb (Rumsfeld), 3:28 bb (Fischer)}, audio (includes a panel discussion) {20:33, at 1:33 (Paris), 2:17 (Munich), 2:31 (Rumsfeld), 3:27 (Fischer)}, Kwame Holman, “Background: Deepening Divide” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Monday February 10 2003, 7:00 p.m.), transcripts, Rumsfeld’s speech {copy}, press conference {copy}.

 

“ Donald Rumsfeld {0:32} {1:47 bb, audio}:

It’s difficult to believe.

That there still could be questions.

In the minds of reasonable people.

Open to the facts before them.

The threat is there to see.

* * *

The likely effect would be, that,

Germany and France would isolate themselves.

Rather than isolate the United States.

* * *

Joschka Fischer: {German} In this democracy, my generation has learned:

{English} You have to make the case.

And to make the case.

In a democracy.

You must convince by yourself {be convinced yourself}.

And, excuse me—

I am not convinced.

This is my problem.

And I cannot go to the public.

And say:

“Well.

Let’s go to war.

Because there are reasons.”

And so on.

And I don’t believe in that.”

Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei, “Press Conference by the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix, and the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, in Baghdad, Iraq” {pf} {14kb.pdf, source} (transcripts) (Baghdad, February 9 2003), BBC video {15:05}, audio {15:53}, reported, 'Good Progress' at Iraqi Talks{earlier} (BBC News, February 9 2003), CBC video (68%, higher resolution): Blix {4:23}, ElBaradei {6:30}, reported, “Iraq Begins 'Change of Heart': Inspectors” (CBC News, February 10 2003), partial transcript, “Blix, ElBaradei Hold News Conference” (CNN, Live Event/Special, February 9 2003, 11:33 a.m. ET) {archive}.

 

“ Hans Blix {4:25, audio}: We have had a good deal of help, from Iraq, on the process.

We have noted, repeatedly, that access to sites has been obtained.

To all sites that we’ve wanted to see.

And access has been prompt, in practically all cases.

Not only opening of doors.

But also, answering a lot of cases, showing around inside, explaining, etcetera.

So, it’s not just opening of doors.

But the general statement would be, that cooperation on process has been good.

* * *

There are some good developments, which I’d like to note, from these two days.

We have been given — and I’m now talking for my group — a number of papers on specific high profile, unresolved issues, in response to a point that was made, at our last visit here, that Iraq was ready to amplify, and to explain further, what they have stated in their declaration.

These papers relate to anthrax issues, they relate to missiles issues, notably to the al-Fatah and to the al-Samoud.

And I should mention, in that context, that we will have a meeting of experts in New York, tomorrow and on Tuesday, which will look at these 2 issues, al-Fatah and al-Samoud.

We had also had papers submitted to us on VX, the chemical nerve agent, which is a very potent one.

And these papers were given to us yesterday, and our experts got to work, and they stayed in this building until about two o’clock in the morning, and went through what they got, and they met with their Iraqi counterparts, during our morning session today, and they have clarified further points, and they will evidently be subject to more study.

There have been proposals, on the Iraqi side, that I think are constructive, to try, to do, undertake physical tests, in order to measure, weapons which they have declared destroyed, and have poured into the ground. Like coline, like anthrax, and like VX.

They were then destroyed, and disappeared, years ago, and there are suggestions for methods, by which you could detect, not only whether qualitatively they are there, but also have some idea of how much, what the quantity was.

It remains to be examined, how helpful these methods are.

{1:24, 1:24, audio} You will recall, that when we were here last time, there had been a finding of 12 empty chemical warheads, of 122 millimeters.

And a commission of inquiry was appointed, by the Iraqi side, and with Mr. Mohamed Shaker, as the chairman.

And they had worked, and they found, almost immediately, four more of this kind of warheads.

I should make the comment, in the margin, that when we made a statement of this, about this, we did say, that we felt and believed, that they were stored in a new bunker.

And that therefore we must conclude that they had been moved there after 1991.

After further study, we should correct that statement.

That the place, where they were stored, was not new.

And I’d like to stand corrected, on behalf of my commission, in that regard.

This commission, that dealt with the 122-millimeter chemical warheads, has now had its mandate broadened. And it has been given the authority, to look for any proscribed items, whether in the chemical, biological, or any other sphere. And we welcome that.

I should also say that today, one of our teams actually found a— one more 122-millimeter empty chemical warhead, at Taji.”

Hans Blix, interviewed February 9 2003 in Baghdad, after the press conference, by Ragah Omaar, BBC video {5:39, source}, reported, Ragah Omaar, BBC video {1:42, source}, discussed, Ragah Omaar (Baghdad), Andrew Gilligan (Munich), interviewed by Sarah Montague, “Iraq” (BBC Radio 4, Today, Monday February 10 2003, 6-9am at 6:32-6:38 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx5411}, audio {5:40}, copy {5:05, source}.

Amer al-Saadi (Iraq scientific adviser, and liaison with UNMOVIC), press conference (Baghdad, February 9 2003), CBC video {5:54}, reported, “Iraq Begins 'Change of Heart': Inspectors” (CBC News, February 10 2003).

Jacques Chirac (President of France), Vladimir Putin (President of Russia), joint press briefing (Elysée Palace, Paris, February 10 2003), French transcript {pf, source}, transcript audio {15:26} (reading the French transcript), “Declaration by Russia, Germany, and France{copy} (Paris, February 10 2003), reported, Peter Finn, “U.S.-Europe Rifts Widen Over Iraq: France, Germany, Russia Urge Extension of Inspections; Iraq Approves U-2 Flights” (Washington Post, February 11 2003) {pf} {copy, copy}.

 

“ Jacques Chirac: I have no evidence.

That these weapons exist in Iraq.”

George J. Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Lowell E. Jacoby (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), Carl W. Ford Jr. (Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research), Robert S. Mueller III (Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), testimony, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States {172kb.txt, copy, 6.5mb.pdf, copy, copy, purl} (U.S. Congress 108-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-161, February 11 2003, Select Committee on Intelligence) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/19:S.HRG.108-161, OCLC: 53414415, LCCN: 2003373661, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, December 1 2003}:

 

“ Senator John W. Warner:In the event that force is used, and after the dust settles and the world press and others can go in and assess the situation, is it your judgment that there will be clearly caches of weapons of mass destruction which will dispel any doubt with regard to the fair and objective analysis that the United States and such other nations that have joined in the use of force did the right thing at the right time?

Director Tenet: Sir, I think we will find caches of weapons of mass destruction.

Absolutely. ...

Senator Carl Levin: U.N. inspectors ...

As far as you know.

Were they given unfettered access?

Director Tenet: I don’t believe so, sir.

Senator Levin: All right.

“ Hans Blix: There were never any denials of access.”

March 17 2004 video {at 40:20} audio {at 40:31}

Now.

We have only shared a small percentage of the sites, so far, that we have suspicions about.

I am going to use the word “small percentage.”

Because I am not allowed to use the actual numbers.

Of sites that you have suspicions about.

I am not allowed to use the actual number.

Of sites that we have shared with the U.N. inspectors.

All I’m allowed to say is, that there has been a “small percentage.”

Of sites that we have shared the information with the inspectors.

My question to you is:

When will we be completing?

The sharing of information?

With the U.N. inspectors?

Director Tenet: Sir, we have given the U.N. inspectors, and UNMOVIC, every site that we have.

That is of high or moderate value.

Where there is proven intelligence.

To lead to a potential outcome.

Every site we have. ...

We have held nothing back.

From sites that we believe.

Based on credible intelligence.

Could be fruitful.

For these inspections.”

George J. Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Lowell E. Jacoby {59kb.pdf} (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), testimony, Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-303, February 12 2003, Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-303, LCCN: 2006360652, OCLC: 54639118, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, February 27 2004}. Transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH transcript, FNS transcript.

 

“ Carl Levin: Prior to the war.

The CIA identified 550 sites in Iraq.

As possibly having weapons of mass destruction.

Or prohibited WMD materials or equipment.

They were called “suspect sites.”

Madam President, 150 of those sites were so-called “top suspect” sites where the CIA believed it would be more likely to find such items.

The 150 top suspect sites were, in turn, divided into three categories:

High priority, medium priority, and low priority.

At two public hearings, shortly before the war, on February 11 and February 12, 2003, I pressed Director Tenet on the issue of how many suspect WMD sites were shared with the United Nations.

On February 12, Director Tenet said the following: ...

“As I said yesterday, we have briefed all of these high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.”

Mr. Tenet did not say “some.”

He did not say “most.”

He said “all.”

“We have briefed all of these high value and moderate value sites.”

To the U.N.

I told Director Tenet.

At the time.

In two public hearings.

That he was wrong.

And that, classified numbers told a different story.

On March 6 2003, Director Tenet again stated, in writing, that:

“We have now provided detailed information on all of the high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.”

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice made the same representation.

In a letter to me, on March 6 2003, in which she said:

“United Nations inspectors have been briefed on every high or medium priority weapons of mass destruction, missile, and UAV-related site the U.S. intelligence community has identified.”

On January 20 2004, the CIA.

After a year of resistance.

Finally declassified the number ...

They finally acknowledged.

That 21 of the 105.

High and medium priority top suspect sites.

On the CIA list.

Were not shared.

With the United Nations, before the war.

So the record is now clear.

That Director Tenet twice gave false information.

On this matter.

To the public.

And to the Congress.

Shortly before the war. ...

Last February, Director Tenet could have answered honestly ...

Instead, he chose a different path.

One of misstating the facts.

I can only speculate as to Director Tenet’s motive.

If he had answered honestly.

And said, that there were 21 high and medium priority top suspect sites, that we had not yet shared with the United Nations.

It would have put an obstacle in the path.

Of the administration’s move.

To end U.N. inspections.

And proceed to war.

It would have been more difficult.

For the administration.

To proceed to war.

Without first having shared with the U.N.

Our intelligence.

On all.

High and medium priority top suspect WMD sites.

And, it would have reinforced.

Widely held.

Public, and international, sentiment.

That we should allow the U.N.

To complete their inspections.

Before going to war.

In other words.

Honest answers.

By Director Tenet.

Might have undermined the false sense of urgency.

For proceeding to war.

And could have contributed to delay.

Neither of which.

Fit the administration’s policy goals.

For the last year.

I have attempted, to have declassified, the number, of high and medium priority top suspect sites, that the U.S. did not share, with the United Nations.

The CIA stonewalled doing that.

For no reason that I can think of.

Except.

That the facts are embarrassing to them. ...

It is more evidence.

Of the shaping of intelligence.

To fit the administration’s policy objectives.”

Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, member, Senate Intelligence Committee), floor statement, “Flawed Intelligence Assessments,” 150 Congressional Record S1422-S1447 {222kb.txt; 182kb.pdf}, at S1436-S1437 {14kb.txt, 27kb.pdf, 29kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, daily edition 150:19, February 23 2004) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/19}, CIA letter: Stanley M. Moskowitz (CIA Director of Congressional Affairs) to Carl Levin, January 20 2004 {182kb.pdf, 108kb.pdf}, transcribed: 150 Congressional Record S1422-S1447, at S1437 {14kb.txt, 29kb.pdf}, C-Span video/text (C-Span Congressional Chronicle, Senate, February 23 2004), Carl Levin, “The CIA Director Misled Congress” (press release, February 23 2004), reported, Douglas Jehl, David E. Sanger, “C.I.A. Admits It Didn't Give Weapon Data to the U.N.” (New York Times, February 21 2004) {copy, copy, copy}.

____________________

 

Apparently unknown.

To Senator Levin.

When he made his statement (February 23 2004).

But well known.

To U.S. officials.

When they attacked Iraq (March 20 2003).

U.S. officials did not permit U.N. inspectors time, to investigate even the 100, special, intelligence-designated, suspect sites they had been given, by the U.S., and other countries.

(Extra, to the 800 sites already on their list).

Far more, than the additional 21 sites.

U.S. officials lied about.

To the Senate committee.

About 60 more.

More than 80 total.

Not 21.

____________________

 

“ Dave Russell {1:09}: How much difference.

Would another three or four months have made.

Of inspections?

Hans Blix: I think a great deal, frankly.

Because, we were given tips, by the intelligence agencies, in various countries.

About—

Perhaps, round about a hundred sites.

That were indicated by them.

And we went, actually, with inspections,

To about three dozen sites,

If I remember rightly.

And we didn’t find any weapons of mass destruction.

Because there’re weren’t any.

Now.

We told the intelligence agencies—

We told the world, Security Council, that,

“Sorry.

There weren’t any.”

And that impressed them, somewhat.

Now.

If we had had three months more.

We would have been able to go.

To all the sites.

Indicated by intelligence.

And there would not have been.

Any weapons of mass destruction.”

Hans Blix, interviewed by Dave Russell (Sveriges Radio, SR International, Radio Sweden, December 8 2005), segment audio {4:29, at 3:20, source}, podcast audio (entire program) {24:51, 4:30-9:22, at 8:10} {17mb.mp3, source, source}.

____________________

 

In his solomen pronouncements.

A 48-hour ultimatum {12kb.txt, 45kb.pdf, copy} (March 17 2003), video {13:45}, audio {13:26}.

Launching war {12kb.txt, 45kb.pdf, copy} (March 19 2003), video {4:06}, audio {4:08}.

I did not hear President George W. Bush.

Announce these facts:

“U.N. inspectors have not had time.

To investigate.

More than 80 top suspect, priority, sites.

Designated by the U.S. and other countries.

Including 21 sites.

We have withheld from U.N. inspectors.”

The decision, by U.S./U.K. officials, to conceal these material facts:—

This is a smoking-gun, of criminal intent.

The decision, by U.S./U.K. officials, to not update their estimates, to reflect what the inspectors did not find, what they disproved, by on-site inspections:—

This is a smoking-gun, of criminal intent.

The decision, by U.S./U.K. officials, to terminate inspections, before U.N. inspectors had time to inspect 100% of the sites and targets considered suspicious by their own intelligence officials:—

This is a smoking-gun, of criminal intent.

In addition.

George Tenet, told this lie.

To the Senate committee:—

“ Senator Carl Levin: U.N. inspectors ...

As far as you know.

Were they given unfettered access?

Director Tenet: I don’t believe so, sir.”

In my opinion, no member of a criminal court jury could possibly entertain reasonable doubt, that the Director of Central Intelligence, knew, to an unassailable fact, when he said it, that what he said was a wilful, malicious, lie.

A Big Lie.

A very material lie.

On TV and radio.

To a big audience.

A lie he could have changed his mind about.

And corrected afterwards.

By letter to the Senate Committee.

But he did not.

(Else, Senator Levin would have mentioned it, and it would be printed in both printed hearings. Instead, George Tenet reconfirmed his sites-lie, in his letter, a month later, on March 6).

This is a smoking-gun, of criminal intent.

There was no single fact.

More important.

Than unfettered access.

Hans Blix, and Mohamed ElBaradei.

Many, many, times.

Declared publicly.

And.

Reported to the U.N. Security Council.

They had unfettered access.

“Criminal intent”?

To do what?

To wage war, in violation of a treaty (S/Res/1441).

The crime against peace.

Penalty:

Death.

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), interviewed Tuesday February 11 2003 by Gordon Corera (security correspondent), introduced by John Humphrys, “Terrorism/Iraq” (BBC Radio 4, Today, Wednesday February 12 2003, 6-9am at 8:10-8:21 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx5413}, audio {11:37, 2:21, at 0:47, source}, copy {1:48, source}.

 

“ Sergei Lavrov {1:40}: I don’t think anybody can, at the moment, on the basis of the facts available, can argue reasonably, that Iraq is not cooperating.

Iraq is cooperating.

And the inspections are achieving results.

Yes, there are still questions to be answered.

But they are being answered. ...

We want the unity in the Security Council.

And we want the unity in the Security Council, on the basis of agreed principles.

They have agreed on 1441.

We have all reiterated our full confidence in inspectors.

If inspectors believe, that 1441 is not sufficient for them.

And they need some extra powers.

This could be easily considered by the Council.

And I assume, that this sort of resolution could be discussed.

I don’t think they would take upon themselves, to say, there is no real sign, that Iraq is disclosing cachés of WMD.

Because what they have been saying, that so far—

They have checked everything.

Which they believed should be checked.

And they reiterated.

A week ago.

In the Council—

That they have not seen any evidence.

That Iraq, in fact, does continue its WMD programs.

That’s the reality we have been given.

So far we have not seen—

Well—

Not just a “smoking gun.”

But not even a gun.”

U.N. Security Council Meeting 4707, transcript, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4707 {165kb.pdf, also via this, this, or ODS} (Friday February 14 2003, 10:25-1:50 p.m., 32 pages, SC/7664), reported, “After Hearing UN Inspectors' Reports, Security Council Debates Next Steps In Iraq{pf} (U.N. News, February 14 2003), U.N. video archive (dead links), C-Span video (10:24 a.m.) {3:24:00} (deleted).

•• Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), “Security Council Briefing: An Update On Inspections{copy, copy, pf} (U.N. Security Council Meeting 4707, February 14 2003), reported, “No Illicit Weapons Found So Far But More 'Credible' Proof From Iraq Needed – Blix{pf} (U.N. News, February 14 2003), U.N. video archive (dead link), BBC “News Special: Iraq Crisis” (BBC 2 TV, February 14 2003, 3:15-4:30 p.m. GMT, 10:15-11:30 a.m. ET) {BBCcat b:anbm545n}, BBC video {39:57, at 0:00-23:45, source}, excerpt {4:05}, CBC video: part-1 {10:15, source}, part-2 {13:13}, PBS audio {23:27, source/transcript}.

•• Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), “Security Council Briefing: The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update” (U.N. Security Council Meeting 4707, February 14 2003), reported, “IAEA Chief Sees No Proof of Illegal Nuclear Activity But Says Probe Continues{pf} (U.N. News, February 14 2003), U.N. video archive (dead link), BBC video {39:57, at 23:23-39:57, source}, CBC video {15:59, source}, PBS audio {16:13, source/transcript}.

•• Security Council Members, statements (U.N. Security Council Meeting 4707, February 14 2003), in this sequence, following the inspector reports, U.N. video archive (dead links): Farouk Al-Shara' (Syria Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister), PBS audio {12:46, source}, Dominique Galouzeau de Villepin (France Foreign Minister), CBC video {20:16, source}, PBS audio {15:46}, Soledad Alvear Valenzuela (Chile Foreign Minister), Tang Jiaxuan (China Foreign Minister), CBC video {16:06}, PBS audio {6:07}, Ana Palacio Vallelersundi (Spain Foreign Minister), Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary, MP), FCO transcript {pf, source}, CBC video {10:51, source}, BBC video (excerpt) {2:50, source, source}, PBS audio {11:41}, Colin L. Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), “Remarks to the United Nations Security Council,” DoS video (bb) {14:19, 4.8mb.wmv, 31.5mb.wmv}, audio {13.2mb.wma}, CBC video {14:13, source}, BBC video (excerpt) {6:50, source}, PBS audio {14:21}, Igor S. Ivanov (Russia Foreign Minister), CBC video {10:03}, PBS audio {8:54}, Luis Ernesto Derbez (Mexico Foreign Minister), Mamady Traoré (Guinea U.N. Ambassador), Munir Akram (Pakistan U.N. Ambassador), Martin Belinga-Eboutou (Cameroon U.N. Ambassador), Ismael Abraao Gaspar Martins (Angola U.N. Ambassador), Stefan Tafrov (Bulgaria U.N. Ambassador), Joschka Fischer (Germany Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor), PBS audio {4:42}, Mohammed A. Aldouri (Iraq U.N. Ambassador), CBC video {14:07, source}, PBS audio {15:38}, afterwards, Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), “Remarks at Stakeout at the United Nations” (media stakeout, U.N. Security Council lobby, New York City), U.N. video archive (dead link) {8:00}, CBC video {7:13}.

Jacques Chirac (President of France), interviewed by James Graff, Bruce Crumley (Elysée Palace, Paris, Sunday February 16 2003), “France is not a Pacifist Country{copy} (Time, February 24 2003) (faulty formatting), French transcript {pf, source}, transcript audio {12:00} (reading the French transcript).

Mark Phillips (Baghdad), “Inspectors Call U.S. Tips 'Garbage' {pf, copy} (CBS News, New York, February 20 2003), video {2:27}: “Inside Iraq, U.N. arms inspectors are privately complaining, about the quality of U.S. intelligence, and accusing the United States of sending them on wild-goose chases.”

 

“ Mark Phillips: Iraq’s al-Samoud 2 missile ... has only been exceeding its 93-mile limit by about 15 miles.

And that, the Iraqis say, is because it isn’t yet loaded down, with its guidance system.

The al-Samoud 2 is not the 800-mile-plus range missile, that Colin Powell insists, Iraq is developing.

In fact, the U.S. claim, that Iraq is developing missiles, that could hit its neighbors — or U.S. troops in the region, or even Israel — is just one of the claims, coming from Washington, that inspectors here are finding increasingly unbelievable.

The inspectors have become so frustrated, trying to chase down unspecific, or ambiguous, U.S. leads, that they’ve begun to express that anger, privately, in no uncertain terms.

U.N. sources have told CBS News, that American tips have lead to one dead end after another.

Example: Satellite photographs, purporting to show new research buildings at Iraqi nuclear sites. When the U.N. went to the new buildings, they found nothing. No nuclear work.

Example: Saddam’s presidential palaces, where the inspectors went, with specific coordinates, supplied by the U.S., on where to look for incriminating evidence. Again, they found nothing.

Example: Interviews with scientists, about the aluminum tubes, the U.S. says Iraq has imported for enriching uranium. But which the Iraqis say, are for making rockets. Given the size, and specification, of the tubes, the U.N. calls the Iraqi alibi:

Air tight.” ...

So frustrated have the inspectors become, that one source here referred to the U.S. intelligence they’ve been getting, as—

Garbage after garbage after garbage.”

In fact, the source used another, cruder, word.

The inspectors find themselves caught, between the Iraqis ...

And the United States.

Whose intelligence they found to be outdated.

Or circumstantial.

Or just plain wrong.”

Hussam Amin (Chief, Iraq National Monitoring Directorate, liaison with UNMOVIC), press conference (Baghdad, February 23 2003, 3:00 p.m. GMT), partial transcript, “General Amin of Iraqi Monitoring Directorate Holds Press Briefing” (CNN, Live Event/Special, February 23 2003, 3:02 p.m. GMT) {archive}.

 

“ Question (through translator): Do you think the demand, to destroy al-Samoud missiles, has—

Does it have a political or military dimension?

As part of the American military campaign?

Is it a result of pressures?

American pressures on Hans Blix?

Particularly, if we take into consideration, that Iraq could actually use these missiles?

To strike at hostile troop buildup?

On the Iraqi borders?

Question number two:

The (unintelligible) company, who is in charge of the missiles.

He says, he’s issued a challenge, to all experts, to come and do an arbitrary test.

Any missile, in the possession of the Iraqi army.

To fire these weapons, to make sure, whether Iraq has actually exceeded the limits set by the United Nations.

Is this—

Would this be part of your negotiations, with the United Nations?

Hussam Amin (through translator): As to the second part of the question, we have offered UNMOVIC to choose samples, arbitrary samples, without prior consultation with Iraq.

And to choose any rocket they like, and to fire this rocket, to determine the maximum range of such missile.

We believe that it will reach below the limited range.

We have, so far, not received any response to our offer.

As to the first part of the question, whether the destruction will affect our military mobility, and the political dimension of the demand.

We have already declared, that we do have these missiles, in our final declaration, which was submitted on the 7th of December, and it’s not an issue.

As a matter of fact, UNMOVIC had inspected the missiles, and old issues related to the missiles, and tagged these missiles, and know the entire situation surrounding this issue.

Certainly, the destruction of these missiles will affect our fighting ability, but will not deal a final blow. It will not be a strong impact— have a strong impact, in our capability. ...

Question (through translator): First question from AFP, last question.

Regarding Hans Blix demand.

To destroy al-Samoud 2.

On what basis did Mr. Blix base his demand?

As long as the missiles, Samoud 2 has only a range of 150 kilometers.

And it is legal under Resolution 786—

Do we have evidence?

That these missiles exceed that range?

Hussam Amin (through translator): Iraq has declared all what— all information it has, regarding these missiles, in its complete and full declaration, on the 7th of December, last year.

Part of this declaration was a number— was a limited number of tests, in which this rocket exceeded the 150 kilometers.

And the reasons for that were technical reasons, acknowledged by missile experts.

One reason was, that this rocket was not equipped with the guidance system.

When the rocket is, or the missile is, equipped with a guidance missile, with a guidance system—

Because when it is equipped with a guidance system, fuel will be used to— for the guidance system, and when there’s no guidance system, the rocket will exceed the limit.

Also the weighing. The measures weren’t in final—

The measurements weren’t in their final and definite form.

The rocket was also still being tested.

It was not in its final design.

The measurements weren’t definitive.

We used lighter measurements.

Al-Samoud 1, which exceeded the range, was a difference in the weight between the warhead, 40 kilos in difference, which affects the range of the missile.

There are other factors, which I do not wish to bore you with, because these are very technical issues.”

Hussein Kamal (Hussein Kamel), Saddam’s son-in-law, defected to Jordan on August 8 1995, interviewed August 22 1995 by UNSCOM/IAEA, asserting destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, leaked and first reported February 24 2003 in John Barry, The Defector’s Secrets {copy, 58kb.pdf} (Newsweek, March 3 2003). Interview transcript (15 pages): {979kb.pdf, 458kb.pdf, 458kb.pdf}:

 

“ Hussein Kamal: All chemical weapons were destroyed.

I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons.

All weapons — biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed. ...

In the nuclear area, there were no weapons.”

Analysis: {report, copy, report}. Corroboration: Six page letter from Hossam Amin to Saddam’s son Qusay Hussein, reported in Barton Gellman, “Iraq’s Arsenal Was Only on Paper{pf} (Washington Post, January 7 2004) {copy}. Hossam Amin wrote to Qusay on August 13 1995, 5 days after Kamal’s defection:

“ Hossam Amin: Destruction of the biological weapons agents took place in the summer of 1991.”

Barton Gellman: “Read alongside subsequent discoveries made by U.N. inspectors, the document supports Iraq’s claim that it destroyed all production stocks of lethal pathogens before inspectors knew they existed.”

France, Germany, Russia, joint memorandum submitted to the Security Council February 24 2003, proposing next steps in Iraq, U.N. Doc. S/2003/214 {125kb.pdf, also via this, or ODS}, reported, “French proposal: full text{pf} (“French-Russian-German memorandum on Iraq”) (BBC News, February 24 2003, 10:55 p.m. GMT), Emily Harris (Berlin correspondent), “France, Germany & Iraq” (NPR: National Public Radio, Morning Edition, Washington D.C., February 25 2003), audio {3:44}, NPR transcript, “Analysis: Two New Proposals Before U.N. Security Council On Disarming Iraq.”

U.S., U.K., Spain, draft Security Council resolution submitted to the Security Council “in blue” February 24 2003, authorizing immediate war, U.N. Doc. S/2003/215 (Provisional) {13kb.pdf, copy} (“The Security Council, ... Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it by resolution 1441 (2002)”), reported, “Draft resolution on Iraq: text{pf} (BBC News, February 24 2003, 7:56 p.m. GMT), “Two plans presented to Security Council for next steps in disarming Iraq{pf} (U.N. News, February 24 2003).

Jimmy Carter (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1977-1981 Jan. 20), interviewed by Bob Edwards, “Carter Urges More Diplomacy on Iraq” (NPR: National Public Radio, Morning Edition, Washington D.C., February 25 2003), audio {7:23}, NPR transcript, “Ex-President Blames Neglect of Mideast for Anti-American Mood,” extended {14:25}.

Hans Blix, media stakeout (U.N. building, New York City, February 25 2003), reported, New Iraqi disarmament letters have 'some positive elements' – Blix{pf} (U.N. News, February 25 2003). “There is one letter in which they tell us they have found an R-400 bomb containing liquid in a site which is known to us at which they did dispose of biological weapons before.” Accord, Hiro Ueki (Baghdad Spokesman for UNMOVIC and the IAEA), “UNMOVIC IAEA Press Statement on Inspection Activities in Iraq{pf} (U.N. News, February 25 2003).

U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Iraq (Command Paper 5769, Cm 5769, February 25 2003) (“This paper brings together some of the key international documents relevant to Iraq. It includes all of the United Nations Security Council resolutions dating from August 1990 up to UNSCR 1441 of November 2002. In addition there are reports on weapons inspections, European Union statements and statements by the Foreign Secretary.”).

U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, debate and vote, “Iraq” (Wednesday February 26 2003, 12:41-7:13 p.m., Hansard, House of Commons, bound volume edition, 6th series, volume 400, columns 265-367), opposition amendment (column 285) defeated 199/393 (Division No. 96, 6:59 p.m., column 363) (“but finds the case for military action against Iraq as yet unproven”), government motion (column 371), adopted 434/124 (Division No. 97, 7:13 p.m., column 367) (“Resolved, That this House takes note of Command Paper Cm 5769 on Iraq; reaffirms its endorsement of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, as expressed in its Resolution of 25th November 2002; supports the Government’s continuing efforts in the United Nations to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction; and calls upon Iraq to recognise this as its final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.”).

U.K. Parliament, House of Lords, debate and vote, “Iraq” (Wednesday February 26 2003, 3:17-12:14 a.m., Hansard, House of Lords, bound volume edition, 5th series, volume 645, columns 244-378), government motion (“That this House takes note of Command Paper Cm 5769 on Iraq”) agreed (column 378) without a “division” (formal vote) {111kb.pdf}.

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC (U.N. Doc. S/2003/232, February 28 2003) {86kb.pdf, copy, also via this, or ODS}.

Dominique de Villepin (France Foreign Minister), intervewed in Paris, at the French Foreign Ministry, by David Frost (BBC TV-1, Breakfast with Frost, London, Sunday March 2 2003, 9-10am) {BBCcat a:andh034f}, BBC transcript {pf, search, search}.

Amer al-Saadi (Iraq scientific adviser, and liaison with UNMOVIC), press conference (Baghdad, March 2 2003), partial transcript, “General Amir Al-Saadi Holds Press Conference” (CNN, Live Event/Special, March 2 2003, 4:00 p.m. GMT) {archive}.

 

“ Amer al-Saadi: Just before I answer questions.

I would like to share with you.

Some thoughts, I had the other day.

When I was watching a TV report.

That showed—

That reported, that experts.

Military experts and scientists.

American scientists.

Were thinking about designing.

A new weapon.

Which could penetrate deep bunkers.

And incinerate any stocks of chemical weapons, biological weapons, that may be hidden there.

And, there was also computer graphics.

Of this weapon.

And the actual penetration.

And it is tipped with a nuclear device.

Small-yield, nuclear device.

Just to do the job, reportedly, cleanly.

Then I was thinking—

Well.

If they know the coordinates.

Because you need an input for this weapon.

To hit its targets.

That is—

If you had the coordinates, of the bunker.

It would be much easier, and less costly, and much faster.

To provide those coordinates to UNMOVIC.

They’ll do the job.

Free of charge.

At no cost.

To the American taxpayer.

Wouldn’t you agree?

So that’s one thought.

The other, also reminded me of a remark by Dr. Blix.

When he said, that UNMOVIC costs $80 million a year.

A war on Iraq would cost upwards from $80 billion.

Plus blood-shed.

On both sides.

This $80 million.

The money for UNMOVIC.

Dr. Blix didn’t say where it comes from.

It comes from Iraq, of course.

Because it is deducted from oil for food program.

So disarmament, peaceful, at no cost, to the American taxpayer.

A war of $80 billion plus, to achieve disarmament.

Well.

I don’t—

I will not go any further.

Another thought was, that occurred to me, was that Mr. Bush and Prime Minister Blair never seem to tire, from repeating, that Iraq must get rid of its weapons of mass destruction, or face the consequences.

This steady drumbeat, of lies upon lies, is all we hear these days.

They’re sending their soldiers, thousands of miles away from home, to fight people who have not threatened them, living in their own homes, in peace.

It is a war driven by greed and nothing else.

It’s not exactly an away-match.

{A football game, on the opponent’s field}.

It’s much more than that.

Bush and Blair will gain credibility, if they did something about Sharon’s occupation of the Palestinian homeland.

And that will not cost them.

Neither blood.

Nor money. ...

Question: Documents ... technical discussions ... private interviews.

So people are asking.

What’s going to happen next?

What is the Iraqi side going to do next?

If someone, says, you need to present more.

Or there’s more things the Iraqis should do?

Amer al-Saadi: Well.

I don’t know if you remember.

The American administration promised.

To provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

With evidence.

That Iraq harbors.

Weapons of mass destruction.

And that.

Iraq is now undertaking activities.

Which are proscribed.

They are still—

If you look at the breakdown of the inspections.

They are not all centered on sites which are under monitoring.

They also include other sites.

Now, these other sites are intelligence information.

And they have been chasing around that.

And unfortunately, from our point of view, UNMOVIC doesn’t clearly say which inspection is motivated — or, yes, is motivated — by intelligence information ...

And, also, they don’t report the results.

I think they owe it to us.

To report results of intelligence inspections.

And the fate of this.

I mean, the United States cannot continue to provide information, and then this information are taken seriously and credibly.

Because.

So far.

Nothing has been found.

To contradict our declaration.

Our declaration is described.

By Secretary Powell.

As false.

And yet, their allegations are truths.

So we should—

We need a judge on this issue.

The judge is UNMOVIC.

They should say.

What is false.

And what is true.

I’ve read a report from—

I think, on the CBS website.

One inspector, here, was asked about this.

And he preferred to be anonymous.

And he said.

That all we got from the United States.

Is garbage.

And more garbage.

And more garbage.

Three times he said “garbage.”

OK.

If they continue to feed them garbage.

They should say so.

Publicly.

In the Security Council.

* * *

Question: Can you tell us, what is the progress that we’ve made on this 550 shells of mustard gas, on this 1.5 tons of VX, and on these several warheads — I mean, (unintelligible), and the war (ph) is more or less believed to be full of anthrax?

I mean, the unaccounted biological and chemical weapons?

What kind of progress we have made?

Amer al-Saadi: Considerable.

For instance.

On the 155 missing mustard shells, they were found.

They were not missing.

They are now—

They are included in the total number of shells destroyed by UNSCOM previously.

But they—

There was a mistake in calculation.

And we found that.

We found evidence, that among the shells that were destroyed in 1992/’93 — mustard shells — there were some which had signs of burning on them.

And this question was raised.

And if you remember that—

What we said, about the 550, they were in a truck.

And during the disturbances after the war, they were burned.

So those—

The contents of this truck ended up in a site — collection site — and were included in the total destroyed amount.

The missing figures actually appear, due to another report, which now we found is inaccurate.

So that is one question resolved.

The other regarding—

You said anthrax?

Or VX?

VX.

Question: Both.

Amer al-Saadi: Both.

With the anthrax, the R-400 bombs, which are unilaterally destroyed in 1991, summer 1991 (unintelligible).

157 of them.

They contained anthrax, and aflatoxin, and another material, botulin toxin.

And these are now being excavated and taken out.

So far, we have reached a figure not quite 157.

But we are nearing it.

There’s work in progress.

So far, more than eight have been found, which are still intact, not perforated.

Which could be tested, for the material inside.

And that would corroborate our—

So that could be said as result.

But there’s another question with the anthrax.

Is the bulk material, that was left over, that was unfilled, that was unilaterally destroyed, also in a site called Al-Hakam.

And this is what the meeting this evening is all about

That the destruction site is known, and it is still undisturbed, and we could look for DNA signatures of those materials.

And, perhaps, we could quantify this material.

Not just qualitative tests, but quantitative tests.

To estimate how much was destroyed there.

And that, in addition to the 157 bombs in Al-Aziziyah (Al-Azzizziyah), will make the total.

Question: And VX?

Amer al-Saadi: VX.

Similarly, 1.5 tons, which is still to be accounted for, was unilaterally destroyed, in a dumping site, near the Al-Muthanna establishment.

And we have made analysis, which strongly indicate, that the total material was destroyed there.

And this is also subject of the discussion this evening, between our two teams.

The results that we’ve made, so far, indicate that something which is near — quite near — that total was destroyed there.

From determination of the phosphorous (ph) that was there.

And they could, UNMOVIC, if they see our calculations, and are convinced about the way they have gone with it, they can check it with more modern techniques, and get a more precise determination, to finalize this question as well.

This is why we have—

We’re having this discussion.”

Martin Bright, Ed Vulliamy, Peter Beaumont, “Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war” (“Secret document details American plan to bug phones and emails of key Security Council members”) {pf} {copy, copy} The Observer, London, Sunday March 2 2003). “Frank Koza, Def Chief of Staff (Regional Targets) CIV/NSA (email, Jan 31 2003, 0:16),” reprinted, “US plan to bug Security Council: The text{pf} {copy, copy} The Observer, London, Sunday March 2 2003).

Igor Ivanov (Russia Foreign Minister), interviewed in London by Bridget Kendall, “Ask Russian Foreign Minister{pf} (BBC World Service, Talking Point, March 4 2003, 2:00 p.m., posted March 5 2003, 10:54 a.m. GMT), video {40:39}, background, Bridget Kendall, Igor Ivanov: Cheery and Direct {pf}, reported, “Russia Threatens Veto of Second U.N. Resolution on Iraq” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, March 4 2003, 1:15 p.m. ET); “Ivanov: Russia may use veto” (CNN, March 4 2003, 11:22 a.m. ET); “Sources: U.S. may consider abandoning second resolution” (CNN, March 4 2003, 6:57 p.m. ET); Bridget Kendall, “The gap between Britain and Russia on Iraq is as wide apart as ever,” video {2:43, source}; “Russia says Iraq veto possible{pf} (BBC News, March 4 2003, 11:22 p.m. GMT).

 

“ Igor Ivanov: Abstaining is not a position Russia can take.

We have to take a clear position.

And.

We are for a political solution.”

Igor Ivanov (Russia Foreign Minister), Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary), “Edited Transcript of a Press Conference{pf} (U.K. Foreign Office, London, March 4 2003, 6:00 p.m.), FCO video (excerpt) {2:05, 789kb.wmv, bb 1.7mb.wmv}, partial transcript, “Straw, Ivanov Hold Press Conference” (CNN, Live Event/Special, March 4 2003, 6:04 p.m. GMT) {archive}.

 

“ Question: You told the BBC, earlier today, that you would not agree to anything that would actually, directly or indirectly, make war more likely.

Did you not convey this to Mr Straw?

Igor Ivanov: Well, I think that I said nothing new.

It is our position.

That we have been standing by, for a long time.

And we have been putting it forward, for quite a long time.

We assume, that now, we have a real possibility, for a political solution, of the issue of Iraq’s disarmament.

And we should make use of this chance.

* * *

Question: You said earlier, essentially, that to abstain is not a position.

Indicating, that Russia will not likely abstain.

If that is the case, what is your position?

And how prepared are you?

To veto?

Igor Ivanov: ... There are certain issues.

When it is desirable.

That there will be no abstainees.

Among the Security Council Permanent Members.

Because those are serious issues.

Because we, as Permanent Members of the Security Council, carry a special responsibility.

In maintaining international peace and stability.

And that is why I said, that the Iraqi issue is precisely the one, where it is unlikely, that one of us would abstain.”

Hans Blix, press conference, moderated by Tony Jenkins (president), (UNCA: U.N. Correspondents Association, U.N. building, New York City, March 5 2003, 1:00 p.m. ET), U.N. video (dead link) {1:00:00}, C-Span video (request) {1:00:00, smil, schedule, 174119373, 175373-1, rss, archive, search, library}, CBC video (first 25%) {15:00}, FNS transcript, partial transcript, “Hans Blix Gives Briefing on Iraqi Compliance” (CNN, Live Event/Special, March 5 2003, 1:02 p.m.) {archive}, reported, “UN to Release List of Remaining Tasks for Complete Iraqi Disarmament{pf} (U.N. News, March 5 2003), David Halton reporting, CBC video (bb) {3:07 bb}, ‘Blix Wants More Time for Inspections,’ (CBC News, Newsworld, March 5/6 2003).

Bill Clinton (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1993-2001 Jan. 20), interviewed by Tavis Smiley, “Clinton Airs Views on Iraq, Affirmative Action” (NPR: National Public Radio, The Tavis Smiley Show, March 6 2003), audio {10:19}, extended {16:28}.

 

“ Bill Clinton: Obviously.

If he can be disarmed without war.

That would be the best of all possible routes.

I think that can be done.

And should be.”

David Kay, interviewed by Sarah Montague (BBC Radio 4, Today, Friday March 7 2003, 6-9am at 8:10-8:21 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx4346}, audio {11:05, source}.

Peter Goldsmith (Lord Goldsmith) (U.K. Attorney-General), to Tony Blair (U.K. Prime Minister), secret legal opinion, Iraq: Resolution 1441 {693kb.pdf, source} {copy, source} {copy, copy} {copy, copy} (March 7 2003), concealed, by Tony Blair from his Cabinet, from Parliament, from the media, from the public, first partially leaked, two years later, by Jon Snow, “A Legal War?” (Channel 4 News, London, April 27 2005, 7:00 p.m.), video (ditto) {4:13}, reported, “Full text: Summary of attorney general's legal advice on March 7 2003” (Guardian, April 27 2005), “Early Iraq legal opinion leaked{pf} (BBC News, April 28 2005, 6:22 a.m. GMT), released, the next day, by Tony Blair (April 28 2005), timelined, a year later, Legality of Military Action in Iraq: Disclosure Statement {97kb.pdf, copy} (U.K. Cabinet Office, U.K. Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers) (anonymous, undated, unsigned), an involuntary, brief, timeline narrative, mainly recounting information then already public, issued in partial answer to a freedom-of-information enforcement notice {108kb.pdf, copy, source} (U.K. Information Commissioner, May 22 2006).

U.N. Security Council Meeting 4714, transcript, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4714 {183kb.pdf, also via this, this, or ODS} (Friday March 7 2003, 10:35-2:20 p.m., 36 pages, SC/7682), reported, “Several Security Council Members Call For More Inspections In Iraq{pf} (U.N. News, March 7 2003), U.N. webcast archive (dead links, but this single one works, with the wrong file name) video {3:30:34}, C-Span video (10:33 a.m.) {3:45:00} (deleted), reported, ‘Britain, U.S. propose deadline for Iraq,David Halton reporting, CBC video (bb) {3:44 bb} (CBC News, The National, March 7/8 2003).

•• Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), “Security Council Briefing: Oral Introduction of the 12th Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC{copy, copy, pf} (U.N. Meeting 4714, March 7 2003), reported, “Blix Welcomes Accelerated Cooperation By Iraq, But Says Unresolved Issues Remain” (U.N. News, March 7 2003), U.N. video archive (dead link), CBC video {18:50, source}, BBC “News Special: The Blix Report” (BBC 2 TV, March 7 2003, 2:54-5:13 p.m.) {BBCcat andf035r}, BBC video {1:24:39, at 0:00-19:08, source}, excerpts: part-1 {5:53}, part-2 {5:48}, part-3 {5:49}, part-4 {1:01}, ABC video {54:46, at 0:00-31:48, source}, with comment by Peter Jennings, PBS audio {18:57, source}.

•• Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), “Security Council Briefing: The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update{37kb.pdf} (U.N. Meeting 4714, March 7 2003), reported, “IAEA Sees Progress In Identifying Iraq's Nuclear Capabilities, Security Council Told” (U.N. News, March 7 2003), U.N. video archive (dead link), CBC video {17:03, source}, BBC video {1:24:39, at 19:05-36:49, source} excerpts: part-1 {5:32}, part-2 {6:03}, part-3 (none), ABC video {54:46, at 31:43-53:43, source}, with comment by Peter Jennings and 3 reporters, Terry Moran, Martha Raddatz, John McWethy, PBS audio {17:35, source}.

•• Security Council Members, statements (U.N. Security Council Meeting 4714, March 7 2003), in this sequence, following the inspector reports: Joschka Fischer (Germany Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor), CBC video {7:34, source}, Farouk Al-Shara' (Syria Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister), CBC video {7:34}, Luis Ernesto Derbez (Mexico Foreign Minister), Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), DoS transcript, White House video {17:40, source}, CBC video {17:39}, PBS audio {17:58, source}, Igor S. Ivanov (Russia Foreign Minister), CBC video {10:03}, PBS audio {10:27}, Dominique Galouzeau de Villepin (France Foreign Minister), CBC video {11:57}, PBS audio {13:06}, Tang Jiaxuan (China Foreign Minister), PBS audio {6:11}, Soledad Alvear Valenzuela (Chile Foreign Minister), Ana Palacio (Spain Foreign Minister), Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary, MP), FCO transcript {pf, source}, CBC video {16:06}, PBS audio {16:51}, Georges Chikoti (Angola Deputy Foreign Minister), Martin Belinga-Eboutou (Cameroon U.N. Ambassador), Stefan Tafrov (Bulgaria U.N. Ambassador), Munir Akram (Pakistan U.N. Ambassador), François Lonsény Fall (Guinea Foreign Minister), Mohammed A. Aldouri (Iraq U.N. Ambassador), CBC video {16:06}, PBS audio {15:38}, afterwards, media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby): Dominique de Villepin (France Foreign Minister), CBC video {10:47, source}, Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), “Remarks After United Nations Security Council Debate,” CBC video {8:23}.

U.S., U.K., Spain, revised draft Security Council resolution “in blue,” submitted by Jack Straw {pf} (U.K. Foreign Secretary) to a private Security Council meeting March 7 2003, following the public meeting. This draft would give the U.S./U.K. a veto, authorizing the U.S./U.K. to launch war, after March 17 2003, against the will of a majority of the Security Council. U.N. Doc. S/2003/215 (Provisional) {14kb.pdf, copy} (“The Security Council, ... Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, ... 3. Decides that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441 (2002) unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has ...”), reported, “UK proposes 17 March deadline for Iraq to comply with UN disarmament demands” {pf} (U.N. News, March 7 2003), Gavin Esler (BBC 2 TV, Newsnight, March 7 2003, 10:30 p.m.) {BBCcat e:andt262y}, excerpt, Tom Carver, video {6:16}.

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes (UNMOVIC working document, 173 pages, delivered privately March 6 2003, 6:30 p.m. ET, to the U.K. and others, released publicly March 7 2003) (the “Cluster Document”) {1455kb.pdf, copy, copy, copy}, reported, “Blix pressure on key Iraq questions{pf} (BBC News, March 8 2003, 12:04 p.m.).

 

“ During UNMOVIC inspections in January 2003, 12 empty 122-mm chemical rocket warheads were found in a storehouse at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad. Iraq later provided four additional from a building in another storage depot. Two more 122-mm rocket warheads were found later at the same depot by an UNMOVIC inspection team. A Commission of Inquiry has been set up by Iraq to investigate why these warheads were stored at these sites or whether any more such warheads or other proscribed munitions are stored at other locations in Iraq. According to a document from the Commission, which was handed over to UNMOVIC in February 2003, the 12 warheads were part of a batch of less than 20 warheads received by Al Muthana in 1989 for training and reverse engineering purposes. ...

The 122-mm chemical rocket warheads found by UNMOVIC in January 2003 were stored in a storehouse that Iraq claims were overlooked from 1991, when a batch of some 2000 were deployed there during the Gulf war. Sealed casings containing some of the rocket warheads were dated April 1988 (4/88). The one rocket warhead with a liquid content has been sampled and analysed by UNMOVIC. The liquid was found to be water contaminated by hydrogen sulphide, which seems to be consistent with the fact that coloured water was used for trial purposes to simulate a CW agent. However, the finding of these 16 rocket warheads could be taken as a demonstration for the absence of a complete and accurate inventory for this type of munition in Iraq.”

Details about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), and spray-tanks: pages 13-14, 17-18, 57-61.

Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), Reports to the U.N. Security Council:

Feb. 14 2003: “The IAEA has verified that Iraq had indeed been manufacturing such rockets ... Iraq has been asked to explain the reasons for the tight tolerance specifications that it had requested from various suppliers. Iraq has provided documentation related to the project for reverse engineering.”

March 7 2003: “The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of these rockets was well documented ... 81-millimetre rockets ... as well as the rationale behind the changes in the tolerances ... The IAEA team has concluded ... that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme.” “After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.”

Mohamed ElBaradei (8:10-8:22 a.m.), audio {12:17}, copy {8:44}, Dominique de Villepin, Joschka Fischer, Jack Straw (8:35-8:45 a.m.), audio {9:56, source}, interviewed Friday March 7 2003 by James Naughtie (BBC Radio 4, Today, Saturday March 8 2003, 7-9am) {BBCcat 90sx2600}, reported, “Blix pressure on key Iraq questions{pf} (BBC News, March 8 2003, 12:04 p.m.).

Jimmy Carter (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1977-1981 Jan. 20), “Just War -- or a Just War?” (New York Times, March 9 2003 {copy, copy, copy}.

 

“ Jimmy Carter: Our apparent determination.

To launch a war against Iraq.

Without international support.

Is a violation of these premises.”

Clare Short (U.K. Secretary of State for International Development), interviewed by Andrew Rawnsley (BBC Radio 4, The Westminster Hour, Sunday March 9 2003, 10-11pm), audio {12:17, search, search, search, a/v, a/v, search}, copy {12:17}, “Clare Short's "reckless" interview{pf}, BBC transcript {pf} (excerpts), reported, Martha Kearney (political editor), “Blair "reckless" (BBC News, TV-2, Newsnight, March 10 2003, 10:30-11:15 p.m.) {BBCcat a:andt263s}, video {6:19}.

Jacques Chirac (President of France), interviewed by Patrick Poivre d'Arvor (TF1), David Pujadas (France 2), (Elysée Palace, Paris, Monday March 10 2003), broadcast live, TF1 video {39:55, 1:10:39, at 30:41}, INA France 2 video {39:45}, RFI audio {39:19, source}, French transcript {pf, source, copy}, English transcript {copy} (excerpts), reported, “Chirac Says France Will Veto U.N. Resolution on Iraq” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, March 10 2003, 4:26 p.m.), referring to a then proposed resolution imposing a March 17 deadline, reported, “France will use Iraq veto{pf} (BBC News, March 10 2003, 10:19 p.m.), Susannah Price, “The real action continues to be the intense bargaining behind the scenes,” BBC video {2:23}.

Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, March 11 2003, 12:05 p.m.), U.N. video: None, partial transcript, “Russian Ambassador Answers Questions” (CNN, Live Event/Special, March 11 2003, 12:04 p.m.) {archive}.

 

“ Sergei Lavrov We still believe, that the inspections should be strongly supported.

And the effectiveness of inspections was again confirmed yesterday, during the briefing — or, rather, consultations — with Dr. Blix.

And our position is the same.

We see no reason, whatsoever, to interrupt the inspections.

And any resolution which contained ultimatums, and which contains automaticity, for the use of force, is not acceptable to us.

And when you read in Financial Times today, that Russia is thinking of applying old Soviet tactic of “no show” during the vote.

And that Russia’s ambassador would find an excuse, to leave the room, when he would be required to raise hands.

Please remember my words.

That this would not be the case.

There would be a show.

And there would be no no-show.”

Donald Rumsfeld (U.S. Secretary of Defense), “DoD News Briefing — Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers” (U.S. Department of Defense, March 11 2003, 1:30 p.m.).

Bill Clinton (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1993-2001 Jan. 20), speech, March 12 2003, reported, David Von Drehle, “Clinton Diverges From Bush on Iraq{copy} (Washington Post, March 13 2003).

 

“ Bill Clinton: “The question is—

Do they want the support bad enough.

To let Mr. Blix finish his work.

And give enough time, to do that? ...

We’ve all got to be together.

We can’t waive the option of using force.

But we ought to do this in a way that brings the world together, not divides it. ...”

That may mean a long, taxing, deployment, for U.S. forces, in the Persian Gulf region.

“A big headache.”

Clinton acknowledged.

But.

“It’s worth it.

To disarm Saddam.

And.

Keep the world community together.””

Hans Blix, interviewed by John Norris, “Hans Blix: Caught Between Iraq and a Hard Place” (6 pages) (MTV News, March 12 2003) (video deleted).

Gordon Brown (U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer), interviewed by Kirsty Wark (BBC 2 TV, Newsnight, March 13 2003, 10:30 p.m.) {BBCcat d:andt263s}, video {8:30}, BBC transcript (subtitles), reported, “UK condemns French veto stance{pf} (BBC News, March 13 2003, 11:44 p.m.).

Dominique de Villepin (France Foreign Minister), interviewed in Paris, at the French Foreign Ministry, by Kirsty Wark (BBC 2 TV, Newsnight, March 14 2003, 10:30 p.m.) {BBCcat e:andt263s}, video {11:35}, BBC transcript (subtitles).

 

“ Kirsty Wark: But at the end of that schedule.

If there was no compliance.

Final compliance.

You would support war?

Dominique de Villepin: At the end of the schedule.

And that’s been the spirit.

And the letter.

Of the Resolution, 1441.

At the end.

If there is no compliance.

If we are at a deadlock.

If the inspectors are going to report, to the Security Council, that they cannot work any more.

Then, we will have—

At the end of the schedule—

A meeting of the Security Council.

Then we will examine all the options.

Including the use of force.

And we would support the use of force.

If it is the last resort. ...

Kirsty Wark: Tony Blair as accused the French of complete intransigence.

British and American officials are using language like “poisoning the diplomatic bloodstream.”

This is a crisis. ...

Dominique de Villepin: You cannot give misleading interpretation of the French position.

As we’ve seen lately, in the British press.

We want respect.

We want tolerance.

We should present the real position.

Of both countries.

* * *

You should ask yourself the question.

Why?

Is there no support in the Security Council, for the British proposal.

Why?

Is there no support to the resolution of the US, the British and the Spanish.

Why?

Not one vote, one position.

Has changed.

In the Security Council.

Since the last report.

Because we all listened.

To the report of the inspectors.

And we’ll stick to the same line.

If it is possible.

To get the disarmament of Iraq.

Peacefully.

And that’s what is said by those reports.

Why?

Should we take the risk.

To go to war.”

 

“ Robert S. McNamara {0:25}: What is an issue in Iraq today, existed in South Vietnam:

We’re alone.

If we can’t persuade other governments.

With comparable interests.

And comparable values.

The merit of our course.

We have reason to consider.

We’re on the wrong course.

And certainly.

We ought to reevaluate it.

If we had followed that policy.

With respect to Vietnam.

We wouldn’t have been there.”

Robert S. McNamara (U.S. Secretary of Defense, Jan. 21 1961-1968 Feb. 29), interviewed by James Naughtie (BBC Radio 4, Today, Wednesday June 9 2004, 6-9am at 7:33-7:39 a.m.), audio {5:28, at 5:03}: “Former U.S Defence Secretary Robert McNamara reflects on the Ronald Reagan era.”

____________________

 

Query: The merit of our course”?

Robert McNamara’s comment — certainly valid in other contexts — does not apply to Iraq.

Because the U.S. position on Iraq was not an honest, political, decision, to launch war.

A political issue on which reasonable, informed, minds could honestly disagree.

This decision had no “merit.”

It was a violent criminal enterprise.

From day-one.

To wage a criminal aggressive war in violation of a “treaty” (S/Res/1441).

And so, the U.S. could never expect to persuade others to agree to it.

Except the other members of the criminal enterprise, chiefly, the political leaders of the U.K., Spain, Australia, Bulgaria.

Robert McNamara apparently did not realize, when John F. Kennedy appointed him Secretary of Defense (1960) — and he had no reason to know — that the U.S. war on Vietnam was also a violent criminal enterprise. And the Pentagon Papers study, which Robert McNamara eventually commissioned, itself did not properly discover, reveal, analyze, or evaluate, this criminal origin, of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Initiated by Dwight D. Eisenhower, secretly following the secret advice of the Dulles brothers (CIA and State Department).

With the criminal war aim, to prevent the people of Vietnam, from electing the government of their choice, in the nationwide election, Eisenhower promised, in writing, to support, and not frustrate, scheduled for 1956. This agreement by Eisenhower, being one of the conditions for the 1954 cease fire, between the Vietnamese and the French, the colonial power which reoccupied Vietnam, after World War 2.

Robert McNamara was an executive with Ford Motor Company, at that time, when these secret decisions were made.

The U.S. decision to prevent the election, install an expatriate dictator (Diem), and arm and defend him, and that decision, until the Kennedy brothers decided to felony-murder him, and his brother, in a CIA orchestrated violent coup (November 3 1963), when Diem became disobedient.

Three weeks before John F. Kennedy received his just deserts, in Dallas (November 22 1963).

  CJHjr

Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary), interviewed by John Humphrys (BBC Radio 4, Today, Saturday March 15 2003, 7-9am at 8:10-8:27 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx2607}, audio {16:29, source}, copy {15:29}, FCO transcript (none), reported, “Straw insists war is legal{pf} (BBC News, March 15 2003, 5:03 p.m.).

Gordon Brown (U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer), intervewed by David Frost (BBC TV-1, Breakfast with Frost, London, Sunday March 16 2003, 9-10am) {BBCcat c:andh034f}, BBC transcript {search, search}.

Dick Cheney (U.S. Vice President), interviewed by Tim Russert (NBC News, Meet the Press, Sunday March 16 2003, 9:00/10:30 a.m. ET), NBC transcript.

 

“ Tim Russert: And even though the International Atomic Energy Agency said, he does not have a nuclear program.

We disagree?

Dick Cheney: I disagree, yes.

And, you’ll find the CIA.

For example.

And other key parts of our intelligence community.

Disagree. ...

We know he has been absolutely devoted, to trying to acquire nuclear weapons.

And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.

I think Mr. ElBaradei, frankly, is wrong.

And I think, if you look at the track record, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and this kind of issue, especially where Iraq’s concerned, they have consistently underestimated, or missed, what it was, Saddam Hussein was doing.

I don’t have any reason, to believe, they’re any more valid this time, than they’ve been in the past. ...

From the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is, we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.”

____________________

 

Query: No reason”?

How about this, for a reason:

In 1990, the IAEA did not have legal authority, to investigate anywhere, except where Saddam declared, he had nuclear facilities.

This fault, in the IAEA inspection regime, was corrected in 1998, with the creation of an Additional Protocol {117kb.pdf}, to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement {81kb.pdf}, which permits snap, no notice inspections.

But.

Way beyond.

Those inspection powers, in the Additional Protocol—

Iraq agreed, in 2002, to snap inspections.

Without restrictions.

S/Res/1441 {58kb.pdf, copy, copy, also via this, this, or ODS}.

Anywhere.

Any time.

Without notice.

Public property, private property, palaces, homes, vehicles, above ground, under ground.

Day or night.

Workday.

Rest day.

Holiday.

“We intend to exercise this right — not to harass — but to demonstrate that, just as there are no sanctuaries in space, there are no sanctuaries in time.”

As Hans Blix explained, to the Security Council (December 19 2002).

And that’s exactly what they did.

Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei—

From day-one.

Repeatedly.

Continuously.

Publicly.

Announced.

And officially reported.

That Iraq cooperated 100%, with their inspections.

The most intrusive inspection regime in the history of the world.

Dick Cheney knew this.

To be an unassailable fact.

And so, he knew this too:

A distant, past history.

Based on a different, inadequate, inspection regime.

Has utterly no relevance.

And no application.

To these new inspections.

Only a wilful.

Malicious.

Liar.

Would pretend to believe otherwise.

  CJHjr

Jacques Chirac (President of France), interviewed by Christiane Amanpour (Elysée Palace, Paris, March 16 2003, before 6:30 p.m. GMT, “just before the Sunday summit started,” the Azores Summit), “Chirac Makes His Case on Iraq{pf} (CBS News, 60 Minutes, March 16 2003, 7:00 p.m. ET), video excerpt {1:15}, “Chirac: ‘A Lot of Progress Has Been Achieved’{pf} (CNN Special Report, March 16 2003, 7:00 p.m. ET), French transcript {pf, source, copy}, English transcript, transcript audio {16:21} (reading the French transcript), reported, Steven Gray, “Chirac Suggests Iraq Be Given 30 More Days: French Leader Speaks Before Summit” {pf} (Washington Post, March 17 2003).

 

“ Christiane Amanpour: Do you believe that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction?

For instance, chemical or biological weapons?

Jacques Chirac: I don’t know.

I have no proof of that.

What we can say today, is that—

If we believe Mr ElBaradei, and his team of experts, there are no longer any weapons—

There are no nuclear weapons.

Or programs, capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

That is something that the inspectors seem to be sure of.

As for chemical, biological weapons of mass destruction—

I don’t know, at all.

We have no proof.

But that is precisely what the inspectors’ task is.

They have to go on with their work.

To find these weapons.

If there are any.

And then, destroy them.

And the inspectors are telling us,

“This is a job we can do.”

So when, for one reason or another, it appears that they can’t, or can no longer do it, then of course, it will be the time to resort to other methods.

Including war.

But this isn’t the case.

So I think, that going into battle, rushing into war today is totally disproportionate, and inadequate.

Given the goal we have set.

Which is to disarm Iraq.

That’s a point on which everybody, of course, agrees.”

Azores Summit, George W. Bush, Tony Blair, José Aznar, press conference, President Bush: Monday "Moment of Truth" for World on Iraq {pf} (community activity center ballroom, Lajes Field Air Force Base, Terceira Island, Azores Portugal, March 16 2003, 5:30-6:05 p.m. AZOT, 6:30-7:05 p.m. GMT), White House video {33:59}, audio {33:41}, retitled, “The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso of Portugal, President Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom in the Azores, Portugal,” 39:12 WCPD 330-336 {28kb.txt, 55kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:39/12}, “Text: Azores summit statement{pf} (BBC News, March 16 2003, 8:26 p.m. GMT), BBC “News Special: Azores Summit” (BBC 2 TV, March 16 2003, 6:25-7:30 p.m. GMT) {BBCcat andf032j}, George W. Bush, statement, BBC video {4:36}, Tony Blair, statement, BBC video {6:45}, reported, “Allies meet for crisis summit{pf} (BBC News, March 16 2003, 6:26 p.m. GMT), Helen Simms, “Many believe it's a council of war,” BBC video {2:27}, Andrew Marr (BBC political editor), “Q & A: Is diplomacy over?{pf} (BBC News, March 16 2003, 11:44 p.m. GMT), “Bush: Monday is 'a moment of truth' on Iraq” (CNN, March 17 2003, 5:38 a.m. GMT).

U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Iraq. UN Documents of early March 2003 {702kb.pdf, source} (Command paper 5785, Cm 5785, March 17 2003) (“These comprise of statements by Hans Blix, head of the UN weapons inspectorate UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), and by Dr. El-Baradei, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to the UN Security Council; the speech made by the Foreign Secretary to the UN Security Council; the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC; and a UNMOVIC working document {1.5mb.pdf} on unresolved disarmament issues.”).

Peter Goldsmith (Lord Goldsmith) (U.K. Attorney-General), written answer, “Iraq: Legality of Armed Force” (Monday March 17 2003, 1:53 p.m. {pf} GMT, U.K. Parliament, Hansard, House of Lords, bound volume edition, 5th series, volume 646, columns WA2-WA3), copy, Harriet Harman (U.K. Solicitor-General), written answer, “Iraq” (Monday March 17 2003, U.K. Parliament, Hansard, House of Commons, bound volume edition, 6th series, volume 401, columns 515W-516W).

Jeremy Greenstock (U.K. U.N. Ambassador), statement (media stakeout, U.N. Security Council lobby, Monday March 17 2003, 10:00 a.m. ET, 3:00 p.m. GMT), FCO transcript {pf, source}, reported, “UK, US and Spain won't seek vote on draft resolution, may take ‘own steps’ to disarm Iraq” {pf} (U.N. News, March 17 2003), “Greenstock statement in full{pf} (BBC News, March 17 2003, 4:01 p.m. GMT), BBC video {2:52}.

U.K. Parliament, House of Lords, debate, “Iraq: Legality of Armed Force” (Monday March 17 2003, 6:52-10:26 p.m., Hansard, House of Lords, bound volume edition, 5th series, volume 646, columns 68-124), opposition “motion for papers” withdrawn (column 124) without a “division” (formal vote) {111kb.pdf}.

“ Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt, that the Iraq regime continues to possess, and conceal, some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.”

George W. Bush, March 17 2003

George W. Bush (U.S. President), “President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours{pf} (White House, Cross Hall, Monday March 17 2003, 8:01-8:15 p.m.), video {13:45}, audio {13:26}, retitled “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” 39:12 WCPD 338-341 {12kb.txt, 45kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:38/12}.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst (deputy legal adviser, Foreign Office), secret resignation letter (Tuesday March 18 2003), first published two years later, Gary Gibbon, “Law of the war{pf} (Channel 4 News, London, March 23 2005), reported, “Wilmshurst resignation letter{pf} (BBC News, March 24 2005, 10:22 a.m.), “Straw facing war advice critics{pf} (BBC News, March 24 2005, 12:39 p.m.). Elizabeth Wilmshurst was first mentioned publicly, a year earlier, as a listed defense witness, for the intended “necessity” defense, in the abandoned criminal prosecution of Katharine Gun, a GCHQ whistleblower, who disclosed a secret email, from the U.S. NSA, asking GCHQ and other intelligence agencies to spy and eavesdrop on U.N. diplomats (The Katherine Gun Case). See, Martin Bright, “US stars hail Iraq war whistleblower{pf, pf} {copy} The Observer, London, Sunday January 18 2004), Richard Norton-Taylor, Ewen MacAskill, “Spy Case Casts Fresh Doubt on War Legality{pf, pf} {copy} (Guardian, London, February 26 2004), “GCHQ translator cleared over leak{pf} {copy}, “Translator turns 'whistle-blower' {pf} (BBC News, February 26 2004, 3:21 p.m., 3:22 p.m.), Richard Norton-Taylor, Ewen MacAskill, “Whitehall United in Doubt on War{pf, pf} {copy} (Guardian, London, February 27 2004). Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Head, International Law Programme, RIIA: Royal Institute of International Affairs) (Chatham House), “Statement from Elizabeth Wilmshurst{copy} (Chatham House, press notice, Friday February 27 2004): “I left my job as a deputy legal adviser in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office because I did not agree that the use of force against Iraq was lawful, and in all the circumstances I did not want to continue as a legal adviser.”

 

“ Elizabeth Wilmshurst:

1. I regret that I cannot agree that it is lawful to use force against Iraq without a second Security Council resolution to revive the authorisation given in SCR 678.

I do not need to set out my reasoning;

You are aware of it.

My views accord with the advice that has been given consistently in this office before and after the adoption of UN security council resolution 1441 and with what the attorney general gave us to understand was his view prior to his letter of 7 March.

(The view expressed in that letter has of course changed again into what is now the official line.)

I cannot in conscience go along with advice — within the Office or to the public or Parliament — which asserts the legitimacy of military action without such a resolution,

Particularly since an unlawful use of force on such a scale amounts to the crime of aggression;

Nor can I agree with such action in circumstances which are so detrimental to the international order and the rule of law.

2. I therefore need to leave the Office:

My views on the legitimacy of the action in Iraq would not make it possible for me to continue my role as a Deputy Legal Adviser or my work more generally.

For example in the context of the International Criminal Court, negotiations on the crime of aggression begin again this year.

I am therefore discussing with Alan Charlton whether I may take approved early retirement.

In case that is not possible this letter should be taken as constituting notice of my resignation.

3. I joined the Office in 1974.

It has been a privilege to work here.

I leave with very great sadness.”

“A minute dated 18 March 2003 from Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Deputy Legal Adviser) to Michael Wood (The Legal Adviser), copied to the Private Secretary, the Private Secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretary, Alan Charlton (Director Personnel) and Andrew Patrick (Press Office).”

Text beside the maroon bar (  ) was concealed by the U.K. Foreign Office, endorsed by Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary), when it released the rest of the letter {15kb.pdf, copy, source} (March 23 2005). The concealed text was promptly published by Channel 4 News, the same day.

____________________

 

Query: Can Elizabeth Wilmshurst be successfully prosecuted? For her failure? To notify Parliament, and the public, of her resignation? And her reasons? And the sudden alteration of the legal opinions of the Foreign Office (her office)? And the Attorney-General?

For the answer, see, e.g., Tammy Lopez, “The Concept of Withdrawal from a Conspiracy” {65kb.pdf, source} (Memorandum for the Office of the Prosecutor, International Tribunal for Rwanda, May 2001) (New England School of Law, International War Crimes Project).

And did it cross her mind to notify Parliament? Or the public?

Elizabeth Wilmshurst never belonged to a criminal conspiracy.

She never agreed to the war.

She never agreed to lie about the facts.

She never agreed to lie about her legal opinion.

And so.

She did not have criminal specific intent.

She had no need to negate the intent she did not have, by taking active, visible, effective, steps to extricate herself, from the criminal conspiracy.

But.

She could nevertheless be a member of a criminal enterprise.

Without agreeing to be.

Without criminal “specific intent.”

The criminal enterprise the members of the criminal conspiracy designed to promote, using the services of tens of thousands of people.

And.

She could further the aims of that criminal enterprise.

Without wanting to.

She could acquiesce.

She could remain silent.

When prompted to speak.

Criminal facilitation.

If her silence was material.

To furthering the criminal goals of the enterprise.

Had she spoken up, she probably would not have stopped the war.

But she might have.

Certainly, it would likely have changed the minds of some Members of Parliament who voted for the war.

And prompted others to change their vote too, those who were content to support a criminal war, provided they could plausibly pretend to believe it was legal.

And, publicity might have enleagued the press, energized the press, bolstered the confidence of editors, to publicly challenge, and intimidate, the ring-leaders of the criminal enterprise (e.g., Tony Blair, Jack Straw, Peter Goldsmith).

Was she prompted to speak?

I don’t think so.

Nobody asked her opinion.

As far as I know.

And if they did, she did not decline to state it.

As far as I know.

Tellingly.

She did speak.

When the Foreign Office adopted an altered legal opinion.

To accord with Peter Goldsmith’s altered legal opinion.

But.

Did she speak to the audience that opinion was designed to influence?

The military, for example?

The Law Officers (Goldsmith/Harman)?

The Cabinet?

Parliament?

  CJHjr

Hans Blix, press conference (U.N. Correspondents Association, U.N. building, New York City, Tuesday March 18 2003), U.N. video archive ditto (dead link), C-Span video (request) {45:00, smil, schedule, 174398727, 175570-1, rss, archive, search, library}, reported, “Probe for Iraqi weapons should have continued – Blix{pf} (U.N. News, March 18 2003).

U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, debate and vote, “Iraq” (Tuesday March 18 2003, 12:35-10:29 p.m., Hansard, House of Commons, bound volume edition, 6th series, volume 401, columns 760-911), Tony Blair (U.K. Prime Minister), his opening statement, No. 10 video {48:05, source}, opposition motion (column 779) defeated 217/396 (Division No. 117, column 902) (“the case for war against Iraq has not yet been established”), motion approving war (column 911), adopted 412/149 (Division No. 118, 10:14 p.m., column 907), C-Span video (request) {1:58:00, schedule, 174375139, 175552-1, rss, archive, search, search} (deleted).

 

“ Resolved, That this House notes its decisions of 25th November 2002 and 26th February 2003 to endorse UN Security Council Resolution 1441;

recognises that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles, and its continuing non-compliance with Security Council Resolutions, pose a threat to international peace and security;

notes that in the 130 days since Resolution 1441 was adopted Iraq has not co-operated actively, unconditionally and immediately with the weapons inspectors, and has rejected the final opportunity to comply and is in further material breach of its obligations under successive mandatory UN Security Council Resolutions;

regrets that despite sustained diplomatic effort by Her Majesty’s Government it has not proved possible to secure a second Resolution in the UN because one Permanent Member of the Security Council made plain in public its intention to use its veto whatever the circumstances;

notes the opinion of the Attorney General that, Iraq having failed to comply and Iraq being at the time of Resolution 1441 and continuing to be in material breach, the authority to use force under Resolution 678 has revived and so continues today;

believes that the United Kingdom must uphold the authority of the United Nations as set out in Resolution 1441 and many Resolutions preceding it, and therefore

supports the decision of Her Majesty’s Government that the United Kingdom should use all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction;

offers wholehearted support to the men and women of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces now on duty in the Middle East;

in the event of military operations requires that, on an urgent basis, the United Kingdom should seek a new Security Council Resolution that would affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian relief, allow for the earliest possible lifting of UN sanctions, an international reconstruction programme, and the use of all oil revenues for the benefit of the Iraqi people and endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq, leading to a representative government which upholds human rights and the rule of law for all Iraqis;

and also welcomes the imminent publication of the Quartet’s roadmap as a significant step to bringing a just and lasting peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians and for the wider Middle East region,

and endorses the role of Her Majesty’s Government in actively working for peace between Israel and Palestine.”

U.K. Parliament, House of Lords, debate and vote, “Iraq” (Tuesday March 18 2003, 3:19-9:32 p.m., Hansard, House of Lords, bound volume edition, 5th series, volume 646, columns 138-232), motion approving war agreed without a division (formal vote) (“That this House takes note of Her Majesty’s Government’s policy on Iraq”) (column 232).

 

The two veto lies

1. France said it would veto a second resolution, under any circumstances.

2. The Security Council would have adopted the second resolution, if France had not threatened to veto.

{Forthcoming}

 

Hans Blix, interviewed Wednesday March 19 2003, by James Naughtie, “Iraq War” (BBC Radio 4, Today, Thursday March 20 2003, 6-9am at 7:50-7:57 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx2611}, audio {6:59, source, source, search, search, a/v, a/v, search, rss}, copy {6:09}, reported, “Annan, Blix Regret Iraq Conflict{pf} (BBC News, March 20 2003).

 

“ Hans Blix: We did not have any obstacles.

From the Iraqi side.

In going anywhere.

They gave us access.

And prompt access.

And we were in a great many places, over Iraq.

And we managed to get going the destruction of the Al-Samoud missiles.

Destroyed over 70 of them.

With Iraqi cooperation. ...

James Naughtie: Why do you think, having had as many conversations with the White House, as you have, that the American administration, in particular, decided that more time wouldn’t solve the problem?

Hans Blix: Well, I think they were doubtful from the beginning.

The resolution, that was adopted, last autumn, was one that was extremely demanding.

And perhaps they weren’t sure, or doubted, that the Iraqis would go along with it.

And that you would have a stalemate, a clash, already from the beginning.

But I think—

They did cooperate with us.

And they lost patience {U.S. officials}, I think, sometime towards the end of January, or the beginning of February.

James Naughtie: Is that because they believed, that their intelligence was producing evidence of material, that you weren’t able to confirm, and that that produced, what we might call, political frustration?

Hans Blix: No.

I think that—

I have a high regard for intelligence.

And I think it’s necessary.

But I must say, that when you watch what came out of intelligence, you were not so convinced.

We had the question of the aluminum tubes.

Which were alleged to be for building of centrifuges.

And it was much doubted.

Even by lots of American experts.

And, you had the even more flagrant case, of the so-called “contract,” which alleged that Iraq had concluded with Niger, or tried to conclude, about the importation of raw uranium, as yellow cake.

And the IAEA found, that this was a fake.

Now, these things did not do much to strengthen the evidence coming—

Or, not the “evidence”—

But, at least the “stories”—

Coming from intelligence.

And, the fact that we did not find things.

At the sites, which were—

Or, in very few cases found things—

At the sites, which were given by intelligence.

Also, I think, weakened that position.

James Naughtie: Do you think—

Let me put this bluntly.

Do you think, Saddam Hussein is in possession of weapons of mass destruction?

Or not.

Hans Blix: Well, I must say, that I am very curious to see, what the Americans may now find.

Because, now they are able to talk to people.

And when they—

These people are no longer fearing repression, by a regime, if they tell the truth.

So.

In all likelihood.

They will tell the truth. ...”

George W. Bush (U.S. President), “President Bush Addresses the Nation{pf} (White House, Oval Office, Wednesday March 19 2003, 10:16-10:20 p.m.), video {4:06}, audio {4:08}, retitled “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” 39:12 WCPD 342-343 {12kb.txt, 45kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:38/12}.

Hans Blix (New York City), interviewed by Anna Maria Tremonti (host, The Current) (CBC Radio One, Iraq War Special, Toronto, Friday March 21 2003), and by Sirius Satellite Radio (CBC Radio One 137), CBC audio {9:50, reported}.

Hans Blix (New York City), interviewed by Harry Smith, video “Hans Blix Reacts To War{4:36, source, search} (CBS News, The Early Show, New York City, recorded Friday March 21 2003, broadcast Saturday March 22 2003, 7-9am ET) (“As the U.S. began its ferocious aerial assault on Baghdad, Harry Smith talked with Chief U.S. Weapons Inspector Hans Blix about his reactions to the start of the war with Iraq”).

Hans Blix (New York City), interviewed Monday March 24 2003 by Aíne Lawlor (Dublin) (RTE Radio One, Morning Ireland, Dublin, March 25 2003, 7-9am at 8:14-8:29 a.m.), audio {2:00:59, Blix 15:00 at 1:15:14}.

Al-Jazerra, launched its English language website (Monday March 24 2003), “was hacked-down one day after it went online,” by an organized denial-of-service attack (millions of pings per minute, shutting-down its servers), “and for the first time in 3-years, since the Arabic site went up, and became the premier source of Arabic news on the internet, for the Arabic world, for the first time ever, that has been hacked-down as well,” reported, Imad Musa (news producer, Al-Jazeera, Washington D.C.), interviewed by Anna Maria Tremonti (CBC Radio One, The Current, Thursday, March 27 2003, 8:55-9:00 a.m.), audio {28:30, Musa 4:05 at 24:25}.

Seymour Hersh, “Who Lied to Whom? {pf}: Why did the Administration endorse a forgery about Iraq's nuclear program?” (The New Yorker, March 31 2003, posted March 24 2003).

Seymour Hersh, interviewed by Anna Maria Tremonti (CBC Radio One, The Current, Thursday, March 27 2003, 8:31-8:41 a.m.), audio {28:30, Hersh 9:42 at 0:00, archive, search, search, search}.

Hans Blix (New York City), interviewed by Edith M. Lederer (AP: Associated Press, U.N. corresondent), “Disappointed Blix Bows Out June 30{pf} (CBS News, Iraq: After Saddam, New York City, interviewed Friday March 28 2003, published Saturday March 29 2003).

Hans Blix (New York City), interviewed by Philippe Bolopion (RFI: Radio France Internationale, March 29 2003), RFI audio {3:35, source} (French).

Donald Rumsfeld (U.S. Secretary of Defense), interviewed by George Stephanopoulos (ABC News, This Week, Sunday, March 30 2003, 11:30 a.m.), transcript {copy, copy}.

 

“ George Stephanopoulos: Is it curious to you?

That given how much control.

U.S. and coalition forces now have.

In the country.

They haven’t found any weapons of mass destruction?

Donald Rumsfeld: Not at all.

If you think—

Let me take that, both pieces.

The area in the south and the west and the north, that coalition forces control, is substantial.

It happens not to be the area where weapons of mass destruction were dispersed.

{0:20 bb} We know where they are.

They’re in the area around Tikrit.

And Baghdad.

And east, west, south and north.

Somewhat.”

March 30 2003, video bb
{14:33 bb, at 0:20 bb, source}

____________________

 

Query:We know where they are”?

Well.

If you know where they are.

Why didn’t you simply tell Mr. Blix?

And he could go and fetch them.

  CJHjr

Hans Blix, interviewed by Ernesto Ekaizer, “"EE UU Se Impacientó Cuando Irak Empezó A Colaborar Con La ONU"{pf} (en: The U.S. became impatient when Iraq began to collaborate with the U.N.) (El Pais, Madrid, April 9 2003) {copy, copy}, English translation, “Interview With Hans Blix: The US Lost Patience When Iraq Began to Collaborate with the UN.”

Ari Fleischer (White House Press Secretary), replying to a question from April Ryan (AURN: American Urban Radio Networks), “Press Briefing with Ari Fleischer{pf} (White House, April 10 2003, 12:20-1:03 p.m. ET) {copy, copy}, video {41:40, at 31:43-32:36}.

 

“ Ari Fleischer {0:51}:

Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.

That is what the war was about.

And is about.”

Hans Blix, “Diplomacy and the United Nations” (New England School of Law, Law Day 2003, Barrister's Ball, Copley Marriott Hotel, Boston, April 11 2003), C-Span video (request) {1:00:00, smil, schedule, 175231423, 176125-1, rss, archive, search, library}, reported, Emily Berg, “Blix wished more time for inspections, did not oppose war{pf} (JSONS: Journalism Students’ Online News Service, Emerson College, Boston, April 15 2003), photos.

Amer al-Saadi (Iraq scientific adviser, and liaison with UNMOVIC), speaking to German ZDF TV, just before his voluntary surrender, in Baghdad, on April 12 2003, reported, Ray Suarez, “War News Roundup” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, April 12 2003, 7:00 p.m.), PBS video bb {13:45 bb, 4:16-5:08 bb, at 4:36-4:52 bb}, rebroadcast (truncated), Ray Suarez, “Weapons Hunt” (May 5 2003), video bb {16:21 bb, at 1:36-2:06 bb}, audio {16:08, at 1:28-1:59}, BBC video {1:33}, reported, “Saddam Aide Surrenders: A senior aide to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, General Amir al-Saadi, has surrendered to US forces in Baghdad” (BBC News, April 12 2003, 18:35 GMT), “Iraqi Scientist 'Has Nothing to Hide' (BBC News, April 13 2003), CBS video (excerpt) {1:33, source}.

 

“ Amer al-Saadi {0:16 bb} {0:52 bb} {0:30 bb, audio}:

I was knowledgeable about those programs.

The past programs.

And I was telling the truth.

Always telling the truth.

Never told anything but the truth.

And time will bear me out.

You’ll see.

There will be no difference.

After this war.”

Jay Garner (Director, Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Iraq: April 21 – May 11 2003, CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority), interviewed by Lisa Mullins (BBC World Service, Newshour (?), April 15 2003, 9.00 p.m. GMT), audio {3:52}, BBC transcript {pf}.

Hans Blix, Peter King (Member, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives), interviewed by Edward Stourton, “Iraq” (BBC Radio 4, Today, Tuesday April 22 2003, 6-9am at 8:10-8:21 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx2756}, audio {11:17}, reported, “Blix: 'US Undermined Inspectors' {pf} (BBC News, April 22 2003); Sally Bolton, agencies, “Blix Attacks US War Intelligence{pf} (Guardian, London, April 22 2003, 1:30 p.m.); Gary Younge (New York), Richard Norton-Taylor, Patrick Wintour, “Blix Attacks 'Shaky' Intelligence On Weapons{pf} (Guardian, London, April 23 2003); David Usborne (New York), “Hans Blix vs the US: 'I Was Undermined' {copy, copy} (Independent, London, April 23 2003).

Hans Blix, Sergei Lavrov (and others), interviewed by Edward Stourton, “Road To War: The Inside Story” {BBCcat anss617r} (BBC 2 TV, April 26 2003, 8:05 p.m.), also broadcast (CBC Passionate Eye, May 4 2003, 8:00 p.m.; CBC Newsworld, May 10 2003, 10:00 p.m.), video (ditto) {48:39, 35.1kb.rm, copy}, (ABC Four Corners, May 26 2003, 8:30 p.m.), retitled, supplemented, audio series, “Fallout from Terror” {BBCcat}, in two parts (BBC Radio 4, part-1 {BBCcat 04vq2959}, March 21 2004, 8:02-9:00 p.m., part-2 {BBCcat 04vq3013}, March 28 2004, 8:02-9:00 p.m.), “The Jigsaw in Pieces,” in four parts (BBC World Service, March 17 2004), part-2, “Opposition,” audio {26:24}, supplementing the initial audio version, “Road To War{pf} {BBCcat 03vq2729} (BBC Radio 4, March 20 2003, 8:30-9:15 p.m.) audio {42:47, source, transcript}.

 

“ Sergei Lavrov (April 2003) {0:22} {1:04}:

It was almost surreal.

Just at the moment.

When we got.

Where we wanted to get.

With the few remaining disarmament tasks.

Just at that moment.

The war was announced.

I believe that—

Unless there is something I, I, I don’t know.

The only explanation is.

That regime-change.

Has all along.

Been the goal.

* * *

{0:12} There was no deadline.

In the resolution.

Which would be considered.

As the end of the road.

And there was no end of the road.

It—

The road was artificially blown-up.

Basically.”

George J. Tenet (U.S. Director of Central Intelligence), Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2002 (Central Intelligence Agency, April 2003) {copy, 357kb.pdf}.

George W. Bush, “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended{pf} (deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, at sea, off the coast of San Diego, May 1 2003, 6:00-6:27 p.m.) video {23:44}, audio {22:15}, retitled, “Address to the Nation on Iraq From the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln,” 39:18 WCPD 516-518 {12kb.txt, 50kb.pdf (faulty), copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:39/18}.

 

“ George W. Bush: We’ve removed an ally of Al Qaida.

And cut off a source of terrorist funding.”

Anonymous, “Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants{742kb.pdf, copy, 742kb.pdf} (Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, May 28 2003).

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), Thirteenth Quarterly Report of the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC (U.N. Doc. S/2003/580, May 30 2003) {282kb.pdf, copy, also via this, and ODS}.

 

“ 84. The excavations made from 19 February to 16 March 2003 unearthed the following items: eight bombs, 96 base plates, 60 nose cones and many fragments of nose cones, tails and bomb bodies, accounting for a total of 104 R-400 bombs, in addition to the 24 R-400 type bombs excavated by UNSCOM. The total number of R-400 bombs accounted for at Al Azzizziyah is 128 (out of 157 declared destroyed).

85.  Samples were obtained of the liquid contents of two R-400 bombs that were excavated by Iraq in February 2003 at Al Azzizziyah. ... The results of that analysis indicated that both bombs contained DNA of virulent B. anthracis. ... In addition, the laboratory confirmed the presence of high levels of manganese and formic acid. Those two elements are an indicative verification of Iraq’s chemical inactivation, as declared, of bomb contents with potassium permanganate and formaldehyde.”

Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary), intervewed by David Frost (BBC TV-1, Breakfast with Frost, London, Sunday, June 1 2003, 9-10am) {BBCcat a:andw003f}, FCO transcript {pf, source}, BBC transcript {search, search}.

Clare Short (U.K. Secretary of State for International Development), interviewed by Jeremy Vine (BBC TV-1, The Politics Show, Sunday June 1 2003, noon-1pm) {BBCcat anpd322x}, BBC transcript, “Clare Short: "We were duped" {pf, search, search, search, a/v, a/v, search} (“Clare Short accuses Tony Blair of duping the public over Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction”).

Hans Blix, interviewed in New York by Jill Colgan, “Interview with Dr. Hans Blix” (ABC News, Foreign Correspondent, June 3 2003, 9:20 p.m.).

Andrew Wilkie (intelligence analyst, resigned March 11 2003, ONA: Australia Office of National Assessments), interviewed June 3 2003 by Mark Davis, “Andrew Wilkie Interview” (SBS News, Dateline, Sydney, June 4 2003, 8:30 p.m.), video {9:18}, transcript.

Greg Thielmann (Director to September 2002, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department), interviewed June 4 2003 by Gordon Corera (security correspondent), Robin Cook (U.K. Foreign Secretary, 1997-2001, resigned March 17 2003 as Leader of the House of Commons and Lord President of the Council), Eric Forth (Shadow Leader of the House of Commons), interviewed by James Naughtie, “Iraq” (BBC Radio 4, Today, Thursday June 5 2003, 6-9am at 8:10-8:27 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx1322}, audio {17:19}, copy (Thielmann only) {3:48, source}, reported, “Bush vows to find Iraqi weapons{pf} (BBC News, June 5 2003, 3:10 p.m.), “Blix hopes for truth over Iraq{pf} (BBC News, June 5 2003, 6:29 p.m.), “Weapons dossier 'sent back six times'{pf} (BBC News, June 6 2003, 8:50 a.m.).

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), “Security Council Briefing: Notes for the briefing of the Security Council on the thirteenth quarterly report of UNMOVIC” {copy, pf} (U.N. Security Council Meeting, June 5 2003), transcript, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4768 {33kb.pdf, via this, this, or ODS} (U.N. Security Council Meeting 4768, Thursday, June 5 2003, 10:45-11:00 a.m., 4 pages, SC/7777), reported, “Still No Conclusions About Existence Of Iraq’s Weapons, Blix Tells Security Council{pf} (U.N. News, June 5 2003), U.N. video archive (dead link), C-Span video {14:00, schedule, 176865104, search, library, archive, rss}, BBC video (excerpt) {1:32, 408.74kb.rm, search, search, a/v, a/v, search, rss}, RTE video (excerpt) {2:05, at 0:25}, Bryan Dobson (presenter), Sinéad Crowley (reporter), “Blix Doubts WMD Existence Prior to Iraq War(accord) (RTE: Radio Telefís Éireann, RTE News Six One, Dublin, June 5 2003, 6:00 p.m.), RTE video (same excerpt) {2:01, at 0:25}, Eileen Dunne (presenter), Sinéad Crowley (reporter), “Hans Blix Delivers His Final Report to the UNSC” (RTE News Nine O'Clock, Dublin, June 5 2003, 9:00 p.m.), reported, “Blix hopes for truth over Iraq{pf} (BBC News, June 5 2003, 6:29 p.m.), Ian Pannell, “It was a rather anti-climatic final outing,” BBC video {1:39}: “Although he doesn’t actually say it, he’s clearly increasingly skeptical, that weapons of mass destruction exist, at all, in Iraq.”

 

“ Hans Blix: I should like also to draw the attention of the Council to the information provided in Appendix I.

It shows that the weapons that were destroyed before inspectors left in 1998, were in almost all cases declared by Iraq and that the destruction occurred before 1993 in the case of missiles and before 1994 in the case of chemical weapons.

The existence and scope of the biological weapons programme was uncovered by UNSCOM in 1995 despite Iraq’s denials and concealment efforts. As to items, only a few remnants of the biological weapons programme were subsequently found. A great deal — Iraq asserts all — was unilaterally destroyed in 1991.

Thus, in the main, UNSCOM supervised destruction of actual weapons and agents took place during the early years of the Commission, and had regard mainly to items declared by Iraq or, at least, found at sites declared by Iraq.

Subsequent UNSCOM disarmament activities dealt almost exclusively with the destruction of equipment and facilities for the production of weapons connected to past programmes.”

Hans Blix (New York City), interviewed by Miriam O'Callaghan (Dublin), “Dr Hans Blix Makes Final Address to UN Security Council” (RTE: Radio Telefís Éireann, RTE News, Prime Time, Dublin, June 5 2003, 9:30 p.m., at 10:02-10:10 p.m.), video {7:49}.

Hans Blix, interviewed June 5 2003 in New York City by Greg Barrow (BBC U.N. Correspondent), “It's still too early to say that weapons will not be found” (BBC News 24, BBC World, June 5 2003) video {5:19, source}, copy {5:19, source}, copy {5:02, source}, reported, Matt Frei (BBC Washington Correspondent), “A damning indictment of US intelligence before the war,” video {2:11} (BBC News, June 5 2003), Blix criticises coalition over Iraq weapons{pf} (BBC News, June 6 2003, 5:12 a.m.), “Hans Blix criticises 'quality' of intelligence{pf} (BBC News, Breakfast, June 6 2003, 7:26 a.m. BT).

Hans Blix (New York City), interviewed Thursday June 5 2003 by James Naughtie (London), “Iraq” (BBC Radio 4, Today, Friday June 6 2003, 6-9am at 7:47-7:57 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx1329}, broadcast audio {10:02, search, search, a/v, a/v, search, rss}, copy {9:47}, extended {17:28}, reportedBlix: 'No surprise' if WMD found” (CNN June 6 2003, 11:33 a.m. GMT).

Judith Miller, William J. Broad, “Some Analysts of Iraq Trailers Reject Germ Use” (New York Times, June 7 2003) {copy}. Peter Beaumont, Antony Barnett, “Blow to Blair Over ‘Mobile Labs’: Saddam’s Trucks Were For Balloons, Not Germs” (The Observer, London, Sunday June 8 2003). Peter Beaumont, Antony Barnett, Gaby Hinsliff, “Iraqi Mobile Labs Nothing to do with Germ Warfare, Report Finds” (Observer, London, June 15 2003) {copy}. Douglas Jehl, “State Department Disputes CIA View of Trailers as Labs” (New York Times, June 26 2003). Douglas Jehl, “Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen, Not Biological Arms” (“Engineering experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency”) (New York Times, August 9 2003) {copy}.

Hans Blix, interviewed June 10 2003, by Helena Smith (New York), “One Last Warning from the Man Who Made an Enemy of Bush{pf} (Guardian, London, June 11 2003).

Hans Blix, interviewed June 10 2003, by Helena Smith (New York), “Blix: I Was Smeared by the Pentagon{pf} (Guardian, London, June 11 2003).

Hans Blix, interviewed by Richard Roth, “Interview With Hans Blix” (CNN News, June 11 2003), copy (CNN Diplomatic License, June 13 2003), reported, Richard Roth (CNN Senior U.N. Correspondent) “Blix takes Washington to task” (CNN Access, June 12 2003, 4:17 p.m. ET), video excerpt {1:55, 4.6mb.mov}, “Hans Blix Explains "Bastards" Comment” (The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, June 12 2003).

Kofi Annan, (U.N. Secretary General), Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), joint press briefing, “Remarks with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan After Their Meeting” (U.S. State Department, C Street Entrance, Washington D.C., June 11 2003).

 

“ Kofi Annan Let me say that,

Blix is a very professional person.

And a very honest person.

He did a very good job.

And he had universal respect.

For his professionalism and his efforts.

I’m sorry to see him leave, at the end of the year.

He is a very good public servant.

And.

I am sure he’s going to remain engaged.

And.

We haven’t heard the last of him.

As to the smear campaign, I can’t really get into it except to say that I have seen some articles in the press, which I have considered unfair, given the work that he has done.

On the question of the quality of the intelligence.

Or it’s being hyped.

Obviously, material intelligence was given to the inspectors.

Who used it in Iraq.

We know the result.

It didn’t get very much.

I don’t think I want to go beyond that.”

Greg Thielmann (Director to September 2002, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department), interviewed by Bill Moyers, “The Case For War” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, NOW, June 13 2003), transcript {pf}.

Hans Blix, interviewed by Miles Pomper, Paul Kerr, “An Interview with Hans Blix{pf} (Arms Control Association, Washington D.C., June 16 2003).

Hans Blix, interviewed by Melissa Block, “Interview with Hans Blix” (NPR: National Public Radio, All Things Considered, Washington D.C., June 17 2003), audio {5:52}.

Hans Blix, interviewed by Felicity Barringer, “Getting Ready to Bow Out, Hans Blix Speaks His Mind on How U.S. Doubted Him” (New York Times, June 19 2003) {copy, NYT “Hans Blix” archive}.

Ahmed Chalabi, John Bolton, interviewed by John Humphrys (BBC Radio 4, Today, Friday June 20 2003, 6-9am at 8:44-8:55 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx1443}, audio {11:20 (Chalabi), at 4:44 (Bolton, Iraq), 8:11 (Bolton, Iran)}.

Hans Blix, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from Iraq” (CFR: Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, June 23 2003), C-Span video (request) {1:02:00, smil, schedule, 177759141, 177141-1, rss, archive, search: Blix, CFR, library: Blix, CFR}, RTE video (excerpt) {2:52, at 1:46}, Anne Cassin (presenter), Sinead Crowley (reporter), “Blix 'Puzzled' by Intelligence Contradictions” (RTE: Radio Telefís Éireann, RTE News One O'Clock, Dublin, June 24 2003, 1:00 p.m.), reported, Grant McCool, “UN Arms Inspector Blix Criticizes U.S. Over Iraq” (Reuters, June 23 2003); Bernard Gwertzman, “Blix: Intelligence on Iraq Weapons Not 'Very Impressive'CFR: Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, June 24 2003) (CFR omits, from their website, the video and text of Hans Blix’s remarks).

 

“ Hans Blix: It is somewhat puzzling, I think,

That you can have a hundred percent certainty,

About the weapons of mass destruction’s existence,

And zero certainty,

About where they are.”

Hans Blix, interviewed by Charlie Rose (WNET/PBS TV, Charlie Rose, New York City, June 24 2003, 11:00 p.m. ET) (“the most watched PBS station in the country”), video “A conversation with the U.N's Hans Blix” (Google, larger) {56:40, Blix at 0:00-36:54, 121.23mb.flv, menu, search, search, search, rss, rss} (“a conversation with the chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix about the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the ensuing war”), distributed by PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, the largest U.S. TV network, with 349 U.S. TV stations (336 listed here), and via satellites in the western hemisphere (PBS national feed to Dish Network, DirecTV, AMC 3, AMC 4).

John P. Abizaid (Lieutenant General, U.S. Army), testimony, Nomination of LTG Abizaid to be Appointed to the Rank of General and Commander of USCentCom {transcript, copy} (U.S. Congress 108-1, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing, June 25 2003), reprinted in, Nominations before the Senate Armed Services Committee, first session, 108th Congress: Hearings ... on nominations of Paul McHale; Christopher Ryan Henry; Stephen A. Cambone; John Paul Woodley, Jr.; Linton F. Brooks; Lt. Gen. John P. Abizaid, USA; Thomas W. O'Connell; Paul M. Longsworth; Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF; Gen. Peter Pace, USMC; Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker (ret.), USA; Ltg. Bryan D. Brown, USA; Gordon R. England; and Michael W. Wynne, January 30, February 27, June 25, July 10, 24, 29, September 23, November 18, 2003 (U.S. Congress 108-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-002, Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-002, LCCN: 2006360674, OCLC: 62208509, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, November 10 2005}.

 

“ Senator Warner: During our meeting in February — where the four senators visited with you at your headquarters — I asked you the same question I’ve asked every single member of this administration as he’s appeared before this committee, or in other fora here in the Senate.

Namely, are we going to find weapons of mass destruction after the troops move forward and the major conflict has subsided and the spotlight of the world press can come in and take the pictures and evaluate the existence or non-existence of weapons of mass destruction?

At that time you gave me a reply.

And perhaps, in the course of your testimony today, you can address that reply.

And what you did, subsequent to our meeting, to confirm the credibility of your reply. ...

Gen. Abizaid: Yes, sir.

During your visit, you asked me very directly, in no uncertain terms, whether I believed we would find weapons of mass destruction.

Either in the course of the campaign or afterwards.

I believe that I told you that we would.

And I thought we would do it rather early in the campaign.

And I believe I also said, that I expected that the enemy would use weapons of mass destruction against our troops.

Fortunately, they did not use weapons of mass destruction against our troops. ...

But it is perplexing to me, Senator, that we have not found weapons of mass destruction, when the evidence was so pervasive that it would exist.

Query:Evidence”?

What evidence?

After your visit, I called in my intelligence staff because you were so adamant — not only you, but also Senator Levin — so adamant, about understanding the questions to the weapons of mass destruction.

And I put my intelligence professionals round the table.

And this was before General Franks had arrived in the theater, or perhaps he was out traveling around.

And I said:

“Is there anybody around this table who believes we will not find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?”

And, to a man and to a woman, they all said, we would find it.

So the confidence of the intelligence professionals, and my confidence in them, was high and actually it remains high.”

______________________

CJHjr: Saying “Yes. We will find it” is an emphatic way of answering that particular question.

Meaning this:

No.”

“No one believes we won’t find it.”

“We are not certain he does not have WMD.”

Pathetic.

Seeking hearsay assurance from staff members, who have no first hand knowledge of the raw intelligence, and its sources, and their credibility, underlying the summaries.

The proper answer to the Senator’s question was this:

“I don’t know.

The Defense Intelligence Agency says there is no evidence of any such weapons.”

Hans Blix, report by Greg Barrow (BBC U.N. correspondent), “Blix bows out of UN role{pf} (BBC News, June 30 2003), video {2:00}.

Joseph C. Wilson 4th (Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad Iraq, 1988-1991; Special Assistant to President Clinton, National Security Council; U.S. Ambassador to Gabon, 1992-1995), “What I Didn't Find in Africa{pf, copy, copy} (New York Times, July 6 2003) (Niger uranium claim).

Hans Blix, interviewed by Julian Marshall (?) (BBC World Service, Newshour (?), Sunday, July 6 2003, 9:00/10:00 p.m.), audio {6:33, source}.

Clare Short (resigned U.K. Secretary of State for International Development), following Peter Greste (report) and John Chipman (interview), interviewed by John Humphrys, comment by Andrew Marr (BBC Radio 4, Today, Monday, July 7 2003, 6-9am at 8:10-8:27 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx7265}, audio {17:21, at 11:05}.

The Decision to go to War in Iraq (“Ninth Report of Session 2002-03”) (U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Report HC 813, dated July 3 2003, published July 7 2003), in 3 volumes: “Report, together with formal minutes” {1.1mb.pdf} (HC 813-I), “Written Evidence” (HC 813-II), “Oral Evidence and Appendix” (“minutes of evidence,” June 17-27 2003, and Appendix 3) (HC 813-III), later replies, The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs {222kb.pdf} (U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6062, November 27 2003), The Decision to go to War in Iraq: Further Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs {1.1mb.pdf} (U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6123, February 3 2004), reported, “Iraq report: Key excerpts{pf} (BBC News, July 7 2003, 9:28 a.m.).

Greg Thielmann, “Press Briefing: Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reassessing the Prewar Assessments” (Arms Control Association, National Press Club, Washington D.C., July 9 2003).

Hans Blix, interviewed at Chernobyl Russia, Mark Irving, “Iraq & the WMD Scandal: Hans Blix: Blair Made a Fundamental Mistake{copy, copy, copy} (Independent on Sunday, London, July 13 2003).

Hans Blix, interviewed by Jane Corbin, “Blix Warning Over Iraq Weapons” (BBC News, posted July 11 2003, 4:00 p.m.), a segment of an update program, “What Happened Next” (BBC 1 TV, Panorama, July 13 2003, 10:15 p.m.) {BBCcat ance803b}, video (excerpt) {1:46, source}, an update to “Chasing Saddam's Weapons” (BBC 1 TV, Panorama, February 9 2003, 10:15 p.m.) {BBCcat ance773n}, BBC transcript, reported, “Blair Made WMD Mistake Says Blix{pf} (BBC News, July 13 2003, 12:21 p.m.), Mark Mardell, “The Questions Keep Coming But the Evidence and Answers Don't” (BBC News, July 13 2003), video {3:09}.

U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, “Iraq” (Wednesday, July 16 2003, 12:40-4:18 p.m., Hansard, House of Commons, bound volume edition, 6th series, volume 409, columns 287-346), debate on The Decision to go to War in Iraq (Foreign Affairs Committee report, HC 813, July 7 2003), opposition motion defeated 200/299 (Division No. 294, 4:05 p.m.) (for “a judicial inquiry finally to establish the facts of the matter”).

Jay Garner (Director, Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Iraq: April 21 – May 11 2003, CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority), interviewed July 17 2003, a source for “Truth, War, & Consequences” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline, October 9 2003), script.

Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay, “Questions, criticism surround information that led to start of war{pf} (Knight Ridder, now McClatchy, Washington D.C. bureau, July 18 2003), Iraq archives 2001-2005, 2006+ (Knight Ridder/McClatchy Newspapers).

Scott Ritter (UNSCOM inspector in Iraq, 1991-1998), Zaab Sethna (spokesman, INC: Iraqi National Congress), Robert Baer (CIA Officer, 1976-1995), intervewed/reported by John Hosking, “Lies, Media and the Path to War:” “Paul Moran Story” (SBS News, Dateline, Sydney, July 23 2003, 8:30 p.m.), video {20:16}, transcript: “How, in the lead-up to the Iraq war, the Australian and international media were manipulated to broadcast claims by a key Iraqi defector about Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The defector, Adnan Saeed al-Haideri ... leader of the INC, Ahmed Chalabi ... The Rendon Group ... ABC TV in Australia through freelance cameraman and journalist Paul Moran ... New York Times reporter Judith Miller.”

Greg Thielmann, interviewed August 12 2003 by Martin Smith, a source for “Truth, War, & Consequences” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline, October 9 2003), script.

Joe Wilson, interviewed by Tim Sebastian (BBC News, HARDtalk, BBC TV-1, BBC World, BBC News 24, broadcast Thursday August 21 2003) {BBCcat anz1751e}, video {24:21, 6.10mb.rm, rss, source, search, search, rss}, regarding, “What I Didn't Find in Africa{pf, copy, copy} (New York Times, July 6 2003) (Niger uranium claim).

Richard Butler (UNSCOM Executive Chairman, July 1 1997-1999 June 30), Andrew Wilkie (intelligence analyst, resigned March 11 2003, ONA: Australia Office of National Assessments), testimony, “Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Australia Parliament, Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, hearing, August 22 2003, 8:15-12:40 p.m.) {438kb.pdf}, reported, Louise Yaxley, “Richard Butler, Andrew Wilkie give evidence to Iraq inquiry” (ABC Radio, The World Today, August 22 2003, 12:10 p.m.).

Hans Blix, interviewed September 7 2003 by Paula Zahn, “Interview With Hans Blix,” part-1, part-2 (CNN, Paula Zahn Now, September 8-9 2003, 8:00 p.m. ET).

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction — Intelligence and Assessments {601kb.pdf, source} (Command Paper 5972, Cm 5972, September 11 2003, 10:55 a.m. {pf}) (U.K. Cabinet Office, Intelligence and Security Committee, Ann Taylor, chairman) (“This Report does not judge whether the decision to invade Iraq was correct. Its purpose is to examine whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications.”), reported, “The ISC report: At a glance{pf} (BBC News, September 11 2003, 12:39 p.m.), '45 minute claim' criticised{pf} (BBC News, September 11 2003, 5:17 p.m.), later reply, Tony Blair (U.K. Prime Minister), Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction — Intelligence and Assessments {473kb.pdf} (Command Paper 6118, Cm 6118, February 3 2004).

U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, debate on the ISC report (published that morning), during a previously scheduled debate, “Defence in the United Kingdom” (Thursday, September 11 2003, 1:26-6:00 p.m., Hansard, House of Commons, bound volume edition, 6th series, volume 410, columns 491-562), reported, “Hoon regrets Iraq 'misunderstanding' {pf} (BBC News, September 11 2003, 5:33 p.m.), 'Time to go', Hoon is told{pf} (BBC News, September 11 2003, 5:02 p.m.).

Ann Taylor (chairman, Intelligence Select Committee, U.K. Cabinet Office), interviewed by Kirsty Wark (BBC 2 TV, Newsnight, September 11 2003, 10:30 p.m.) {BBCcat d:andx024l}, video {5:05}, BBC transcript {pf}.

Dick Cheney (U.S. Vice President), interviewed by Tim Russert (NBC News, Meet the Press, Sunday, September 14 2003, 9:00/10:30 a.m. ET), video {part-1 55mb.mov, source, source, part-2 49mb.mov}, NBC transcript {pf, menu}, FDCH transcript {pf, copy, copy}.

Hans Blix, interviewed by Rafael Epstein, “Blix Believes Iraq's WMDs Destroyed 10 Yrs Ago” (ABC Radio, AM, September 17 2003, 8:04:28 a.m.), audio (excerpts) and comment, Menzies Campbell (Shadow Foreign Secretary, Liberal Democrat Party), interviewed by Robin Lustig, “Iraq WMDs” (BBC Radio 4, World Tonight, September 17 2003, 10:20-10:24 p.m.) {BBCcat 92sx0220}, audio {45:00, at 3:26}, reported, “Blix: Iraq Bluffed On WMD{pf} (CBS News/AP, September 17 2003).

Hans Blix, interviewed by John Humphrys (BBC Radio 4, Today, Thursday September 18 2003, 6-9am at 8:10-8:23 a.m.) {BBCcat 92sx0221} (“Hans Blix tells us he thinks Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction do not exist.”), audio {13:41, interviews, search, search, a/v, a/v, search, rss}, copy {9:40}, reported:Blix criticises UK's Iraq dossier{pf} (BBC News, September 18 2003) (“Former UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix accused the British Government of using spin in its controversial dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction”), Peter Biles, “Dr Blix says exaggeration, spin and hype damage government credibility” (BBC News, September 18 2003), video {1:15}, “Blix: No need for Iraq war: Says U.S. and Britain saw what they wanted to see” {pf} (CBS News/AP, September 18 2003), “Blix attacks Iraq weapons 'spin'” (CNN News, September 18 2003, 1:15 p.m. ET).

Hans Blix, interviewed by Evrydiki Bersi (Evridiki Bersi), 'Saddam Was a Man of Brinkmanship, But He Calculated Wrongly,' Proposes Hans Blix” (Kathimerini, Athens, September 22 2003), reported, “Blix Questions U.S. Honesty: Ex-U.N. Weapons Chief Says Iraq Posed No Immediate Threat” {pf} (AP: Associated Press, CBS News, September 21 2003).

 

“ Hans Blix: I’m glad to tell a Greek newspaper, that Perrikos is the world’s most experienced weapons inspector.

{Demetrius Perricos, Acting Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC}.

He’s got intelligence, a critical mind, and energy.

He handled Japan and South Africa and, in Iraq, it was he, who set up the mission of the inspectors, quicker than was ever expected, quicker than the dates given by the Security Council.”

Andrew Neil (presenter, BBC Daily Politics), interviewed by Chris Eakin, video {5:58, source} (BBC News 24, September 24 2003), reported, “No WMD in Iraq, source claims{pf} (BBC News, September 24 2003, 7:48 p.m.), Matt Frei (BBC Washington Correspondent), “The report will reach no firm conclusions,” video {2:14}.

Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary) (New York City), interviewed Wednesday September 24 2003 by James Naughtie (London) (BBC Radio 4, Today, Thursday September 25 2003, 6-9am at 8:10-8:25 a.m.) {BBCcat 90sx7396}, audio {14:41} (“Iraq’s missing WMD, and his speech to the UN, later today”), FCO transcript (none), reported, “Straw's hope for WMD discovery{pf} (BBC News, September 25 2003, 9:39 a.m.).

Tony Blair (U.K. prime minister), intervewed by David Frost (BBC TV-1, Breakfast with Frost, London, Sunday, September 28 2003, 9-10am) {BBCcat d:andw006n}, BBC transcript {pf, search, search, a/v, a/v}.

David Kay (Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group), “Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISQ) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence” (Central Intelligence Agency, October 2 2003) {copy}.

David Kay, interviewed by Jim Lehrer, “Newsmaker: David Kay” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, October 2 2003, 7:00 p.m.), video {bb} {13:45 bb}.

Hans Blix (Stockholm), interviewed (BBC World Service, October 3 2003), audio {5:30}, copy {5:30}, reported, “'No surprise' Iraq WMD not found{pf} (BBC News, October 3 2003, 1:13 p.m.), Reuters, “Blix Says No Surprises in Iraq Weapons Report” (New York Times, October 3 2003).

Hans Blix (Stockholm) (previous interview excerpts), Terence Taylor (President, U.S. office, IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies; UNSCOM, weapons inspector, 1993-1999), Menzies Campbell (Shadow Foreign Secretary, Liberal Democrat Party), interviewed by Edward Stourton (BBC Radio 4, Today, Friday October 3 2003, 6-9am at 7:09-7:18 a.m.) {BBCcat 92sx0316}, audio {8:20}.

Hans Blix (Stockholm), interviewed October 3 2003 by Bob Drogin (Washington D.C.), “North Korea ripped off Saddam Hussein{copy} (Los Angeles Times, October 4 2003).

 

“ Kay, speaking to reporters in a conference call organized by the CIA, insisted he had uncovered a “rather remarkable amount” of evidence.

* * *

“It’s a long way from finding some minor things, as they did, to concluding Iraq was an imminent danger,”

Blix said in a telephone interview from Stockholm, Sweden.

Blix said most of Kay’s discoveries “don't seem very big, and some may be legitimate dual-use items,” or those allowed under U.N. rules because they have civilian uses.

“In many cases, Kay’s report says they may be ‘suitable for’ this or ‘suitable for’ that,”

Blix added.

“Well, a butcher’s knife is also ‘suitable for’ murder.””

David Kay, interviewed by Linda Wertheimer, “Kay Still Seeking 'Truth' About Iraq Arsenal” (NPR: National Public Radio, Weekend Edition Sunday, Washington D.C., October 5 2003), audio {8:42}, extended {15:17}.

Scott Ritter (UNSCOM inspector in Iraq, 1991-1998), interviewed by David Jessel (BBC News, HARDtalk, BBC TV-1, BBC World, BBC News 24, broadcast Tuesday October 6 2002) {BBCcat anz1573x}, video {24:14, 6.08mb.rm, rss, menu, search, search, rss}, reported, “Iraq: Scott Ritter{pf} (BBC News, October 7 2003).

Greg Thielmann, interviewed about October 13 2003 by Scott Pelley, “The Man Who Knew: Ex-Powell Aide Says Saddam-Weapons Threat Was Overstated” {pf} (CBS News, 60 Minutes II, October 15 2003), rebroadcast, February 4 2004, video {1:36}. David Albright (President, Founder, ISIS: Institute for Science and International Security), interviewed about October 13 2003 by Scott Pelley, “Powell’s Expert: Scott Pelley interviews physicist David Albright, who questions the evidence behind Secretary Powell’s charge, that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes to build nuclear weapons” (CBS News, 60 Minutes II, web exlcusive, October 15 2003), video {1:37}.

David Kay (Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group), interviewed mid-October 2003 by Jane Corbin, PBS transcript (Posted January 22 2004), a source for “Still Chasing Saddam’s Weapons{pf} (BBC 1 TV, Panorama, November 23 2003, 10:15 p.m.) {BBCcat ance807d}, BBC script, {copy}, reported, “The weapons hunter speaks{pf} (BBC News, November 23 2003, 8:24 p.m.), and a source for “Chasing Saddam’s Weapons” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline, January 22 2004), PBS script:

 

“ David Kay: The tubes looked like they were suitable for centrifuge.

In fact, I still think

If I were only looking at the tubes—

They were suitable for the centrifuge.”

____________________

 

Query:Looked like”?

You did not say,

“The tubes looked like

They were suitable for centrifuge.”

You said,

The tubes were an exact match,

“To Iraqi plans

That we captured in 1991.”

An exact match

To the Iraq prototype tubes

You said, you yourself, personally, discovered in 1991.

You said:

“ David Kay: These have

The very specific alloy composition.

And they have

The exact height,

And diameter,

To Iraqi plans,

That we captured in 1991.

Is there some possible use?

I haven’t thought of, out there?

That matches,

The exact alloy composition,

The exact length dimensions,

The exact internal diameter,

As a gas centrifuge?

Always possible.

But,

Highly unlikely.”

David Kay, interviewed by Susan Watts (science editor), “Dossier on Saddam” (BBC transcript) (BBC 2 TV, Newsnight, September 12 2003, 10:30 p.m.) {BBCcat d:andt237w}, video {7:07}, quoted further, here (timeline 2002).

An unequivocal assertion

Of an unassailable fact

To an audience of millions.

You said:

“ David Kay: I’ve seen one of them.

The centrifuge tubes

Look like they’re of the design, which is German derived.

That the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s, and developed.

They’re for enriching uranium.”

David Kay, interviewed by Jane Corbin, “The Case Against Saddam” (BBC 1 TV, Panorama, September 23 2002, 10:36 p.m.) {BBCcat ance759w}, video {47:13}, BBC transcript {copy} (faulty), correct transcripts of David Kay’s words: PBS, ABC, quoted further, here (timeline 2002).

For a year-and-a-half, before David Kay made those assertions, to an audience of millions, the U.S. intelligence community knew, and reported on their intelligence net, this to be an unassailable fact:

Those tubes were an exact match to Iraq’s 83-mm field artillery rockets, the exact same tubes they had used, and IAEA inspectors had observed, for more than a decade, to make the combustion chambers of their rockets (a legal weapon).

And.

Those tubes did not match, in any particular, Iraq’s prototype centrifuges.

Which David Kay said, he himself, personally, discovered in 1991.

Specifically, the (artillery rocket) tubes were:

Aluminum, not the exact alloy of Iraq’s two prototype centrifuge designs (maraging steel and carbon fiber). Aluminum tubes are unsuitable for uranium centrifuges. They deform, and unbalance, with the extreme sustained speeds (50,000-90,000 rpm) necessary to enrich to bomb grade uranium (90% U-235). Query (I’m thinking about Iran): Are these inexpensive tubes suitable to spin at a much lower sustained speed, without deforming (with a wall thickness suitable to that speed, and a proper very large diameter)? Are such greatly reduced speeds suitable for enriching electricity plant fuel (3%-5% U-235)? Will greatly reduced speeds enrich to fuel grade at such a slow rate they are impracticable, or uneconomic, on a commercial scale? (I’m thinking extremely prolonged payroll expense).

And, the (artillery rocket) tubes were:

Half the diameter of Iraq’s centrifuge prototype tubes, not the exact diameter.

More than twice the length of Iraq’s centrifuge prototype tubes, not the exact length/height.

More than 3-times the wall thickness (3.3-mm) of Iraq’s centrifuge prototype tubes (1.0-mm), not the exact internal diameter (too heavy for fast, sustained, spin).

Source, U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (unclassified edition) {purl, copy, html}, “Chapter III. Intelligence Community Analysis Of Iraq’s Nuclear Program” {3.8mb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Report No. 108-301, July 9 2004, Select Committee on Intelligence) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/5:108-301, Serial Set: (none yet), CIS: 2004 S423-1(?), LCCN: 2004356402, OCLC: 55948335, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, July 15 2004}.

Query:I still think”?

David Kay is not a centrifuge expert.

He is not a scientist.

He is not an engineer.

He presents himself as an analyst.

Yet, he stubbornly disregards the evidence.

The expert, informed, opinion, of centrifuge experts.

Who have personally built and operated centrifuges.

That these tubes cannot be used for centrifuges.

Because their walls are far too thick (3.3mm).

And because, they are the wrong dimensions.

And the wrong material.

When David Kay lied.

To the BBC audience of millions.

He was a wilful malicious liar.

Either,

He knew, for a fact, his assertions were untrue.

Or else,

He knew, for a fact, he did not know, for a fact, they were true.

If the latter be the case, he concealed his ignorance, and his hearsay sources, and asserted an unassailable fact, citing what he knew to be a false source: His certain, personal, knowledge: He saw an aluminum tube (he said), and he personally knew Iraq’s 1991 prototype designs (he said).

They did not match.

But he said they did.

He asserted, for a fact, that he knew, for a fact, they were centrifuge tubes.

And he knew, for a fact, this assertion was untrue.

David Kay is intoxicated with deceit.

An exemplar.

Of the United States of America.

Their national character.

  CJHjr

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
a 13th generation American
(Jamestown Virginia, Martin’s 100, 1620)

Seymour M. Hersh, “The Stovepipe: How conflicts between the Bush Administration and the intelligence community marred the reporting on Iraq’s weapons” {pf} (The New Yorker, October 27 2003, posted October 20 2003).

Liz Jackson (reporter), “Spinning the Tubes: How Australian intelligence was seized upon on by the CIA, spun and gilded, then presented to the world as the best evidence that Saddam Hussein was building weapons of mass destruction” (ABC: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Four Corners, October 27 2003), transcript {photo}.

Robert Greenwald (producer/director), Uncovered: The Whole Truth About The Iraq War (56-minute video, released November 3 2003, via the internet) (video clips of U.S. government officials, their pre-war assertions, post-war rationalizations, deconstructed, in analytical interview commentaries, by retired CIA and other government officials), video {56:08, 45.6kb.wmv} {56:08, Google video}, discussed, “A Buzzflash interview: Robert Greenwald, Producer/Director of Uncovered: The Whole Truth About the Iraq War, a new documentary that reveals how the Bush administration lied the nation into war” (BuzzFlash, November 3 2003), expanded into, Uncovered: The War on Iraq (Brave New Films, 87-minute film, released August 20 2004, in New York City, Boston, Washington D.C.), film transcript {146kb.pdf}, discussed, Robert Greenwald, “The Director’s Introduction” (truthuncovered.com).

Hans Blix, interviewed in Stockholm, “Bleak Outlook for US in Iraq Says Blix” (Reuters, November 21 2003).

Jay Garner (Director, Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Iraq: April 21 – May 11 2003, CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority), interviewed by Gordon Corera (security correspondent) (BBC Radio 4, Today, Wednesday November 26 2003, 7-9am at 7:50-7:57 a.m.) {BBCcat 92sx0650}, audio {7:40}, extended {21:02, source}.

Demetrius Perricos (Acting Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), Fifteenth Quarterly Report on the Activities of UNMOVIC (U.N. Doc. S/2003/1135, November 26 2003) {115kb.pdf, copy, also via this, or ODS}.

 

“ Appendix I

The destruction, removal or rendering harmless of proscribed items and materials in connection with Iraq’s biological weapons programme since 1991 ...

5.  In August 1991, ...

6.  Iraq also handed over to the first biological inspection team the remaining bacterial isolates it had obtained from international culture collections. They comprised some 70 unused original vials with different microbial materials ...

10.  In July 1995, under pressure from the Special Commission, Iraq finally admitted the production of bulk biological warfare agents. Iraq stated that the biological weapons programme had been obliterated shortly after the 1991 Gulf war. Iraq acknowledged that it had decided not to declare the full extent of its biological weapons programme, to remove any evidence of its former existence but to retain all remaining associated facilities, equipment and materials. According to Iraq, a cleanup of the sites involved in the biological weapons programme began in June 1991 and continued until August 1991, prior to the arrival in Iraq of the first biological inspection team of the Special Commission. ...

13.  Iraq also declared that it had unilaterally destroyed all biological weapons and bulk agents during July and August 1991. After August 1995, Iraq recovered and provided for verification by the Special Commission, and later UNMOVIC, remnants of biological munitions (missile warheads and aerial bombs that had been filled with Bacillus anthracis, Botulinum toxin and aflatoxin), including several intact bombs, and locations of the unilateral destruction of bulk agent (Bacillus anthracis, Botulinum toxin, Clostridium perfringens and aflatoxin). These included a dumping site at Al-Hakam, Al-Aziziyah firing range, and Al-Nibai desert.

14.  In 1996, Iraq declared and identified the site of the unilateral destruction of biological bulk agent at Al-Hakam. Samples were taken by the Special Commission, and analysis at that time indicated that the samples contained elevated levels of Bacillus anthracis spores.”

David Albright, Iraq’s Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction {459kb.pdf} (ISIS: Institute for Science and International Security, Country Assessments: Iraq, December 5 2003, 39 pages) {photo}.

John McCarthy, “Senators Were Told Iraqi Weapons Could Hit U.S.: Nelson said claim made during classified briefing” (Florida Today, December 15 2003).

George W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 2001-2009 Jan. 20), interviewed by Diane Sawyer (ABC News, Primetime, special edition, December 16 2003, 8:00 p.m. ET), transcript {copy, copy}.

 

“ Diane Sawyer: 50 percent of the American people have said, that they think, the Administration exaggerated the evidence, going into the war with Iraq.

Weapons of mass destruction.

Connection to terrorism.

Are the American people wrong?

Misguided?

George W. Bush: No, the intelligence I operated on was good sound intelligence.

The same intelligence that my predecessor operated on.

The—

There is no doubt.

That Saddam Hussein was a threat.

The—

Otherwise, the United Nations wouldn’t have passed, you know, resolution after resolution after resolution demanding that he disarm.

I first went to the United Nations.

September the 12th, 2002.

And said:

“You’ve given this man resolution after resolution after resolution. He’s ignoring them. You step up and see that he honor those resolutions. Otherwise, you become a feckless, debating society.”

And so.

For the sake of peace.

And.

For the sake of freedom of the Iraqi people.

For the sake of the security of the country.

And.

For the sake of the credibility of international institutions.

A group of us moved.

And the world is better for it.

Diane Sawyer: When you take a look back—

Vice President Cheney said,

“There is no doubt.

Saddam Hussein has.

Weapons of mass destruction.”

Not programs.

Not intent.

“There is no doubt.

He has.

Weapons of mass destruction.”

Secretary Powell said,

“100 to 500 tons of chemical weapons.”

And now, the inspectors say.

That there’s no evidence.

Of these weapons existing right now.

The yellow cake in Niger.

George Tenet has said, that shouldn’t have been in your speech.

Secretary Powell talked about mobile labs.

Again, the intelligence—

The inspectors have said, they can’t confirm this.

They can’t corroborate.

Nuclear.

Suggestions that he was on the way on an active nuclear program—

David Kay,

“We have not discovered.

Significant evidence of—”

George W. Bush: Yet.

Diane Sawyer: Is it “yet”?

George W. Bush: But what David Kay did discover was—

They had a weapons program.

And had that— that—

Let me finish for a second.

Now it’s more extensive than— than missiles.

Had that knowledge been examined by the United Nations.

Or had David Kay’s report been placed in front of the United Nations.

He, Saddam Hussein, would have been in material breach of 1441.

Which meant it was a causis belli.

And, look.

There is no doubt.

That Saddam Hussein was a dangerous person.

And there’s no doubt.

We had a body of evidence proving that.

And there is no doubt.

That the President must act.

After 9/11.

To make America a more secure country.

Diane Sawyer: Again.

I’m just trying to ask.

These are supporters.

People who believed in the war.

Who have asked the question.

George W. Bush: Well.

You can keep asking the question.

And my answer’s gonna be the same.

{0:29 bb} Saddam was a danger.

And the world is better off.

Because we got rid of him.

Diane Sawyer: But stated as a hard fact.

That there were weapons of mass destruction.

As opposed to the possibility.

That he could move to acquire those weapons.

Still—

George W. Bush: So what’s the difference?

Diane Sawyer: Well—

George W. Bush: The possibility.

That he could acquire weapons—

If he were to acquire weapons.

He would be the danger.

That’s—

That’s what I’m trying to explain to you.

A gathering threat.

After 9/11.

Is a threat that needed to be dealt with.

And it was done after 12 long years of the world saying the man’s a danger.

And so.

We got rid of him.

And.

There’s no doubt.

The world is a safer, freer place.

As a result of Saddam being gone.

Diane Sawyer: But, but, again—

Some, some of the critics have said this.

Combined with the failure.

To establish proof of elaborate terrorism contacts.

Has indicated that.

There’s just not precision.

At best.

And misleading.

At worst.

George W. Bush: Yeah.

Look.

What—

What we based our evidence on.

Was a very sound national intelligence estimate.

Diane Sawyer: Nothing should have been more precise?

George W. Bush: I—

I made my decision, based upon enough intelligence, to tell me, that this country was threatened with Saddam Hussein in power.

Diane Sawyer: What would it take?

To convince you.

He didn’t have weapons of mass destruction?

George W. Bush: Saddam Hussein was a threat.

And the fact that he is gone means America is a safer country.

Diane Sawyer: And if he doesn’t have weapons of mass destruction?

George W. Bush: Diane, you can keep asking the question.

I’m telling you.

I made the right decision for America.

Because Saddam Hussein used weapons of mass destruction.

Invaded Kuwait.

But the fact that he is not there is—

Means America’s a more secure country.”

Video excerpt bb {14:33 bb, at 2:21 bb, source}

Hans Blix (Stockholm), interviewed by Tim Sebastian (London) (BBC News, HARDtalk, BBC TV-1, BBC World, BBC News 24, December 17 2003) {BBCcat anz1846k}, video {23:36, 5.97mb.rm, rss, menu, search, search, rss}, reported, Saddam's weapons {pf}, “Blix Rejects Blair WMD Claims{pf} (BBC News, December 17 2003): “Dr Blix said it was "innuendo" to suggest laboratories were used for WMD.”

Dana Priest, Walter Pincus, “Kay Plans to Leave Search for Iraqi Arms{pf} (Washington Post, December 18 2003), reported, “Top Iraq WMD Hunter 'Will Resign'{pf} (BBC News, December 19 2003).

 2004 

 

 

Bush/Cheney Doctrine on pre-emptive offensive war

We’re going to attack you.

Not because we’re certain you deserve it (beyond all doubt). And not because we’re satisfied you deserve it (beyond reasonable doubt). And not because you probably deserve it (more likely than not), or possibly deserve it (less likely than not), or even might deserve it (a hint of evidence, an unsubstantiated hypothesis, a theory).

We’re going to attack you, because we are not certain you don’t deserve it.

We have lingering doubt.

We’re not certain (beyond all doubt) you are innocent.

We’re going to attack you, to be on the safe side.

It’s prudent.

And, we’re going to conceal our uncertainty, and assert “conclusive evidence,” because disclosing uncertainty might provoke assertions about our true motives:— That we want permanent military bases in your country. That our friends want to rake-off your oil profits. And reward us, in due course.

And because public debate might disquiet our armed forces, and instill doubt in their minds, that our orders might be unlawful.

Indeed, criminal:

____________________

 

“ Suspicion is a state of mind of the accuser and not a state of mind or an act by the one accused.

It is a monstrous proposition containing the very essence of license that the state of mind of the accuser shall be the determining factor, in the absence of evidence of guilt, whether the accused shall or shall not be summarily executed. ...

The orders to execute such persons and mere suspects on suspicion only and without proof, were criminal on their face.

Executions pursuant thereto were criminal.

Those who gave or passed down such orders must bear criminal responsibility for passing them down and for their implementation by the units subordinate to them.”

The High Command Case, 11 N.M.T. 462-697 (opinion), at 531 (U.S. Military Tribunal 5, Nürnberg Germany, trial, 5 February-August 13, judgment, October 27-28, 1948), volumes 10-11, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (“Nuernberg, October 1946–April 1949”) (15 volumes, U.S. GPO, Washington D.C., 1949-1953) (“the green series”) {SuDoc: D 102.8, ditto, LCCNs: 49045929, 97071903, OCLC: 12799641, UC, WorldCat}, volume 10 (1951, 31+1308 pages) {55.9mb.pdf, source}, volume 11 (1951, 31+755 pages) {58.5mb.pdf}, also reported, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (“Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission”), volume 12, page 86 (15 volumes, U.K. HMSO, London, 1947-1949) {LCCNs: 47022747, 97080284, OCLC: 45912266, UC, WorldCat}.

____________________

 

“ John Warner: You said, on NBC’s Today Show, on Tuesday, that it was, quote:

“Absolutely prudent.

For the U.S. to go to war.”

Dr. Kay, I concur in those conclusions.

I believe a real and growing threat

has been eliminated.

And a coalition of nations.

Acted prudently.

In the cause of freedom.”

John W. Warner (Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee), Senate Hearing 108-678, January 28 2004, addressing and quoting David Kay, interviewed by Matt Lauer (NBC News, The Today Show, Tuesday, January 27 2004, 7:00-10:00 a.m. ET), MSNBC video {7:03, 5.36mb.wmv}, transcript printed, “David Kay Interview,” 150 Congressional Record S315-S316 {pf} {12kb.txt, 38kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, daily edition 150:7, January 28 2004) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/7}.

____________________

 

If they do not fear.

The rule of law:—

All violent criminal enterprises.

Do their killings.

Because.

It’s prudent.

To protect their interests. Achieve their objectives. Deter law-enforcement. Banish the rule of law. Install the rule of force:

The Law of Empire.

And, if they feel the need to persuade anybody, the public for instance, all violent criminal enterprises do the exact same thing:

They lie.

About the facts.

About their motives.

Advancing, for justification, whatever comes to hand, which sounds plausible.

____________________

 

“ Gustave Mark Gilbert (U.S. Army military intelligence, assigned to the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Germany):

“We got around to the subject of war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I did not think that the common people are very thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction.”

Hermann Wilhelm Goering (prisoner and defendant):

“Why, of course, the people don’t want war,” Goering shrugged.

“Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war, when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece.

Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany.

That is understood.

But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy.

And it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”

Gilbert: “There is one difference,” I pointed out.

“In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives.

And in the United States only Congress can declare wars.”

Goering: “Oh, that is all well and good.

But, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders.

That is easy.

All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger.

It works the same way in any country.””

Hermann Wilhelm Goering, interviewed by Gustave Mark Gilbert, April 18 1946, printed in Nuremberg Diary, pages 278-279 (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947) {LCCN: 47004157}, (reprint: New York: Da Capo Press, 1995) {LCCN: 95020429}.

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 

 

Liar Glossary

A willful liar knows, or believes correctly, what s/he asserts is untrue. In U.S. executive, legislative, or judicial proceedings, this lie is prima facie criminal, if it’s “material”.

A reckless liar does not know, or believe, what s/he asserts is untrue. But s/he does know that s/he doesn’t know it is true. S/he pretends s/he knows. This lie is likewise prima facie criminal (as I suppose). S/he’s not willful as to the asserted fact (because s/he doesn’t know, or believe, it’s untrue). But s/he is willful as to a material omission: That s/he’s ignorant. And merely guessing, hoping, supposing, inferring it’s true, perhaps concealing ambiguities, contrary evidence, credibility issues, and such. Asserting certainty, and concealing ignorance, or uncertainty:— A willful, deceitful, coupling.

A willfully blind liar has a reasonable basis, ostensibly, for believing what s/he asserts is true but, secretly, doubts it, or questions it, or fears it may not be true. And decides to not investigate further, as a reasonable person would, because s/he wants it to be true. This too is a criminal lie (as I suppose), if the jury believes, beyond reasonable doubt, s/he had the opportunity and resources to investigate those doubts, and decided not to, because s/he feared a proper investigation might substantiate those doubts.

A negligent liar believes what s/he asserts is true, but omits to first inquire properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances. This lie is not criminal, if the jury is not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the failure to investigate was willful.

For example: The claim by Condoleezza Rice, that National Intelligence Estimate, submitted to her office, precisely to inform her about her about a topic central to her legal duties. This document contained caveats, and language of uncertainty, concealed from Congress, and from the public, in the unclassified version published by the CIA, four days later.

A recklessly negligent liar can reasonably foresee, that deadly or other serious consequences will likely result, if the assertion is untrue. And yet, s/he still omits to first inquire properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances, in light of these heightened consequences. This lie too is not criminal (absent willfulness, as with negligence). But the reckless nature of it supplies the criminal intent for any underlying crime of recklessness (the deadly or other serious consequences which follow from it). For example, involuntary manslaughter. Or “depraved indifference”.

A grossly negligent liar has been put on notice, that the assertion is likely untrue, or possibly untrue. And yet, s/he persists, in later repeating the assertion, without first inquiring properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances, prompted to do so, by the notice. This lie too is not criminal (absent willfulness).

But, notice can be so significant, in focusing the liar’s mind on the issue, that a jury can feel satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that what previously may have been non-willful negligence, constitutes willful intent to deceive, afterwards, in later assertions, following the notice, or in failing to correct previous assertions, thus elevating the liar to more a culpable category. This depends on how the jury feels about the quality of the notice, the authority of its basis, the competing authority of whatever basis the liar might have, if any, for the assertion, and the opportunity and resources s/he had available, and decided to not use.

For example: The decision by U.S. officials to repeat assertions, and to not correct previous assertions, on the basis of information provided by Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei, that intelligence targets, which U.S. officials supplied, proved to be entirely innocent.

For example: David Kay’s numerous assertions, that Jacques Chirac and Russia said, they believed Iraq had WMD. David Kay was put on notice, by Carl Levin, face to face, in the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing (January 29 2004), that David Kay’s assertions were likely untrue, quoting documents. And yet, David Kay, in the days, weeks, and months after this hearing, repeated these assertions, many, many, times.

An innocent liar reasonably believes, without doubts, what s/he asserts is true, because s/he was lied to by others, and tricked by them into voicing their lie. S/he’s an “innocent agent” of the actual liar(s), blameless, without criminal or moral turpitude.

It’s an honest mistake, if s/he reasonably believes, without doubts, what s/he erroneously asserts is true, if neither s/he, nor anyone one on whom s/he may have relied, was willful, reckless, or negligent in formulating the erroneous assertion. Likewise, if s/he misspeaks:— If s/he says, without realizing it, what s/he did not intend to say, or would not have said, if s/he had thought about it more carefully in context. For example, if s/he was thinking about some other aspect of what s/he said, instead, and was not mentally focused on the erroneous assertion, if it was merely incidental, for example, and not “material” to what s/he was talking about. Or, if s/he forgot what s/he once knew. Or was confused about what s/he thought s/he was talking about.

A simple cure, to all issues about assertions, is to disclose the basis of the assertion: “I believe this, because so-and-so told me so. Because this document seems to prove it.” Et cetera. Such disclosures validate an honest intent, and alert listeners how to investigate the assertion further, if they question it.

But the absence of such disclosures does not necessarily indicate dishonest intent, as people normally facilitate conversation by omitting diversions from the main theme into subsidiary issues about substantiation.

But, on important assertions, on which lives depend, an honest person would normally disclose the basis for a belief, if s/he has any reason to suspect there is any conceivable possibility it may not be true.

The reliability of hearsay is always suspect. Even if the hearsay source is honest, and knowledgeable, the speaker might have misunderstood, or misremembered, what the hearsay speaker actually said. Or the subtleties of it. Its nuances and caveats. And the fact that it too might, in turn, be based on yet further hearsay.

For example: This is the mistake Brian Hutton made in his flawed, inquiry judgment, accepting a hearsay assertion as true, instead of calling for an examination of the source of that hearsay.

I presume Hutton was afraid of what he would find out. In which case, he was willfully blind.

If not, then he was grossly negligent, at the very least, because he well knows, being a judge, the unreliability of hearsay: His experience constitutes “notice,” that he cannot make reliable findings of fact based on hearsay, particularly when the credibility of the witnesses, asserting the hearsay, is at issue.

Brian Hutton was willfully blind, or grossly negligent. He might have been lucky, and be right. But his finding of fact is disputed by Brian Jones, the U.K. expert, who did what Hutton declined to do, and actually investigated the source of the hearsay, as best he could.

But Hutton was not a liar as to the supposed “fact” he found. Because he disclosed the basis for his finding (unreliable hearsay) and, hence, did not represent it to be more authoritative than it is (unauthoritative).

Though he may have lied about his opinion, willfully, recklessly, or negligently (that he believed the fact he found, or that it deserved the dignity of the label “fact,” or “finding,” despite the unreliable hearsay evidence of it).

He made no effort, as far I know, to ask for the intelligence.

His duty was to ask for the underlying intelligence — the “best evidence” of the supposed fact.

And, if the government refused to give it to him, his duty was to report, that he was unable to form an informed, reliable, opinion, and to decline to make any finding of fact on that point.

______________________

Note: All species of lies include material omissions, which are necessary to be stated in order to prevent a truthful assertion from inducing a material erroneous inference, in the mind of the listener. Material omissions are the principal technique of deceit, employed by CIA and other government liars.

For example: The Bush/Blair lie, that Jacques Chirac said he would vote against war, “under any circumstances.” An incendiary lie. A vivid display of criminal intent. An overt act, in a violent criminal conspiracy. Omitting to mention, what he was talking about:— Not war generally, but only about the particular second resolution, then-tabled by the U.S./U.K. (authorizing war after March 17 2003), and a technical explanation of the “circumstances” of the vote, that a “no” vote is not a “veto,” unless there are also 9 “yes” votes, and a majority of the 15-member Security Council had already indicated they too would vote “no,” not “yes,” on that particular resolution, at that particular time. And, what he was not talking about:— The “circumstances” of the inspections. He plainly said (concealed by Bush/Blair in their lie), he would vote for war later, if Saddam frustrated the inspections (then producing promising results). While the assertion is true (he said, “under any circumstances”), the omissions induce an erroneous inference, namely that inspections were fruitless because Saddam knew he could frustrate them without consequences. The truth — which both Bush and Blair chose to conceal, by their material omissions — is the exact opposite.

Another example: David Kay’s assertion, that a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) was tested “out” to a range of 500 km. Omitting to mention (if it was the case), that the test was on a circular course, and that its associated radio equipment would not operate beyond a range of 150 km, suggesting its fuel capacity was merely to provide dwell-time over the target area, if it was for photo-reconnaissance. (I don’t know the truth of these UAV issues, merely that Mr. Blix identified them as issues, and that the U.S./U.K. prevented him from investigating them, by attacking Iraq.)

Another example: David Kay’s unequivocal assertions — grooming the public for war, on the BBC’s Newsnight (September 13 2002) and Panorama (September 23 2002) news programs — that the aluminum tubes were “centrifuge tubes.” This was either a willful or reckless lie, if he knew of the contrary opinion of the centrifuge experts (which he is not). Or else a willfully blind lie, or negligent lie, if he had available to him an easy way to discover the opinion of those experts and did not seek it. But, on the topic of material omissions, even if he disagreed with the opinion of the experts (which he is not), their expert opinion is a material “fact,” though they may be mistaken. Hence, it was a separate willful or reckless lie, by him, to omit to mention their expert opinion (if he knew about it) and, as well, the innocent plausible explanation of other experts (which he is not): That the tubes met the specifications for Iraq’s 81mm artillery rocket program. This, if he knew about that possibility, and their opinion, as I presume he did.

  Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 

Citations

WCPDWeekly Compilation of Presidential Documents {purl} (Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office) {SuDoc: AE 2.109: (1986-), GS 4.114: (1965-1985), ISSN: 0511-4187, LCCN: 65009929, OCLC: 1769543, GPOCat, GPOCat, LL: paper, paper, DL, WorldCat}.

PPPUSPublic Papers of the Presidents of the United States {purl, purl} {ucsb, umich} (Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office) {SuDoc: AE 2.114: (1984-), GS 4.113: (1929-1933, 1945-1983), ISSN: 0079-7626, LCCN: 58061050, OCLC: 1198154, GPOCat, GPOCat, LL: paper, paper, DL, UC, WorldCat}.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush {gpo, ucsb} (January 20 2001-2009 January 20) {OCLC: 52344983, WorldCat}.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton {gpo, ucsb, umich} (January 20 1993-2001 January 20) {OCLC: 31268646, WorldCat}.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush {gpo, ucsb, umich} (January 20 1989-1993 January 20) {OCLC: 2235199, WorldCat}.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan {ucsb, umich} (January 20 1981-1989 January 20) {OCLC: 22427819, WorldCat}.

Cong. Rec.Congressional Record {purl} (daily edition) (annual pagination in 4 sections: S:Senate, H:House, E:Extension of Remarks, D:Daily Digest) (U.S. Government Printing Office) {SuDoc: X/A, ISSN: 0363-7239, LCCN: 80646573, OCLC: 02437919, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, WorldCat}.

Cong. Rec.Congressional Record (permanent edition) (annual pagination as a single whole, hence, different page numbers from the daily edition) (U.S. Government Printing Office) {SuDoc: X., ISSN: 0883-1947, OCLC: 05058415, LCCN: 12036438, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

Serial SetUnited States Congressional Serial Set {purl} (volume list: Congresses 15-91 (1817-1970), 85-108+ (1957-2004+) (volumes for each session, compiled several years later, containing a duplicate original of all Congressional committee reports, and House and Senate documents, but not committee hearings or serial prints, except when rarely exhibited to a report) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/2:Serial, OCLC: 5866454, 8396583, LCCN: 92643101, GPOCat, DL, WorldCat} (selected online volumes, Congresses 23-64, 1833-1917), previously, American State Papers (1789-1838).

 

 

Related documents:

Efforts to Determine the Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related Programs (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-678, January 28 2004, Senate Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-678, LCCN: 2005414430, OCLC: 57070686, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, November 26 2004} (concealed from the internet by the committee, or by others in the U.S. government), John W. Warner (Chairman), Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member) {11kb.html}, witness: David Kay (Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group, June 11 2003-2004 Jan. 23), C-Span video (request) {2:44:45, schedule, 538818909, 180284-1}, broadcast video: part-1 {2:04:09, source}, part-2 {37:49}, transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH transcript {178kb.html, copy, source}, FNS transcript {130kb.pdf, copy}.

The Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs {report, html} (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-855, October 6 2004, Senate Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-855, LCCN: 2006361858, OCLC: 61718189, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, September 23 2005} (concealed from the internet by the committee, or by others in the U.S. government), John W. Warner (Chairman), Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member), witnesses: Charles A. Duelfer (Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs), Head (from January 23 2004), CIA Iraq Survey Group) {105kb.pdf}, Joseph J. McMenamin (Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps; Commander, CIA Iraq Survey Group) {223kb.pdf}, C-Span video (request) {3:06:01, 3:05:00, schedule, 142566567, 183823-1}, transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH and FNS {copy}.

Background: The pretexts for war: WMD + France’s veto: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/iraq-2003d.html

 

Source:This document is not copyrighted, and may be freely copied.

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

CJHjr

Posted Feb. 1 2004. Updated Nov. 23 2007.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/iraq-wmd-timeline-2003.html

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