Alt+left-arrow to return from a link

 

Iran: Uranium enrichment
See George lie. Latest:  1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  4 

Iran nuclear, uranium enrichment:

U.S. Congress committees: Hearings, bills, markups, reports

by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 

• Congressional Record (Iran*)

_______

Buttons:

LOC (Library of Congress): A date-sorted menu, from a Congressional Record stemmed search (“Iran, Iran’s, Iranian, Iranians”), in 3 of the 4 sections of the daily edition: Senate chamber, House chamber, House extension of remarks (written statements), excludes the daily digest (U.S. Library of Congress, “Thomas,” a copy of the GPO daily edition online).

GPO: Same as LOC, but at the U.S. Government Printing Office instead, the official daily edition online (less precise search software and it won’t date-sort).

Daily: Same as LOC, but in the “Daily Digest” only.

Digest: Same as Daily, but at the U.S. Government Printing Office instead.

Volumes: 2007 (volume 153, Congress 110-1), 2006 (volume 152, Congress 109-2), 2005 (volume 151, Congress 109-1), 2004 (volume 150, Congress 108-2), 2003 (volume 149, Congress 108-1), 2002 (volume 148, Congress 107-2), 2001 (volume 147, Congress 107-1), 2000 (volume 146, Congress 106-2).

 

Joint Committees

 

Joint Economic Committee

• Energy and the Iranian Economy {225kb.txt, 822kb.pdf, purl, source, source} (U.S. Congress 109-2, S. Hrg. 109-720, JEC: Joint Economic Committee, Hearing, July 25 2006, 10:00 a.m.-12:05 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.EC 7:EN 2/24, LCCN: (none yet), OCLC: 122525386, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, March 2 2007}, Hugh James Saxton (chairman) {21kb.html}, John F. (Jack) Reed (ranking minority member) {44kb.pdf}, witnesses, panel 1: Paul E. Simons {19kb.pdf, copy, copy, dos copy: none} (EB/ESC: deputy assistant secretary for energy, sanctions, and commodities, bureau of economic and business affairs, since renamed, EEB: bureau of economic, energy and business affairs, DoS: U.S. State Department), panel 2: Kenneth Katzman {19kb.pdf, copy, copy} (specialist in middle eastern affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress), Ilan Berman {78kb.pdf, copy, copy} (vice president for policy, AFPC: American Foreign Policy Council), Andrew Davenport {29kb.pdf, copy, copy} (vice president, Conflict Securities Advisory Group), Jeffrey J. Schott {29kb.pdf, copy, copy, 33kb.html, pf} (senior fellow, Institute for International Economics, later renamed, October 23 2006, Peterson Institute for International Economics), C-Span video: none, committee video/audio: none, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript {archive}, CQ/FDCH transcript copy.

____________________

 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

• The Iran Crisis: A Transatlantic Response {194kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-1, CSCE: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing, CSCE 109-1-5, June 9 2005, 1:30-3:45 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.SE 2:109-1-5, LCCN: none, OCLC: 76834574, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, November 9 2006}, Samuel Dale Brownback {7kb.html} (chairman), Christopher Henry Smith {5kb.html} (co-chairman), Benjamin Louis Cardin {6kb.html} (ranking member), witnesses: Goli Ameri {15kb.html} (U.S. Public Delegate to the U.N. Human Rights Commission), Karim Lahidji {8kb.html} (vice-president, FIDH: International Federation of Human Rights), Manda Zand Ervin {7kb.html} (founder, Alliance of Iranian Women).

____________________

 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

• China's Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and Its Role in Addressing the Nuclear and Missile Situations in Both Nations (U.S. Congress 109-2, USCC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing, September 14 2006, 8:30-4:30 p.m. ET), agenda, {SuDoc: Y 3.2:C 44/??, GPOcat}, Daniel A. Blumenthal (commissioner, hearing co-chair), Carolyn Bartholomew {16kb.html, 8.6kb.pdf} (commissioner, commission vice chairman), William A. Reinsch {16kb.html, 8.8kb.pdf} (hearing co-chair), witnesses, panel-1: Paula A. DeSutter {32kb.html, 38kb.pdf, 33kb.html, source, source} (assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance and implementation (T/VCI), office of the under secretary of state for arms control and international security (T), DoS: U.S. State Department), Peter W. Rodman (bio, bio) {44kb.pdf, 68kb.doc, source, source} (assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (ISA), office of the under secretary of defense for policy (USDP), DoD: U.S. Defense Department), panel-2: Ehsan Ahrari {47kb.html, 40kb.pdf} (CEO, Strategic Paradigms, Alexandria Virginia), John Calabrese {42kb.html, copy, 37kb.pdf} (adjunct scholar, MEI: Middle East Institute, assistant professor, Washington Semester Program, AU: American University, Washington D.C.), Ilan Berman {41kb.html, 89kb.pdf} (vice president for policy, AFPC: American Foreign Policy Council), transcripts, panel-1, panel-2.

 

 

Senate Committees

 

Senate Intelligence Committee

• Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States {233kb.txt, purl, 227kb.pdf, purl, source, source} (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-724, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2 2006, 10:10 a.m.-1:50 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/19:S.HRG.109-724, LCCN: (none yet), OCLC: 94529841, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, March 21 2007}, Charles Patrick Roberts (chairman), John Davison Rockefeller IV (vice chairman) {20kb.html}, witnesses: John Negroponte (Director of National Intelligence) {97kb.pdf, copy, source}, Michael V. Hayden (General, U.S. Air Force; Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence; former Director, NSA: National Security Agency), Robert S. Mueller III (Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), Porter J. Goss (Director, Central Intelligence Agency), Michael D. Maples (General, U.S. Army; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), Charles Allen (Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security), Carol Rodley (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research), C-Span video {3:42:25, 216mb.rm, schedule, 547801449, 191001-1}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript {archive}, CQ/FDCH transcript.

 
 

Query: “Conducted”?

“Enrichment program”?

“Nearly two decades”?

Wow.

Two decades.

20 long years.

With no IAEA monitoring.

They must have a whole bunch of bombs.

By now.

Or anyway, bomb fuel, 90% enriched.

Tons of it.

Is that what you want us to believe?

Mr. Negroponte?

But.

This is a bald-faced lie.

Is it not.

Mr. Negroponte.

The IAEA never made this claim.

Because what John Negroponte said is not true.

Iran’s first act of enrichment.

A 1-centrifuge experiment.

Was June 25 2003.

Nine months after Iran orally informed the IAEA about the facility (September 2002), then under construction. IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40, June 6 2003, ¶¶ 2-3.

Eight months after the IAEA was scheduled to visit the facility (October 2002), subsequently postponed (on account of Iraq, I suppose). IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40, June 6 2003, ¶ 4.

Four months after Iran formally declared the facility, then still under construction, during the IAEA’s first visit (February 21 2003). IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40, June 6 2003, ¶ 5.

Four months after the IAEA placed the facility under IAEA safeguards.

And after the IAEA first took extensive baseline swabs.

All over the facility.

Not “clandestine.”

Not “two decades” earlier.

 
 

What they did for “nearly two decades.”

Was not “conduct” an enrichment program.

As this liar, John Negroponte, asserts.

And well knows.

They got educated.

About nuclear science.

They sent students to school.

In the U.S. and Russia and France.

They conducted tiny experiments.

With their tiny research reactor.

And in their chemistry labs.

And in their physics labs.

The nuts and bolts of education.

With the goal in mind, to create.

In the future.

A “program” to enrich uranium.

Mohamed ElBaradei characterized this nuclear education phase this way:

 

“Developing” a program which did not exist.

Not “conducting” a program which did exist.

As this liar, John Negroponte, pretends.

To the acclaim of the Israel-Jew Lobby.

Which packs all congressional hearing rooms.

With monitors.

Lest Members of Congress—

Forget, they are being watched.

Forget, where their money comes from.

Forget, their powerful opposition lurks.

Ready to strike.

At the next election.

Should a Member stray.

The first step in creating a program.

Which did not exist.

Was to purchase, from the A.Q. Khan network, parts for 500 centrifuges.

In “the mid 1990s.”

Mohamed ElBaradei tells us.

 

This was a perfectly legal purchase.

Of items Iran is entitled to have.

By the NPT treaty.

This purchase likely occurred after Bill Clinton persuaded Russia, on May 10 1995, to not sell Iran, the complete, turn-key, centrifuge plant, Iran wanted to buy.

William J. Clinton (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1993-2001 Jan. 20), Boris Yeltsin (Russia President, July 10 1991-1999 Dec. 31), “Remarks by President Clinton and President Yeltsin in a Joint Press Conference” {copy} (Kremlin, Press Conference Hall, May 10 1995, 2:40-3:20 p.m.), retitled “The President’s News Conference With President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow,” 31:19 WCPD 777-819 {29kb.txt, 45kb.pdf, issue contents 4kb.txt, 23kb.pdf faulty} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:31/19}, 1995 PPPUS 661-667, at 662, 664 (book 1) {30kb.txt, 104kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.114:995/BK.1}, quoted with an additional narrative here.

Another would-have-been.

Perfectly legal purchase.

It was only after that disappointment, Iran would have any reason to buy parts, for 500 centrifuges, from the A.Q. Khan network.

Though, they might have bought them a year or two earlier, to first investigate the feasibility, hassle, and expense, of doing it themselves, from scratch.

But it was only after May 10 1995, that Iran had any reason to get serious, to set to work in a determined effort, to “develop” their own centrifuge plant.

Which did not exist.

And with no centrifuge plant, Iran plainly could not “conduct” an enrichment program.

Now, more years go by.

During which Iran slowly acquired the specialized steel, and other materials and parts, create engineering drawings, and such, to actually manufacture centrifuges (500 is not enough), and to spin-test them mechanically, and balance them, and to design and engineer the rest of the plant, with all its vacuum pumps, piping, controls, safety measures, and such. And build the buildings to house the plant.

This is an engineering program.

And a construction program.

Not an enrichment program.

Only after they made a centrifuge plant, can Iran be said to have a “centrifuge enrichment program.”

But even at this stage, Iran was still not “conducting” a centrifuge enrichment program.

They were still “developing” it.

Even after June 25 2003.

They were still “developing” it.

Because you can’t enrich uranium, to fuel grade (3-5%).

With only one centrifuge.

At least not on a commercial scale.

And scaling-up, from a single centrifuge, to a coordinated cascade, of 164 centrifuges.

That was their next stage of “developing” an enrichment program.

Which still, did not exist.

At long last.

After connecting-up 164 centrifuges.

After spinning them one-by-one to balance them.

Speeding them up.

To rebalance them.

Testing the piping, seals, valves, vacuum pumps, vacuum chamber, controls, gas flow.

With an inert gas.

Only then.

After all of these preliminaries.

Did Iran finally create a centrifuge plant.

Ready to introduce uranium hexafloride gas.

For enrichment.

A gas, at all times, under IAEA seals.

Only then.

Can Iran be said to be “conducting.”

A centrifuge enrichment program.

April 2006.

Not 20 years earlier.

As this liar.

John Negroponte.

Testified.

In grave and solemn tones.

To Congress.

Query: “Clandestine”?

Oooooh ...

“Clandestine.”

Sounds sinister.

Did Iran have any legal obligation to report to the IAEA?

Its efforts to create a centrifuge plant?

Years before it was ever expected to exist?

If not, then what Iran did is not “clandestine.”

Because that word implies wrongdoing, a duty to reveal.

It’s a blatant lie.

By John Negroponte.

 

Iran publicly announced and reported its uranium mining activities (which is anyway not a topic of the NPT treaty), when they first started.

Iran reported to the IAEA the design and plans for its uranium conversion plant (which is anyway not an “enrichment” activity), on July 31 2000 {GOV/2003/75, November 10 2003, annex 1, ¶ 2}, years before the NPT treaty safeguards agreement required those reports.

Iran had no obligation to report its two centrifuge plants at Natanz (testing, production), until 180 days (6 months) before they intend to feed uranium hexafloride gas into a centrifuge there.

They reported them orally in 2002 and formally on February 21-22 2003. Both were then under construction.

They first introduced uranium hexafloride gas on June 25 2003, into one centrifuge at their pilot testing plant at Natanz, an experiment with IAEA consent and under IAEA safeguards.

Making a centrifuge plant is perfectly lawful under the NPT treaty.

And they reported it, when they were supposed to.

Iran did not report a number of tiny experiments, part of their education and development experiments,

But Iran was, prima facie, lawfully entitled to not report these, to protect themselves from the unlawful material breaches of the NPT treaty, by the United States, targeted explicitly at Iran, explicitly to prevent it from obtaining the materials to make their a centrifuge plant.

A provocation, John Negroponte concealed, from his deceitful testimony.

Query: “Violation”?

A lie.

Created by John Negroponte.

By concealing, from his prepared statement, and his testimony (reading that statement), the material breaches by the United States of the NPT treaty.

This malicious, unlawful, lawbreaking by the U.S. legalized any otherwise unlawful failure (if any) by Iran to report to the IAEA.

All of Iran’s activities have been legal under the NPT treaty.

A procedural failure.

To report a lawful activity.

This is not a violation of the NPT treaty.

It’s a prima facie violation of the Safeguards Agreement.

Not the NPT treaty.

But it’s only a prima facie violation.

If Iran has a legal justification.

For its failure to report.

Then its failure to report is not a violation.

Of the Safeguards Agreement.

Was Iran legally justified in failing to report?

Absolutely.

A prima facie lawful countermeasure.

To the extensive material breaches of the NPT treaty.

By the United States.

And by many other NPT member nations.

Colluding with the United States.

All of whom have the continuing legal duty, under the NPT treaty, to assist Iran, to acquire the things it needs, to develop its centrifuge plant, and its civilian nuclear electricity plant, at Bushehr.

Not to frustrate Iran’s efforts.

By seizing goods Iran bought and paid for.

Punishing and abusing companies and countries seeking to assist Iran.

Hence, a lawful failure to report.

This is not a “violation.”

As the liar, John Negroponte, asserts.

And if anybody wants to argue the point, then the most John Negroponte could honestly assert is a “possible” violation, but Iran has a persuasive legal argument, that it is not a violation.

Query: “Seeks nuclear weapons”?

North Korea “probably” has nuclear weapons.

John Negroponte tells us.

But John Negroponte omits that adverb “probably,” when he tells us, confidently, that Iran “seeks” nuclear weapons.

That disappearing adverb, juxtaposed next to Iran, means, John Negroponte here asserts a higher level of certainty about Iran, than he does about Korea, which not only claims to have nuclear weapons, but is known to have the fissile material (plutonium) to make them.

John Negroponte’s assertion, of greater certainty, about Iran’s intentions—

This is a blatant lie.

By John Negroponte.

All those acquainted with the evidence say, they do not know, if Iran “seeks” nuclear weapons.

The IAEA doesn’t know.

 
 

The U.K. Foreign Secretary doesn’t know.

The Russian Foreign Minister doesn’t know.

The two ranking officials on the U.S. Congress, House Intelligence Committee (chairman and ranking minority member)—

Fully briefed, on all the evidence, available to John Negroponte—

They don’t know.

All of them.

(Except the liars, John Negroponte, and his co-conspirators).

They all say, they do not know.

Notwithstanding the U.S. pouring intense effort to persuade them to the contrary.

Query: “Not yet”?

The words “not yet” are an implied assertion of fact.

That Iran intends to do so.

Acquire nuclear weapons.

Enrich uranium to bomb grade (90% U-234).

As to which there is no evidence.

Therefore, the use of the words “not yet” is a lie.

Query: “Iran ... threatens”?

If Iran “threatens international security,” it doesn’t do so with nuclear weapons.

Because Iran has no nuclear weapons.

And there’s no evidence Iran “seeks” nuclear weapons.

Merely endless assertions to that effect.

By U.S. official liars.

Like John Negroponte.

A “threat” is what George W. Bush asserts, he has legal authority to prevent, by ordering a war, without a vote in Congress.

A “threat to the peace,” from Iran’s nuclear program, is what the U.N. Security Council must find, before it has jurisdiction, legal authority, to issue a binding order, for Iran to stop enrichment, impose sanctions, or authorize war.

And so, John Negroponte is here playing his part, in the U.S. government conspiracy to lie, to do the best he can, to pretend, that Iran’s nuclear program is a “threat to the peace,” without any nuclear bomb to point to, without any evidence, of any effort or intention to “seek” a nuclear bomb.

A liar for hire.

A team player.

Just like he’s always been.

Just like they knew he would continue to be.

When George W. Bush appointed him to the job.

And when the Senate voted to confirm him to the job.

So, no surprises, then.

Query: Evidence?

Unlike President George W. Bush — who is a bald faced liar — John Negroponte does not assert it to be an unassailable fact, that Iran “seeks” nuclear weapons.

George W. Bush asserts that to be an unassailable fact, at every opportunity, with the TV cameras and tape recorders rolling.

John Negroponte asserted this to be a supposed opinion, not an unassailable fact, when he used the words “we assess”.

“We assess” is intelligence-speak for opinion, not fact, meaning we don’t know for sure.

At least, that’s what it means to people who pay close attention.

And that excludes the general public, busy and preoccupied with their daily affairs.

But this assessment, too, is nevertheless a lie.

By John Negroponte.

Because he is Director of National Intelligence.

And we are therefore bound to assume, that any such assessment is based on evidence.

Unless he tells us otherwise.

He did not tell us otherwise.

Therefore, John Negroponte lied, by concealing from us the basis for that assessment.

That assessment is plainly no different from the faulty assessment that Cuba has a bio weapons program.

Another assessment not based on evidence.

It’s based on theories, inferences, suppositions, imaginings, what might be, would could be.

An “opinion” a reasoned, rational, assessment of weighty, persuasive, evidence.

There is no such evidence.

Therefore, there can not be an “opinion” that Iran “seeks” a nuclear weapon.

There can be a fear.

There can be a suspicion.

There can be a blind, irrational, belief.

But there can not be an “opinion.”

And, there can not be an “assessment.”

An “assessment” is a big word implying, even more weighty, persuasive, evidence.

The most that can be said, about either country, is they have the scientific, and engineering, “capability” to do it, if they want to.

But whether or not they intend to do it, we do not know.

They say they don’t.

There’s no evidence they do.

As in any society, there are many voices.

And then there’s government policy.

The authoritative voice, in control of the decision.

An honest person can say no more than that.

John Negroponte is dishonest.

A liar.

Just like the rest of his co-conspirators.

Apparently, at least some Senators know a liar when they hear one.

They want to give John Negroponte a second chance:

Anonymous (Associated Press), “Intelligence Update On Iran Is Requested: Senate Democrats Write President” {pf} (Washington Post, May 20 2006) {full text}.