Iran nuclear, uranium enrichment: Timeline, sources, links, video/audio

Iran is embarking on a long-term plan, based on the merits of energy mix, to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6000 MW {megawatts} within two decades.

Naturally, such a sizeable project entails with it an all out planning, well in advance, in various fields of nuclear technology such as fuel cycle, safety and waste management.

I take this opportunity to invite all the technologically advanced member States to participate in my country’s ambitious plan for the construction of nuclear power plants and the associated technologies such as fuel cycle, safety and waste management techniques.

George W. Bush: I sought an additional resolution of support from the Congress to use force against Iraq, should force become necessary.

While I appreciate receiving that support, my request for it did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President’s constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.

Mohamed ElBaradei: 2. At the September 2002 regular session of the IAEA General Conference, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), H.E. Mr. R. Aghazadeh, stated that Iran was “embarking on a long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6000 MW within two decades.” He also stated that such a sizeable project entailed “an all out planning, well in advance, in various field of nuclear technology such as fuel cycle, safety and waste management.”

3. During the General Conference, the director general met with the Vice President, and asked that Iran confirm whether it was building a large underground nuclear related facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak, as reported in the media in August 2002.

The Vice President provided some information on Iran’s intentions to develop further its nuclear fuel cycle, and agreed on a visit to the two sites later in 2002 by the director general, accompanied by safeguards experts, and to a discussion with Iranian authorities during that meeting on Iran’s nuclear development plans.

4. The visit to Iran was originally scheduled for October 2002, but finally took place from 21 to 22 February 2003. The director general was accompanied by the Deputy director general for Safeguards (DDG-SG) and the Director of the Division of Safeguards Operations (B).

5. During his visit, the director general was informed by Iran of its uranium enrichment programme, which was described as including two new facilities located at Natanz, namely a pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) nearing completion of construction, and a large commercial-scale fuel enrichment plant (FEP) also under construction.

These two facilities were declared to the Agency for the first time during that visit, at which time the director general was able to visit both of them.

Iran also confirmed that the heavy water production plant 3, referred to in paragraph 3 above, was under construction in Arak.

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3  Heavy water production facilities are not nuclear facilities under comprehensive NPT safeguards agreements, and are thus not required to be declared to the Agency thereunder.

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6. During the visit, the director general was informed that Iran would accept modifications to its Subsidiary Arrangements, as requested by the Board of Governors in 1992, which would henceforth require the early provision of design information on new facilities and on modifications to existing facilities, as well as the early provision of information on new locations outside of facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs). This was confirmed to the Agency in a letter dated 26 February 2003 (see paragraph 15 below).

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8. During the discussions in Iran in February between DDG-SG and the Iranian authorities, reference was made by the Agency to information in open sources on the possible conduct of enrichment activities at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran.

The Iranian authorities acknowledged that the workshop had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no operations in connection with its centrifuge enrichment development programme involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any other location in Iran.

According to the Iranian authorities, all testing had been carried out using simulation studies.

While a centrifuge component production facility is not a nuclear facility required to be declared to the Agency under Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran was requested, in light of its stated policy of transparency, to permit the Agency to visit the workshop and to take environmental samples there to assist the Agency in verifying Iran’s declaration and confirming the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

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15. The Subsidiary Arrangements General Part in force with Iran from 1976 to 26 February 2003 included what was, until 1992, standard text which called for provision to the Agency of design information on a new facility no later than 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into the facility, and the provision of information on a new LOF together with the report relating to the receipt of nuclear material at the LOF.

With the acceptance by Iran on 26 February 2003 of the modifications to the Subsidiary Arrangements proposed by the Agency, the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part now requires Iran to inform the Agency of new nuclear facilities and modifications to existing facilities through the provision of preliminary design information as soon as the decision to construct, to authorize construction or to modify has been taken, and to provide the Agency with further design information as it is developed.

Information is to be provided early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.

John Bolton: The fact is,

The Iranians are pursuing nuclear weapons.

And that makes them a danger,

To the region,

And the world as a whole.

So, today’s Chairman’s summary, at the IAEA, is an important first step, in the IAEA’s decision-making progress

But we are much more concerned, about what is actually going on, inside Iran.

Kirsty Wark: What evidence do you have,

That they are

Pursuing

Weapons of mass destruction?

John Bolton: The Iranians have activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. They have a heavy water production facility, that can only be used for a heavy water-reactor, which is a fast way to breed plutonium. They’re mining uranium. They only have one nuclear power plant. The Russians are going to supply all of the fuel, so there is no reason to be engaged in any of the rest of this activity.

Kirsty Wark: But.

What if they do sign up to the statement.

And allow the additional protocol.

What then?

If they allow that access,

What will you do?

John Bolton: I think, if they truly sign and fully implement the additional protocol, and give the IAEA inspectors complete, unimpeded access, we will simply see further proof, that,

They’re pursuing nuclear weapons.

Kirsty Wark: And then?

John Bolton: Then, I think, it would be up to the IAEA board, to refer the matter to the Security Council, and for the United States, the other nuclear weapons states, to take action.

Kirsty Wark: What kind of action?

John Bolton: I think, some of the things we are doing right now.

To deny the Iranians access, to the technology they need, throughout their nuclear fuel cycle.

And to alert people, that,

They are pursuing nuclear weapons.

Kirsty Wark: So.

Just to be quite clear about this.

No matter,

Whether or not,

The Iranians allow additional access,

And additional inspections,

As far as you are concerned,

If those inspections yield nothing,

They are still on the axis of evil.

John Bolton: The information we have, about which we have a high degree of confidence, is that,

The Iranians are pursuing nuclear weapons.

And, I might say, they are also pursuing a vigorous program in ballistic missiles, increasing the range that they have, in making themselves a broader and broader problem.

Kirsty Wark: So.

Is there a possibility, that you would take military action, in Iran, if necessary?

John Bolton: No.

The obvious intent here, is to get a peaceful solution,

To the problem.

But the problem is,

The Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Kirsty Wark: But.

Do you rule out military intervention.

John Bolton: We are nowhere close to even considering that.

But.

All options are obviously on the table.

As the President has said repeatedly.

And there must be.

To provide a strong deterrent,

To those who might otherwise seek nuclear weapons.

Kirsty Wark: But when you use language like,

“They definitely have weapons of mass destruction”—

John Bolton: No.

I said,

We judge, at this point, they don’t have the weapons.

But.

They are actively pursuing them.

Kirsty Wark: But if, in your judgement, in the United States judgement, they continue this pursuit, and show no signs of agreeing to your demands.

And if, indeed, you think they are going to still be supplied with the parts for this program.

How do you stop them?

John Bolton: Well, one thing that we have already begun, based on the President’s speech in Krakow, Poland on May 31st—

The Proliferation Security Initiative—

Is to begin to interdict

Shipments of components, for a nuclear weapons program,

At sea.

In the air.

And on land.

We are working on that right now.

We had a meeting in Madrid last week with ten other countries, all of which signed up to the idea of going after weapons of mass destruction shipments in international commerce.

Kirsty Wark: You can see, how, to some people, this sounds belligerent.

It sounds as if, you are preparing the ground, for possible military intervention.

John Bolton: Well, I think—

The first thing you have to keep in mind, is that nuclear weapons are very dangerous.

And countries that possess nuclear weapons

And countries that possess ballistic missiles

Have the ability to blackmail the rest of us

And work their will

In a way, that we simply cannot find acceptable.

The choice, in this case, is for Iran.

Iran can adhere to its international treaty obligations.

And give up

The pursuit of nuclear weapons.

And then,

It would be accepted back

Into the international community.

Kirsty Wark: Is the American goal,

Regime-change in Iran?

John Bolton: The American goal — on what I work on — is the elimination of

Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

I think, the President has spoken very eloquently, to the importance of true democracy coming to Iran, of having the people there having a real chance to live in freedom.

What I’m concerned about.

And what I’m focused on.

And what the IAEA, today, took a very important step toward.

Is stopping

The Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Kirsty Wark: But if, in the end—

And it may be a very long way down the road—

Then military action was considered—

In Iraq, at the moment,

America is losing at least a soldier a day.

There’s no sign of soldiers coming home.

Is there an appetite, for continuing in Iraq.

Never mind the possibility, of starting a further military campaign, in Iran?

John Bolton: I think, in Iraq, our objective is quite clear. That is to turn responsibility for governing the country over to Iraqis as soon as possible. It was never our intention to have a long occupation. We are not an imperialist power. What we were after was the elimination of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and the elimination of Iraq’s WMD program. We are well on the way, on both of those. The burden is on us to give authority back to the Iraqi people. But we start from a very low base, decades of Ba'ath Party totalitarianism. So it’s not for want of desiring, to get authority back into the hands of the Iraqi people, that this is taking longer than we expected. But we are working as best as we can, under the circumstances.

Kirsty Wark: But, briefly,

Would there be an appetite

For further military intervention

By Americans

In another country?

John Bolton: Americans don’t have an appetite

For any military intervention.

What we seek, though, is the elimination of weapons programs, that threaten us, and our friends, and allies.

Kirsty Wark: John Bolton,

Thank you very much.

Mohamed ElBaradei: 33. On 25 June 2003, Iran introduced UF6 {uranium hexafloride gas} into the first centrifuge for the purpose of single machine testing, and on 19 August 2003 began the testing of a small ten-machine cascade with UF6.

Iran continues to co-operate with the Agency in implementing safeguards measures now in place at PFEP for monitoring single machine and small cascade testing.

34. In accordance with its standard practice, the Agency took baseline environmental samples at PFEP at Natanz before nuclear material was introduced in the facility.

This baseline sampling campaign was conducted during inspections carried out between March and June 2003, and samples were taken at many locations within the facility.

While the Agency has already received the results from some of the samples (see below), which have been provided to Iran, other samples are still being analysed by a number of laboratories that participate in the Agency’s Network of Analytical Laboratories.

35. Iran has stated that it has not carried out any enrichment and that no nuclear material was introduced to the PFEP prior to the Agency’s having taken its first baseline environmental samples there.

John Humphrys: The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, is in Iran.

I spoke to him, a few hours ago.

I asked him first,

If he thinks,

They really are

Developing nuclear weapons.

Jack Straw: The answer is,

Nobody knows

For certain.

Because the Iranians have so far refused effective, intrusive, inspections, of the kind now proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

So what we, in concert with everybody else in the international community, are proposing is, that they have to sign up to what’s called an additional protocol, which provides for these more intrusive inspections.

Mohamed ElBaradei: 11. In a letter dated 24 August 2003, the Resident Representative of Iran to the Agency informed the director general that Iran was

and expressed the hope that, “in this negotiation the concerns of [Iran] and the ambiguities on the Additional Protocol are removed.”

2.1. The Iranian Government has decided to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to address and resolve through full transparency all requirements and outstanding issues of the Agency and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA.

2.2. To promote confidence with a view to removing existing barriers for co-operation in the nuclear field:

2.2.a. Having received the necessary clarifications, the Iranian Government has decided to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures. As a confirmation of its good intentions the Iranian Government will continue to co-operate with the Agency in accordance with the Protocol in advance of its ratification.

2.2.b. While Iran has a right within the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes it has decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.

Iran has stated that it is acting in accordance with the Protocol’s provisions, pending the Protocol’s formal entry into force.

George W. Bush: As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.

In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion.

It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.

The E3/EU recognise Iran’s rights under the NPT, exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination. ...

The suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements.

The E3/EU recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.

34. As Iran will have an assured supply of fuel over the coming years, it will be able to provide the confidence needed by making a binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water power and research reactors.