Iraq WMD War: Timeline 2002, video/audio, sources

Dick Cheney {0:13 bb}:

Simply stated:

There is no doubt.

That Saddam Hussein.

Now has weapons of mass destruction.

There is no doubt.

He is amassing them.

To use.

Against our friends.

Against our allies.

And against us.

There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has — or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities. ...

Although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possesses CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly including artillery rockets, rocket shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but also could consist of some mustard agent or stabilized VX.

Susan Watts: It’s a promise,

He may come to regret.

Tony Blair’s long-awaited dossier,

Of evidence,

Against Saddam Hussein.

This is now center stage,

In the battle for opinion,

On President Bush’s mission,

To deal with Iraq.

We now know when,

The dossier will be produced.

In just under two-weeks time.

So the pressure’s on,

To make sure,

It says something new.

* * *

Tony Blair,

And the officials writing his dossier,

Will have taken on board,

The distinctly underwhelmed reaction,

Earlier this week,

To a report on the Iraqi threat,

From a think tank,

With strong ties,

To British Intelligence.

Blair now knows,

He’ll have to build,

A stronger case,

To justify,

Any mission,

To target Saddam.

The authors of this week’s report, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, deny cooperation with the government.

Saying, they only want to get the discussion rolling,

But the current president, of the institute, is a former weaons inspector, to Iraq.

Terence Taylor: I’m one of those who believes,

There is substantial evidence,

Hard evidence,

Not speculation,

Already available.

And, it’s been available.

For a long time.

* * *

Susan Watts: The strongest evidence, to emerge, on Iraq’s nuclear goals, came over the weekend.

When the New York Times reported,

Intelligence services claimed,

That Saddam has been buying,

Needed to produce uranium.

This suggests that all important intent,

Skeptics are demanding.

And.

More details, on this material, is likely to form a central plank, of the Blair dossier.

David Kay is one of the best placed individuals, to judge the significance, of these tubes.

He got to handle one, this week, when he gave evidence, at Congressional hearings, on Iraq’s weapons.

Is there some possible use?

I haven’t thought of, out there?

Always possible.

But.

Highly unlikely.

Susan Watts: He believes,

The meter-and-a-half long tubes,

Matter.

Because,

They show,

Saddam is committed,

To home-grown weapons.

And not just one bomb.

David Kay: They’re aiming to produce their own fissile material.

High enriched uranium.

And.

They’re going to produce it,

With an industrial scale process.

Thousands of gas centrifuges.

Lined up in a cascade fashion.

That really says,

Saddam Hussein,

Or someone in Iraq,

Has aspirations,

For a multiple number of nuclear weapons,

As we enter the 21st century.

And.

They must have some plan,

To use them.

Susan Watts: The emphasis,

From both sides of the Atlantic,

Is on the nuclear threat.

Which resonates,

With popular fears.

But surprises experts.

Who view biological weapons as a far more urgent concern.

Query: An exact match?

Nope.

The aluminum tubes, Saddam was buying:—

Are not the exact alloy composition.

Are not the exact diameter.

Are not the exact length.

Are not the exact inner diameter

“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991.”

Or.

To any other species of “gas centrifuge.”

Dramatically, the U.S. intelligence community knew — for well more than a year — that these aluminum tubes:—

Were an exact match, to Iraq’s artillery rockets.

Did not match:—

Any known species of centrifuge rotor.

Did not even come close to such a match.

And, least of all:—

Did not resemble.

In any particular.

“Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991.”

To wit:

____________________

 

U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (unclassified edition) {purl, copy, html}, “Chapter III. Intelligence Community Analysis Of Iraq’s Nuclear Program” {3.8mb.pdf}, page 88 (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Report No. 108-301, July 9 2004, Select Committee on Intelligence) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/5:108-301, LCCN: 2004356402, OCLC: 55948335, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, July 15 2004}. All the quotes in this box, in answer to queries, are from this report.

 

Query: “The exact alloy composition”?

“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991”?

 
 

Query: “The exact diameter”?

“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991”?

 
 

Query: “The exact inner diameter”?

“To Iraqi plans that we captured in 1991”?

 
 

Query: “Some possible use”?

“I haven’t thought of”?

“Highly unlikely.”

 

Senate Report No. 108-301 (July 9 2004), page 91.

  –CJHjr

Jane Corbin: Saddam has the raw material.

For The Bomb.

Natural uranium.

Mined and processed, inside Iraq.

But it needs to be enriched.

To reach weapons grade.

Now, there’s new information.

That Saddam is seeking centrifuges.

Machines to enrich uranium.

Just as he did before.

In the last 14 months.

Several shipments.

A total of 1000 aluminium centrifuge tubes.

Have been intercepted by intelligence agencies.

Before they actually reached Iraq {photo}.

David Kay: I’ve seen one of them.

The centrifuge tubes look like they’re of the design, which is German derived.

That the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s, and developed.

They’re for enriching uranium.

That is, taking natural uranium up to the level that makes it useful for a weapon. ...

Jane Corbin: What does it tell you?

The fact, that they’re trying to get several of these?

There have been several shipments.

David Kay: Well, it tells me that they’re going for a large scale programme.

Over a thousand centrifuges.

Which, in fact, is what they were going for, before the Gulf War intervened {1991}.

George W. Bush: The danger to our country is grave.

The danger to our country is growing.

The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons.

The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary to make more biological and chemical weapons.

And according to the British government, the Iraqi regime could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes, after the order were given.

The regime has long-standing, and continuing, ties to terrorist organizations.

And, there are al Qaeda terrorists.

Inside Iraq.

Question: If an inspection team goes in now,

And finds nothing.

Because—

Perhaps Iraq is very good at hiding it.

Or—

Perhaps they have nothing.

But you all are of the belief, that they have it.

If they find nothing,

Does it make your job more difficult?

In trying to assemble an international coalition,

To disarm him by other means.

Donald Rumsfeld: Goodness gracious!

That is kind of like looking down the road,

For every conceivable obstacle you can find,

And then driving into it.

I just don’t—

I don’t get up in the morning,

And ask myself that.

So—

So the idea,

That if you had an appropriate inspection regime,

That they’d come back, and say,

Is—

Is so far beyond anyone’s imagination,

That—

It’s not something I think about.

If you have an appropriate inspection regime—

They’re going to find weapons of mass destruction.

Or else they’re going to get thrown out.

Or else they’re going to be denied access, and they’re going to leave themselves.

Because,

They’re there.

George W. Bush: I went to the United Nations the other day.

And I want to share with you, why I went.

First, I wanted to make sure the world heard the case.

This man is a dictator.

Who ... said he would get rid of weapons, of mass destruction.

And still has them.

And we need to fear the fact.

That he has weapons, of mass destruction. ...

He either gets rid of his weapons.

And the United Nations gets rid of his weapons—

He can either get rid of his weapons.

And the United Nations can act.

Or the United States will lead a coalition, to disarm this man.

I’m willing to give peace a chance to work.

I want the United Nations to work.

I want him to do what he said he would do.

But for the sake of our future.

Now’s the time.

Now’s the time.

For the sake of your children’s future.

We must make sure, this madman never has the capacity to hurt us.

With a nuclear weapon.

Or to use the stockpiles of anthrax.

That we know he has.

Or VX.

The biological weapons.

Which he possesses.

I laid out a vision for peace.

Vladimir Putin: Russia does not have in its possession any trustworthy data.

That supports the existence of nuclear weapons.

Or any weapons of mass destruction, in Iraq.

And, we have not received any such information, from our partners, as yet ...

We have apprehensions.

That such weapons might exist in Iraq.

That is why, we want to see the inspectors travel there.

Sergei Lavrov: Throughout their many years of work in Iraq, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted some 7,000 inspections.

As a result, they achieved significant progress in shutting down Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. ...

Up to now, we—

Like all unbiased observers—

Have not seen any kind of persuasive evidence.

That there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Or programmes to develop them.

Nor have we seen any other facts.

That would situate Iraq, in the context of combating terrorism.

The only way to remove any doubts is the immediate redeployment of the international inspectors to Iraq.

Tony Blair: The goal is disarmament.

Of all chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

If Saddam complies—

That is the UN mandate fulfilled. ...

My message to him is this:

Disarm or you face force. ...

Cooperate fully and—

Despite the terrible injustice you have often inflicted on others—

We will be just with you.

Evelyn Leopold (Reuters, chief U.N. correspondent) {6:06}: Dr. Blix.

President Bush keeps talking about “zero tolerance.”

Which puts a lot of pressure on you.

What you consider a serious violation:

At one point you’ve said,

And also:

Would an omission.

In the declaration.

Be something you would report.

As a serious violation.

Hans Blix: I’ll take the first part of your question, first.

I think it is useful to have this discussion.

Because, it really deals with what could trigger armed action, and war.

So it is an important discussion.

At the same time, I think one needs to nuance it.

I think—

I’ve seen that—

Several people, in high positions, have talked about it.

And I, myself, have talked about:

The one flat tire.

Well, that’s a flat tire.

If it is with our own people,

It’s one thing.

If it is with the Iraqi escorts,

Having one flat tire is one thing.

If they have four flat tires.

On the way out.

Delaying us much more.

Then, it may be a different thing.

So.

What this points to, I think, is that,

You may have to take account,

Whether you can read an intention

Into something.

I haven’t seen that referred to,

In the discussion.

I think, we still have to use our common sense,

In judging:

* * *

Your second question?

Evelyn Leopold Would an omission in the declaration—

Hans Blix: Ah. An omission in the declaration.

Evelyn Leopold —be something you would report, as a serious violation.

Hans Blix: Yah.

Well, we take one day at a time here.

And the declaration should come before the 8th of December.

And then we will then analyze that.

Of course, I think this is one of the most important moments we foresee, is the declaration by Iraq.

Because, you’ll recall, that in 1991, the Resolution 687 {32kb.pdf, copy, copy, via this, this, or ODS}.

At the time, the concept was, that Iraq declares, and we verify.

And this was—

Some said, that this developed into,

And we are now, again, getting back to a wish to a declaration, which in the view of the Security Council offers a last opportunity for Iraq to declare what they may have.

We are not, on our side, contending, that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.

We have a great many questions.

We cannot exclude it.

And we are not saying, that all the intelligence is wrong.

It may be right.

But we are not also confirming it.

So the Iraq’s declaration — I come back to now — is a very important document.

And we hope that they take it very seriously.

And when it gets here, well, then we would have all our people analyzing it, and comparing it with the knowledge that we have of the past.

Edith M. Lederer (Associated Press, chief U.N. correspondent): Dr. Blix, on this—

On a similar subject.

The Iraqi government, in its letter of acceptance, reiterated several times, that it has no programs for weapons of mass destruction.

This would assume, that in its declaration, it will not refer to any programs of weapons of mass destruction.

My question is, that in Washington, some U.S. officials have said that if, in fact—

If the Iraqis go ahead, with what they have said in this letter, that this in itself would be a cause for a falsification or an omission.

And I was wondering, if you could comment on this contention, and the idea, that this could be the start of triggering a material breach.

Hans Blix: ... Now.

If, as you say, a declaration comes.

And it maintains the position of the past.

Then.

I think it will be the moment.

For those.

Who consider.

That they have evidence.

To consider.

Whether they put that evidence.

On the table.

I don’t think they can simply—

Or anyone can simply say,

And.

I think, one would have to present evidence.

And we’ve seen it, as our task, at any rate.

Always to deal with evidence.

We are performing inspections.

And I said, also, that if I have solid evidence.

That Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.

Then I would put that on the table.

Of the Security Council.

I do not have that.

But others may have such evidence.

And, I think, that would be the moment.

To possibly present it.

Bill Plante: The U.S. said.

It could provide massive intelligence.

About the weapons.

It believes.

Iraq is hiding.

And what it expects.

U.N. inspectors.

To find.

Question (Washington Post): General, does the declaration provide any evidence?

Of biological and chemical agents?

You previously said you destroyed?

Including anthrax and (unintelligible) {VX?}.

Any evidence to support your previous claims?

Of the destruction of these things?

Amer al-Saadi: It was not just a claim.

It’s a fact.

And the evidence.

Some first class evidence.

Is given.

* * *

The biological file.

The biological declaration.

Is about.

A program that never existed after 1991.

It was totally.

And completely.

Removed.

In 1991.

Before the inspectors arrived to Iraq.

So when you remove something completely.

It no longer exists.

And.

If you want to do it properly.

You also remove all of the evidence.

Of it ever existed.

And that’s what we did.

And.

Retrospectively.

It was a mistake.

* * *

Question In terms of the question.

Of unanswered questions.

Timing over (unintelligible) UNSCOM days.

You said, that there were—

There’s “first-class evidence,” that did not satisfy UNSCOM, for political reasons, at the time.

But have you presented any evidence?

In these declarations?

To help UNMOVIC?

At this point?

Resolve issues?

Such as the disposition of the VX nerve agent?

Amer al-Saadi: There is an implication.

In your question.

That VX still exists.

I have said.

That nothing of the previous program exists.

Our problem, now, is to produce.

The complete evidence.

Of the picture.

Of the biological program.

We have presented documents, regarding—

Supporting documents.

Now.

Those documents have not been increased, since then.

Not by a single document.

Because we have done all researching we could.

And we could not find any more.

The UNSCOM at the time, from the time of (unintelligible), the executive chairman.

They received, what is called as.

The “Farm Document.”

Or “Hydrafarm Document.”

They contain all the sensitive material.

Regarding the biological, chemical, nuclear, and missile programs.

We don’t know.

What’s in—

Exactly.

In those documents.

And there—

If you remember.

There were about 1.5 million documents.

Or more.

With the, I think, transparencies and (unintelligible) immoral (unintelligible).

Question Microfilm.

Amer al-Saadi: Microfilm, yes.

Microfilm documents.

It’s all with them.

And they are in a position to judge this program.

Better than we do.

But they are politically motivated.

The biological program gave them a good opportunity to keep everything open.

David Kay: All the permanent members

Of the Security Council

Know,

That Saddam has continued his WMD program.

For the French, Russians, and Chinese,

The issue is not lack of evidence.

Hans Blix: Inspections resumed on 27 November. ...

The Iraqi cooperation has been very helpful.

For our logistical and infrastructure build-up. ...

Access to sites has been prompt.

And assistance on the sites expeditious.

It seems probable that a general instruction has been issued, not in any way to delay or impede inspection, of the kind of sites we have gone to, so far. ...

Some sites were inspected last Friday—

The Muslim day of rest.

In one of them, the Iraqi staff were absent and a number of doors inside locked, with no keys available.

The Iraqi side offered to break the doors open, while videotaping the event.

However, they agreed with a suggestion, that the doors in question could be sealed overnight, and the offices inspected the next morning.

Clearly.

We have the right.

To undertake inspections.

At any time.

Night or day.

Whether on weekdays.

Or religious holidays.

We intend to exercise this right.

Not to harass.

But to demonstrate.

That, just as there are no sanctuaries in space.

There are no sanctuaries in time.

Mohamed ElBaradei:

5. Iraq’s overall conclusion with respect to its nuclear programme is as follows:

7. Iraq states that its nuclear activities from 1991 to 2002 have been limited to the use of radioisotopes for non-proscribed purposes (e.g. medical, agricultural and industrial uses), in conformity with Security Council resolution 707 (1991). ...

9. It should be noted that, in the course of the meeting that took place in Baghdad on 19 November 2002, the Iraqi counterpart, referring to a number of published reports, acknowledged that Iraq had made several unsuccessful attempts since 1991 to import high-strength aluminum tubing, but stated that the tubing had been intended for the manufacture of 81-millimetre rockets and not for the enrichment of uranium.

These attempts are not mentioned in the Iraqi declaration covering post-1991 activities, although the IAEA understands that it is referred to in the part of the declaration that deals with missiles.

The IAEA intends to pursue this matter further with Iraq.

In addition, during that same meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi authorities, referring again to published reports, denied any efforts to import uranium after 1991.

The declaration makes no mention of this issue, but the matter will be pursued further by the IAEA.

As previously reported to the Council by the IAEA, all nuclear material known to exist in Iraq (mostly natural uranium) remains under IAEA control at a storage location in Iraq, and has been subject to periodic verification since 1998 pursuant to Iraq’s Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). ...

Since the resumption of Security Council mandated activities in Iraq, the IAEA has conducted sixty-eight inspections, including inspections at a Presidential Site and at six sites that had not previously been inspected.

Inspections have been carried out.

Without prior notification to Iraq.

Except where notification was necessary, to ensure that specific support from the counterpart would be available at the facility (e.g. a crane for the removal of Agency air samplers).

And immediate access.

Has been provided.

By the Iraqi authorities.

No evidence of prohibited activities has been detected, though the results of the collection of environmental samples are not yet available.

Mohamed ElBaradei: We have, both of us, indicated, we are making good progress, in having access to sites.

Iraq is cooperating well, in terms of process. ...

Iraq has been opening doors to us.

Iraq has been giving us immediate access to sites. ...

Hans Blix: Mr. Baradei said they opened the doors.

The cooperation on proceedings, on procedure, has been good.

They have been helpful.

Helped us also in the terms of logistics — we have been setting up an office in Mosul.

And on all these scores, access, prompt access, yes, there has been good cooperation.

Presumably an instruction to their people, to let us in, in sites of the type we have visited so far.

Question: Mr. Ambassador, do you agree with some countries in the Security Council issuing their own assessment?

Not waiting only for the inspectors to issue their assessment.

But they are doing a parallel assessment.

Do you approve of that procedure?

Sergei Lavrov Well, it’s up to any country to have its own view, on any issue, in the world affairs.

But it does not mean, that this view is the view of the Security Council.

{0:46 bb} We repeatedly said—

That we have been hearing allegations.

That Iraq does continue its WMD programs.

We have heard it many times.

We never saw any evidence.

That this is the case.

We don’t know whether this is true.

Or not.

And we want this to be verified.

By professionals.

By UNMOVIC, and by IAEA.

To say that, “We know, but we wouldn't tell you,” is not something which is persuasive, frankly speaking.

It’s not a poker game.

When you hold your cards.

And call others’ bluff.

Colin Powell: And let me just touch on a few examples.

And we’ll be giving out a fact sheet later.

With additional examples.

Before the inspectors were forced to leave Iraq.

They concluded.

That Iraq could have.

Produced 26,000 liters of anthrax.

That is three times the amount Iraq had declared.

Yet.

The Iraqi declaration is silent.

On this stockpile.

Which, alone, would be enough to kill several million people.

The regime also admitted, that it had manufactured 19,180 liters of a biological agent called botchulinum toxin.

UN inspectors later determined.

That the Iraqis could have.

Produced 38,360 additional liters.

However, once again.

The Iraqi declaration is silent.

On these missing supplies. ...

Nor does the declaration address questions that have arisen since the inspectors left in 1998.

For example.

We know.

That in the late 1990s.

Iraq built.

Mobile biological weapons production units.

Yet.

The declaration tries to wave this away.

Mentioning only.

Mobile refrigeration vehicles.

And food-testing laboratories.

We also know.

That Iraq has tried to obtain.

High-strength aluminum tubes.

Which can be used to enrich uranium.

In centrifuges.

For a nuclear weapons program.

The Iraqi regime is required.

By Resolution 1441.

To report those attempts.

Iraq, however, has failed.

To provide adequate information.

About the procurement and use of these tubes.

Most brazenly of all.

The Iraqi declaration denies.

The existence of any.

Prohibited weapons programs.

At all.

The United States, the United Nations and the world waited for this declaration from Iraq.

But Iraq’s response is a catalogue.

Of recycled information.

And flagrant omissions.

It should be obvious.

That the pattern of systematic holes and gaps.

In Iraq’s declaration.

Is not the result of accidents.

Or editing oversights.

Or technical mistakes.

These are.

Material omissions.

That, in our view, constitute.

Another.

Material breach. ...

As Ambassador John Negroponte.

Said, earlier today.

Saddam Hussein has so far responded.

To this final opportunity.

With a new lie.

Ray Suarez: Iraq responds, that ...

There is nothing new to report.

They simply don’t have the things, that it’s alleged that they have, in the country.

Hans Blix: That’s right.

And they have not changed their position.

They say there was nothing left.

And they still continue to say that.

So it’s not surprising, that there is no new— nothing new on that score.

However, what we need is evidence.

The U.S. and the U.K. say.

That they have evidence.

That the Iraqis retain weapons of this kind.

We do not have such evidence.

* * *

Ray Suarez: What evidence would there be?

Of something that’s been destroyed?

Hans Blix: Well, for instance, you would have records, of the destruction.

They have said they destroyed all the biological weapons already in the summer of 1991.

And one would have thought that they would have some record, of that action.

If they did not, well, then there would be some people, who took part in the operations ...

The best thing, that we could get, would be if any member state would tell us:

Rather than the round-about way.

To get knowledge about it, from some defector.

Michael McAuliffe: The U.S. and Britain ...

This is the closest Blix has ever come.

To telling the two governments.

To put up.

Or shut up.

Sarah Montague: The chief U.N. weapons inspector, Hans Blix, says,

Britain and America

Are not yet giving him

The information he needs,

To prove,

That Iraq is lying,

About its weapons program.

He made the claim in an interview, with the BBC World Affairs correspondent Allan Little.

Allan asked him,

Whether the 12,000 pages,

That Iraq has given to the U.N.,

Amounted to a full disclosure.

Hans Blix: Well.

If you are sure,

That they have something,

That they haven’t disclosed,

Then it’s not full disclosure.

But.

The question is:

“Do you have evidence to show that.”

The U.K. feels, “Yes.”

The United States says also, “Yes.”

We say, “We don’t know.”

It may be full disclosure.

Or it may not be.

We do not think Iraq has submitted adequate supporting evidence, for the text.

And therefore, we would say, that the Security Council can have no confidence, that this is a complete disclosure. ...

Allan Little: So the Iraqi contention.

Which we’ve heard, over and over again.

And which we heard again today.

That, “This amounts to full disclosure.”

“There’s nothing missing.”

Is simply not credible.

Hans Blix: A declaration, per se, is not credible.

You have to support it by evidence.

And if they do not do that.

Then, there will not be confidence.

It may be true.

Or it may be false.

But, it’s in their interest, to produce this evidence, to convince the Security Council, and the world, that this is true.

The most important thing, that governments, like the U.K., or the U.S., could give us, would be to tell us, the sites, where they are convinced, that they keep some weapons of mass destruction.

This is what we want to have.

Allan Little: And are you getting that access? {to intelligence}

Hans Blix: Well.

Not very much.

Not yet.

I hope we will.

And now that we are in full operation.

I hope it will come.

Allan Little: So.

There have already been occasions.

When they’ve blocked access. {to intelligence}

Hans Blix: Well.

We get a lot of briefings.

About what they believe.

That the Iraqis have.

But, of course, what you really need to have.

Is an indication of the place.

Where.

Things are stored.

If they know it.

And they have all the methods.

To look—

To listen to telephone conversations.

They have spies.

They have the satellites.

Et cetera.

So they have a lot of sources.

Which we do not have.

Allan Little: So.

You’re not getting.

All the cooperation, and support—

Hans Blix: Not yet.

Allan Little: —you feel you deserve—

Hans Blix: Oh no.

Not yet.

Allan Little: —from the Western intelligence agencies.

Hans Blix: We get some.

But we don’t get all we needed.

Allan Little: So.

Interestingly.

It’s not the Iraqis.

Who are impeding.

Your unfettered access—

Hans Blix: No {chuckles}.

Allan Little: —it’s the Western countries.

Hans Blix: Well.

If the Iraqis gave us full cooperation, we wouldn’t need any intelligence.

Allan Little: So.

What sort of intelligence?

Would be useful to you?

Hans Blix: To tell us.

Precisely.

Where.

They believe, that they are storing things.

If the U.K. and the U.S. are convinced.

And they say, they have evidence.

Well.

Then one would expect.

That they would be able.

To tell us:

Where is this stuff?

Hans Blix: We would like to have clues.

As to where,

The United States’

And other countries’

Intelligence

Feel,

They know,

Iraqis are storing weapons of mass destruction.

Then,

We can send in the inspectors.

Mohamed ElBaradei: I think,

Now is the time,

For countries that have information,

That contradicts Iraq’s declaration,

To come forward with this information.

Nuclear Weapons

• The declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger.

• Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?

Amer al-Saadi: I’ll go straight into the matter.

The Americans.

And the British.

Are the only players.

In this macabre game.

Being played against Iraq, these days.

They led UNMOVIC.

And the IAEA.

And the world.

To believe.

That they have iron-clad evidence.

That Iraq hides weapons of mass destruction.

And promised.

To supply the evidence.

Then we had the Blair dossier.

Followed some days later by the CIA report.

Some—

Both of them chose the public media.

For transmitting their information.

I do not know how many of you present in this place, were present in this place, when I spoke to the media, from this chair, on the same day the Blair report came out.

I said.

{Video, 0:43, September 24 2002}.

That the report was long on allegations.

And short on evidence.

I also said.

That the report was a hodgepodge.

Of half truths.

Naive, short-sighted allegations.

And lies.

The CIA report was much the same.

Where do we stand today?

On that score?

{Video, 0:22} After 24 days of inspections.

Covering practically all the sites.

Named in those reports.

And after the submission of our declaration of December 7.

The lies.

And baseless allegations.

Have been uncovered.

The true part of the half truths.

Appear in details in our declaration.

Now.

Instead of declaring bankruptcy.

Or at least sacking their advisers.

And keeping quiet.

We have the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw.

And General Colin Powell.

Declaring Iraq in “material breach.”

On what basis is this done?

Is it on new evidence?

Yet to be submitted?

No.

It turned out to be based on old rehashed reports.

Left in 1990s, by the discredited and defunct UNSCOM.

The British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw.

Quotes from that report.

That Iraq’s declaration on December 7 does not account for the following: 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals; 360 tons of bulk chemical warfare agents, including one and a half tons of VX; 30,000 pieces of special empty munitions; large quantities of growth media acquired for use in production of BW agents, including three times the amounts of anthrax that Iraq previously declared.

These rehashed allegations date from UNSCOM’s days, under the executive chairman, Richard Butler.

That could be enough, for some people to dismiss that report altogether.

However, we are ready to deal with each of those questions, if you ask us.

Both Mr. Straw.

And General Powell.

Omit to mention.

That what was called.

“Remaining disarmament issues.”

Featured in the report of April 1999.

Were in fact dealt with.

In the recommendations of the panel.

Headed by Ambassador Amorim, of Brazil.

Which were adopted by the Security Council Resolution 1284, of 1999.

 

That resolution created UNMOVIC.

The replacement to UNSCOM.

And gave it the task of determining the remaining disarmament questions.

And to elaborate a plan.

To resolve those questions.

With Iraq’s cooperation.

In what was called, “reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification plan.”

That implied, that the remaining questions were of less significance than the disarmament work achieved before.

Which some fair-minded knowledgeable members of the council considered more than 95 percent achieved.

Security Council Resolution 1441 gave UNMOVIC a much wider mandate, backed by a unanimous council decision.

Why don’t they let the specialized organs of the United Nations get on with their task?

Why interfere in their work in this crude fashion?

We should all learn from the past experience with UNSCOM.

All the questions in the Amorim report were responded to by Iraq’s—

By the Iraqi side.

In February 1999.

And in Iraq’s comment, after the report was published, in April 1999.

Much of those responses and comments were included in the declaration of December 7.

• We have received recently a document.

Dated the 20th of—

December 20.

It is titled.

“The U.S. Catalogs, Material Omissions.”

Prepared.

The document says.

Prepared by the State Department.

On the—

 

It contains 1-1/2 pages.

Of questions.

But I’ll take some of them.

And I leave you, to ask any question you’d like, regarding that document.

• On the “nuclear weapons.”

There’s one and a half lines.

It says.

I quote.

 

Is it “efforts” to procure?

Or is it “procurement”?

One is not sure, first of all.

Second, when did this occur?

There is no question about that.

No reference about that.

But I remember, during their visit.

Dr. El-Baradei and Dr. Hans Blix, to Iraq, on the 18th and the 19th of last month,

Mr. El-Baradei asked about any procurements.

By Iraq.

From South Africa.

Or Niger.

Of uranium.

First of all.

It’s not “uranium.”

It is yellow cake.

Which is uranium oxide, crude uranium oxide.

Second.

Our response was.

In the mid-’80s.

And.

It is contained in our declaration.

And that was that.

No new procurement.

Or attempts to procure.

Were ever made.

That was a question.

Formally asked.

Across the table.

And was formally answered.

By us.

Now.

Are we “hiding our uranium procurement”?

Should we address any question, thrown at us?

Some—

Like that?

We have answered the question.

Verbally.

When it was asked.

And on record.

What we actually did.

And there is nothing more to say.

So that was—

On “nuclear weapons.”

Mind you.

Not on uranium oxide, yellow cake.

It was under the title.

Frightening title.

Of.

“Nuclear weapons.”

There is a long story.

From uranium oxide.

To a nuclear bomb.

• On the VX nerve gas

You have all heard the story of the VX.

In fact, it is a scandal.

It is not a story.

Because Iraq produced a document.

Which is a first-class document.

In evidence.

Of our claim.

That no production.

Proper production.

Was achieved in 1990.

And the document is an inventory.

Of all materials produced in 1990.

Dated the end of 1990.

That should be enough.

To prove.

That no VX was produced.

Now.

Questions.

And answers.

It came out, that there was.

An attempt.

To produce.

In April 1990.

A quantity of VX.

But was not successful.

That quantity amounted to 1.5 ton.

Specifically, two batches.

The material degraded rapidly.

And attempts were abandoned to produce it.

Because it was considered—

It was a waste of raw materials.

And that was that.

There were evidence.

To that effect.

In the production reports.

During interviews.

With the personnel, involved in that production.

And letters.

And reports.

On the production.

Dated November {1990}.

Proving.

Conclusively.

That there was no VX.

Yet.

UNSCOM insisted, that VX was produced.

And, it is unaccounted for.

And, perhaps even weaponized.

And, later they produced evidence of analysis.

From a United States laboratory.

Of fragments of a warhead.

Of a rocket warhead.

Which supposedly contained traces.

Of VX degradation products.

I don’t know if I’m boring you.

With these technical things.

But this is the truth of the matter.

I don’t see that this is the business of the foreign secretary of Britain, or the United States, to talk about these things.

They should be left to the experts.

UNMOVIC can deal with that.

Anyway, just to conclude that story.

UNSCOM, under Butler.

Brought ampoules of VX material.

Produced in the United States.

Supposedly for the purpose.

Of calibrating their equipment.

Their analysis equipment.

In the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring Center.

In the laboratory.

Now.

We all know.

You calibrate your measuring equipment.

When you do a quantitative test.

But.

When you do a qualitative test.

You do a preliminary analysis.

To see, if there is any traces.

Of that material.

And, in order to determine.

How much of it.

Exactly.

Do you calibrate your equipment.

Now.

Bearing in mind.

That laboratory never performed a VX test.

Because there was no VX.

To perform tests on it.

And when samples, purported to contain VX, were supposed to be analyzed, they were taken to the United States.

They were not analyzed here, in Baghdad.

Now.

Those samples, for calibration, were sealed.

And we found out later.

That they have been opened.

And Butler.

Before leaving his post.

Insisted, that that laboratory be opened.

Those samples taken and destroyed.

And the logbook, of the laboratory, also destroyed.

Why would they do that?

For us, it was obvious.

That VX was intended to manipulate.

And tamper with samples.

Taken from Iraq.

In order to prove.

That there were traces of VX on them.

And that, it comes from Iraq.

We insisted, the samples should be sent to other reputable laboratories, outside the United States.

Under the custody of trusted people.

Not, specifically, one citizen.

Of a country.

Thats business is.

To prove this thing.

Representatives of international laboratories.

From Switzerland and France.

Came and took samples.

From the same material.

That previous samples was taken.

And they performed tests.

And found no traces of VX.

Now.

That should have put the matter to rest.

But, no.

It wasn’t.

It still crops up, every now and then.

That Iraq had VX.

And it weaponized it.

And Iraq weaponized it.

We addressed this question also.

In our declaration.

Yet.

I read.

I quote.

 

“This information?”

Question mark.

This is the end of the VX nerve gas.

• In the Jack Straw quote.

About precursors.

Precursor chemicals.

Now.

Precursors are material or ingredients of preparation of agents, in the end.

You need several precursors.

In order to make an agent.

If you find some discrepancies in the material balance of one ingredient.

And the rest of the ingredients are okay, are all accounted for.

It means this discrepancy is insignificant.

Because as—

To make it simpler.

If a housewife is asked.

How many pies can you produce?

From one kilogram of flour?

She would say.

If none of these are available.

She wouldn’t be able to produce the pie.

So.

It is as simple as that.

Some ingredients in the material balance were—

There was a shortfall.

And we declared that.

And we gave the reasons.

They were not accepted by UNSCOM.

For a purpose.

In order to keep the subject alive.

And now.

It crops up, in this U.S. document.

This is the business for UNMOVIC.

This is the business that UNMOVIC is charged.

According to the resolution.

To resolve.

With the cooperation of Iraq.

And to report on it.

And it’s not for Jack Straw.

Or Colin Powell.

To question us about it.

I think that’s enough.

And I will be ready to answer questions.

* * *

Question: Have you put this in the declaration?

The story on the anthrax?

Amer al-Saadi: Of course.

Question: Then.

Why would Blix say.

That there are no answers?

Or they’re inaccurate?

Amer al-Saadi: No, no.

That’s not—

That’s not the point, I think, he was making.

He said, there is no change in Iraq’s position, regarding that.

There are—

There are some, let’s say, lack of—

Lack of evidence, documentary evidence.

On certain aspects of the biological program.

Because, as we have explained earlier.

The biological program was completely obliterated.

Including the documents.

And even the active—

Its destruction was removed.

Without a trace.

So.

It was difficult, to recreate and re-establish.

A story of a dead program.

That was the difficulty.

We made for ourselves.