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Ditto Iran?
by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
• Congress debates, votes
• Iraq wmd war timeline: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005-2006, 2007
• David Kay
• Charles Duelfer
• Iran uranium timeline
• Israel/Palestine timeline:
• Palestine Peace Not Apartheid
• The Israel Lobby
• Settlements
• Blockade, reprisals
George W. Bush: Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction.
Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11th. But we know their true nature.
North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.
Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens--leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections—then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.
By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.
They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.
We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our Nation’s security.
We will be deliberate.
Yet, time is not on our side.
I will not wait on events, while dangers gather.
I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.
The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us, with the world’s most destructive weapons.
Naji Sabri: At present, there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
There are no means of producing them.
There is no intention in the government that the country should produce or acquire these weapons of mass destruction.
We said to Mr. Blair, declare the positions of these places and send the team of your inspectors to come to Baghdad.
If he is sure of this lie, let him send a team of British experts to Iraq, to locate these things which he claims that Iraq has.
We challenge him, to prove his point.
David Goodhart: The attack on Iraq.
Which now just seems a matter of time.
Will surely create further dissonance.
Between Europe and America.
Tony Blair: It depends on what happens. I repeat the demand, that the weapons inspectors are let back into Iraq, unconditionally. The U.N. is pressing Saddam to fulfil his obligations. He is refusing to do so.
David Goodhart: There seems to be a widely held expert view, that he doesn’t yet have deliverable weapons of mass destruction.
Is the fact, that he might be trying to develop them, sufficient grounds for an invasion?
Tony Blair: If the time comes for action, people will have the evidence presented to them.
But be in no doubt at all, that—
He is certainly trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
In particular, a nuclear capability.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. {Richard Dearlove, Chief, UK SIS: Secret Intelligence Service, a/k/a: MI-6}.
There was a perceptible shift in attitude.
Military action was now seen as inevitable.
Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.
But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.
The NSC {U.S. National Security Council} had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record.
There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
* * *
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week.
Richard Butler: Iraq’s stated position is that,
It has no weapons of mass destruction.
As recently as last week, two senior Iraqi officials, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, reiterated this claim. ...
It is essential to recognize that,
The claim,
Made by Saddam’s representatives that,
Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction,
Is false.
Everyone concerned.
From Iraq’s neighbors to the U.N. Security Council to the Secretary General of the United Nations, with whom Iraq is currently negotiating on the issue.
Everyone,
Simply, Mr. chairman,
Is being lied to.
* * *
Joe Biden: Is it possible to construct an inspection regime that—
If it were agreed.
We both agree it’s not likely to be.
But if it were—
That it would be efficacious?
That you would have some—
How intrusive would it have to be?
In order to have some significant expectation?
That you would be able to root out the bulk of his biological, chemical, and/or potential nuclear capacity?
Richard Butler: Mr. chairman, the conduct of inspections is entirely within our technical and intellectual capability.
If we were allowed to go anywhere anytime, we can do the job.
We can do it well and competently and completely.
What it relies on is the willingness of Iraq to allow us to go anywhere anytime.
Absent that, it will never—
Joe Biden: Well, some in our Defense Department make the argument, that notwithstanding the fact you theoretically could be allowed to go anywhere anytime, that over the last 4 years, the regime has been able to, through mobilizing, if you will—
Making mobile their biological-weapons laboratories and digging deep into the ground in places where we don’t know—
Even if we were free to roam, we would still not be able to do the job.
Richard Butler: Yes, I’ve read and heard, with great interest, of course, the mobilizing and burial arguments, as recently as in the last 24 hours by a very distinguished member of the administration.
I think they can be overstated, quite frankly.
And I’m a bit concerned about the stridency with which some of those things are said.
Almost as if to justify a coming invasion.
I repeat, it can be done.
No arms-control inspection or verification is perfect.
Anyone who’s been in that business will tell you that.
I’ve been in it for a quarter of a century.
And I’ll tell you straight up.
There can be errors and mistakes.
But, Senator, there is an enormous gap between an inspection regime that is given full access, and one that is cheated upon.
Now, given full access, our technologies and intelligence are such that we can do a very, very good job.
I don’t think it serves our purpose well.
That is, the purpose of getting to the clear truth of things.
To say this work is inherently flawed.
It isn’t.
What is its big problem is refusal to allow it to be done.
George W. Bush: The policy.
Of my government.
Our government.
Of this administration.
Is:
Regime-change.
For a reason.
Saddam Hussein is a man who poisons his own people, who threatens his neighbors, who develops weapons of mass destruction.
And I will assure His Majesty, like I have in the past, we’re looking at all options, the use of all tools.
I’m a patient man.
But.
I haven’t changed my opinion.
Since the last time he was in the Oval Office.
John Humphrys: There was a degree of excitement yesterday, when the Iraqis revealed, that they had invited Hans Blix, the head of the United Nations weapons inspectors, to Baghdad, for what they called “technical talks.”
People opposed to a war, against Saddam, seized on it.
It showed, they said, that Saddam was prepared to make the concessions that were needed.
Mr. Blix, and his inspection team.
Or UNMOVIC, as it was known.
Would be allowed in.
The threat had worked.
But.
That’s not how the Americans see it.
A few hours after the announcement from the United Nations, I spoke to John Bolton, the American Under-Secretary of State.
And asked him, how seriously the offer was being taken, in Washington.
John Bolton: What we want, is free and unimpeded access for UNMOVIC.
Uh—
To, uh—
Whatever they want to see, in Iraq.
To carry out, really, Resolution 687 {32kb.pdf, copy, copy, via this, this, or ODS}.
The cease fire resolution, back from 1991.
Which, obviously, the Iraqis have violated, almost from the day it was passed.
And, with almost four years, with no weapons inspectors inside Iraq, there’s an awful lot of work to do.
We continue to favor the reintroduction of the inspectors, and we’re supporting them as much as we can.
But one has to be dubious, given the Iraqi record of deception, as to what exactly their agreement would mean.
But.
Let there be no mistake.
While we also insist on.
The reintroduction of weapons inspectors.
Our policy.
At the same time.
Insists on.
Regime-change in Baghdad.
And.
That policy will not be altered.
Whether the inspectors go in.
Or not.
John Humphrys: So.
In other words.
There will be war.
Whatever happens.
John Bolton: No.
There are all kinds ways for regime-change to take place.
And, uh—
Uh—
There’re—
The Iraqi opposition has long felt, that the country is really burdened, intolerably, by Saddam Hussein’s presence in Baghdad.
And that opposition continues to grow.
So, uh—
The real question is, uh—
The removal of Saddam Hussein.
And his continuing threat.
To peace and security in the region.
John Humphrys: What’s changed?
In Iraq.
Since September the tenth.
To drive you down this road.
John Bolton: Well, I don’t—
Uh—
I don’t think our policy is tied to September 11.
Although we continue to explore what linkages there might be, between Saddam and al-Qaeda.
I think, the point is, that.
The threat that Saddam represents.
To our interests, the interests of our friends and neighbors in the region, and to peace and security at large.
Is what motivates us to think, that.
Regime-change is the only way.
To, to eliminate that threat.
John Humphrys: The United States — indeed Western Europe — has faced many threats, over the years.
Particularly during the Cold War.
And it relied, then, on a very effective policy, called “deterrence.”
Why doesn’t deterrence work today?
John Bolton: Because deterrence assumes a certain equivalence.
And a certain rationality on the other side.
In the case of Iraq, there is an enormous asymmetry between his capabilities and ours.
And yet.
If he possesses weapons of mass destruction.
Nuclear, chemical, or biological.
He can inflict enormous damage on our forward-deployed forces, or our friends and allies in the region, or our interests in the region.
Uh—
That, uh, simply are not susceptible to fine theories of deterrence.
John Humphrys: But why should he do that?
If he knows.
That the response to doing it.
Would be annihilation?
John Bolton: The, uh—
If Saddam Hussein were a rational person, he wouldn’t have used poison gas against his own people, he wouldn’t have invaded Kuwait 10 years ago, he wouldn’t have done a lot of things.
It’s precisely the arbitrary and totalitarian nature of his regime that makes him such a threat.
John Humphrys: In that case, it follows.
That there can be no answer.
Other than an attack against him.
Because.
If you regard him.
Both.
As irrational.
And.
A threat to your security.
Then that’s it.
End of conversation.
John Bolton: No.
I think what follows is.
The importance of regime-change.
Which can be accomplished in a number of different respects.
But I don’t see how anybody can rest easy.
For peace and security in the region.
As long as Saddam Hussein’s regime is in Baghdad.
John Humphrys: Well, the answer to that is.
That the policy of containment.
That we’ve been practicing.
For so long now, since the Gulf war.
Has worked.
John Bolton: I think the answer to that is.
That Saddam continues aggressively to pursue the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction capability.
We have ample evidence of that.
That activities he’s engaged in with respect to nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missile capabilities.
Uh—
This man is a threat.
As long as he is in power.
And.
As President Bush has warned repeatedly.
Time is not on our side.
That, as people acquire these very dangerous weapons, their threat increases geometrically.
And that, that has to be something that, uh, I think, that all, all responsible leaders, in the international community, should keep in mind.
John Humphrys: Why, in that case, are your allies.
Tony Blair himself.
Not as impressed by this argument.
As apparently they should be.
We hear from King Abdullah, of Jordan.
That Mr. Blair himself.
Your closest ally.
Standing shoulder-to-shoulder, and all that.
He, himself, is unenthusiastic.
John Bolton: Well, Mr. Humphrys, all I can say is, we are in constant consultation with a wide range of our allies, and we don’t necessarily discuss all of our political or military options in public.
We are content that, at the appropriate moment, we will have the requisite degree of international support.
John Humphrys: But if you don’t have it.
And all the indications are.
That, at the moment, you won’t.
Then what?
John Bolton: We will have it, Mr. Humphrys.
John Humphrys: Isn’t the reality, that Washington would go ahead and do it.
With, or without, support from other countries.
John Bolton: Well, I think that’s a hypothetical.
I think we will have support.
So I’m not that worried about the hypothetical.
John Humphrys: Can I remind you?
Of something that a former Chief of Staff.
General Sir Gerald Templer said?
This was at the time of Suez.
When there was great controversy.
Over attacking Egypt.
And, he said, that,
“Of course we can get to Cairo.
But what the Hell do we do?
When we get there?”
Doesn’t the same question apply.
To any attack on Iraq.
Having taken Baghdad.
What then?
John Bolton: Well.
Deleting your reference to the attack on Baghdad.
I think it is only prudent, to plan for Iraq, in the post-Saddam Hussein era.
And, in fact, we have already begun that.
Working with Iraqi leaders in the Diaspora.
And other Iraqi opposition figures.
To try to do the responsible forward-planning.
That we ought to be doing.
To alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.
Which Saddam has imposed on them.
And to move them toward a democratic form of government.
So, so, that, that work has, really, already begun.
John Humphrys: Isn’t there another argument here?
That what you’ve done is.
You’ve taken a political decision.
And it makes little strategic, or even tactical, sense?
John Bolton: I, I think as long as you have, uh, a dangerous dictatorial regime.
That oppresses its own people.
And.
That seeks to acquire.
Weapons of mass destruction.
That does represent both a tactical and strategic threat to the United Stares.
That’s one of the principal reasons.
Why we feel.
Regime-change is so necessary.
John Humphrys: Mr. Bolton, you know.
And we know.
Of many regimes.
That fit that description.
Have done for many years.
America hasn’t attacked them.
Indeed, often, it’s helped them.
John Bolton: Well.
There aren’t that many that are as close to producing weapons of mass destruction capability, as Iraq.
But I can tell you, that we are very concerned, about each and every one of the governments, that’s attempting to, to acquire such weapons.
I think that’s one reason why President Bush, in his State of the Union message, earlier this year, outlined the Axis of Evil concept.
And, as he put it — I think quite cogently — then,
“We cannot allow the world’s most dangerous leaders to acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.”
John Humphrys: So.
Having unseated Saddam Hussein.
If that’s what you succeed in doing.
You then start somewhere else.
John Bolton: Well, we—
You don’t have to draw that conclusion.
What we’re doing, very actively now, is seeking to increase our efforts, and those who share our concern about these weapons, to deny those who’re seeking them the resources and the expertise they need to, uh, perfect their weapons program.
It’s a very, very, urgent matter.
And we’re consulting with, uh, with, with many governments around the world.
I was just in Moscow, earlier this week, talking about precisely this problem.
It’s something that we have a common view on, I think, uh, with our Western allies, and many other governments around the world.
And it’s something, that, uh—
Especially since September 11, uh—
We’ve all grown more acutely aware of.
John Humphrys: As you say, you’re in Russia.
You do not have a common view on this.
With Russia.
The Russians are helping Iran.
With their nuclear program.
John Bolton: They are.
And that’s why we’ve made it clear, that we think it’s important that they stop their cooperation with Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
It’s going to be a very important element in our future relationship.
John Humphrys: But.
If they don’t take your view.
That Iran is part of an Axis of Evil.
And quite clearly they don’t.
There’s not very much you can do about it.
Is there.
John Bolton: Well, I think they do take our view, that they don’t want to see a nuclear-capable, ballistic missile-equipped, Iran.
Which, after all, is much closer to them, than it is to us.
John Humphrys: But, again.
They’re entitled to say,
“We are a sovereign nation.
We will do.
What we chose to do.”
John Bolton: Well.
I think—
Number one.
I don’t think that’s what they are saying.
And number two.
If they were to take a—
A position.
Just like any other nation.
That took a position.
That they were going to continue, to allow assistance to go to the Iranian nuclear weapons program.
It would have a very significant impact on our bilateral relationship with them.
John Humphrys: So significant, that you would break-off relations?
John Bolton: No, no, no.
Certainly not.
But it’s a matter of profound strategic importance to both us and the Russians.
And I think they—
I think they understand that.
John Humphrys: The final thought, Mr. Bolton.
Do you believe.
That Saddam Hussein will still be in power.
In a year from now.
John Bolton: I certainly hope not.
For the safety of the Iraqi people.
If nothing else.
John Humphrys: Six months from now?
John Bolton: Uh—
I’m not—
I’m not making predictions.
I—
I hope—
If I—
If wishes could, could rule in the world, I would hope that his regime would come to an end immediately.
The sooner the better.
For the sake of the Iraqi people.
John Humphrys: John Bolton.
Many thanks.
John Bolton: Thank you.
Simply stated:
There is no doubt.
That Saddam Hussein.
Now has weapons of mass destruction.
There is no doubt.
He is amassing them.
To use.
Against our friends.
Against our allies.
And against us.
There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has — or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities. ...
Although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possesses CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets, rocket shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but also could consist of some mustard agent or stabilized VX.
Curt Weldon: Are you satisfied, that proliferation controls are better today, than they were in the past, relative to this kind of technology going in, that could enhance our capability, in the area of weapons of mass destruction?
* * *
David Kay {1:13}: Let me give you the case of the aluminum centrifuge rotors, that was in the weekend piece, by Michael Gordon and Judith Miller.
The Iraqi centrifuge pieces — that a team I led was on discovered — were made of marging steel {maraging steel}. Marging steel is harder to get access to. It is a more specialized technology. Not everyone can produce it.
They were going to carbon fiber rotors. Because carbon fiber winding machines, although controlled, because they are relevant to missile technology, as you know, Mr. Weldon, in addition to centrifuges, were still at that point where they were becoming generally available, because of Callaway golf clubs, high performance fly rods, and a whole series of other issues. So they were on the slope, and they understood it. By going to carbon fiber, they were better off.
Going to aluminum is even easier.
Because a number of countries that have the capabilities to extrude high performance aluminum tubes is almost in any country that has a machine tool industry.
So the problem has become porous. We have not found an effective way of dealing with it.
But let me tell you, I am pessimistic, that there is an easy way to deal with it, other than:—
Replacing the regime.
Committee audio {3:11:26, at 2:22:17}, C-Span video {1:13}.
Words underlined in green are spoken by David Kay (video/audio), and appear in the FDCH transcript, but the committee omitted these words, from the transcript it altered, of its congressional hearing. Words lined-through are substituted, by the committee, in the transcript it altered, for a word David Kay spoke.
The words the committee omitted, from its altered transcript, constitute an assertion of fact, by David Kay, that the aluminum tubes are centrifuge tubes. And, an endorsement, by David Kay, of the factual assertions, to that effect, about those particular tubes, in the New York Times article.
And he ought to know a centrifuge tube when he sees one, because he led was on a team which discovered Iraqi’s.
But Iraq only had four maraging steel tubes, and they didn’t work. They had their 15 carbon fiber tubes which did work, and Iraq’s blueprints for them — prototypes for a uranium enrichment program, which the IAEA certified, in the 1990s, never did exist.
These factual assertions, constitute prima facie criminal lies, to Congress, by David Kay, by the unseen principals, orchestrating, assisting, and promoting that lie, and by the large prima facie criminal conspiracy he appears to be fronting, at this U.S. Congressional hearing, and in his BBC News television interviews, which shortly follow, hyping and sexing-up Tony Blair’s impending September dossier, and influencing the House of Commons debate, the same day (September 24, below).
Those Members of Congress, staff members, and others, responsible, for inciting, and implementing, the falsification, of this U.S. government official record, are likewise members of a prima facie criminal cover-up conspiracy, to conceal evidence, of this prima facie crime.
–CJHjr
____________________
Query: “Aluminum is even easier”?
Oh.
I see.
They troubled themselves, to design centrifuges, with maraging steel or carbon fiber rotors, because they didn’t realize, aluminum would do the same job.
And so.
Now.
They bought a bunch of aluminum tubes.
To make centrifuge rotors with.
They learned their mistake, in the meantime.
Is this your explanation?
David Kay?
–CJHjr
Susan Watts: It’s a promise,
He may come to regret.
Tony Blair’s long-awaited dossier,
Of evidence,
Against Saddam Hussein.
This is now center stage,
In the battle for opinion,
On President Bush’s mission,
To deal with Iraq.
We now know when,
The dossier will be produced.
In just under two-weeks time.
So the pressure’s on,
To make sure,
It says something new.
* * *
Tony Blair,
And the officials writing his dossier,
Will have taken on board,
The distinctly underwhelmed reaction,
Earlier this week,
To a report on the Iraqi threat,
From a think tank,
With strong ties,
To British Intelligence.
Blair now knows,
He’ll have to build,
A stronger case,
To justify,
Any mission,
To target Saddam.
The authors of this week’s report, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, deny cooperation with the government.
Saying, they only want to get the discussion rolling,
But the current president, of the institute, is a former weaons inspector, to Iraq.
Terence Taylor: I’m one of those who believes,
There is substantial evidence,
Hard evidence,
Not speculation,
Already available.
And, it’s been available.
For a long time.
* * *
Susan Watts: The strongest evidence, to emerge, on Iraq’s nuclear goals, came over the weekend.
When the New York Times reported,
Intelligence services claimed,
That Saddam has been buying,
Thousands of aluminium tubes.
Key components of centrifuges.
Needed to produce uranium.
This suggests that all important intent,
Skeptics are demanding.
And.
More details, on this material, is likely to form a central plank, of the Blair dossier.
David Kay is one of the best placed individuals, to judge the significance, of these tubes.
He got to handle one, this week, when he gave evidence, at Congressional hearings, on Iraq’s weapons.
David Kay: These have
The very specific alloy composition. And,
They have the exact height and diameter,
To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991.
Is there some possible use?
I haven’t thought of, out there?
That matches,
The exact alloy composition,
The exact length dimensions,
The exact internal diameter,
As a gas centrifuge?
Always possible.
But.
Highly unlikely.
Susan Watts: He believes,
The meter-and-a-half long tubes,
Matter.
Because,
They show,
Saddam is committed,
To home-grown weapons.
And not just one bomb.
David Kay: They’re aiming to produce their own fissile material.
High enriched uranium.
And.
They’re going to produce it,
With an industrial scale process.
Thousands of gas centrifuges.
Lined up in a cascade fashion.
That really says,
Saddam Hussein,
Or someone in Iraq,
Has aspirations,
For a multiple number of nuclear weapons,
As we enter the 21st century.
And.
They must have some plan,
To use them.
Susan Watts: The emphasis,
From both sides of the Atlantic,
Is on the nuclear threat.
Which resonates,
With popular fears.
But surprises experts.
Who view biological weapons as a far more urgent concern.
Query: An exact match?
Nope.
The aluminum tubes, Saddam was buying:—
Are not the exact alloy composition.
Are not the exact diameter.
Are not the exact length.
Are not the exact inner diameter
“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991.”
Or.
To any other species of “gas centrifuge.”
Dramatically, the U.S. intelligence community knew — for well more than a year — that these aluminum tubes:—
Were an exact match, to Iraq’s artillery rockets.
Did not match:—
Any known species of centrifuge rotor.
Did not even come close to such a match.
And, least of all:—
Did not resemble.
In any particular.
“Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991.”
To wit:
____________________
In 2001, the IC {Intelligence Community} became aware that Iraq was attempting to procure 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes
Manufactured from 7075-T6 aluminum,
With an outer diameter of 81 mm,
And inner diameter of 74.4 mm,
A wall thickness of 3.3 mm
And a length of 900 mm.
The tubes were to be anodized using chromic acid
And were to be shipped, wrapped in wax paper and separated from each other.
Query: “The exact alloy composition”?
“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991”?
On August 17, 2001, DOE {U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. government’s nuclear experts} published a Technical Intelligence Note (TIN), Iraq’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway? (TIN000064) which contained an extensive eight page analysis of whether the aluminum tubes were intended for a rocket or a centrifuge program.
* * *
The DOE assessed that 7075-T6 aluminum
“Provides performance roughly half that of
The materials Iraq previously pursued.”
Prior to the Gulf War,
Iraq had pursued rotors
Made from maraging steel
And carbon fiber composites,
Which both offer better uranium separative capacity.
If Iraq were to pursue a rotor of 7075-T6 aluminum instead, it would need twice as many rotors, as well as twice as many other centrifuge components, such as end caps, bearings, and outer casings.
* * *
According to the DOE, Iraq began its uranium centrifuge enrichment program in the late 1980s when they began to work, by themselves, on an oil type centrifuge, a derivative of a machine that was developed by Jesse Beams in the U.S. during the Manhattan Project.
This centrifuge design is supported by oil bearings, rather than magnets.
The Iraqis were able to make a rotor, but it had severe problems with vibrations and leaking seals, consumed excessive amounts of power and never operated close to its target operating speed.
According to the DOE, neither the Iraqis nor anyone else, including the U.S., who has ever attempted to build a Beams centrifuge, has ever put these into a centrifuge cascade for uranium enrichment.
The Iraqis abandoned the Beams design and in 1989 obtained assistance from German engineers who helped the Iraqis obtain Zippe type magnetic suspension centrifuge components and designs.
The Iraqis attempted two versions of this centrifuge design, a maraging steel rotor and a carbon fiber rotor.
Ira