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Ditto Iran?
by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
• Congress debates, votes
• Iraq wmd war timeline: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005-2006, 2007
• David Kay
• Charles Duelfer
• Iran uranium timeline
• Israel/Palestine timeline:
• Palestine Peace Not Apartheid
• The Israel Lobby
• Settlements
• Blockade, reprisals
George W. Bush: Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction.
Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11th. But we know their true nature.
North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.
Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens--leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections—then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.
By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.
They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.
We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our Nation’s security.
We will be deliberate.
Yet, time is not on our side.
I will not wait on events, while dangers gather.
I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.
The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us, with the world’s most destructive weapons.
Naji Sabri: At present, there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
There are no means of producing them.
There is no intention in the government that the country should produce or acquire these weapons of mass destruction.
We said to Mr. Blair, declare the positions of these places and send the team of your inspectors to come to Baghdad.
If he is sure of this lie, let him send a team of British experts to Iraq, to locate these things which he claims that Iraq has.
We challenge him, to prove his point.
David Goodhart: The attack on Iraq.
Which now just seems a matter of time.
Will surely create further dissonance.
Between Europe and America.
Tony Blair: It depends on what happens. I repeat the demand, that the weapons inspectors are let back into Iraq, unconditionally. The U.N. is pressing Saddam to fulfil his obligations. He is refusing to do so.
David Goodhart: There seems to be a widely held expert view, that he doesn’t yet have deliverable weapons of mass destruction.
Is the fact, that he might be trying to develop them, sufficient grounds for an invasion?
Tony Blair: If the time comes for action, people will have the evidence presented to them.
But be in no doubt at all, that—
He is certainly trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
In particular, a nuclear capability.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. {Richard Dearlove, Chief, UK SIS: Secret Intelligence Service, a/k/a: MI-6}.
There was a perceptible shift in attitude.
Military action was now seen as inevitable.
Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.
But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.
The NSC {U.S. National Security Council} had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record.
There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
* * *
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week.
Richard Butler: Iraq’s stated position is that,
It has no weapons of mass destruction.
As recently as last week, two senior Iraqi officials, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, reiterated this claim. ...
It is essential to recognize that,
The claim,
Made by Saddam’s representatives that,
Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction,
Is false.
Everyone concerned.
From Iraq’s neighbors to the U.N. Security Council to the Secretary General of the United Nations, with whom Iraq is currently negotiating on the issue.
Everyone,
Simply, Mr. chairman,
Is being lied to.
* * *
Joe Biden: Is it possible to construct an inspection regime that—
If it were agreed.
We both agree it’s not likely to be.
But if it were—
That it would be efficacious?
That you would have some—
How intrusive would it have to be?
In order to have some significant expectation?
That you would be able to root out the bulk of his biological, chemical, and/or potential nuclear capacity?
Richard Butler: Mr. chairman, the conduct of inspections is entirely within our technical and intellectual capability.
If we were allowed to go anywhere anytime, we can do the job.
We can do it well and competently and completely.
What it relies on is the willingness of Iraq to allow us to go anywhere anytime.
Absent that, it will never—
Joe Biden: Well, some in our Defense Department make the argument, that notwithstanding the fact you theoretically could be allowed to go anywhere anytime, that over the last 4 years, the regime has been able to, through mobilizing, if you will—
Making mobile their biological-weapons laboratories and digging deep into the ground in places where we don’t know—
Even if we were free to roam, we would still not be able to do the job.
Richard Butler: Yes, I’ve read and heard, with great interest, of course, the mobilizing and burial arguments, as recently as in the last 24 hours by a very distinguished member of the administration.
I think they can be overstated, quite frankly.
And I’m a bit concerned about the stridency with which some of those things are said.
Almost as if to justify a coming invasion.
I repeat, it can be done.
No arms-control inspection or verification is perfect.
Anyone who’s been in that business will tell you that.
I’ve been in it for a quarter of a century.
And I’ll tell you straight up.
There can be errors and mistakes.
But, Senator, there is an enormous gap between an inspection regime that is given full access, and one that is cheated upon.
Now, given full access, our technologies and intelligence are such that we can do a very, very good job.
I don’t think it serves our purpose well.
That is, the purpose of getting to the clear truth of things.
To say this work is inherently flawed.
It isn’t.
What is its big problem is refusal to allow it to be done.
George W. Bush: The policy.
Of my government.
Our government.
Of this administration.
Is:
Regime-change.
For a reason.
Saddam Hussein is a man who poisons his own people, who threatens his neighbors, who develops weapons of mass destruction.
And I will assure His Majesty, like I have in the past, we’re looking at all options, the use of all tools.
I’m a patient man.
But.
I haven’t changed my opinion.
Since the last time he was in the Oval Office.
John Humphrys: There was a degree of excitement yesterday, when the Iraqis revealed, that they had invited Hans Blix, the head of the United Nations weapons inspectors, to Baghdad, for what they called “technical talks.”
People opposed to a war, against Saddam, seized on it.
It showed, they said, that Saddam was prepared to make the concessions that were needed.
Mr. Blix, and his inspection team.
Or UNMOVIC, as it was known.
Would be allowed in.
The threat had worked.
But.
That’s not how the Americans see it.
A few hours after the announcement from the United Nations, I spoke to John Bolton, the American Under-Secretary of State.
And asked him, how seriously the offer was being taken, in Washington.
John Bolton: What we want, is free and unimpeded access for UNMOVIC.
Uh—
To, uh—
Whatever they want to see, in Iraq.
To carry out, really, Resolution 687 {32kb.pdf, copy, copy, via this, this, or ODS}.
The cease fire resolution, back from 1991.
Which, obviously, the Iraqis have violated, almost from the day it was passed.
And, with almost four years, with no weapons inspectors inside Iraq, there’s an awful lot of work to do.
We continue to favor the reintroduction of the inspectors, and we’re supporting them as much as we can.
But one has to be dubious, given the Iraqi record of deception, as to what exactly their agreement would mean.
But.
Let there be no mistake.
While we also insist on.
The reintroduction of weapons inspectors.
Our policy.
At the same time.
Insists on.
Regime-change in Baghdad.
And.
That policy will not be altered.
Whether the inspectors go in.
Or not.
John Humphrys: So.
In other words.
There will be war.
Whatever happens.
John Bolton: No.
There are all kinds ways for regime-change to take place.
And, uh—
Uh—
There’re—
The Iraqi opposition has long felt, that the country is really burdened, intolerably, by Saddam Hussein’s presence in Baghdad.
And that opposition continues to grow.
So, uh—
The real question is, uh—
The removal of Saddam Hussein.
And his continuing threat.
To peace and security in the region.
John Humphrys: What’s changed?
In Iraq.
Since September the tenth.
To drive you down this road.
John Bolton: Well, I don’t—
Uh—
I don’t think our policy is tied to September 11.
Although we continue to explore what linkages there might be, between Saddam and al-Qaeda.
I think, the point is, that.
The threat that Saddam represents.
To our interests, the interests of our friends and neighbors in the region, and to peace and security at large.
Is what motivates us to think, that.
Regime-change is the only way.
To, to eliminate that threat.
John Humphrys: The United States — indeed Western Europe — has faced many threats, over the years.
Particularly during the Cold War.
And it relied, then, on a very effective policy, called “deterrence.”
Why doesn’t deterrence work today?
John Bolton: Because deterrence assumes a certain equivalence.
And a certain rationality on the other side.
In the case of Iraq, there is an enormous asymmetry between his capabilities and ours.
And yet.
If he possesses weapons of mass destruction.
Nuclear, chemical, or biological.
He can inflict enormous damage on our forward-deployed forces, or our friends and allies in the region, or our interests in the region.
Uh—
That, uh, simply are not susceptible to fine theories of deterrence.
John Humphrys: But why should he do that?
If he knows.
That the response to doing it.
Would be annihilation?
John Bolton: The, uh—
If Saddam Hussein were a rational person, he wouldn’t have used poison gas against his own people, he wouldn’t have invaded Kuwait 10 years ago, he wouldn’t have done a lot of things.
It’s precisely the arbitrary and totalitarian nature of his regime that makes him such a threat.
John Humphrys: In that case, it follows.
That there can be no answer.
Other than an attack against him.
Because.
If you regard him.
Both.
As irrational.
And.
A threat to your security.
Then that’s it.
End of conversation.
John Bolton: No.
I think what follows is.
The importance of regime-change.
Which can be accomplished in a number of different respects.
But I don’t see how anybody can rest easy.
For peace and security in the region.
As long as Saddam Hussein’s regime is in Baghdad.
John Humphrys: Well, the answer to that is.
That the policy of containment.
That we’ve been practicing.
For so long now, since the Gulf war.
Has worked.
John Bolton: I think the answer to that is.
That Saddam continues aggressively to pursue the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction capability.
We have ample evidence of that.
That activities he’s engaged in with respect to nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missile capabilities.
Uh—
This man is a threat.
As long as he is in power.
And.
As President Bush has warned repeatedly.
Time is not on our side.
That, as people acquire these very dangerous weapons, their threat increases geometrically.
And that, that has to be something that, uh, I think, that all, all responsible leaders, in the international community, should keep in mind.
John Humphrys: Why, in that case, are your allies.
Tony Blair himself.
Not as impressed by this argument.
As apparently they should be.
We hear from King Abdullah, of Jordan.
That Mr. Blair himself.
Your closest ally.
Standing shoulder-to-shoulder, and all that.
He, himself, is unenthusiastic.
John Bolton: Well, Mr. Humphrys, all I can say is, we are in constant consultation with a wide range of our allies, and we don’t necessarily discuss all of our political or military options in public.
We are content that, at the appropriate moment, we will have the requisite degree of international support.
John Humphrys: But if you don’t have it.
And all the indications are.
That, at the moment, you won’t.
Then what?
John Bolton: We will have it, Mr. Humphrys.
John Humphrys: Isn’t the reality, that Washington would go ahead and do it.
With, or without, support from other countries.
John Bolton: Well, I think that’s a hypothetical.
I think we will have support.
So I’m not that worried about the hypothetical.
John Humphrys: Can I remind you?
Of something that a former Chief of Staff.
General Sir Gerald Templer said?
This was at the time of Suez.
When there was great controversy.
Over attacking Egypt.
And, he said, that,
“Of course we can get to Cairo.
But what the Hell do we do?
When we get there?”
Doesn’t the same question apply.
To any attack on Iraq.
Having taken Baghdad.
What then?
John Bolton: Well.
Deleting your reference to the attack on Baghdad.
I think it is only prudent, to plan for Iraq, in the post-Saddam Hussein era.
And, in fact, we have already begun that.
Working with Iraqi leaders in the Diaspora.
And other Iraqi opposition figures.
To try to do the responsible forward-planning.
That we ought to be doing.
To alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.
Which Saddam has imposed on them.
And to move them toward a democratic form of government.
So, so, that, that work has, really, already begun.
John Humphrys: Isn’t there another argument here?
That what you’ve done is.
You’ve taken a political decision.
And it makes little strategic, or even tactical, sense?
John Bolton: I, I think as long as you have, uh, a dangerous dictatorial regime.
That oppresses its own people.
And.
That seeks to acquire.
Weapons of mass destruction.
That does represent both a tactical and strategic threat to the United Stares.
That’s one of the principal reasons.
Why we feel.
Regime-change is so necessary.
John Humphrys: Mr. Bolton, you know.
And we know.
Of many regimes.
That fit that description.
Have done for many years.
America hasn’t attacked them.
Indeed, often, it’s helped them.
John Bolton: Well.
There aren’t that many that are as close to producing weapons of mass destruction capability, as Iraq.
But I can tell you, that we are very concerned, about each and every one of the governments, that’s attempting to, to acquire such weapons.
I think that’s one reason why President Bush, in his State of the Union message, earlier this year, outlined the Axis of Evil concept.
And, as he put it — I think quite cogently — then,
“We cannot allow the world’s most dangerous leaders to acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.”
John Humphrys: So.
Having unseated Saddam Hussein.
If that’s what you succeed in doing.
You then start somewhere else.
John Bolton: Well, we—
You don’t have to draw that conclusion.
What we’re doing, very actively now, is seeking to increase our efforts, and those who share our concern about these weapons, to deny those who’re seeking them the resources and the expertise they need to, uh, perfect their weapons program.
It’s a very, very, urgent matter.
And we’re consulting with, uh, with, with many governments around the world.
I was just in Moscow, earlier this week, talking about precisely this problem.
It’s something that we have a common view on, I think, uh, with our Western allies, and many other governments around the world.
And it’s something, that, uh—
Especially since September 11, uh—
We’ve all grown more acutely aware of.
John Humphrys: As you say, you’re in Russia.
You do not have a common view on this.
With Russia.
The Russians are helping Iran.
With their nuclear program.
John Bolton: They are.
And that’s why we’ve made it clear, that we think it’s important that they stop their cooperation with Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
It’s going to be a very important element in our future relationship.
John Humphrys: But.
If they don’t take your view.
That Iran is part of an Axis of Evil.
And quite clearly they don’t.
There’s not very much you can do about it.
Is there.
John Bolton: Well, I think they do take our view, that they don’t want to see a nuclear-capable, ballistic missile-equipped, Iran.
Which, after all, is much closer to them, than it is to us.
John Humphrys: But, again.
They’re entitled to say,
“We are a sovereign nation.
We will do.
What we chose to do.”
John Bolton: Well.
I think—
Number one.
I don’t think that’s what they are saying.
And number two.
If they were to take a—
A position.
Just like any other nation.
That took a position.
That they were going to continue, to allow assistance to go to the Iranian nuclear weapons program.
It would have a very significant impact on our bilateral relationship with them.
John Humphrys: So significant, that you would break-off relations?
John Bolton: No, no, no.
Certainly not.
But it’s a matter of profound strategic importance to both us and the Russians.
And I think they—
I think they understand that.
John Humphrys: The final thought, Mr. Bolton.
Do you believe.
That Saddam Hussein will still be in power.
In a year from now.
John Bolton: I certainly hope not.
For the safety of the Iraqi people.
If nothing else.
John Humphrys: Six months from now?
John Bolton: Uh—
I’m not—
I’m not making predictions.
I—
I hope—
If I—
If wishes could, could rule in the world, I would hope that his regime would come to an end immediately.
The sooner the better.
For the sake of the Iraqi people.
John Humphrys: John Bolton.
Many thanks.
John Bolton: Thank you.
Simply stated:
There is no doubt.
That Saddam Hussein.
Now has weapons of mass destruction.
There is no doubt.
He is amassing them.
To use.
Against our friends.
Against our allies.
And against us.
There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has — or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities. ...
Although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possesses CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets, rocket shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but also could consist of some mustard agent or stabilized VX.
Curt Weldon: Are you satisfied, that proliferation controls are better today, than they were in the past, relative to this kind of technology going in, that could enhance our capability, in the area of weapons of mass destruction?
* * *
David Kay {1:13}: Let me give you the case of the aluminum centrifuge rotors, that was in the weekend piece, by Michael Gordon and Judith Miller.
The Iraqi centrifuge pieces — that a team I led was on discovered — were made of marging steel {maraging steel}. Marging steel is harder to get access to. It is a more specialized technology. Not everyone can produce it.
They were going to carbon fiber rotors. Because carbon fiber winding machines, although controlled, because they are relevant to missile technology, as you know, Mr. Weldon, in addition to centrifuges, were still at that point where they were becoming generally available, because of Callaway golf clubs, high performance fly rods, and a whole series of other issues. So they were on the slope, and they understood it. By going to carbon fiber, they were better off.
Going to aluminum is even easier.
Because a number of countries that have the capabilities to extrude high performance aluminum tubes is almost in any country that has a machine tool industry.
So the problem has become porous. We have not found an effective way of dealing with it.
But let me tell you, I am pessimistic, that there is an easy way to deal with it, other than:—
Replacing the regime.
Committee audio {3:11:26, at 2:22:17}, C-Span video {1:13}.
Words underlined in green are spoken by David Kay (video/audio), and appear in the FDCH transcript, but the committee omitted these words, from the transcript it altered, of its congressional hearing. Words lined-through are substituted, by the committee, in the transcript it altered, for a word David Kay spoke.
The words the committee omitted, from its altered transcript, constitute an assertion of fact, by David Kay, that the aluminum tubes are centrifuge tubes. And, an endorsement, by David Kay, of the factual assertions, to that effect, about those particular tubes, in the New York Times article.
And he ought to know a centrifuge tube when he sees one, because he led was on a team which discovered Iraqi’s.
But Iraq only had four maraging steel tubes, and they didn’t work. They had their 15 carbon fiber tubes which did work, and Iraq’s blueprints for them — prototypes for a uranium enrichment program, which the IAEA certified, in the 1990s, never did exist.
These factual assertions, constitute prima facie criminal lies, to Congress, by David Kay, by the unseen principals, orchestrating, assisting, and promoting that lie, and by the large prima facie criminal conspiracy he appears to be fronting, at this U.S. Congressional hearing, and in his BBC News television interviews, which shortly follow, hyping and sexing-up Tony Blair’s impending September dossier, and influencing the House of Commons debate, the same day (September 24, below).
Those Members of Congress, staff members, and others, responsible, for inciting, and implementing, the falsification, of this U.S. government official record, are likewise members of a prima facie criminal cover-up conspiracy, to conceal evidence, of this prima facie crime.
–CJHjr
____________________
Query: “Aluminum is even easier”?
Oh.
I see.
They troubled themselves, to design centrifuges, with maraging steel or carbon fiber rotors, because they didn’t realize, aluminum would do the same job.
And so.
Now.
They bought a bunch of aluminum tubes.
To make centrifuge rotors with.
They learned their mistake, in the meantime.
Is this your explanation?
David Kay?
–CJHjr
Susan Watts: It’s a promise,
He may come to regret.
Tony Blair’s long-awaited dossier,
Of evidence,
Against Saddam Hussein.
This is now center stage,
In the battle for opinion,
On President Bush’s mission,
To deal with Iraq.
We now know when,
The dossier will be produced.
In just under two-weeks time.
So the pressure’s on,
To make sure,
It says something new.
* * *
Tony Blair,
And the officials writing his dossier,
Will have taken on board,
The distinctly underwhelmed reaction,
Earlier this week,
To a report on the Iraqi threat,
From a think tank,
With strong ties,
To British Intelligence.
Blair now knows,
He’ll have to build,
A stronger case,
To justify,
Any mission,
To target Saddam.
The authors of this week’s report, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, deny cooperation with the government.
Saying, they only want to get the discussion rolling,
But the current president, of the institute, is a former weaons inspector, to Iraq.
Terence Taylor: I’m one of those who believes,
There is substantial evidence,
Hard evidence,
Not speculation,
Already available.
And, it’s been available.
For a long time.
* * *
Susan Watts: The strongest evidence, to emerge, on Iraq’s nuclear goals, came over the weekend.
When the New York Times reported,
Intelligence services claimed,
That Saddam has been buying,
Thousands of aluminium tubes.
Key components of centrifuges.
Needed to produce uranium.
This suggests that all important intent,
Skeptics are demanding.
And.
More details, on this material, is likely to form a central plank, of the Blair dossier.
David Kay is one of the best placed individuals, to judge the significance, of these tubes.
He got to handle one, this week, when he gave evidence, at Congressional hearings, on Iraq’s weapons.
David Kay: These have
The very specific alloy composition. And,
They have the exact height and diameter,
To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991.
Is there some possible use?
I haven’t thought of, out there?
That matches,
The exact alloy composition,
The exact length dimensions,
The exact internal diameter,
As a gas centrifuge?
Always possible.
But.
Highly unlikely.
Susan Watts: He believes,
The meter-and-a-half long tubes,
Matter.
Because,
They show,
Saddam is committed,
To home-grown weapons.
And not just one bomb.
David Kay: They’re aiming to produce their own fissile material.
High enriched uranium.
And.
They’re going to produce it,
With an industrial scale process.
Thousands of gas centrifuges.
Lined up in a cascade fashion.
That really says,
Saddam Hussein,
Or someone in Iraq,
Has aspirations,
For a multiple number of nuclear weapons,
As we enter the 21st century.
And.
They must have some plan,
To use them.
Susan Watts: The emphasis,
From both sides of the Atlantic,
Is on the nuclear threat.
Which resonates,
With popular fears.
But surprises experts.
Who view biological weapons as a far more urgent concern.
Query: An exact match?
Nope.
The aluminum tubes, Saddam was buying:—
Are not the exact alloy composition.
Are not the exact diameter.
Are not the exact length.
Are not the exact inner diameter
“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991.”
Or.
To any other species of “gas centrifuge.”
Dramatically, the U.S. intelligence community knew — for well more than a year — that these aluminum tubes:—
Were an exact match, to Iraq’s artillery rockets.
Did not match:—
Any known species of centrifuge rotor.
Did not even come close to such a match.
And, least of all:—
Did not resemble.
In any particular.
“Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991.”
To wit:
____________________
In 2001, the IC {Intelligence Community} became aware that Iraq was attempting to procure 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes
Manufactured from 7075-T6 aluminum,
With an outer diameter of 81 mm,
And inner diameter of 74.4 mm,
A wall thickness of 3.3 mm
And a length of 900 mm.
The tubes were to be anodized using chromic acid
And were to be shipped, wrapped in wax paper and separated from each other.
Query: “The exact alloy composition”?
“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991”?
On August 17, 2001, DOE {U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. government’s nuclear experts} published a Technical Intelligence Note (TIN), Iraq’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway? (TIN000064) which contained an extensive eight page analysis of whether the aluminum tubes were intended for a rocket or a centrifuge program.
* * *
The DOE assessed that 7075-T6 aluminum
“Provides performance roughly half that of
The materials Iraq previously pursued.”
Prior to the Gulf War,
Iraq had pursued rotors
Made from maraging steel
And carbon fiber composites,
Which both offer better uranium separative capacity.
If Iraq were to pursue a rotor of 7075-T6 aluminum instead, it would need twice as many rotors, as well as twice as many other centrifuge components, such as end caps, bearings, and outer casings.
* * *
According to the DOE, Iraq began its uranium centrifuge enrichment program in the late 1980s when they began to work, by themselves, on an oil type centrifuge, a derivative of a machine that was developed by Jesse Beams in the U.S. during the Manhattan Project.
This centrifuge design is supported by oil bearings, rather than magnets.
The Iraqis were able to make a rotor, but it had severe problems with vibrations and leaking seals, consumed excessive amounts of power and never operated close to its target operating speed.
According to the DOE, neither the Iraqis nor anyone else, including the U.S., who has ever attempted to build a Beams centrifuge, has ever put these into a centrifuge cascade for uranium enrichment.
The Iraqis abandoned the Beams design and in 1989 obtained assistance from German engineers who helped the Iraqis obtain Zippe type magnetic suspension centrifuge components and designs.
The Iraqis attempted two versions of this centrifuge design, a maraging steel rotor and a carbon fiber rotor.
Iraq was able to produce about 60 maraging steel rotors indigenously, only four of which passed dimensional inspection, but they never ran a centrifuge machine using these rotors.
Because they were having problems making the maraging steel rotors, the German “consultants” recommended that the Iraqis try a carbon fiber rotor.
Iraq covertly imported 30 pre-made carbon fiber rotors. Iraq built two machines with the carbon fiber rotors.
One machine failed during the run-up, but the other machine operated.
Iraq was continuing to work with the Germans to optimize that machine until the program was halted because of the Gulf War.
Query: “The exact diameter”?
“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991”?
According to the DOE assessment,
The tube diameter was smaller
Than that of any known deployed centrifuge machine
And was about half the diameter
Of Iraq’s pre-Gulf War prototype machine.
DOE noted that a small diameter would have presented “various design and operational problems that veteran engineers of Iraq’s prior program should readily understand.”
Query: “The exact inner diameter”?
“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991”?
A wall thickness of 3.3 mm ...
According to the DOE assessment ...
“The tubes are too thick
For favorable use as rotor tubes,
Exceeding the nominal 1-mm thickness {tube walls}
Of known aluminum rotor tubes
By more than a factor of three ...
Additionally, various tolerances specified in contract documents ... are looser than the expected precision call-outs for an aluminum rotor tube by factors of two to five.”
The DOE also noted that the anodized surface, requested by Iraq in its tube procurements, “... is not consistent with a gas centrifuge application.”
* * *
Iraq had worked on this design prior to the Gulf War, obtained substantial foreign assistance on this design, and had a full set of designs and drawings for this centrifuge. ...
DOE analysts contacted Gernot Zippe, the designer of the Zippe centrifuge, directly and he confirmed that the wall thickness of his centrifuge designs were not more than 1 mm.
Query: “Some possible use”?
“I haven’t thought of”?
“Highly unlikely.”
On August 17, 2001 ...
The assessment noted that the Iraqis had declared to the IAEA that the Nasser State Establishment obtained and used large numbers of high-strength aluminum tubes to manufacture
81-mm rockets
Dating back to at least 1989.
The tubes were declared to be made of
7075-T6 aluminum
With an 81 mm outer diameter,
74.4 mm inner diameter,
And 900 mm length—
The same specifications
Of the tubes Iraq was trying to acquire
In 2001.
The assessment also noted that the IAEA [redacted] found large numbers of the tubes stored in various locations around the site.
Senate Report No. 108-301 (July 9 2004), page 91.
–CJHjr
George W. Bush: At the United Nations Security Council, it is very important, that the members understand:
That the credibility of the United Nations is at stake.
That the Security Council must be firm, in its resolve, to deal with,
A true threat to world peace.
And that is Saddam Hussein.
That the United Nations Security Council must work, with the United States and Britain and other concerned parties, to send a clear message that,
We expect Saddam to disarm.
And if the United Nations Security Council won’t deal with the problem, the United States and some of our friends will.
That’s the message the Secretary of State has delivered forcefully.
That’s the message that he will continue to carry.
* * *
Question: Mr. President, how important is it, that that resolution give you an authorization of the use of force?
George W. Bush: That will be part of the resolution.
The authorization to use force.
If you want to keep the peace,
You’ve got to have,
The authorization to use force.
But it’s—
This will be—
This is a chance for Congress, to indicate support.
It’s a chance for Congress to say, we support the administration’s ability to keep the peace.
That’s what this is all about.
Question: Will regime change be part of it?
George W. Bush: Yes.
That’s the policy of the government.
Jane Corbin: Saddam has the raw material.
For The Bomb.
Natural uranium.
Mined and processed, inside Iraq.
But it needs to be enriched.
To reach weapons grade.
Now, there’s new information.
That Saddam is seeking centrifuges.
Machines to enrich uranium.
In the last 14 months.
Several shipments.
A total of 1000 aluminium centrifuge tubes.
Have been intercepted by intelligence agencies.
Before they actually reached Iraq {photo}.
David Kay: I’ve seen one of them.
The centrifuge tubes look like they’re of the design, which is German derived.
That the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s, and developed.
They’re for enriching uranium.
That is, taking natural uranium up to the level that makes it useful for a weapon. ...
Jane Corbin: What does it tell you?
The fact, that they’re trying to get several of these?
There have been several shipments.
David Kay: Well, it tells me that they’re going for a large scale programme.
Over a thousand centrifuges.
Which, in fact, is what they were going for, before the Gulf War intervened {1991}.
Query: When you see Jane Corbin on TV, do wonder to yourself? CIA/MI-6? NSC/DoD/SAIC? Liar for hire? And what species? Faithfully voicing her masters’ script?
–CJHjr
George W. Bush: The danger to our country is grave.
The danger to our country is growing.
The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons.
The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary to make more biological and chemical weapons.
And according to the British government, the Iraqi regime could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes, after the order were given.
The regime has long-standing, and continuing, ties to terrorist organizations.
And, there are al Qaeda terrorists.
Inside Iraq.
Question: If an inspection team goes in now,
And finds nothing.
Because—
Perhaps Iraq is very good at hiding it.
Or—
Perhaps they have nothing.
But you all are of the belief, that they have it.
If they find nothing,
Does it make your job more difficult?
In trying to assemble an international coalition,
To disarm him by other means.
Donald Rumsfeld: Goodness gracious!
That is kind of like looking down the road,
For every conceivable obstacle you can find,
And then driving into it.
I just don’t—
I don’t get up in the morning,
And ask myself that.
We know
They have weapons of mass destruction.
We know
They have active programs.
There isn’t any debate about it.
So—
So the idea,
That if you had an appropriate inspection regime,
That they’d come back, and say,
“You were wrong.”
Is—
Is so far beyond anyone’s imagination,
That—
It’s not something I think about.
If you have an appropriate inspection regime—
They’re going to find weapons of mass destruction.
Or else they’re going to get thrown out.
Or else they’re going to be denied access, and they’re going to leave themselves.
Because,
They’re there.
____________________
Query: “It’s not something I think about”?
The U.N. inspectors.
Investigated all the sites.
You asked them to investigate.
Those you allowed them time to investigate.
Before you ordered them to leave.
So you could attack Iraq.
They came back to you.
And they said,
“You were wrong.”
“There are no weapons of mass destruction.
Or programs.
At any of these sites.”
There was “an appropriate inspection regime.”
They did not “find weapons of mass destruction.”
They were not “thrown out.”
They were not “denied access.”
They did not “leave themselves.”
That obstacle in the road.
You didn’t want to trouble yourself about.
That obstacle was in the road, from day-one.
Plain for all to see.
And you knew, from day-one, you would reach it.
As you drove down that road.
And so what did you do?
You removed the obstacle.
You threw the inspectors out.
But this was not in your gift to do.
You contracted-away your asserted right,
To command the inspectors,
And attack Iraq.
When you agreed to be bound by S/Res/1441.
You launched a war.
In violation of that treaty (S/Res/1441).
You killed 200,000 people.
You maimed, orphaned, widowed, bereaved, millions more.
You drove 2 million into exile.
You destroyed the livelihood of millions.
This is not politics.
This is violent crime.
Penalty:
Death.
–CJHjr
George W. Bush: I went to the United Nations the other day.
And I want to share with you, why I went.
First, I wanted to make sure the world heard the case.
This man is a dictator.
Who ... said he would get rid of weapons, of mass destruction.
And still has them.
And we need to fear the fact.
That he has weapons, of mass destruction. ...
He either gets rid of his weapons.
And the United Nations gets rid of his weapons—
He can either get rid of his weapons.
And the United Nations can act.
Or the United States will lead a coalition, to disarm this man.
I’m willing to give peace a chance to work.
I want the United Nations to work.
I want him to do what he said he would do.
But for the sake of our future.
Now’s the time.
Now’s the time.
For the sake of your children’s future.
We must make sure, this madman never has the capacity to hurt us.
With a nuclear weapon.
Or to use the stockpiles of anthrax.
That we know he has.
Or VX.
The biological weapons.
Which he possesses.
* * *
I laid out a vision for peace.
“A close comparison of the unclassified version ... and the original classified NIE ... reveals striking differences. ... Some convey the impression that the intelligence community was much more confident, and more united in its views, than it actually was. Others appear designed to portray a sense of heightened threat, and particularly of a threat that could touch the U.S. homeland. Sentences and phrases in the classified NIE expressing uncertainty were deleted while new formulations alluding to gathering danger were added.
The words “we judge” and “we assess” were deleted from five key findings of the classified document. ... In each case, uncertainties turned into fact.
The unclassified version had no reference to the dissenting opinions of the Department of Energy, U.S. Air Force, or the extensive dissenting views of the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) ... Instead, where there was agency disagreement, the unclassified version used the phrase “most analysts assess” or “most analysts believe.” Only on one occasion did the unclassified version mention the reason why “some” analysts disagreed. We now know that entire government agencies rejected many of what were portrayed as consensus judgments and that they held less alarmist views of Iraqi behavior.”
Vladimir Putin: Russia does not have in its possession any trustworthy data.
That supports the existence of nuclear weapons.
Or any weapons of mass destruction, in Iraq.
And, we have not received any such information, from our partners, as yet ...
We have apprehensions.
That such weapons might exist in Iraq.
That is why, we want to see the inspectors travel there.
Sergei Lavrov: Throughout their many years of work in Iraq, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted some 7,000 inspections.
As a result, they achieved significant progress in shutting down Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. ...
Up to now, we—
Like all unbiased observers—
Have not seen any kind of persuasive evidence.
That there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Or programmes to develop them.
Nor have we seen any other facts.
That would situate Iraq, in the context of combating terrorism.
The only way to remove any doubts is the immediate redeployment of the international inspectors to Iraq.
Tony Blair: The goal is disarmament.
Of all chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
If Saddam complies—
That is the UN mandate fulfilled. ...
My message to him is this:
Disarm or you face force. ...
Cooperate fully and—
Despite the terrible injustice you have often inflicted on others—
We will be just with you.
Evelyn Leopold (Reuters, chief U.N. correspondent) {6:06}: Dr. Blix.
President Bush keeps talking about “zero tolerance.”
Which puts a lot of pressure on you.
What you consider a serious violation:
At one point you’ve said,
“A half-hour delay would not be one.
A 2-hour delay, in getting access to a site, might be one.”
And also:
Would an omission.
In the declaration.
Be something you would report.
As a serious violation.
Hans Blix: I’ll take the first part of your question, first.
I think it is useful to have this discussion.
Because, it really deals with what could trigger armed action, and war.
So it is an important discussion.
At the same time, I think one needs to nuance it.
I think—
I’ve seen that—
Several people, in high positions, have talked about it.
And I, myself, have talked about:
The one flat tire.
Well, that’s a flat tire.
If it is with our own people,
It’s one thing.
If it is with the Iraqi escorts,
Having one flat tire is one thing.
If they have four flat tires.
On the way out.
Delaying us much more.
Then, it may be a different thing.
So.
What this points to, I think, is that,
You may have to take account,
Whether you can read an intention
Into something.
I haven’t seen that referred to,
In the discussion.
I think, we still have to use our common sense,
In judging:
Whether something
Is a way of
Preventing us,
Hindering us,
In the inspections.
Or if it is not.
* * *
Your second question?
Evelyn Leopold Would an omission in the declaration—
Hans Blix: Ah. An omission in the declaration.
Evelyn Leopold —be something you would report, as a serious violation.
Hans Blix: Yah.
Well, we take one day at a time here.
And the declaration should come before the 8th of December.
And then we will then analyze that.
Of course, I think this is one of the most important moments we foresee, is the declaration by Iraq.
Because, you’ll recall, that in 1991, the Resolution 687 {32kb.pdf, copy, copy, via this, this, or ODS}.
At the time, the concept was, that Iraq declares, and we verify.
And this was—
Some said, that this developed into,
“They hide and we seek.”
And we are now, again, getting back to a wish to a declaration, which in the view of the Security Council offers a last opportunity for Iraq to declare what they may have.
We are not, on our side, contending, that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.
We have a great many questions.
We cannot exclude it.
And we are not saying, that all the intelligence is wrong.
It may be right.
But we are not also confirming it.
So the Iraq’s declaration — I come back to now — is a very important document.
And we hope that they take it very seriously.
And when it gets here, well, then we would have all our people analyzing it, and comparing it with the knowledge that we have of the past.
Edith M. Lederer (Associated Press, chief U.N. correspondent): Dr. Blix, on this—
On a similar subject.
The Iraqi government, in its letter of acceptance, reiterated several times, that it has no programs for weapons of mass destruction.
This would assume, that in its declaration, it will not refer to any programs of weapons of mass destruction.
My question is, that in Washington, some U.S. officials have said that if, in fact—
If the Iraqis go ahead, with what they have said in this letter, that this in itself would be a cause for a falsification or an omission.
And I was wondering, if you could comment on this contention, and the idea, that this could be the start of triggering a material breach.
Hans Blix: ... Now.
If, as you say, a declaration comes.
And it maintains the position of the past.
Then.
I think it will be the moment.
For those.
Who consider.
That they have evidence.
To consider.
Whether they put that evidence.
On the table.
I don’t think they can simply—
Or anyone can simply say,
“This is wrong.”
And.
“We all know it is wrong.”
I think, one would have to present evidence.
And we’ve seen it, as our task, at any rate.
Always to deal with evidence.
We are performing inspections.
And I said, also, that if I have solid evidence.
That Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.
Then I would put that on the table.
Of the Security Council.
I do not have that.
But others may have such evidence.
And, I think, that would be the moment.
To possibly present it.
Bill Plante: The U.S. said.
It could provide massive intelligence.
About the weapons.
It believes.
Iraq is hiding.
And what it expects.
U.N. inspectors.
To find.
Question (Washington Post): General, does the declaration provide any evidence?
Of biological and chemical agents?
You previously said you destroyed?
Including anthrax and (unintelligible) {VX?}.
Any evidence to support your previous claims?
Of the destruction of these things?
Amer al-Saadi: It was not just a claim.
It’s a fact.
And the evidence.
Some first class evidence.
Is given.
* * *
The biological file.
The biological declaration.
Is about.
A program that never existed after 1991.
It was totally.
And completely.
Removed.
In 1991.
Before the inspectors arrived to Iraq.
So when you remove something completely.
It no longer exists.
And.
If you want to do it properly.
You also remove all of the evidence.
Of it ever existed.
And that’s what we did.
And.
Retrospectively.
It was a mistake.
* * *
Question In terms of the question.
Of unanswered questions.
Timing over (unintelligible) UNSCOM days.
You said, that there were—
There’s “first-class evidence,” that did not satisfy UNSCOM, for political reasons, at the time.
But have you presented any evidence?
In these declarations?
To help UNMOVIC?
At this point?
Resolve issues?
Such as the disposition of the VX nerve agent?
Amer al-Saadi: There is an implication.
In your question.
That VX still exists.
I have said.
That nothing of the previous program exists.
Our problem, now, is to produce.
The complete evidence.
Of the picture.
Of the biological program.
We have presented documents, regarding—
Supporting documents.
Now.
Those documents have not been increased, since then.
Not by a single document.
Because we have done all researching we could.
And we could not find any more.
The UNSCOM at the time, from the time of (unintelligible), the executive chairman.
They received, what is called as.
The “Farm Document.”
Or “Hydrafarm Document.”
They contain all the sensitive material.
Regarding the biological, chemical, nuclear, and missile programs.
We don’t know.
What’s in—
Exactly.
In those documents.
And there—
If you remember.
There were about 1.5 million documents.
Or more.
With the, I think, transparencies and (unintelligible) immoral (unintelligible).
Question Microfilm.
Amer al-Saadi: Microfilm, yes.
Microfilm documents.
It’s all with them.
And they are in a position to judge this program.
Better than we do.
But they are politically motivated.
The biological program gave them a good opportunity to keep everything open.
Hans Blix: Inspections resumed on 27 November. ...
The Iraqi cooperation has been very helpful.
For our logistical and infrastructure build-up. ...
Access to sites has been prompt.
And assistance on the sites expeditious.
It seems probable that a general instruction has been issued, not in any way to delay or impede inspection, of the kind of sites we have gone to, so far. ...
Some sites were inspected last Friday—
The Muslim day of rest.
In one of them, the Iraqi staff were absent and a number of doors inside locked, with no keys available.
The Iraqi side offered to break the doors open, while videotaping the event.
However, they agreed with a suggestion, that the doors in question could be sealed overnight, and the offices inspected the next morning.
Clearly.
We have the right.
To undertake inspections.
At any time.
Night or day.
Whether on weekdays.
Or religious holidays.
We intend to exercise this right.
Not to harass.
But to demonstrate.
That, just as there are no sanctuaries in space.
There are no sanctuaries in time.
Mohamed ElBaradei:
5. Iraq’s overall conclusion with respect to its nuclear programme is as follows:
“No activities of any substance related to the former INP were carried out during and beyond April 1991. All nuclear program activities were practically terminated and abandoned during April 1991 and only reports of previous accomplishments and new missions (non-proscribed) were issued later.” ...
7. Iraq states that its nuclear activities from 1991 to 2002 have been limited to the use of radioisotopes for non-proscribed purposes (e.g. medical, agricultural and industrial uses), in conformity with Security Council resolution 707 (1991). ...
9. It should be noted that, in the course of the meeting that took place in Baghdad on 19 November 2002, the Iraqi counterpart, referring to a number of published reports, acknowledged that Iraq had made several unsuccessful attempts since 1991 to import high-strength aluminum tubing, but stated that the tubing had been intended for the manufacture of 81-millimetre rockets and not for the enrichment of uranium.
These attempts are not mentioned in the Iraqi declaration covering post-1991 activities, although the IAEA understands that it is referred to in the part of the declaration that deals with missiles.
The IAEA intends to pursue this matter further with Iraq.
In addition, during that same meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi authorities, referring again to published reports, denied any efforts to import uranium after 1991.
The declaration makes no mention of this issue, but the matter will be pursued further by the IAEA.
As previously reported to the Council by the IAEA, all nuclear material known to exist in Iraq (mostly natural uranium) remains under IAEA control at a storage location in Iraq, and has been subject to periodic verification since 1998 pursuant to Iraq’s Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). ...
Since the resumption of Security Council mandated activities in Iraq, the IAEA has conducted sixty-eight inspections, including inspections at a Presidential Site and at six sites that had not previously been inspected.
Inspections have been carried out.
Without prior notification to Iraq.
Except where notification was necessary, to ensure that specific support from the counterpart would be available at the facility (e.g. a crane for the removal of Agency air samplers).
And immediate access.
Has been provided.
By the Iraqi authorities.
No evidence of prohibited activities has been detected, though the results of the collection of environmental samples are not yet available.
Mohamed ElBaradei: We have, both of us, indicated, we are making good progress, in having access to sites.
Iraq is cooperating well, in terms of process. ...
Iraq has been opening doors to us.
Iraq has been giving us immediate access to sites. ...
Hans Blix: Mr. Baradei said they opened the doors.
The cooperation on proceedings, on procedure, has been good.
They have been helpful.
Helped us also in the terms of logistics — we have been setting up an office in Mosul.
And on all these scores, access, prompt access, yes, there has been good cooperation.
Presumably an instruction to their people, to let us in, in sites of the type we have visited so far.
Question: Mr. Ambassador, do you agree with some countries in the Security Council issuing their own assessment?
Not waiting only for the inspectors to issue their assessment.
But they are doing a parallel assessment.
Do you approve of that procedure?
Sergei Lavrov Well, it’s up to any country to have its own view, on any issue, in the world affairs.
But it does not mean, that this view is the view of the Security Council.
That we have been hearing allegations.
That Iraq does continue its WMD programs.
We have heard it many times.
We never saw any evidence.
That this is the case.
We don’t know whether this is true.
Or not.
And we want this to be verified.
By professionals.
By UNMOVIC, and by IAEA.
To say that, “We know, but we wouldn't tell you,” is not something which is persuasive, frankly speaking.
It’s not a poker game.
When you hold your cards.
And call others’ bluff.
Colin Powell: And let me just touch on a few examples.
And we’ll be giving out a fact sheet later.
With additional examples.
Before the inspectors were forced to leave Iraq.
They concluded.
That Iraq could have.
Produced 26,000 liters of anthrax.
That is three times the amount Iraq had declared.
Yet.
The Iraqi declaration is silent.
On this stockpile.
Which, alone, would be enough to kill several million people.
The regime also admitted, that it had manufactured 19,180 liters of a biological agent called botchulinum toxin.
UN inspectors later determined.
That the Iraqis could have.
Produced 38,360 additional liters.
However, once again.
The Iraqi declaration is silent.
On these missing supplies. ...
Nor does the declaration address questions that have arisen since the inspectors left in 1998.
For example.
We know.
That in the late 1990s.
Iraq built.
Mobile biological weapons production units.
Yet.
The declaration tries to wave this away.
Mentioning only.
Mobile refrigeration vehicles.
And food-testing laboratories.
We also know.
That Iraq has tried to obtain.
High-strength aluminum tubes.
Which can be used to enrich uranium.
In centrifuges.
For a nuclear weapons program.
The Iraqi regime is required.
By Resolution 1441.
To report those attempts.
Iraq, however, has failed.
To provide adequate information.
About the procurement and use of these tubes.
Most brazenly of all.
The Iraqi declaration denies.
The existence of any.
Prohibited weapons programs.
At all.
The United States, the United Nations and the world waited for this declaration from Iraq.
But Iraq’s response is a catalogue.
Of recycled information.
And flagrant omissions.
It should be obvious.
That the pattern of systematic holes and gaps.
In Iraq’s declaration.
Is not the result of accidents.
Or editing oversights.
Or technical mistakes.
These are.
Material omissions.
That, in our view, constitute.
Another.
Material breach. ...
As Ambassador John Negroponte.
Said, earlier today.
Saddam Hussein has so far responded.
To this final opportunity.
With a new lie.
Ray Suarez: Iraq responds, that ...
There is nothing new to report.
They simply don’t have the things, that it’s alleged that they have, in the country.
Hans Blix: That’s right.
And they have not changed their position.
They say there was nothing left.
And they still continue to say that.
So it’s not surprising, that there is no new— nothing new on that score.
However, what we need is evidence.
The U.S. and the U.K. say.
That they have evidence.
That the Iraqis retain weapons of this kind.
We do not have such evidence.
* * *
Ray Suarez: What evidence would there be?
Of something that’s been destroyed?
Hans Blix: Well, for instance, you would have records, of the destruction.
They have said they destroyed all the biological weapons already in the summer of 1991.
And one would have thought that they would have some record, of that action.
If they did not, well, then there would be some people, who took part in the operations ...
The best thing, that we could get, would be if any member state would tell us:
“We have evidence.
That they keep weapons of mass destruction.
Somewhere.”
Rather than the round-about way.
To get knowledge about it, from some defector.
Michael McAuliffe: The U.S. and Britain ...
This is the closest Blix has ever come.
To telling the two governments.
To put up.
Or shut up.
Michael McAuliffe (reporting), “Blix to U.S., U.K: "Where Are The Weapons?"” (CBC News, December 20 2002), audio {1:25}.
____________________
Sarah Montague: The chief U.N. weapons inspector, Hans Blix, says,
Britain and America
Are not yet giving him
The information he needs,
To prove,
That Iraq is lying,
About its weapons program.
He made the claim in an interview, with the BBC World Affairs correspondent Allan Little.
Allan asked him,
Whether the 12,000 pages,
That Iraq has given to the U.N.,
Amounted to a full disclosure.
Hans Blix: Well.
If you are sure,
That they have something,
That they haven’t disclosed,
Then it’s not full disclosure.
But.
The question is:
“Do you have evidence to show that.”
The U.K. feels, “Yes.”
The United States says also, “Yes.”
We say, “We don’t know.”
It may be full disclosure.
Or it may not be.
We do not think Iraq has submitted adequate supporting evidence, for the text.
And therefore, we would say, that the Security Council can have no confidence, that this is a complete disclosure. ...
Allan Little: So the Iraqi contention.
Which we’ve heard, over and over again.
And which we heard again today.
That, “This amounts to full disclosure.”
“There’s nothing missing.”
Is simply not credible.
Hans Blix: A declaration, per se, is not credible.
You have to support it by evidence.
And if they do not do that.
Then, there will not be confidence.
It may be true.
Or it may be false.
But, it’s in their interest, to produce this evidence, to convince the Security Council, and the world, that this is true.
Hans Blix is awake, to what he just said.
U.S./U.K. officials, they make bold declarations, which they do not support, with evidence.
–CJHjr
The most important thing, that governments, like the U.K., or the U.S., could give us, would be to tell us, the sites, where they are convinced, that they keep some weapons of mass destruction.
This is what we want to have.
Allan Little: And are you getting that access? {to intelligence}
Hans Blix: Well.
Not very much.
Not yet.
I hope we will.
And now that we are in full operation.
I hope it will come.
Allan Little: So.
There have already been occasions.
When they’ve blocked access. {to intelligence}
Hans Blix: Well.
We get a lot of briefings.
About what they believe.
That the Iraqis have.
But, of course, what you really need to have.
Is an indication of the place.
Where.
Things are stored.
If they know it.
And they have all the methods.
To look—
To listen to telephone conversations.
They have spies.
They have the satellites.
Et cetera.
So they have a lot of sources.
Which we do not have.
Allan Little: So.
You’re not getting.
All the cooperation, and support—
Hans Blix: Not yet.
Allan Little: —you feel you deserve—
Hans Blix: Oh no.
Not yet.
Allan Little: —from the Western intelligence agencies.
Hans Blix: We get some.
But we don’t get all we needed.
Allan Little: So.
Interestingly.
It’s not the Iraqis.
Who are impeding.
Your unfettered access—
Hans Blix: No {chuckles}.
Allan Little: —it’s the Western countries.
Hans Blix: Well.
If the Iraqis gave us full cooperation, we wouldn’t need any intelligence.
Allan Little: So.
What sort of intelligence?
Would be useful to you?
Hans Blix: To tell us.
Precisely.
Where.
They believe, that they are storing things.
If the U.K. and the U.S. are convinced.
And they say, they have evidence.
Well.
Then one would expect.
That they would be able.
To tell us:
Where is this stuff?
Hans Blix: We would like to have clues.
As to where,
The United States’
And other countries’
Intelligence
Feel,
They know,
Iraqis are storing weapons of mass destruction.
Then,
We can send in the inspectors.
Mohamed ElBaradei: I think,
Now is the time,
For countries that have information,
That contradicts Iraq’s declaration,
To come forward with this information.
Nuclear Weapons
• The declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger.
• Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?
Richard Boucher: The Public Affairs Bureau put together the sheet.
Based on a variety of classified and unclassified information, prepared in other bureaus of the State Department.
Including information that had been cleared.
And was consistent with the NIE. ...
Greg Thielmann: That December statement was not cleared, or shown, to the State Department’s Intelligence Bureau ...
It certainly cries out for further investigation.
About why that was not done.
And who actually wrote those words.
Greg Thielmann (Director to September 2002, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department), February 3 2004.
Henry Waxman, the Democratic California congressman, charges that President Bush’s U.N. Ambassador designate, John Bolton, participated in promoting the administration’s phony story about Saddam Hussein negotiating to buy uranium for nuclear weapons from the African country of Niger.
Subsequently, Waxman says, the State Department tried to cover up Bolton’s involvement by using the designation “sensitive but unclassified” to conceal information about his role “in the creation of a fact sheet distributed to the United Nations that falsely claimed Iraq had sought uranium from Niger.”
James Ridgeway, “Uranium Equals Kryptonite for Bush Nominee: Congressman demands answers from Bolton over Niger fiasco” (Village Voice, March 1 2005) {copy}.
Concealment of a State Department Official’s Role in the Niger Uranium Claim
In April 2004, the State Department used the designation “sensitive but unclassified” to conceal unclassified information about the role of John Bolton, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, in the creation of a fact sheet distributed to the United Nations that falsely claimed Iraq had sought uranium from Niger. {p.6}
On December 19, 2002, the State Department issued a fact sheet entitled “Illustrative Examples of Omissions from the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council.” 9 The fact sheet listed eight key areas in which the Bush Administration found fault with Iraq’s weapons declaration to the United Nations on December 7, 2002. Under the heading “Nuclear Weapons,” the fact sheet stated:
The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?
It was later discovered that this claim was based on fabricated documents. 10 In addition, both State Department intelligence officials and CIA officials reported that they had rejected the claim as unreliable. 11 As a result, it was unclear who within the State Department was involved in preparing the fact sheet.
On July 21, 2003, I wrote to Secretary of State Colin Powell, asking for an explanation of the role of John Bolton, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, in creating the document. 12 ¶
On September 25, 2003, the State Department responded with a definitive denial: ¶
“Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, John R. Bolton, did not play a role in the creation of this document.” 13
Subsequently, however, I joined six other members of the Government Reform Committee in requesting from the State Department Inspector General a copy of an unclassified {p.7} “chronology” on how the fact sheet was developed. 14 ¶
This chronology described a meeting on December 18, 2002, between Secretary Powell, Mr. Bolton, and Richard Boucher, the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Public Affairs. According to this chronology, Mr. Boucher specifically asked Mr. Bolton ¶
“for help developing a response to Iraq’s Dec 7 Declaration to the United Nations Security Council that could be used with the press.” ¶
According to the chronology, which is phrased in the present tense, Mr. Bolton “agrees and tasks the Bureau of Nonproliferation,” a subordinate office that reports directly to Mr. Bolton, to conduct the work.
This unclassified chronology also stated that on the next day, December 19, 2003, the Bureau of Nonproliferation “sends email with the fact sheet, ‘Fact Sheet Iraq Declaration.doc,’” to Mr. Bolton’s office (emphasis in original). A second e-mail was sent a few minutes later, and a third e-mail was sent about an hour after that. According to the chronology, each version “still includes Niger reference.” Although Mr. Bolton may not have personally drafted the document, the chronology appears to indicate that he ordered its creation and received updates on its development.
The Inspector General’s chronology was marked “sensitive but unclassified.” In addition, the letter transmitting the chronology stated that it “contains sensitive information, which may be protected from public release under the Freedom of Information Act,” and requested that no “public release of this information” be made. 15 ¶
In fact, however, the chronology consisted of nothing more than a factual recitation of information on meetings, e-mails, and documents.
Footnotes
9 U.S. Department of State, Illustrative Examples of Omissions from the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council (Dec. 19, 2002) (online at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118.htm) {copy, copy}.
10 Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake; U.N. Nuclear Inspector Says Documents on Purchases Were Forged, Washington Post (Mar. 8, 2003) {copy}.
11 See, e.g., (Over)selling the World on War, Newsweek (June 9, 2003) (quoting Greg Thielmann, a former director of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), as stating that “INR had concluded that the purchases were implausible — and made that point clear to Powell’s office”). See also Statement by George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence {copy, copy}, Central Intelligence Agency (July 11, 2003) (stating that the CIA repeatedly prevented Bush Administration officials from inserting the claim into various official statements, including “many public speeches, Congressional testimony and the secretary of state’s United Nations presentation in early 2003”).
12 Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell (July 21, 2003).
13 Letter from Paul V. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Sept. 25, 2003).
14 Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman et. al to Anne W. Patterson, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of State (Apr. 6, 2004) (this request was made under 5 U.S.C. § 2954, the “Seven-Member Rule,” which requires an executive agency to “submit any information requested of it” when sought by seven members of the House Government Reform Committee).
15 Letter from Anne W. Patterson, Deputy Inspector General, Department of State, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Apr. 15, 2004).
Query: And your evidence? An accusation presupposes evidence. And if you don’t have any evidence, then you’re an inflammatory liar. For pretending you do.
–CJHjr
Question: So you’re saying that the Iraqis necessarily had to ... explain an accusation that turned out to be based on fraudulent evidence?
Mr. Boucher: No. The accusation ... that Iraq was sending agents out to purchase uranium.”
• Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), Reports to the U.N. Security Council:
Jan. 9 2003, ¶¶ 8-10: “The specifications of the aluminium tubes ... appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets ... 81-millimetre rockets ... While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it.”
Jan. 20 2003, ¶¶ 48-52: “The IAEA has conducted a series of inspections at sites involved in the production and storage of reverse engineered rockets, held discussions with and interviewed Iraq personnel, taken samples of aluminium tubes and begun a review of the documentation provided by Iraq relating to contracts with the traders. As a result of these inspection efforts, it has been possible to confirm the existence of a programme for producing 81-millimetre rockets. The IAEA’s analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminium tubes recently sought by Iraq appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets ... the combustion chambers of which were made of high-strength aluminium.”
Jan. 27 2003: “IAEA inspectors have inspected the relevant rocket production and storage sites, taken tube samples, interviewed relevant Iraqi personnel, and reviewed procurement contracts and related documents. From our analysis to date it appears that the aluminium tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges.”
Amer al-Saadi: I’ll go straight into the matter.
The Americans.
And the British.
Are the only players.
In this macabre game.
Being played against Iraq, these days.
They led UNMOVIC.
And the IAEA.
And the world.
To believe.
That they have iron-clad evidence.
That Iraq hides weapons of mass destruction.
And promised.
To supply the evidence.
Then we had the Blair dossier.
Followed some days later by the CIA report.
Some—
Both of them chose the public media.
For transmitting their information.
I do not know how many of you present in this place, were present in this place, when I spoke to the media, from this chair, on the same day the Blair report came out.
I said.
{Video, 0:43, September 24 2002}.
That the report was long on allegations.
And short on evidence.
I also said.
That the report was a hodgepodge.
Of half truths.
Naive, short-sighted allegations.
And lies.
The CIA report was much the same.
Where do we stand today?
On that score?
{Video, 0:22} After 24 days of inspections.
Covering practically all the sites.
Named in those reports.
And after the submission of our declaration of December 7.
The lies.
And baseless allegations.
Have been uncovered.
The true part of the half truths.
Appear in details in our declaration.
Now.
Instead of declaring bankruptcy.
Or at least sacking their advisers.
And keeping quiet.
We have the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw.
And General Colin Powell.
Declaring Iraq in “material breach.”
On what basis is this done?
Is it on new evidence?
Yet to be submitted?
No.
It turned out to be based on old rehashed reports.
Left in 1990s, by the discredited and defunct UNSCOM.
The British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw.
Quotes from that report.
That Iraq’s declaration on December 7 does not account for the following: 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals; 360 tons of bulk chemical warfare agents, including one and a half tons of VX; 30,000 pieces of special empty munitions; large quantities of growth media acquired for use in production of BW agents, including three times the amounts of anthrax that Iraq previously declared.
These rehashed allegations date from UNSCOM’s days, under the executive chairman, Richard Butler.
That could be enough, for some people to dismiss that report altogether.
However, we are ready to deal with each of those questions, if you ask us.
Both Mr. Straw.
And General Powell.
Omit to mention.
That what was called.
“Remaining disarmament issues.”
Featured in the report of April 1999.
Were in fact dealt with.
In the recommendations of the panel.
Headed by Ambassador Amorim, of Brazil.
Which were adopted by the Security Council Resolution 1284, of 1999.
–CJHjr.
That resolution created UNMOVIC.
The replacement to UNSCOM.
And gave it the task of determining the remaining disarmament questions.
And to elaborate a plan.
To resolve those questions.
With Iraq’s cooperation.
In what was called, “reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification plan.”
That implied, that the remaining questions were of less significance than the disarmament work achieved before.
Which some fair-minded knowledgeable members of the council considered more than 95 percent achieved.
Security Council Resolution 1441 gave UNMOVIC a much wider mandate, backed by a unanimous council decision.
Why don’t they let the specialized organs of the United Nations get on with their task?
Why interfere in their work in this crude fashion?
We should all learn from the past experience with UNSCOM.
All the questions in the Amorim report were responded to by Iraq’s—
By the Iraqi side.
In February 1999.
And in Iraq’s comment, after the report was published, in April 1999.
Much of those responses and comments were included in the declaration of December 7.
• We have received recently a document.
Dated the 20th of—
December 20.
It is titled.
“The U.S. Catalogs, Material Omissions.”
Prepared.
The document says.
Prepared by the State Department.
On the—
“Illustrative Examples of Omissions from Iraqi Declarations to the United Nations Security Council.”
The U.S. Catalogs 'Material Omissions' (The New York Times, December 20 2002) {copy}, reprinting, “Illustrative Examples of Omissions from the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council” {copy, copy} (U.S. State Department, Office of the Spokesman, “Fact” Sheet, December 19 2002). –CJHjr.
It contains 1-1/2 pages.
Of questions.
But I’ll take some of them.
And I leave you, to ask any question you’d like, regarding that document.
• On the “nuclear weapons.”
There’s one and a half lines.
It says.
I quote.
{Nuclear Weapons}
• The declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger.
• Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?
Is it “efforts” to procure?
Or is it “procurement”?
One is not sure, first of all.
Second, when did this occur?
There is no question about that.
No reference about that.
But I remember, during their visit.
Dr. El-Baradei and Dr. Hans Blix, to Iraq, on the 18th and the 19th of last month,
Mr. El-Baradei asked about any procurements.
By Iraq.
From South Africa.
Or Niger.
Of uranium.
First of all.
It’s not “uranium.”
It is yellow cake.
Which is uranium oxide, crude uranium oxide.
Second.
Our response was.
“From South Africa, no.”
“From the Niger, yes.”
In the mid-’80s.
And.
It is contained in our declaration.
And that was that.
No new procurement.
Or attempts to procure.
Were ever made.
That was a question.
Formally asked.
Across the table.
And was formally answered.
By us.
Now.
Are we “hiding our uranium procurement”?
Should we address any question, thrown at us?
Some—
Like that?
We have answered the question.
Verbally.
When it was asked.
And on record.
What we actually did.
And there is nothing more to say.
So that was—
On “nuclear weapons.”
Mind you.
Not on uranium oxide, yellow cake.
It was under the title.
Frightening title.
Of.
“Nuclear weapons.”
There is a long story.
From uranium oxide.
To a nuclear bomb.
• On the VX nerve gas
You have all heard the story of the VX.
In fact, it is a scandal.
It is not a story.
Because Iraq produced a document.
Which is a first-class document.
In evidence.
Of our claim.
That no production.
Proper production.
Was achieved in 1990.
And the document is an inventory.
Of all materials produced in 1990.
Dated the end of 1990.
That should be enough.
To prove.
That no VX was produced.
Now.
Questions.
And answers.
It came out, that there was.
An attempt.
To produce.
In April 1990.
A quantity of VX.
But was not successful.
That quantity amounted to 1.5 ton.
Specifically, two batches.
The material degraded rapidly.
And attempts were abandoned to produce it.
Because it was considered—
It was a waste of raw materials.
And that was that.
There were evidence.
To that effect.
In the production reports.
During interviews.
With the personnel, involved in that production.
And letters.
And reports.
On the production.
Dated November {1990}.
Proving.
Conclusively.
That there was no VX.
Yet.
UNSCOM insisted, that VX was produced.
And, it is unaccounted for.
And, perhaps even weaponized.
And, later they produced evidence of analysis.
From a United States laboratory.
Of fragments of a warhead.
Of a rocket warhead.
Which supposedly contained traces.
Of VX degradation products.
I don’t know if I’m boring you.
With these technical things.
But this is the truth of the matter.
I don’t see that this is the business of the foreign secretary of Britain, or the United States, to talk about these things.
They should be left to the experts.
UNMOVIC can deal with that.
Anyway, just to conclude that story.
UNSCOM, under Butler.
Brought ampoules of VX material.
Produced in the United States.
Supposedly for the purpose.
Of calibrating their equipment.
Their analysis equipment.
In the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring Center.
In the laboratory.
Now.
We all know.
You calibrate your measuring equipment.
When you do a quantitative test.
But.
When you do a qualitative test.
You do a preliminary analysis.
To see, if there is any traces.
Of that material.
And, in order to determine.
How much of it.
Exactly.
Do you calibrate your equipment.
Now.
Bearing in mind.
That laboratory never performed a VX test.
Because there was no VX.
To perform tests on it.
And when samples, purported to contain VX, were supposed to be analyzed, they were taken to the United States.
They were not analyzed here, in Baghdad.
Now.
Those samples, for calibration, were sealed.
And we found out later.
That they have been opened.
And Butler.
Before leaving his post.
Insisted, that that laboratory be opened.
Those samples taken and destroyed.
And the logbook, of the laboratory, also destroyed.
Why would they do that?
For us, it was obvious.
That VX was intended to manipulate.
And tamper with samples.
Taken from Iraq.
In order to prove.
That there were traces of VX on them.
And that, it comes from Iraq.
We insisted, the samples should be sent to other reputable laboratories, outside the United States.
Under the custody of trusted people.
Not, specifically, one citizen.
Of a country.
Thats business is.
To prove this thing.
Representatives of international laboratories.
From Switzerland and France.
Came and took samples.
From the same material.
That previous samples was taken.
And they performed tests.
And found no traces of VX.
Now.
That should have put the matter to rest.
But, no.
It wasn’t.
It still crops up, every now and then.
That Iraq had VX.
And it weaponized it.
And Iraq weaponized it.
We addressed this question also.
In our declaration.
Yet.
I read.
I quote.
{VX ...}
• What is the Iraqi regime trying to hide by not providing this information?
“This information?”
Question mark.
This is the end of the VX nerve gas.
• In the Jack Straw quote.
About precursors.
Precursor chemicals.
Now.
Precursors are material or ingredients of preparation of agents, in the end.
You need several precursors.
In order to make an agent.
If you find some discrepancies in the material balance of one ingredient.
And the rest of the ingredients are okay, are all accounted for.
It means this discrepancy is insignificant.
Because as—
To make it simpler.
If a housewife is asked.
How many pies can you produce?
From one kilogram of flour?
She would say.
“Zero.
Because I need other ingredients.
And I need utensils.
And I need a stove.”
If none of these are available.
She wouldn’t be able to produce the pie.
So.
It is as simple as that.
Some ingredients in the material balance were—
There was a shortfall.
And we declared that.
And we gave the reasons.
They were not accepted by UNSCOM.
For a purpose.
In order to keep the subject alive.
And now.
It crops up, in this U.S. document.
This is the business for UNMOVIC.
This is the business that UNMOVIC is charged.
According to the resolution.
To resolve.
With the cooperation of Iraq.
And to report on it.
And it’s not for Jack Straw.
Or Colin Powell.
To question us about it.
I think that’s enough.
And I will be ready to answer questions.
* * *
Question: Have you put this in the declaration?
The story on the anthrax?
Amer al-Saadi: Of course.
Question: Then.
Why would Blix say.
That there are no answers?
Or they’re inaccurate?
Amer al-Saadi: No, no.
That’s not—
That’s not the point, I think, he was making.
He said, there is no change in Iraq’s position, regarding that.
There are—
There are some, let’s say, lack of—
Lack of evidence, documentary evidence.
On certain aspects of the biological program.
Because, as we have explained earlier.
The biological program was completely obliterated.
Including the documents.
And even the active—
Its destruction was removed.
Without a trace.
So.
It was difficult, to recreate and re-establish.
A story of a dead program.
That was the difficulty.
We made for ourselves.
We’re going to attack you.
Not because we’re certain you deserve it (beyond all doubt). And not because we’re satisfied you deserve it (beyond reasonable doubt). And not because you probably deserve it (more likely than not), or possibly deserve it (less likely than not), or even might deserve it (a hint of evidence, an unsubstantiated hypothesis, a theory).
We’re going to attack you, because we are not certain you don’t deserve it.
We have lingering doubt.
We’re not certain (beyond all doubt) you are innocent.
We’re going to attack you, to be on the safe side.
It’s prudent.
And, we’re going to conceal our uncertainty, and assert “conclusive evidence,” because disclosing uncertainty might provoke assertions about our true motives:— That we want permanent military bases in your country. That our friends want to rake-off your oil profits. And reward us, in due course.
And because public debate might disquiet our armed forces, and instill doubt in their minds, that our orders might be unlawful.
Indeed, criminal:
____________________
Suspicion is a state of mind of the accuser and not a state of mind or an act by the one accused.
It is a monstrous proposition containing the very essence of license that the state of mind of the accuser shall be the determining factor, in the absence of evidence of guilt, whether the accused shall or shall not be summarily executed. ...
The orders to execute such persons and mere suspects on suspicion only and without proof, were criminal on their face.
Executions pursuant thereto were criminal.
Those who gave or passed down such orders must bear criminal responsibility for passing them down and for their implementation by the units subordinate to them.
____________________
John Warner: You said, on NBC’s Today Show, on Tuesday, that it was, quote:
“Absolutely prudent.
For the U.S. to go to war.”
Dr. Kay, I concur in those conclusions.
I believe a real and growing threat
has been eliminated.
And a coalition of nations.
Acted prudently.
In the cause of freedom.
____________________
If they do not fear.
The rule of law:—
All violent criminal enterprises.
Do their killings.
Because.
It’s prudent.
To protect their interests. Achieve their objectives. Deter law-enforcement. Banish the rule of law. Install the rule of force:
The Law of Empire.
And, if they feel the need to persuade anybody, the public for instance, all violent criminal enterprises do the exact same thing:
They lie.
About the facts.
About their motives.
Advancing, for justification, whatever comes to hand, which sounds plausible.
____________________
Gustave Mark Gilbert (U.S. Army military intelligence, assigned to the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Germany):
“We got around to the subject of war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I did not think that the common people are very thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction.”
Hermann Wilhelm Goering (prisoner and defendant):
“Why, of course, the people don’t want war,” Goering shrugged.
“Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war, when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece.
Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany.
That is understood.
But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy.
And it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”
Gilbert: “There is one difference,” I pointed out.
“In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives.
And in the United States only Congress can declare wars.”
Goering: “Oh, that is all well and good.
But, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders.
That is easy.
All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger.
It works the same way in any country.”
–Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
A willful liar knows, or believes correctly, what s/he asserts is untrue. In U.S. executive, legislative, or judicial proceedings, this lie is prima facie criminal, if it’s “material”.
A reckless liar does not know, or believe, what s/he asserts is untrue. But s/he does know that s/he doesn’t know it is true. S/he pretends s/he knows. This lie is likewise prima facie criminal (as I suppose). S/he’s not willful as to the asserted fact (because s/he doesn’t know, or believe, it’s untrue). But s/he is willful as to a material omission: That s/he’s ignorant. And merely guessing, hoping, supposing, inferring it’s true, perhaps concealing ambiguities, contrary evidence, credibility issues, and such. Asserting certainty, and concealing ignorance, or uncertainty:— A willful, deceitful, coupling.
A willfully blind liar has a reasonable basis, ostensibly, for believing what s/he asserts is true but, secretly, doubts it, or questions it, or fears it may not be true. And decides to not investigate further, as a reasonable person would, because s/he wants it to be true. This too is a criminal lie (as I suppose), if the jury believes, beyond reasonable doubt, s/he had the opportunity and resources to investigate those doubts, and decided not to, because s/he feared a proper investigation might substantiate those doubts.
A negligent liar believes what s/he asserts is true, but omits to first inquire properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances. This lie is not criminal, if the jury is not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the failure to investigate was willful.
For example: The claim by Condoleezza Rice, that she did not read the National Intelligence Estimate, submitted to her office, precisely to inform her about her about a topic central to her legal duties. This document contained caveats, and language of uncertainty, concealed from Congress, and from the public, in the unclassified version published by the CIA, four days later.
A recklessly negligent liar can reasonably foresee, that deadly or other serious consequences will likely result, if the assertion is untrue. And yet, s/he still omits to first inquire properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances, in light of these heightened consequences. This lie too is not criminal (absent willfulness, as with negligence). But the reckless nature of it supplies the criminal intent for any underlying crime of recklessness (the deadly or other serious consequences which follow from it). For example, involuntary manslaughter. Or “depraved indifference”.
A grossly negligent liar has been put on notice, that the assertion is likely untrue, or possibly untrue. And yet, s/he persists, in later repeating the assertion, without first inquiring properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances, prompted to do so, by the notice. This lie too is not criminal (absent willfulness).
But, notice can be so significant, in focusing the liar’s mind on the issue, that a jury can feel satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that what previously may have been non-willful negligence, constitutes willful intent to deceive, afterwards, in later assertions, following the notice, or in failing to correct previous assertions, thus elevating the liar to more a culpable category. This depends on how the jury feels about the quality of the notice, the authority of its basis, the competing authority of whatever basis the liar might have, if any, for the assertion, and the opportunity and resources s/he had available, and decided to not use.
For example: The decision by U.S. officials to repeat assertions, and to not correct previous assertions, on the basis of information provided by Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei, that intelligence targets, which U.S. officials supplied, proved to be entirely innocent.
For example: David Kay’s numerous assertions, that Jacques Chirac and Russia said, they believed Iraq had WMD. David Kay was put on notice, by Carl Levin, face to face, in the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing (January 29 2004), that David Kay’s assertions were likely untrue, quoting documents. And yet, David Kay, in the days, weeks, and months after this hearing, repeated these assertions, many, many, times.
An innocent liar reasonably believes, without doubts, what s/he asserts is true, because s/he was lied to by others, and tricked by them into voicing their lie. S/he’s an “innocent agent” of the actual liar(s), blameless, without criminal or moral turpitude.
It’s an honest mistake, if s/he reasonably believes, without doubts, what s/he erroneously asserts is true, if neither s/he, nor anyone one on whom s/he may have relied, was willful, reckless, or negligent in formulating the erroneous assertion. Likewise, if s/he misspeaks:— If s/he says, without realizing it, what s/he did not intend to say, or would not have said, if s/he had thought about it more carefully in context. For example, if s/he was thinking about some other aspect of what s/he said, instead, and was not mentally focused on the erroneous assertion, if it was merely incidental, for example, and not “material” to what s/he was talking about. Or, if s/he forgot what s/he once knew. Or was confused about what s/he thought s/he was talking about.
A simple cure, to all issues about assertions, is to disclose the basis of the assertion: “I believe this, because so-and-so told me so. Because this document seems to prove it.” Et cetera. Such disclosures validate an honest intent, and alert listeners how to investigate the assertion further, if they question it.
But the absence of such disclosures does not necessarily indicate dishonest intent, as people normally facilitate conversation by omitting diversions from the main theme into subsidiary issues about substantiation.
But, on important assertions, on which lives depend, an honest person would normally disclose the basis for a belief, if s/he has any reason to suspect there is any conceivable possibility it may not be true.
The reliability of hearsay is always suspect. Even if the hearsay source is honest, and knowledgeable, the speaker might have misunderstood, or misremembered, what the hearsay speaker actually said. Or the subtleties of it. Its nuances and caveats. And the fact that it too might, in turn, be based on yet further hearsay.
For example: This is the mistake Brian Hutton made in his flawed, inquiry judgment, accepting a hearsay assertion as true, instead of calling for an examination of the source of that hearsay.
I presume Hutton was afraid of what he would find out. In which case, he was willfully blind.
If not, then he was grossly negligent, at the very least, because he well knows, being a judge, the unreliability of hearsay: His experience constitutes “notice,” that he cannot make reliable findings of fact based on hearsay, particularly when the credibility of the witnesses, asserting the hearsay, is at issue.
Brian Hutton was willfully blind, or grossly negligent. He might have been lucky, and be right. But his finding of fact is disputed by Brian Jones, the U.K. expert, who did what Hutton declined to do, and actually investigated the source of the hearsay, as best he could.
But Hutton was not a liar as to the supposed “fact” he found. Because he disclosed the basis for his finding (unreliable hearsay) and, hence, did not represent it to be more authoritative than it is (unauthoritative).
Though he may have lied about his opinion, willfully, recklessly, or negligently (that he believed the fact he found, or that it deserved the dignity of the label “fact,” or “finding,” despite the unreliable hearsay evidence of it).
He made no effort, as far I know, to ask for the intelligence.
His duty was to ask for the underlying intelligence — the “best evidence” of the supposed fact.
And, if the government refused to give it to him, his duty was to report, that he was unable to form an informed, reliable, opinion, and to decline to make any finding of fact on that point.
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Note: All species of lies include material omissions, which are necessary to be stated in order to prevent a truthful assertion from inducing a material erroneous inference, in the mind of the listener. Material omissions are the principal technique of deceit, employed by CIA and other government liars.
For example: The Bush/Blair lie, that Jacques Chirac said he would vote against war, “under any circumstances.” An incendiary lie. A vivid display of criminal intent. An overt act, in a violent criminal conspiracy. Omitting to mention, what he was talking about:— Not war generally, but only about the particular second resolution, then-tabled by the U.S./U.K. (authorizing war after March 17 2003), and a technical explanation of the “circumstances” of the vote, that a “no” vote is not a “veto,” unless there are also 9 “yes” votes, and a majority of the 15-member Security Council had already indicated they too would vote “no,” not “yes,” on that particular resolution, at that particular time. And, what he was not talking about:— The “circumstances” of the inspections. He plainly said (concealed by Bush/Blair in their lie), he would vote for war later, if Saddam frustrated the inspections (then producing promising results). While the assertion is true (he said, “under any circumstances”), the omissions induce an erroneous inference, namely that inspections were fruitless because Saddam knew he could frustrate them without consequences. The truth — which both Bush and Blair chose to conceal, by their material omissions — is the exact opposite.
Another example: David Kay’s assertion, that a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) was tested “out” to a range of 500 km. Omitting to mention (if it was the case), that the test was on a circular course, and that its associated radio equipment would not operate beyond a range of 150 km, suggesting its fuel capacity was merely to provide dwell-time over the target area, if it was for photo-reconnaissance. (I don’t know the truth of these UAV issues, merely that Mr. Blix identified them as issues, and that the U.S./U.K. prevented him from investigating them, by attacking Iraq.)
Another example: David Kay’s unequivocal assertions — grooming the public for war, on the BBC’s Newsnight (September 13 2002) and Panorama (September 23 2002) news programs — that the aluminum tubes were “centrifuge tubes.” This was either a willful or reckless lie, if he knew of the contrary opinion of the centrifuge experts (which he is not). Or else a willfully blind lie, or negligent lie, if he had available to him an easy way to discover the opinion of those experts and did not seek it. But, on the topic of material omissions, even if he disagreed with the opinion of the experts (which he is not), their expert opinion is a material “fact,” though they may be mistaken. Hence, it was a separate willful or reckless lie, by him, to omit to mention their expert opinion (if he knew about it) and, as well, the innocent plausible explanation of other experts (which he is not): That the tubes met the specifications for Iraq’s 81mm artillery rocket program. This, if he knew about that possibility, and their opinion, as I presume he did.
–Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
Related documents:
• Background: The pretexts for war: WMD + France’s veto: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/iraq-2003d.html
Source:This document is not copyrighted, and may be freely copied.
Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
Posted Feb. 1 2004. Updated Dec. 7 2007.
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/iraq-wmd-timeline-2002.html
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