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Iran: Uranium enrichment
See George lie. Latest:  1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  4 

Iran nuclear, uranium enrichment:

U.S. Congress committees: Hearings, bills, markups, reports


by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.


Bombing Iran's IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities

U.S. complicity in Israel settlement confiscations

War Crimes Act
Blockade, reprisals
Iran uranium timeline
Congress committees

Congress resolutions, War power

IAEA, Security Council
Iran nuclear analysis
Congress Iraq wmd war
John Bolton

Iraq wmd war timeline: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005-2006, 2007

IR655
Israel/Palestine timeline:

Palestine Peace Not Apartheid

The Israel Lobby

This Page:

Joint Committees:

Economic
CSCE
USCC

Senate Committees:

Intelligence
Armed Services
Foreign Relations
Banking
Judiciary
Governmental Affairs
Democratic Policy

House Committees:

Intelligence
Armed Services
Foreign Affairs
Financial Services
Oversight/Reform

Pending Bills:

H.R.282, S.333

H.Res.846
H.Res.782
S.3536

 

Congressional Record (Iran*)

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

_______

Buttons:

LOC (Library of Congress): A date-sorted menu, from a Congressional Record stemmed search (“Iran, Iran’s, Iranian, Iranians”), in 3 of the 4 sections of the daily edition: Senate chamber, House chamber, House extension of remarks (written statements), excludes the daily digest (U.S. Library of Congress, “Thomas,” a copy of the GPO daily edition online).

GPO: Same as LOC, but at the U.S. Government Printing Office instead, the official daily edition online (less precise search software and it won’t date-sort).

Daily: Same as LOC, but in the “Daily Digest” only.

Digest: Same as Daily, but at the U.S. Government Printing Office instead.

Volumes: 2007 (volume 153, Congress 110-1), 2006 (volume 152, Congress 109-2), 2005 (volume 151, Congress 109-1), 2004 (volume 150, Congress 108-2), 2003 (volume 149, Congress 108-1), 2002 (volume 148, Congress 107-2), 2001 (volume 147, Congress 107-1), 2000 (volume 146, Congress 106-2).

 

Joint Committees

 

Joint Economic Committee

Energy and the Iranian Economy {225kb.txt, 822kb.pdf, purl, source, source} (U.S. Congress 109-2, S. Hrg. 109-720, JEC: Joint Economic Committee, Hearing, July 25 2006, 10:00 a.m.-12:05 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.EC 7:EN 2/24, LCCN: (none yet), OCLC: 122525386, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, March 2 2007}, Hugh James Saxton (chairman) {21kb.html}, John F. (Jack) Reed (ranking minority member) {44kb.pdf}, witnesses, panel 1: Paul E. Simons {19kb.pdf, copy, copy, dos copy: none} (EB/ESC: deputy assistant secretary for energy, sanctions, and commodities, bureau of economic and business affairs, since renamed, EEB: bureau of economic, energy and business affairs, DoS: U.S. State Department), panel 2: Kenneth Katzman {19kb.pdf, copy, copy} (specialist in middle eastern affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress), Ilan Berman {78kb.pdf, copy, copy} (vice president for policy, AFPC: American Foreign Policy Council), Andrew Davenport {29kb.pdf, copy, copy} (vice president, Conflict Securities Advisory Group), Jeffrey J. Schott {29kb.pdf, copy, copy, 33kb.html, pf} (senior fellow, Institute for International Economics, later renamed, October 23 2006, Peterson Institute for International Economics), C-Span video: none, committee video/audio: none, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript {archive}, CQ/FDCH transcript copy.

____________________

 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Iran Crisis: A Transatlantic Response {194kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-1, CSCE: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hearing, CSCE 109-1-5, June 9 2005, 1:30-3:45 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.SE 2:109-1-5, LCCN: none, OCLC: 76834574, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, November 9 2006}, Samuel Dale Brownback {7kb.html} (chairman), Christopher Henry Smith {5kb.html} (co-chairman), Benjamin Louis Cardin {6kb.html} (ranking member), witnesses: Goli Ameri {15kb.html} (U.S. Public Delegate to the U.N. Human Rights Commission), Karim Lahidji {8kb.html} (vice-president, FIDH: International Federation of Human Rights), Manda Zand Ervin {7kb.html} (founder, Alliance of Iranian Women).

____________________

 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

China's Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and Its Role in Addressing the Nuclear and Missile Situations in Both Nations (U.S. Congress 109-2, USCC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing, September 14 2006, 8:30-4:30 p.m. ET), agenda, {SuDoc: Y 3.2:C 44/??, GPOcat}, Daniel A. Blumenthal (commissioner, hearing co-chair), Carolyn Bartholomew {16kb.html, 8.6kb.pdf} (commissioner, commission vice chairman), William A. Reinsch {16kb.html, 8.8kb.pdf} (hearing co-chair), witnesses, panel-1: Paula A. DeSutter {32kb.html, 38kb.pdf, 33kb.html, source, source} (assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance and implementation (T/VCI), office of the under secretary of state for arms control and international security (T), DoS: U.S. State Department), Peter W. Rodman (bio, bio) {44kb.pdf, 68kb.doc, source, source} (assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (ISA), office of the under secretary of defense for policy (USDP), DoD: U.S. Defense Department), panel-2: Ehsan Ahrari {47kb.html, 40kb.pdf} (CEO, Strategic Paradigms, Alexandria Virginia), John Calabrese {42kb.html, copy, 37kb.pdf} (adjunct scholar, MEI: Middle East Institute, assistant professor, Washington Semester Program, AU: American University, Washington D.C.), Ilan Berman {41kb.html, 89kb.pdf} (vice president for policy, AFPC: American Foreign Policy Council), transcripts, panel-1, panel-2.

 

 

Senate Committees

 

Senate Intelligence Committee

Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States {233kb.txt, purl, 227kb.pdf, purl, source, source} (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-724, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2 2006, 10:10 a.m.-1:50 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/19:S.HRG.109-724, LCCN: (none yet), OCLC: 94529841, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, March 21 2007}, Charles Patrick Roberts (chairman), John Davison Rockefeller IV (vice chairman) {20kb.html}, witnesses: John Negroponte (Director of National Intelligence) {97kb.pdf, copy, source}, Michael V. Hayden (General, U.S. Air Force; Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence; former Director, NSA: National Security Agency), Robert S. Mueller III (Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), Porter J. Goss (Director, Central Intelligence Agency), Michael D. Maples (General, U.S. Army; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), Charles Allen (Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security), Carol Rodley (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research), C-Span video {3:42:25, 216mb.rm, schedule, 547801449, 191001-1}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript {archive}, CQ/FDCH transcript.

 

“ John Negroponte {Iran: 7:48}:

{0:46} Our concerns about Iran are shared by many nations, by the International Atomic Energy Agency and, of course, Iran’s neighbors.

Iran conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement.

And despite its claim to the contrary, we assess that Iran seeks nuclear weapons.

We judge that Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile material.

* * *

{0:29} North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons, a claim that we assess is probably true.

And it has threatened to proliferate these weapons abroad.

Thus, like Iran, North Korea threatens international security and is located in a historically volatile region.”

John Negroponte (Director of National Intelligence), testimony, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing, February 2 2006), cited just above, accord, prepared statement {97kb.pdf}. C-Span video {3:42:25, at 1:00:30}.

 

Query: “Conducted”?

“Enrichment program”?

“Nearly two decades”?

Wow.

Two decades.

20 long years.

With no IAEA monitoring.

They must have a whole bunch of bombs.

By now.

Or anyway, bomb fuel, 90% enriched.

Tons of it.

Is that what you want us to believe?

Mr. Negroponte?

But.

This is a bald-faced lie.

Is it not.

Mr. Negroponte.

The IAEA never made this claim.

Because what John Negroponte said is not true.

Iran’s first act of enrichment.

A 1-centrifuge experiment.

Was June 25 2003.

Nine months after Iran orally informed the IAEA about the facility (September 2002), then under construction. IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40, June 6 2003, ¶¶ 2-3.

Eight months after the IAEA was scheduled to visit the facility (October 2002), subsequently postponed (on account of Iraq, I suppose). IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40, June 6 2003, ¶ 4.

Four months after Iran formally declared the facility, then still under construction, during the IAEA’s first visit (February 21 2003). IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40, June 6 2003, ¶ 5.

Four months after the IAEA placed the facility under IAEA safeguards.

And after the IAEA first took extensive baseline swabs.

All over the facility.

Not “clandestine.”

Not “two decades” earlier.

 

“ Mohamed ElBaradei: 33. On 25 June 2003, Iran introduced UF6 {uranium hexafloride gas} into the first centrifuge for the purpose of single machine testing, and on 19 August 2003 began the testing of a small ten-machine cascade with UF6.

Iran continues to co-operate with the Agency in implementing safeguards measures now in place at PFEP {Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant} for monitoring single machine and small cascade testing.

34. In accordance with its standard practice, the Agency took baseline environmental samples at PFEP at Natanz before nuclear material was introduced in the facility.

This baseline sampling campaign was conducted during inspections carried out between March and June 2003, and samples were taken at many locations within the facility.”

Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA Director General), Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/63, 26 August 2003, derestricted 12 September 2003) {50kb.pdf}, page 7, ¶¶ 33-35:

 

What they did for “nearly two decades.”

Was not “conduct” an enrichment program.

As this liar, John Negroponte, asserts.

And well knows.

They got educated.

About nuclear science.

They sent students to school.

In the U.S. and Russia and France.

They conducted tiny experiments.

With their tiny research reactor.

And in their chemistry labs.

And in their physics labs.

The nuts and bolts of education.

With the goal in mind, to create.

In the future.

A “program” to enrich uranium.

Mohamed ElBaradei characterized this nuclear education phase this way:

“ Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme.”

Mohamed ElBaradei, Report, ¶ 45, page 8 (IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003) {324kb.pdf}.

 

“Developing” a program which did not exist.

Not “conducting” a program which did exist.

As this liar, John Negroponte, pretends.

To the acclaim of the Israel-Jew Lobby.

Which packs all congressional hearing rooms.

With monitors.

Lest Members of Congress—

Forget, they are being watched.

Forget, where their money comes from.

Forget, their powerful opposition lurks.

Ready to strike.

At the next election.

Should a Member stray.

The first step in creating a program.

Which did not exist.

Was to purchase, from the A.Q. Khan network, parts for 500 centrifuges.

In “the mid 1990s.”

Mohamed ElBaradei tells us.

“ 16. Iran has said it is unable to supply any documentation or other information about the meetings that led to the acquisition of 500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s.”

Mohamed ElBaradei, Report, ¶ 16, page 4 (IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, February 27 2006, derestricted March 8 2006) {80kb.pdf}.

 

This was a perfectly legal purchase.

Of items Iran is entitled to have.

By the NPT treaty.

This purchase likely occurred after Bill Clinton persuaded Russia, on May 10 1995, to not sell Iran, the complete, turn-key, centrifuge plant, Iran wanted to buy.

William J. Clinton (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1993-2001 Jan. 20), Boris Yeltsin (Russia President, July 10 1991-1999 Dec. 31), “Remarks by President Clinton and President Yeltsin in a Joint Press Conference{copy} (Kremlin, Press Conference Hall, May 10 1995, 2:40-3:20 p.m.), retitled “The President’s News Conference With President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow,” 31:19 WCPD 777-819 {29kb.txt, 45kb.pdf, issue contents 4kb.txt, 23kb.pdf faulty} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:31/19}, 1995 PPPUS 661-667, at 662, 664 (book 1) {30kb.txt, 104kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.114:995/BK.1}, quoted with an additional narrative here.

Another would-have-been.

Perfectly legal purchase.

It was only after that disappointment, Iran would have any reason to buy parts, for 500 centrifuges, from the A.Q. Khan network.

Though, they might have bought them a year or two earlier, to first investigate the feasibility, hassle, and expense, of doing it themselves, from scratch.

But it was only after May 10 1995, that Iran had any reason to get serious, to set to work in a determined effort, to “develop” their own centrifuge plant.

Which did not exist.

And with no centrifuge plant, Iran plainly could not “conduct” an enrichment program.

Now, more years go by.

During which Iran slowly acquired the specialized steel, and other materials and parts, create engineering drawings, and such, to actually manufacture centrifuges (500 is not enough), and to spin-test them mechanically, and balance them, and to design and engineer the rest of the plant, with all its vacuum pumps, piping, controls, safety measures, and such. And build the buildings to house the plant.

This is an engineering program.

And a construction program.

Not an enrichment program.

Only after they made a centrifuge plant, can Iran be said to have a “centrifuge enrichment program.”

But even at this stage, Iran was still not “conducting” a centrifuge enrichment program.

They were still “developing” it.

Even after June 25 2003.

They were still “developing” it.

Because you can’t enrich uranium, to fuel grade (3-5%).

With only one centrifuge.

At least not on a commercial scale.

And scaling-up, from a single centrifuge, to a coordinated cascade, of 164 centrifuges.

That was their next stage of “developing” an enrichment program.

Which still, did not exist.

At long last.

After connecting-up 164 centrifuges.

After spinning them one-by-one to balance them.

Speeding them up.

To rebalance them.

Testing the piping, seals, valves, vacuum pumps, vacuum chamber, controls, gas flow.

With an inert gas.

Only then.

After all of these preliminaries.

Did Iran finally create a centrifuge plant.

Ready to introduce uranium hexafloride gas.

For enrichment.

A gas, at all times, under IAEA seals.

Only then.

Can Iran be said to be “conducting.

A centrifuge enrichment program.

April 2006.

Not 20 years earlier.

As this liar.

John Negroponte.

Testified.

In grave and solemn tones.

To Congress.

Query: Clandestine”?

Oooooh ...

“Clandestine.”

Sounds sinister.

Did Iran have any legal obligation to report to the IAEA?

Its efforts to create a centrifuge plant?

Years before it was ever expected to exist?

If not, then what Iran did is not “clandestine.”

Because that word implies wrongdoing, a duty to reveal.

It’s a blatant lie.

By John Negroponte.

 

“ Tim Sebastian: The facts are.

There has been a pattern.

Of deception and lying.

For years.

Hasn’t there.

From Iran.

Mohamed ElBaradei: The fact that—

They have been working on a program.

For almost 20 years.

The fact that—

They have not been under obligation.

At that time, to inform us.

But the fact also that—

They have not really been fully transparent, in telling us in advance what was going on.

So, we now need—

Tim Sebastian: That’s diplomacy for saying.

They’ve lied.

Consistently.

Haven’t they.

Mohamed ElBaradei: Well.

No.

I’m not saying that. ...

Tim Sebastian: You went to Iran.

In February. {2003} ...

For the first time.

They declared two new facilities.

Didn’t they.

Two nuclear facilities, to you.

That you had missed.

And your agency had missed—

Mohamed ElBaradei: No.

Tim Sebastian: —before.

Mohamed ElBaradei: We have not “missed.”

These are facilities still under construction.

And so they are not really operating facilities.

Tim Sebastian: But you didn’t know they were being built.

Did you.

Mohamed ElBaradei: No, we did not.

And.

They did not have a legal obligation to tell us.

As early as that, as when they started.”

Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), interviewed by Tim Sebastian, “Mohamed ElBaradei{pf} (BBC News 24, BBC World, HARDtalk, August 29 2003), video {24:14}.

Iran publicly announced and reported its uranium mining activities (which is anyway not a topic of the NPT treaty), when they first started.

Iran reported to the IAEA the design and plans for its uranium conversion plant (which is anyway not an “enrichment” activity), on July 31 2000 {GOV/2003/75, November 10 2003, annex 1, ¶ 2}, years before the NPT treaty safeguards agreement required those reports.

Iran had no obligation to report its two centrifuge plants at Natanz (testing, production), until 180 days (6 months) before they intend to feed uranium hexafloride gas into a centrifuge there.

They reported them orally in 2002 and formally on February 21-22 2003. Both were then under construction.

They first introduced uranium hexafloride gas on June 25 2003, into one centrifuge at their pilot testing plant at Natanz, an experiment with IAEA consent and under IAEA safeguards.

Making a centrifuge plant is perfectly lawful under the NPT treaty.

And they reported it, when they were supposed to.

Iran did not report a number of tiny experiments, part of their education and development experiments,

But Iran was, prima facie, lawfully entitled to not report these, to protect themselves from the unlawful material breaches of the NPT treaty, by the United States, targeted explicitly at Iran, explicitly to prevent it from obtaining the materials to make their a centrifuge plant.

A provocation, John Negroponte concealed, from his deceitful testimony.

Query: Violation”?

A lie.

Created by John Negroponte.

By concealing, from his prepared statement, and his testimony (reading that statement), the material breaches by the United States of the NPT treaty.

This malicious, unlawful, lawbreaking by the U.S. legalized any otherwise unlawful failure (if any) by Iran to report to the IAEA.

All of Iran’s activities have been legal under the NPT treaty.

A procedural failure.

To report a lawful activity.

This is not a violation of the NPT treaty.

It’s a prima facie violation of the Safeguards Agreement.

Not the NPT treaty.

But it’s only a prima facie violation.

If Iran has a legal justification.

For its failure to report.

Then its failure to report is not a violation.

Of the Safeguards Agreement.

Was Iran legally justified in failing to report?

Absolutely.

A prima facie lawful countermeasure.

To the extensive material breaches of the NPT treaty.

By the United States.

And by many other NPT member nations.

Colluding with the United States.

All of whom have the continuing legal duty, under the NPT treaty, to assist Iran, to acquire the things it needs, to develop its centrifuge plant, and its civilian nuclear electricity plant, at Bushehr.

Not to frustrate Iran’s efforts.

By seizing goods Iran bought and paid for.

Punishing and abusing companies and countries seeking to assist Iran.

Hence, a lawful failure to report.

This is not a “violation.”

As the liar, John Negroponte, asserts.

And if anybody wants to argue the point, then the most John Negroponte could honestly assert is a “possible” violation, but Iran has a persuasive legal argument, that it is not a violation.

Query: Seeks nuclear weapons”?

North Korea “probably” has nuclear weapons.

John Negroponte tells us.

But John Negroponte omits that adverb “probably,” when he tells us, confidently, that Iran “seeks” nuclear weapons.

That disappearing adverb, juxtaposed next to Iran, means, John Negroponte here asserts a higher level of certainty about Iran, than he does about Korea, which not only claims to have nuclear weapons, but is known to have the fissile material (plutonium) to make them.

John Negroponte’s assertion, of greater certainty, about Iran’s intentions—

This is a blatant lie.

By John Negroponte.

All those acquainted with the evidence say, they do not know, if Iran “seeks” nuclear weapons.

The IAEA doesn’t know.

 

“ Hans Blix {1:43}: The IAEA Board of Governors have not asserted, that the Iranians have that intention.”

Hans Blix (chairman, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm; IAEA Director General, 1981-1997), replying to Mark Turner (Financial Times, London) (United Nations, Press Conference, June 1 2006), U.N. video {36:59, at 32:49 (Q/A), 33:10 (quote), source}.

 

The U.K. Foreign Secretary doesn’t know.

The Russian Foreign Minister doesn’t know.

The two ranking officials on the U.S. Congress, House Intelligence Committee (chairman and ranking minority member)—

Fully briefed, on all the evidence, available to John Negroponte—

They don’t know.

All of them.

(Except the liars, John Negroponte, and his co-conspirators).

They all say, they do not know.

Notwithstanding the U.S. pouring intense effort to persuade them to the contrary.

Query: Not yet”?

The words “not yet” are an implied assertion of fact.

That Iran intends to do so.

Acquire nuclear weapons.

Enrich uranium to bomb grade (90% U-234).

As to which there is no evidence.

Therefore, the use of the words “not yet” is a lie.

Query: Iran ... threatens”?

If Iran “threatens international security,” it doesn’t do so with nuclear weapons.

Because Iran has no nuclear weapons.

And there’s no evidence Iran “seeks” nuclear weapons.

Merely endless assertions to that effect.

By U.S. official liars.

Like John Negroponte.

A “threat” is what George W. Bush asserts, he has legal authority to prevent, by ordering a war, without a vote in Congress.

A “threat to the peace,” from Iran’s nuclear program, is what the U.N. Security Council must find, before it has jurisdiction, legal authority, to issue a binding order, for Iran to stop enrichment, impose sanctions, or authorize war.

And so, John Negroponte is here playing his part, in the U.S. government conspiracy to lie, to do the best he can, to pretend, that Iran’s nuclear program is a “threat to the peace,” without any nuclear bomb to point to, without any evidence, of any effort or intention to “seek” a nuclear bomb.

A liar for hire.

A team player.

Just like he’s always been.

Just like they knew he would continue to be.

When George W. Bush appointed him to the job.

And when the Senate voted to confirm him to the job.

So, no surprises, then.

Query: Evidence?

Unlike President George W. Bush — who is a bald faced liar — John Negroponte does not assert it to be an unassailable fact, that Iran “seeks” nuclear weapons.

George W. Bush asserts that to be an unassailable fact, at every opportunity, with the TV cameras and tape recorders rolling.

John Negroponte asserted this to be a supposed opinion, not an unassailable fact, when he used the words “we assess”.

“We assess” is intelligence-speak for opinion, not fact, meaning we don’t know for sure.

At least, that’s what it means to people who pay close attention.

And that excludes the general public, busy and preoccupied with their daily affairs.

But this assessment, too, is nevertheless a lie.

By John Negroponte.

Because he is Director of National Intelligence.

And we are therefore bound to assume, that any such assessment is based on evidence.

Unless he tells us otherwise.

He did not tell us otherwise.

Therefore, John Negroponte lied, by concealing from us the basis for that assessment.

That assessment is plainly no different from the faulty assessment that Cuba has a bio weapons program.

Another assessment not based on evidence.

It’s based on theories, inferences, suppositions, imaginings, what might be, would could be.

An “opinion” a reasoned, rational, assessment of weighty, persuasive, evidence.

There is no such evidence.

Therefore, there can not be an “opinion” that Iran “seeks” a nuclear weapon.

There can be a fear.

There can be a suspicion.

There can be a blind, irrational, belief.

But there can not be an “opinion.”

And, there can not be an “assessment.”

An “assessment” is a big word implying, even more weighty, persuasive, evidence.

The most that can be said, about either country, is they have the scientific, and engineering, “capability” to do it, if they want to.

But whether or not they intend to do it, we do not know.

They say they don’t.

There’s no evidence they do.

As in any society, there are many voices.

And then there’s government policy.

The authoritative voice, in control of the decision.

An honest person can say no more than that.

John Negroponte is dishonest.

A liar.

Just like the rest of his co-conspirators.

Apparently, at least some Senators know a liar when they hear one.

They want to give John Negroponte a second chance:

Anonymous (Associated Press), “Intelligence Update On Iran Is Requested: Senate Democrats Write President{pf} (Washington Post, May 20 2006) {full text}.

 

See George lie

“ George W. Bush:

... missiles and weapons of mass destruction ... Iran aggressively pursues these weapons ... January 29 2002 {24kb.txt, 60kb.pdf copy} {video 48:10} {audio 48:06}.

... Iran ... pursues weapons of mass destruction ... January 28 2003 {33kb.txt, 50kb.pdf copy} {video 59:54} {audio 59:52}.

The Iranian Government must ... abandon their nuclear weapons program. January 1 2004 {9kb.txt, 14kb.pdf, copy}.

... the need for Iran to fully disclose and disarm its weapons programs. January 29 2004 {33kb.txt, 27kb.pdf, copy}.

... the Iranians ... must give up their nuclear weapons programs. January 26 2005 {16kb.txt, 66kb.pdf, copy}.

... Iran ... pursuing nuclear weapons ... February 2 2005 {31kb.txt, 59kb.pdf, copy} {video 54:08} {audio 54:08}.

... Iran ... its nuclear weapons program. March 8 2005 {21kb.txt, 57kb.pdf, copy} {video 32:52}.

... the Iranians ... their behavior — trying to clandestinely develop a nuclear weapon, or using the guise of a civilian nuclear weapon program to get the know-how to develop a nuclear weapon. January 13 2006 {24kb.txt, 60kb.pdf, copy} {video 26:24}.

And the Iranians have said, “We want a weapon.” January 26 2006 {46kb.txt, 84kb.pdf, copy} {video 46:14}.

Our beef with Iran is the fact that they want to develop a nuclear weapon. March 4 2006 {21kb.txt, 57kb.pdf, copy} {video 24:38}.

Iran ... they started to try to enrich uranium in order to develop a weapons program. March 22 2006 {21kb.txt, 98kb.pdf, copy} {video 1:19:12}.

... the Iranians ... they must give up their nuclear weapons ambitions ... give up its nuclear weapons program. April 10 2006 {63kb.txt, 103kb.pdf, copy} {video 1:10:11}.

... the Iranians should not have a nuclear weapon ... They must make the choice to give up their weapons ... their nuclear weapons ambitions. May 5 2006 {77kb.txt, 70kb.pdf, copy}.”

{In progress.  CJHjr}

 

What would you do?”

“ Carl Levin {8:25}: Mr. Ambassador, we need a director of national intelligence who will tell a president what a president may not want to hear.

But what he needs to hear.

We’ve too often seen heads of the intelligence community exaggerate, or misrepresent, or misstate, intelligence, to support the policy preferences of the White House.

We saw this with Bill Casey who — a bipartisan Iran-Contra Report concluded — had:

“misrepresented or selectively used available intelligence to support the policy that he” — Bill Casey — “was promoting.” ...

More recently, George Tenet also was engaged in exaggerations, and misstatements, when he said, for instance, publicly, that Iraq had:

“provided training in poisons and gases to two al-Qa'ida associates,”

which was close to what the President was saying publicly about the same issue.

But the underlying intelligence said, that that reporting was contradictory, and was from sources of varying reliability. ...

My question is this:

Are you troubled, by that kind of a public statement, of Director Tenet, which differs or differed from the underlying intelligence, relative to the connection between al-Qa'ida and Saddam Hussein?

John Negroponte: ... I believe in calling things the way I see them.

And I believe that the president deserves from his director of national intelligence, and from the intelligence community, unvarnished truth, as I best understand it.

Carl Levin: That’s critically important, because it’s not been the case.

When the DCI said that something was a slam dunk {copy} which was not a slam dunk, even given the underlying classified intelligence, that was not giving the president the unvarnished truth.

Now, you’re not responsible for what Tenet said, but your assurance here, that you will do that, is important.

There’s another aspect of unvarnished truth here, though.

And that is, that if you conclude, that policymakers are making public statements that differ from the classified intelligence.

What action will you take?

And I want to just give you a couple recent examples.

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, a single uncorroborated report alleged that the lead 9/11 hijacker, Mohammed Atta, had met in Prague in April 2001 with an Iraqi intelligence officer named Al-Ani.

On December 9th, 2001, Vice President Cheney said {0:13 bb} that the Prague meeting had been, quote,

“pretty well confirmed,”

although it had never been confirmed.

On September 8th, 2002, Vice President Cheney was asked if the CIA thought the report of the meeting was credible.

And he said {0:10 bb} it was

“credible.”

But in fact — in fact — as early as late spring of 2002, long before that statement, the intelligence community was skeptical that the meeting had taken place {4:44 bb}. ...

So you have the CIA, in its classified assessment, saying that

“the most reliable reporting to date casts doubt on that possibility.”

But yet, you have the top policymakers saying, that that meeting, we believe, took place.

My question to you is this:

What would you do?

If you were DNI, at the time that kind of a public statement were made.

If you believed, that it went beyond the classified intelligence.

John Negroponte: I think you’re raising a hypothetical.

Carl Levin: No, that’s a real one.

John Negroponte: ... I would, first of all, do my utmost to make sure that the right intelligence is presented to the president, the vice president, the Cabinet members and our armed forces and the Congress.

Carl Levin: And if you believed an erroneous statement was made, by a top policymaker, to the public?

What would you do?

John Negroponte: Well, I think that, first of all, given an opportunity to comment beforehand on the correctness or not of the statement, and if I had information that contradicted what was in a draft presidential speech, I would seek to ensure that that incorrect information did not find its way into a presidential or—

Carl Levin: And if it did?

John Negroponte: Well, you know, we have to cross that bridge, Senator.

But, I believe, that we’ve got to work to establish objective intelligence. And the Intelligence Reform Act deals with a number of mechanisms designed to do that.

Carl Levin: Thank you.”

Nomination of Ambassador John D. Negroponte to Be Director of National Intelligence {254kb.txt, 6959kb.pdf, purl, copy, source, source}, pages 18-20 (U.S. Congress 109-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-79, April 12 2005, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/19:S.HRG.109-79, LCCN: 2006415042, OCLC: 62187149, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, October 31 2005}, witness: John D. Negroponte {280kb.pdf}, transcripts {Lexis}: CQ/FDCH transcript (New York Times). FNS transcript. C-Span video {3:00:22, at 1:03:51}. The full text of this colloquy is annotated, linked, and challenged, here.

____________________

 

Query: Cross that bridge”?

And so what happened?

John Negroponte got to the bridge.

But he would not cross it.

No surprise.

Willfully colluding.

In the din.

Of hysterical public lies.

By George W. Bush.

John Bolton.

Nicholas Burns.

Robert Joseph.

Greg Schulte.

By command of Condoleezza Rice.

Supported by a chorus.

A host, of “expert” witnesses.

In the pay of the racist Israel-Jew Lobby.

With a begging bowl.

A criminal agenda, of theft and abuse.

And a war agenda.

Expatriate Iranian agitators.

With a regime-change agenda.

Reporters.

Who don’t report the facts.

(But they’re improving).

Editorial writers and pundits.

(Who are not improving).

Who do not like to be confused.

By the facts.

  CJHjr (June 22 2006)

Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States (U.S. Congress 110-1, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing, January 11 2007, 2:30 p.m. ET), John Davison Rockefeller IV (chairman), Christopher Samuel Bond (Kit Bond) (vice chairman), witnesses: John Negroponte (Director of National Intelligence) {188kb.pdf, copy, source}, Michael V. Hayden (Director of Central Intelligence) {22kb.pdf}, Robert S. Mueller III (Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) {43kb.pdf}, Randall M. Fort (Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research , Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State) {59kb.pdf}, Michael D. Maples (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) {216kb.pdf}, C-Span video {3:20:39, 193mb.rm, schedule, 198691005, 196143-1}, DNI transcript {147kb.pdf, source, copy}.

____________________

 

Senate Armed Services Committee

Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-783, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 28 2006, 9:30 a.m.) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.109-783, LCCN: 2007395101, OCLC: 85436578, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, February 27 2007}, John Warner (chairman), Carl Levin (ranking minority member), witnesses: John Negroponte (Director of National Intelligence) {91kb.pdf, copy, 63kb.html source}, Michael V. Hayden (General, U.S. Air Force; Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence; former Director, NSA: National Security Agency), Michael D. Maples (General, U.S. Army; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) {111kb.pdf, copy}, C-Span video {2:27:00, 143mb.rm, schedule, 194129076, 191386-1}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, CQ/FDCH transcript copy.

 

“ John Negroponte {Iran: 2:04}:

{1:18} With respect Iran’s nuclear program, our concerns are shared by many nations, by the IAEA and, of course, Iran’s neighbors.

* * *

Iran conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement.

And despite its claims to the contrary, we assess, that Iran seeks nuclear weapons.

While Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile material, the danger that it will do so is a reason for immediate concern.

* * *

{0:18} Like Iran, North Korea threatens international security and is located in a historically volatile region.

Unlike Iran, North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons already, a claim that we assess is probably true.”

John Negroponte (Director of National Intelligence), testimony, Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing, February 29 2006), cited just above, accord, prepared statement {91kb.pdf, copy}. C-Span video {2:27:00, at 28:43}.

See above, for comments on this testimony. Besides the quoted material, about Iran’s nuclear program, John Negroponte made many subtle changes in his prepared statement, about Iran, from his statement 4 weeks earlier (February 2).

 

U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy and the Roles and Missions of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy in Nonproliferation in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2007 and the Future Years Defense Program (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Hearing), March 29 2006, 9:30 a.m., witnesses: Peter C. W. Flory (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy) {57kb.pdf}, James E. Cartwright (General, USMC; Commander, U.S. Strategic Command) {45kb.pdf}, Jerry Paul (principal deputy administrator, NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration, DoE: U.S. Department of Energy) {58kb.pdf}, Robert Joseph (under-secretary for arms control and international security (T), DoS: U.S. State Department) (written statement, no oral testimony) {34kb.html, 31kb.pdf}Senator John Cornyn (Subcommittee chairman): The honorable Robert G. Joseph, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, could not be with us today due to a conflict with his testimony in the Foreign Relations Committee, but he has submitted a very helpful statement for the record.” Video (none). Audio (none). Transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, CQ/FDCH transcript.

____________________

 

S.3536
“A bill to ensure oversight of intelligence on Iran, and for other purposes”

Harry Reid (Senate Minority Leader), “Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions,” 152 Congressional Record S6063-S6064 {2kb.txt, 65kb.pdf}, S.3536 introduced, S6061 {17kb.txt, 46kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:79, June 19 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/79}, additional cosponsors, S6283-S6285, at S6284 {22kb.txt, 59kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:81, June 21 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/81}.

“ Harry Reid: Third, this legislation asks the question:

What is the process for making sure that senior administration officials do not publicly mischaracterize the evidence and the challenge of Iran?

Much of what we heard from the administration in the run-up to Iraq about mushroom clouds, yellow cake, and aluminum tubes turned out to be overstated or based on intelligence that was known to be very, very suspect.

I am told that the most famous of the Vice President’s speeches on Iraq — the August 2002 VFW speech that set the rush to war and dramatically overstated the threat from Iraq — was never even cleared by the intelligence community.

 

“ Dick Cheney {0:13 bb}:

Simply stated:

There is no doubt.

That Saddam Hussein.

Now has weapons of mass destruction.

There is no doubt.

He is amassing them.

To use.

Against our friends.

Against our allies.

And against us.”

August 26, 29, 2002
{video bb, at 14:56 bb}

 

With my legislation in place, and with vigilance from Congress, we will be one step closer to ensuring this kind of misleading information does not happen regarding the threat posed by Iran.

I want to be clear: President Bush must take seriously the challenge of Iran, as I know he does, but the way to success will be a policy based on the facts.

Under my legislation, the administration will be held accountable for anything less. ...”

____________________

 

“ Section 1. Short title. This Act may be cited as the “Iran Intelligence Oversight Act.”

Section 2. Intelligence on Iran. ...

(a)(1) Submittal Required.—As soon as is practicable, but not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress an updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iran ...

(c)(1) Report Required.—As soon as is practicable, but not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the process for vetting and clearing statements of Administration officials that are drawn from or rely upon intelligence.

(2) Elements.—The report shall—

(A) describe current policies and practices of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the intelligence community for—

(i) vetting and clearing statements of senior Administration officials that are drawn from or rely upon intelligence; and

(ii) how significant misstatements of intelligence that may occur in public statements of senior public officials are identified, brought to the attention of any such officials, and corrected;

(B) assess the sufficiency and adequacy of such policies and practices; and

(C) include any recommendations that the Director considers appropriate to improve such policies and practices.”

See Larisa Alexandrovna, “Congress Quietly Holds Classified Briefings on Iran as Democrats Seek Access to Intelligence” (Raw Story, June 22 2006).

Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States (U.S. Congress 110-1, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing, February 27 2007, 9:30 a.m.), Carl Levin (chairman) {pf}, John Warner (ranking minority member), witnesses: John Michael McConnell (Director of National Intelligence) {103kb.pdf, copy}, Michael D. Maples (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) {166kb.pdf}, Thomas Fingar (Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, and chairman, National Intelligence Council), C-Span video {3:05:56, 181mb.rm, schedule, 550955713, 196853-1}, DNI transcript {128kb.pdf, source}.

 

Carl Levin joins the criminal enterprise

“ Carl Levin: Turning to Iran’s nuclear program, we need to know the intelligence community’s current ... assessment of the circumstances under which Iran might give up its weapons program”

____________________

 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Iran: Security Threats and U.S. Policy {332kb.txt, 669kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 108-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-353, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 28 2003) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.108-353, LCCN: 2004368937, OCLC: 55063718, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, May 5 2004}, Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {22kb.pdf, copy}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {16kb.pdf, copy}. Witnesses, panel 1: Richard L. Armitage (Deputy Secretary of State (S), DoS: U.S. State Department) {29kb.html, 32kb.pdf, copy}, panel 2: William Luers (President and CEO, United Nations Association of the United States of America) {74kb.pdf, copy}, Nasser Hadian (Professor of Political Science, Tehran University; Visiting Professor, Columbia University, New York City) {93kb.pdf, copy}, Anthony H. Cordesman (Chair in Strategy, CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies) {76kb.pdf, copy}, Robert J. Einhorn (senior adviser, International Security Program, CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies) {55kb.pdf, copy}. Transcripts {Lexis}: CQ transcript (both panels) {copy, split: panel 1, panel 2}. FNS transcripts: panel 1, panel 2 {current, archive}.

“ Richard Armitage: ... a government which has a hunger for weapons of mass destruction ... Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons program ...”

Richard L. Armitage (Deputy Secretary of State, DoS: U.S. State Department), Iran: Security Threats and U.S. Policy (U.S. Congress 108-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-353, October 28 2003, Foreign Relations Committee), pages 7 (testimony), 8 (written statement), further cited just above.

____________________

 

“ Richard Armitage: I think Iran has a secret nuclear-weapons program.

I believe it.

But I don’t know it. ...”

Richard L. Armitage “told me,” Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans: Would President Bush go to war to stop Tehran from getting the bomb?” (New Yorker, April 8 2006) {copy}.

Iran: Weapons Proliferation, Terrorism, and Democracy {263kb.txt, purl, 436kb.pdf, purl, source, source} (U.S. Congress 109-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-211, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 19 2005, 10:13 a.m.-12:36 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.109-211, OCLC: 63198507, LCCN: 2006372421, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, February 2 2006}, Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {23kb.pdf, copy}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {70kb.pdf, copy}, witnesses, panel 1: R. Nicholas Burns (under-secretary for political affairs (P), DoS: U.S. State Department) {37kb.pdf, copy, 41kb.html, source}, panel 2: Geoffrey Kemp (director of regional strategic programs, Nixon Center) {25kb.pdf, copy}, Gary Milhollin (director, WPNAC: Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control) {21kb.html, 45kb.pdf}, George Perkovich {64kb.pdf, copy, copy, pf} (vice president for studies, CEIP: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Abbas William Samii (regional analysis coordinator for southwest asia and the middle east, RFE/RL: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) {62kb.pdf, copy}, transcripts {Lexis}: CQ transcript (both panels) {copy, split: panel 1, panel 2}, FNS transcripts: panel-1, panel-2 {archive}.

The President's Budget for Foreign Affairs {601kb.txt, 1.3mb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-769, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 15 2006, 9:45-11:55 a.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.109-769, LCCN: 2007361603, OCLC: 85357107, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, March 2 2007}, Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {24kb.pdf}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {71kb.pdf}, witness: Condoleezza Rice (Secretary of State (S), U.S. State Department) {56kb.html, 74kb.pdf, opening statement}, C-Span video {2:12:58}, committee video {2:26:33, begins at 13:45}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript. CQ/FDCH transcript.

A Nuclear Iran: Challenges and Responses {202kb.txt, purl, 182kb.pdf, purl, source, source} (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, February 15, March 2 2006, closed hearing 9:00 a.m., Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-679, open hearing 10:40 a.m.-12:43 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.109-679, LCCN: 2007361436, OCLC: 76966741, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, December 8 2006}, Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {9kb.html, 12kb.pdf, copy}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {60kb.pdf, copy}, Richard John Santorum {20kb.html}, witnesses: Ronald F. Lehman II {52kb.pdf, copy} (director, Center for Global Security Research, LLNL: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore California), Patrick Clawson {33kb.pdf, copy, copy, 27kb.html, pf} (deputy director for research, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.), Ray Takeyh {28kb.pdf, copy, source, copy} (senior fellow for middle eastern studies, CFR: Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.), committee audio {2:17:16, begins at 14:55}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, CQ/FDCH transcript {copy}.

See also Richard G. Lugar, Lugar releases report to Bush on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Iran” and report {140kb.pdf} (March 1 2006): “The United States should adopt as a basic non-proliferation principle that countries which forego their own enrichment and reprocessing programs have guaranteed access to nuclear reactor fuel at reasonable prices.”

____________________

 

Query: Guaranteed”?

Would that be like—

A contract?

To supply Iran with nuclear fuel?

Like the U.S. did already?

And then violated?

Keeping the money?

Violating the NPT treaty in the process?

Like France did already?

And then violated?

Keeping the money?

Violating the NPT treaty in the process?

Forcing Iran to invest millions of dollars, or billions, to develop their own fuel cycle?

Some “guarantee.”

A guarantee — from a rogue state — is worth—

What?

Exactly?

I’d tell you—

To take your “guarantee”—

And shove it.

Actions have consequences.

And especially, unlawful actions.

A lesson U.S. officials can’t seem to learn.

“ Ali Larijani: Before the revolution {1979}, Iran had a contract with the USA, for the supply of fuel, for a reactor.

They gave the reactor.

But they refused to give the fuel.

Even though they had received the money, and never returned the money.

Siemens, the German company, was to construct a power plant {Bushehr}.

But they canceled the contract.

We have a share in Eurodif of France—10%.

But they didn’t give us one gram of fuel.

In the 1980s, there was some discussion, in the IAEA, to have some guarantees, for the supply of fuel, for the member states of the NPT.

The discussions took seven years.

With no results.

So, therefore, there is no real guarantee, for the supply of fuel.

I think if a country has just a little brain, it would not depend on the fuel from another country.”

Ali Ardashir Larijani (Secretary of the Supreme Security Council of Iran), interviewed by Barbara Slavin in Tehran, February 6 2006, “Interview with Ali Larijani{pf} (USA Today, February 6 2006), discussed, Barbara Slavin (senior diplomatic correspondent, USA Today), interviewed by Peter Slen (executive producer, Washington Journal), “Life in Iran” (C-Span, Washington Journal, February 21 2006, 8:30-9:15 a.m.), “discusses her recent trip to Iran,” C-Span video {39:30, 548037701, 191226-3}, and see, Barbara Slavin (senior diplomatic correspondent, USA Today), interviewed by Robb Harleston, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran” (C-Span, Washington Journal, June 1 2006, 8:35-9:15 a.m.), C-Span video {35:00, 171535418, 192787-4}. “On May 31, the U.S. announced a shift in policy, saying it will work with other countries to hold direct talk with Iran about Iran’s nuclear program. He announced one condition on this policy: Iran must agree to stop nuclear activities that could lead to a bomb.”

____________________

 

Inciting Murder and Arson

In their comfortable, safe, setting, U.S. Senators listened, without comment, as a witness proposed murder and arson.

As a tool against Iran.

A witness in the pay of the Israel Lobby:

“ Patrick Clawson {Q/A 6:53, at 3:38}:

On the military side—

And it’s not my specialty.

But let me just suggest that—

The potential for covert action.

And that if we look around the Middle East—

The way in which the Israelis stopped the Egyptian missile program in the early 1960s — and the initial Israeli efforts against the Iraqi programs — were:

To arrange premature deaths of scientists involved and

To take other covert actions.

And the Iranian industrial facilities are highly complex industrial facilities that have been subject already to lots of industrial accidents.

If the rate of accidents rose dramatically, and that slowed down the Iranian program, that could have quite an impact.

So, I would hope, that if we ever got to that point of military action, the first thing we would try would be things less confrontational.

Like covert actions.

Because, I worry, that if we start attacking them,

They’re going to attack us back. ...

Ray Takeyh: Now—

Whacking the scientists

Patrick can speak about that.

I think Iranians have enough scientific knowledge, and scientific software, to be able to continue the program.”

Patrick Clawson (deputy director for research, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.), Ray Takeyh (senior fellow for middle eastern studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.), testimony, A Nuclear Iran: Challenges and Responses (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, March 2 2006), further cited above. Committee audio {2:17:16, begins at 14:55, at 1:28:22 (Q/A Joe Biden), 1:31:37 (quote)}.

 

“ All of the initial attacks would be undertaken more or less simultaneously, in order to kill as many of the technically competent staff as possible, therefore doing the greatest damage to longer-term prospects.

This would be a necessary part of any military action and would probably extend to the destruction of university laboratories and technology centres that indirectly support the Iranian nuclear scientific and technical infrastructure. ...

The killing of those with technical expertise would have a much more substantial impact on any efforts to redevelop nuclear capabilities.

Furthermore, since such expertise is known to include foreign nationals {Russians}, the killing of such people already working in the country would serve as a deterrent to the involvement of others in the future.”

Paul Rogers (Professor of Peace Studies, University of Bradford; Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group), Iran: Consequences of a War (Oxford Research Group, February 2006) {135kb.html, 1085kb.pdf}.

 

U.S. Senators apparently think that’s a fine idea.

Because they didn’t speak up.

And that’s a very encouraging wink and nod.

To the U.S. military and CIA.

Presently engaged in just such a violent criminal enterprise inside Iran.

A reinforcement, of the orders they have received to do it.

Which George W. Bush, too, appears to endorse:

“ George W. Bush: We’ve agreed on the goal. And that is, the Iranians should not have a nuclear weapon, the capacity to make a nuclear weapon, or the knowledge as to how to make a nuclear weapon. That’s our stated goal.

It’s also the goal, fortunately, of other—

Of friends and allies, starting with Great Britain, Germany, and France. ...

... their nuclear weapons ambitions ... their nuclear weapons ambitions ...

Now, I want to emphasize this point.

And that is, is that we’re not only making sure they don’t have the means to develop the weapon but the knowledge.

And that’s why I was very strong in saying that they should not have—

That there should not be a research component involved with the Russian deal that will enable the Iranians to learn how to better enriched— enrich uranium.”

George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror{pf} (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., April 10 2006, 10:36-11:45 a.m.) {video 1:10:11}, retitled Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and a Question-and-Answer Session,” 42:15 WCPD 671-686, at 666-667 {64kb.txt, 37kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:42/15}.

 

“ George W. Bush: We do not want the Iranians to have a nuclear weapon, the capacity to make a nuclear weapon, or the knowledge as to how to make a nuclear weapon. That’s our stated goal.”

George W. Bush, President Discusses the Economy, Participates in Press Availability” {pf} (White House, Rose Garden, April 28 2006, 11:47-12:20 p.m.) {video 29:50}, retitled Remarks on the National Economy and an Exchange With Reporters,” 42:17 WCPD 811-818, at 813 {32kb.txt, 37kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:42/17}.

 

Violent crime has been the principal tool of U.S. foreign policy, for so many decades, it’s not surprising, no U.S. Senator so much as raises an eyebrow, when it’s advanced, once again.

Just one more target, in the ongoing continuum, of U.S. government criminal enterprises.

It’s part of the DNA of the U.S. government.

It’s who they are.

It’s what they do.

It’s natural behavior.

The U.S. government is an organism.

Which self-selects its officials and employees.

To weed-out dissenting voices.

Alien DNA.

To maintain its desired DNA.

Iran’s nuclear scientists and technicians are civilians.

So too everybody else involved, all the suppliers to their nuclear program.

All their nuclear facilities are “civilian objects,” certified to be so by IAEA inspectors.

They have nothing to do, with anything to do, with weapons.

Hence, following a declaration of war, targeting any of those individuals, or any of those facilities, is a violent war crime.

Under both U.S. domestic law and under international law.

And what that means is this:

Every single country in the world has the legal authority to put on trial, and execute or imprison (if they are convicted), all of these people:

Every U.S. military officer, or CIA officer, and all of their contractors, and assets, who—

Issue an order to attack any of those nuclear people, or nuclear facilities.

Transmit any such order, down a chain of command.

Obey any such order.

Release a weapon, so targeted.

As in the past, none of these people has anything to fear from the current U.S. government, which issues such orders, and conducts, or pays for, the killing and destruction.

But there’s no statute of limitations on such crimes.

Including the many past such crimes.

And so, in the unlikely event, the day ever comes, when courageous politicians, and voters, decide to turn their face away, from the violent criminal course they have traveled, these many decades—

In that event, then yes, even the U.S. government itself could prosecute all these people too, its own officials.

At any time, decades into the future.

But Patrick Clawson was not proposing war.

He was proposing covert action.

War, properly declared, legalizes killing and destruction, by those who do it, those who release the bombs, fire the missiles.

Provided the targets are proper “military objectives.”

If it’s a criminal war of aggression, well that’s a crime against peace only by those who set it in motion.

The Big Shots.

First and foremost, the liars, who prepare public opinion.

Followed by the command group, with authority to issue the orders.

And Members of Congress who vote for it.

Or refuse to vote to allow a vote.

But without a proper declaration of war, killing and destruction, by covert action, is not shielded by the laws of war.

They remain, murder and arson.

Another international crime.

The “crime against humanity.”

Because it’s state-sponsored.

(On orders of the U.S. government).

Another crime all nations have legal authority to prosecute, in their own courts. If they can get their hands on any of the killers, or co-conspirators.

And so, what Patrick Clawson proposed is a violent crime.

Under all scenarios.

Under all laws.

Both peace and war.

Ian Bruce, “U.S. Spells Out Plan to Bomb Iran” (The Herald, Glasgow Scotland, May 16 2006) {copy}: “The main plan calls for a rolling, five-day bombing campaign against 400 key targets in Iran, including 24 nuclear-related sites, 14 military airfields and radar installations, and Revolutionary Guard headquarters. ... The alternative to an all-out campaign is a demonstration strike against one or two high-profile targets such as the Natanz uranium enrichment facility or the hexafluoride gas plant at Isfahan.”

{In progress.  CJHjr}

____________________

Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Impact of Potential Sanctions: An Intelligence Community Assessment (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, May 11 2006, 9:30 a.m. closed hearing), witnesses: Robert D. Walpole (deputy director for strategy and evaluation, NCPC: National Counterproliferation Center, DNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, previously, NIO/WMDP: National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation, NIC: National Intelligence Council); S. Leslie Ireland (mission manager for Iran, DNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence); R. Nicholas Burns (under-secretary for political affairs (P), DoS: U.S. State Department); Paul E. Simons (EB/ESC: deputy assistant secretary for energy, sanctions, and commodities, bureau of economic and business affairs, since renamed, EEB: bureau of economic, energy and business affairs, DoS: U.S. State Department).

Energy Security and Oil Dependence (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, May 16 2006, 9:30 a.m. ET), Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {18kb.pdf}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {64kb.pdf}, witnesses: Vinod Khosla (president, Khosla Ventures, Menlo Park California), Jason S. Grumet (executive director, National Commission on Energy Policy, Washington D.C.) {175kb.pdf}, committee video {2:46:17, begins at 15:55}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, CQ/FDCH transcript.

Iran’s Political/Nuclear Ambitions and U.S. Policy Options {487kb.txt, purl, 395kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-763, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings, May 17-18 2006) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.109-763, LCCN: 2007395152, OCLC: 84842829, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, March 2 2007}, day-one (May 17 2006, 9:30 a.m.-12:50 p.m. ET): Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {19kb.pdf, copy}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {71kb.pdf, copy}, witnesses, panel 1: Robert J. Einhorn {41kb.pdf, copy, source, copy, source} (senior adviser, CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies), David Albright {84kb.pdf, copy} (president, founder, ISIS: Institute for Science and International Security), panel 2: Kenneth M. Pollack {43kb.pdf, copy, copy, source, source} (director of research and senior fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, BI: Brookings Institution), Karim Sadjadpour {38kb.pdf, copy, copy} (Iran analyst, ICG: International Crisis Group), Patrick Clawson {34kb.pdf, copy, copy, 24kb.html, pf} (deputy director for research, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Geoffrey Kemp {31kb.pdf, copy} (director of regional strategic programs, Nixon Center), committee video {3:33:37, begins at 21:45}, day-two (May 18 2006, 9:30-11:40 a.m. ET): Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {16kb.pdf}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {64kb.pdf}, witnesses: Frank G. Wisner (vice chairman for external affairs, American International Group, Inc., New York City) {156kb.pdf}, Vali R. Nasr (professor of national security affairs, NPS: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California) {141kb.pdf}, Julia Nanay (senior director, PFC Energy, Washington D.C.) {31kb.pdf}, James A. Phillips (research fellow for middle eastern affairs, Center for Foreign Policy Studies, HF: Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.) {50kb.pdf}, committee video {2:29:06, begins at 22:00}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcripts, May 17, May 18, CQ/FDCH transcripts, May 17, May 18. Iran’s Political/Nuclear Ambitions and U.S. Policy Options: A Compilation of Statements by Witnesses ... May 17 and 18, 2006 {239kb.txt purl, 259kb.pdf purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Committee Print S. Prt. 109-63, May 17 2006) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.PRT.109-63, LCCN: (none), OCLC: 70078254, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, June 14 2006}.

A Status Report on United Nations Reform {183kb.txt, purl, 175kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-719, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 25 2006, 9:40-11:57 a.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.109-719, OCLC: 77527624, LCCN: 2007361364, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, January 9 2007}, Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {17kb.pdf}, witness: John R. Bolton (interim U.S. U.N. ambassador) {41kb.pdf, 55kb.html, copy}, committee video {2:44:15, begins at 27:18}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, CQ/FDCH transcript.

The lead liar, of the U.S. government conspiracy to lie.

He talks big, to the press.

In the corridors, of the United Nations building.

With the TV cameras, and tape recorders, rolling.

A bold, audacious, unflinching, liar.

Asserting the unassailable fact.

That Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

But what does the lead liar have to say?

When he’s summoned to Washington D.C.?

To a Congressional committee hearing?

Where broods.

That specter.

A 5-year prison sentence.

For lying:

 

“ John Bolton {Q/A 3:15 at 0:55}:

Yesterday in London there was a meeting of the political directors of the Perm-5-plus-Germany, in an effort to help delineate the package, of incentives and disincentives, that we want to present to Iran.

A package that will show them, on the one hand, on the incentive side, the prospects that are open to them, if they seriously commit to suspend their uranium enrichment, and plutonium reprocessing, activities.

This will be, in many respects, an elaboration of what the E.U.-3 — Britain, France, and Germany — have said to them before, as well as, I think the—

Combined with the various Russian offers to guarantee fuel supplies, and so on, that have been made in the past.

On the other hand, a package of disincentives, to show clearly, to the Iranians, if they choose not to suspend their progress, toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, what that option will be for them as well.”

John Bolton (interim U.S. U.N. ambassador), testimony, A Status Report on United Nations Reform (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, May 25 2006), cited just above. Committee video {2:44:15, at 1:08:51 (Q/A Chuck Hagel), 1:10:07 (quote)}.

 

He changed his tune.

Now, it’s not a weapons “program.”

It’s merely “uranium enrichment.”

And yes.

That is a weapons “capability.”

In theory.

If they can improve their centrifuge technology, down the road, to enrich from 5% to 90% (U-235), and if they want to — in a separate, secret, facility, unknown to the IAEA — which they say they don’t, and they long ago offered to cast their 5% fuel into rods, to prevent further enrichment.

But yes.

He did not claim they “seek” a “weapons capability.”

He did not claim they have nuclear “weapons” ambitions.

And so, no criminal prosecution, on that testimony.

But what’s this?

“Plutonium reprocessing”?

A brand new claim.

Apart from a tenth of a gram, in an “separation” experiment, more than a decade ago, there’s no mention by the IAEA of any such “plutonium reprocessing.”

And, they have precious little to reprocess, anyway, even if they wanted to.

From their tiny research reactor.

Fully controlled, under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

Yes, it’s a lie.

But not a “material” lie, he might claim.

And, he was only referring to what they might do in the future, he might claim, but nobody challenged him, to explain.

John Bolton can’t resist, throwing out another baseless, unsubstantiated, allegation, a hot-button topic.

It’s who he is.

John Bolton is a bold, audacious, unflinching, liar.

Yes.

But he’s also a lawyer.

He pays close attention to his forums.

He obviously believes he can’t be prosecuted, for lying, in the course of his executive branch duties, at the United Nations.

For lying, in the course of his executive branch duties, in a speech to AIPAC, inciting that powerful Israel Lobby, to pressurize Members of Congress, media executives, writers, commentators.

For lying, in the course of his executive branch duties, to the press, in official State Department press briefings.

For lying, in the course of his executive branch duties, direct to the public, at every opportunity, in TV news interviews.

  CJHjr

Renomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, July 27 2006, 9:30 a.m. ET), Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {9kb.html, 18kb.pdf}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {15kb.pdf}, witness: John Bolton (interim U.S. U.N. ambassador, following his first failed Senate confirmation, a recess appointment on August 1 2005, expiring with the 109th Congress, in December 2006) {45kb.pdf, 44kb.html, U.S./U.N. archive, DoS copy, DoS archive}, C-Span video {3:38:05, 212mb.rm, schedule, 166014310, 193556-1}, committee video {3:53:19, 59.2mb.rm}, transcripts {Lexis}: CQ transcript: part-1 {pf}, part-2 {pf}, FNS transcript.

Responding To Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Next Steps {305kb.txt, purl, 259kb.pdf, purl, source, source} (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-648, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 19 2006, 9:35 a.m.-12:47 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.109-648, LCCN: 2007361394, OCLC: 76962188, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, December 8 2006}, Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {16kb.pdf}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member), witnesses, panel 1: R. Nicholas Burns {53kb.pdf, 44kb.html, source} (under-secretary for political affairs (P), DoS: U.S. State Department), panel 2: Ray Takeyh {39kb.pdf, copy, source} (senior fellow for middle eastern studies, CFR: Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.), Ashton B. Carter {96kb.pdf} (professor of science and international affairs, International Security Program, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge Massachusetts), Martin S. Indyk {39kb.pdf, copy, source, source} (director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, BI: Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.), C-Span video {3:13:20, 188mb.rm, schedule, 548517705, 194357-1, rss, archive, search}, committee video {3:34:16, 54.4mb.rm, begins at 20:30}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcripts: panel-1, panel-2, CQ transcript {copy, source}.

Iran: An Update (U.S. Congress 110-1, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, March 29 2007, 10:15 a.m. ET), Joseph R. Biden Jr. (chairman), Richard G. Lugar (ranking minority member) {15kb.pdf}, witness: R. Nicholas Burns {53kb.pdf, 41kb.html, source} (under-secretary for political affairs (P), DoS: U.S. State Department), committee video {3:36:11, begins at 1:32:45}, transcript {copy, source}.

____________________

 

Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs

Reauthorization of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing, June 22 2006, 3:30 p.m.), Richard Shelby (chairman) {19kb.html, copy}, Paul Sarbanes (ranking minority member) {17kb.html, copy}, Charles E. Schumer (ranking minority member, Economic Policy subcommittee) {21kb.html, copy}, Richard John Santorum {19kb.html}, John F. (Jack) Reed {18kb.html}, A. Wayne Allard, Melquiades R. (Mel) Martinez. Witnesses: R. Nicholas Burns {51kb.pdf, copy, source} (under-secretary for political affairs (P), DoS: U.S. State Department), Patrick O'Brien {99kb.pdf, copy, 18kb.html, source} (assistant secretary for terrorist finance and financial crimes (TFI), Department of the Treasury), C-Span video: none, committee video {2:40:41, begins at 24:23, part-1 24:23-42:10, recess 42:05-1:58:45, part-2 1:58:40-2:38:30}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, FDCH transcript, CQ transcript {copy}.

 

Query:Weapons”?

 

“ Richard Shelby: ... Iran’s development of nuclear weapons ... its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction ... Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program ...

Wayne Allard: ... Iran continues to aggressively pursue weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. ...

Mel Martinez: ... Iran continues its march towards nuclear weapons ...

Nicholas Burns: ... Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability ...

Patrick O'Brien: ... Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful nuclear energy program ...

Richard Shelby: ... Iran ... that country’s nuclear weapons program ...

Nicholas Burns: ... Iran ... its nuclear weapons program ...

Mel Martinez: ... Iran’s ... pursuit of nuclear weapons ...

Nicholas Burns: ... Iran’s nuclear weapons program ...”

Reauthorization of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act, testimony and statements (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing, June 22 2006), further cited above.

Minimizing Potential Threats from Iran: Assessing the Effectiveness of Current US Sanctions on Iran (U.S. Congress 110-1, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Hearing, March 21 2007, 9:00 a.m. ET), Christopher John Dodd (chairman) {19kb.html, pf, copy}, Richard Shelby (ranking minority member) {19kb.html, pf, copy}, Jon Tester {21kb.html, pf}, witnesses: R. Nicholas Burns (under-secretary for political affairs (P), DoS: U.S. State Department) {36kb.pdf, copy, source, 32kb.html, source}, Stuart A. Levey (under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence (TFI), U.S. Treasury Department) {50kb.pdf, copy, 33kb.html, source}, Mark Foulon (acting under-secretary for the bureau of industry and security (BIS), U.S. Commerce Department) {81kb.pdf, copy}, C-Span video: none, committee video {2:39:56, 40.7mb.rm, begins at 19:50}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, FDCH transcript, CQ transcript {copy, source}.

____________________

 

Senate Judiciary Committee

Presidential Signing Statements (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearing, June 27 2006, 10:00 a.m.). Arlen Patrick Specter (chairman), Patrick J. Leahy (ranking minority member) {10kb.html}. Witnesses, panel 1: Michelle Boardman (Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice) {41kb.html}, panel 2: Charles J. Ogletree Jr. (Professor of Law, Executive Director, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & Justice, Harvard Law School) {13kb.html}, Christopher S. Yoo (Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School; Visiting Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School) {23kb.html}, Bruce Fein (Partner, Fein & Fein) {16kb.html}, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz (Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington D.C.) {28kb.html}. C-Span video: None. Committee video/audio: None. Transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcripts: panel 1, panel 2.

See George W. Bush’s “signing statement” (October 16 2002), asserting legal authority — without a vote in Congress — to order the U.S. to war, preemptively, “to deter ... threats.”

And see the many public assertions, by him and his senior officials, that Iran is a “threat.”

____________________

 

Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

Iran: Teheran's Nuclear Recklessness and the U.S. Response--The Experts' Perspective {158kb.txt, 4.12mb.pdf, purl, source, source} (U.S. Congress 109-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-672, November 15 2005, 3:00 p.m. ET, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security) {SuDoc: Y 4.G 74/9:S.HRG.109-672, LCCN: 2006470444, OCLC: 76880920, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, December 7 2006}, Thomas Allen Coburn (chairman) {26kb.pdf}, Thomas Richard Carper (ranking minority member), witnesses, panel-1: Newt Gingrich {204kb.pdf} (former Speaker of the House of Representatives, U.S. Congress 104-105, 1995-1998), Alfonse Marcello D'Amato {20kb.pdf} (U.S. Senator, 1981-1999), R. James Woolsey {67kb.pdf} (director of Central Intelligence, 1993-1995), panel-2: Gary S. Samore {18kb.pdf} (vice president, Program on Global Security and Sustainability, MF: John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation), Ray Takeyh {34kb.pdf, copy, source} (senior fellow for middle eastern studies, CFR: Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.), Ilan Berman {78kb.pdf} (vice president for policy, AFPC: American Foreign Policy Council), C-Span video: None, committee video: none, transcripts {Lexis}: None. FNS transcript: None.

Iran's Nuclear Impasse: Next Steps (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing, July 20 2006, 1:30 p.m. ET, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security), following this: “met in closed session to receive a briefing regarding Iran from officials of the Department of State.” Criminal lies in secret briefings, that’s a speciality of the U.S. government criminal conspiracy, and members of Congress conspire with the executive branch to be lied to, in service of their ideological agendas, by not creating evidence of the lies (audio/video/transcripts), a professional discipline which honest members of Congress would insist on, as a guard against U.S. government criminal enterprises, including those involving members of Congress. Thomas Allen Coburn (chairman), Thomas Richard Carper (ranking minority member), witnesses: Amir Abbas Fakhravar {24kb.pdf, source, copy, source} (Independent Student Movement), Ilan Berman {54kb.pdf, copy} (vice president for policy, AFPC: American Foreign Policy Council), Michael A. Ledeen {37kb.pdf, copy, 17kb.html, pf, source} {BBC} (freedom scholar, AEI: American Enterprise Institute), Ray Takeyh {31kb.pdf, copy, copy, source} (senior fellow for middle eastern studies, CFR: Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.), Jim Walsh {84kb.pdf, copy, copy, source} (research associate, Security Studies Program, MIT: Massachusetts Institute of Technology), committee video {2:33:08, begins at 19:59}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, CQ transcript copy.

U.S. International Broadcasts into Iran: Can We Do Better? (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing, September 20 2006, 9:30 a.m., Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security). Thomas Allen Coburn (chairman), Thomas Richard Carper (ranking minority member). Witnesses: Kenneth Y. Tomlinson (chairman, BBG: Broadcasting Board of Governors, Washington D.C.), Tim Shamble (President, Local 1812, International Broadcasting Bureau (VOA), AFGE: American Federation of Government Employees), Amir Abbas Fakhravar (Independent Student Movement), Alex Alexiev, (Vice President for Research, CSP: Center for Security Policy), Robert Schadler (Senior Fellow in Public Diplomacy, American Foreign Policy Council, Washington D.C.; Member, Board of Directors, Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy), Abbas William Samii (Regional Analysis Coordinator for Southwest Asia and the Middle East, RFE/RL: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty).

____________________

 

Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Pre-Iraq War Intelligence: An Oversight Hearing on Pre-War Intelligence Relating to Iraq (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing, June 26 2006, Democratic Policy Committee). Byron Leslie Dorgan (chairman) {82kb.pdf}. Witnesses, panel 1: Lawrence B. Wilkerson (chief of staff to Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, 2001-2005) {110kb.pdf}, Paul R. Pillar (national intelligence officer for the near east and south asia, 2000-2005, U.S. National Intelligence Council) {72kb.pdf}, Carl W. Ford Jr. (assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research, 2001-2003, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department) {81kb.pdf}, Wayne E. White (former deputy director, Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department) {94kb.pdf}, panel 2: Joseph Cirincione (senior vice president for national security and international policy, CAP: Center for American Progress) {154kb.pdf, 51kb.pdf}, Rod Barton (former senior advisor to the Iraq Survey Group) {74kb.pdf}, Michael Smith (defense correspondent, London Sunday Times) {104kb.pdf}, C-Span video {3:02:00}, committee video {3:06:22}, audio {72.4mb.mp3}, transcript {245mb.pdf}, other transcripts {Lexis}: CQ transcript (panel 1). FNS transcript: None.

 

 

House Committees

 

House Intelligence Committee

Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States {689kb.pdf, copy, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, staff report, August 23 2006) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/18:IR 1/2, LCCN: 2007395101, OCLC: 71124559, GPOcat, WorldCat, February 27 2007}, Mike Rogers (Subcommittee chairman), Rush D. Holt (Subcommittee Ranking Minority Member), published, Peter Hoekstra (Committee chairman), “House Intelligence Committee Releases Report on Iranian Strategic Threat” {51kb.pdf, source}.

•• Dafna Linzer, “U.S. Spy Agencies Criticized On Iran: GOP-Led Panel Faults Intelligence{pf} (Washington Post, August 24 2006, page A01).

 

“ The 29-page report.

Principally written by a Republican staff member on the House intelligence committee who holds a hard-line view on Iran.

Fully backs the White House position.

That the Islamic republic is moving forward.

With a nuclear weapons program.

And.

That it poses a significant danger.

To the United States.

But.

It chides the intelligence community.

For not providing enough direct evidence.

To support that assertion. ...

Jamal Ware, spokesman for the House intelligence committee, said three staff members wrote the report.

But he did not dispute.

That the principal author was.

Frederick Fleitz.

A former CIA officer.

Who had been a special assistant to.

John R. Bolton.

The administration’s former point man on Iran at the State Department.”

•• Dafna Linzer, “U.N. Inspectors Dispute Iran Report By House Panel: Paper on Nuclear Aims Called Dishonest{pf} (Washington Post, September 14 2006, page A17).

 

“ Officials of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency said in a letter {228kb.pdf} ...

Among the committee’s assertions is that Iran is producing weapons-grade uranium at its facility in the town of Natanz.

The IAEA called that “incorrect.”

Noting that weapons-grade uranium is enriched to a level of 90 percent or more.

Iran has enriched uranium to 3.5 percent under IAEA monitoring. ...

Rep. Rush D. Holt (D-N.J.), a committee member, said the report was.

“Clearly not prepared in a manner that we can rely on.”

He agreed to send it to the full committee for review.

But the Republicans decided to make it public, before then, he said in an interview.

The report was never voted on or discussed by the full committee. Rep. Jane Harman (Calif.), the vice chairman, told Democratic colleagues in a private e-mail that the report—

“Took a number of analytical shortcuts that present the Iran threat as more dire — and the Intelligence Community's assessments as more certain — than they are.”

Privately, several intelligence officials said the committee report included at least a dozen claims that were either demonstrably wrong or impossible to substantiate.

Hoekstra’s office said the report was reviewed by the office of John D. Negroponte, the director of national intelligence.

Negroponte’s spokesman, John Callahan, said in a statement that his office “reviewed the report and provided its response to the committee on July 24, ’06.”

He did not say whether it had approved or challenged any of the claims about Iran’s capabilities.

“This is like prewar Iraq all over again,” said David Albright, a former nuclear inspector who is president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security—

{Spin the threat and trash the inspectors}. ...

The committee report, written by a single Republican staffer ...

The report’s author, Frederick Fleitz ...”

•• Mike Rogers (chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence), interviewed by Brian Todd, “IAEA Blasts U.S. Intelligence Report on Iran” (CNN, The Situation Room, September 14 2006, 7:00 p.m. ET), video {2:01}.

 

“Iran is currently enriching uranium to weapons grade.”

 

“ Mike Rogers: If you take the caption, with the text, that is right along with the report.

It says, that we don’t believe that they’ve gotten there.

But the point of that whole section is.

They are trying.

To enrich uranium.

To weapons grade.”

•• Melissa Fleming (Head, Media & Outreach Section and Spokesperson, Division of Public Information, IAEA), Rush D. Holt (Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence), interviewed by Carolyn Quinn (BBC Radio 4, PM, September 14 2006, 5:46-5:50 p.m.), audio {59:57, at 45:08} (the BBC will delete this audio on September 21 2006), reported, “US Iran report branded dishonest{pf} (BBC News, September 14 2006, 17:07 GMT).

 

“ Melissa Fleming: {3:16}: There were inaccuracies in the report.

And it was important for us.

To set the record straight.

To the U.S. Congress.

On the facts.

Also.

This was a matter of integrity.

Of the IAEA, and its inspectors.

Rush D. Holt: I had argued against public release of it.

And failing that.

Because the majority staff was insistent on releasing it.

But failing in my efforts to stop the public release.

I tried to minimize some of the exaggerated and unsubstantiated statements.

And I should say, that before it was released there were even more exaggerated and unsubstantiated conclusions than there are now. ...

Supposition and innuendo and guesswork.

About a potential adversary.

Are a poor way to make decisions.

About war and peace.”

____________________

 

House Armed Services Committee

Iran's Nuclear Capabilities (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-1, House Armed Services Committee, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Hearing, September 29 2005, 10:00 a.m. ET), Hugh James Saxton (chairman) {21kb.pdf, copy}, witnesses: Reuel Marc Gerecht {23kb.pdf, copy, source, 17kb.html, pf, source} (resident fellow, AEI: American Enterprise Institute), Kenneth M. Pollack {104kb.pdf, copy, copy, source, source} (director of research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, BI: Brookings Institution), committee audio {59:41}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript: none, FDCH transcript {copy}.

Options Available to the United States to Counter a Nuclear Iran (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, House Armed Services Committee, Hearing, February 1 2006, 11:00 a.m. ET), Duncan Lee Hunter (chairman) {16kb.pdf, copy}, Isaac Newton (Ike) Skelton IV (ranking minority member), witnesses: Michael Eisenstadt {91kb.pdf, copy, source, copy, source} (director, military & security studies program, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), George Perkovich {46kb.pdf, copy, copy, pf} (vice president for studies, CEIP: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Ilan Berman {91kb.pdf, copy} (vice president for policy, AFPC: American Foreign Policy Council), committee audio {2:26:55}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, CQ/FDCH transcript {copy}.

Assessing the Iranian Threat, its Geopolitics, and U.S. Policy Options (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, House Armed Services Committee, Hearing, June 8 2006, 10:00 a.m. ET), Duncan Lee Hunter (chairman) {24kb.pdf, copy}, Isaac Newton (Ike) Skelton IV (ranking minority member), witnesses: Patrick Clawson {398kb.pdf, copy, source, copy, 20kb.html, pf} (deputy director for research, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.), Ray Takeyh {405kb.pdf, copy, copy, source} (senior fellow for middle eastern studies, CFR: Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.), committee audio {2:47:48, recess 1:47:50-2:05:44}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript {archive}, CQ/FDCH transcript {copy}.

____________________

 

House Foreign Affairs Committee

(renamed January 5 2007)

House “International Relations” Committee (1995-2006, U.S. Congresses 104-109)

Enforcement of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and Increasing Security Threats From Iran {219kb.html, pf, 433kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 108-1, House International Relations Committee, Serial No. 108-59, MECA: Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Hearing, June 25 2003, 2:40-4:13 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:IR 1/16, LCCN: 2004356571, OCLC: 54353886, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, January 15 2004}, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (MECA chairman) {22kb.html}, witnesses, panel-1: Charles English (Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, European and Eurasian Affairs, DoS: U.S. State Department), Anna Borg (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Energy, Sanctions and Commodities, and Coordinator for Conflict Diamonds, DoS: U.S. State Department), Philo Dibble (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Former Deputy Chief of Missions in Damascus Syria, DoS: U.S. State Department), Charles Ries {16kb.html} (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, April 2000-2004 June, DoS: U.S. State Department), panel-2: Roger W. Robinson Jr. {16kb.html} (president, CEO, Conflict Security Advisory Group, president, RWR Inc., former senior director of international economic affairs, National Security Council), Patrick Clawson {28kb.html} (deputy director for research, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.), transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcripts: panel-1, panel-2, iran archive, CQ transcript, copy: panel-1, panel-2.

Iranian Proliferation: Implications for Terrorists, Their State Sponsors, and U.S. Counter-Proliferation Policy {284kb.html, pf, 641kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 108-2, House International Relations Committee, Serial No. 108-144, MECA: Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Hearing, June 24 2004, 3:10-5:40 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:P 94/3, LCCN: 2007361326, OCLC: 57312211, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, November 24 2004}, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (MECA chairman) {11kb.html, copy}, Shelley Berkley, Steve Chabot (MECA vice chairman), witnesses, panel-1: John R. Bolton (under-secretary for arms control and international security (T), DoS: U.S. State Department) {57kb.html, copy}, panel-2: Paul Leventhal {286kb.pdf} (founder, senior adviser, NCI: Nuclear Control Institute), Michael Eisenstadt {30kb.html, copy, 22kb.html, pf} (director, military & security studies program, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), committee video: none, C-Span video: none, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcripts: panel-1, panel-2, iran archive, CQ transcripts, panel-1, panel-2.

United States Policy Toward Iran: Next Steps {241kb.html, pf, 993kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-1, House International Relations Committee, Serial No. 109-3, Hearing, February 16 2005, 10:30-12:30 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:IR 1/18, LCCN: 2006360573, OCLC: 60314955, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, April 28 2005}, Henry J. Hyde (chairman) {68kb.html, copy}, witnesses: Mark Palmer (Committee on the Present Danger) {49kb.pdf, copy}, Gary Sick (Senior Research Scholar and Adjunct Professor of International Relations, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University) {31kb.html, copy}, Henry D. Sokolski (Executive Director, NPEC: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center) {407kb.html, copy}, committee video {1:55:17}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript: None, CQ transcript {copy}.

Iran: A Quarter-Century of State-Sponsored Terror {273kb.html, pf, 381kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-1, House International Relations Committee, Serial No. 109-36, joint hearing, MECA: Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, ITN: Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, February 16 2005, 1:10-3:15 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:IR 1/19, LCCN: 2006361864, OCLC: 61364945, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, August 17 2005}, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (MECA chairman) {11kb.html, copy}, Gary Leonard Ackerman (MECA Ranking Minority Member), Edward Randall Royce (ITN chairman), Brad Sherman (ITN Ranking Minority Member), witnesses: Yonah Alexander (Senior Fellow, Director, International Center for Terrorism Studies, PIPS: Potomac Insitute for Policy Studies), Matthew A. Levitt {204kb.pdf, copy, source, copy} (Director, Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.), William J. Daugherty {14kb.html, copy} (then a CIA Officer, pretending to be a State Department diplomat, 3rd Secretary of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iranian hostage, 1979-1981), Steven W. Kirtley {9kb.html, copy} (then a corporal, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. embassy guard, Iranian hostage, 1979-1981), Lynn Smith Darbyshire (sister of Vince Smith, killed in the Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, October 23 1983), committee video {2:09:59}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript: None, CQ transcript {copy}.

United States Policy Toward Iran: Next Steps {402kb.html, pf, 1mb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, House International Relations Committee, Serial No. 109-183, Hearing, March 8 2006, 10:23 a.m.-2:15 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:IR 1/18/2006, LCCN: none, OCLC: 71755984, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, September 22 2006}, Henry J. Hyde (chairman) {68kb.pdf, copy}, Thomas Peter Lantos (ranking minority member) {13kb.html}, witnesses, panel 1: R. Nicholas Burns {41kb.html, 108kb.pdf, copy} (under-secretary for political affairs (P), DoS: U.S. State Department), Robert Joseph {31kb.html, 98kb.pdf, copy} (under-secretary for arms control and international security (T), DoS: U.S. State Department), panel 2: John C. Hulsman {123kb.pdf, copy} (senior research fellow, HF: Heritage Foundation), Michael A. Ledeen {83kb.pdf copy, 17kb.html, pf, source} {BBC} (freedom scholar, AEI: American Enterprise Institute), Gary Milhollin {21kb.html, copy, 74kb.pdf} (director, WPNAC: Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; professor emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School), Abbas William Samii {108kb.pdf, copy} (regional analysis coordinator for southwest asia and the middle east, RFE/RL: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), C-Span video {4:01:09, Iran begins at 10:47, 234mb.rm, schedule, 194384971, 191516-2}, committee video {4:13:42, video begins at 12:33, Iran begins at 23:19}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcripts: panel-1, panel-2, CQ transcript (both panels) {copy, split: panel-1, panel-2}.

Hezbollah's Global Reach {223kb.html, pf, 1.44mb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, House International Relations Committee, Serial No. 109-233, joint hearing, MECA: Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, ITN: Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, September 28 2006, 10:33-12:37 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:H 49, LCCN: 2007361457, OCLC: 79839619, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, December 29 2006}, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (MECA chairman) {25kb.pdf}, Gary Leonard Ackerman (MECA ranking minority member), Edward Randall Royce (ITN chairman), Brad Sherman (ITN ranking minority member), witnesses, panel-1: Frank C. Urbancic Jr. {29kb.pdf, 35kb.html, source} (principal deputy coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, DoS: U.S. State Department), John G. Kavanagh {58kb.pdf} (section chief, International Terrorism Operations Section II, Counterterrorism Division, U.S. FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation), panel-2: Eitan Azani {172kb.pdf, copy} (senior researcher, ICT: Institute for Counterterrorism, Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya Israel), Christopher Hamilton {57kb.pdf, copy, 16kb.html, pf} (senior fellow, counterterrorism studies, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.), Ilan Berman (vice president for policy, AFPC: American Foreign Policy Council) {60kb.pdf}, C-Span video {2:04:56, 120.67mb.rm, schedule, 197446520, 194522-1}, committee video {2:11:15}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcripts: panel-1, panel-2, CQ transcript.

House “Committee on Foreign Affairs” (U.S. Congress 110-1), renamed January 5 2007, from House “Committee on International Relations” (1995-2006, U.S. Congresses 104-109).

Briefing: Next Steps in the Iran Crisis {297kb.pdf, source} (U.S. Congress 110-1, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing, January 11 2007, 10:00-1:00 p.m. ET), printed in, Iran (“Briefing and Hearing ... January 11 and January 31, 2007,” Committee Serial No. 110-3) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:??, GPOcat}, Thomas Peter Lantos (chairman) {27kb.html, copy, pf, source}, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (ranking minority member) {29kb.html, source}, witnesses: Thomas R. Pickering {37kb.html} (former under-secretary for political affairs (P), May 27 1997-2001 Jan. 20, DoS: U.S. State Department), R. James Woolsey Jr. {21kb.html} (former director, CIA: Central Intelligence Agency, Feb. 5 1993-1995 Jan. 10), committee video {2:27:33}, CQ transcript {copy, source}, reported, Ian Talley, “House Foreign Affairs chairman: US Must Pursue Talks With Iran” (Dow Jones Newswires, January 11 2007), Tom Lantos interviewed by Robert Siegel, “Foreign Relations Panel Hears from Rice on Iran” (NPR: National Public Radio, All Things Considered, Washington D.C., January 12 2007) (NPR evening news), audio (copy) {5:07}, NPR transcript.

Understanding the Iran Crisis {298kb.pdf, source} (U.S. Congress 110-1, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing, January 31 2007, 10:00-11:40 a.m. ET), printed in, Iran (“Briefing and Hearing ... January 11 and January 31, 2007,” Committee Serial No. 110-3) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:??, GPOcat}, Thomas Peter Lantos (chairman) {11kb.html, copy, pf, source}, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (ranking minority member) {7.6kb.pdf, source}, witnesses: Abbas Milani {30kb.html} (Director, Iranian Studies, Stanford University, co-director, Iran Democracy Project, Hoover Institution, Stanford California), Ray Takeyh {30kb.html, copy, source} (senior fellow for middle eastern studies, CFR: Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.), S. Enders Wimbush {30kb.html} (Director, CFSS: Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute, Washington D.C.), CQ transcript {copy, source}.

The Iranian Challenge {539kb.pdf, source} (U.S. Congress 110-1, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing, committee Serial No. 110-19, March 6 2007, 2:04-4:20 p.m. ET), Thomas Peter Lantos (chairman) {11kb.html}, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (ranking minority member), witness: R. Nicholas Burns {41kb.html, 50kb.html, source} (under-secretary for political affairs (P), DoS: U.S. State Department), committee video {2:27:33}, CQ transcript {copy, source}.

Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Latest Developments and Next Steps {1.7kb.pdf, source} (U.S. Congress 110-1, House Foreign Affairs Committee, joint hearing of two subcommittees, TNT: subcommittee on terrorism, nonproliferation, and trade, MESA: subcommittee on the middle east and south asia, committee Serial No. 110-12, March 15 2007, 1:10-4:08 p.m. ET), Brad Sherman (chairman, FAC/TNT subcommittee) (“a covert program to develop nuclear weapons”), Edward Randall Royce (ranking minority member, FAC/TNT subcommittee) (“Tehran’s nuclear weapons program”), Gary Leonard Ackerman (chairman, FAC/MESA subcommittee) (“as the IAEA recently reported, Iran’s nuclear weapons program is booming”), Mike Pence (ranking minority member, FAC/MESA subcommittee), witnesses: David Albright {245kb.pdf, copy, source} (president, founder, ISIS: Institute for Science and International Security), Matthew Levitt {19kb.html, copy, pf} (director, Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., interlude, Nov. 14 2005-2007 Jan., U.S. Treasury Department, deputy assistant secretary, OIA: Office of Intelligence and Analysis, TFI: Office of the Under-Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence), Daniel Byman {40kb.html, copy, source, source} (senior fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Polcy, BI: Brookings Institution; director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, GWU: George Washington University), Ilan Berman {68kb.pdf} (vice president for policy, AFPC: American Foreign Policy Council), committee video {2:04:41}, FNS transcript {archive, archive}, CQ transcript {copy, source}.

Isolating Proliferators and Sponsors of Terror: The Use of Sanctions and the International Financial System to Change Regime Behavior {911kb.pdf, source} (U.S. Congress 110-1, joint hearing, House Foreign Affairs Committee, TNT: subcommittee on terrorism, nonproliferation, and trade, HFAC committee Serial No. 110-55, House Financial Services Committee, DIMPTT: subcommittee on domestic and international monetary policy, trade, and technology, HFSC committee Serial No. 110-22, April 18 2007, 2:28-3:53pm, 4:45-6:40pm ET), Brad Sherman {35kb.html} (chairman, FAS/TNT subcommittee), Edward Randall Royce {35kb.html, pf} (ranking minority member, FAS/TNT subcommittee), Luis V. Gutiérrez (chairman, FSC/DIMPTT subcommittee), Ron Paul (ranking minority member, FSC/DIMPTT subcommittee), witnesses, panel-1: Patricia McNerney {48kb.html, dos copy none} (principal deputy assistant secretary, ISN: bureau of international security and nonproliferation, T: office of the under secretary of state for arms control and international security, DoS: U.S. State Department), Paul E. Simons {37kb.html, dos copy none} (EB/ESC: deputy assistant secretary for energy, sanctions, and commodities, EEB: bureau of economic, energy and business affairs, DoS: U.S. State Department), Adam J. Szubin {80kb.html, copy, source} (director, OFAC: office of foreign assets control, DoT: U.S. Treasury Department), Daniel Glaser {joint prepared text with Szubin} (TFI: deputy assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes, DoT: U.S. Treasury Department), panel-2: Sarah Steelman {28kb.html, reported 128kb.pdf, source} (Missouri treasurer), Roger W. Robinson Jr. {35kb.html} (president & CEO, CSAG: Conflict Securities Advisory Group Inc., former senior director of international economic affairs, National Security Council), David L. Asher {17kb.html} (senior associate fellow, Asian Studies Center, HF: The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C.), Victor D. Comras {51kb.html} (The Eren Law Firm, former member of the U.N. al-Qaeda monitoring group), Jack A. Blum {308kb.pdf} (counsel, Baker & Hostetler, Washington D.C., former special counsel, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations), HFAC video {2:49:38}, HFSC video {2:49:38}, FNS transcript {archive, archive}, CQ transcript {184mb.html, source}, reported, “U.S. Presses for Broader Use of Targeted International Sanctions: Financial enforcement undercuts rogue regimes ability to conduct business” (USINFO, U.S. State Department, April 19 2007), Stephen Fidler, Roula Khalaf (London), Guy Dinmore in (Washington), “US under fire for anti-Iran tactics{pf} (Financial Times, April 19 2007).

____________________

 

H.R. 282:  
Iran Freedom Support Act  
(a/k/a/ Iran Sanctions Act)

Subcommittee markup, Holding the Current Regime in Iran Accountable for Its Threatening Behavior and Supporting a Transition to Democracy in Iran (Markup of H.R. 282: Iran Freedom Support Act) {30kb.html, 114kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, House, International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, business meeting (markup), April 13 2005, 12:00 p.m., Committee Serial No. 109-51) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:R 26/2, LCCN: 2006361864, OCLC: 61676637, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, September 23 2005}, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (chairman), Gary Leonard Ackerman (ranking minority member), C-Span video: none, committee video/audio: none, other transcripts {Lexis}: None. FNS transcript: None. CQ transcript: None.

Full committee markup, Markup of H.R. 282, Iran Freedom Support Act (U.S. Congress 109-2, House International Relations Committee, business meeting (markup), March 15 2006, 10:30 a.m.), Henry J. Hyde (chairman) {12kb.pdf}, Thomas Peter Lantos (ranking minority member) {11kb.html}. C-Span video: None. Committee video (57:20) {video begins at 11:25}. Transcripts {Lexis}: None. FNS transcript: None. CQ transcript: None.

Full committee report, Iran Freedom Support Act {139kb.txt purl, 285kb.pdf purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, House Report No. 109-417, House International Relations Committee, April 25 2006) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/8:109-417, Serial Set: (none yet), CIS: (none yet), LCCN: (none yet), OCLC: 68125260, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, September 23 2005}, submitted April 25 2006, “Reports of Committees on Public Bills and Resolutions,” 152 Congressional Record H1740 {11kb.txt, 47kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:46, April 25 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/46}.

House debate, Iran Freedom Support Act (a/k/a/ Iran Sanctions Act), (U.S. Congress 109-1, House Bill H.R. 282: “To hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran”), introduced January 6 2005, amended by a substitute bill {104kb.pdf} and approved by the full committee (37-3) March 15 2006, adopted by the House April 26 2006 {H.R.282.eh, 30kb.txt, 68kb.pdf}, “Iran Freedom Support Act,” 152 Congressional Record H1754-H1774 (debate) {205kb.txt, 198kb.pdf}, H1785-H1786 (vote) {8kb.txt, 61kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:47, April 26 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/47}, House roll call vote (H.R. 282) 109-2:105 (397/21/0/14) (April 26 2006, 2:49 p.m.). “Extensions of Remarks” (written statements): Fortney Hillman (Pete) Stark Jr., “Opposing President Bush's March to War in Iran,” E623 {3kb.txt, 57kb.pdf} (April 26) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/47}; Russ Carnahan, “Iran Freedom Support Act,” E640 {3kb.txt, 57kb.pdf} (April 27); James Thomas Kolbe, “Iran Freedom Support Act,” E649-E650 {3kb.txt, 57kb.pdf} (April 27); Steny Hamilton Hoyer, “Iran Freedom Support Act,” E663 {5kb.txt, 57kb.pdf} (April 27); Steve King, speech, “Energy Prices in America,” H1898-H1905 {64kb.txt, 82kb.pdf} (April 27) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/48}; Henry Arnold Waxman, “Iran Freedom Support Act,” E669 {5kb.txt, 51kb.pdf} (May 1) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/49}; Janice D. Schakowsky, “Iran Freedom Support Act,” E729 {4kb.txt, 55kb.pdf} (May 4) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/52}; Tammy Baldwin, “H.R. 282 Iran Sanctions Act,” E751-E752 {8kb.txt, 57kb.pdf} (May 8) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/54}. Received by the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations {H.R.282.rfs, 30kb.txt, 77kb.pdf}, 152 Congressional Record S3700 {47kb.pdf} (received) {2kb.txt} (referred) {2kb.txt} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:48, April 27 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/48}.

Senate Bill S.333 (U.S. Congress 109-1): “To hold the current regime in Iran accountable for its threatening behavior and to support a transition to democracy in Iran” (“Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2005”) (a/k/a/ Iran Sanctions Act), introduced and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 9 2005.

 

A Congressional “finding”?

 

“ I made a difficult decision in voting against H.R. 282, the Iran Sanctions Act, a bill that I co-sponsored.

I based my vote on the significant changes the International Relations Committee made to the underlying bill ...

The bill {H.R.282.eh, 30kb.txt, 68kb.pdf} ... purports to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

It contains the following “finding” of Congress {Section 302}:

“Iran has manipulated Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire technologies needed to manufacture nuclear weapons under the guise of developing peaceful nuclear technology.”

(Emphasis added.)

I find this language troubling.

The finding states a conclusion that Iran is seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons as it pursues the development of nuclear power generation.

I fear that this or a subsequent Administration could use such finding to justify an invasion or other military action against Iran, under its doctrine of preemption.

Prior to its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Administration cited the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 as one of its bases for taking this country into war.

A Congressional finding that Iran is seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons could provide a basis for the Administration to conduct preemptive strikes or declare war against Iran.

I believe Congress should not, once again, provide cover to this Administration, which has shown ample evidence of incompetence in the collection of intelligence on the development of weapons of mass destruction by foreign nations.

A Congressional “finding” is no substitute for reliable intelligence on the status of Iran’s nuclear program.”

Tammy Baldwin, written statement, “H.R. 282 Iran Sanctions Act,” 152 Congressional Record E751-E752 {8kb.txt, 57kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:54, May 8 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/54}.

____________________

 

Query:The finding states a conclusion”?

Yes.

That’s what the committee report asserts.

“ Iran’s program to develop weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, is a special concern to the American people and should alarm the entire international community.”

Iran Freedom Support Act {139kb.txt, 285kb.pdf}, page 9 (U.S. Congress 109-2, House Report No. 109-417, House International Relations Committee, April 25 2006), further cited above.

And, in the event of ambiguity, and doubt, about what a law means, what the committee report says the law means—

That’s what it means:

“ In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which

“represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those [members of Congress] involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.””

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, n.16 (U.S., No. 01-618, Jan. 15 2003) {802kb.pdf}, quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984), quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969).

An unequivocal assertion, of an unassailable fact—

Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

And seeks nuclear weapons.

As if by saying it’s so—

They can make it so.

Legislating facts.

“Henceforth, black is white.”

So sayeth, the United States Congress.

The Israel-Jew Lobby strikes again.

  CJHjr

 

Algiers Accords

 

“ Point I:  
Non-Intervention in Iranian Affairs

1. The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.”

Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria {24kb.pdf} (General Declaration, January 19 1981). And see Ronald W. Reagan (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1981-1989 Jan. 20), “Suspension of Litigation Against Iran” (Executive Order 12294 {copy}, White House, February 24 1981). Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.

____________________

 

Query:Algeria”?

“ The hostage crisis ... the Iranians refused to sign any direct agreement with the United States. We finally suggested that the agreement take the form of mutually dependent promises to Algeria, and that was acceptable for reasons that still remain obscure.”

Warren Christopher (Deputy Secretary of State, Feb. 26 1977-1981 Jan. 16; Secretary of State (S), Jan. 20 1993-1997 Jan. 27), “Welcome to the Bazaar” (New York Times, June 13 2006).

____________________

 

“ Senator Frank Church {chairman}. Well, I am all in favor of newspapers.

We can agree on the desirability of a free press, wherever it may exist.

But I have been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 18 years and I know something about words of art.

And a “correct” policy is a word of art.

And what it means is that we are not engaging in covert penetration of the political processes of another country with whom we maintain such “correct” relationship.

Charles A. Meyer {Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, April 2 1969-1973 March 2}.

Is the support of the press a covert operation, a destabilizing nature?

The chairman. Yes.

I think any secret use of American money is a policy of intervention, whatever the argument may be, for or against it.

And it does not correspond to what is known as a “correct” posture toward a foreign government.

Any more than the large contributions we gave to the Chilean political parties.

Unless you would think that a foreign power was conducting “correct” relationships with the United States if it secretly contributed large amounts of money to an American Presidential campaign or an American political party or American newspapers.

I don’t think—

Your answer {in testimony, 2 years earlier, on March 29 1973} certainly left the committee with a very different impression of American policy from the facts as we subsequently found them.”

Intelligence Activities--Covert Action, pages 21-48 {1618kb.pdf}, 35-39, at 38 (U.S. Congress 94-1, Hearings, December 4-5 1975, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), being volume 7 of Intelligence Activities--Senate Resolution 21 {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/17:IN 8/v.7, CIS: 76 S961-7, LCCN: 76601277, OCLC: 2203353, 2068447, GPOcat, DL, WorldCat}, 7 volumes of hearings which support the 6 books comprising the Church Committee’s Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (U.S. Congress 94-1, Senate Report No. 94-755, April 14 1976) {SuDoc: 94-2:S.RP.755, Serial Set: 13133-3,4,5,6,7,8, CIS: 76 S963-1,2,3,5,6,7, LCCN: 76601758, OCLC: 2347318, 2147932, GPOcat, DL, WorldCat}.

  CJHjr

____________________

 

H. Res. 846:  
Requesting ... directing ... documents ... strategies and plans ... regime change ... or ... military force against Iran

H. Res. 846 {H.Res.846.ih, 4kb.txt, 31kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2): House resolution, “Requesting the President and directing the Secretary of State to provide to the House of Representatives certain documents in their possession relating to strategies and plans either designed to cause regime change in or for the use of military force against Iran,” introduced and referred to the House Committee on International Relations, “Public Bills and Resolutions,” 152 Congressional Record H3306-H3308 {pf}, at H3308 {27kb.txt, 66kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:67, May 25 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/67}.

Markup of H.R. 846, Requesting the President and directing the Secretary of State to provide to the House of Representatives certain documents in their possession relating to strategies and plans either designed to cause regime change in or for the use of military force against Iran (U.S. Congress 109-2, House, International Relations Committee, business meeting (markup), June 21 2005, 9:30 a.m.), Henry J. Hyde (chairman), Thomas Peter Lantos (ranking minority member). C-Span video: None. Committee video {3:16:39, at 17:15-27:30} (video includes a subsequent hearing, Democracy in Latin America: Successes, Challenges and the Future). Transcripts {Lexis}: None. FNS transcript: None. CQ/FDCH transcript: None.

Requesting the President and Directing the Secretary of State to Provide to the House of Representatives Certain Documents in Their Possession Relating to Strategies and Plans Either Designed to Cause Regime Change in or for the Use of Military Force Against Iran: Adverse Report Together With Dissenting Views (to accompany H. Res. 846) {pf} {12kb.txt purl, 43kb.pdf purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, House Report No. 109-526, House International Relations Committee, June 23 2006) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/8:109-526, Serial Set: (none yet), CIS: (none yet), LCCN: (none), OCLC: 70251408, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}, filed June 23 2006, “Reports of Committees on Public Bills and Resolutions,” 152 Congressional Record H4553-H4554 {5kb.txt, 59kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:84, June 26 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/84}.

____________________

 

House Financial Services Committee

World Bank lending to Iran {91kb.txt, 942kb.pdf, purl, source, html, pf, pdf, source} (U.S. Congress 108-1, House Financial Services Committee, Serial No. 108-59, Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology, Hearing, Wednesday, October 29 2003, 10:05-11:42 a.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 49/20:108-59, LCCN: 2004398322, OCLC: 55201053, GPOcat (none), WorldCat, May 11 2004}, Michael Garver Oxley (committee chairman) {56kb.pdf}, Judy Biggert (subcommittee chairman), Carolyn Bosher Maloney (subcommittee ranking minority member), witnesses: William E. Schuerch {139kb.pdf, copy, 13kb.html} (deputy assistant secretary for international development, U.S. Treasury Department), Ray Takeyh {24kb.pdf, copy, source} (professor of national security studies and director of studies, Near East and South Asia Center, NDU: National Defense University, Washington D.C.), Patrick Clawson {31kb.pdf, copy, copy, 26kb.html, pf} (deputy director for research, WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.), CQ/FDCH transcript {copy}.

____________________

 

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee

U.N. Sanctions after Oil-for-Food: Still a Viable Diplomatic Tool? {196kb.txt, 10.1mb.pdf, purl, copy, source} (U.S. Congress 109-2, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Serial No. 109-175, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Hearing, May 2 2006, 10:03 a.m.-1:20 p.m. ET) {SuDoc: Y 4.G 74/7:SA 5/2, LCCN: 2006470160, OCLC: 74710653, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, October 17 2006}, statements: Christopher H. Shays (chairman) {128kb.pdf}, Dennis J. Kucinich (ranking minority member) {9kb.html, 7kb.txt, 50kb.pdf}, John R. Bolton (interim U.S. U.N. ambassador) {44kb.html, 347kb.pdf}, Joseph A. Christoff (Director, International Affairs and Trade Team, GAO: General Accountability Office) {482kb.pdf}, Carne Ross (Director, Independent Diplomat) {128kb.pdf}, George A. Lopez (Senior Fellow, Professor of Political Science, Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame) {744kb.pdf}, Elizazbeth Daniel (Committee Staff), “Briefing Memo for the Hearing” (April 27 2006) {2283kb.pdf}, C-Span video {3:16:35, 188mb.rm, schedule, 160484886, 192308-1}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcripts, panel 1, panel 2, CQ/FDCH.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Nuclear Proliferation Challenges (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Hearing, September 26 2006, 2:00 p.m. ET), statements: Christopher H. Shays (chairman) {120kb.pdf}, Dennis J. Kucinich (ranking minority member), briefing documents (September 21 2006): briefing memorandum {1.28mb.pdf}, attachments 1-3 {1.79mb.pdf}, attachments 4-5 {947kb.pdf}, attachment 6 {1.63mb.pdf}, attachments 7-8 {10kb.pdf}, witness, panel-1: Hans Blix (chairman, WMD Commission; Executive chairman, UNMOVIC, March 1 2000-2003 June 30; IAEA Director General, 1981-1997), prepared statement (not posted by the committee, I wonder why, and what it says), attachment {33kb.pdf, 74kb.pdf, source}, witnesses, panel-2: William H. Tobey (deputy administrator for defense nuclear proliferation, NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration, DoE: U.S. Department of Energy) {46kb.pdf}, Andrew K. Semmel (deputy assistant secretary of state for nuclear nonproliferation policy and negotiations, bureau of international security and nonproliferation (ISN), office of the under secretary of state for arms control and international security (T), DoS: U.S. State Department) {37kb.pdf}, Jack David (deputy assistant secretary of defense for combating weapons of mass destruction and negotiations policy, DoD: U.S. Defense Department) {32kb.pdf}, Gene Aloise (Director, Natural Resources and Environment, GAO: Government Accountability Office) {1.68mb.pdf}, witnesses, panel-3: Thomas Graham Jr. (chairman, Bipartisan Security Group, Global Security Institute) {629kb.pdf}, Baker Spring (F.M. Kirby Research Fellow for National Security Policy, Heritage Foundation) {43kb.pdf}, Jonathan Granoff (President, GSI: Global Security Institute) {1.60mb.pdf}, Henry D. Sokolski (NPEC: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center) {54kb.pdf}, Frank von Hippel (Co-chairman, International Panel on Fissile Materials) {373kb.pdf}, C-Span video: none, committee video/audio: none, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript, CQ transcript {408kb.pdf, source, copy, source}, reported, Dan Robinson, “Blix Urges Security Guarantees for Iran” (VOA: Voice of America News, September 27 2006).

 

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Posted Jan. 29 2006. Updated May 10 2007.

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