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Iran: Uranium enrichment (latest)


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News, context, start, Iraq: U.S. bases, electricity, oil revenues, missing billions, Iran: U.S. sanctions1, sanctions2, P-5 enrichment cartel, non-facts: enough oil and gas, outside fuel supply, centrifuges, “hiding” underground, “they lied,” countermeasures, “no economic sense,” Iran's economic plans, reprisals, Philippe Douste-Blazy, Jack Straw, IAEA, U.N. Security Council Docs. S/PRST/2006/15, S/Res/1696, “threat to the peace,” John Bolton, laptop/Merlin, Hans Blix, Big Lie, media, caveats, Hermann Goering, Reuel Marc Gerecht, blackmail.



1 U.N. Security Council orders Iran to suspend activities at its nuclear fuel cycle plants (uranium conversion and centrifuges) (S/Res/1696, July 31 2006).

Iran declines, asserting the order is unlawful.

U.S. destroys the plants, to enforce the order.

Iran retaliates against U.S. bases in Iraq.

U.S. second wave destroys Iran’s military and government.

U.S. “secures” Iran’s western oil fields, “for the benefit of the Iranian people.”

2 Israel attacks Iran (offense).  
Iran retaliates against Israel (defense).  
U.S. attacks Iran in “defense” of Israel (offense).




May 31 2006:

What Iran should say to Condoleezza Rice

Iran will not, again, suspend our enrichment activities, not least because spinning down the centrifuges causes many to crash, destroying them, and we don’t have any to spare.

We suspended our enrichment activities for more than two long years. During this time, slowly, one by one, incendiary allegations were investigated and found to be without merit, by the IAEA.

During this period, U.S. President George W. Bush, and other of his officials, have repeatedly asserted, they will not permit Iran to conduct fuel enrichment, under any circumstances, citing their supposed fear, that Iran will one day make nuclear weapons.

We believe, no amount of verification and monitoring by the IAEA will persuade U.S. officials to abandon their unlawful demand, and abandon their unlawful threats, of violence against Iran.

Iran will not surrender its right to fuel enrichment, under any circumstances.

Accordingly, Iran can see no purpose in suspending fuel enrichment, yet again.

Iran’s fuel enrichment activities are currently conducted under the watchful eye of IAEA inspectors, under the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, as in the past.

If the U.S. wishes to engage in talks, Iran is ready to participate.

To encourage such talks, Iran will once again reinstate its additional cooperation with the IAEA, under the Additional Protocol, and as well the additional voluntary cooperation Iran was providing, before the IAEA Board decided to refer Iran to the Security Council.

This, on the condition, that matters are restored to the status quo ante.

If the IAEA Board formally rescinds its resolution—

And if the Security Council formally terminates its agenda item on this topic—

Then, on the later of those dates, Iran will thereupon resume its former additional cooperation.

And, Iran will engage in talks, to find methods of satisfying reasonable, impartial, observers, that Iran’s nuclear activities are peaceable.



June 1 2006:

The P5 offer

“You suspend enrichment, and we will suspend action at the U.N. Security Council.”

That’s the same as this offer:

“Give me your money, and I won’t kill you.”

Iran should post the offer, for the public to evaluate, and then sit back and wait for the storm, of public scorn and ridicule.

Meanwhile, Iran should make this counter offer:

“You order The Boeing Company to suspend manufacture of airplanes, pending our talks, and we will suspend enrichment, as soon as we verify Boeing has complied.”

The P5 are terrorists.

Threatening violence, and sanctions, to blackmail Iran, to stop doing what it’s entitled to do.

If the P5 honestly wish to resolve, peaceably, the crisis they have created, then let them submit their case, to the U.N. I.C.J. (International Court of Justice), for a ruling, whether the Security Council has lawful authority to adopt sanctions, or authorize war, on the facts of the case.

This, because they have no apparent authority, there being no evidence, of any threat to the peace.”

If the U.S. wishes to assert, that Iran has forfeited its right to enrich uranium, because Iran may not have reported to the IAEA, this or that, as they should have, then let the U.S. submit that case, and that remedy, to the I.C.J., where that issue can be determined peaceably, and that remedy can be ordered lawfully.

And, where Iran can present its counter case, that any reporting failures were: (1) not “material breaches,” and (2) were lawful countermeasures, to protect itself, from massive “material breaches,” by the United States, which unlawfully prevented Iran from pursuing the peaceable activities the treaty guaranteed to them.



June 12 2006:

The U.S. enrichment veto

“ The confidential diplomatic package backed by Washington and formally presented to Iran on Tuesday leaves open the possibility that Tehran will be able to enrich uranium on its own soil, U.S. and European officials said.

That concession ... is conditioned on Tehran suspending its current nuclear work until the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency determines with confidence that the program is peaceful.

U.S. officials said Iran would also need to satisfy the U.N. Security Council that it is not seeking a nuclear weapon, a benchmark that White House officials believe could take years, if not decades, to achieve.”

Karl Vick, Dafna Linzer, “Proposal Would Let Iran Enrich Uranium: Tehran Must Meet U.N. Guidelines{pf} (Washington Post, June 7 2006), accord Nazila Fathi, “Iran to Offer Its Own Terms on Uranium” (New York Times, June 11 2006).

This is the standard U.S. scam, to give legal gloss, to its pretensions, that the U.S. President is Emperor of the World.

Pass a resolution.

Which can only be revoked by a later resolution.

If the U.S. President doesn’t veto it.

The Iranians might agree to this.

If some big, unexpected, event occurs—

If Hell freezes over.

For example.

Otherwise, Iranian leaders will never agree, that the U.S. President can veto their lives, and kill their citizens.

U.S. Presidents killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens, before the 2003 war, when they preempted many proposed Security Council votes, with their many threatened vetoes, to suspend U.N. sanctions, against Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, which did not exist, because Saddam promptly destroyed them all, mostly in 1991, as the U.N. had demanded.


Here’s a counter offer, were Iran to dance this dance:

Iran will agree to this, if the Security Council includes this provision, in its resolution, approving the deal:

“The Security Council decides:

1. That Iran, and any member of the Security Council, is authorized to submit a draft resolution, at any time, to terminate this resolution, and this agenda item, and thereupon restore the status quo ante, including Iran’s right to resume uranium enrichment, under IAEA Safeguards.

2. That the draft resolution will, immediately, and automatically, become an agenda item, taking precedence over all other matters on the agenda, and will be promptly considered, debated, and voted upon, in public session, with Iran entitled to be heard, at length, in the debate.

3. That if the draft resolution does not pass, others may again be introduced, after 6 month intervals.

4. That the draft resolution will pass, on the vote of 9 or more members, and a “no” vote, by any Permanent Member, will not constitute a veto.

5. That if the draft resolution is defeated, by a “yes” vote of fewer than 9 members, the resolution will nevertheless be deemed to have passed, in the absence of evidence, submitted in the debate — which a reasonable, impartial, informed, person would reasonably consider to be persuasive and substantial — that Iran is then currently violating Article 2 of the NPT.

6. That each member of the United Nations shall be entitled, to judge that evidence for itself, in deciding, whether or not any otherwise binding Security Council resolution shall be binding on it.”



“ Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

The NPT, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Article 4(2) (Vienna, June 19 1973) {25kb.pdf, 25kb.pdf}, status {12kb.pdf}, declarations {68kb.pdf}.



July 31 2006:

Iran ordered to suspend enrichment permanently

The U.N. Security Council, on July 31 2006, ordered Iran to suspend uranium enrichment (S/Res/1696).

This suspension order is permanent.

Because it cannot be revoked.

Without consent of the U.S. government.

Which can veto any revoking resolution.

Regardless of what the IAEA inspectors, or the 14 other members of the Security Council, may later say.

A very great failure of diplomacy, by the Russians.

Who should know better.

They watched the maneuvers of a violent criminal regime, up close, when Adolph Hitler gripped the levers of power, for 12 years, in Germany.

The prima facie criminal U.S. war on Iraq, launched on a lie, and in violation of a Security Council resolution (S/Res/1441).

The prima facie criminal U.S. war on Gaza, and the rest of the Palestinians, by blockade, as a co-belligerent with Israel, with the prima facie criminal war aim, to overthrow their democratically elected government.

The prima facie criminal U.S. war on Lebanon, to increase a buffer zone, to defend the prima facie criminal land-grab, and unlawful military occupation, in the occupied territories, by their co-belligerent, Israel.

And now Iran.

The predicate for scenario 1 is now in place.

Politically, the U.S. requires nothing further from the Security Council.

To attack Iran.

Except for whatever political show it desires to pretense, before the attack, to demonstrate, once again, how irrelevant the Security Council is.

George W. Bush can now assert, that Iran has no legal right to continue uranium enrichment.

And, that the U.N. Security Council has determined, that any continuation constitutes a “threat” to international peace and security.

Even though that’s not what they said.

That must be what they meant.

George W. Bush will boldly assert.

Because the Security Council members all knew, they did not otherwise have legal authority, to adopt that order.

George W. Bush can simply declare diplomacy exhausted, the Security Council cowards, to confront the “threat” — which they, themselves, have recognized — and war as the only solution to that threat.

War is what the Israel-Jew Lobby wants.

And, what the Israel-Jew Lobby wants, Congress always provides.


But, in the present political climate, some votes might disobey the Israel-Jew Lobby, citing a bankrupt nation, and many other reasons, no evidence, a failed war in Iraq, increased hatred of the U.S., and such.

In that event, if Congressional leaders judge, the vote would not be certain, George W. Bush would likely order the U.S. military to attack Iran anyway, without a vote in Congress, based on the authority he asserts he has, to do so, “to deter ... threats.”

George W. Bush has declared, that history will judge him a hero, if he pursues his own vision, to remake the Middle East.

He has said, he is content to be judged by history, and so, is indifferent, to his present day critics.

His vision obviously requires plunging the entire Middle East into flames, in order to remake it.

The U.S. attack on Iran will be criminal.

And so too, the nuclear targets in Iran (“civilian objects”).

Creating the largest criminal trial in U.S. and world history, down the road, if an honest administration is ever elected, to control the U.S. Congress and the U.S. administration (very unlikely).

Only if Iran now files a lawsuit, in the U.N. International Justice of Court, can it overturn the Security Council resolution, and thereby neutralize George W. Bush’s rhetorical pretexts.

Unlike nearly every other case, this particular lawsuit, the U.S. cannot block and ignore.

Because the defendants would be the Security Council itself, and the IAEA.

The U.S. fears lawsuits.

Because it’s conduct is nearly always unlawful.

And usually criminal.

The U.S. does not permit lawsuits against itself, in U.S. courts, or international courts, for its international activities, including its violent crimes and intentional torts.





“ Of the 114 chapters in the Koran, 113 of them start with the words:

“In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful.”

In the Koran, God tells the Profit, people follow you because of the merciful nature of God, and that if you are harsh with people, they will turn their backs on you.”

Hussein Ali Montazeri (84 year old Grand Ayatollah), interviewed in Qom, March 8 2006 (Channel 4 News, London, March 13 2006, 7:29 p.m.) (video not posted).



“ I believe that we are on a very short fuse—

Months rather than years ...

I think that we should actively be preparing for whatever military actions are necessary.

But I think our goal has to be to replace the regime. ...

If this government—

If this dictatorship is so dangerous, that we have to consider bombing it—

It’s too dangerous to leave it in charge of one of the world’s largest supplies of oil.”

Newt Gingrich (former Speaker of the House of Representatives, U.S. Congress 104-105, 1995-1998), interviewed by Sean Hannity and Bob Beckel, “Interview with Newt Gingrich{LexisNexis, Lexis} (Fox News, Hannity & Colmes, January 27 2006, 9:00 pm EST), reported in Paul Craig Roberts, “The Coming War on Iran: Fox News Fans the Hysteria” (CounterPunch, January 30 2006). And see: Newt Gingrich, interviewed in “Gingrich Warns of War With Iran” (Human Events, February 10 2006): “Our objective should be the systematic replacement of this regime.” Patrick J. Buchanan, “Churchill, Hitler, and Newt{copy} (WND: WorldNetDaily, February 20 2006): “The Argumentum ad Hitlerum.”




In a dictatorship —

Do the people have the power?

To throw-out a government?

If they don’t like it?

In periodic elections?

The president?

The parliament?

The Assembly of Experts?

City and Village Councils?

Even if the laws.

Big Money.

Powerful forces.

Unseen hands.

Limit their choice of candidates.

Can the people?


Throw the incumbents out?

If they want to?

In a dictatorship?



“ The 1973 embargo sparked a new hawkishness in Washington.

An article in the March, 1975, issue of Harper’s, titled “Seizing Arab Oil,” unabashedly outlined plans for a U.S. invasion to seize key Middle East oilfields and prevent Arab countries from having such control over the modern world’s most vital commodity.

The author, writing under a pseudonym, wasn’t just any old right-wing blowhard; it turned out to be Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

But seizing Arab oilfields was too risky as long as the Soviet Union existed. The Soviet collapse in 1991 opened up new possibilities. ...

“The plan to take over Iraq is a revival of an old plan that first appeared in 1975. It was the Kissinger plan,”

James Akins, who served as U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia under Kissinger, told me in an interview in Washington in 2003.

Dyer insists that the Iraq invasion wasn’t about oil, but about extending U.S. power.

But these goals go hand in glove.”

Linda McQuaig, “History Will Show U.S. Lusted After Oil” (Toronto Star, December 26 2004) {copy}. See also Glenn Frankel, “U.S. Mulled Seizing Oil Fields In ’73: British Memo Cites Notion of Sending Airborne to Mideast” {pf} (Washington Post, January 1 2004) {copy}; Robert Dreyfuss, “The Thirty-Year Itch” (Mother Jones, March-April 2003).

CJHjr: In 1975, then (unelected) President Gerald Ford appointed George H.W.Bush Director of Central Intelligence, Dick Cheney White House Chief of Staff, replacing Donald Rumsfeld, appointed Secretary of Defense, and fired Henry Kissinger from one of his two jobs (National Security Advisor), leaving him as Secretary of State (the “Halloween Massacre”). In brief {2:30 bb}, Michael Kirk, “The Dark Side” (WGBH, Frontline, first broadcast June 20 2006, PBS: Public Broadcasting Service) {video 2/6 bb, 19:11 bb, at 0:00-2:30 bb}.



“ First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.

Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.

Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. ...

The United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated.”

Dick Cheney (U.S. Secretary of Defense), Paul Dundes Wolfowitz (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy), Irving Lewis Libby (“Scooter”) (Chief of Staff to Wolfowitz), Defense Planning Guidance (February 18 1992 draft, 46 pages, classified), excerpted inExcerpts From Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival' {copy, excerpts} (New York Times, March 8 1992), reported in Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls For Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One-Superpower World: Pentagon’s Document Outlines Ways to Thwart Challenges to Primacy of America” (New York Times, March 8 1992) {copy, copy}, reprinted in Robert Carlyle Byrd (U.S. Senator, West Virginia), statement, “The Threadbare Supercop,” 138 Congressional Record S3110-S3113 (March 10 1992, daily edition 138:32, U.S. Congress 102-2) {SuDoc: X/A.102/2:138/32}, reported in Barton Gellman, “Keeping the U.S. First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower” (Washington Post, March 11 1992) {copy, copy, copy}, context Nicholas Lemann, “The Next World Order: The Bush Administration may have a brand-new doctrine of power” (The New Yorker, April 1 2002, pages 42-48) {833kb.pdf}.



The Golden Rule

“ The United States have to take a hard look at their own behavior.

And ask themselves:

If they were in the place of other nations.

What would they do?”

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (President of Iran), interviewed by Barbara Slavin in Tehran, February 11 2006, “Iran Can Progress Despite Enemies, President Says{pf} (USA Today, February 13 2006) {copy}. And see Barbara Slavin (Senior Diplomatic Correspondent, USA Today), interviewed on Washington Journal (C-Span, February 21 2006), “Discusses her recent trip to Iran,” C-Span video {39:30}, (C-Span, June 1 2006), “Discusses U.S. policy toward Iran. On May 31, the U.S. announced a shift in policy, saying it will work with other countries to hold direct talk with Iran about Iran’s nuclear program. He announced one condition on this policy: Iran must agree to stop nuclear activities that could lead to a bomb,” C-Span video {35:00}. And see Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, interviewed by Stefan Aust, Gerhard Spörl, Dieter Bednarz, in Tehran, “‘We Are Determined’” (Spiegel, May 30 2006) {copy}.

God: Love your neighbor as yourself.”

Jesus: Do to others as you would have them do to you.”

Jesus: “So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets.”

Muhammed: “None of you [truely] believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.”

Hillel: “What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor. This is the whole Torah. All the rest is commentary.”

Tse-kung: Is there one word that can serve as a principle of conduct for life?

Confucius: “Shu”—reciprocity. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire.”



R.I.P. NPT:  
How the United States destroyed the Nuclear Non-Profileration Treaty


by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.


When rational people appear to behave irrationally—

There’s a reason.

And the larger the group, more than one reason is likely.

U.S. Congress

If you want to experience a group psychosis, in real time, power-up your Windows Media Player, or RealOne Player, get on-line, and open this URL (Alt-F, Open): audio {2:26:55} (Options Available to the United States to Counter a Nuclear Iran, House Armed Services Committee hearing, February 1 2006).

A U.S. Congressional committee hearing — without a single, moderate, questioning, critical, voice — predicated on the “fact” that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

This supposed “fact” is not established in the public record. And it’s abundantly refuted in the public record.

And so, what is the reason(s) for this apparently psychotic behavior, by the U.S. Congress?


Three days later, on February 4 2006, the Board of Governors of the IAEA (U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency) voted (27/3/5) to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council, for Iran’s supposed failure(s) to comply with its obligations to cooperate with the IAEA.

This, despite heroic cooperation by Iran, unprecedented in world history.

Apart from Iraq.

Which likewise cooperated 110% with U.N. inspectors.

Until George W. Bush, and Tony Blair, ordered the inspectors out and decided that killing 100,000 Iraqis was a price those victims were willing to pay, to enable the U.S. to establish permanent military bases in Iraq; groom and corrupt an obeisant government; control and thieve {2.3mb.pdf} the second largest oil reserves on earth; surveil {accord}, destabilize, and attack Iraq’s neighbors, with covert criminal gangs {copy, accord, copy}, and by overt military assault.

All the while, strong-arming Israel’s theft {copy}, nearby, of Palestinian land.



Permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq

“ Jimmy Carter: I believe ... the reason that we went into Iraq was to establish a permanent military base in the Gulf region ...

Arab leaders around the world, they all have noticed this.

They’re the ones that have brought it to my attention.

And I think it’s an accurate statement.”

Jimmy Carter (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1977-1981 Jan. 20), interviewed by Larry King, “Interview With Jimmy Carter{copy} (CNN, Larry King Live, February 1 2006).


H.Amdt.750 (“None of the funds made available in this Act may be used by the Government of the United States to enter into a basing rights agreement between the United States and Iraq”) to H.R.4939, amendment introduced, debated, adopted, “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006,” 152 Congressional Record H1097-H1118 {190kb.txt, 178kb.pdf}, at H1107-H1110 (introduced, debated), H1110 (adopted by voice vote) (March 16 2006, daily edition 152:34, U.S. Congress 109-2) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/34}, video (0:26:25).

S.Amdt.3717 (“None of the funds made available by title I of this Act may be made available to establish permanent military bases in Iraq or to exercise control over the oil infrastructure or oil resources of Iraq”), superceded by S.Amdt.3855 (“No funds made available by title I of this Act may be made available to establish permanent United States military bases in Iraq or to exercise control by the United States over the oil infrastructure or oil resources of Iraq”) to H.R.4939, amendments adopted and debated, “Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006,” 152 Congressional Record S3937-S3973 {317kb.txt, 273kb.pdf}, at S3948-3949 (introduced), S3952 (adopted by voice vote), S3957-S3963 (debated) (May 3 2006, daily edition 152:50, U.S. Congress 109-2) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/50}.

Comment by CJHjr:


We can spend as much money as we want, to help United States oil companies “exercise control over the oil infrastructure or oil resources of Iraq.”

And, we can spend as much money as we want, to build military bases:

If we pretend they’re not “permanent.”


If we intend, as some future date, to turn them over to the Iraqi government.

Because, our intended gift makes them permanent Iraqi military bases, not “permanent United States military bases.”

And the U.S. puppet compliant client Iraqi government will allow the U.S. to continue to control and operate these permanent Iraqi military bases.

Or have access to them, any time we want.

Under a “basing rights agreement,” dictated negotiated by the U.S. government, with the U.S. puppet compliant client Iraqi government, using funds (to pay for the “negotiations”) from the many other sources available to the U.S. government, besides this particular law.


“We can live with that.”

“A fine piece of propaganda.”


Richard Cowan, “Iraq War Bill Deletes US Military Base Prohibition{copy} (Reuters, June 10 2006): “Senate aides said Republican staffers removed the provisions from the bills before House and Senate negotiators convened this week in a late-night work session to write a compromise spending bill.”

“ The conferees have not included a provision proposed by the Senate to prohibit the use of funds in this title to establish permanent United States military bases in Iraq, or to exercise United States control over the oil infrastructure or oil resources of Iraq.

The House bill contained no similar provision.”

Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2006, and for Other Purposes {pf}, page 102 {459kb.txt, purl, 466kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 109-2, House Report No. 109-494, Senate-House Conference Committee, June 8 2006) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/8:109-494, Serial Set: (none yet), CIS: (none yet), LCCN: (none), OCLC: 70135738, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}, submitted “Conference Report on H.R. 4939,” 152 Congressional Record H3587-H3627 {pf} {482kb.txt, 358kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:72, June 8 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/72}.



Query:No similar provision”?

Some Members of Congress sometimes collude, as principals, for witnesses to lie to Congress.

The Members might as well lie to themselves, too.

And, for the historical record.

And make it unanimous.



See also: Daniel McGrory, “In the Chaos of Iraq, One Project is on Target: a Giant US Embassy{copy} (Times, London, May 3 2006); Michael Hirsh, John Barry, Mark Hosenball, Michael Hastings, Scott Johnson, “Stuck in the Hot Zone: Don't dream about full exits. The military is in Iraq for the long haul.” {rss} (Newsweek, May 1 2006); Peter Spiegel, Bush’s Requests for Iraqi Base Funding Make Some Wary of Extended Stay{copy} (Los Angeles Times, March 24 2006) (Balad airbase, Al Asad airbase, Tallil airbase, Camp Taji); Charles J. Hanley (Associated Press, Balad airbase), “‘I Think We'll Be Here Forever’ {copy, truncated} (Army Times, March 20 2006) (also al-Qayyarah airbase, in the north); Dahr Jamail, “Iraq: Permanent US Colony{copy} (Truthout, March 14 2006); Tom Engelhardt, Can You Say ‘Permanent Bases’? The American Press Can’t{copy} (Tom Dispatch, February 14 2006); Oliver Poole (al-Asad airbase), “Football and Pizza Point to US Staying for Long Haul” (Daily Telegraph, February 11 2006); Thomas E. Ricks (Balad airbase), “Biggest Base in Iraq Has Small-Town Feel: Most Troops at Balad Never Meet Iraqis” {pf} (Washington Post, February 4 2006); Chris Hughes, “Billion Dollar Bunker: U.S. plans Baghdad embassy more secure than Pentagon” (Daily Mirror, January 3 2006); Bradley Graham (Baghdad), “Commanders Plan Eventual Consolidation of U.S. Bases in Iraq{pf} (Washington Post, May 22 2005); Thom Shanker, Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Key Iraq Bases” (New York Times, April 19 2003) {copy}.

The apparent motive of the IAEA voters was their supposed suspicion, that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program.

They all knew, there’s only one way to discover if this is true. And that’s if Iran cooperates with the IAEA. Permitting snap inspections, of sites not permitted by the normal IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Answering questions they don’t normally have to answer.

These inspection powers are contained in the IAEA “Additional Protocol,” which Iran signed on December 18 2003, voluntarily obeying it, since October 21 2003, when it announced it’s intention to sign it. Iran’s parliament (Majlis) has not ratified this Protocol, in view of the turmoil created by the United States assertions — supported by no evidence — that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program. Ratification is a carrot in Iran’s efforts to face-down these unsubstantiated claims.

However, the government of Iran acted as if the Protocol was in force, as certified many times by the IAEA Director-General, until February 6 2006, when the IAEA Board of Governor’s voted to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council. This suspension is another negotiating carrot by Iran, which informed the IAEA Director-General it would reinstate compliance with the Protocol when the U.N. Security Council terminated its involvement in this matter.

The Director General of the IAEA assured his Board of Governors, and the public, there’s no rush. Iran poses no “imminent threat” to anybody, he said, and the purpose of the resolution is merely to “build confidence,” that Iran has no nuclear weapons program.

They all knew, Iran’s parliament had passed a law, prohibiting the government of Iran from obeying that Additional Protocol, if the IAEA referred Iran to the U.N. Security Council.

Hence, they all knew, by adopting their resolution, they were terminating the ability of the IAEA to discover if their suspicions are true.

And so, what is the reason(s) for this apparently psychotic behavior, by the IAEA Board of Governors?

The reason(s)

The Director General is mistaken.

There is a rush.

George W. Bush has only 3 more years in office (until January 20 2009).

Tony Blair likely has only 1 year left (until May 2007), although his large crowd of co-conspirators will serve until the next U.K. general election (by May 5 2010).

Could these scheduled departures be a candidate?

For one of the reason(s), we’re searching for?

We’ll come back to this question.

U.S. NPT veto?

The Iranians believe this is the reason.

Not least, because many U.S. officials say it’s the reason:

The U.S. believes, there’s no place in the world for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — guaranteeing nations the right to a peaceable nuclear industry — unless the U.S. has a veto.

But the U.S. has no veto.

So the U.S. does the next best thing.

Just like they did for Iraq:

The U.S. fabricates, and promotes as unassailable “fact,” an endless stream of non-facts:

Accusations, suspicions, innuendos, theories, inferences.

To frustrate and prevent the object nations of U.S. antipathy from exercising their legal rights under the treaty.

The Iranians believe the U.S. wants to badger Iran forever, until:

1.  A regime comes to power in Iran which suits the U.S. government, or

2.  George W. Bush is ready to give Israel the nod, and the both of them attack Iran, a one-two punch, its nuclear facilities, or the whole country (regime change). With Tony Blair & Co. nodding in agreement. A violent crime, by a very large number of leaders and military officers, in that axis of evil.

Either way, there’s no pleasing George W. Bush & Co., his masters, and the nations they can bully, bribe, and sway.

And so, Iran’s decision to terminate its voluntary compliance, with the IAEA Additional Protocol. And to proceed, under IAEA Safeguards, to develop a nuclear fuel cycle.

Which the United States of America long ago agreed, Iran has the absolute treaty-right to do.

And to Hell with George W. Bush.

And his masters.

And all his cronies too.

A nuclear fuel source they can trust. And depend upon. To supply their own future nuclear electricity plants.

And to export, under IAEA Safeguards. As fuel for all other nations, harassed by the United States, and its cabal of treaty-violaters.

An excellent source of foreign currency. And political influence, among the most of the nations of the world. Those who do not admire the United States of America.

For good reasons. A violent rogue state. Which contempts the rule of law, and the right of others to pursue their happiness.

Particularly the U.S.-vetoed nations. Those, like Iran, whom the U.S. will not permit to generate electricity with nuclear power.


“ Nuclear energy is expected to become once again a primary source of energy, with the rising demand for oil and gas and the ensuing increase in the prices, which incidentally can sharply accelerate for any political provocation.

We should add to this the concerns about the environment, and the world will have no alternative but to revert back to nuclear energy, at least for decades to come.

This implies that many countries in the developing world would have to acquire or produce their own facilities for nuclear energy as well as nuclear fuel.

The moves towards restrictions on nuclear fuel production under the pretext of non-proliferation are bound to make the developing countries dependant on an exclusive cartel of nuclear fuel suppliers; a cartel that has a manifest record of denials and restrictions for political and commercial reasons.

For Iran, as the chief target of denials, it is only reasonable to continue to develop and expand its nuclear fuel production capability to meet its requirements for nuclear energy.

This process takes time, it takes years to complete. To meet our needs five to ten years from now we need to start today if today is not already late.

For Iran it is a strategic economic goal to be a supplier of the nuclear fuel and energy, for its domestic needs and beyond.

We are a major player in the oil and gas sector.

We will be a player in the nuclear field.”

Statement (omitted by the IAEA from its website) by the Iranian representative at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting, August 8-11 2005, reprinted in Iranian Nuclear Policy & Activities: Complementary Information to the Report of the Director General (GOV/2005/67), pages 121-125, at 122 (September 12 2005) (Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Vienna, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/657, 15 September 2005) {495kb.pdf}.



Exactly so:


“ The President has proposed that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities — the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for nuclear weapons — be limited to those states that already operate full-scale, fully-functioning facilities.

In return, he called on the world’s nuclear fuel suppliers to assure supply, in a reliable and cost effective manner, to those states which forego enrichment and reprocessing.”

Robert Joseph (Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (T), U.S. Department of State), prepared statement, “U.S. Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” {31kb.pdf}, U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy and the Roles and Missions of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy ... Future Years Defense Program (Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Hearing, March 29 2006).


The emperor has spoken.

The emperor will be obeyed.

But, wait a minute:


Query: Will George W. Bush be obeyed?


“ The world — and the countries that want to secure their future — are all against the monopoly of nuclear technology, by a few countries.

To say that no country has the right, to have access to nuclear technology means, that in 20 years’ time, all of the countries of the world will have to beg, certain Western or European countries, to meet their energy demands.

They will have to beg, for energy, in order to run their lives.

Which country, nation, or honest official, is ready to take that? ”

Ali Khamenei (Supreme Leader of Iran), speech, on the 17th anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeyni’s death (Ayatollah Khomeyni’s mausoleum, IRINN: Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television, June 4 2006, 6:45 GMT), recorded and translated (presumably) by BBC Monitoring who — conspicuously — have not published their accurate translation, of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech (October 26 2005), to correct the New York Times headline lie: “wipe Israel off the map.”

Proving a secret program

In the course of their psychotic hearing — “psychotic,” because it assumed a fact which is not a fact (so far as the public record shows) — the U.S. Congress House committee had rational discussions, about various issues.

One issue was this:

How to punish the “bad guys” — as they refer to the elected president of Iran, a former mayor of Tehran — and his masters (whom they refer to as “non-elected”), elected by the elected Assembly of Experts.

Without alienating the general populace of Iran.

This is very troublesome task, replied a witness.

Because every last man, woman, and child in Iran, believes their nation does not have a nuclear weapons program. Because that’s what their leaders tell them. Because they’ve seen nothing to make them doubt what they hear. And because it seems a very extravagant waste of money, for no apparent benefit.

These (the general populace of Iran) unanimously believe, Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful, and lawful under the treaty. For electricity generation, the production of isotopes, radioactive markers, and such, routinely used in medicine, agriculture and industry, research, and the like.

And, they believe, if this were not true, they would hear about it. From the U.N. IAEA inspectors, who come and go every few weeks, taking their swipes, to analyze back in their laboratories, looking at their live video feeds, testing their samples, and such.

But the U.N. IAEA inspectors certify, that 100% of Iran’s nuclear program — which the IAEA knows about — is perfectly innocent, peaceable, and lawful, under the treaty.

And so, the notion, that the Iranian people are to be punished — by U.N. sanctions, by a military strike, or whatever — can produce only one result:

Unanimous support, by the populace, for their government (the “bad guys”).

And intense hatred, of the United States of America.

The exact opposite of what the psychotic U.S. officials say they want.

Iran’s nuclear weapons program — the “fact” unchallenged in the Congressional hearing — is a closely guarded secret, the witness said. Only a very few people in Iran know about it. Few, if any, government officials in Iran know about it, he said, apart from the “bad guys,” and only a few of them.

And there, that discussion ended.


Because, if it’s such a secret program, then the witness, who asserts, the supposed secret program to be an unassailable fact—

That witness is a patent liar, because he knows, he does not know, for a fact, that any such program exists.

And because, they have no way of convincing even those who want to be convinced, and pretend to be convinced (their own cheerleaders), that this supposed “fact” exists.

Let alone any member of the United Nations, none of whom has any legal obligation to obey any unlawful Security Council resolution (e.g., sanctions), based on asserted suspicion, instead of facts.

And least of all, the Iranian people.

And because, if the program is such a closely guarded secret, among such a small number of people, then it’s not a “program” at all, of any description the English language recognizes. It’s not approved, adopted, budgeted, funded, administered, staffed, with employees hard at work, to design and implement.

At most, it’s a idea, in the minds of the secret small group (if any). An option, they might think about, down the road, one day (maybe). Likely documented, with a stack of papers in some drawer, somewhere, of the sort every government in the world has plenty of: Analyzing the task, the cost of it, the problems of achieving it, and what use it would be, in the end.

I don’t suppose many people in Iran would feel they deserve punishment for such theoretical musings.

Nor many people elsewhere in the world.

Except psychopaths.

And hoodlums, with an agenda.

The Non-Facts

They’re everywhere.

U.S. speakers.

On radio, TV, print.

Some openly, some secretly, on the U.S. payroll (think tanks, CIA assets).

And their U.K. toddies.

And their media shills.

Asserting as unassailable fact, that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program.

And here’s their great long list, of non-facts, to prove it:

1. Iran has so much oil and gas {get ready for an argument masquerading as fact}, they have no need to generate electricity with nuclear power. Therefore {get ready for a non-fact inference from the argument}, the only explanation for their nuclear program is to build a bomb.


“ Iran can not merely rely on fossil fuel for its energy for the following considerations:

Continued use of energy in its present form is bound to turn Iran into a net importer of crude oil and some of its by-products in the coming decades;

Local use of these resources as fuel will drastically affect Iran’s foreign exchange earnings from export of crude oil and natural gas;

The utilization of these resources in processing industries such as petrochemicals will generate much greater added value;

The environmental impact of increased reliance on fossil fuel is a serious concern of the entire international community;

Iran also has vast gas reserves. But their development is extremely costly and the costs can only be offset by gas export as envisaged and implemented in current gas development projects;

In the projected 7000 megawatt scenario, Iran will annually save 70 million barrels of crude oil based on 60% EAF, with an economic value of over US$1.5 billion annually;

The environmental value will amount to preventing the release into the atmosphere of over 157000 tons of carbon dioxide, 1150 tons of suspending particles, 130 tons of sulfur and 50 tons of nitrous oxide;”

Statement (omitted by the IAEA from its website) by the Iranian representative at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting, November 2003 (part of a paper distributed after the statement, entitled “Why Iran’s Nuclear Program is Exclusively Peaceful”), reprinted in Iranian Nuclear Policy & Activities: Complementary Information to the Report of the Director General (GOV/2005/67), pages 73-86, at 78 (12 September 2005) (Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Vienna, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/657, 15 September 2005) {495kb.pdf}.



The U.K. had lots of oil and gas.

Once upon a time.

In their sector of the North Sea.

But now, U.K. oil and gas is running out.

Production is declining.

The U.K. now imports gas.

To power its electricity generators.

Looming, in the future?

A balance of payments crisis.

And what that means is this:

Say you want to sell your house, and you’ve been offered a new, high-paying, job, in a company which sells stuff to foreigners.

Are you willing to accept payment, for all this, in Iranian money?

Instead of dollars? Or pounds? Or euros?

  Yes.       No.

I didn’t think so.

Balance of payments is about this:

How to get foreign money.

To buy foreign things.

Instead of sending it up the smokestack, generating electricity, Iran can sell its oil and gas, to foreigners (Japan, China, India, Pakistan).

To get foreign money.

To buy foreign things.

And to get friends, to stand by their side.

When an axis of evil menaces.

And, once they figure out how to do it, they can build nuclear plants on their borders, and sell electricity to their neighbors, as well.

Like Iraq.

More foreign money.

To buy foreign things.




“ Demand, almost 9,000 megawatts last summer, is expected to rise sharply this year ...

“We’re about 4,000 megawatts in the hole nationwide to meet our needs,”

Maj. Al Moff, 4th Infantry Division electricity specialist, noted at a recent internal briefing for division officers. ...

One Iraqi proposal is for a transmission line to import much more than the 100 megawatts of Iranian power Iraq now buys.

The U.S. Embassy won’t talk about it ...

The Iranian Embassy says Tehran has earmarked $1 billion in loans for Iraqi infrastructure, mostly for electrical power, the Iranian news agency reports.”

Charles J. Hanley, Sameer N. Yacoub (Associated Press, Baghdad), Electricity Hits Three-Year Low in Iraq{copy} (Guardian, London, March 15 2006).

And see Glenn Zorpette, Re-engineering Iraq{pf} (IEEE Spectrum, February 2006):

“U.S. and Iraqi officials have spent billions on restoring Iraq’s electrical system. So why is Baghdad getting just 6 hours of electricity a day?”

“To properly rebuild the oil infrastructure ... would cost about $20 billion. Likewise, the electricity sector needs about $20 billion ... (some observers have lately put just that electricity figure at $30 billion to $40 billion). There is no solution to these problems without money, and the money is not there.”

Query:The money is not there?” Jonathan Weisman, “War Costs Approach $10 Billion a Month” (San Francisco Chronicle, April 20 2006), Jonathan Weisman, “Unforeseen Spending on Materiel Pumps Up Iraq War Bill{pf} (Washington Post, April 20 2006): “The U.S. government is now spending nearly $10 billion a month in Iraq and Afghanistan, up from $8.2 billion a year ago, a new Congressional Research Service report found.”

See Amy Belasco (Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress, Order Code: RL33110, April 24 2006) {245kb.pdf}.


“ Barbara A. Mikulski: But where are we with the oil?

When is it going to start to pay the bill?

Condoleezza Rice: They are producing currently at below the prewar range of 2 billion to 2.5 billion.”

Query: “Billion”? I believe she mispoke. Iraq was producing that many million barrels per day, less than 1 billion per year.  CJHjr

Supplemental Budget Request for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Appropriations Committee, Hearing, March 9 2006), witnesses: Donald H. Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Condoleezza Rice (Secretary of State), Peter Pace (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), John Abizaid (Commander, U.S. Central Command). C-Span video, 3:05:05. FNS transcript: 9:33 a.m. {Lexis}, CQ transcript {pf}.




How much?

How much below, the prewar average?

Iraq’s oil production, for the year 2005, averaged 1,878 thousand barrels per day (1.878 million).

It declined sharply, but lately recovered (2005-2006):

September: 2,053
October: 1,803
November: 1,703
December: 1,653
2005 Average: 1,878
January: 1,603
February: 1,803
March: 1,903
April: 1,903
May: 1,903
5-Month Average: 1,823


Source EIA: International Petroleum Monthly (U.S. EIA: Energy Information Administration), “World Crude Oil Production (Including Lease Condensate) (Thousand Barrels per Day),” Table 4.1a (annual figures, 1970-2005) and Table 1.1a (monthly figures, 1977-present), July 2006 table posted: August 2 2006.

Source IEA: The U.S. EIA government publication, International Petroleum Monthly, cites, for its data, the IEA Monthly Oil Data Service, presumably reflected in its monthly publication: Oil Market Report (IEA: International Energy Agency, an organization of 26 oil importing countries). These IEA monthly reports contain a narrative, about Iraq’s oil production and exports: 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002 (menus of pdf files, of less than 100kb.each).

Source OPEC: The U.S. EIA government publication, International Petroleum Monthly, also cites, for its data, the Monthly Oil Market Report (OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. OPEC’s numbers are similar to the above table. See, e.g., OPEC Table 15 (August 2006) {1.2mb.pdf}.

See also Ghaida Ghantous (Doha), “Iraq Says Ready to Negotiate Oilfield Contracts” (Reuters, April 21 2006, 8:39 AM ET): “Iraq pumped some 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) and sold some 1.7 million bpd before the invasion, and prior to the 1990 Gulf War, crude output levels were at around 3 million bpd. ... Shamkhi Faraj, director general of marketing and economics at the ministry of oil ... ‘So far this month we achieved 1.58 for the average of the first 18 days, and hope we can be for the rest of month we’ll be close to 1.5-1.6,’ Faraj said. ‘For the second half, we hope to do 1.6, maybe a little bit higher toward the end of the year.’”

That drop of 450,000 barrels a day (September-January), at $50 a barrel, is $22.5 million per day, in lost revenue, $8.2 billion per year. At $70 a barrel, it’s $31.5 million per day, in lost revenue, $11.5 billion per year. See also Walid Khadduri, “$18 billion—Iraq’s Annual Oil Losses” (Al-Hayat, April 11 2006): “...stolen and siphoned wealth ... smuggling, sabotage, and lost opportunities.”

The U.S. is stealing Iraq’s oil and gas in two ways:

1. Selling off all Iraq’s unproven reserves, which is the most of Iraq’s oil and gas. This transfer of national wealth, from the Iraq State (and its people), to oil companies, was made possible by the U.S. imposing the condition in Iraq’s constitution, that exclusive state ownership, via the Iraqi state oil company, applies only to existing proven reserves.

2. Imposing an opaque “production sharing agreement” with a robber-baron high percentage payable to oil companies, equivalent to what they might deserve for the risk and expense of drilling in the deep sea. In Iraq, you can get oil, practically by poking a stick the ground: No risk, no unusual expense, warranting a very low percentage.

The details of this, I haven’t yet studied.

The press has completely ignored this massive theft.


Greg Palast, “Secret US Plans For Iraq's Oil {pf} (BBC News, Newsnight, BBC TV-2, London, Thursday March 17 2005, 10:30 p.m.) {BBCcat d:andm749n}, video (bb) {11:24, 2.88mb.rm, bb, 17.58mb.rm, search, search, rss, rss, rss} {BBC bb player, bb source}: “A joint investigation by Newsnight and Harper's Magazine: The Bush administration made plans for war and for Iraq’s oil before the 9/11 attacks, sparking a policy battle between neo-cons and Big Oil, BBC’s Newsnight has revealed,” also broadcast, and Greg Palast interviewed by Amy Goodman, U.S. Broadcast Exclusive {copy}: Secret U.S. Plans For Iraq's Oil Spark Political Fight Between Neocons and Big Oil” (Democracy Now! The War and Peace Report, New York City, March 21 2005), video/audio {59:08, audio 27.1mb.mp3} {Palast 19:48 at 12:46-32:35: video/audio}. Greg Palast, “OPEC on the March: Why Iraq Still Sells Its Oil à la Cartel” (Harper's Magazine, volume 310, number 1859, New York City, April 2005, pages 74-76), reported, “Palast, neocons, Iraq oil, and madness” (Prairie Weather, blog, March 19 2005). Greg Palast, interviewed by Scott Horton (blog, blog), “The BBC's Greg Palast returns to the show to discuss his new Harper's article, ‘OPEC on the March’” (Weekend Interview Show with Scott Horton, Austin Texas, Saturday March 26 2005), audio {22:42, 2.6mb.mp3}. Censored 2007, Top 25 Censored Stories of 2007 (SSU: Sonoma State University, Project Censored, Rohnert Park California) (“The News That Didn't Make the News”).

Greg Muttitt, Crude Designs: The Rip-Off of Iraq's Oil Wealth{copy} {2.3mb.pdf} (Platform, London, November 2005, with GPF: Global Policy Forum, IPS: Institute for Policy Studies, NEF: New Economics Foundation, Oil Change International, War on Want).

Karen Button, “Who Will Possess Iraq’s Oilfields?” (URUKNET, February 15 2006).

Kevin Zeese, “Looting By Another Name: The Corporate Takeover of Iraq’s Economy” (Counterpunch, May 10 2006) {copy}.


“ The Security Council, ...

12. Notes the establishment of a Development Fund for Iraq to be held by the Central Bank of Iraq and to be audited by independent public accountants ...

13. Notes further that the funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority {U.S.A.}, in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration, for the purposes set out in paragraph 14 below;

14. Underlines that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq; ...

17. Requests further that the Secretary-General transfer as soon as possible to the Development Fund for Iraq ... all surplus funds in the escrow accounts ...; ...

20. Decides that all export sales of petroleum ... audited by independent public accountants ... in order to ensure transparency, and decides further that, except as provided in paragraph 21 below, all proceeds from such sales shall be deposited into the Development Fund for Iraq until such time as an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq is properly constituted;

21. Decides further that 5 per cent of the proceeds referred to in paragraph 20 above shall be deposited into the Compensation Fund ... 

23. Decides that all Member States in which there are:

(a) funds or other financial assets or economic resources of the previous Government of Iraq or its state bodies, corporations, or agencies, located outside Iraq as of the date of this resolution, or

(b) funds or other financial assets or economic resources that have been removed from Iraq, or acquired, by Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former Iraqi regime and their immediate family members, including entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction,

shall freeze without delay those funds or other financial assets or economic resources and ... immediately shall cause their transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq ...”

S/RES/1483 (U.N. Security Council, May 22 2003) {58kb.pdf, copy, copy}. And see SC/7765 (press release); S/PV.4761 (verbatim record of the meeting) {72kb.pdf} {via this, this, or ODS}.

Ed Harriman, So, Mr Bremer, Where Has All the Money Gone?” (The Guardian, July 7 2005); Ed Harriman, “Where Has All the Money Gone?” (27:13 London Review of Books, July 7 2005); Ed Harriman, Cronyism and Kickbacks” (28:2 London Review of Books, January 27 2006).

The 50 Billion Dollar Robbery” (BBC Newsnight, March 15 2006), video {bb} (13:36): “Three years after the start of the Iraq war, where has the 50 billion dollars of reconstruction money gone? Billions are unaccounted for ... scams and frauds ...”

Iraq’s Missing Billions” (Channel 4, Dispatches, March 20 2006, 8:00 p.m.), video {28.1mb.rm} (48:04), transcript.

Dave Lindorff, “Who's Following the Iraq Money? The Case of the Missing $21 Billion” (CounterPunch, June 7 2006):

“ The new inspector general, an affable attorney named Stuart Bowen ....

One of the laws the president chose to ignore was the one establishing the special inspector general post for Iraq.

What the president did was write a so-called “signing statement” on the side (unpublicized of course), saying that the new inspector general would have no authority to investigate any contracts or corruption issues involving the Pentagon.

Well, since most of the missing money has been going to the military in Iraq, that pretty much meant nothing of consequence would be discovered by the inspector general.

You might think that the inspector general himself would have complained about such a restriction on his authority to do the job that Congress had intended, but Bush took care of that.

In his role as Chief Executive, he appointed Bowen to the post, a man who has a long history of working as a loyal manservant to the president. Bowen was a deputy general counsel for Governor Bush (meaning he was an assistant to the ever solicitous solicitor Alberto Gonzales). He did yeoman service to Bush as a member of the term that handled the famous vote count atrocity in Florida in the November 2000 election, and then worked under Gonzales again in the White House during Bush's first term, before returning briefly to private practice.

Bowen simply never mentioned to anyone that, courtesy of a secretive and unconstitutional order from the president, he was not doing the job that Congress had intended.”



“ The Special Inspector General shall refrain from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation, or from issuing a subpoena, which requires access to sensitive operation plans, intelligence matters, counter-intelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations by administrative units of the Department of Defense related to national security, or other matters the disclosure of which would constitute a serious threat to national security. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense jointly may make exceptions to the foregoing direction in the public interest.”

George W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 2001-2009 Jan. 20), “President's Statement on the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act, 2005{pf} (White House, October 28 2004), retitled, “Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,” 40:44 WCPD 2673-2674 {9kb.txt, 43kb.pdf} {ucsb} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:40/44}, concerning, H.R. 4200 (U.S. Congress 108-2), Public Law 108-375, inter alia, § 1203 (“Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction”), 118 Stat. 1811-2199, at 2078-2081 (October 28 2004) {1.26mb.txt, 2.26mb.pdf}.



It’s hard to pity the Iraqis any more, just for the past:

Mass killings and maimings by the U.S. military; destruction of homes, businesses, livelihoods; poisoning all present and future generations of Iraqis with depleted uranium oxide dust, the most pernicious war crime in the history of the world; theft of billions of dollars of Iraqi money; bribing their well-groomed government officials to obey U.S. orders, some of them already long time CIA paid assets ...

By comparison, future U.S. sanctions may not seem so bad:

If they finally throw-out the U.S. military (unlikely), they will have to scrap all the junk electricity plants, General Electric et al. unloaded on Iraq — not one of them fit for their purpose — for want of spare parts and high-maintenance chemicals, blocked by U.S. sanctions.

Future sanctions?

Certainly, because the U.S. will then designate Iraq a state sponsor of terror, on orders of the Israel Lobby.


Because Arabs live there.

And because, you can’t have an Israel Lobby, without a continuous supply of “existential” threats.

And so, the more of those, the better.

Like Iran {93kb.png, 241kb.pdf, AJC, AIPAC, JINSA, WINEP}.


Not a nut or bolt

There are many, many, countries in the world, who would love to buy a turn-key nuclear electricity plant.

Provided, nowhere, on any item, appear the words: “General Electric Corporation” or “Westinghouse Corporation.”

And provided, “not a nut or bolt{copy, copy}, or ounce of uranium, comes from the United States of America. From any company of that country. From any subsidiary or affiliate, anywhere in the world, owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any United States company or national.

Too many countries, and too many companies, have been abused, and thieved from, by the United States of America, and its Office of Foreign Assets Control, which prohibits dealings with those in the disfavor, of the moment, of psychotic and psychopathic U.S. officials.


And something as fundamental, expensive, complicated, and important, as electricity generation, cannot be dependant on the whim of psychotic psychopaths and hoodlums.

Not made in the USA.”

That’s the best sales aid any business in the world can possibly hope for. To guarantee a huge market for themselves.

More foreign money.

To buy foreign things.

And more friends, to stand by their side.

End of story.

On the “They have no need to generate electricity with nuclear power” argument.

And the inference — masquerading as a fact — which depended on that argument.

Actions have consequences.

A lesson U.S. officials can’t seem to learn.


“ As of the end of 1992, there were 424 commercial nuclear power reactors in operation in 29 countries ... About 75 percent of these are light-water reactors (LWRs) fueled by low-enriched uranium (LEU) containing 3 to 4 percent uranium-235.”

Office of Technology Assessment (U.S. Congress), “Safeguards and the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Appendix 4-C to chapter 4, “Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation” {1.9mb.pdf, copy}, of Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction {copy, 6.7mb.pdf}, at page 181 (OTA-BP-ISC-115, December 1993, 8+263 pages) {SuDoc: Y 3.T 22/2:2 W 37/3, LCCN: 94182147, OCLC: 30522241, GPOCat, LL: microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.


“ Today, there are about 430 {443} nuclear reactors in the world being used to produce electricity. About 100 are in the United States {103}. ...

It is not difficult to imagine a world with 1,000 nuclear reactors.

There are 124 nuclear reactors on the drawing board today, or under construction. Until recently, none of those were in the United States.

We haven’t built one new nuclear powerplant from scratch since the 1970s. ... France is now about 80 percent reliant on electricity from nuclear powers {58 nuclear electricity plants}. ...

It has to do with a balance of payments in the United States.

Some country is going to produce these advanced nuclear technology powerplants.

Russia, for example, might produce 30 or 40 of these.

When it does, it will have the technology available to sell those powerplants to India, China, and other parts of the world where they need large amounts of energy which is clean.

The United States will be left behind if we are not a part of that process.”

Lamar Alexander (U.S. Senator, Tennessee), statement, “Nuclear Power{8kb.txt, 47kb.pdf}, 152 Congressional Record S702-703 (February 6 2006, daily edition 152:12, U.S. Congress 109-2) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/12, ISSN: 0363-7239, LCCN: 80646573, OCLC: 02437919, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.



Query:Left behind”?

Here’s an idea:

Let’s bomb our competition.

Then, they’ll be “left behind.”

Not us.


India? General Electric? Westinghouse?

If you want a good laugh:

Watch George W. Bush & Co. try to sell India.

On the merits of a nuclear electricity plant.

From a U.S. manufacturer.

Like, General Electric Corporation.

Or Westinghouse Corporation.

Or General Atomics.

They’ll probably make a Bollywood movie out of it.

To make all India laugh.

“ Kwame Holman {0:12 bb, audio}: Secretary Rice spent most of the afternoon before the House International Relations Committee, where, among other things, she said the deal with India would create thousands of American jobs, in the nuclear industry. ...

R. Nicholas Burns {0:51 bb, audio}: This deal will seal a new strategic relationship, between India and the United States, that will have incalculable benefits for our country in the 21st century.

It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions. India is one of the biggest polluters in the world because it burns coal for its energy.

It’s jobs for Americans.

For the American corporations that will go in and build these peaceful nuclear power plants.

And it’s good for nonproliferation.

It will strengthen the system.

It will be an abject lesson to the Irans, and the North Koreas, of the world, that they’re not playing by the rules.

And that’s why we’re going to pressure them, to give up their nuclear weapons.

But a country that plays by the rules—

That doesn’t test its nuclear weapons (it’s got a moratorium under way)—

It hasn’t diverted its nuclear technology—

That country is going to be rewarded.

That’s the kind of system that we should try to build, in the 21st century. ...

{0:26 bb, audio} They plan to buy eight 1,000-megawatt reactors, from overseas, from the United States, or Europe.

That is jobs for Americans.”

R. Nicholas Burns (Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P), U.S. Department of State), panel discussion, in “U.S.–India Nuclear Partnership” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, April 5 2006). Video {bb} {15:02 bb, at 4:25 bb (panel), 4:10 bb, 10:58 bb, 12:31 bb (quotes)}. Audio {14:53, at 4:16 (panel), 4:01, 10:50, 12:23 (quotes)}.


This man need two mouths.

Speaking out of both sides of one mouth—

That’s not enough.

His many declarations, contradictory, hypocritical, deceitful, on any one topic—

That’s too many to speak, at any one time.

With only one forked tongue.

Query:Jobs for Americans”?

Dream on.

Bush will offer the usual U.S. carrots:

Free financing, from the U.S. Export-Import Bank and OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) (corporate welfare), guaranteeing the U.S. companies will be paid no matter what, with U.S. taxpayers subsidizing the long-term loan, so India can pay the U.S. companies.

But what of his sticks?

What guarantees can Bush give — which anybody can trust — that psychotic U.S. officials (like him and Henry Hyde), down the road, won’t slap sanctions on India (again).


“You’re either with us, or against us.”

As in: The IAEA vote on Iran. The IPI: Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. War on Iraq. Aid to Hamas. Buying nuclear fuel from Russia.

The U.S. policy which doomed Vietnam (among others) to endless war, when Ho Chi Minh & Co. refused to accept the result, when Dwight Eisenhower, and his psychotic Secretary of State Allen Dulles, violated the solemn written U.S. promise to insure a nationwide election in Vietnam by July 1956.

Because the CIA assured Eisenhower that Ho Chi Minh would get 80% of the vote, and the U.S. puppet, they installed in the South — the expatriate Ahmed Chalabi of his day (Diem) — would be laughed off the political stage, by the voters.

Obeying his U.S. masters, Diem outlawed, and criminalized, all political proposals seeking reconciliation with Ho Chi Minh.

India, then and now, is a member of that outlaw gang, the Non-Aligned Movement, 135 or so nations, who seek a third way of politics, and reject dominion by the United States of America.

The last nation on earth, who would ever buy a nuclear electricity plant, from any United States company, is India.

Unless somebody pays somebody else a whole lot of bribes.

Buying any promise, from any U.S. company, to do anything in the future, is a ticket to endless blackmail, by U.S. officials, and their sanctions. Trying to complete the plant, get the fuel to get it going, all those spare parts, repairs, safety modifications, control upgrades, down the road, over the life of the plant, replacement fuel, to keep it going.

The U.S. takes a dislike to the democratically elected government of Palestine, and—


The U.S. threatens every Arab bank in the Middle East, to freeze their New York City bank accounts, if they transfer any money to that new Hamas government.

The U.S. can’t persuade any other country to abuse Iran, so—


The U.S. threatens foreign banks with U.S. branches, with big money punishment, if they don’t stop doing business with Iran.

And big name European banks obey: UBS (Zurich), Credit Suisse (Zurich), ABN Amro (Amsterdam), HSBC (Bermuda/London).

Obviously, the world needs a new banking center.

And we’re likely to get one.

Or several.

Much oil pricing may switch from dollars to euros and rubles.

Foreign central banks are reducing their dollar holdings.

Because the U.S. government is a financial basket case {copy}.

As well as a bully.

When the dollar crashes—

Will we suddenly get exchange controls?

Already drafted, and ready to publish?

In the Federal Register?

An overnight surprise?

Like LBJ did?

Lyndon B. Johnson (U.S. President, Nov. 22 1963-1969 Jan. 20), “Statement by the President Outlining a Program of Action to Deal with the Balance of Payments Problem” (San Antonio Texas, January 1 1968) 1968-69 PPPUS 8-13 (book 1) {copy}, “The President’s News Conference at the LBJ Ranch” (LBJ Ranch, Johnson City Texas, 11:07 a.m., Monday, January 1 1968) 1968-69 PPPUS 1-7 (book 1) {copy}. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Governing Certain Capital Transfers Abroad,” Executive Order 11387 (January 1 1968) (Commerce Department, Foreign Direct Investment Regulations).

And wage/price controls?

An overnight surprise?

Like Tricky Dick did?

Richard Milhous Nixon (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1969-1974 Aug. 9), “Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: ‘The Challenge of Peace’” (White House, Oval Office, August 15 1971, 9:00 p.m., radio/TV), 1971 PPPUS 886-891 (browse) {296kb.pdf, copy}. Richard Nixon, “Providing for Stabilization of Prices, Rents, Wages, and Salaries,” Executive Order 11615 (August 15 1971).

Will New York City stagnate?

Into an international banking backwater?

Will foreign banks decide, they no longer need a U.S. branch?

And the bullying which goes with it?

From U.S. government thugs?

Especially Asian banks?

What if India wants to give money to Hamas?

Will the U.S. freeze shipments of parts and fuel to India’s nuclear electricity reactors?

It’s not only because they haven’t built a nuclear electricity plant in 30 years and their new technology is unproven.

Thanks to decades of psychopaths and thugs in the U.S. government—

General Electric, Westinghouse, General Atomics—

They can look forward to building nuclear electricity plants, in the U.S.

But nowhere else.

France is also trying to sell India the 25-30 nuclear electricity plants India wants over the next decades.

France has 59 in operation, and will soon commission a brand new plant in Finland, subsidized by the French government, to showcase its new pressurized reactor design.

France wants to build plants in Britain.

As far as I know, France has never followed the U.S. practice of sanctions, punishing countries who won’t obey the orders of France, punishing companies of other countries too, who do business, with the blacklisted country.

Like the U.S. routinely does.

Except for Iran.

France’s refusal to honor its contract to give Iran uranium (below).

India might laugh at France’s offer too, because of that one piece of French bullying.

But maybe not.

Is there a better source, for a nuclear electricity plant?

Russia? A dubious supplier: Iran still doesn’t have its Russian plant running at Bushehr.

Ditto Cuba, with its badly needed Russian plant — “an act of aggression” against the United States — unfinished, rusting:

“ § 6031. Statement of policy

It is the sense of the Congress that— ...

(4) ... the President should do all in his power to make it clear to the Cuban Government that—

(A) the completion and operation of any nuclear power facility ...

will be considered an act of aggression which will be met with an appropriate response in order to maintain the security of the national borders of the United States and the health and safety of the American people.”

22 U.S.C. § 6031. “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996: An Act, To seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes,” Public Law 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (March 12 1996) {141kb.txt, 138kb.pdf}.




One day, maybe.

If the U.S. gives Brazil permission.

On a case-by-case basis.

A trustworthy nuclear electricity plant supplier.

That’s what the world needs now.

But one the U.S. can’t bully, bribe, or sway.

“ R. Nicholas Burns: And we also think it’s important, perhaps, for countries to stop any kind of cooperation with Iran on nuclear issues — even on civil nuclear issues like the Bushehr facility. ...

It’s time for countries to use their leverage — their diplomatic, and economic, and political leverage — to demonstrate to the Iranians that there is a cost for the type of strident behavior that we see from the Iranian government.”

R. Nicholas Burns (Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P), U.S. Department of State), “Press Conference With the Western Press” (Moscow, U.S. Embassy, April 19 2006).


“ Question: How can you comment, on the statement of U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, that all countries should discontinue cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field, in particular, Russia — on the NPP at Bushehr?

Answer: ... The construction by Russia, in Iran, of the NPP {Nuclear Power Plant} at Bushehr, which is under the full control of IAEA, has been conducted strictly in accordance with our international commitments.

It has to be noted that this NPP has no relationship to Iran’s uranium enrichment activities.

Besides, Americans well know, that the reactor of the Bushehr plant under construction, by virtue of its technical characteristics, cannot be used for the purpose of producing materials suitable for a military nuclear program.

We have an agreement with the Iranians to supply for Bushehr nuclear fuel from Russia, and moreover, the spent fuel will be returned to us, which precludes the possibility of its being used for military purposes, and this is also known in Washington.

In this connection the construction of this NPP presents no threat to nonproliferation.”

“Mikhail Kamynin, the Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from ITAR-TASS News Agency Regarding the Statement of US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns Demanding an End to Cooperation with Iran in the Nuclear Field” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 675-20-04-2006, April 20 2006).


“ Question (in Russian through interpreter): Is there any contradiction?

That you say that you support the Russian initiative?

And you support the Iranian people’s right to use the nuclear energy (for peaceful) purposes?

And on the other hand, you are saying that everybody else should stop/cease cooperation with Iran in nuclear area?

Bushehr included?

R. Nicholas Burns: I think it’s logical.

It’s not a contradiction in the following sense:

Any successful diplomatic proposal has to be a combination of carrots and sticks.

So the carrot is, if Iran plays by the rules, and if it adheres to what the IAEA and the Security Council want, there is a possibility for Iran.

But as long as Iran continues to violate what the IAEA and the UN Security Council want, it shouldn’t receive the benefits yet, until it promises and indeed exhibits an ability to comply with the IAEA and UNSC.

So, our view is that there has to be some pressure — diplomatic pressure — put on Iran.

It has to be denied some of the benefits of relations with other countries, until it commits to abide by the rules of the international community.

It’s outside the rules right now.

Everyone agreed in the meeting.

Everyone agrees, that they announced last week, “We have gone to full enrichment, 164 centrifuges,” Ahmadinejad said, “3,000 centrifuges by the autumn.” ...

We’re not asking Russia to be the only country that stops normal activities.

We’re asking all the other countries to stop normal activities. ...

There are many countries that need to take these steps.”

R. Nicholas Burns (Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P), U.S. Department of State), “Press Conference With the Russian Press” (Moscow, U.S. Embassy, April 19 2006). And see R. Nicholas Burns,“Interview With Associated Press Correspondent Henry Meyers” (Moscow, Hotel Marriott Grand, April 18 2006): “The view of the United States is that Iran is definitely not in compliance, because Iran just last week took steps to further the enrichment process ... So, the Iranian violations of their responsibilities to the IAEA, and to the United Nations Security Council are, in the American view, substantial. And we think that Mr. ElBaradai {ElBaradei} can only find them to be in non-compliance. And so, therefore, we expect further action in the Security Council in the month of May.”



“Iran continues to violate what the IAEA and the UN Security Council want.”

Burns is talking about Iran’s enrichment efforts. Those 164 centrifuges they’ve got working, a test cascade, they are trying to perfect.

And, he’s talking about the request, by the IAEA Board of Governors, and the request, by the U.N. Security Council, that Iran suspend that cascade test.

Yes, Iran refuses to comply with those requests.

This is a “violation”?


If you want to buy a house.

And you want me to lend you $1 million.

To pay for it.

And I say, “No.”

Have I “violated” what you “want”?

Have I “violated” my “responsibilities”?

Am I “not in compliance” with my responsibilities?

Am I “outside the rules”?

These terms — “violated,” “not in compliance,” “outside the rules”—

These terms imply a lie

A wilful, malicious, lie.

And the lie is, that I have a legal duty, to loan you $1 million.

I have no such legal duty.

Iran has no legal duty, to do what the IAEA “wants,” to do what the U.N. Security Council “wants.”

Iran has the perfect right to say, “No.”

“We’re not going to abandon our economic future, our energy plans, our national investment, our hopes and our dreams, to please you.”

The IAEA has no legal authority to impose a treaty reservation on Iran, without Iran’s consent.

The Security Council made a request, not a demand.

Iran has no legal obligation to obey that request.

And, down the road, the Security Council has no legal authority to convert that request into a demand, unless they can establish a “threat,” based on evidence, not suspicion.

Iran poses no threat.

You can lie, and tell everybody I “violated” what you want, your loan request.

And they’ll just laugh, at what an inconsequential nitwit you are.

Because they know, I have no legal obligation, to loan you any money.

And, like me, they’re liable to tell you, to just “Fcuk off.”

But here, you telling the “Big Lie.”

About things the public does not know about.

You’re a government official, lying to the public, that Iran is doing something wrong, something they are not entitled to do.

You’re inciting violent crime, preparing the public to support a military attack on Iran.

And for that, if it occurs, you’ve earned yourself a noose, on the gallows.

I only have one question about this.

Why does anybody refer to R. Nicholas Burns as a “diplomat”?

This man is a thug and a hoodlum.

He works for thugs and hoodlums.

His thug God Mother, Condoleezza Rice.

His thug God Fathers, Dick Cheney, G.W.Bush&Co.

His thug Capos, Robert Joseph, John Bolton.

As for Bushehr

Giving with one hand.

And taking away with the other.

That’s one thing:

“ (e)(1) Of the funds appropriated under this heading that are allocated for assistance for the Government of the Russian Federation, 60 percent shall be withheld from obligation until the President determines and certifies in writing to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of the Russian Federation—

(A) has terminated implementation of arrangements to provide Iran with technical expertise, training, technology, or equipment necessary to develop a nuclear reactor {Bushehr}, related nuclear research facilities or programs, or ballistic missile capability;”

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006, “Title II—Bilateral Economic Assistance, Funds Appropriated to the President, Other Bilateral Economic Assistance, Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union,” Public Law 109-102, 119 Stat. 2171, 2183 (November 14 2005) {249kb.txt, 268kb.pdf}. Accord, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007 {purl}, page 800 (Appendix, “Department of State and Other International Programs”) {735kb.pdf, copy} {SuDoc: PREX 2.8:2007, ISSN: 0163-2000, LCCN: 70611049, OCLC: 932137, 06018330, 36506203, GPOCat, WorldCat}.




Inducing the breach of a contract—

Persuading Russia to breach its contract with Iran, to finish that nuclear electricity plant—

Which Iran has been trying to get built for 32 long years

Since 1974—

That’s another thing.


That’s a treble-damage tort.

Under English law (“actionable interference with contractual rights”), the law of every U.S. State (except Louisanna) (“tortious interference with contract”) and, I presume, other countries too.

“ One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.”

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977) {OCLC: 507573, LCCN: 65005788, WorldCat}. The defendant can also be liable for interfering with the plaintiff’s ability to perform its obligations under a contract. Id. § 766A. “The interference is often by inducement. The inducement may be any conduct conveying to the third person the actor’s desire to influence him not to deal with the other. Thus it may be a simple request or persuasion exerting only moral pressure.” (§ 766, comment k). Quoted from Gary Myers, “The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law,” 77 Minnesota Law Review 1097, 1108 (May 1993).


Let’s see, now—

It’s a $1 billion contract.

Times 3.

That’s a $3 billion tort.

By the United States of America.

Against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Just one more, of billions and billions of dollars, in intentional damage, the U.S. government has maliciously inflicted on Iran.

Which the U.S. refuses to be sued for, in any court.

Russia refused Burns.

And so, the tort is inducement, to breach a third-party contract.

Without any damages, so far.

But not for want of trying.

By U.S. government thugs.




I forgot.

We were talking about India.

What has thug Rice Burns & Co been saying to India?

And Pakistan?

About that devilish IPI: Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline?

“ The US has asked Pakistan to abandon the seven billion dollar gas pipeline planned to Pakistan and India ahead of next week’s visit by a high-level Iranian delegation, a newspaper reported on Monday.

“The US has asked Pakistan to distance itself from the pipeline, but the leadership is adamant in its refusal to the constant US demands,”

The Nation quoted a senior government official as saying.

Iran and Pakistan have said the project would forge ahead despite US reservations. Pakistan said the project is vital to meet the country’s growing energy needs.

The US appeal came before Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was slated to arrive on May 24 in Islamabad for consultations with Pakistani leaders on key issues including the international standoff over Tehran’s nuclear programme and the pipeline.

A day later, Iranian First Vice President Parviz Dawoudi is also set to arrive.

Meanwhile, the joint working group of Iran, Pakistan and India was also scheduled to meet in the Pakistani capital from May 22 to 24 for technical discussions on the proposed 2,670 km pipeline from Iran’s southern Pars field.

Those discussions are to be followed by ministerial-level talks next month in Tehran.

Pakistani officials said the project should take three to four years to complete after the three countries strike a final deal.”

US Asks Pak to Abandon Gas Project With Iran{pf} (Times of India, May 15 2006). Pepe Escobar, “Russia and Iran Lead the New Energy Game” (Asia Times, July 14 2006): “Putin announced in Shanghai on June 15 that "Gazprom is ready to support the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and India with financial resources and technology".”


Like everything else, it’s none of their business.

But they make it their business.

Or, rather, try to make it their business.

To the huge amusement, of a Bollywood audience, of hundreds of millions.

Would Thugs Incorporated punish naughty India?

By blocking completion of those 8 nuclear electricity plants?

India will never buy?

From any U.S. company?

For that precise reason?

Boeing? General Electric? Honeywell? Collins?

What do U.S. companies sell?

Which foreigners can’t get somewhere else?

And avoid abuse, from the U.S. government.

For example:

Will any Muslim nation?

Or any other of the 135 member nations of NAM (Non-Aligned Movement)?

Be foolish enough?

Ever again?

To buy another airplane?

From The Boeing Company?

Or General Electric engines?

Or Honeywell, or Collins, avionics?

“ The report said that two companies not based in the United States — the aircraft builder Airbus and the engine manufacturer Rolls Royce — had been providing full service to Iran.

Most of Iran’s current aircraft are Boeing products, however. ...

“U.S. government sanctions against Iran prohibit U.S. companies from doing business in that country,”

said a Boeing statement prepared in response to a query from the International Herald Tribune.

“Boeing abides by those sanctions and the U.S. government policies behind them.

However ... in 2004 we submitted a license request to the U.S. government that would allow us to survey the condition of Iranian commercial aircraft, determine flight safety requirements, and ultimately (under separate license) provide spares and parts to Iran’s airlines.”

Boeing said it had heard nothing from the U.S. government about its request.

The report was particularly critical of General Electric, the world’s leading manufacturer of aircraft engines.

It said that GE had threatened to stop providing services to Lufthansa, Air France, KLM and the Turkish airline THY if they did any more maintenance or overhaul work for Iranian airlines that used GE parts.

Those airlines immediately halted Iranian work, leaving several engines sitting unfinished.

A GE spokesman at the company’s jet engine division in Cincinnati, Rick Kennedy, said his company had been trying for a year and a half to get permission to export safety-related parts to Iran, but like Boeing, had heard nothing from the American authorities.

In the meantime, he said, the company believed it would be breaking the law if it allowed any repair work of any kind to take place anywhere with U.S. parts.

The report for the International Civil Aviation Organization said that Honeywell, a major provider of air navigation equipment and software, had deliberately delayed delivering important navigation information to Iranian airlines, and it called the delay “a serious threat to aviation safety.”

Honeywell said it “is ... complying with all U.S. export laws and regulations.””

Don Phillips, “Iran Sanctions’ Risk to Air Safety Is Cited in Report{pf} (International Herald Tribune, December 13 2005).


Of course, when you buy a Boeing aircraft.

You don’t actually get a Boeing aircraft.

If you’re a foreign buyer.

You get a second-rate aircraft.

With various parts ripped out of it.

On secret orders of the U.S. State Department.

Applying U.S. export controls.

(And it might be a second-rate {pf} aircraft anyway, for U.S. buyers too, even with all it parts).

“ According to the State Department charges, Boeing shipped 94 commercial jets overseas between 2000 and 2003 that carried the QRS-11 gyrochip embedded in the flight boxes. At the time, the chip, used in the guidance system of the Maverick missile, was on a list of products that required a license for foreign sales.

The chip is part of a backup system that maintains an artificial horizon for pilots, Boeing spokesman Tim Neale said Saturday.

The 2-ounce, 1-inch-diameter chip, made by a unit of BEI Technologies in Concord, Calif., sells for less than $2,000. ...

19 of the planes went to China, where the U.S. export of listed defense items is prohibited.”

Associated Press, “Boeing Fined $15 Million for a Chip: U.S. Says Prohibited Device Was in Planes Sold to China{pf} (Washington Post, April 9 2006). Accord Dominic Gates, “Boeing pays $15 million fine{pf} (Seattle Times, April 8 2006): “Senior vice president and general counsel Douglas Bain described export control as the ‘biggest issue we face’.”


The U.S. government refuses to connect to its classified network, 16,000 computers, bought from a Chinese factory (Lenovo), formerly owned by IBM, fearing secret hardware/software spyware, key-stroke Trojans, and such.

Likewise, foreign buyers have to assume, Boeing aircraft are fitted with secret listening devices, burst transmitters, and transponders. On secret orders of the NSA (National Security Agency), FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), DoD (Department of Defense).

Because they do like to know, what Big Shot passengers are talking about, during their flights.

Like these 27 bugs, they planted:

“The National Security Agency, the supersecret eavesdropping agency, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence organizations, led an operation to plant bugs in a Boeing 767 used by the president of China while it was in the United States for refitting, officials said. The listening devices were quickly discovered, and the Chinese government disclosed the incident early last year.”

James Risen, Eric Lichtblau, “Spy Suspect May Have Told Chinese of Bugs, U.S. Says” (New York Times, April 15 2003) {copy, excerpt}.

And, who knows, a tiny C4 explosive, as well? Somewhere along the elevator control cable? At a structural joint? Awaiting a particular radio signal, pulse-train? To assassinate a Big Shot passenger? Like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hugo Chávez, Fidel Castro, Vladimir Putin?

Part of the CIA Predator Drone {pf} assassination {pf} program {pf}?

Boeing wouldn’t do that?

Boeing depends, for its survival, on U.S. government defense contracts.

The same government which has issued standing orders, to the U.S. military, to shoot down airliners, and other civilian aircraft, inside the U.S., based on suspicion.

The same government with thousands of secret CIA assets on the payroll.

Some working for Boeing?

With access to airplanes under construction?

They wouldn’t do that?

If you’re a Big Shot.

Or a fellow passenger.

Will you bet your life on it?

The UAE (United Arab Emirates) bought from Boeing (21 777s) and AirBus (45 A-380s), $30 billion. But the UAE is immune from U.S. sanctions (for the time being), because the U.S. military depends on the Emirates port facilities.

India is preparing to buy from Boeing (68 aircraft, $7.1 billion: 8 777-200s, 15 777-300s, 27 787s, 18 737-800s) and AirBus (43 aircraft, $2.2 billion: A-319, A-320, A-321), $9.3 billion, but with 30% of contract value to be built in India. A home-grown source of some future parts, maybe.

They’re asking for trouble.

Big trouble.

Like nuclear electricity plants, airplanes too have a very long life. They too involve a promise, about the future: Repairs, maintenance, spare parts, upgrades, safety modifications:

“ Lindsay Hilsum: The Chairman of Iran Air is off to China too {video, in his office, at Tehran}.

He’s a little coy about his trip and won’t tell me its purpose.

Behind him, a model 747, given to Iran Air by Boeing, before the Revolution {1979}.

Now, sanctions prevent U.S. companies from supplying spares to Iran’s aging fleet.

China might be a source of black market parts.

Iranian newscasts frequently feature air crashes {video of an Iranian TV news broadcast, and video at a crash site, showing dead passengers in body bags}.

A recent report, to the International Civil Aviation Organization, said U.S. sanctions were having a negative effect on the safe operation of Iran air carriers.

Passengers, it said, were pawns in the game.

The U.S. won’t allow its companies to provide documentation for new updates and safety modifications.

Lindsay Hilsum: Does that potentially compromise safety?

Mahmoud Mehranpour (Iran Air executive):

If we couldn’t find, yes.

But we will find the documents.

Lindsay Hilsum: How do you find the documents?

Mahmoud Mehranpour: This is the secret.

This is the secret.

We will find the documents.



And we will manage for ourselves.

This is the secret of our business.

Lindsay Hilsum: With the constant danger of crashes, and several aircraft grounded for lack of parts, Iran Air is now buying Russian planes, to update its fleet {video at the crash site}.”

Lindsay Hilsum (international editor), in Tehran, “News from Iran: Living with Sanctions” (Channel 4 News, London, March 10 2006, 7:28 p.m.) {video, 8:21}: “Iran has learned to live with an American embargo, but aircraft safety is suffering as a result.”


I can’t say it’s the worst example.

But only on a tally of the killing.

On that count, the violent, criminal, U.S. military, and CIA, carry the flag.

But killing aircraft passengers and crew, by denying them safety modifications, spare parts, documentation, and such.

That, too, is beyond sick.

Another vivid symbol, of the most despicable people, and the most hated people, on the face of the earth:

The United States of America.

And that includes the many millions of them, who have their doubts, yet acquiesce.

Who cast their votes, the one way, in their supposed self interest.

And not the other way, to bring this to an end, to change their rogue path.

Granted, many voters have no choice. Most Democrat candidates unite with Republican candidates, on this issue. But there are sometimes candidates independent of these two political parties.

“ Anybody can go into a polling station and, with a pencil, get rid of a government, without killing anybody.

There are people all over the world, who would give their lives, for a system like that.”

  Tony Benn, BBC Question Time, March 23 2006 {video} (1:00:13, at 28:37)

Many citizens will nonetheless vote against a candidate who does promise, to vote against U.S. government criminal enterprises, to alter the law, to bring both the government and its officials to justice (now exempt from lawsuits), to endorse impeachment proceedings against the President, the Vice President, and their many, many, criminal henchwo/men (H. Res. 635, U.S. Congress 109-1, December 18 2005), to terminate all U.S. sanctions and replace them with one: Freezing all Israeli bank accounts, imposing international sanctions on Israel, and transferring all U.S. aid from Israel to the Palestinians. Until the very last piece of that wall is removed from Palestinian land, and so too every last Israeli settlement on Palestinian land, enforcing U.S. demands, a U.N. International Court of Justice ruling, and many, many, U.N. resolutions, including S/Res/242, S/PV.1382 (November 22 1967).

In the criminal law, voting against that candidate, while believing the U.S. government and its officials have committed, are committing, or will commit, crimes—

That’s “specific intent.”

No matter what else a candidate stands for, crime trumps politics.

“Specific intent,” no different, legally, from the intent of the most gung-ho advocates, among them, of violent crime, and other intentional torts.

The tools, of U.S. foreign policy.

  CJHjr (a 13th generation American)


2. The Europeans offered (eventually), to supply Iran with nuclear fuel. Therefore {get ready for a non-fact inference}, the only reason to make their own fuel is to build a bomb.


“ Fortunately, Iran is believed to still be several years away from being able to produce nuclear weapons. But it has now embarked on a course that can have no other plausible intent.

Turning its back on generous European and Russian offers that would have guaranteed its supplies of civilian reactor fuel, helped its economy, added jobs and lessened its diplomatic isolation, this week Tehran unsealed the centrifuges it can now use to enrich uranium to bomb-grade levels.”

Editorial (anonymous), “Iran and the Bomb” (New York Times, January 13 2006).



It’s little wonder, the writers of New York Times editorials decide to remain anonymous.

The U.S. contracted, to supply Iran, with nuclear fuel.

Once upon a time.

And then they changed their mind (and kept the money).

End of story.

On the “They don’t need to make their own fuel” argument.

And the inference — masquerading as a fact — which depended on that argument.

Actions have consequences.

A lesson U.S. officials can’t seem to learn.


“ US was obliged under the contract made prior to 1979 to supply new fuel for Tehran 5 MW Research Reactor, being under the Agency comprehensive Safeguards, producing radioisotope for application in medicine, agriculture and industry.

It neither gave the fuel nor the two million dollars received for.

Iran had projects with the IAEA on radioisotope production using this reactor.

None of the international organizations including the IAEA took any step in redressing the situation and forcing the US to fulfill its contractual and legal obligations which had impeded the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

Considering the aforementioned developments which proves the assertion of the lack of implementation of promotional pillars of Statute of the IAEA as well as provisions of the Article 4 of NPT along with continuous sanctions by certain countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran had no choice other than to depend on its own resources and manpower in order to exercise its inalienable rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”

Iranian Nuclear Policy & Activities: Complementary Information to the Report of the Director General (GOV/2005/67), at page 7 (September 12 2005) (Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Vienna, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/657, 15 September 2005) {495kb.pdf}.



France contracted, to supply Iran, with nuclear fuel.

Once upon a time.

And then they changed their mind (and kept the money).

End of story (again).

Actions have consequences.


“ In 1975, Iran purchased a 10% share in a Eurodif uranium enrichment plant being built at Tricastin in France that was part of enrichment technology Eurodif developed, and agreed to buy a quota of enriched uranium from the new plant.

Shah also gave one billion dollars as financial aid to the said company but Iran has not received even a gram of uranium from the plant where it desperately needed for its reactor producing radioisotopes for mainly medical purposes.”

IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/657, just above, at page 4.



The Russians contracted, to provide the Ukraine with gas.

Once upon a time.

And then they quadrupled the price {pf}. And reduced the supply.

End of story (again).

Actions have consequences.


A business plan

Here’s an idea:

Let’s get the Russians to promise Iran, to supply them with uranium fuel, for their electricity plant.

That will shut-up the Iranians, for a few years. They’ll labor away, to design their ideal nuclear electricity plant, and they’ll spend a whole lot of money to build it. And get real excited, at their progress in the world.

Then, when they ask Russia for the fuel, to start it up, our friends the Russians will say:

“Oops! Look what you made us do! You made us suspicious again! You made us change our mind.”

That will remind the Iranians of their proper caste in the world, and teach them to abandon their aspirations, and their pretensions, to the life of their betters.

Good idea?

Or maybe we’ll set the hook first. And give them some line to play:

Our friends the Russians can give them fuel for one electricity plant.

Then let the Iranians sell the Chinese, and the Indians, and all the Muslim nations, on the merits of nuclear electricity generation.

And down the road, when all these customers are ready to buy their turn-key nuclear plants, and Iran asks Russia for the fuel, to complete the sales, our friends the Russians will say:

“Oops! Look what you made us do! You made us change our mind. Did we forget to tell you? Muslim nations aren’t allowed to have nuclear electricity generation. And as for the Chinese and the Indians, they would rather deal with us direct. They don’t trust your electricity plant. Just ask them. (Maybe our bribes are bigger than yours).”

That will put Iran out of the electricity plant business, and we and the Russians can take over all those sales, and divide up all that business, between us.

Just like two big friendly Mafia Families.

Like we did with Saddam, and his Supergun.

We let him spend a few billion dollars with U.K. machine tool makers, grinding all those high-spec steel parts.

And then, when it got down to the last few items, the hardest ones to make (the breechblock and such), we pretended to suddenly discover the transaction, and we seized the parts at the dock (after Saddam paid for them, of course), before the ship set sail (April 11 1990).

That way, we took all his money, and he didn’t get his Supergun.

An excellent piece of business.

A Western business plan.

Good idea?



3. {Get ready for a non-fact} Iran can use enriched uranium from their centrifuges to make a bomb.

Iran enriched uranium to 1.2%, in an experiment.

3% enrichment was the specification of the centrifuge plant they wanted to buy. It’s that plant — they were unlawfully prevented from buying — they are attempting to build themselves.

“Highly enriched” uranium is 20% or more enriched.

“Bomb grade” uranium is 90% enriched.

The first uranium bomb (Hiroshima) was 80% enriched.

To get from 3% to 90%, that’s apparently possible to do, with centrifuges.

But not with these centrifuges.


“ Terry Gross {1:55} How far is the Iranian nuclear weapons program?

What do we know about that?

Joseph Cirincione: We actually know a great deal about this program.

More than we ever knew about Iraq’s program. More than we know about North Korea’s program, actually.

We’ve had inspectors there for three years.

They’ve been asking lots of questions. They’ve been to lots of sites. Haven’t gotten all the answers. Haven’t been allowed to visit some of the sites.

But Iran’s program is basically at a beginning level.

That is they’ve acquired, illegally, the technologies to build centrifuges. They got that through the A.Q. Khan network, running out of Pakistan.

And they’ve acquired some of the ability to turn their uranium — which they have in mines in Iran — into uranium gas, “uranium hexafloride” it’s called.

But they haven’t perfected either the centrifuge techniques or the uranium conversion techniques.

That is, the gas that they’ve been trying to make now for, oh, since the 1990s, is still too impure, to use in the centrifuges. It’s got too many heavy metals, still in that gas.

We know that, because the IAEA has gone and sampled the gas. Something you couldn’t detect, by the CIA, or spy satellites. You have to have inspectors on the ground to do that.

The centrifuges are still just a test centrifuge. They have a 164 set up at their facility at Natanz.

They haven’t got them to work properly.

In order to enrich uranium, you need thousands of centrifuges.

Can they build them?

Can they get all this to work?

Yes. But it takes years.

We know this, because that’s what it takes other countries to do. And we know the relative state of the Iranian engineering ability.

So that’s why the U.S. intelligence agencies officially estimate — in the latest National Intelligence Estimate — they Iran cannot build a nuclear bomb until sometime in the next decade. Assuming that — today — they decide to go all out.”

Joseph Cirincione (Director for Nonproliferation, CEIP: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), interviewed by Terry Gross in “The New Brinksmanship: Iran's Nuclear Threat” (NPR: National Public Radio, Fresh Air, February 8 2006). Audio {38:12, at 18:46-20:42}.


Query:Haven’t been allowed to visit some of the sites”?

“ 36. As noted in the Director General’s November 2004 report {IAEA GOV/2004/83, 15 November 2004, 239kb.pdf}, since December 2003, Iran has facilitated, in a timely manner, Agency access under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to nuclear materials and facilities, as well as to other locations in the country, and has permitted the Agency to take environmental samples as requested by the Agency. ...

37. Iran has, since October 2003, provided the Agency upon its request, and as a transparency measure, access to certain additional information and locations beyond that required under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.”

Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA Director General), Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶¶ 36-37, page 9 (IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/67, 2 September 2005) {94kb.pdf}.


“ 15. As undertaken in its letter to the Agency of 10 November 2003, Iran has continued to act as if its Additional Protocol were in force. Since September 2005 the Agency has conducted three complementary accesses.

16. On 1 November 2005 ... the Agency was given access to the buildings requested within the area of interest at Parchin (see para. 41 of GOV/2005/67) {94kb.pdf}, in the course of which environmental samples were taken.”

Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA Director General), Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶¶ 15-16, page 4 (IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/87, 18 November 2005) {54kb.pdf}.


“ Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency, and to act as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by providing in a timely manner the requisite declarations and access to locations. ...

On 1 November 2005, the Agency was given access to a military site at Parchin, with a view to providing assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at that site, where several environmental samples were taken.”

Olli Heinonen (IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards), Update Brief, Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran’s Suspension of Enrichment-related and Reprocessing Activities, pages 1-2 (IAEA document number: none, 31 January 2006) {82kb.pdf}.



Centrifuges are not “illegal.”

Iran has the treaty right to develop a fuel cycle and to manufacture uranium-235 to fuel nuclear electricity plants (e.g., enriched 3.5%, as Iran is working to do).

And to do that with centrifuges.

The only thing potentially “illegal” was not reporting to the IAEA the acquisition of the centrifuges.

Iran says (as I recollect) they had no such obligation, until 6 months before they intended to begin feeding uranium hexafloride gas into a production centrifuge plant.

This, they have still not done, because first they have to learn to spin the centrifuges at the incredibly high speeds necessary for this work (50,000 rpm).

Maybe they had an obligation to report, in advance, their first, small, experiment, with 1 centrifuge (June 25 2003), or 10 centrifuges (August 19 2003).

This, I haven’t yet studied, but they anyway reported within two months.

But even if Iran did violate a notice provision, in the treaty Safeguards Agreement (and I haven’t yet studied this question), it doesn’t matter.

Iran did not violate what the treaty is designed to prevent: “prohibited activities” (weapons related).

The mere failure to report a non-prohibited activity (if it was a failure) is a very minor matter.

But, more importantly, it’s a plainly lawful countermeasure, to the immense, continuous, relentless, treaty violations by the United States of America, for decades — “material breaches.” And by the rest of the NPT treaty parties, who violated their treaty obligations to censure the U.S.

And not only for these reasons.

And not only because they have only P-1 centerfuges.

Not P-2 centerfuges.

But because these centrifuges are subject to U.N. IAEA Safeguards.

The IAEA inspectors take their swipes, and their samples and, long before any such enrichment could be achieved, in any significant quantities, the U.N. IAEA inspectors would know about it.

The only way Iran can possibly enrich to bomb grade, is with an entirely separate, secret, and more advanced, centrifuge plant, buried underground somewhere, in the wild out yonder, where nobody knows it is.

Or to withdraw from the NPT treaty and throw-out the U.N. inspectors.

And that’s what U.S. officials doubless hope they can provoke Iran to do.

The pretext they want.

To attack.

Final conclusive proof, they’ll say, that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program.

Another non-fact inference.

Another piece of non-evidence.

Conclusive proof of nothing.

But, nevertheless, a candidate, for one of the reason(s) we’re searching for, to explain the apparently psychotic behavior, of the United States, and the other nations voting for the IAEA resolution, nations U.S. officials managed to bully, bribe, or sway.


“ This one vote won’t be nearly enough to prevent Iran from completing its drive of the past two decades to build nuclear weapons, or even to delay it.”

Editorial (anonymous), “Facing Down Iran” (New York Times, February 8 2006).


My, My.

What a waste of money.

All those salaries, to all those U.N. IAEA inspectors.

And they can’t even see their hand in front of their face.

You could fire them all, and wouldn’t notice a single bit of difference.

If you want to know what’s going on in Iran, you don’t need to go there and look around.

All you have to do is read the New York Times.

The pronouncements, by its anonymous editorial writers.

After their secret briefings by anonymous U.S. officials.

It’s little wonder, the writers of New York Times editorials decide to remain anonymous.


4. Iran buries it’s nuclear facilities underground. If their nuclear facilities were innocent, as they claim {get ready for a non-fact inference}, they would have no reason to hide them.


“ The Israelis have bombed a French-built nuclear plant near Iraq’s capital, Baghdad, saying they believed it was designed to make nuclear weapons to destroy Israel.

It is the world’s first air strike against a nuclear plant.”

On this Day, “Israel bombs Baghdad nuclear reactor” (BBC News, June 7 1981) (Osirak nuclear reactor).


“ During the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq war, the Bushehr reactors were repeatedly targeted by Iraq, which bombed the plant six times: 24 March 1984, 12 February 1985, 5 March 1985, 12 July 1986, and twice in November 1987. ...

The attacks destroyed the entire core area of both reactors ...

According to officials from West Germany’s national reactor inspectorate (Technischer Ueberwachungsverein), before the bombings, Bushehr-1 could have been completed in about three years, but following them, it would cost an estimated $2.9 billion to $4.6 billion to repair the damage.”

Andrew Koch, Jeanette Wolf, “Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: a Profile{176kb.pdf} (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998). And see Anthony H. Cordesman (Senior Fellow for Strategic Assessment), “Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft” {303kb.pdf}, page 7 (CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 17 2000): Iraq bombed Bushehr 7 times: March 24 1984, February 12 1985, March 4 1985, July 12 1986, November 17 1987, November 19 1987, and July 19 1988.



End of story.

On the “They have no reason to bury their nuclear facilities underground” argument.

And the inference — masquerading as a fact — which depended on that argument.

Actions have consequences.

The U.N. IAEA inspectors have anyway been underground, and inspected all these buried facilities, and certify, they all — all of these facilities — are innocent, and comply with the treaty.

5. Iran lied to the U.N. IAEA, and concealed much of its nuclear program, prior to 2003. They lied, for 18 years {get ready for a non-fact inference}, because their nuclear program is a weapons program, and not an innocent program.

Query:They lied”?

About what?


“ Iran introduced UF6 {uranium hexafloride gas} into the first centrifuge at PFEP {Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, at Natanz} on 25 June 2003, and, on 19 August 2003, began testing a small ten-machine cascade. On 31 October 2003, Agency inspectors observed that no UF6 gas was being fed into the centrifuges, although construction and installation work at the site was continuing.”

Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA Director General), Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, footnote 3, ¶ 55, page 10 (IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003) {324kb.pdf}.


June 25 2003 was the first physical act of enrichment Iran conducted, with 1 centrifuge, then a 10-machine cascade experiment, a couple months later, which produced uranium enriched to 1.2% (U-235). Light water reactor fuel grade is 3-5% (for electricity plants). Bomb grade is 90%.

That was 5 months before Mohamed ElBaradei’s report, in which he asserted (a U.S. government script, no doubt):

“ Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme.”

Mohamed ElBaradei, Report, ¶ 45, page 8 (IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003), ibid.


Query:18 years”?

Then 16 years ago, in 1987, a Pakistani walks into your office (a likely CIA asset, on a sting operation) and says:

“Do you want to buy a bomb?”

(Or plans for a bomb. Or some such.)

And you reply:


Then, 8-10 years later, you contact the Pakistani, and say:

“How about a centrifuge enrichment plant?

To make fuel for an electricity plant?”

And he says:


What exactly did Iran lie about?

During those 8-10 years?

Plainly, Iran did not lie, about a “uranium centrifuge enrichment programme.”

Because Iran did not have any such program.

And Mohamed ElBaradei does not claim otherwise, when he decided to lie, in his report.

Mohamed ElBaradei carefully crafted his headline lie, to avoid saying, Iran actually had a “uranium centrifuge enrichment programme.”

He merely asserted Iran was “developing” such a program.

A subtlety U.S. rabble-rousers prefer to ignore.

And a “developing” effort (if any) which amounted to nothing, because Iran bought a centrifuge plant, they didn’t develop one.

Iran bought a centrifuge plant from the A.Q. Khan network (supposedly).

A perfectly legal purchase.

“In the mid 1990s.”

Mohamed ElBaradei tells us. IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, ¶ 16, page 4 (February 27 2006, derestricted March 8 2006) {80kb.pdf}.

Presumably, only after Bill Clinton persuaded Russia (on May 10 1995) to not sell Iran, the complete, turn-key, centrifuge plant, Iran wanted to buy.

Another would-have-been.

Perfectly legal purchase:

“ The alarm bells went off in January {1995} when Russia signed a contract to complete the construction of a moribund nuclear power plant in Iran {Bushehr}.

The U.S. government repeatedly asked Russia to cancel the deal, arguing that Iran could use the reactor deal to bolster its nuclear infrastructure and as a cover to obtain sensitive nuclear technologies and equipment critical for producing separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

Adding to suspicions, Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor N. Mikhailov, and Iran’s Vice President and President of the AEOI, R. Amrollahi, signed a secret protocol declaring their commitment to negotiate additional contracts for research reactors, and to develop a uranium mine, train AEOI scientific personnel at Russian academic institutions, and build a gas centrifuge plant for enriching uranium.

The U.S. government did not learn about the centrifuge plant until March or April, at which point it stepped up its efforts to convince Russia to abandon the entire deal.

On April 30 — with Congress considering tough legislation that would sanction foreign companies that did business with Iran and cut off aid to Russia if it proceeded with the deal — President Bill Clinton announced his decision to institute a U.S. trade embargo on Iran.

The Russian-Iranian deal was a major issue at the May 10 U.S.-Russian summit in Moscow, at which Russia agreed that it would not supply a centrifuge plant.

Yeltsin said then that the deal contained components with the “potential for creating weapons-grade fuel,” so “we have decided to exclude those aspects from the contract.”

Nevertheless, most of the deal remained intact, which is a continuing sore point between the United States and Russia. ...

The deal dates back to the 1970s, when West Germany agreed to build two 1300 megawatt-electric light-water reactors (LWRs) at Bushehr, about 750 kilometers south of Tehran.

Reactor construction began in 1974, but the shah’s ... government was replaced ... in 1979. And, in 1980, Iran and Iraq became embroiled in an eight-year war.

Germany stopped work in 1979, and the partially finished reactors were heavily damaged—one extensively—in Iraqi bombing raids during the war.

Germany refused to finish the reactors, partly because of its own suspicions regarding Iranian weapon intentions, and partly because the United States exerted pressure.”

David Albright (President, ISIS: Institute for Science and International Security), “An Iranian bomb?,” 51:4 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, pages 20-26 (July/August 1995).

“ President Clinton: With regard to the nuclear sales to Iran—

As you know, the United States opposes the sale of the reactor {Bushehr} and the centrifuge.

I want to say, that I was deeply impressed that President Yeltsin told me, that he had decided, in the interest of nonproliferation, not to supply the centrifuge, and related equipment, to Iran. ...

Question: Mr. President, you made clear in advance on the Iran nuclear deal, that you wouldn’t be satisfied with anything short of an outright cancellation of that sale {Bushehr}.

Today, you said that it’s going to be referred to a lower level, that you weren’t able to solve this question.

I want to know, are there any repercussions?

Are you disappointed that you weren’t able to get this sale closed?

And will you resist Republican threats, to cut off foreign aid to Russia?

President Clinton: Well, first of all, this sale was in the pipeline, announced, and is legal under international law.

I believe it is unwise.

I think it should not go forward.

We actually got more done today than I thought we would do, and we are ahead of where I thought we would be.

As I said, President Yeltsin made it clear to me, that even though it would be some financial sacrifice to Russia, he did not believe they should proceed with the centrifuge, and the related portions of the sale, that could have a much more direct and immediate impact on weapons production.

President Yeltsin: I would like to add to what President Bill Clinton just said.

The point is, that the contract was concluded legitimately, and in accordance with international law, and no international treaties were violated in the process.

But it is true, that the contract do contain components of peaceful and military nuclear energy.

Now we have agreed to separate those two.

Inasmuch as they relate to the military component, and the possibility, the potential, for creating weapons-grade fuel and other matters — the centrifuge, the construction of silos, and so on — we have decided to exclude those aspects from the contract.

So the military component falls away, and what remains is just a peaceful nuclear power station on light water reactors {Bushehr}, which is designed to provide heat and energy. ...

President Clinton: We should stay away from big words like “threats,” when we’re managing matters, which can be managed, in a relationship that is quite good for the world, and that has made us all safer.”

William J. Clinton (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1993-2001 Jan. 20), Boris Yeltsin (Russia President, July 10 1991-1999 Dec. 31), “Remarks by President Clinton and President Yeltsin in a Joint Press Conference{copy} (Kremlin, Press Conference Hall, May 10 1995, 2:40-3:20 p.m.), retitled “The President’s News Conference With President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in Moscow,” 31:19 WCPD 777-819 {29kb.txt, 45kb.pdf, issue contents 4kb.txt, 23kb.pdf faulty} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:31/19}, 1995 PPPUS 661-667, at 662, 664 (book 1) {30kb.txt, 104kb.pdf, copy} {Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1995 (purl) SuDoc: AE 2.114:995/BK.1, ISSN: 0079-7626, LCCN: 58061050, OCLC: 31268646, 1198154, GPOCat, LL: paper, DL, WorldCat}.


Having bought A.Q. Khan’s P-1 centrifuge design (which A.Q. Khan allegedly developed from a design stolen from a Netherlands company), and parts for 500 centrifuges, Iran then proceeded to reverse-engineer them (because 500 aren’t enough) and to engineer the rest of the plant.

And only then did began Iran’s — perfectly legal — efforts to “develop” a “uranium centrifuge enrichment programme,” about 6-8 years — not 18 years — before Mohamed ElBaradei made his 18-year assertion, in his report (2003).

And this is why Mohamed ElBaradei’s assertion is a lie.

It implies another lie, designed to incite rabble-rousers.

And the liars who rouse them:

That Iran had an obligation, to report, to the IAEA, its dreams, supposings, musings, contingencies, conjectures, searchings, theories, hopes, aspirations, efforts.

And thereafter, their daily grind, to reverse-engineer, engineer, obtain raw materials, parts, and such.

Dogged, every step of their — perfectly legal — journey, by a malicious U.S. government, flouting its obligations under the NPT treaty, a powerful, outlaw, rogue state, an international pariah, a deadly cancer, in the heart, of the rule of law.

Which paragraph number?

Of which treaty?

Of which Safeguards Agreement?

Requires Iran?

To report such preliminaries?

To report such development effort?

I haven’t (yet) looked, but I very much doubt there is any such reporting obligation.

All the while, during these 8-10 years — and before and since — the U.S. government relentlessly, savagely, disrupted every single one of Iran’s efforts, to restart construction of its Bushehr electricity plant, obtain shipment of its parts, bought and paid for long ago, obtain fuel to power it.

$5 billion dollars they’ve spent on it, already, mostly decades ago.

And still, they have no electricity from it.

The U.S. did this with endless threats, against every single country Iran approached, for assistance.

A blatant, unlawful, illegal, “material breach” of the legal obligations the United States voluntarily undertook, and agreed to, long ago, when it ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

A treaty the U.S. is free to withdraw from.

Any time it pleases.

But the U.S. has not withdrawn from that treaty.

Until it does so, the U.S. remains legally bound and obligated, to assist Iran, obtain everything it needs, to complete its Bushehr electricity plant, obtain shipment of its parts, bought and paid for long ago, obtain fuel to power it.

And any, and all, other electricity plants Iran may fancy to design and build.

And the fuel cycle necessary to manufacture fuel to power them.

The exact opposite of what the U.S. has maliciously done, these past decades.

Why do people hate the United States of America?

Iran wouldn’t have a nuclear program, if they had not lied.

Because the United States of America violated its treaty obligations and actively prevented Iran from acquiring what they needed to establish their program.

Items Iran has the right, under the treaty, to obtain.

Lying to the U.N. IAEA was a prima facie lawful international countermeasure, to that unlawful conduct by the United States of America.

A legal remedy, provided to the Iranians, by international law, when dealing with a rogue state, which will not obey and fulfil its legal obligations, and conduct itself in accordance with the rule of law.

End of story.

On the “They lied” argument.

And the inference — masquerading as a fact — which depended on that argument.

Actions have consequences.

A lesson U.S. officials can’t seem to learn.



“ True, over the past 18 years Iran has not always provided the agency with all the information it has demanded.

But this should be viewed against the backdrop of illegal restrictions, including extraterritorially imposed sanctions by the United States.”

Kamal Kharrazi (Iran Foreign Minister), “Iran’s Nuclear Option” (Global Agenda, 2005), “Despite U.S. Charges, Iran Is Not Building Nuclear Weapon: Iraq Respects Both a Fatwa Against the Bomb and IAEA Restrictions” (Global Viewpoint, January 27 2004).


The U.S. imposed sanctions against Iran, in violation of the treaty obligations imposed on the U.S. by the treaty it ratified.

For more than two decades, the U.S. has threatened and punished it’s own nationals, other countries, other countries’ nationals, who supplied, or tried to supply, Iran with what the U.S. agreed Iran is entitled under the treaty to have.

And the rest of the treaty parties did nothing.

To condemn the United States of America.

To protect Iran’s treaty rights.


“ In this respect, the statement contained in the United States Memorial (pp. 37-41) presented to the arbitral tribunal in the Air Service case (see footnote 49 above) is significant:

“...International law recognizes that a party to an agreement {Iran} which is breached by the other party {U.S.} may reciprocally suspend proportional obligations under the agreement. ...

This generally recognized principle serves as one of the most important sanctions behind international law — namely reciprocity.

No State {U.S.} can validly claim from other States {Iran}, as a matter of binding obligation, conduct which it is not prepared to regard as binding upon itself.” ...


49  Case concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XVIII (Sales No. E/F.80.V.7), pp. 443 et seq.”

Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (Special Rapporteur), “Third Report on State Responsibility,” U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/440 and A/CN.4/440/Add.1 (June 10-14 1991) (U.N. International Law Commission), reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1991, volume 2, part 1, footnote 61, ¶ 33, page 13, and footnote 49, ¶ 26, page 12 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.l (Part 1)) {4061kb.pdf}. Third Report portion: {1351kb.pdf}.


“ Article 60.

Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach. ...

2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties {U.S.} entitles: ...

(b) a party specially affected by the breach {Iran} to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State; ...

3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in: ...

(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.”

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties {458kb.pdf} (May 23 1969), article 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, at 346 {U.N. Doc.: ST/LEG(05)/U5, ISSN: 0379-8267, LCCN: 48022417, WorldCat}. Status {U.N. Doc.: ST/LEG/SER.E/, ISSN: 0082-8319, LCCN: 48022417, WorldCat}. U.S. Senate Treaty No. 92-12, Richard Milhous Nixon (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1969-1974 Aug. 9), “Message to the Senate Transmitting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” {71kb.pdf} (White House, November 22 1971), 1971 PPPUS 1131-1132 {Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1971: SuDoc: GS 4.113:971, ISSN: 0079-7626, LCCN: 58061050, OCLC: 32945066, 1198154, GPOCat, LL: paper, DL, WorldCat}.


“ (1) In certain circumstances, the commission by one State {U.S.} of an internationally wrongful act may justify another State {Iran} injured by that act in taking non-forcible countermeasures in order to procure its cessation and to achieve reparation for the injury. ...

(2) Judicial decisions, State practice and doctrine confirm the proposition that countermeasures meeting certain substantive and procedural conditions may be legitimate ... might justify otherwise unlawful conduct “taken in response to a previous international wrongful act of another State and ... directed against that State.””

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” (International Law Commission, United Nations, draft articles {70kb.pdf} with commentaries {1278kb.pdf}, 2001), commentary to article 22, page 180, chapter 4 {1.3mb.pdf} of “Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session” (2001), U.N. Docs. A/56/10 {27.2mb.pdf} and A/56/10/Corr.1 (October 24 2001) {95kb.pdf, via this, this, or ODS} (U.N., Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10, 2001), to be reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, volume 2, part 2 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2000/Add.l (Part 2)).



These draft articles, on “State Responsibility,” are the result of 45 years work, by the U.N. International Law Commission.

The U.N. General Assembly “commends them to the attention of Governments.” U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 {74kb.pdf and via this, this, or ODS} (U.N. General Assembly, Resolution, December 12 2001), attaching the draft articles.

And, “commends once again ....” U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/35 {21kb.pdf, via this, this, or ODS} (U.N. General Assembly, Resolution, December 2 2004).

Included is a summary of the law of non-violent international countermeasures (articles 22, 49-54).

The legality of violent international countermeasures (“reprisals”) is a separate topic, a species of self-defense (to deter future unlawful violence). (Hamas).

The Commission’s research, writings, discussions, reports, on countermeasures are spread over many years, in many documents, and particularly these:

Roberto Ago (1907-1995) (Special Rapporteur), “Eighth Report on State Responsibility,” ¶¶ 78-99 (then article 30, now article 22) (January-June 1979, U.N. International Law Commission), U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/318 and Add.1-4, reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1979, volume 2, part 1, pages 39-47 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.l (Part 1)) {7795kb.pdf}. Eighth Report portion: {2358kb.pdf}.

International Law Commission (United Nations), “Summary Records of the Thirty-first Session,” discussion of countermeasures (then article 30, now article 22) at meetings 1544-1545 (June 1, June 5 1979), U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/SR.1544 {192kb.pdf} and A/CN.4/SR.1545 {218kb.pdf}, the term “countermeasures” adopted by the drafting committee and the draft article adopted by the Commission at meeting 1567 (July 10 1979), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.1567 {236kb.pdf}, reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1979, volume 1, pages 54-63, 169-175 (1980), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979 {7790kb.pdf}.

International Law Commission (United Nations), “Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-first Session,” (1979), U.N. Doc. A/34/10 {7290kb.pdf} (U.N., Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 10, 1979), reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1979, volume 2, part 2, pages 115-122 (1980), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.l (Part 2) {7354kb.pdf}.

Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (Special Rapporteur), “Third Report on State Responsibility,” U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/440 and A/CN.4/440/Add.1 (June 10-14 1991) (U.N. International Law Commission), reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1991, volume 2, part 1 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.l (Part 1)) {4061kb.pdf}. Third Report portion: {1351kb.pdf}.

Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (Special Rapporteur), “Fourth Report on State Responsibility,” U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/444 and Add.1-3 (May-June 1992) (U.N. International Law Commission), reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1992, volume 2, part 1 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.l (Part 1)) {2887kb.pdf}. Fourth Report portion: {2040kb.pdf}.

International Law Commission (United Nations), “Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-fourth Session,” chapter III, ¶¶ 105-276 (September 1 1992), U.N. Doc. A/47/10 {2415kb.pdf and via ODS}, pages 34-99 (U.N., Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10, 1992), reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1992, volume 2, part 2, pages 17-41 (November 1994), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.l (Part 2) {2477kb.pdf}.

Sixth Committee (Legal) of the U.N. General Assembly, 47th Session, Summary Record of Meetings 20-30 (October 26 – November 6 1992), U.N. Docs. A/C.6/47/SR.20 through /SR.30 (223 pages) {not on ODS or elsewhere on the internet}, on agenda item 129: “Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-fourth Session (cited just above). The “topical summary” of this debate — A/CN.4/446 (January 25 1993, 82 pages) — is also not on the internet (except in French and Arabic), but the debate pertaining to countermeasures (summarized there, at ¶¶ 135-242, pages 38-63) is discussed here: Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (Special Rapporteur), “Fifth Report on State Responsibility,” U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/453 and Add.1-3 (May-June 1993) (U.N. International Law Commission), reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1993, volume 2, part 1, ¶¶ 27-61, pages 12-18 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.l (Part 1)) {8517kb.pdf}. Fifth Report portion: {2198kb.pdf}.

International Law Commission, “State responsibility: Comments and observations received from Governments,” U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/488 (March 25 1998) {661kb.pdf}, A/CN.4/488/Add.1 (April 30 1998) {49kb.pdf}, A/CN.4/488/Add.2 (May 4 1998) {46kb.pdf}, A/CN.4/515/Add.3 (July 20 1998) {55kb.pdf} {via this, this, or ODS} (U.N. International Law Commission), to be reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1998, volume 2, part 1 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1998/Add.l (Part 1)).

James Crawford (Special Rapporteur), “Second Report on State Responsibility,” ¶¶ 357-392, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/498/Add.4 (July 19 1999) {46kb.pdf} {via this, this, or ODS} (U.N. International Law Commission), to be reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1999, volume 2, part 1 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.l (Part 1)).

James Crawford (Special Rapporteur), “Third Report on State Responsibility,” ¶¶ 285-367, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.3 (July 18 2000) {303kb.pdf}, A/CN.4/507/Add.3/Corr.1 (August 21 2000) {67kb.pdf}, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add.4 (August 4 2000) {245kb.pdf} {via this, this, or ODS} (U.N. International Law Commission), to be reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2000, volume 2, part 1 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2000/Add.l (Part 1)).

International Law Commission, “State responsibility: Comments and observations received from Governments,” U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/515 (March 19 2001) {453kb.pdf}, A/CN.4/515/Add.1 (April 3 2001) {158kb.pdf}, A/CN.4/515/Add.2 (May 1 2001) {157kb.pdf}, A/CN.4/515/Add.3 (June 28 2001) {143kb.pdf} {via this, this, or ODS} (U.N. International Law Commission), to be reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, volume 2, part 1 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.l (Part 1)).



6. {Get ready for an argument masquerading as a fact} It makes no economic sense for Iran to make its own nuclear fuel, therefore {get ready for a non-fact inference}, their nuclear program is a weapons program, and not an innocent program, for electricity.


“ Philippe Douste-Blazy {1:00}:

Today, it’s very simple.

No civilian nuclear program can explain the Iranian nuclear program.


It’s an Iranian secret military program.”

Philippe Douste-Blazy (France Minister of Foreign Affairs), interview (Les Quatre Vérités, France 2 TV, February 16 2006), transcript excerpt {copy, copy}, audio excerpt {9:52 at 0:38-1:39} rebroadcast, Stéphane Paoli (Téhéran), Bernard Guetta, Benoît Collombat, Delphine Minoui, “France Inter en Iran” (France Inter Radio, February 16 2006), reported Valérie Gas, “Nucléaire: Douste-Blazy accuse l'Iran” (RFI Acutalité, February 16 2006); Anonymous (AFP: Agence France-Presse), “Iran Insists Nuclear Programme Peaceful” (DNA: Daily News & Analysis, February 16 2006) {copy}; Molly Moore, “Iran Working On Nuclear Arms Plan, France Says: Official Rejects Claim About Civilian Program” {pf} (Washington Post, February 17 2006); Anonymous, “Iran Reaffirms Commitment to NPT, IAEA Safeguards” (IRNA: Islamic Republic News Agency, February 19 2006).



Query:Very simple”?

Stupidity and mendacity are not hallmarks of the French.

So I’ll attribute Mr. Douste-Blazy’s grandiose leap of logic to an excess of zeal and a paucity of information.

From a man who agreed to an impossible task:

To sell, to a very rational public, a very irrational, immoral, unethical, and illegal scheme.

But, to his credit, Mr. Douste-Blazy did not masquerade his assertion to be an unassailable fact, based on secret intelligence.

A sharp contrast, to his mendacious U.S. counterparts.

He asserted it to be an opinion, a logical deduction, from a premise.

Then unknown to him (apparently), his premise is faulty.

His premise being faulty, so too his deduction.


Hot air.

Adding nothing to the sum of human knowledge.

Leaving us right back where we started.

Endless allegations.

No proof.

Whether the French press provided Mr. Douste-Blazy with the scorn and ridicule his foolish, uninformed, bluster merits, I do not know.

Nor whether he later apologized, to the public, when he learned of his faulty premise.

An apology is the mark of an honest wo/man.



“ Jack Straw: The second — and equally powerful — reason for our concern is the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme itself.

Iran has no civil operational need for the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan nor for the enrichment facility at Natanz, which are at the centre of the current stand-off.

Iran claims that the sole function of these facilities is as part of the production process for nuclear reactor fuel.

But Iran has only one nuclear power reactor, that which is under construction at Bushehr.

The point is this: most countries in the world with only a few operating nuclear power reactors do not find it makes economic sense to develop costly conversion and enrichment facilities.

The Russians, in any event, have contracted to supply fuel to Bushehr for ten years; and have offered to supply it for the lifetime of the reactor if the Iranians want that.”

Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Secretary), speech, “Iran: The Path Ahead” (IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March 13 2006, 1:30 p.m.), transcript {92kb.doc}, video {50.5mb.wmv}.

Query:Economic sense”?

Well, then.

How about this?

Let’s give France $1 billion, and that will give us the right to pay them even more money, for fuel, for our reactor.

Does that make “economic sense”?

Or how about this?

Let’s give the United States $2 million, and that will give us the right to pay them even more money, for fuel, for our reactor.

Does that make “economic sense”?

Or how about this?

Let’s give Germany several billion dollars, for a turn-key electricity plant at Bushehr, including the fuel.

Does that make “economic sense”?

Or how about this?

Let’s ask Argentina to sell us fuel, for our reactor.

Does that make “economic sense”?

Iran did all these things.

And every single deal was destroyed, by the United States of America.

Iran paid all that money, and never got a single gram of uranium fuel.

Argentina? The U.S. blocked that deal, before (thankfully) Iran paid the money (for a change).


Query:Only one nuclear power reactor”?

Time and again, for more than 30 years, beginning with the Shah, Iran has announced its intention, to build many nuclear electricity plants.

23 plants, the Shah first said.

20,000 MW (megawatts), United States nuclear electricity consultants to the Shah projected Iran needed, by the year 2000.

7,000 megawatts, the Iranians posited, to the IAEA, in a 2003 calculation, illustrating the savings from nuclear electricity, savings in oil, greenhouse gases, particulates.

20,000 megawatts, eventually, the Iranian president lately said.

That’s about 20 nuclear power reactors.

Not “one”:


“ Question (through a translator):

The next step after enrichment, sir.

What is that?

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (through a translator):

Enrichment is a technology for the production of fuel.

We have completed the testing phase.

Later, we need to produce 20,000 megawatts of power, in keeping with the laws of the Iranian parliament.

We are keeping one power plant.

We will start forth on another power plant.

And we have (inaudible) feasibility study on other power plants, leading to 20,000 megawatts.

We want to provide for our own fuel needs domestically, of course.

And we are going to use this capability on the medical, let’s say, “front,” as well, and agricultural and other fields. ...

Question (through a translator):

A small question for you:

In the future, will Iran increase uranium enrichment to 5 percent?

Say yes or no, sir.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (through a translator):

For fuel, you need 3.5 to 5 percent.

We need that, and no more.

For our power plants, we need that and we have made appropriate designs.

And our production program calls for the same.

We have no other needs.”

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (President of Iran), press conference, “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Holds News Conference” (Tehran, April 24 2006), CQ transcript {Lexis}.


Bushehr, a light water, nuclear electricity reactor, is specified for 1000 megawatts.

Bushehr is a Russian redesign of the original German reactor, which was nearly finished, before Iraq bombed it 7 times, to smithereens, during the Iraq-Iran war (1981-1988).

The U.S. military was stationed in Baghdad at the time, assisting Saddam, as a co-belligerent with Iraq, in Iraq’s criminal war of aggression against Iran. This, in violation of the U.S. Constitution, without a vote in Congress, to declare war on Iran. Ronald Reagan, and his complicit U.S. military command, frequently violated the U.S. Constitution in this way, an enemy within, a silent coup d'état, against the U.S. Constitution. Donald Rumsfeld (special Presidential envoy), George H.W. Bush (U.S. Vice President), and others personally conveyed offers and advise to Saddam, including what targets in Iran the Iraqi air force should attack, provided Saddam with tactical intelligence, arms, munitions, and such. See, e.g., Howard Teicher (U.S. National Security Council staff, responsible for the Middle East and for Political-Military Affairs 1982-1987), affidavit dated January 31 1995, United States v. Carlos Cardoen, et al. (S.D. Florida, No. 93-241-CR), and see, Derek Mitchell, Michael Bevin, timeline, US-Iraq 1980s (Cooperative Research).

Did Iraq bomb Bushehr on U.S. orders or advise?

Bushehr — then and now — is a “civilian object.” Bombing it, is a text-book, violent, war crime, by the Iraqi chain of command and by each U.S. official who may have incited, aided and abetted, conspired, facilitated such attacks.

Iran has contracted for additional nuclear electricity plants in the past and, each time, the United States threatened the supplier country with punishment, and they backed-out of the contracts.

Once again, Iran is now soliciting international tenders for 2 more nuclear electricity plants at Bushehr, on a 50-50 joint venture basis, with thoughts of 15 or 20 more. (Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf, has the water necessary, for light water nuclear electricity plants).

See, generally, Julian Rush (science editor), “News from Iran: Inside Bushehr” (Channel 4 News, London, March 6 2006) {video, 18:21}: “We go inside Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor to see how scientists there view the row raging above their heads.” “Iran Sees Its Nuclear Power Station Delayed to 2007” (Reuters, Tehran, May 1 2006): “Aliasghar Soltanieh, Iran’s envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said on April 22 it would issue two tenders for nuclear power stations in the coming weeks.”


See Greg lie

“ Greg Schulte {2:05}: We also have clear indications, that they’re moving forward, to acquire the material, the technology, the knowhow, to build nuclear weapons.

After all, IAEA inspectors have been to the centrifuge halls at Natanz.

They’ve seen these centrifuges spinning.

We know they are enriching uranium.

Robin Lustig: But that, in itself, doesn’t mean they are making a bomb.

You can use centrifuges.

You can enrich uranium.

Without wanting to make a bomb.

Greg Schulte: But sensible people ask sensible questions.

And the sensible question here is,

Why would they want to enrich uranium,

For peaceful purposes,

If they don’t even have a nuclear reactor.

There’s one reactor under construction.

At Bushehr.

And that reactor is going to be fueled by the Russians.

Robin Lustig: So give me then.

If you can.

Three pieces of hard evidence.

That you believe.



To the fact.

That Iran is developing.

A nuclear weapon.

Greg Schulte: I cannot offer you.

A smoking gun.”

Gregory L. Schulte (U.S. IAEA Ambassador), interviewed by Robin Lustig, “Iran” (BBC Radio 4, The World Tonight, May 4 2006, 10:00-10:45 p.m.) {BBCCat 06sx0741}, audio {5:25, 44:58, at 28:29, 29:07}. See also Gregory Schulte, “Ambassador Schulte Iran Speech at IISS” (IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, May 4 2006, 2:30 p.m.).


Query:One reactor”?


Is what I would say.

If Greg Schulte were an honest, incompetent, negligent, government civil servant.

But Greg Schulte is a very competent, very political, operative.

And so, I can only say, what the facts plainly demonstrate:

Greg Schulte is a dishonest, wilful, malicious, bold, audacious, liar.

Just like John Bolton, and the rest of his many bosses.



Making an argument in a speech, dressed up as a fact, and omitting to mention actual facts, which undercut the argument, that’s the very definition of misleading and, if he made these omissions on purpose, the very definition of a lie.

And, not surprisingly, it’s a blatant violation of BBC editorial guidelines, to omit these two material facts, and especially because they are obscure facts, not in the general knowledge of the population:

Iran’s oft announced intention to build additional nuclear electricity plants. And the long, sordid, history of unlawful, illegal, abuse by the United States of America, blocking all attempts by Iran, to get fuel, and complete its plant at Bushehr.

The BBC?

Jack Straw funds the BBC World Service (£225 million per year), from his Foreign Office budget.

And he, or his minions, hold meetings with BBC staff.

Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy {154kb.pdf} (U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, March 22 2002, the “Wilton Report”), “Policy direction” (¶ 23.7, page 38), “Advice and direction provided by the FCO” (¶ 7.5, page 15), burying “a potential problem story” (¶ 18.7, page 32), BBC World Service FCO funding: £180 million (2002) (¶ 17.2, page 31).

What do you do?

When your paymaster makes a speech?

Containing misleading, material, factual omissions?

The principal technique of government lies.

An “oversight,” as the BBC might phrase it.

Do you broadcast his speech?

And without editorial comment?

To supply the omitted facts?

And do BBC staff fear for their jobs?

If they don’t play along?

And sell their paymaster’s agenda?

BBC World Service officials claim, they are masters of their editorial content, and the U.K. Foreign Office is master of where they broadcast, how they broadcast, and to whom they broadcast.

On the content of what they broadcast, they imply a “Chinese Wall” protects their staff from retaliation, by the Foreign Office, their paymaster:

“There is a separation and a Chinese wall between the daily editorial decisions and those people having the debates and discussions and regular meetings with the Foreign Office.”

Richard Sambrook (Director, Global News Division, BBC World Service), testimony, November 29 2005 (linked below).

What care (if any) goes into the selection of this editorial staff, before they are ever hired in the first place, transferred from their proving grounds, to ensure their opinions are compatible with the Foreign Office—

This is not disclosed.

Nor, who does this selection.

Nor, the career fate, of independent minded editors.

Foreign Affairs—Third Report, ¶¶ 3-65 (Public Diplomacy), at ¶¶ 45-58 (BBC World Service and public diplomacy) (U.K. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, March 29 2006).

BBC Charter Review—Second Report, ¶¶ 56-65 (“Public diplomacy and the World Service”), testimony (“Minutes of Evidence”) of Richard Sambrook (Director, Global News Division, BBC World Service), Nigel Chapman (Director, BBC World Service) (November 29 2005) at Q912 (“Chinese wall”) (U.K. House of Lords, Select Committee on the BBC Charter Review, February 15 2006).

Jack Straw, a lawyer, may have an innocent explanation, for why he omitted these two material facts, from his speech.

Facts which gut his carefully crafted argument.

But Jack Straw is the lead salesman, of the U.S./U.K. plot, to demonize Iran.

And Jack Straw therefore has the duty, to be master of the facts.

For this reason, the obvious explanation is the likely one:

Jack Straw is a wilful, malicious, liar.



Iran’s Energy and Economic Plans

And these are not the only material omissions, Jack Straw maliciously, or negligently, omitted to mention, in his carefully crafted, written, speech, he solemnly delivered, on a big stage.

In striking contrast, to the irresponsible conduct, of the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, Iran has developed an energy policy and an economic plan.

For the future.

These are long-term plans, looking far beyond the horizon, of one nuclear electricty plant, at Bushehr, and other such plants, in the near term.

They’ve decided to stop being a victim.

Of abuse.

From the United States government.

And it’s cronies.

Like the U.K. and France.

“ We will be a player in the nuclear field.”

Apparently, Iran’s leaders have decided to bust the cartel.

The abusive cartel, the U.S. has created, by malicious violation of the NPT treaty.

They intend to become a supplier {pf}, of peaceful nuclear technology, under IAEA safeguards, to the rest of the world.

Just like the NPT treaty was designed to promote.

And assist the many victim nations the cartel refuses to deal with.



“ Margarita Lopez Maya {1:13}: With Iran, we are old friends with Iran.

I mean, we formed part of OPEC.

We founded OPEC, in 1961.

So, those are more than 45 years, together, in a very important commercial tie, which is the oil business.

Emilio San Pedro {0:58}: In February, Venezuela — accompanied only by Cuba and Syria — voted against referring Iran, to the U.N. Security Council, for its nuclear program.

For Gustavo Márquez, the country’s Minister of Integration — who represented Venezuela, at that crucial U.N. Atomic Energy Agency vote — Venezuela’s position about Iran is logical, and consistent:

Gustavo Márquez Marín: I want to be very clear, as regards Iran.

We have a coherent position, at the international level, on this.

We defend the right of all people, all countries, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

And to master all the technology, including for the production of nuclear fuel.

But we would never support Iran in a program that developed nuclear weapons.

We believe that what’s really at stake, in this matter, is the control of nuclear fuel.

And Iranian oil.

Just as occurred in Iraq.

This is what’s behind it.

Because, if these countries, the nuclear powers, are the only ones that are going to have the possibility of enriching uranium, then they are going to control the enconomy of the fuel.

The new fuel of the future. The energy of the future. Which is nuclear fuel.”

Margarita Lopez Maya (professor), Gustavo Márquez Marín (Venezuela’s IAEA ambassador), interviewed in Caracas, by Emilio San Pedro, “A New Axis of Power, Part Two: U.S. Relations” (BBC Radio 4, April 25/30 2006, 8:00/5:00 p.m., producer: Paul O'Keefe) {BBCCat 06vq3575}. The above text, I transcribed from that domestic BBC Radio 4 version (audio, 37:60, not posted). Text beside the green bar (  ) is omitted from the shorter, and slightly modified, BBC World Service version (May 2006), posted, audio {22:25, at 4:49-5:63, 15:05-16:04} {9315kb.mp3}.


This is a very long-term goal, way beyond the horizon, decades into the future.

An horizon Jack Straw, and his cronies, do not want the public, and the press, to peer beyond.

Mastering all aspects of nuclear energy, and the design and construction of nuclear plants, hazardous materials management, and such—

This takes a lot of time, a lot of investment, a lot of patience, and a lot of money.

But, there’s a big payoff, down the road.

Jobs, export earnings, prestige, friends.

A payoff France well appreciates, as the leading nation in nuclear electricity.

On the verge of an explosion of prosperity.

As many nations prepare to rush to France, begging for nuclear electricity plants.

Does this explain France’s otherwise mysterious participation in the U.S./U.K. plot to demonize Iran?

France stands out, conspicuously, from other western nations, in its national character.

The French are rational.

And, the French exhibit generosity of spirit.

A positive attitude.

A supportive attitude.

They view the glass half full, not half empty.

A French voice, is a very welcome voice, in any conversation, on any topic.

The French normally stand in solidarity, with the oppressed, and the disadvantaged.

But the U.S./U.K. plot against Iran is irrational (except as a corrupt technique to preserve a cartel).

And very mean-spirited.

Are France’s leaders so terrified?

Of the economic threat Iran poses to France?

Now so far in the future?

Is that why they joined in this plot?

It’s a stark departure, from the normal, admirable, behavior, of France.

Another part of its energy plan, Iran’s leaders have decided to reduce domestic consumption of oil, and the pollutants from burning oil.

Iran has invested heavily in mass transit in Tehran.

And, here’s another good example for the U.S. and U.K.:

Iran has decided, apparently, to convert its internal combustion engines (cars, trucks, buses) to natural gas, which Iran has OPEC’s biggest supply of (27.5 trillion cubic meters).

“ Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (through a translator):

Another policy of my government is to reduce our energy consumption.

As you might appreciate, last year, close to $10 billion we spent on gasoline. Well, that is a lot of money. And our per capita petrol consumption in a word is very high. We need to reduce that. And we have worked toward that.

The first item of the budget, Hara 13 (ph) we have addressed that problem. We have incorporated policies to change the model of our fuel consumption, bring down fuel consumption. And I'm please to say that the Islamic Council (inaudible) approve of the paragraph fully and bylaws are ready and they will be put in motion very soon.

And also in metropolitan areas we’re also adding rail and tram facilities, urban rail (inaudible) picture.

And also, we are trying to move away from petroleum to clean natural gas. That is another policy of my cabinet. And this year, we are going to open 400 new stations pumping natural gas, with appropriate (inaudible).”

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (President of Iran), press conference, “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Holds News Conference” (Tehran, April 24 2006), CQ transcript {Lexis}. And see Liam Halligan (economics correspondent), “News from Iran: All about the Oil (Channel 4 News, London, March 8 2006) {video, 3:46}.


Natural gas.

Now that’s a great idea.

World class leadership.

Will the U.S. and U.K. follow Iran’s excellent leadership?

I’ve seen TV documentaries, about natural gas powered trucks and buses, in some European cities, painted green, to emphasize their reduced pollution and reduced greenhouse gases. There’s obviously some pollution, and carbon dioxide (compared with hydrogen, with zero pollution), but apparently much reduced, over gasoline (petrol) and diesel.

And, you can convert automobiles to natural gas, too. SeeIran, Netherlands To Increase Auto Gas Conversion Cooperation” (PIN: Petroenergy Information Network, November 13 2005).

I’ve lost the thread, on U.S. natural gas supplies, which I’ll have to research, though I recollect there’s a lot of gas in the Gulf of Mexico.

Which brings us, to Field of Dreams (a baseball movie).

Why have U.S. oil companies not added a natural gas pump at their filling stations?

They’ve obviously got the obscene profits to do it.

I guess they don’t have any natural gas to sell.

Or maybe there’s little profit in natural gas, because there’s no need for any oil refineries, and they want to protect their cartels and investments in refineries, fleets of oil tankers.

The U.S. and U.K. governments could easily find a way to cause this to be done, by incentives, hopefully to small businesses, not the oil companies.

If they wanted to.

If they had the political will.

To stop waging war.

Building offensive weapons.

“Projecting power.”

And start spending their money on something useful.

And so, the leadership of Iran, building natural gas filling stations, or giving subsidies to small businesses to build them.

Field of Dreams (1989) (a farmer, facing bankruptcy, built a baseball park, in the middle of his Iowa corn field, in the middle of nowhere, when a disembodied voice said this to him).


Thanks to U.S. sanctions, Iran has been forced to develop a now flourishing domestic engineering industry:


“ Jon Snow {live in Tehran, at night, on a plaza, outside a huge, illuminated, gorgeous, golden dome}:

Many in Tehran expect the worst.

After 25 years of unilaterial U.S. sanctions, their economy has had to cope, with the impact of isolation.

As our international editor, Lindsay Hilsum, now reports.

Lindsay Hilsum {video, in a machine tool workshop, showing operators, milling steel, welding valves}:

Not just a workshop, milling valve castings, for the Iranian oil industry, but a symbol, of the Islamic Republic’s independence.

Weapons, of alloyed steel, in the cold war, with the U.S.A.

At Shamsabad, south of Tehran, they manufacture pipe accessories, and well-heads, for the oil industry.

25 years ago, Iran would have imported this sort of equipment, from America.

But after the hostage crisis, the U.S. imposed sanctions.

Masoud Ghadesi (Solar Iran) {“a businessman who used to represent a U.S. firm supplying oil well-heads and other equipment,” video, interview in his office}:

It became a sort of a blessing in disquise.

Because we had to develop some techonology.

The capabilities of indegenous supply sources has tremendously grown up.

Today, this country produces compressors, parts; they produce pumps—

Lindsay Hilsum: Brazening it out.

Iranians have high level engineering skills.

One reason the Americans, and Europeans, take seriously, the possibility that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon.

For now, only the U.S. maintains an embargo.

But Europe may be considering a ban, on new investment.

So Iran is looking east.

This is a joint venture with a Chinese company, making specialized valves for the oil and gas industry {video, in the factory, Lindsay Hilsum speaking near giant steel valves, 6 feet tall}.

What the Iranian government is hoping, is that, if the U.S. and Europe push for sanctions in the U.N. Security Council — however targeted, however precise — that the Chinese will veto. ...

Masoud Ghadesi (Solar Iran):

These sort of sanctions—

They’re mostly a gesture of anger.

And they have not been effective.

You should have to really kid yourself, to believe it its effectiveness, in paralizing a nation.”

Lindsay Hilsum (international editor), in Tehran, “News from Iran: Living with Sanctions” (Channel 4 News, London, March 10 2006, 7:28 p.m.) {video, 8:21}: “Iran has learned to live with an American embargo, but aircraft safety is suffering as a result.” And see Lindsey Hilsum, I Predict Iranian Cloned Sheep” (New Statesman, March 13 2006) {copy}.




In what way is Iran “isolated”?

Every country in the world.

Does business with Iran.

But one.

(Or maybe two, U.S.-Israel, a rogue state axis of evil).

On what rational basis?

Can U.S. officials?

And western media talkers?


The elephant in the room?

Plainly, it’s the U.S. which is isolated.

From every other country in the world.

Vis-à-vis Iran.

Not the other way around.

Jon Snow, I love you.

But pay attention, to what you say:

Unilateral isolation” well describes the isolation, from Iran, which the U.S. government has imposed on itself.

On U.S. businesses.

Who used to make a lot of money in Iran.

On U.S. citizens, and U.S. universities.

Who used to enjoy great influence, on Iranian citizens, several hundred thousand of whom, once upon a time, at any one time, studied in U.S. universities.

But pretending, that a single country {U.S.} can impose isolation, from the rest of the world, on another country {Iran}

Used in that irrational sense—

“Unilateral isolation” is an oxymoron.

It’s non-sense.



“Close to $10 billion we spent on gasoline.  
Well, that’s a lot of money.”

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said.

And worse, about half that, they import, a big drain on their foreign exchange, their balance of payments. SeeHamaneh Explains about Fuel Rationing” (PIN: Petroenergy Information Network, April 27 2006).

And so, Iran is very busy, increasing its refining capacity, part of its economic plan, to save money, and conserve foreign exchange (“import substitution,” in economics-speak).

And, Iran is very busy, increasing their natural gas treatment plants (to remove impurities), and natural gas pipelines, all over the place, for heating, cooking, industry. SeeNIGC Supplies Natural Gas to 534 Cities, over 2,200 Villages” (PIN, October 22 2005) andNIGC to Construct 5,000 km Gas Lines Within 4th Plan” (PIN, April 17 2006).

And, Iran is very busy, building a brand new industry. Petrochemicals, to take their valuable raw material (oil), and make it more valuable still, by making something useful from it, and selling that to foreigners, at a bigger profit. SeePetrochemical Exports To Double This Year” (PIN, April 25 2006).

More foreign money, to buy foreign things.

This, instead of burning up their oil, generating electricity, polluting their air.

And, Iran is very busy, building pipelines, for oil and gas and petrochemical feedstocks (ethylene).

And, Iran is very busy, building-up the expertise and business opportunities of Iranians, saving foreign exchange, in the process. By doing more and more of this oil and gas and petrochemical work in-country, by Iranians.

For example, Iran contracted for a “$1.2 billion {€960 million} deal with companies from France, Germany and South Korea to build a petrochemical plant in Iran,” a 4-year contract, to make ethylene, a feedstock for petrochemicals (and, as I recollect, an additive for gasoline, to raise its octane). See Molly Moore, “Iran Raises Stakes in Nuclear Dispute: Atom Technology Exports, Oil Cuts Are Threatened” {pf} (Washington Post, April 26 2006).

But, Iran canceled that contract, paying off all three foreign companies, for their work so far.

Why? Iran wants to do the work themselves. To develop it’s own engineering industry. High value jobs, for Iranians. And, a 27% savings (€260 million), much of it in foreign exhange, I suppose. See Alfred Kueppers, “Iran to Cancel 960 Mln Euro Petrochemical Deal with Linde, Hyundai, Technip” (AFX News, April 24 2006) {copy}.

The history of the world, so far, is this:

Rich nations rob poor nations, of their natural resources, take them away, make something useful from them, and then sell that back to the poor countries, at a big profit, further oppressing them.

And it’s that history, Iranians are defending themselves against.

A very wise move.

An excellent long-term energy policy.

An excellent long-term economic plan.





“ It’s about confidence-building.

It’s not about an imminent threat.”

Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA Director General), “Director General Briefs Press on Iran Nuclear Issue” (IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Vienna, February 2 2006).  CJHjr


IAEA documents and Iran’s replies are on a separate webpage: IAEA, Security Council.



U.N. Security Council

U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1696 (July 31 2006). U.N. Doc. S/Res/1696 {32kb.pdf, via this or ODS}. Transcript of the meeting: U.N. Doc. S/PV.5500 {73kb.pdf, via this or ODS} (U.N. Security Council, Meeting 5500, Wednesday, July 31 2006, 10:20-11:25 a.m., 12 pages, SC/8792). U.N. video: Meeting {1:18:17, source}; media stakeouts after the meeting: U.S. (John Bolton) {9:12}, EU3 (Germany, U.K., France: Thomas Matussek, Emyr Jones Parry, Jean-Marc de La Sabliere) {18:32}, Qatar (Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser) {15:06}, Russia (Vitaly Churkin) {13:21}. C-Span video {1:24:30}. Reported, “UN Security Council Demands That Iran Suspend Nuclear Activities” (U.N. News, July 31 2006), UN Issues Iran Nuclear Deadline” (BBC News, July 31 2006, 16:27 GMT).


U.N. Security Council, Presidential Statement (March 29 2006). U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/15 {25kb.pdf, via this or ODS}. Transcript of the meeting: U.N. Doc. S/PV.5403 {28kb.pdf, via this or ODS} (U.N. Security Council, Meeting 5403, Wednesday, March 29 2006, 4:30-4:35 p.m., 2 pages, SC/8679). U.N. video: Meeting {8:18}; media stakeout before the meeting: P5 (U.K., France, China, U.S., Russia) {23:09}; media stakeouts after the meeting: EU3 (France, U.K., Germany) {12:23}, U.S. (John Bolton) {07:00}. Reported, “UN Security Council Calls on Iran to Suspend Enrichment-Related Activities” (U.N. News Service, March 29 2006). And see Louis Charbonneau (Reuters), “World Powers Meet in Berlin to Discuss Iran Crisis{pf} (Washington Post, March 30 2006).

Javad Zarif (Iran U.N. Ambassador, from August 5 2002), prevented by the Security Council from speaking at its meeting, his reply (U.N. press conference, March 29 2006), U.N. video {37:55}.

Javad Zarif (Iran U.N. Ambassador, from August 5 2002), interviewed by Wolf Blitzer (CNN News The Situation Room, March 30 2006, 5:00 p.m. ET)


Additional U.N. Security Council documents — additional reports, subsequent interviews with Javad Zarif, and comment — are on a separate webpage: IAEA, Security Council.



“ U.S., British and French diplomats secured Russian and Chinese support by ... dropping language hinting that Iran’s nuclear program constitutes a threat to international peace and security. ...

John R. Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, insisted ... expressed frustration ... “Iran’s nuclear weapons program is unacceptable.”

Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Andrei Denisov, conceded that there are suspicions, very strong suspicions” that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, but he said there is still no hard evidence ...

The IAEA ... acknowledges that Iran has the right to nuclear energy and that it cannot prove Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.”

Colum Lynch, “Security Council Pressures Tehran: Iran Is Urged to Halt Uranium Enrichment” {pf} (Washington Post, March 30 2006).



Query:Is developing nuclear weapons”?

This is not what Andrei Denisov said.

Pay attention to your business, Mr. Lynch.

And your role, in promoting war.

By misquoting officials.

And omitting to quote, or report, the pertinent things they say.

Andrei Denisov said (quoted below):

“We have suspicions on intentions.”

Only intentions.”

Not weapons development.

He did not say, “there are suspicions that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.”

As you erroneously reported, Mr. Lynch.




“ Suspicion is a state of mind of the accuser and not a state of mind or an act by the one accused.

It is a monstrous proposition, containing the very essence of license, that the state of mind of the accuser shall be the determining factor, in the absence of evidence of guilt, whether the accused shall or shall not be summarily executed. ...

The orders to execute such persons and mere suspects on suspicion only, and without proof, were criminal on their face.

Executions pursuant thereto were criminal.

Those who gave or passed down such orders must bear criminal responsibility for passing them down and for their implementation by the units subordinate to them.”

The High Command Case, 11 N.M.T. 462-697 (opinion), at 531 (U.S. Military Tribunal 5, Nürnberg Germany, trial, 5 February-August 13, judgment, October 27-28, 1948), volumes 10-11, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (“Nuernberg, October 1946–April 1949”) (15 volumes, U.S. GPO, Washington D.C., 1949-1953) (“the green series”) {SuDoc: D 102.8, ditto, LCCNs: 49045929, 97071903, OCLC: 12799641, UC, WorldCat}, volume 10 (1951, 31+1308 pages) {55.9mb.pdf, source}, volume 11 (1951, 31+755 pages) {58.5mb.pdf}, also reported, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (“Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission”), volume 12, page 86 (15 volumes, U.K. HMSO, London, 1947-1949) {LCCNs: 47022747, 97080284, OCLC: 45912266, UC, WorldCat}.


“ Edi Lederer {1:20}: Mr. Ambassador, why was it important to drop the reference to “threats” to international peace and security?

Which is actually what the Security Council is responsible for.

Andrei Denisov: We haven’t dropped it.

We simply—

We didn’t insert it.

And that’s a different thing.

Edi Lederer: What is the difference?

Andrei Denisov: Because, you know, when you speak about threat, to international peace and security, you must have strong, clear, and legally approved evidence.

We don’t have such evidence.

That is the purpose, why we use International Atomic Energy Agency, as a watchdog, specially designed to provide such qualification, such verification, such approval.

For a time being, we have suspicions — a very strong one — but suspicions, on intentions.

That intentions also have some, some, some evidence.

But it is only intentions.

So, from that point of view, the road—

It is like a ladder. You know. If you want to climb up, you must step on the first step. And then the second. And not try to leap.

That is the case.”

Andrei Denisov (Russia’s U.N. Ambassador), questioned by Edith M. Lederer (Associated Press) (blog), in a media stakeout, shortly before a 3:30 p.m. private Security Council meeting, before Security Council meeting 5403 (March 29 2006, 4:30-4:35 p.m.) {video, 23:09, at 20:56}, excerpts quoted in Evelyn Leopold, Irwin Arieff (Reuters), “Wrapup 1—UN demands Iran stop uranium enrichment work” (Reuters, March 29 2006, 8:22 p.m. EST), and Warren Hoge, U.N. Council Urges Iran to Halt Atom Activity” (New York Times, March 30 2006).


“ Question {English} {2:49 bb}: And to Foreign Minister Lavrov, specifically.

Given that yesterday’s Security Council statement omits — apparently at your request — language calling Iran a “threat” to international peace and security—

Do you think, that the regime is not that sort of threat?

Or, did you have other reasons, for opposing that language?

Sergei Lavrov {English}: In principle, Russia doesn’t believe that sanctions could achieve the purposes of settlement of various issues.

We believe, that there must be a balanced approach, of the international community, to each and every conflict, based on the international law, and based on the need to make sure, that all members of the international community fulfill their commitments and obligations.

And that’s how we all try to work, in case of the nuclear program of Iran.

And the key to this, is, the work of the IAEA, which has been supported yesterday, by the Security Council, aimed at clarifying all issues related to the past Iranian nuclear program.

The IAEA has reported, that it cannot yet testify, that there is no military aspect of this program.

But, at the same time, the last report of the IAEA says, that it cannot also assert, that there is a military aspect, to the Iranian nuclear program.

So, before we call any situation a “threat,” we need facts.

Especially, in the region like the Middle East, where so many things are happening.

We prefer, very strongly, to base our specific actions on specific facts.

And, in this particular case, the facts could be provided by the IAEA.

So far, they have not been provided.”

Sergei Lavrov (Russian Foreign Minister), press conference (German Foreign Office, Berlin, March 30 2006) video {23:20, 109mb.wmv, 4mb.wmv, Q/A at 16:52-17:41(Q) and 18:30-20:31(A)}, transcribedPress Availability After the P5+1 Meeting,” “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo, French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and European Union High Representative Javier Solana” (U.S. State Department, 2006/T10-2, Berlin, March 30 2006), reportedIranian Nuclear Program Must Be Solved Via IAEA Channels – Moscow{copy} (Interfax, March 31 2006, citing a Russian Foreign Ministry statement), quoted Jeffrey Fleishman (Berlin), Alissa J. Rubin (Vienna), “Calm Is Urged in Iran Debate{copy} (Los Angeles Times, March 31 2006), accordTranscript of Remarks and a Reply to a Media Question by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov at Press Conference of Foreign Ministers of Six States Following Consultations on Iranian Nuclear Program, Berlin, March 30, 2006” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 533-31-03-2006, March 31 2006).



They have no evidence.

Of any nuclear weapons program.

Contrary to endless assertions.

By U.S. officials.

The most pernicious, the most abusive, the most dangerous, the most deadly, liars, on the world stage today.

A villainous threat, to international peace and security.


See John lie

“ John Bolton (2006):

... the Iranian nuclear weapons program ... (January 17) {copy} {5:55, at 2:09}.

... Iran’s nuclear weapons program ... the Iranian nuclear weapons program ... Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons ... (January 17) {copy} {3:20, at 0:51}.

Iran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program for close to two decades. (January 25) {copy}.

... Iran’s illegitimate pursuit of nuclear weapons ... the Iranian nuclear weapons program is a clear threat to international peace and security which is the jurisdictional threshold for the Council ... (January 31) {3:19, at 0:24, 2:49}.

... the Iranian clandestine nuclear weapons program ... (February 2) {copy} {8:19, at 1:41}.

... Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons ... seeking to develop nuclear weapons ... clear and unrelenting drive to acquire nuclear weapons ... (March 5) {28kb.pdf}.

... Iran’s nuclear weapons program ... the strategic decision that they have been pursuing these last 18 plus years of trying to acquire nuclear weapons ... their continued aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons ... its decision to acquire nuclear weapons ... The Iranian nuclear weapons program constitutes a threat to international peace and security. (March 9) {copy} {19:17, at 0:23, 14:09}.

The way to resolve the Iranian crisis is for Iran to stop its search for nuclear weapons. (March 10) {copy} {7:12, at 5:02}.

... continuing to try and acquire mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle as part of its effort to get nuclear weapons ... (March 13) {2:30, at 1:07}.

... the mistake they have made these last 18 years in trying to pursue nuclear weapons ... the Iranian nuclear weapons program ... (March 17) {5:15, at 0:57, 3:49}.

... the government of Iran that has been pursuing nuclear weapons ... attempting to ... continue to pursue nuclear weapons ... a continuing desire to get nuclear weapons that poses and has posed a threat to international peace and security ... (March 29) {copy} {7:00, at 0:00}.

... the Iranian nuclear weapons program ... (April 26) {copy}.

... the continued work that Iran is doing to acquire nuclear weapons capability ... Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons ... the Iranian nuclear weapons program ... a government that is seeking, in violation of treaty obligations, to acquire nuclear weapons ... pursuit of nuclear weapons ...the Iranian nuclear weapons program ... their pursuit of nuclear weapons ... the strategic policy that it's pursuing in trying to acquire nuclear weapons ... nuclear weapons ... the government of Iran is still pursuing uranium enrichment on behalf of their nuclear weapons program ... (April 28) {copy}.

... Iran ... the pursuit of nuclear weapons ... (May 3) {copy}.

... Iran ... their strategic decision to acquire nuclear weapons ... they continue to pursue nuclear weapons ... (May 3) {copy}.

The particular threat posed by Iran at the moment is that it is seeking a violation of its solemn treaty obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to violate that treaty and acquire nuclear weapons ... pursuit of nuclear weapons ... its 20-year clandestine effort to acquire nuclear weapons ... (May 4) {copy}.

Iran’s continued ... pursuit of weapons of mass destruction ... (May 17) {copy}.

Iran’s nuclear weapon program ... the nuclear weapon program. ... (June 6) {pf}.

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons ... pursuit of nuclear weapons ... Iran's unrelenting pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a grave and direct threat to international peace and security ... we must treat the threat they pose to our friends and allies in the region and beyond with the utmost gravity. ... (July 27) {copy, 45kb.pdf}.

Iran ... continuing its pursuit of nuclear weapons ... The pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran constitutes a direct threat to international peace and security ... Iran ... its nuclear weapons programme ... pursuit of nuclear weapons ... (July 31) {copy, meeting S/PV.5500} {U.N. video, 1:18:17, 9:07-12:48, at 9:56-11:55}.

... the entire length of the Iranian nuclear weapons program, some 18 or more years ... (July 31) {copy, stakeout} {U.N. video, 9:12, at 4:34-5:34}.”

John Robert Bolton (U.S. interim U.N. Representative, a temporary, recess, appointment, expiring with the 109th Congress).


“ John Bolton: ... pursuit of nuclear weapons ... pursuit of nuclear weapons ...

Jonathan Rugman: What Mr. Larijani — the chief nuclear negotiator for Iran — told us yesterday, was:

That Iran is not pursuing a nuclear bomb, and

That for America to even contemplate military operations is ridiculous, because America is bogged down in a quagmire in Iraq.

What’s your response to that?

John Bolton: Well I think he has a lot of interesting opinions.

Some of which are unrelated to reality.

Starting with the proposition, that they don’t have a nuclear weapons program.

Manifestly, they do have a nuclear weapons program.”

John Robert Bolton, interviewed by Jonathan Rugman (U.N. building lobby, New York City), “Ante Upped Over Iran” (Channel 4 TV, London, March 7 2006) {video, 4:43}.

And see:

Ali Larijani Interview: Jon Snow interviews Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, live in Tehran” (Channel 4 News, London, March 6 2006) {video, 10:36}.

Ali Larijani, interviewed by Amira Howeidy, “Taking Matters in Hand” (Al-Ahram Weekly, Cairo, Issue No. 791, April 20-26 2006) {pf}: “The French philosopher René Decartes said, ‘I think therefore I am.’ For the Americans it is, ‘I cause damage therefore I am.’”



If it’s “manifest.”

Then it’s:

“Clearly apparent to the sight or understanding; obvious.”

So tell us, John Bolton, liar:

We’ve spent 2,050 days in Iran (the IAEA inspectors).

Looking at every site you told us to investigate.

Just as we did in Iraq.

And we found nothing.

Just as we did in Iraq.

Where shall we now go?

John Bolton, liar.

To see this “nuclear weapons program”?

Which is so plain to see.

Here’s a correct use of that adverb:

“Manifestly,” John Bolton’s assertion is “unrelated to reality.”


See Bob lie

“ Robert G. Joseph (2006):

For almost 20 years, Iran ... a covert program aimed at nuclear weapons ... Iran’s nuclear weapons program ... its nuclear weapons ambitions ... its determined pursuit of nuclear weapons ... (February 1).

... its pursuit of nuclear weapons ... (February 5).

... their nuclear weapons aspirations ... their nuclear weapons program ... (February 6).

Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons ... its nuclear weapons ambitions ... (March 29) {31kb.pdf}.”

Robert Joseph (Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (T), U.S. Department of State).



Joseph carefully omitted to make weapons claims (subject to a 5 year prison sentence for lying), in his testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, on March 8 2006 (United States Policy Toward Iran: Next Steps).

But he makes these claims freely, elsewhere, in his speeches: AIPAC (the Israel Lobby), press briefings, Foreign Press Center.

In my opinion, this too is a crime, because he’s speaking on executive branch business, promoting public support for government policy, soliciting pressure, on Members of Congress, from the nation’s most powerful political lobby, the one that most Members of Congress depend upon, and obey, to get reelected.

But I don’t suppose any government official has ever been prosecuted for lying in such forums. I don’t recollect any, and I haven’t tried to research it. Precious few senior U.S. government officials have ever been prosecuted, even for lying to Congress, a frequent occurrence. Such lies are crimes with a political motive, and the liars are protected by a powerful political constituency.

U.S. Attorneys-General themselves (the prosecutor) are nearly always, or always, co-conspirators in U.S. government criminal enterprises involving senior U.S. government officials. And so, they don’t prosecute themselves, and the other members of their criminal conspiracies.

In addition, Joseph is inciting violent crime, preparing the public and rabble rousers for a criminal attack against Iran. And he would certainly be convicted, in that event, for his participation in that criminal conspiracy, in any later trial.

(War on suspicion is a hanging offense: The crime against peace, an international crime, with no statute of limitations. Any country in the world has authority (under international law) to try any member of the conspiracy they can manage to get their hands on, in their own courts, and to create an international tribunal for that purpose, by executive agreement with one of more other countries).

In testimony to Congress, U.S. officials refer to Iran’s weapons “capability” — not a “program” — and it’s the fuel cycle they’re talking about: It can produce low enriched fuel for light water electricity reactors (4% U-235). They claim, but have not proven, that Iran’s old design P-1 centrifuges can enrich to bomb grade (90% U-235), once they are operational (some considerable time hence).

But 3 weeks later, in his written testimony {31kb.pdf} to a Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, Joseph gets more aggressive, asserting as unassailable fact, that Iran has nuclear weapons “ambitions” and Iran is actively in a “quest” for such weapons. U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy and the Roles and Missions of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy ... Future Years Defense Program (Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Hearing, March 29 2006).

Both of these asserted facts are lies, because Joseph knows, it may not be true.

But, in testimony, Joseph stays well clear of still bolder lies, the ones he tells elsewhere, in other forums — and the wilful lies John Bolton tells — that Iran has a nuclear weapons “program.”

Wilfully asserting certain knowledge about what they know for a fact they do not know (a criminal lie, in testimony to Congress).

What Nicholas Burns does is to admit, that his assertions are suspicion. He does not assert it to be unassailable fact, as do Bolton and Joseph. But, Burns maliciously crafts such unequivocal assertions elsewhere his written statements. This, to provide the media with sound bites which Burns knows to be untrue.

Burns can defeat a criminal prosecution, by showing that his initial admission of suspicion qualified his later unequivocal assertions, taking his statement as a whole.

Well knowing, that the media is free to omit his admission and merely quote/broadcast his unequivocal assertions, if that’s what they want to do, to advance their agenda.

Hence, Burns is just as dishonest as the rest.



The Laptop

We’re told very little about the laptop.

And much of what U.S. officials have said about it is exaggerated, according to Seymour Hersh’s sources.

So, before we discuss the laptop—

Let’s first discuss another matter.

And see.

What lessons it might teach us.


Operation Merlin

“ He was a nuclear engineer who had defected to the United States years earlier and quietly settled in America. He went through the CIA’s defector resettlement program ... the CIA had arranged for the Russian to become an American citizen and had kept him on the payroll, to the tune of $5,000 (U.S.) a month. ...

Only a handful of CIA officers knew of the existence of MERLIN. ...

Within minutes of being handed the designs, he had identified a flaw. “This isn’t right,” he told the CIA officers gathered around the hotel room. “There is something wrong.”

His comments prompted stony looks, but no straight answers from the CIA men in the room. ...

After their trip to San Francisco, the case officer handed the Russian a sealed envelope with the nuclear blueprints inside ... technical designs for a TBA 480 high-voltage block, otherwise known as a “firing set,” for a Russian-designed nuclear weapon.

The Russian was told not to open the envelope under any circumstances. ...

In Vienna, the Russian ... unsealed the envelope with the nuclear blueprints and included a personal letter of his own to the Iranians. No matter what the CIA told him, he was going to hedge his bets. There was obviously something wrong with these blueprints — so he decided to mention that fact to the Iranians in a letter. They would certainly find flaws for themselves, and if he didn't tell them first, they would never want to deal with him again ...

The Russian slipped through the front door, and hurriedly shoved his envelope through the inner door slot at the Iranian office.”

James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration, Chapter 9, “A Rogue Operation” (Free Press, Simon & Schuster, New York), published January 3 2006. Excerpts quoted from:George Bush Insists that Iran Must Not Be Allowed to Develop Nuclear Weapons. So why, six years ago, did the CIA give the Iranians blueprints to build a bomb?” (Guardian, London, January 5 2006). “CIA Used A-bomb Plan as Bait: U.S. gave flawed design to Iran: Author” (Toronto Star, March 4 2006) {copy}.


Query:Only a handful of CIA officers knew”?

And what does that teach us?

That a small criminal cabal.

(e.g., Dick Cheney & Co.)

Has the resources and the capacity.

To scam the U.S. intelligence community.

And create “intelligence.”

To drive whatever agenda they desire.

So, in this case, had the Russian not been honest, and written his note to the Iranians—

This could have happened:

All in good time, the NSA would record communications, which mentioned bomb plans.

Or, a CIA asset would report a conversation about it.

Or, a journalist, or expatriate regime opponent, might report it.

Tipped-off by the cabal, with a photocopy, of part of the plans.

And then, the public chorus would commence.

That Iran has a hidden nuclear weapons program.

And the cabal?

They keep quiet.

The handful of CIA officers?

They keep quiet.

And now, the laptop:


“ In mid-July, senior American intelligence officials called the leaders of the international atomic inspection agency to the top of a skyscraper overlooking the Danube in Vienna and unveiled the contents of what they said was a stolen Iranian laptop computer.

The Americans flashed on a screen and spread over a conference table selections from more than a thousand pages of Iranian computer simulations and accounts of experiments, saying they showed a long effort to design a nuclear warhead, according to a half-dozen European and American participants in the meeting.

The documents, the Americans acknowledged from the start, do not prove that Iran has an atomic bomb. They presented them as the strongest evidence yet that, despite Iran’s insistence that its nuclear program is peaceful, the country is trying to develop a compact warhead to fit atop its Shahab missile, which can reach Israel and other countries in the Middle East.”

William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, “The Laptop: Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran's Nuclear Aims” (New York Times, November 13 2005). And see Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans: Would President Bush go to war to stop Tehran from getting the bomb?” (New Yorker, April 8 2006) {copy}.


The Iranians have not been given the opportunity to comment on this laptop.

It’s been kept secret from them.

All they know about it, is what they read in the newspapers.

The U.S. has concealed how they came to acquire this laptop.

No U.S. official has spoken about this laptop.

And its origins.

And the state of its hard drive.

Under oath.

To Congress.

At least not in a public session.

No U.S. official has spoken about it publicly.

They merely allude to it, darkly, in oblique references.

And leak tales about it, to their favorite media shills.

But, before we muse on its origins—

And whether this laptop was born and raised in the USA—

And has never been anywhere near Iran—

Let’s first assume, it’s authentic.

Designing a missile warhead is a perfectly legitimate activity.

To target Israel.

A venomous threat to Iran.

Israeli leaders, continuously, publicly, boldly, promise, they intend to attack Iran, and that’s a 100% certainty.

And, to target U.S. forces in the Middle East, their bases.

U.S. leaders publicly threaten to attack Iran, and their political proxies publicly urge such an attack.

And so, to be able to retaliate against such an attack, and thereby deter one, Iran needs an accurate missile warhead.

They want to hit what they are aiming at.

They don’t want to drop it on a Palestinian town by mistake.

And they don’t want to waste their expensive missiles.

They don’t want them to splash the sea, or on waste land, or on a residential neighborhood.

They want to hit the target.

In Israel.

Or U.S. bases, in Iraq, or Qatar, or Bahrain, or Kuwait, or Oman, or Dubai.

Israel’s nuclear weapons facilities, a Cabinet meeting (military command), Mosad intelligence headquarters, U.S./Israel air force, army, ordinance stores, or whatever it may be.

And the nations hosting U.S. bases, at the time of any U.S. attack.

Those nations, too, want Iran to hit the target.

And not miss, and hit them by mistake.

Though, if they permit the U.S. to attack Iran from their territory, or from their territory support such an attack, the host nation’s leaders, themselves, become a lawful target too.

The government officials, who made that command decision.

Whose successors (following an attack by Iran) will inherit the command authority (from their dead predecessors) to countermand that decision, and order U.S. forces to cease and desist and exit their territory.

They, anyway, hope Iran will forgive them, and target only the U.S. bases.

And not miss the U.S. bases, and hit them instead.

But why would Iran need to design missile warheads?

They bought missiles, from whomever, Russia, China, North Korea.

Surely, they wouldn’t pay all that money, if the missiles can’t hit their target.

Well, like everything else, missiles come in different models and generations, and the newer ones are better than the older ones.

The older ones are, indeed, inaccurate. See Gordon Prather, “Iran Has Nuke Warheads! Not” (Antiwar.com, November 23 2005); Gordon Prather, “Smoking Laptop” (Antiwar.com, February 11, 2006).

And, they’re expensive to buy.

And, they have to pay in foreign currency.

So, maybe the Iranians want to make their own missiles.

They can afford more that way.

Create high skilled jobs in the process.

And not have to do battle with that troublesome, elected, Iranian Parliament, which controls the use of all of Iran’s foreign currency assets.

Iran is said to have modified the missiles they bought.

Or at least they’re trying to.

To improve their accuracy.

So it’s plausible, they would be working on missile warhead designs.

U.S. officials know.

The whole rest of the world knows.

Designing missile warheads is a legitimate activity.

And so, U.S. officials announced suspicious elements, they said are on the laptop too:

“The documents specified a blast roughly 2,000 feet above a target — considered a prime altitude for a nuclear detonation.”


“A telltale sphere of detonators to trigger an atomic explosion.”

Assuming these claims are true—

And continuing to assume the laptop itself is authentic—

Where did this sophisticated computer simulation program come from?

Dealing with the physics of hypersonic speed, turbulence, heat, for a missile, reentering the earth’s dense atmosphere, at 3,750 miles per hour, from above the stratosphere, tumbling, guidance and controls, for a detachable warhead.

Based on a database of thousands, or tens of thousands, of scientific measurements, from dozens, or hundreds, of test launches, of hypersonic missiles.

Have the Iranians tested dozens, or hundreds, of hypersonic missiles?

To create this scientific database?

Did they create this computer simulation program?


From scratch?

Or is this somebody else’s program?

They acquired?

From Russia? Syria? Pakistan? China? North Korea? Egypt?

It might be a program, acquired from a nuclear weapons state, originally designed for a nuclear warhead.

Which they intended, eventually, to modify for conventional explosives.

Down the road.

After they first learned the science of hypersonic physics, how to control and target the warhead.

A missile warhead is not a nuclear weapon.

It’s merely transport, for whatever’s inside it.

Maybe they intended to do both.

Modify it to use now, but also understand how to fit a nuclear device in that warhead too.

To put on the shelf for the future.

A contingency design.

They might want to consider.

Down the road.

If the Axis of Evil (U.S./Israel) decides to go big:


“ We were prepared — as I would say at the time — to drill them back to the fourth century.”

Ace Lyons (then CinCPAC) said, about 1988 events.


“ The decision was made not to completely obliterate Iran. ... However, had things not gone well in the Gulf, I’ve no doubt that we would have put those plans into effect.”

Richard L. Armitage (then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security) said, about 1988 events.


Or, maybe it’s disinformation.

The Iranians purposely creating uncertainty, about their capabilities, to deter an attack from Israel, and the U.S.

But is the laptop authentic?

I doubt the U.S. will ever permit the Iranians, or anybody else, to see this mysterious laptop.

And certainly not examine its hard drive.

(What’s missing from a hard drive is just as diagnostic, of its authenticity, as what’s on it).

Now in U.S. hands, no one can trust anything about that hard drive, anyway.

By the time U.S. officials got done with it—

Their additions and subtractions.

No one can trust it.

Including honest U.S. intelligence analysts.

Neither what’s on it.

Nor what’s not on it.

And so, we’re unlikely to ever hear what the Iranians might have to say about it.

Since they will never get to look at it.

And that’s just the way U.S. officials like it:

Allegations, no proof.

To stir suspicions.

And preempt explanations.

If the laptop is not authentic, then a likely source is the Israelis.

But its most likely source is that exact same cabal, of U.S. officials, who created the fake plans, for an atomic bomb firing block (fuse).

They’ve got all the computer programs anybody could possibly want, which they can modify.

Including, whatever computer programs they may have gotten from Libya, who may have bought them from the A.Q. Khan network (Pakistani programs, Russian, Syrian, North Korean, Chinese, or whatever).

And, they have the expertise to make authoritative designs and such.

And, they’ve got a few hundred thousand Iranians, living down the road, there in California, to chose from, to translate into Persian, for planting on the laptop.

And all this likely kept secret, from the U.S. officials doing the talking, who may really believe it’s authentic.

“Innocent agents” of the cabal of U.S. official liars.

And kept secret, from the (fictitious?) owner of the laptop.

Who might also believe it’s genuine.

And the (fictitious?) owner’s (fictitious?) relative, who (we’re supposed to believe) gave it to the CIA.

The laptop’s (fictitious?) owner was a paid asset of the CIA and German intelligence, we’re told.

Now dead or missing.


The perfect “cut-out.”

A person who doesn’t know the origin of what he has.

And, being dead or missing, can’t be asked about it.

Little wonder, the laptop is viewed through the lens of the Niger uranium documents.

“A forgery,” Mohamed ElBaradei declared them to be.

As every intelligence agency had likewise declared them to be, long before the U.S. finally gave them to Mohamed ElBaradei.

You put all this in the stew.

And what have you got?

“Evidence,” which is not merely insubstantial and not persuasive.

Its authenticity is highly suspect, as well.

Not least, because it cannot be examined, by independent experts.

More likely than not—




There is merely “some” evidence.

Andrei Denisov said.

But only about intentions:

What Iran might do in the future.

And mainly, merely “suspicions,” even about intentions.

They have no evidence about any actual nuclear weapons program.

Intentions are not a treaty violation.

And the U.N. Security Council has no legal authority to amend the NPT treaty to deprive Iran of its treaty rights, based on such intentions.

Even if the U.S. accusers could prove intentions.

Which they cannot prove.

Likewise, a nuclear weapons “capability” is not a treaty violation.

Yes, mastering the uranium fuel cycle, empowers the master, to enrich to bomb grade (90% U-235).

If that’s what they want to do.

At some future time.

If their centrifuge technology is up to the task.

Or if they could, over time, improve it for that task.

And yes, given the time, the money, and the political will, the master could also learn to make a uranium bomb.

And yes, they could eventually make it small enough (2,000 pounds), with all the shielding, high explosives, and hardware that goes with it, to fit in a warhead for Iran’s missiles.

A warhead to survive hypersonic heat and buffeting, plunging down, from above the stratosphere, at Mach 5 (3750 mph).

And yes, they could eventually design a robust fuse (a milli-second switch, a ground-approach radar, a computer, or whatever it may be), to explode it, at the right height above the ground, despite that speed (5,500 feet per second, 5.5 feet per millisecond).

(The first uranium bomb (Hiroshima), dropped by parachute, weighed 9,700 pounds, with 64.1 kilograms of 80% enriched uranium U-235, fused with an altimeter switch, exploding about 2000 feet above the ground).

And yes, all these “could be”s add up to a very useful deterrent, against bellicose rogue states, like the U.S. and Israel.

But what “could be” is not a treaty violation.

And what “could be” is not a threat to international peace and security.

As for suspicions — about what “is” as oposed to what “could be” — we convicted Germans, of crimes, for taking serious action, based on mere suspicions.

And so, sanctions and demands, based on suspicions are plainly unlawful, the very antithesis of the rule of law.

The U.N. Security Council cannot establish, based on mere suspicions, a threat to international peace and security.

And for that reason, the Security Council has no jurisdiction to issue a binding resolution.

And no member nation, of the United Nations, would have any legal obligation, to obey any such unlawful Security Council resolution.

Will Iran now file suit in the U.N. International Court of Justice? Against the IAEA and U.N. Security Council? For a declaratory judgment to that effect? Seeking a preliminary injunction (“provisional measures”), to suspend the demands of both bodies, pending argument and decision on the merits?

A 3-year delay, more or less.

A cream pie, in the U.S. face.

This delay would coincide, with the time remaining, to the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld-Rice regime (January 20 2009).

Unless U.S. voters do their duty.

On November 7 2006.

And elect a Congress.

To impeach them first.

For their “high crimes and misdemeanors” (U.S. Constitution, article II § 4).

(H. Res. 635 U.S. Congress 109-1, December 18 2005).



Power v. Law


“ Hans Blix {1:35}: It is not something that is—

Where we are in a hurry.

I think there is time for talks.

And I think it’s somewhat worrisome that—

While the matters were still in the IAEA, there was a question of urging Iran, to suspend it’s enrichment program—

As soon as it gets to the Security Council, it’s a question of ordering Iran, under Chapter 7, which is binding for member states.

James Naughtie: Indeed.

And that Chapter 7 reference is going to be the moment, when the whole tenor of this argument changes.

Isn’t it.

Hans Blix: Yes.

But no one mentions, that under the U.N. Charter, you just can’t go ahead and order a member state to do anything.

I don’t think the Council could turn to Brazil {copy}, and say:

“You must stop your enrichment {pf} program.”

Or Japan.

The condition, for such a binding decision, is that the Council characterizes the situation as a threat to international peace and security.

That’s the basis.

And can one say, that the Iranian enrichment of a gram, or less than a gram, of uranium, up to 3.5%, constitutes a threat — today — to international peace and security?

Or is there time for further talk.”

Hans Blix (Chairman, WMD Commission; Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC, March 1 2000-2003 June 30; IAEA Director General, 1981-1997), interviewed by James Naughtie (BBC Radio 4, Today, May 2 2006, 8:45-8:50 a.m.) {BBCCat 06sx0724}, audio {4:33}.


So the issue is now plain.

Does the U.N. Security Council have jurisdiction (“competence,” legal authority), to declare a threat to the peace” (U.N. Charter, chapter 7, article 39)—

If a nation enriches uranium, under IAEA Safeguards—

For a legitimate and lawful commercial purpose—

To fuel and refuel 20 electricity plants (5% U-235)—

And, in future, to export under IAEA safeguards—

A legitimate activity, which an international treaty regime was created, explicitly, to encourage and facilitate—

Because that nation could, at some future time, secretly replicate that enrichment process, elsewhere, and improve it, to produce bomb grade enriched uranium (90% U-235).

Which all 5 permanent members of the U.N. Security Council themselves have done, and possess, and declare to be perfectly legal, and not a “threat to the peace,” in their hands.

Is this a “threat”?

Within the meaning of the U.N. Charter?

Is a hypothetical threat a “threat”?

A threat which does not now exist.

And may never exist.



Here’s the normal test, on an issue of opinion, about facts:

Can a reasonable person, properly informed, reasonably form that opinion?

If not, the Security Council does not have jurisdiction, to assert that opinion (in the form of a resolution, purporting to bind all member states to obey), because that supposed opinion is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical.

If so, the Security Council does have jurisdiction, to adopt a binding resolution, based on that asserted opinion.

And that resolution becomes binding on all U.N. member states, if 9 or more Council members vote “yes” and if, among those voting “no” (if any), is not one or more of the permanent 5 members (China, France, Russia, U.K., U.S.) (a “veto”).

And a court will not substitute its opinion for that of the Security Council.

Absent a showing, that one or more of the “yes” votes was procured by fraud (bullying, bribery, by the U.S., for example).

Or that the asserted opinion was not an honest opinion, by one of the members voting “yes,” but rather a feigned opinion, a deceit. (A dishonest opinion is a state of mind and hence hard to prove, even on a preponderance of the evidence, “more likely than not.” But it’s not impossible to prove, by confessions, informers, electronic intercepts, secret recordings, memos, for example).

Although it appears to violate the U.N. Charter (article 27(3)), the U.N. I.C.J. (International Court of Justice) has nevertheless held, that the Charter does not require a “yes” vote, from all 5 permanent members, because that provision is slightly ambiguous, and “for a long period the voluntary abstention of a permanent member has consistently been interpreted as not constituting a bar to the adoption of resolutions by the Security Council.” South-West Africa Case, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (1971) {I.C.J. summary of ¶¶ 19-41 of its opinion}.

Hence, absent a “no” vote from one of them, a resolution will pass, with 9 votes, even if one or more of the permanent members abstains (doesn’t vote, one way or the other).



But this issue of “threat” is not a mere question of fact.

It’s a mixed question of fact and law.

The Security Council is master of the facts.

But the U.N. I.C.J. is master of the law.

And so, the U.N. I.C.J. itself has jurisdiction, to decide what is the meaning of “threat” in the U.N. Charter, as a matter of law, for itself to decide (without reference to any particular supposed facts), and not a matter of opinion, for the Security Council to decide.

Everything in life is a “threat.”

A comet is a “threat.”

Orbiting now, at the outer limits of the solar system.

Yes, it could collide with Earth, one day.

An automobile is a “threat.”

Yes, tens of thousands of people are killed, each year, by automobiles.

Yes, automobiles melt glaciers.

As master of the law, of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. I.C.J. has jurisdiction to decide, that a hypothetical, future, threat, is not a “threat” within the meaning of the U.N. Charter.

Because it’s hypothetical.

Even our worrisome comet—

And our dangerous automobiles—

They exist.

But not a hypothetical threat.

It does not now exist.

It may never exist.

It’s too remote.

Too uncertain.

Too speculative.

To constitute a “threat.”

As that term was generally understood.

At the time the U.N. Charter was adopted.

And in the present time.

The U.N. I.C.J. might well decide.

As a matter of law.

If suspicion, for example, about existing facts, is an unlawful basis for serious action—

Then, surely too, speculation, about future facts—

Which do not now exist, and may never exist—

That speculation is, likewise, an even more unlawful basis, for serious action, such as a binding resolution.

The U.N. I.C.J. might well decide.

As a matter of law.

Serious action.

A binding Security Council resolution, to put a member state out of business.

A business that member state has invested hundreds of millions of dollars to develop.

As part of a very important, energy and economic plan.

A business thousands of families depend upon, for their livelihood.

A business affecting the well being, and economic health, of many generations to come.

Based on such an opinion, about the law of the Charter, the U.N. I.C.J. has jurisdiction, legal authority, to overturn a Security Council resolution, premised on such a hypothetical threat, a mere speculation.

As a mistake of law, on the part of the Security Council.

But, “Oh,” you might say to yourself.

“This is only temporary.”

“This is not a serious matter.”

“To order Iran to suspend it’s enrichment activities.”

“As soon as IAEA is satisfied, that no nuclear weapons activities are afoot, in Iran, that order will be revoked.”

“Just like our sanctions against Saddam were to be.”

“As soon as Saddam proved, he had no weapons of mass destruction programs.”

I rest my case.

The many initiatives, to revoke 12 years of sanctions against Saddam, they were all blocked by the U.S., a threatened veto.

The IAEA can never assert satisfaction (beyond reasonable doubt), that something does not exist.

But, the IAEA can assert satisfaction, that no evidence exists, of any violation of the treaty, despite a diligent, proactive, effort by the IAEA to discover that evidence.

Even if the IAEA did so, a decade hence, the U.S. could nevertheless veto the proposed resolution, to revoke the order, and permit Iran to resume enrichment.

Yes, the U.N. Charter requires all member states, to act “in good faith.”

But the U.S. has rarely acted “in good faith,” in the U.N. Security Council, certainly not, in recent decades.



Based on 2,050 days of intrusive, IAEA inspections—

Iran does not have a nuclear weapons “program.”

Iran does not have nuclear weapons “ambitions.”

Iran does not “quest” for nuclear weapons.

Though — as in any country — there are likely some, without leadership responsibilities, who want such weapons (if they don’t have to pay for it themselves), and wish their leaders would change their mind, and do it.

A whole lot of people, paid a whole lot of money, tried as hard as they could, to prove it.

Because their livelihoods and careers depend on demonizing Iran.

And because, their reputations depend on it.

Because they have endlessly asserted the unassailable fact, that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

To admiring audiences.

They failed.

Because, what they are trying to prove is apparently not true.

Iran is not seeking a nuclear weapons “capability.”

As U.S. official liars assert.

In their very slippery testimony to Congress, and public statements.

But this is an unassailable fact:

Iran now has nuclear weapons “capability.”

(Even though that’s not what they are “seeking”).

Because Iran is now master, of the nuclear fuel cycle.

They can enrich uranium.

In the future, Iran’s leaders could change their mind, and create a nuclear weapons program, if they wanted to.

Though, being religious, moral, and very, very, rational, they would first have to square that change of mind with their firm, rational, opinion — which they often pronounce — that nuclear weapons are criminal and immoral.

And so, the U.S. simply wants to enleague the U.N. Security Council, as a tool, to punish Iran for what “could be.”

At some distant time in the future.

An abortion, to be on the safe side: Some fetuses will grow up to be criminals, but you don’t know which ones. The would be Mozarts, the would be Hitlers: “Kill them all.”

But, in this case, the baby is born already.

So it’s murder.

Pure and simple.

A tool, to preserve a cartel.

A cartel, to supply electricity plant fuel.

A cartel, to deny vast populations of the world, nuclear electricity plants.

A tool, to give George W. Bush, the credibility he now lacks, to issue an order to the U.S. military, to attack Iran, without consent of Congress, “to deter ... threats.”

Were the U.N. Security Council ever to agree, that Iran’s nuclear program poses a “threat,” to international peace and security.

A tool, to force on Iran, without its consent, a reservation to the NPT, to deny Iran its treaty right, to fuel enrichment.

A tool, to put Iran out of the electricity plant business.

A supreme irony.

An enrichment program Iran would never have started in the first place, but for the relentless, continuous, U.S. violation of the NPT treaty, threatening and punishing countries and their nationals’s businesses, who wanted to supply Iran with nuclear electricity plants, parts, and fuel, Iran had already paid for.

All items the NPT treaty permitted, and promised, Iran was entitled to have.

First, you violate the treaty, to make them start (enrichment).

A treaty violation, the U.S. owes Iran billions and billions of dollars, in damages for.

Now, you violate the treaty, to make them stop.

More billions and billions of dollars, in damages.

Why do people hate the United States of America?



What the U.S. wants from the U.N. Security Council is, of course, illegal, and unenforceable in any court, not least the U.N.’s own court, the International Court of Justice, in the Hague.

And this, presumably, is why George W. Bush appointed John Robert Bolton, to be U.S. interim U.N. Representative, a recess appointment, when the Senate refused to vote on his nomination.

John Bolton is a bold, audacious, unflinching, liar.

John Bolton never misses an opportunity to assert — with the TV cameras and tape recorders rolling — that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

The Big Lie.

The Big Lie has no influence on members of the U.N. Security Council.

They all well know, John Bolton is a liar.

But the public believe the Big Lie.

Because it’s big:

A government official says it.

With no equivocation.

No “if”s. No “and”s. No “but”s.

Because it’s official, that deceit resonates.


As many voices repeat the lie.

Instead of questioning it.

The public are too busy, to question the big lie.

The public have no means, to investigate the big lie.

And when people paid to question it, and paid to investigate it, on behalf of the public, don’t do their jobs (Congress, the press, the broadcast media)—

That confirms the big lie is true.

And so, the U.S. government conspiracy to lie.

Fronted by John Bolton, but assisted by others.

To prepare the U.S. public for war.

To enable Members of Congress to pretend to believe the Big Lie.

John Bolton, and his conspirators, assert to be unassailable fact, that Iran has a nuclear weapons program (a would-be violation of the NPT treaty).

Because they know — on the actual facts — they wouldn’t get a single vote, on the U.N. Security Council, except their own, and those they can bully, bribe, and sway.

And, without that lie for cover, they will also lose many votes in the U.S. Congress.

Assuming Bush would risk to consult Congress — which he asserts he has no obligation to do — before ordering the U.S. military to attack, “to deter ... threats.”

An assertion which would gain great gravitas, he would loudly proclaim, the instant the U.N. Security Council declares, Iran’s nuclear program is a “threat.”

Nearly all U.S. military commanders are likely willing, to commit the violent crime of obeying Bush’s orders.

But not likely, if Congress voted against those orders.

Some few officers might not obey those orders, without a vote in Congress, because without that vote, Bush’s orders to attack Iran are patently unlawful, a plain violation of the U.S. constitution.

With a vote in Congress, an attack on Iran is still a patent international crime against peace, but most U.S. military officers would likely still do it, comforted, that all those Members of Congress voting “yea” would keep military officers company, in the dock, at a later trial.

And on the gallows, at the public executions, which follow.

There being no evidence, how many members of the Security Council will vote in favor of any U.S. resolution for sanctions, or war?

A purported repeal of the rule of law.

And which members would vote for this?

This pronouncement, that there is no law in international affairs, only power, abuse, blackmail, violence.

Here, the U.S. strategy is significant.

The U.N. Security Council has no jurisdiction to issue a binding resolution about every day affairs.

Only about threats to international peace and security.

And so the first U.S. task is to create a threat.

Enter John Bolton.

The lead U.S. liar.

Endlessly asserting the lie, that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

But that lie alone is not sufficient to constitute a threat.

Iran has not invaded a neighbor for 250 years.

And so a second lie is necessary:

That Iran wants to attack Israel (“wipe Israel off the map”).

But this is an aggressive mistranslation of what Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said, by the New York Times, which has not learned the lesson, its editors later claimed they learned, when they likewise aggressively reported equally false “facts,” which stoked the fires of war, against Iraq.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has no legal authority, and no command authority, over Iran’s foreign policy, over Iran’s military, and certainly not over a decision for Iran to wage war.

But there’s, anyway, an innocent explanation, for a faithful translation (which the mainstream media ignores), of that 1979 historical rhetoric, by the Islamic Republic’s founding father, which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quoted, in his speech.

And this faithful translation, and explanation, will — eventually — make an appearance, in the mainstream {pf} media.

Provoking a storm, of public fury, at being lied to.

Yet again.

And yet again, by the New York Times, home of the largest Jewish population on earth, outside Israel.

Unless the New York Times editors correct their false translation, themselves, and make a prominent — page-1 — apology, long before the U.S. attacks Iran, citing the New York Times translation, as justification (concealing their own, secret, FBIS-BBC Monitoring accurate translation). Preserving their original translation, an historical record, to explain the hundreds of thousands of quotations, of the New York Times translation.

So, a third lie is necessary, to counter the innocent explanation:

That Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism against Israel.

But this terrorism charge, too, is fallacious.

Iran’s support for various Palestinian groups (in common with other nations, like Saudi Arabia) is prima facie lawful.

Because what those groups do is not clearly unlawful.

Indeed, what they do appears plainly lawful:

They resist the Israeli military occupation, and theft, of Palestinian territory, an occupation the United States, and all organs of the United Nations, have declared to be unlawful, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the International Court of Justice.

And, they attack innocent Israeli civilians, as an international countermeasure, to the unlawful killing by Israelis, of innocent Palestinian civilians (a 4-to-1 kill ratio).

And a like ratio of maimed and wounded.

An eye for an eye.

A lawful act of self-defense under the laws of peace, and a lawful attack under the laws of war, firmly recognized, for centuries, in the laws of war, including the U.S. Army Field Manual on The Law of Land Warfare:


“ 497. Reprisals

a. Definition. Reprisals are acts of retaliation in the form of conduct which would otherwise be unlawful, resorted to by one belligerent {Palestinian suicide bombers} against enemy personnel or property for acts of warfare committed by the other belligerent {Israel} in violation of the law of war, for the purpose of enforcing future compliance with the recognized rules of civilized warfare. ...

b. Priority of Other Remedies. Other means of securing compliance with the law of war should normally be exhausted before resort is had to reprisals. ... Even when appeal to the enemy for redress has failed, it may be a matter of policy to consider, before resorting to reprisals, whether the opposing forces are not more likely to be influenced by a steady adherence to the law of war on the part of their adversary. ...

d. When and How Employed. Reprisals are never adopted merely for revenge, but only as an unavoidable last resort to induce the enemy to desist from unlawful practices. ... commanding officers must assume responsibility for retaliative measures when an unscrupulous enemy leaves no other recourse against the repetition of unlawful acts.

e. Form of Reprisal. The acts resorted to by way of reprisal need not conform to those complained of by the injured party, but should not be excessive or exceed the degree of violence committed by the enemy.”

The Law of Land Warfare {10.3mb.pdf/txt, source}, ¶ 497 (“Reprisals”), pages 177-178 (U.S. Army, Field Manual 27-10, July 18 1956, and amendment dated July 15 1976) {SuDoc: D 101.20:27-10, ditto, LCCN: 56062174, OCLC: 39027139, GPOCat, WorldCat} (boldface and box added, quoted in full here), accord, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, paragraphs 16.16-16.19, chapter 16 (“Enforcement of the Law of Armed Conflict”), section F (“Reprisals”) (U.K. Ministry of Defense, July 1 2004).


“ 27. The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized nations acknowledge retaliation as the sternest feature of war. A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage.

28. Retaliation will therefore never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and moreover cautiously and unavoidably — that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence and the character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.

Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.”

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, ¶¶ 27-28 (U.S. War Department, “General Orders, No. 100,” Washington D.C., April 24 1863) {LCCN: 10010408, OCLC: 6647087, uc, gwu, WorldCat}, reprinted, The War of the Rebellion {html}, series-3, volume-3 {html} (“Series III--Volume III”) (volume number 124), pages 1 {html} (“Correspondence, Orders, Reports, and Returns of the Union Authorities from January 1 to December 31, 1863”), 148-164 {html: 148-164}, at 151 {html, 70kb.pdf, 186kb.gif} (U.S. Congress 56-1, House Doc. 287, 1899) {SuDoc: W 45.5:V.124, Serial Set: 3964, source, list} (the “Lieber Code”) {source, copy, copy, copy}.


“ Headquarters Cavalry Command,
Army of Invasion.
In the Field, S.C., February 22, 1865.

Major-General Wheeler,
Commanding, C.S. Cavalry:

General: Yesterday a lieutenant and seven men and a sergeant of a battery were taken prisoners by one of your regiments — if I am correctly informed, a Texas regiment — armed with Spencer carbines and commanded by a lieutenant-colonel.

This officer and his men, after surrendering and being disarmed, were inhumanly and cowardly murdered.

Nine of my cavalrymen were also found murdered yesterday, five in a barn-yard, three in an open field, and one in the road. Two had their throats cut from ear to ear.

This makes in all eighteen Federal soldiers murdered yesterday by your people.

Unless some satisfactory explanation be made to me before sundown, February 23, I will cause eighteen of your soldiers, now my prisoners to be shot at that hour.

And if this cowardly act be repeated, if my people when taken are not treated in all cases as prisoners of war should be, I will not only retaliate as I have already mentioned, but there shall not be a house left standing within reach of my scouting parties along my line of march, nor will I be responsible for the conduct of my soldiers, who will not only be allowed but encouraged to take a fearful revenge.

I know of no other way to intimidate cowards.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. Kilpatrick,
Brevet Major-General, Commanding Cavalry.”

SuWho? SuDoc Serial Set

Letter dated February 22 1865, J. Kilpatrick (U.S. Army) to J. Wheeler (C.S. Army), printed, The War of the Rebellion {html}, series-1, volume-47 (“Series I--Volume XLVII--In Three Parts”), part-1 {html} (“Part I--Reports”) (volume number 98), pages 1 {html} (“Operations in North Carolina (From February 1), South Carolina, Southern Georgia, and East Florida, January 1--June 30, 1865”), 860 {html, 72kb.pdf, 188kb.gif} (U.S. Congress 54-1, House Doc. 37/1, 1895) {SuDoc: W 45.5:V.98, Serial Set: 3409, source, list}.

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies {html} (U.S. War Department, 1880-1901, 129 volumes, 138,579 pages) {SuDoc: W 45.5, Serial Set: (list), LCCN: 03003452, OCLC: 00427057, DL, WorldCat}.



This indeed, and ironically so, is the only legal basis for the use of otherwise criminal weapons, like U.S. nuclear weapons.

(Apart from military targets at sea, like Diego Garcia, and war-ships, isolated and distant from a civilian population, posing no prospect of poisoning land, provided the aerisol poisons are also unlikely to reach land: “fallout”).

Israel declares it’s in a state of war with the Palestinians, and justify their targeted assassinations on that basis.

So the law declared in the U.S. Army Field Manual applies.

But peace or war, the lawful objective is the same:

To deter an opponent from future unlawful attacks.

And so the high decibel declarations, by U.S. and European officials, and their obeisant media, that Hamas, for example, is a terrorist group—

This is nothing more than a mere argument.

With the volume turned up.

To silence critics.

A poor argument.

An argument any court would likely dismiss.

And in any event, very far from a settled issue, necessary to justify any claim, that Hamas et al. are terrorists and, hence, that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorists.



In the unlikely event John Bolton is right, about his first lie (a nuclear weapons program), he doesn’t know it. Hence, John Bolton’s assertions are a “lie,” a willful, malicious, lie about his certainty, asserting to be an unassailable fact what he in fact knows he does not know.

Indeed, John Bolton may not even suspect such a program exists, in his actual honest opinion.

And I never thought I would use the word “honest” and John Bolton in the same sentence.

John Bolton is a man without moral character.

He is attempting to drive the U.S. goal to stop Iran’s fuel cycle, no matter how harmless it may be.

John Bolton lies with the full approval of all those acting together with him in the U.S. government conspiracy to lie.

Not least John Bolton’s two masters, Condoleezza Rice and George W. Bush, who have the power and authority to require him to cease and desist.

If that’s what they wanted him to do.

And remove him from office, if he won’t obey.

The purpose of John Bolton’s lie — on behalf of his co-conspirators, Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush & Co. — is to provide cover, an excuse, for the vast audience who share the goal, but not the methods.

Many people do not wish to be seen to be associating with liars, violent criminals, hoodlums, thugs, and other species of despicable gangs.

John Bolton’s lie empowers this vast audience, to pretend they believe John Bolton’s lie (because he’s a government official, privy to all those intelligence secrets).

They can repeat John Bolton’s lie, as unassailable fact, that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, if that’s what they want to do.

John Bolton’s lie empowers them to pretend to feel justified to repeat his lie.

And this is exactly what Members of Congress do.

Except for a very few, courageous, Members.

Like Ron Paul (Member, House Committee on International Relations), “Iran: The Next Neocon Target,” 152 Congressional Record H1555-H1559 {pf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:42, April 5 2006) {40kb.txt, 81kb.pdf} {copy} {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/42}, video (42:42). Ron Paul, “Agreeing to Talk to Iran Unconditionally,” 152 Congressional Record H4498 {pf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:82, June 22 2006) {5kb.txt, 44kb.pdf} {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/82}. Ron Paul, “Why Are the American People So Angry?” 152 Congressional Record H4905-H4911 {pf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:87, June 29 2006) {54kb.txt, 149kb.pdf} {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/87}, video (54:40). Ron Paul “Sanctions against Iran” (Ron Paul’s Texas Straight Talk, April 17 2006) {copy}.

Like Dennis J. Kucinich (Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform), “A Nation Permanently At War,” 152 Congressional Record H1066 {pf} {2kb.txt, 44kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:34, March 16 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/34}. And see: Dennis J. Kucinich, “Kucinich Demands Answers From Administration About U.S. Troops in Iran: Sends Letter to the President” (April 14 2006) {pf}, “Letter to President Bush,” 152 Congressional Record E723 {4kb.txt, 55kb.pdf}. “Kucinich Questions the President on U.S. Trained Insurgents in Iran: Sends Letter to President Bush” (April 18 2006) {pf}, “April 18, 2006 Letter to President Bush,” 152 Congressional Record E726 {5kb.txt, 55kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:52, May 4 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/52}, “War With Iran Not Inevitable,” 152 Congressional Record H3024 {pf} {2kb.txt, 46kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:65, May 23 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/65}.

And it’s what anonymous editorial writers do too, for the New York Times (quoted above) and, among others, the Washington Post:


“ ... its pursuit of nuclear weapons ... Iran’s bomb ambitions ...”

Editorial (anonymous), “A Faltering Coalition: While U.N. Security Council nations waffle, Iran’s nuclear program proceeds” {pf} (Washington Post, April 2 2006).


“ While the diplomacy drags on, Iran’s race for a bomb will continue.”

Editorial (anonymous), “Back to the Security Council: Iran says it won’t heed a U.N. resolution — but that’s not the point” {pf} (Washington Post, May 2 2006).


“ Because Iran has natural uranium supplies and the technological know-how to convert uranium into bomb fuel, the only conceivable long-term solution is to somehow persuade Iranian leaders that they have more to lose from building nuclear weapons than from not building them.”

Editorial (anonymous), “Recipe for a Perfect Crisis” (New York Times, April 15 2006).


Query:Persuade Iranian leaders”?

Of what they persuaded themselves about?

Decades ago?

How about this:

Let’s persuade American leaders.

To pay attention.

To the evidence.

That Iran is producing electricity plant fuel (3.5-5% U-235 enriched).

Not “bomb fuel” (90%).

The lack of evidence, of any bomb program.

Let’s persuade American leaders.

To stop their psychotic behavior.

Attempting to create facts.

By endless assertions.

Supported by no evidence.

Let’s persuade American leaders.

To accept Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle accomplishment.

And get over it.

Get used to it.

Support the IAEA inspectors.

And let the music play.

And let’s vote out of office.

On November 7 2006.

Every last psychotic Member of Congress.

And that’s a big number.



As for reporters/editors, many of them omit to mention any facts which challenge the U.S. assertions. Their articles probe various aspects of the dispute on the assumption, an unstated premise, that the assertions are true.

Other reporters/editors sometimes report Iran’s denials, but they use the standard deceit technique the BBC World Service adopts, when covertly selling the propaganda of their paymaster, the British Foreign Office. (I attribute dishonesty, and this motive, to BBC News, when they do this, because they are very competent to report properly, when they want to, and because they keep quiet about things they would normally probe and report, like the mysterious vote count, for the first Iraq election):

They report that Iran denies the charges, but they give their readers no information for assessing the basis of the denials, or the charges, and their relative credibility.

Like this:


“ Iran says its nuclear program, which has now been referred to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions, is aimed only at generating electricity, an assertion that is openly disbelieved by governments in Europe and the United States.”

Richard Bernstein (Berlin), “Germans Say 6 Companies Sold Nuclear Parts to Iran Network” (New York Times, March 29 2006).


This amounts to proof, for that segment of the audience who believe the propaganda. Or pretend to believe it. Or want to believe it.

Because if there were any basis for the denials, that would be reported.

By an honest media. A competent media.

The small segment of the audience who know better, they are left to sit and fume, a strong inducement to political apathy.

And for the rest, those with an open mind, they are left in continued uncertainty, inclined by their bias to accept the propaganda of their government, disinclined, for want of evidence, to speak out.

Exactly what the propagandists want:


“ ... it would create doubt in the public mind.”

Richard Nixon to H.R. Haldeman (Oval Office, October 15 1972), Nixon Oval Office tape recording, quoted in Ken Ringle, “Still Bugged By Nixon: Archives Releases More Watergate Tapes” {pf} (Washington Post, December 11 2003).


Doubt takes the bulk of the population out of play.

They are too unsure of their ground to speak up.

They can’t prove it’s not true.

Their silence is appropriated, as support, by the proponents for action.

Like this:


“ I made 11 trips to Europe and to the Middle East in the last year on this issue.

And in the hundreds of conversations that I had with Russians, Chinese, Indians, Europeans, not a single person — not a single official from any of those governments — ever said that they doubted that Iran was trying to seek a nuclear weapons capability.

There is no international difference of opinion. There is no debate around the world about the essential fact of what Iran is trying to do.

And that does inform our diplomacy and our national strategy.”

R. Nicholas Burns (under secretary for political affairs (P), U.S. Department of State), testimony, United States Policy Toward Iran: Next Steps (U.S. Congress 109-2, House International Relations Committee, Hearing, March 8 2006), accord, R. Nicholas Burns, prepared statement {108kb.pdf}.


Query:A nuclear weapons capability”?

Based on the evidence:

Iran is “trying to seek a nuclear” “capability.”

Not “a nuclear weapons capability.”

As you relentlessly assert.

To be an unassailable fact.


Let’s see if I understand this:

What they didn’t say.

About what they don’t know.

Proves ...

that what they don’t know ...

is a “fact.”

Holy Mackerel.


In Washington D.C.

With the means, to destroy all life on earth.



But here’s a pleasant surprise:

A few reporters sometimes counter these lies.

They report information, which enables readers to assess the competing claims, to assign the burden of proof.

These reporters ground their reports in the facts.

Like this:


“ Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Andrei Denisov, conceded ... there is still no hard evidence ...

The IAEA ... acknowledges ... it cannot prove Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.”

Colum Lynch, “Security Council Pressures Tehran: Iran Is Urged to Halt Uranium Enrichment” {pf} (Washington Post, March 30 2006).


“ Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov ... seemed to question the evidence that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons under cover of a civilian atomic energy program.

“Before we call any situation a threat, we need facts, especially in a region like the Middle East, where so many things are happening,”

he said.”

Warren P. Strobel, “Russia, China oppose Iran sanctions” (Knight Ridder, March 30 2006).


This is a very welcome improvement.

A professional discipline, which few reporters/editors observed ahead of the U.S. attack on Iraq (March 17 2003).

And few reporters/editors observe now.

All reporters/editors should now follow these examples, in every such article, as a standard caveat.

And, there are other authoritative caveats:


“ Jonathan Karl (ABC News): You alluded to the fact that the administration has gone around to members of IAEA, and Security Council, with a, you know, classified briefing —

This is what the case basically against Iran.

The case they have a nuclear weapons program.

Are you saying you don’t think that they’ve made the case effectively?

And what do you mean by disinformation?

Jane F. Harman: ... The issue is how capable are they, and what are the real intentions of Iran’s leaders?

And I think the jury’s out on both of those.

So, at any rate, I and some others — but it was my request — were briefed in a classified setting, on the material that the U.S. is shopping around.

And all I’m saying is, I remain skeptical.

Lots of unanswered questions and conjecture that I have is that—

If I were Iran, and I wanted to put out disinformation, it might look a lot like what our government is claiming is information.

And I can’t tell you that’s true.

But I can’t tell you it’s not true.

And I want to be absolutely sure, that we base decisions, especially tough decisions like what are the next steps with Iran — and I surely hope they are diplomatic because I think those are our best options — on pristine and pure intelligence, or the closest we can get to that.”

Jane F. Harman (Ranking Minority Member, House Permanent Select Committe on Intelligence), “Intelligence Support to the Military” (Council on Foreign Relations, panel discussion, Washington D.C., April 4 2006, FNS transcript, 12:30 p.m.).


“ Chris Wallace: Congressman, how close is Iran to actually developing a nuclear weapon?

Or don’t we really know?

Pete Hoekstra: I’d say we really don’t know. ...

Chris Wallace: But, Chairman Hoekstra—

I mean—

Almost everyone agrees.

This is the major foreign policy issue, or challenge, facing this country today.

And you’re saying, we really don’t know? What’s going on in Tehran?

Pete Hoekstra: Hey, sometimes it’s better to be honest, and to say, there’s a whole lot we don’t know about Iran, that I wish we did know.

And we, as public policymakers, need to know that — as we’re moving forward, and as decisions are being made on Iran — we don’t have all of the information that we would like to have.

And that’s nothing more than being honest.

Being honest with the American people.

Of saying, in some of this stuff, we wish we had the information.

But right now we don’t.

Chris Wallace: Congresswoman Harman, you’ve also been quite critical.

You say the information we have on Iran is thin.

You’ve said some of it may be, in fact, Iranian disinformation.

How can we be talking about what to do?

How soon to do it?

The possibility of military strikes?

If we really are that much in the dark?

Jane F. Harman: Well, I hope the White House is listening to what Pete Hoekstra just said.

We don’t know.

Our intelligence is thin.

I don’t think we have enough sources.

I don’t think our analysis is sharp enough.

I’m not comfortable that, even if we knew more, that the White House would be listening clearly to the intelligence case.

They apparently did not in Iraq.

It was not a very strong case.

But those who tried to speak truth to power were shut out.

This is not a time to be saber-rattling, in our government, talking about the military option.

We don’t know enough.

And my view is, at our peril, we risk any good outcome, if we don’t join with the world — especially China and Russia — and try to help the U.N., or at least the group of concerned nations, isolate Iran, if we don’t have full transparency into its nuclear capabilities.

Just the fact that the Iranian government is making a lot of noise doesn’t prove their capability.

Remember, the Iraqi government made a lot of noise, and they had nothing.”

Peter Hoekstra (Chairman), Jane F. Harman (Ranking Minority Member), House Permanent Select Committe on Intelligence, interviewed by Chris Wallace, House Intel Leaders on 'FNS' (FOX News Sunday With Chris Wallace, April 23 2006, 9:00 a.m.), FNS transcript.

And see, Jack Straw’s statements (then U.K. Foreign Secretary): “We don’t know for certain, that they are moving towards the development of a nuclear weapons system ... it’s the working assumption, of everybody.” (March 13 2006). “Let’s be clear. There is no smoking gun. There is no Casus Belli. We can’t be certain about Iran’s intentions. And that is, therefore, not a basis on which anybody would gain authority to go for military action.” (April 9 2006).


Yes, space is a premium in newspapers.

Yes, reporters/editors are pressured by deadlines.

Yes, you can’t write a book, to retell the whole story, each time you report new facts.

But here, extreme violence is threatened.

And sanctions, a double-edged sword.

And for these reasons:

Yes, you must make space for caveats.

In each and every story.

   Charles Judson Harwood Jr., April 8 2006



Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans: Would President Bush go to war to stop Tehran from getting the bomb?” (New Yorker, April 17 2006, posted April 10) {copy}.

Paul Krugman, “Yes He Would” (New York Times, April 10 2006) {copy, copy}: “Current polls suggest that the Democrats could take one or both houses of Congress this November, acquiring the ability to launch investigations backed by subpoena power. This could blow the lid off multiple Bush administration scandals. ... an appropriately timed military strike could change the domestic political dynamics. ... Given the combination of recklessness and dishonesty Mr. Bush displayed in launching the Iraq war, why should we assume that he wouldn’t do it again?”

And see Seymour M. Hersh, interviewed by Amy Goodman, transcript, Seymour Hersh: Bush Administration Planning Possible Major Air Attack on Iran” (Democracy Now!, April 12 2006), part of a news hour, “The War and Peace Report” {video/audio, 27.1mb.mp3, 59:05, at 8:35-35:30, video/audio, 26:55}.



“ Gustave Mark Gilbert (U.S. Army military intelligence, assigned to the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Germany):

“We got around to the subject of war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I did not think that the common people are very thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction.”

Hermann Wilhelm Goering (prisoner and defendant):

“Why, of course, the people don’t want war,” Goering shrugged.

“Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war, when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece.

Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany.

That is understood.

But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy.

And it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”

Gilbert: “There is one difference,” I pointed out.

“In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives.

And in the United States only Congress can declare wars.”

Goering: “Oh, that is all well and good.

But, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders.

That is easy.

All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger.

It works the same way in any country.””

Hermann Wilhelm Goering, interviewed by Gustave Mark Gilbert, April 18 1946, printed in Nuremberg Diary, pages 278-279 (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947) {LCCN: 47004157}, (reprint: New York: Da Capo Press, 1995) {LCCN: 95020429}.



Like this:


“ Tim Marshall: Where Iraq informs the debate about Iran is this:

Who is going to believe you?

Who is going to believe you?

When you say Iran is pursuing a nuclear bomb.


Where is your evidence?

You don’t have it.

You’re unlikely to get it.

Why will anybody follow you down that line?

When people followed you down the Iraq line.

And there was no WMD.

Reuel Marc Gerecht: Well, let’s take the latter point.

One, already the French, the British, and the Germans believe this.

I mean, they don’t have any doubt about that.

If you look at what the Iranians have done, the way they have maintained a clandestine program.

It simply doesn’t make sense, to believe that this is a program designed for peaceful purposes.

So, that isn’t a terribly hard argument to make.

At least, to the political elites in Europe.

Now, whether you could make a popular argument, that is going to overcome the very deep anti-Americanism, which preceded the Iraq war, in Europe—

That’s a different issue.

And that’s an issue that I don’t think should be determining, of what the United States does.

I mean, the United States has to make a decision, based on whether it thinks it is tolerable to have a nuclear armed theocracy that has had a very long record on terrorism and anti-American behavior. ...

I would suggest to you, that as we actually get closer to a red line, that Iran on it’s own accord — what it would mean to have a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic — will actually dominate that debate.”

Reuel Marc Gerecht (AEI: American Enterprise Institute; PNAC: Project for the New American Century), interviewed by Tim Marshall (Foreign Affairs Editor), World News Tonight (Sky News, April 12 2006, 8:00-9:00 p.m., at 8:06-8:22) {no posted transcript or video}.




“ (1) A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief —

(a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and

(b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand.

(2) The nature of the act or omission demanded is immaterial, and it is also immaterial whether the menaces do or do not relate to action to be taken by the person making the demand.

(3) A person guilty of blackmail shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.”

Theft Act 1968, section 21 (England and Wales).



By CJHjr: Formatting (xhtml/css), bold-face, links, highlighting, text {in braces}, text beside a green bar (   ), text in yellow boxes.

This document is not copyrighted and may be freely copied.

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.


Posted Jan. 29 2006. Updated September 28 2006.


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