Iraq WMD War: Timeline 2002, video/audio, sources

John Humphrys: There was a degree of excitement yesterday, when the Iraqis revealed, that they had invited Hans Blix, the head of the United Nations weapons inspectors, to Baghdad, for what they called “technical talks.”

People opposed to a war, against Saddam, seized on it.

It showed, they said, that Saddam was prepared to make the concessions that were needed.

Mr. Blix, and his inspection team.

Or UNMOVIC, as it was known.

Would be allowed in.

The threat had worked.

But.

That’s not how the Americans see it.

A few hours after the announcement from the United Nations, I spoke to John Bolton, the American Under-Secretary of State.

And asked him, how seriously the offer was being taken, in Washington.

John Bolton: What we want, is free and unimpeded access for UNMOVIC.

Uh—

To, uh—

Whatever they want to see, in Iraq.

To carry out, really, Resolution 687 {32kb.pdf, copy, copy, via this, this, or ODS}.

The cease fire resolution, back from 1991.

Which, obviously, the Iraqis have violated, almost from the day it was passed.

And, with almost four years, with no weapons inspectors inside Iraq, there’s an awful lot of work to do.

We continue to favor the reintroduction of the inspectors, and we’re supporting them as much as we can.

But one has to be dubious, given the Iraqi record of deception, as to what exactly their agreement would mean.

But.

Let there be no mistake.

While we also insist on.

The reintroduction of weapons inspectors.

Our policy.

At the same time.

Insists on.

Regime-change in Baghdad.

And.

That policy will not be altered.

Whether the inspectors go in.

Or not.

John Humphrys: So.

In other words.

There will be war.

Whatever happens.

John Bolton: No.

There are all kinds ways for regime-change to take place.

And, uh—

Uh—

There’re—

The Iraqi opposition has long felt, that the country is really burdened, intolerably, by Saddam Hussein’s presence in Baghdad.

And that opposition continues to grow.

So, uh—

The real question is, uh—

The removal of Saddam Hussein.

And his continuing threat.

To peace and security in the region.

John Humphrys: What’s changed?

In Iraq.

Since September the tenth.

To drive you down this road.

John Bolton: Well, I don’t—

Uh—

I don’t think our policy is tied to September 11.

Although we continue to explore what linkages there might be, between Saddam and al-Qaeda.

I think, the point is, that.

The threat that Saddam represents.

To our interests, the interests of our friends and neighbors in the region, and to peace and security at large.

Is what motivates us to think, that.

Regime-change is the only way.

To, to eliminate that threat.

John Humphrys: The United States — indeed Western Europe — has faced many threats, over the years.

Particularly during the Cold War.

And it relied, then, on a very effective policy, called “deterrence.”

Why doesn’t deterrence work today?

John Bolton: Because deterrence assumes a certain equivalence.

And a certain rationality on the other side.

In the case of Iraq, there is an enormous asymmetry between his capabilities and ours.

And yet.

If he possesses weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear, chemical, or biological.

He can inflict enormous damage on our forward-deployed forces, or our friends and allies in the region, or our interests in the region.

Uh—

That, uh, simply are not susceptible to fine theories of deterrence.

John Humphrys: But why should he do that?

If he knows.

That the response to doing it.

Would be annihilation?

John Bolton: The, uh—

If Saddam Hussein were a rational person, he wouldn’t have used poison gas against his own people, he wouldn’t have invaded Kuwait 10 years ago, he wouldn’t have done a lot of things.

It’s precisely the arbitrary and totalitarian nature of his regime that makes him such a threat.

John Humphrys: In that case, it follows.

That there can be no answer.

Other than an attack against him.

Because.

If you regard him.

Both.

As irrational.

And.

A threat to your security.

Then that’s it.

End of conversation.

John Bolton: No.

I think what follows is.

The importance of regime-change.

Which can be accomplished in a number of different respects.

But I don’t see how anybody can rest easy.

For peace and security in the region.

As long as Saddam Hussein’s regime is in Baghdad.

John Humphrys: Well, the answer to that is.

That the policy of containment.

That we’ve been practicing.

For so long now, since the Gulf war.

Has worked.

John Bolton: I think the answer to that is.

That Saddam continues aggressively to pursue the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction capability.

We have ample evidence of that.

That activities he’s engaged in with respect to nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missile capabilities.

Uh—

This man is a threat.

As long as he is in power.

And.

As President Bush has warned repeatedly.

Time is not on our side.

That, as people acquire these very dangerous weapons, their threat increases geometrically.

And that, that has to be something that, uh, I think, that all, all responsible leaders, in the international community, should keep in mind.

John Humphrys: Why, in that case, are your allies.

Tony Blair himself.

Not as impressed by this argument.

As apparently they should be.

We hear from King Abdullah, of Jordan.

That Mr. Blair himself.

Your closest ally.

Standing shoulder-to-shoulder, and all that.

He, himself, is unenthusiastic.

John Bolton: Well, Mr. Humphrys, all I can say is, we are in constant consultation with a wide range of our allies, and we don’t necessarily discuss all of our political or military options in public.

We are content that, at the appropriate moment, we will have the requisite degree of international support.

John Humphrys: But if you don’t have it.

And all the indications are.

That, at the moment, you won’t.

Then what?

John Bolton: We will have it, Mr. Humphrys.

John Humphrys: Isn’t the reality, that Washington would go ahead and do it.

With, or without, support from other countries.

John Bolton: Well, I think that’s a hypothetical.

I think we will have support.

So I’m not that worried about the hypothetical.

John Humphrys: Can I remind you?

Of something that a former Chief of Staff.

General Sir Gerald Templer said?

This was at the time of Suez.

When there was great controversy.

Over attacking Egypt.

And, he said, that,

Doesn’t the same question apply.

To any attack on Iraq.

Having taken Baghdad.

What then?

John Bolton: Well.

Deleting your reference to the attack on Baghdad.

I think it is only prudent, to plan for Iraq, in the post-Saddam Hussein era.

And, in fact, we have already begun that.

Working with Iraqi leaders in the Diaspora.

And other Iraqi opposition figures.

To try to do the responsible forward-planning.

That we ought to be doing.

To alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.

Which Saddam has imposed on them.

And to move them toward a democratic form of government.

So, so, that, that work has, really, already begun.

John Humphrys: Isn’t there another argument here?

That what you’ve done is.

You’ve taken a political decision.

And it makes little strategic, or even tactical, sense?

John Bolton: I, I think as long as you have, uh, a dangerous dictatorial regime.

That oppresses its own people.

And.

That seeks to acquire.

Weapons of mass destruction.

That does represent both a tactical and strategic threat to the United Stares.

That’s one of the principal reasons.

Why we feel.

Regime-change is so necessary.

John Humphrys: Mr. Bolton, you know.

And we know.

Of many regimes.

That fit that description.

Have done for many years.

America hasn’t attacked them.

Indeed, often, it’s helped them.

John Bolton: Well.

There aren’t that many that are as close to producing weapons of mass destruction capability, as Iraq.

But I can tell you, that we are very concerned, about each and every one of the governments, that’s attempting to, to acquire such weapons.

I think that’s one reason why President Bush, in his State of the Union message, earlier this year, outlined the Axis of Evil concept.

And, as he put it — I think quite cogently — then,

John Humphrys: So.

Having unseated Saddam Hussein.

If that’s what you succeed in doing.

You then start somewhere else.

John Bolton: Well, we—

You don’t have to draw that conclusion.

What we’re doing, very actively now, is seeking to increase our efforts, and those who share our concern about these weapons, to deny those who’re seeking them the resources and the expertise they need to, uh, perfect their weapons program.

It’s a very, very, urgent matter.

And we’re consulting with, uh, with, with many governments around the world.

I was just in Moscow, earlier this week, talking about precisely this problem.

It’s something that we have a common view on, I think, uh, with our Western allies, and many other governments around the world.

And it’s something, that, uh—

Especially since September 11, uh—

We’ve all grown more acutely aware of.

John Humphrys: As you say, you’re in Russia.

You do not have a common view on this.

With Russia.

The Russians are helping Iran.

With their nuclear program.

John Bolton: They are.

And that’s why we’ve made it clear, that we think it’s important that they stop their cooperation with Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

It’s going to be a very important element in our future relationship.

John Humphrys: But.

If they don’t take your view.

That Iran is part of an Axis of Evil.

And quite clearly they don’t.

There’s not very much you can do about it.

Is there.

John Bolton: Well, I think they do take our view, that they don’t want to see a nuclear-capable, ballistic missile-equipped, Iran.

Which, after all, is much closer to them, than it is to us.

John Humphrys: But, again.

They’re entitled to say,

John Bolton: Well.

I think—

Number one.

I don’t think that’s what they are saying.

And number two.

If they were to take a—

A position.

Just like any other nation.

That took a position.

That they were going to continue, to allow assistance to go to the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

It would have a very significant impact on our bilateral relationship with them.

John Humphrys: So significant, that you would break-off relations?

John Bolton: No, no, no.

Certainly not.

But it’s a matter of profound strategic importance to both us and the Russians.

And I think they—

I think they understand that.

John Humphrys: The final thought, Mr. Bolton.

Do you believe.

That Saddam Hussein will still be in power.

In a year from now.

John Bolton: I certainly hope not.

For the safety of the Iraqi people.

If nothing else.

John Humphrys: Six months from now?

John Bolton: Uh—

I’m not—

I’m not making predictions.

I—

I hope—

If I—

If wishes could, could rule in the world, I would hope that his regime would come to an end immediately.

The sooner the better.

For the sake of the Iraqi people.

John Humphrys: John Bolton.

Many thanks.

John Bolton: Thank you.

Curt Weldon: Are you satisfied, that proliferation controls are better today, than they were in the past, relative to this kind of technology going in, that could enhance our capability, in the area of weapons of mass destruction?

* * *

David Kay {1:13}: Let me give you the case of the aluminum centrifuge rotors, that was in the weekend piece, by Michael Gordon and Judith Miller.

The Iraqi centrifuge pieces — that a team I led was on discovered — were made of marging steel {maraging steel}. Marging steel is harder to get access to. It is a more specialized technology. Not everyone can produce it.

They were going to carbon fiber rotors. Because carbon fiber winding machines, although controlled, because they are relevant to missile technology, as you know, Mr. Weldon, in addition to centrifuges, were still at that point where they were becoming generally available, because of Callaway golf clubs, high performance fly rods, and a whole series of other issues. So they were on the slope, and they understood it. By going to carbon fiber, they were better off.

Going to aluminum is even easier.

Because a number of countries that have the capabilities to extrude high performance aluminum tubes is almost in any country that has a machine tool industry.

So the problem has become porous. We have not found an effective way of dealing with it.

But let me tell you, I am pessimistic, that there is an easy way to deal with it, other than:—

Replacing the regime.