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Full-text: September 8 1988
Iran Air Flight 655 (July 3 1988, 290 victims)
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CIS: 89 S201-17 SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.100-1035
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 8, 1988
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
90-353 WASHINGTON : 1989
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
Congressional Sales Office,
U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC 20402
Sam Nunn, Georgia, Chairman
| John C. Stennis, Mississippi | John W. Warner, Virginia |
| J. James Exon, Nebraska | Strom Thurmond, South Carolina |
| Carl Levin, Michigan | Gordon J. Humphrey, New Hampshire |
| Edward M. Kennedy, Massachusetts | William S. Cohen, Maine |
| Jeff Bingaman, New Mexico | Dan Quayle, Indiana |
| Alan J. Dixon, Illinois | Pete Wilson, California |
| John Glenn, Ohio | Phil Gramm, Texas |
| Albert Gore, Jr., Tennessee | Steven D. Symms, Idaho |
| Timothy E. Wirth, Colorado | John McCain, Arizona |
| Alan J. Dixon, Illinois | Pete Wilson, California |
Richard C. Shelby, Alabama
Arnold L. Punaro, Staff Director
Carl M. Smith, Staff Director for the Minority
Christine Cowart Dauth, Chief Clerk
(II)
CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Page
Fogarty, Rear Adm. William M., USN, Director of Policy and Plans, U.S. Central Command, and Head of the Investigation Team, accompanied by Capt. George N. Gee, USN, Director, Surface Combat Systems Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and Capt. Richard D. DeBobes, Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Kelly, Rear Adm. Robert J., USN, Vice Director for Operations, Joint Staff
(III)
Investigation into the Downing of an Iranian Airliner by the U.S.S. “Vincennes”
_______________
Thursday, September 8, 1988
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Wirth, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, Gramm, and McCain.
Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, assistant chief clerk; Judith A, Freedman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, Norman G. Mosher, and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Tiffany E. Berger, Barbara B. Brown, Lori M. Jackson, Mary J. Kampo, and Mickie Jan Wise, staff assistants.
Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Leon Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Terrence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Dale F. Gerry and Christopher Mellon, assistants to Senator Cohen; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.
Opening Statement by
Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman
Chairman Sam Nunn: The committee will come to order.
On July 3, the U.S.S. Vincennes, an Aegis cruiser operating in the southern Persian Gulf, downed Iran Air flight 655. ¶
An investigation of this tragic accident was undertaken by a team of military officers from the U.S. Central Command, which exercises operational command of U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf.
The report of that investigation, endorsed by the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, was publicly released in unclassified form on August 19. ¶
The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on this investigation report and on the performance of the Aegis combat system.
The committee had intended to hold this hearing at the Aegis Combat System Center at Wallops Island, VA. ¶
There the committee would have reviewed a reconstruction of the events and the {p.2} flow of information that led to the airliner shootdown. ¶
Unfortunately, because of floor activity this morning, we had to cancel that visit — we hope to do that at some point in the future — and we have instead had the hearing here.
We appreciate very much, Admiral, you and the Department of Defense, all of you, being willing to shift on late notice, which was not until yesterday afternoon. ¶
We just could not avoid making that shift.
The committee is conducting this hearing as part of its broad oversight responsibilities relating to activities of the Department of Defense. ¶
The principal purposes of the hearing are ¶
• to ensure that a comprehensive and objective investigation of this incident has been conducted by the Department of Defense; ¶
• to assess the performance of the Aegis combat system; ¶
• to ensure that the appropriate lessons have been learned from this incident, especially those concerning the conduct of military operations in low-intensity conflict environments; and ¶
• to ensure that any necessary changes in hardware, procedures, training and personnel policies have been identified for implementation, of course, if there are such indications that changes are needed.
The committee’s witnesses this morning are the three military officers who have considerable operational and technical expertise on the issues that are central to the investigation report. ¶
On behalf of the entire committee I extend a warm welcome to ¶
• Rear Adm. Robert J. Kelly, U.S. Navy, Vice Director for Operations, Joint Staff; ¶
• Rear Adm. William M. Fogarty, U.S. Navy, Director of Policy and Plans, U.S. Central Command, and head of the investigative team; and ¶
• Capt. George N. Gee, U.S. Navy, Director of the Surface Combat Systems Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and also an expert on the Aegis combat system.
Admiral Fogarty will first summarize the results of the investigation. Admiral Kelly will then discuss the review of the investigative report by higher authority within the Department of Defense, and following these presentations, members will have an opportunity to question all three witnesses.
The committee understands that investigating officers traditionally do not publicly present the results of their investigation. ¶
In this instance, however, the report itself has been made public, so therefore, I think it is appropriate for the investigating officer to assist the committee’s review of this public document.
Before hearing from Admiral Fogarty, I would like to yield to Senator Warner for any comments he would like to make at this time.
Senator Warner.
Senator John W. Warner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ¶
I join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning.
During the course of my questions I will press on two points, providing you have not covered both points in the direct testimony, and both of these points I have made in prior public statements about this tragic incident.
Number one, did we inject this ship into a situation which was really a mission impossible? Namely, we were confronted with political-military decisions and trying, at the same time to defend this ship in an environment which essentially was a peacetime environ- {p.3} ment, except during those intense periods when enemy forces convert it to a wartime environment.
Commercial air traffic and commercial seafaring traffic was present at all times, and yet this ship had to stand guard 24 hours a day on an alert status which demanded such that it defend itself or others in the course of its mission. Is that a situation that was just impossible?
We need to focus on this question as we continue to utilize our Armed Forces throughout the world, frankly in comparable situations; more and more, the cause of freedom must be defended under scenarios which are totally unlike World War II and other subsequent military engagements where there has been a clearer definition between the bad guys and the good guys.
The second question relates to the captain of the ship and the traditions of the Navy. I have said publicly many times and indeed the chairman and I joined on a number of talk shows and other means of communication, and we, at least certainly I did, steadfastly defended the captain’s actions. I think this report confirms those earlier judgments by a number of us.
On the other hand, the doctrine that the captain is responsible for the ship is one that goes back to the earliest times of seafaring men. And I do not doubt that that doctrine has prevented many, many accidents and other situations harmful to crew or to others throughout the history of our Navy and other navies. I wonder if that doctrine in any way has been changed or should be changed because of the facts of this case.
I say that most sincerely — should it be changed in view of the technological nature of warfare today, and the complexity of the instruments of offense and defense that are under the command of a captain of a modern ship?
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Nunn. Senator Cohen or Senator McCain, do either of you have any opening comments?
Senator Cohen. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that the Navy has a half-hour presentation to make, and so I would waive some cosmic questions that I intend to ask during the course of the hearing.
Senator McCain. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nunn. Admiral, why don’t you lead off? ¶
We will accord you full attention here until you complete your presentation because we know the time sequences are important. ¶
We will not interrupt you for questions. ¶
Then, after you complete your presentation, we will go ahead with Admiral Kelly, and then we will come back for questions. {p.4}
Query: No oath?
No swearing-in of the witnesses?
U.S. criminal law nevertheless applies to any lies, by these witnesses, at this hearing, and any conspiracy to lie.
Others, not present at this hearing, can themselves both lie, and conspire to lie, at this hearing.
As principals.
By knowingly and willfully authorizing, assisting, or preparing, documents or statements presented at this hearing, which they know to contain untrue material facts, or omit to contain material facts necessary to prevent erroneous, misleading, material, inferences.
Even though the witnesses doing the talking may not formally take an oath at the hearing, to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
And even though the witnesses themselves may not even know they are lying. As “innocent agents.” Of the actual liars: Those principals not present at the hearing.
Furthermore.
U.S. Senators can themselves be members of a criminal conspiracy to lie to Congress.
And can themselves criminally lie to Congress.
As principals.
By knowingly and willfully permitting witnesses to lie.
At a Congressional hearing.
Which they are conducting.
Now.
Let the proceedings begin.
–CJHjr
Statement of
Rear Adm. William M. Fogarty, USN,
Director of Policy and Plans, U.S. Central Command,
and Head of the Investigation Team,
accompanied by
Capt. George N. Gee, USN,
Director, Surface Combat Systems Division,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
and
Capt. Richard D. DeRobes,
Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION ON THE IRAN AIR 655 ACCIDENT
Admiral Fogarty: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. ¶
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning and brief you on the results of the investigation of the incident, and in lieu of a statement for the record I would submit the briefing which I am about to give.
As the chairman has stated, the people at the table with me here are Admiral Kelly, who is Deputy Director for Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Captain (Admiral-select), Gee, who serves on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.
BRIEFING OUTLINE
• Synopsis of facts.
• Aegis description.
• Engagement sequence.
• Fundamental considerations.
• Investigation results.
• Actions to improve air safety.
The purpose of this brief is to outline the findings of the investigation which I headed and to answer any questions regarding the investigation. ¶
The contents of the briefing are shown on the view-graph. ¶
I will summarize the facts, outline in simple terms some aspects of the Aegis weapon system, describe the engagement itself, review some fundamental but critical considerations pertinent to the accident, discuss the findings of the investigation, and finally I will highlight actions taken by the Department of Defense to prevent a recurrence of this tragic accident.
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
IRAN AIR ACTUAL FLIGHT PROFILE
• Always ascending.
• Only mode III IFF squawk.
• Within airway amber 59.
• Maximum airspeed of 385 kts.
I believe a quick review of the facts as we now know them will help establish the framework for this briefing.
After an exhaustive reconstruction of the event, we now know that Iran Air Flight 655 was in fact always ascending in altitude and squawked only a Mode III signal on IFF, which is characteristic of a civilian aircraft. ¶
Iran Air 655 always flew inside the commercial airway, Amber 59. ¶
Flight 655 attained a maximum air speed of 385 knots, and during my further description of the engagement sequence I will try to explain how these facts were misinterpreted. {p.5}
AEGIS WEAPON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
• No Aegis weapon systems equipment deficiences {sic: deficiencies} existed during the engagement.
• Vincennes’ Link-11 interface was down for 28 seconds during the engagement sequence.
One unique attribute of the Aegis weapon system is its ability to record an enormous amount of technical data, which has been carefully analyzed. ¶
Later in the brief I will show still photographs of the tactical displays of the Vincennes tapes. ¶
From that analysis I, as the investigating officer, and with my team concluded that the Aegis weapon system performed as it was designed.
The only technical hitch occurred when the tactical data link used to automatically exchange information between other units was interrupted for 28 seconds. This is the Link 11. ¶
However, this interruption had no impact on the Vincennes’ overall performance.
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE
• With little time and under combat stress during a surface engagement, watch-standers misinterpreted some tactical information.
As both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated, no combat action is error-free. ¶
I certainly agree with that. ¶
In this case we now know that some tactical information was misinterpreted by people engaged in combat, who were forced to make key judgments in a very short period of time.
In this case, the commanding officer honestly felt that his ship and crew could be attacked by an aircraft operating from a civilian/military airfield while he was engaged in a surface battle with Iranian gunboats. {p.6}

In order to better understand the terminology in the description of the engagement, I will show you the manner in which the Combat Information Center, CIC, is organized and some of the information available to members of the watch team.
This is a schematic representation of the Combat Information Center in the Vincennes. ¶
So as not to confuse you with several abbreviations, I have highlighted the key watch positions that are frequently referred to in the report. ¶
The commanding officer, the tactical action officer, TAO, and Golf Whiskey, the officer responsible for monitoring the air picture, are shown at the Aegis display system. ¶
The anti-air warfare coordinator, AAWC, the tactical information coordinator, the so-called TIC, the identification supervisor, IDS, are shown in what is commonly referred to as “air alley.”
iframe: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-cic-command.html
U.S. Navy (Tim Masterson)
This is a picture of the Aegis display system and the large screen displays on the Vincennes. ¶
This is the area where the commanding officer, the tactical action officer, and Golf Whiskey, the officer responsible for monitoring the air picture, sat at general quarters that day. {p.8}
iframe: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-air-alley-virtual.html
U.S. Navy (Advance Information Technology)
This picture of air alley shows a picture of consoles operated by the men who sit behind the Aegis display system. ¶
The circular screen is where computer-generated symbology, which represents the contacts, appear. ¶
The operator’s CRO, or character readout, is located directly above the circular screen.
The operator uses the CRO to review specific information such as bearing, range, speed, altitude and IFF returns interrogated by an Aegis computer.
Mr. Chairman, the next viewgraph describes the intelligence background and is above the classification level right here. ¶
I will go ahead to the next, with your permission, sir. {p.9}
iframe: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-sasc-chart.html
DoD chart, “Sea of Lies” (Newsweek, July 13 1992)
This chart depicts the rash of Iranian gunboat activity, which included an attack against a U.S. helicopter within hours of Iran Air 655’s departure. ¶
On the evening of July 2, a Danish merchant in international waters was harassed by Iranian gunboats. The merchant requested distress assistance from the United States, and the frigate Montgomery responded and fired a warning shot to stop their aggressive behavior.
Only hours later, during the early morning of 3 July, a Pakistani merchant was also harassed. ¶
She also issued a distress call. ¶
Query: “Distress call”? “Harassed”?
Admiral William J. Crowe Jr.: We got no requests from the merchant ships.
DoD Press Briefing, July 3 1988.
Admiral William M. Fogarty: No merchant vessels requested assistance.
DoD Report, ¶ 2(e), p.37 (1988: p.25) (July 28 1988).
Ted Koppel: We checked with the captain of the Pakistani merchant ship.
He tells us that he issued no distress call that day.
Nor was he harassed.
Ted Koppel, ABC Nightline, July 1 1992.
_______________
A blatant lie to Congress is a prima facie criminal lie.
–CJHjr
Soon thereafter explosions were heard in the vicinity of a Liberian merchant, where numerous Iranian gunboats were gathered.
Query: “Liberian merchant”? –CJHjr
Ted Koppel: As for the Liberian merchant ship, she is referred to on official Navy charts as the Stoval.
Newsweek reporter John Barry checked Liberian registry and international shipping records.
There is no evidence that any such ship exists.
Ted Koppel, ABC Nightline, July 1 1992.
Admiral William J. Crowe Jr.: Like Newsweek, I am unable to find the Stoval in the Liberian registry.
House Hearing, p.14 (July 21 1992).
While reentering the Persian Gulf after escorting the Samuel B. Roberts mothership to safety, the Vincennes launched her LAMPS Mark III helo to investigate. ¶
Later that morning, a third neutral merchant, this time a West German ship, was being closely tracked by two Iranian gunboats. ¶
As Vincennes and Montgomery approached the area, the gunboats dispersed.
Shortly thereafter, one group of gunboats opened fire on the Vincennes’ helo. ¶
Thirty-three minutes later, Iran Air 655 was detected departing the civilian/military airport at Bandar Abbas, Iran.
Although the incident does not appear on this chart, the crew of Vincennes was well aware that two Iranian F-14s approached the Navy cruiser Halsey on the afternoon of July 2. ¶
This is the day previous. ¶
Those fighters closed to within seven nautical miles before turning outbound. ¶
Halsey had to resort to repeated warnings and the use of fire control radars to illuminate the aircraft. {p.10}
ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE
0647 Z
• P-3 62 nm west of Vincennes.
• SPY radar detects Flt 655 BRG 025, RNG 47 nm at 900 ft.
• IDS breaks mode III as 6675 (C & D holds 6760).
• First call of F-14 heard by at least two watchstanders on internal net 15/16.
• ADT stated Flt 655 was squawking modes II and III.
With this background in mind, I would now like to describe the 7-minute flight of Iran Air 655,
When Iran Air 655 departed the civilian/military airfield at Bandar Abbas at 0647 Zulu, Greenwich Mean Time, the sequence of events occurred in chronological order. ¶
An Iranian P-3 patrol craft was approaching Vincennes from the west.
The SPY radar aboard Vincennes initially detected flight 655 bearing 025 degrees true from the Vincennes at a range of 47 miles. ¶
Query: “P-3 62 nm west”?
Then why doesn’t the P-3 appear on the supposed photograph of the two radar images at this time?
Range scale 64 miles.
As well as 3 minutes later?
Digitally removed?
Cropped?
–CJHjr
The identification supervisor, IDS, testified he saw an IFF Mode III squawk of 6675. ¶
We know that the Aegis computer saw a Mode III squawk of 6760, which was actually flight 655’s assigned IFF code.
It was at this time that someone reported that the approaching aircraft was an F-14.
The investigation was unable to determine who initiated that report. ¶
The SPS-49 air detect tracker, ADT, testified he saw both a Mode II and III squawk from flight 655.
Query: “49 ADT”? “Mode II”? “0647”?
Admiral William M. Fogarty: 49 ADT stated that TN 4131 IFF broke Mode II on his RCI (not on CRO) only one time.
That occurred when it was at 20 miles.
DoD Report, ¶ 2(k), p.52 (1988: p.35) (July 28 1988).
_______________
Query: “20 miles”?
That’s about 0652:45 Z.
Not here, at 0647:37 Zulu, at 47 n.miles.
But a full five minutes later, instead.
After “someone reported that the approaching aircraft was an F-14”.
After that someone announced his intention to attack.
And who was that someone?
Who said out loud it was an F-14?
And said out loud he intended to attack?
For everyone in the CIC to hear?
Before 49 ADT convinced himself he momentarily saw what he didn’t see (military mode-2). Together with what he did see (civilian mode-3).
That someone was Scott Lustig (Lieutenant Commander) “(GW)”.
Talking out loud on the satellite radio, to his captain’s boss, at Bahrain, Anthony A. Less (Rear Admiral), Commander of the Joint Task Force Middle East.
Scott Lustig was seated at position “GW” (labeled “EC” on the August 19 plan), directly at the left hand of Captain Rogers (CO).
Scott Lustig was in charge of air defense.
And the boss of 49 ADT, the operator of the warship’s rotating air search radar (AN/SPS-49(V)) and, in addition, the warship’s MAD radio-talker too, seated at position “ADT” (labeled “ARC” on the August 19 plan), 3-4 seats away from Scott Lustig.
Willfully, misplacing this assertion, on the timeline, is prima facie criminal lie.
–CJHjr
ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE (CONT)
0648 Z
• IDS reviewed commercial air schedule.
• Flt 655 BRG 025, RNG 44 nm, CSE 202, SPD 232, ALT 2,500 ft by SPY radar.
• U.S.S. Sides illuminated flt 655 with fire control radar.
At 0648 Zulu the identification supervisor reviewed the commercial air schedule at his station and, because Iran Air 655 was 27 minutes late, he incorrectly concluded that the contact of interest was not flight 655. ¶
At this moment, Vincennes’ Aegis radar held flight 655 on a constant bearing of 025 degrees at a range of 44 nautical miles on a course of 202 degrees true at an altitude of 2,500 feet.
It was at this stage that the U.S.S. Sides, which was about 18 nautical miles northeast of Vincennes and who had been tracking the aircraft, trained her fire control radar on flight 655.
ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE (CONT)
0650 Z
• Vincennes issues first warning on IAD to flt 655.
• IDS sees mode II 1100 on his RCI and reports possible F-14 over internal net 15/16 to all stations.
• Several people hear the F-14 call.
• GW reports inbound F-14 to GB BRG 025, RNG 32 nm.
• GW tells GB that a warning was issued and ignored.
• OSDA tagged Flt 655 as F-14 on large screen displays in front of the CO, TAO and GW.
At 0650 Zulu the engagement decision process which evolves over the next 4 minutes really begins. ¶
Three minutes into the flight, Vincennes began to issue the first of several IAD warnings. ¶
Sides {p.11} also warned the aircraft. ¶
The identification supervisor testified he saw a Mode II IFF signal on his remote control indicator,
Several men heard the approaching aircraft identified as an F-14. ¶
Golf Whiskey, the officer sitting next to the commanding officer, charged with monitoring the air picture, reported to Golf Bravo, the commander Joint Task Force, Middle East, that an F-14 was approaching Vincennes on a bearing 025 degrees at a range of 32 nautical miles. ¶
Query: “IDS”? “Mode II”? “0650”? “32 nm”?
Admiral William M. Fogarty: IDS reported seeing a Mode II-1100 and Mode III-6675 on his RCI about 3-4 minutes before engagement when TN 4131 was at 9000 ft and near the SE corner of Qeshm Island. He reported possible F-14 and Mode II-1100 over net 15/16 to “all stations.” USS Vincennes’s system data showed only Mode III-6760 at this time.
DoD Report, ¶ (4)(b), p.47 (1988: p.32) (July 28 1988).
_______________
Query: “Reported”?
Don’t you mean, “later recollected”?
And, “later recollected he reported”? –CJHjr
Admiral William M. Fogarty: The exact times of the calls are very difficult to establish, the reason being that most of that was passed over the internal phone circuit which we did not have a recording of.
We had to relate it to the time of the firing and move back from there.
Senate Hearing, p.30 (below)
Query: “9000 feet”?
That’s at 0652 Zulu.
When IR655 was at 9000 feet.
Not here, during 0650 Zulu, at range 32 n.miles.
When IR655 was at 6500 feet.
But nearly two full minutes later, instead.
After Scott Lustig, the IDS’s boss, publicly proclaimed (during 0650 Zulu, range 32 n.miles) the target was an F-14.
An authority figure.
Talking on the radio to Bahrain.
Making an official report.
To another authority figure.
Before the IDS convinced himself he momentarily saw what he didn’t see (military mode-2). In addition to what he did see (civilian mode-3).
Scott Lustig was the boss of the IDS, seated at position “IDS,” 3-4 seats away from Scott Lustig.
Note: The aircraft was at 6160 feet at range 34 n.miles. At 7000 feet at range 29 n.miles. Extrapolating, IR655 was at 6500 feet at range 32 n.miles, when Scott Lustig spoke that range to Anthony Less, during the minute 0650 Zulu. The aircraft was at 9200 feet 10 n.miles later, at range 22 n.miles, some seconds after 0652:00 Zulu.
When Scott Lustig spoke 32 n.miles, IR655 was then climbing at 316 knots. At that speed it would take nearly 2 full minutes (1 minute, 54 seconds) to travel those 10 n.miles.
To reach the point fixed in the IDS’s memory, as he later stated in his recollection.
Misplaced here, on the timeline. Two minutes, and 10 n.miles, too soon.
Willfully, misplacing this assertion, on the timeline, is prima facie criminal lie.
–CJHjr
The same officer informed Golf Bravo that a radio warning has been issued and ignored.
Query: “Warning”?
Admiral William M. Fogarty: The following warning was issued to TN 4131 over IAD by USS Vincennes:
{0650:02–0650:22 Z} “Unknown aircraft on course 206, speed 316 position 2702N/05616E you are approaching US Naval warship request you remain clear.
DoD Report, ¶ (4)(a), p.47 (1988: p.31) (July 28 1988). {Time}, ICAO Report, pp.16, B-16 (Nov. 7 1988).
_______________
This “warning”:
• Contains no threat.
• Issues no instructions.
• Requests no reply.
• Conceals the location of the warship (to “remain clear” of).
Hence, these words are not a “warning.”
To assert otherwise is prima facie criminal lie.
Absent the text.
Without the text, this is an assertion of an unassailable fact. With the text, it’s an opinion. Like my own assertion is (that it’s not a “warning”).
By telling Anthony Less he had “warned” the target, Scott Lustig deceived Anthony Less, about a material fact. And, prima facie lied to him. Because Anthony Less was entitled to believe, that the Vincennes radio-talker, seated next to Scott Lustig, obeyed his talking script. Which he did not do.
Senior U.S. Military Officers also asserted, at this hearing, that the Vincennes “warned” the target. And, they concealed the text of this “warning,” from their testimony, at this hearing.
The text was present at this hearing, in the hands of the Senators, the DoD report of the investigation. And, it was available to the public, from the DoD Press Office.
The Senators omitted it from their printed hearing.
99.9999% of the public watching and listening to this hearing, on TV and radio, and reading about it later in print, did not have a copy of the DoD Report. Nor, I imagine, did 95% of the journalists and editors, of print, TV, and radio news. And, apart from those willfully colluding in the criminal lie to Congress (maybe most of them), I suppose that most, or all, of the Senators were not masters of this detail.
To this vast bulk, of the worldwide population, this assertion was an unassailable fact, and hence a lie — that a “warning” had been “issued” to Iran Air flight 655 and the pilot “ignored” the “warning.”
And so we have a situation — common in political life — where U.S. Government officials lie direct to the public, doing what’s necessary, in secret from the public, to ensure they cannot be successfully prosecuted for their lie (as they suppose).
And the very best forum, to propagate lies to the public, is a U.S. Congressional hearing. This, because the public has a high expectation, that what is said at such a hearing will be the truth. Because lying, to a Congressional hearing, is a crime, no less than in a courtroom.
The format, of the political institution of a Congressional hearing, is not suited to double duty. To inquiring into the facts of a matter and — at the same time — inquiring into the separate matter, whether they are being lied to.
And you only have to look at this very webpage, and its related webpages, to see how an inquiry into lying can overwhelm an inquiry into the events being lied about. It’s an intense, dense, effort, to penetrate a criminal conspiracy of criminal deceit.
And that’s not the mission-statement of the United States Congress.
Members of Congress normally operate under a 5-minute rule for questions. They can easily be buried in documents they can’t possibly read and absorb, in the pace of their daily duties. They can easily be tricked and deceived with lies.
And, being a political institution, and not a judicial institution, Congressional committee members are not all devoted to the same goal. They have political agendas. And they keep secrets from each other.
Indeed, I imagine it’s common, that some members of a committee, and especially their staffs, are themselves periodic members of prima facie criminal conspiracies, in combination with Executive Branch officials, to lie to their very own committees.
And I believe we are witnessing that in this very hearing.
And especially so with military and intelligence officers, and their Congressional allies, who routinely conceal their criminal lies behind the veil of classified, secret, information. Which the public cannot penetrate.
And, if we are dealing with lies on orders, then we are also dealing with U.S. prosecutors who will not prosecute the liars.
Apart from the criminal liars amongst them, Congressional committees operate on faith, and so too the news journalists, reporting their activities:
_______________
A true democracy is one that operates on faith — faith that government officials are forthcoming and honest, and faith that informed citizens will arrive at logical conclusions.
Damon J. Keith (Circuit Judge), Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir., Aug. 26 2002) {copy, 255kb.pdf}
Complaining about being lied to, in a secret briefing, by CIA and DIA Officers. Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S.Hrg. 108-863, March 9 2004, Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-863, OCLC: 62239981, LCCN: 2006360652, GPOCat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. John Warner (Chairman), Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member) {13kb.html, copy}. Witnesses: George J. Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence) {82kb.html, 80kb.pdf, copy}, Lowell E. Jacoby (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) {139kb.pdf, copy}. C-Span video {3:02:00}. Transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH transcript, FNS transcript {copies: 215kb.html, 151kb.pdf}. Articles: Washington Post {pf}, New York Times, Los Angeles Times.
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But even with disclosure of the text of the supposed “warning,” asserting a dishonest opinion is a prima facie criminal lie.
Pretending to believe what you don’t really believe.
And an actual criminal lie, if that’s what the jury believes, beyond reasonable doubt, in light of all the evidence at the trial.
Furthermore:
Query: “Ignored”?
These words are not capable of being “ignored.”
Because they seek no response from the aircraft — no reply, no action — of any kind.
And to assert otherwise is prima facie criminal lie.
Not least, because the Vincennes radio-talker negligently failed to ask the pilot to identify himself and state his intentions.
A negligent violation of the U.S. NOTAM:
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Unidentified aircraft, whose intentions are unclear or who are approaching U.S. naval vessels, will be contacted on these frequencies and requested to identify themselves and state their intentions as soon as they are detected. ...
The measures will be implemented in a manner which does not unduly interfere with the freedom of navigation and overflight.
NOTAM FAA FDC 052/87 (Sept. 8 1987).
ICAO Report, p. F-4 (Nov. 7 1988).
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And, a negligent violation of the radio-talker’s talking script (below).
Both documents concealed, by senior U.S. Military Officers. From the text of their DoD Report. Both the public version. And the classified version. And from their testimony to Congress.
Material facts, buried, without relevant comment, in their secret classified exhibits.
Which no Congressional staff member is authorized to look at. Which no member of the Congressional committee is authorized to look at, except alone, inside a distant, high security, guarded, locked, room. Which no member of Congress, if s/he does look at it, is authorized to copy, or make notes of, or disclose, or mention. And — for that reason — which few Members will look at:
“Had I read the report and been critical, they would have accused me of leaking it the way they’ve done with other senators.”
Charles E. Schumer (U.S. Senator), talking about the secret CIA National Security Estimate on Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction. Dana Priest, “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized” {pf} (Washington Post, April 27 2004).
Asserting, that concealed text is a “warning” and, at the same time, willfully concealing documents — which are not eligible for a “secret” classification, or any other level of classification — which prove that text is not a “warning” and that it violated the legal duty of the United States of America—
And failing to call attention to this contrary information—
This, is a prima facie criminal lie.
Concealing the negligence of the Vincennes radio-talker.
And concealing the negligence of senior U.S. Military Officers who issued a faulty talking script to their warship radio-talkers (next).
Furthermore:
Query: “Issued to”?
The Vincennes radio-talker recklessly failed to speak the aircraft’s unique transponder (IFF) squawk code (a 4-digit number) — staring the radio-talker in his face from his CRO computer display — so that the pilot could know whom the radio-talker was talking about.
Hence, these words were not “issued to” Iran Air Flight 655.
And to assert otherwise is prima facie criminal lie.
The Vincennes radio-talker was an “innocent agent” of his senior U.S. Military Officers who recklessly failed to provide him with a proper talking script, requiring him to speak that squawk code. “Reckless,” because they could foresee the deadly consequences of their negligence.
An excellent criminal motive to conceal their faulty talking script from the text of their report. And from their testimony.
A prima facie criminal lie by material omission.
And another excellent criminal motive is this:
Their own talking script itself expressly distinguishes a “request” from a “warning.” The Vincennes hello message — which violated this talking script — does not even qualify as a mere “request,” and certainly not a “warning.”
And so, they couldn’t pretend this Vincennes hello message was a “warning,” if they disclosed their talking script, which expressly says it’s not a “warning”.
And so they decided to simply lie, and conceal this material document from the text of their report, buried as a secret exhibit, without comment:
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United States Navy Procedure for Communicating with Unidentified Aircraft
United States Navy ships are required to warn unknown or potentially hostile aircraft that are approaching a Navy ship.
Prior to this warning, a request for information is transmitted. The request is:
Unidentified air contact on course _____, speed _____, altitude _____. You are approaching a U.S. Navy warship operating in international waters bearing _____, range _____ from you. Request you establish communications, identify yourself and state your intentions.
If the unknown aircraft fails to respond and continues to approach the naval ship or the aircraft movements are not understood, the following warning is given:
Unidentified aircraft on course _____, speed _____, altitude _____, you are approaching a U.S. Navy warship bearing _____, range _____, from you. Your identity is not known/your intentions are unclear (one or both). You are standing into danger and may be subject to United States defensive measures. Request you remain clear of me. Request you alter your course immediately to _____ (course) to remain clear.
Requests for information and warnings are made on both the Military Air Distress frequency (243.0 mHz) and the international Air Distress frequency (121.5 mHz).
United States Navy ship captains realize that not all commercial aircraft transmit their proper IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) code or remain in the proper airways and will take this into account when they encounter such an aircraft.
ICAO Report, Appendix F.
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No pilot, in the history of the world, I don’t suppose, has ever heard a radio-talker speak geographical coordinates to identify an aircraft.
Certainly not, when it’s squawking its unique transponder ID number.
I’m guessing, but I don’t suppose the pilot switched on and programmed his inertial navigation system, for a 28 minute trip, he had flown many times, during the previous two years.
He wasn’t flying a “great circle” route.
Furthermore:
Query: Simultaneous broadcast?
This hello message was likely broadcast (if it was broadcast) while the pilot was busy talking to his airport office.
A material fact omitted by U.S. Military Officers. From their DoD Report. Both the public version. And the classified version. And from their classified exhibits. And from their classified enclosures. And from their testimony to Congress.
If they had time-stamped recordings and transcripts of the pilot’s conversations — as they surely did — and from many sources — then they maliciously concealed this material information from their report and testimony.
A prima facie criminal lie by material omission.
And finally:
Query: A “radio” warning?
Senior U.S. Military Officers concealed from their report, and from Congress, that Scott Lustig failed to inform Anthony Less that a different warning had been issued to the target.
And the target did not react.
That was the Sides, locking-on to the target with its fire control radar.
Staring Scott Lustig in his face, on his large screen display (a half bar across the top of the target symbol).
This is diagnostic of a civilian aircraft (which doesn’t have a radar homing and warning receiver, sounding a loud alarm, when locked-on).
And, prima facie negligence by Scott Lustig.
And, hence, by the United States of America.
A prima facie criminal lie by material omission.
–CJHjr
Finally, during this minute the own ship display assistant, OSDA, hearing the contact was an F-14, tagged flight 655 with an F-14 label on the screens in front of the commanding officer, the tactical action officer and Golf Whiskey.
ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE (CONT)
0651 Z
• GW tells GB his intention to engage F-14 at 20 nm.
• GB tells GW to issue warning before engaging.
• AAWC directs continuous warnings. One MAD and one IAD warning issued.
• Flt 655 BRG 025, RNG 30 nm, CSE 207, SPD 350, ALT 7,000 ft by SPY radar.
• CO acknowledges CICO’s report that approaching aircraft is possibly a commercial aircraft.
At 0651 Zulu, Vincennes informed Golf Bravo of his intention to engage at 20 miles and was directed to warn the approaching aircraft. ¶
Continuous warnings began. ¶
Query: “Warning”?
The first “warning” wasn’t a “warning.”
And so, there’s nothing “continuous” about this, his second try.
Was this a “warning”?
This, the second “warning,” the Vincennes IAD talker spoke {0651:09–0651:43 Zulu} while the pilot was busy talking, to Air Traffic Control (Tehran Area Control Center) {0650:54–0651:30 Zulu}.
And, while the Sides IAD talker was apparently busy talking too, broadcasting his own warning, at the same time, on the same frequency — a jabble of babble no listener could possibly understand.
Hence, for both reasons, it was not a “warning” to the pilot.
And anybody who knew these facts, and claimed it was a “warning,” was a liar. And not just any old liar, but a prima facie criminal liar. Twice over. Lying in an official U.S. Government report. And lying to Congress.
And so too all those members of the criminal conspiracy to lie. And all those other principal liars. Who knowingly authorized and assisted the liars. Among them, any United States Senators, at this very hearing, and committee staff members, who knew the truth and kept quiet, while these witnesses lied.
These material facts were omitted by senior U.S. Military Officers. From their DoD Report. Both their public version. And their secret classified version. And from their secret classified exhibits. And from their secret classified enclosures. And from their testimony to Congress.
If they had time-stamped recordings and transcripts of the pilot’s conversations — as they surely did — and from many sources — then they maliciously concealed this material information from their report and testimony. They certainly had plenty of recordings of the simultaneous broadcast jumble by the Vincennes and Sides, which they maliciously concealed.
Two prima facie criminal lies, by material omission.
Concealing the negligence of senior U.S. Military Officers:
• Who recklessly failed in their duty to require their warship crews to monitor the three, published, radio frequencies for Bandar Abbas departures (Tower, Approach/Departure Control, Tehran Area Control Center). And, the Iran Air company frequency.
• Who recklessly failed in their duty to supply their warship crews with the VHF radios, and frequencies, and airway charts, necessary for that purpose.
• Who recklessly failed in their duty to train their warship crews in the departure protocol of civilian aircraft, using the hundreds of actual tape-recorded conversations of departing airliners, they had previously recorded, to train with.
“Reckless,” because they could foresee the deadly consequences of their negligent failure to do their duty.
An excellent criminal motive, for senior U.S. Military Officers, to unite, in a criminal conspiracy, to lie in an official U.S. Government report, and to lie to Congress.
–CJHjr
Flight 655 remained on a constant bearing of 025 degrees, now 31 nautical miles from Vincennes on a course of 270 degrees at speed 350 knots, climbing through an altitude of 7,000 feet.
At the end of this minute, the combat information officer told the commanding officer that the approaching aircraft was possibly a commercial airliner.
ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE (CONT)
0652 Z
• Radio warnings issued.
• Attempts to try to illuminate Flt 655 begin.
• The “contact” is observed to be descending.
• By SPY radar, Flt 655 at 9,000 ft ascending.
Two minutes prior to firing, warnings were being issued continuously. ¶
Query: “Continuously”?
So far, we haven’t had a single warning.
The first “warning” wasn’t a “warning.”
The second “warning” wasn’t a “warning.”
And so, there’s nothing “continuous” about this, his third, and final, try.
Was this a “warning”?
Admiral William M. Fogarty:
(h) USS Vincennes issued a challenge over IAD to TN 4131:
{0652:33–0653:03 Zulu}: “Unknown aircraft on CSE-210, SPD-360, ALT 10,000. You are approaching USN warship BRG 201, 20 miles from you. You are standing into danger and may be subject to USN defensive measures.”
DoD Report, ¶ (6)(h), p.50 (July 28 1988), public version: p.35. {Time}, from ICAO Report, p.16 ¶ 2.10.8, p.B-16 (Nov. 7 1988).
Query: “Issued ... to TN 4131”?
Once again, for the third time, this “warning” was not “issued to” IR655. Because he did not speak the pilot’s unique transponder squawk code. Staring the Vincennes talker in the face on his CRO. The very same CRO which also displayed course, speed, altitude, and bearing, which he did speak.
Query: “Warning”?
Once again, for the third time, the Vincennes talker violated the U.S. NOTAM, and failed yet again to ask the pilot to identify himself and state his intentions.
But that’s not what many different U.S. Government officials repeatedly pretended:
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Richard S. Williamson: The plane ... failed to heed, or even answer, the repeated warnings and requests for identification.
Richard S. Williamson (Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs, 1988-1989), formal, prepared, written, 15-page statement, spoken in person, by this lawyer, to the U.N. ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, July 13 1988 (AP880714-0103).
When later confronted, about another lie in his statement (that the Vincennes was in international waters), Williamson claimed he was an innocent liar, that he himself was lied to, by senior U.S. Military Officers, the actual, principal, liars.
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Once again, the Vincennes talker violated his talking script, and did not issue instructions to the pilot.
And what of the Sides talker? Was he too, once again, also broadcasting a warning? Another Sides warning unaccounted for? Once again talking on top of the Vincennes talker? More babble?
Senior U.S. Military Officers had it in their power to prove the Sides talker wasn’t. And they didn’t.
They lied about the first warning.
They lied about the second warning.
And now we’re supposed to believe they didn’t lie about the third warning too? The final Vincennes warning.
If they’re not lying about the third warning too, they have it in their power to prove it, with actual VHF recordngs.
It’s obvious, from their decision to conceal their secret proof, what their secret proof proves.
–CJHjr
Vincennes began to try to train a fire control illuminator on the aircraft. ¶
Because of a procedural error, this attempt was not successful until the actual time of the engagement.
Query: “Procedural error”?
The decision by William C. Rogers III (Captain, Commanding Officer, USS Vincennes), knowingly and willfully, with specific intent, to violate Navy Regulations, and falsely certify an officer as qualified to stand Watch, whom Rogers knew to be untrained and unqualified for that Watch (Anti-Air Warfare Controller), who had the duty, but not the knowhow, to lock-on with the fire control radar, as an aid to identifying the target, required by the Rules of Engagement —
This is a mere “procedural error”?
Of no consequence?
Which did not contribute to the ambush?
And had no bearing on the legal responsibility of the United States of America to the Islamic Republic of Iran?
–CJHjr
Also during this minute, the first reports of descending altitude occurred. ¶
The aircraft, as we know now, was always ascending.
ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE (CONT)
0653 Z
• No radars detected from Flt 655.
• Flt 655 BRG 018, RNG 16 nm, SPD 371 kts, ALT 11,230 ft by SPY radar.
• TIC begins to update range of Flt 655 at every open spot on internal net 15/16.
• By SPY radar, Flt 655 RNG 14 nm, 12,000 ft SPD 382 kts.
At 0653 Zulu, the commanding officer continued to hold his fire while searching for any kind of electronic emission that might help {p.12} identify the unknown, assumed hostile aircraft that was steadily closing. ¶
Flight 655 was now bearing 018 degrees, only 16 nautical miles from Vincennes, climbing through 11,000 feet at a speed of 371 knots.
Concerned that the aircraft continued to close despite the repeated warnings, the tactical information coordinator began to update the aircraft’s range at every opportunity. ¶
One minute prior to firing, Flight 655 was 14 nautical miles from Vincennes, climbing through 12,000 feet at a speed of 382 knots.
ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE (CONT)
0654 Z
• IDS observes Flt 655 at 7,800 ft. at 455 kts descending.
• Spy radar holds Flt 655 at 12,000 ft ascending at 380 kts.
• Firing key turned.
• AAWC recalls altitude of 6,000-7,000 ft.
• 14 secs after firing key is turned, MSS starts launch sequence.
• 3 secs later first missile is launched followed by a second missile.
• Two missiles intercepted Flt 655 BRG 001, RNG 8 nm at 13,500 ft at 383 kts.
The identification supervisor reported seeing profile information at the beginning of this minute that actually occurred after missile impact. In fact, Flight 655 was ascending past 12,000 feet at 380 knots when the commanding officer turned the firing key.
Query: “Observes”? “Reported”?
Don’t you mean, “later recollected”? –CJHjr
Admiral William M. Fogarty: The exact times of the calls are very difficult to establish, the reason being that most of that was passed over the internal phone circuit which we did not have a recording of.
We had to relate it to the time of the firing and move back from there.
Senate Hearing, p.30 (below)
Query: “At the beginning of this minute”?
Or did you just maliciously falsify what the IDS meant?:
Admiral William M. Fogarty: IDS observed TN 4131 at 445 kts at an altitude of 7800 ft and descending during engagement.
He recalled it being a minute from launch.
DoD Report, ¶ (8)(e), p.55 (1988: p.37) (July 28 1988).
Admiral William M. Fogarty: TN 4131 descended rapidly following missile intercept. ¶