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Iran: Uranium enrichment
Iran nuclear, uranium enrichment:
• Bombing Iran's IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities
• Iran uranium timeline
• Congress committees
• Congress resolutions, war power
• IAEA, Security Council
• Analysis
• Israel
• John Bolton
• IR655
• Iraq wmd war timeline
1 U.N. Security Council orders Iran to suspend activities at its nuclear fuel cycle plants (uranium conversion and centrifuge enrichment).
Iran declines, asserting the order is unlawful.
U.S. destroys the plants, to enforce the order.
Iran retaliates against U.S. bases in Iraq.
U.S. second wave destroys Iran’s military and government.
U.S. “secures” Iran’s western oil fields, “for the benefit of the Iranian people.”
2 Israel attacks Iran (offense).
Iran retaliates against Israel (defense).
U.S. attacks Iran in “defense” of Israel (offense).
July 31 2006:
The U.N. Security Council, on July 31 2006, ordered Iran to suspend uranium enrichment (S/Res/1696).
This suspension order is permanent.
Because it cannot be revoked.
Without consent of the U.S. government.
Which can veto any revoking resolution.
Regardless of what the IAEA inspectors, or the 14 other members of the Security Council, may later say.
A very great failure of diplomacy, by the Russians.
Who should know better.
They watched, the maneuvers of a violent criminal regime, up close, when Adolph Hitler gripped the levers of power, for 12 years, in Germany.
They watched, the prima facie criminal U.S. war on Iraq, launched on a lie, and in violation of a Security Council resolution (S/Res/1441).
They watched, the prima facie criminal U.S. war on Gaza, and the rest of the Palestinians, by blockade, as a co-belligerent with Israel, with the prima facie criminal war aim, to overthrow their democratically elected government.
They watched, the prima facie criminal U.S. war on Lebanon, to increase a buffer zone, to defend the prima facie criminal land-grab, and unlawful military occupation, in the occupied territories, by their co-belligerent, Israel.
And now Iran.
The predicate for scenario 1 is now in place.
Politically, U.S. officials require nothing further, from the Security Council.
To attack Iran.
Except for whatever political show they desire to pretense, before the attack.
So they can chant, once again, their mantra, how irrelevant the Security Council is.
George W. Bush can now assert, that Iran has no legal right to continue uranium enrichment.
And, that the U.N. Security Council has determined, that any continuation constitutes a “threat” to international peace and security.
Even though that’s not what they said.
That must be what they meant.
George W. Bush will boldly assert.
Because the Security Council members all knew, they did not otherwise have legal authority, to adopt that order.
George W. Bush can simply declare diplomacy exhausted, the Security Council cowards, to confront the “threat” — which they, themselves, have recognized — and war as the only solution to that threat.
War is what the Israel-Jew Lobby wants.
And, what the Israel-Jew Lobby wants, Congress always provides.
Normally.
But, in the present political climate, some votes might disobey the Israel-Jew Lobby, citing a bankrupt nation, and many other reasons, no evidence, a failed war in Iraq, increased hatred of the U.S., and such.
In that event, if Congressional leaders judge, the vote would not be certain, George W. Bush would likely order the U.S. military to attack Iran anyway, without a vote in Congress, based on the authority he asserts he has, to do so, “to deter ... threats to U.S. interests.”
“U.S. interests”?
That’s code.
For Israel.
George W. Bush has declared, that history will judge him a hero, if he pursues his own vision, to remake the Middle East.
He has said, he is content to be judged by history, and so, is indifferent, to his present day critics.
His vision obviously requires plunging the entire Middle East into flames, in order to remake it.
The U.S. attack on Iran will be criminal.
And so too, the nuclear targets in Iran (“civilian objects”).
Creating the largest criminal trial in U.S. and world history, down the road, if an honest administration is ever elected, to control the U.S. Congress and the U.S. administration (very unlikely).
Only if Iran now files a lawsuit, in the U.N. International Justice of Court, can it overturn the Security Council resolution, and thereby neutralize George W. Bush’s rhetorical pretexts.
Unlike nearly every other case, this particular lawsuit, the U.S. cannot block and ignore.
Because the defendants would be the Security Council itself, and the IAEA.
The U.S. fears lawsuits.
Because it’s conduct is nearly always unlawful.
And usually criminal.
The U.S. does not permit lawsuits against itself, in U.S. courts, or international courts, for its international activities, including its violent crimes and intentional torts.
–CJHjr
It’s about confidence-building.
It’s not about an imminent threat.
____________________
Previously:
Annex
Letter dated 4 February 2006 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council
In paragraph 2 of resolution GOV/2006/14 of 4 February 2006 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, the Board requested that I transmit to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see enclosures).
The Board also requested me to report to the Security Council the steps required of the Islamic Republic of Iran as specified in paragraph 1 of the same resolution.
I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its enclosures to the attention of all Members of the Security Council.
( Signed )
Mohamed ElBaradei
Enclosures
List of enclosures concerning the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
| Reports/meeting records/update briefs | Page |
| Update brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards dated 31 January 2006 | 6 |
| Report GOV/INF/2006/2 dated 10 January 2006 | 10 |
| Report GOV/INF/2006/1 dated 3 January 2006 | 11 |
| Report GOV/2005/87 dated 18 November 2005 | 12 |
| Report GOV/lNF/2005/13 dated 2 November 2005 | 17 |
| Report GOV/2005/67 dated 2 September 2005 | 18 |
| Report GOV/2005/62 dated 10 August 2005 | 33 |
| Report GOV/2005/61 dated 8 August 2005 | 34 |
| Extract (paras. 48-61) from meeting record GOV/OR.1130 dated 16 June 2005 | 35 |
| Extract (paras. 102-121) from meeting record GOV/OR.1119 dated 1 March 2005 | 38 |
| Report GOV/2004/83 dated 15 November 2004 | 43 |
| Report GOV/2004/60 dated 1 September 2004 | 75 |
| Report GOV/2004/34/Corr.l dated 18 June 2004 | 98 |
| Report GOV/2004/34 dated l June 2004 | 99 |
| Report GOV/2004/11 dated 24 February 2004 | 119 |
| Report GOV/2003/75 dated 10 November 2003 | 132 |
| Report GOV/2003/63 dated 26 August 2003 | 161 |
| Report GOV/2003/40 dated 6 June 2003 | 171 |
| Extract (para. 24) from meeting record GOV/OR.1062 dated 17 March 2003 | 180 |
| Resolutions/information circular/meeting record | |
| Resolution GOV/2006/14 dated 4 February 2006 | 182 |
| Result of roll-call vote taken on 4 February 2006 on draft resolution GOV/2006/12/Rev.l | 185 |
| Resolution GOV/2005/77 dated 24 September 2005 | 186 |
| Result of roll-call vote taken on 24 September 2005 on draft resolution GOV/2005/76 | 188 |
| Resolution GOV/2005/64 dated 11 August 2005 | 189 |
| Information circular INFCIRC/648 dated 1 August 2005 | 191 |
| Resolution GOV/2004/90 dated 29 November 2004 | 198 |
| Resolution GOV/2004/79 dated 18 September 2004 | 200 |
| Resolution GOV/2004/49 dated 18 June 2004 | 203 |
| Resolution GOV/2004/21 dated 13 March 2004 | 206 |
| Resolution GOV/2003/81 dated 26 November 2003 | 209 |
| Resolution GOV/2003/69 dated 12 September 2003 | 212 |
| Extract (paras. 52-58) from meeting record GOV/OR.1072 dated 19 June 2003 | 215 |

• S/2006/150 (9 March 2006) {584kb.pdf, via this or ODS}. Letter dated 8 March 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran — Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)).
Annex
Letter dated 8 March 2006 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council
Further to my communication dated 4 February 2006 sent to the President of the Security Council, and in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution GOV/2006/14, adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors at its meeting on 4 February 2006, I convey herewith my report to the Board of Governors for its meeting commencing on 6 March 2006 on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2006/15, dated 27 February 2006) (see enclosure).
I should note that the Board of Governors did not adopt a resolution at its March meeting.
I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its enclosure to the attention of all members of the Security Council.
( Signed )
Mohamed ElBaradei
Enclosure
• Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA Director General), Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006, derestricted 8 March 2006) {80kb.pdf}.
____________________
• “Security Council consults on IAEA report relating to Iran’s nuclear ambitions” {pf} (U.N. News Service, March 17 2006), and see, Evelyn Leopold (Reuters), “Britain, U.S., France upbeat on Iran agreement at UN” (Reuters, March 18 2006): “The 15 council members meet again on Tuesday.”
• U.N. Security Council, Presidential Statement S/PRST/2006/15 (March 29 2006) (cited above).
• Javad Zarif (Iran U.N. Ambassador, from August 5 2002), prevented by the Security Council from speaking at its meeting, his reply (U.N. press conference, March 29 2006), U.N. video {37:55}.
• Javad Zarif (Iran U.N. Ambassador, from August 5 2002), interviewed by Wolf Blitzer (CNN News The Situation Room, March 30 2006, 5:00pm ET)
U.S., British and French diplomats secured Russian and Chinese support by ... dropping language hinting that Iran’s nuclear program constitutes a threat to international peace and security. ...
John R. Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, insisted ... expressed frustration ... “Iran’s nuclear weapons program is unacceptable.”
Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Andrei Denisov, conceded that there are “suspicions, very strong suspicions” that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, but he said there is still no hard evidence ...
The IAEA ... acknowledges that Iran has the right to nuclear energy and that it cannot prove Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
____________________
Query: “Is developing nuclear weapons”?
This is not what Andrei Denisov said.
Pay attention to your business, Mr. Lynch.
And your role, in promoting war.
By misquoting officials.
And omitting to report the pertinent things they say.
Andrei Denisov said (quoted below):
“We have suspicions on intentions.”
“Only intentions.”
Not weapons development.
He did not say, “there are suspicions that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.”
As you erroneously reported, Mr. Lynch. –CJHjr
Suspicion is a state of mind of the accuser and not a state of mind or an act by the one accused.
It is a monstrous proposition containing the very essence of license that the state of mind of the accuser shall be the determining factor, in the absence of evidence of guilt, whether the accused shall or shall not be summarily executed. ...
The orders to execute such persons and mere suspects on suspicion only and without proof were criminal on their face.
Executions pursuant thereto were criminal.
Those who gave or passed down such orders must bear criminal responsibility for passing them down and for their implementation by the units subordinate to them.
Edi Lederer {1:20}: Mr. Ambassador?
Why was it important?
To drop the reference to “threats”?
To international peace and security?
Which is actually.
What the Security Council is responsible for.
Andrei Denisov: We haven’t dropped it.
We simply—
We didn’t insert it.
And that’s a different thing.
Edi Lederer: What is the difference?
Andrei Denisov: Because, you know—
When you speak about threat
To international peace and security.
You must have strong, clear, and legally approved evidence.
We don’t have such evidence.
That is the purpose.
Why we use International Atomic Energy Agency.
As a watchdog, specially designed, to provide such qualification, such verification, such approval.
For a time being, we have suspicions.
A very strong one.
But suspicions.
On intentions.
That intentions also have some, some, some evidence.
But it is only intentions.
So, from that point of view, the road—
It is like a ladder. You know. If you want to climb up, you must step on the first step. And then the second. And not try to leap.
That is the case.
____________________
Question {English} {2:49 bb}: And to Foreign Minister Lavrov, specifically.
Given that yesterday’s Security Council statement.
Omits.
Apparently at your request.
Language calling Iran a threat.
To international peace and security—
Do you think, that the regime is not that sort of threat?
Or, did you have other reasons, for opposing that language?
Sergei Lavrov {English}: In principle, Russia doesn’t believe that sanctions could achieve the purposes of settlement of various issues.
We believe, that there must be a balanced approach, of the international community, to each and every conflict, based on the international law, and based on the need to make sure, that all members of the international community fulfill their commitments and obligations.
And that’s how we all try to work, in case of the nuclear program of Iran.
And the key to this, is, the work of the IAEA, which has been supported yesterday, by the Security Council, aimed at clarifying all issues related to the past Iranian nuclear program.
The IAEA has reported, that it cannot yet testify, that there is no military aspect of this program.
But, at the same time, the last report of the IAEA says, that it cannot also assert, that there is a military aspect, to the Iranian nuclear program.
So.
Before we call any situation a threat
We need facts.
Especially, in the region like the Middle East, where so many things are happening.
We prefer, very strongly,
To base our specific actions
On specific facts.
And,
In this particular case,
The facts could be provided by the IAEA.
So far, they have not been provided.
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CJHjrCharles Judson Harwood Jr.
Posted Jan. 29 2006. Updated June 7 2009.
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/iran-nuclear-iaea-un.html
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