The July 3, 1988 Attack by the Vincennes on an Iranian Aircraft

(III)

 

The July 3, 1988 Attack by the Vincennes on an Iranian Aircraft

______________________

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Investigations Subcommittee,
and the Defense Policy Panel,
Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, July 21, 1992.

The panel and subcommittee met in joint session, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the panel) presiding.

Opening Statement of Hon. Les Aspin, a Representative from Wisconsin, Chairman, Defense Policy Panel

Les Aspin, Chairman. The meeting will come to order.

Today we will delve into a little bit of history. ¶

Earlier this month, Newsweek magazine and “ABC News Nightline” aired several allegations about the shootdown of the Iranian airbus by the cruiser Vincennes, and generally about our Persian Gulf operations in 1987 and 1988.

The allegations can be grouped together into three charges: ¶

To address these allegations, the committee has invited Adm. William Crowe, who was at the center of our Persian Gulf naval operations in 1987 and 1988 as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While Admiral Crowe can’t address every allegation, he is in a better position than anyone else to address the bulk of them. I am going to ask Admiral Crowe to speak on whatever aspect of this he wishes to address. Then we will go through the allegations one by one.

Before we do that, let me call upon the ranking member of the committee here and then the people of the Investigations Subcommittee, because this is a joint Policy Panel and Investigations hearing. ¶

First let me call upon the ranking Republican of the full committee, Mr. Bill Dickinson. {p.2}

Statement of
Hon. William L. Dickinson, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Minority Member, Defense Policy Panel

William Louis Dickinson.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Crowe, let me welcome you to the committee. Your attendance here might be reluctant, but we’re delighted to have you anyway.

Americans love a conspiracy story, and Newsweek and Nightline have provided the American public with a little grist for the mill. ¶

If true, the allegations made by the media of a so-called ‘secret war” in the Persian Gulf are very serious and they should certainly be worthy of further study. ¶

If false, then they provide a good case study for how not to do a major international news story and add some credence to the opinion that many politicians have of the media in general.

I must admit that my immediate reaction to the Nightline story was that the allegation about a secret war had a ring of truth to it. ¶

Since then, however, I have revisited what I and others in the Congress knew about U.S. operations in the Gulf from July of 1987 to July of 1988. My conclusion is that we knew quite a bit.

Admiral Crowe, I know that you are eager to testify with regard to the specific allegations made by Newsweek and Nightline, and I would hope also you might spend some time refreshing the committee’s collective memory as to the situation in the Gulf in 1987 and 1988. If we have that context, we will be in a better position to judge whether any further action is warranted by this committee.

Let me say that I saw the Nightline program when it first aired. ¶

It bothered me a great deal because I remembered the Tonkin Gulf incident, when it was reported to the Congress and to the American people one way, and then we found out many years later, after the conflict was over, that the events leading up to our declaration in the Congress in support of military action in Vietnam was, in fact, based on erroneous information given to us. ¶

I couldn’t help but be concerned on whether we were, in fact, given erroneous information as to what happened during that period.

The allegation made by Mr. Ted Koppel, at least the facts that he related, said at the time of the shootdown of the civilian airplane we learned that it was not approaching the naval vessel but was within the corridor of commercial travel and was climbing and turning away. ¶

This is contrary to what we had been told in this committee and other hearings we have had. ¶

So I think it would be very helpful to all of us to have your testimony as to your recollection and what you know of the facts so that we can either go further into it or put the matter to rest, hopefully.

So thank you for your presence here today. It’s always a pleasure and you always make a good witness. We enjoy your presence here, as well as your contribution to the real world. ¶

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Let me next call upon the Chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee, Nick Mavroules. {p.3}

Statement of
Hon. Nicholas Mavroules, a Representative from Massachusetts, Chairman, Investigations Subcommittee

Nicholas James Mavroules.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Admiral Crowe.

I would like to make just two observations before we hear from our distinguished witness.

First, I think all the talk about a tilt toward Baghdad or a secret alliance with Saddam Hussein in the mid-1980s reveals a very poor memory. ¶

We did tilt toward Baghdad when it was fighting Iran. ¶

Everyone who read the newspapers knew that. ¶

It didn’t require a security clearance to read that we were giving intelligence information to the Iraqis or to understand that the last thing we wanted was an Iranian victory. ¶

In fact, Iran-contra was a scandal because it revealed the Reagan administration as hypocritical, helping Iran when everyone thought we were helping Iraq.

Second, whether or not the Navy inquiry headed by Admiral Fogarty was a coverup, it certainly produced a poorly drafted report. ¶

I always found it startling that the Pentagon would release a report on an event of this magnitude without including a single map or time line in the written document. ¶

Position information, which would likely be a major feature of this hearing, was treated very cavalierly and very sloppily in the Fogarty report.

My point is, Mr. Chairman, even if we come out of this investigation convinced that there was no coverup, that does not amount to a passing grade for the Navy’s written report — and I’m being extremely critical in that area. ¶

The Pentagon simply has to learn how to present reports with greater clarity and responsiveness to the issues.

For example, the report on the Iowa explosion was absolutely irresponsible, and the report on the Vincennes is virtually incomprehensible. ¶

That, in my judgment, Mr. Chairman, makes two Fs in a row.

Thank you for the opportunity.

The Chairman. Let me finally call upon the ranking Republican of the Investigations Subcommittee, Larry Hopkins.

Statement of
Hon. Larry J. Hopkins, a Representative from Kentucky, Ranking Minority Member, Investigations Subcommittee

Larry Jones Hopkins.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ¶

I want to welcome back to our committee Admiral Crowe and his volunteering to once again set in the “electric chair” in this room.

Mr. Chairman, many of us in this room, unlike the average American, participated in the debate and deliberations over the American policy in the Persian Gulf during 1987. Some of us were supportive of the reflagging effort, some were not. But I think all of us basically remember the general outlines of the U.S. policy at that time, and that was to protect from continued Iranian aggression the free flow of commerce and oil in and out of the Persian Gulf.

Now here we are some 5 years later, and two news organizations would appear to rewrite history by piecing together a fragile mosaic {p.4} of fact, perhaps rumor, perhaps conjecture and fiction, into a sensational story of Government intrigue and conspiracy.

The charges that have been made against the Pentagon are serious and troubling. But it would be equally troubling if these charges, which have been so prominently and convincingly advanced in the media, proved to be creations resulting from irresponsible news reporting. ¶

So I hope that Admiral Crowe will help us begin to sort through these questions and I look forward to his testimony today.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Let me just say to the members of the committee what we plan to do here. ¶

We will be looking forward to try to come to some kind of conclusion about these various issues — the issue about whether the Vincennes was the aggressor, the question about whether we did conduct an operation against Iran, a secret war against Iran, and the issue of whether there was a coverup in the Fogarty report. ¶

We expect to come to some conclusions about that and issue a report.

Our hearing today is with Admiral Crowe. ¶

We will also be having our staff go out and talk to other people, and we will perhaps be doing other hearings and have other witnesses, which will be announced later.

Our witness today is the man who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when all of this took place. ¶

We welcome him here. ¶

As we said before, Admiral Crowe, you can address any part of this story that you may want to address, and then we would like to ask you some questions, sir.

Statement of
Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Crowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ¶

You may regret those last words. I plan to address them at some length. It has been my practice in the past to submit my statements for the record and to summarize them, but I would like not to do that today, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. You’re the witness, sir. You can proceed any way you want.

Admiral Crowe. I would like to deliver my entire statement, and I apologize in advance for the length.

I appreciate your invitation to appear this afternoon. ¶

I have been informed that your main interests — and I think this was confirmed by your comments — are the recent ABC Nightline newscast with Ted Koppel and the Newsweek magazine article by John Barry and Roger Charles addressing our Gulf convoy operations and the downing of the airbus by the Vincennes on 3 July, 1988.

I would like to start with some prefatory remarks before proceeding to details. ¶

I have been reading military history for over 50 years. I am well aware of the temptation to refight and flesh out accounts of battles. With the passage of time, it is often possible to uncover new material, correct errors, and develop new perspectives. I have no argument with such efforts. I find good history, particularly military history, both instructional and enjoyable. {p.5}

My main criticism of the ABC-Newsweek treatment, however, is the inflated and outrageous rhetoric employed on the basis of very slim and often mistaken information. ¶

I am even more appalled by the authors’ tendency to leap from slim evidence to patently false charges of coverup, secret war and conspiracy. ¶

I consider such sensationalism inexcusable and totally inappropriate for responsible news organizations.

Unlike ABC-Newsweek, I am, on request, prepared to cite my various sources today and give you the names of people who are both authoritative on specific questions and who are prepared to publicly state their views and, if you so desire, to testify. ¶

ABC-Newsweek refer only to mysterious “Navy sources, former Pentagon officials,” et cetera.

I should also mention that the Vincennes incident is now 4 years old. Believe me, it was a huge task for me to locate many of the individuals associated with it on short notice. They are strung out from Cairo to Norway to Alaska and points in between. Memories, including my own — in fact, mainly my own — were difficult to energize. ¶

I have, however, in the last 10 days spent a great deal of time talking to people, reviewing data, in an attempt to refresh my memory. I believe that I can address most of the issues of interest and of concern to you. Where failing memory has defeated my efforts, I will say so.

Let me now move to substance. ¶

I strongly object to the fact that in an attempt to excoriate the Navy, ABC-Newsweek totally ignored the air of terrorism and peril that pervaded the Gulf at that time. Over 200 attacks were made on shipping in 1987, 1988, and 1989. Our units were working in a half war/half peace environment. This is the most stressful kind of challenge for commanding officers and crews. The Stark incident, the Bridgeton mining, the Roberts striking a mine, the inflated rhetoric coming from Teheran, all were constantly on the minds of our service personnel.

Moreover, the U.S. rules of engagement, neglected by ABC-Newsweek, strongly emphasized that each commanding officer’s first responsibility was to the safety of his ship and crew. If he was to err, it was to be on the side of protecting his people. In this day and age of supersonic missiles, our warships cannot be expected to take the first shot before reacting. It’s a heavy burden, but ships’ captains are expected to make forehanded judgments, and if they genuinely believe they are under threat, to act aggressively.

Also unmentioned were two Iraqi attacks on ships in Iranian waters on the 1st of July, 1988, and the U.S. intelligence estimate that in the runup to the 4th of July holiday we would very likely encounter a rash of Iranian activity.

On the evening of 2 July, the day before the Vincennes attack, an attack was mounted on the Danish tanker Karama Maersk just off Abu Dhabi. The U.S.S. Montgomery came to the assistance of this ship at its request and drove off the attackers. All of this background influenced the events of 3 July, 1988, as well as the subsequent investigation, and it was ignored by ABC-Newsweek.

Likewise, nothing is said or written about the Iranian role in the airbus tragedy. There was no coordination between Iranian surface raiders and civil air authorities. The tower at Bandar Abbas airport did not monitor emergency frequencies and therefore failed to {p.6} alert the pilots of the airbus. Had it done so, the tragedy would probably have been avoided.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was portrayed in these articles as some sort of benign group, set upon by American forces bent on doing them harm. But these same Revolutionary Guards were vicious terrorists, attacking unarmed merchantmen and intentionally shooting at deckhouses so as to kill innocent civilians. That is the reason that our military forces were there.

We had the difficult task of neutralizing these seaborne terrorists, and our people did a superb job of protecting ships and lives under the most trying circumstances. In fact, the convoying effort was eminently successful. I have even heard some members of the Congress, who initially opposed reflagging, express this opinion.

Let me now turn to some specifics. ¶

I would like first to address the serious charge of a “secret war.” It graphically conveys the questionable quality of the Newsweek-Nightline research.

ABC-Newsweek contended that we were forced to covert means in order to keep our tilt toward Iraq from showing. This has already been commented on by Chairman Mavroules. This conclusion implies that Iran had not figured out the tilt. It was written about extensively in the U.S. press and a subject of considerable congressional commentary.

The administration was confronted with a difficult choice. Of course, Iran didn’t like what we were doing, and Teheran complained loudly. The alternative was to let Iranian gunboats terrorize the Gulf. The administration elected to intervene while at the same time going to great lengths not to extend U.S. involvement any further than necessary. A conscious and deliberate effort was made to keep our activities at sea and to stay off Iranian soil. I would suggest that ABC’s characterization that the reflagging operation as a tilt against Iran is neither profound nor a new thought.

Breathlessly, the article charged that “secret operations were more extensive than reported.” ¶

I certainly hope so. This is the nature of military operations, to confuse your potential enemy and to be prepared for any eventuality. ¶

A number of operations were characterized in a sinister fashion because they were not made public. Do Newsweek and Nightline suggest that we should have shared all of these details at the time with them — and with the forces that opposed us? Should we have risked American lives so that the media could have a good story? I leave it to you to judge if we were mistaken in not also revealing our properly classified plans to Newsweek and Nightline.

More importantly — and this was at the heart of the Nightline accusations — the appropriate congressional committees were consistently briefed on our various operations, including the intelligence exchanges with Iraq, which Mr. Koppel emphasized so heavily. ¶

Every exchange of fire was reported formally and in writing to the Congress. If Congress and the executive branch disagreed about the applicability of the War Powers Resolution, that argument was political. ¶

At no time was I told to conceal anything from the Congress, I never did conceal anything from the Congress, and I never ordered anyone else to do so.

Actually, a great deal ultimately did appear in the press about what was billed by ABC-Newsweek as a secret war. Newsweek it- {p.7} self, in October, 1987 issues, described in some detail an attack on the Iranian minelayer Iran AJR, the character of our night operations, and the role of small helicopters operating off ships. ¶

During this period, countless articles appeared in U.S. newspapers and magazines about our anti-mining efforts and night operations and revealing the existence of barges off Saudi Arabia and Kuwait which acted as bases for helicopters and patrol boats {1069kb.pdf}. At one point, we took American journalists and a camera crew to visit one of our barges.

Koppel, in a very sarcastic tone, commented — and I quote — ¶

Perhaps he was not reading the press accounts during those days. Even Newsweek articles by John Barry, one of the writers of the piece under present discussion, dispelled emphatically the impression of passivity. ¶

Short of releasing our detailed operation plans to Newsweek, I don’t know what more we could have done.

Let me cite some of the significant and erroneous allegations.

Ted Koppel on Nightline, in alarming tones, referred to an intelligence exchange between military intelligence services of the U.S. and Iraq, and then accused the Pentagon of not informing Congress of these discussions. ¶

Simply not true. The talks that were conducted were fully reported to the appropriate congressional committees before they commenced. Both the House and Senate oversight committees were briefed in September 1987. The operation didn’t commence then, so they were briefed again in July of 1988 before the military talks began. The project, incidentally, was terminated in September of 1988. In my judgment, these exchanges were not very profitable.

Some reference was made to an intelligence project mounted by the CIA called Eager Glacier. It was similarly briefed to the pertinent committees October 5th and 6th, 1987, and again on the 13th of October.

I quote again. “Senior administration officials” are quoted as saying that we captured “several other minelayers” after the highly publicized seizure of the Iran AJR in September, 1987, including the Rakish, but kept it quiet for fear of revealing a tilt toward Iraq. Now, this has already been referred to in the newspaper, but I will clear it up.

The reference to “other minelayers” was the cornerstone of Ted Koppel’s argument that we were waging a secret war without informing Congress. Actually, the Iran AJR’s pre-revolutionary name was Arya Rakhsh. They were one and the same ship. This fact was actually briefed to members of the press before Iran AJR was scuttled. The crew was repatriated to Iran through Oman. There were no other minelayers captured during the entire convoy operation. Certainly, we constantly attempted to track the remaining minelayers, but after the Iran AJR incident, they didn’t stray far from home. Aside from this vague reference, ABC-Newsweek did not cite one specific regarding the other minelayers they were referring to. But the reader is left with a blatantly untrue impression. {p.8}

On 8 October, 1988, a patrolling helicopter was fired upon at night off Farsi Island and, in turn, we sank three IRGC gunboats. Four Iranians — and they were IRGC, in other words, the Revolutionary Guard, not Iranian Navy — were subsequently captured in the wake of the incident and were repatriated through Oman. This encounter was reported both to the Congress and announced by DOD press spokesmen in Washington. It was neither a minelaying crew nor was it something that we were keeping secret either from the Congress or the public.

Their article charges that a Task Force 160 helicopter was downed by friendly fire. I recently spoke with the commanders of the various helicopter units in the Gulf. No helicopters were downed in the Gulf by friendly fire or, for that matter, by hostile fire. We lost several helicopters during operations due to mechanical malfunctions, to pilot error, or accidents on the pad. If you wish, I can furnish a list of those casualties.

Once again I quote Newsweek. ¶

I have researched this at some length. Actually, Admiral Brooks visited Secretary Garrett in the summer of 1990, while Brooks was changing duty stations. Secretary Garrett, who I have talked to personally, recalls Brooks leaving him a letter rather than a report. He characterized Brooks’ letter as a communication from a disgruntled officer. In a recent phone call, Admiral Brooks told me it was a private matter between him and the Secretary, and he didn’t know where the 200-page figure came from.

Newsweek further charged, ¶

Emphatically not true. In order to avoid another incident like the accidental attack on the U.S.S. Stark, our AWACS tracked Iraqi aircraft, whenever possible, and reported their positions to our ships. We told the Iraqis we would be doing this and, when their aircraft got close, our ships would also warn them via radio to stay clear. Our operational instructions specifically prohibited AWACS units from providing any assistance to Iraqi aircraft attacking Iran or its shipping. ¶

The former commander of the AWACS aircraft unit is now a member of this committee’s staff, retired Col. Doug Roach, and he confirmed the preceding account.

ABC-Newsweek also made vague references to U.S. contingency plans and possible strikes against Iranian installations. The most misleading statement was a reference to “former Pentagon officials — we must have a lot of former Pentagon officials — who differed on whether mainland strikes were actually carried out.” ¶

This statement defies my imagination. ¶

How could we mount such a strike without it becoming public? ¶

I can state unequivocally that no strikes were carried out on the Iranian mainland, or on Iranian islands for that matter. ¶

Any other conclusion is sheer fabrication.

We retaliated twice in response to Iranian provocations, both well documented and on the public record. ¶

The first was an attack on the ROTSAM oil platform in the central Gulf on 19 October, 1987, in reaction to a Silkworm firing from the al Fao Peninsula against the U.S.-owned tanker Sungari and the U.S.-flagged Sea {p.9} Isle City. ¶

The second was an attack against oil platforms in the central Gulf after the Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine. ¶

These were highly publicized and, of course, reported in writing to the Congress.

It is true we discussed a number of imaginative schemes for heavier retaliations, and even drew up some contingency plans based on such ideas. ¶

But they were never — I repeat — never implemented and could not have been implemented except by specific approval at the highest level of the U.S. Government.

A “senior Pentagon official” was reported as authorizing the use of a decoy ship to lure out Iranian boats. ¶

This charge also has no basis in fact. ¶

I recall hearing discussed the possibility of employing some type of “Q” ships, such as were used in World War I. ¶

But the idea never got out of the brainstorming stage.

This week I polled the main operational commanders in the Gulf: Admirals Bernsen, Less, ultimately Fogarty, and also General Crist. ¶

Aside from measures to conceal our own ship movements, they know of no deception plans either being approved or employed. ¶

Certainly I did not approve or order any deception scenario. ¶

Frankly, we established control of the Gulf without resorting to such measures. ¶

More significantly, our first priority was not to lure them out but to convince the Iranian units, both large and small, to remain in port. ¶

Newsweek does not identify its “senior Pentagon official.”

I must reemphasize strongly, we were extremely careful to keep the Congress informed. Any engagement involving an exchange of fire was formally reported. In addition, a host of briefings of some type, formal or informal, both at the member and staff level, were given to the Congress over a period of 30 months. I have some lists of those that were made up informally and kept by our staffs.

In the course of the commitment to the protection of shipping, a number of legislators and their assistants visited the Gulf — I think some of you in this room did — where they received up-to-the-minute briefings from commanders. Some were taken aboard ships and some visited the barges. ¶

When Koppel says the Congress was not informed, he is clearly in error.

I would like now to turn to the Vincennes story, especially the vituperous charge of a “coverup.”

ABC and Newsweek were particularly fascinated with Vincennes’ entry into Iranian waters, suggesting that I had conceded the truth only when confronted on the Nightline program. ¶

It is accurate that I told the truth, but is the first time I had ever been asked that question by a reporter.

Incidentally, the article, in referring to my 3 July press briefing, says I talked to Captain Rogers. I never met or saw Will Rogers until several months after I retired. The information I was using came from Vincennes’ messages.

At my 3 July, 1988 press briefing, which Newsweek attended, not one question was asked about the geographic position of the ship. The ship’s position relative to the air corridor, however, was the subject of several queries. For quite some time after that, I was under the impression that Vincennes had not entered Iran’s territorial waters, but that matter was properly and appropriately left to the formal investigation to sort out. {p.10}

Interestingly, when Secretary Carlucci and I appeared at a press conference on 19 August, 1988 to present the Fogarty report, Newsweek was again present. ¶

No one asked a question about the ship’s track or position at the time of firing, or whether the ship entered into territorial waters. ¶

When Admirals Fogarty and Kelly testified to Congress shortly thereafter, before both the Senate and House committees, not one question was asked about the ship’s position. ¶

So what has become a central point of the so-called coverup didn’t seem terribly important at the time, or throughout the past 4 years, to either the media or the Congress. ¶

The reason is simple — it was never viewed as a significant issue. ¶

Which side of the line the ship was on had nothing to do with the misidentification of the aircraft or the other circumstances that bore directly on the shootdown.

The Newsweek article insists that the Vincennes’ entry into Iranian territorial waters was clearly in violation of international law. ¶

I take vigorous issue with that view. ¶

A warship acting in self-defense has the right, under international law, to enter the aggressor waters to defend itself. ¶

This was the United States legal view for as long as I was in the Navy. ¶

Moreover, the rules of engagement which governed Rogers clearly permitted entering Iran’s waters if his ship was under imminent threat or engaged.

Rear Admiral Fogarty’s final report was classified secret, delivered to the Congress, and it did conclude that the Vincennes had entered Iranian territorial waters. ¶

An exhibit attached to the report included the investigating team’s navigational calculations which illuminated the ship’s tracks and placed the Vincennes inside Iran’s territorial waters at the time of firing. ¶

Several exhibits included navigational data — that is, logs, et cetera — which were used to reconstruct the incident. ¶

When the report was redacted for public release, that information was withheld for two reasons: ¶

I remind you that the climate after the shootdown was a great deal different than today. ¶

It was, to say the least, tense, volatile and uncertain. ¶

The Iran-Iraq war was still in progress, and the verbal threats issuing from Teheran were loud and inflammatory.

This question of the climate being different not only applies to this incident, it’s a fact that is ignored throughout the article and the newscast.

Nevertheless, the classified report and the redacted unclassified version were transmitted to both the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees. ¶

Chairman Aspin released a statement on 19 August, 1988, saying his committee had received both. ¶

ABC and Newsweek failed to mention this fact. ¶

Incidentally, there were some 308 exhibits and appendices. ¶

I know of no instance where Congress made an issue out of the fact that the Vincennes had gone across the line into territorial waters, or any criticism of this portion of the classified report, or any suggestions that the Pentagon should release the conclusion. ¶

Again, I believe the congressional members {p.11} and staff must have believed it more beneficial not to disclose the classified material at that time.

Very shortly after the shootdown, the International Civil Aviation Organization, colloquially known as ICAO, inaugurated an investigation of the incident, conducted by five people from neutral countries. ¶

This step was taken with the U.S. Government’s support and encouragement. ¶

Secretary Carlucci and I both directed our representatives dealing with ICAO to be fully forthcoming. ¶

This policy of cooperation was reaffirmed after we had the Fogarty report in hand. ¶

All of the navigational data from the classified report was to be revealed during the deliberations. ¶

The U.S. Government did not want to repeat the KAL 007 experience, where Moscow provided ICAO with considerable misleading and false data.

ICAO completed its report in November, 1988 and distributed it to the 30-some member states of the ICAO Council. ¶

In December, the report became public. ¶

Iran also received a copy. ¶

In March 1989 the report was approved by the full ICAO organization, distributed to the 165-member nations of the ICAO, and announced in an international press conference. ¶

The report cited the correct latitude and longitude of the Vincennes at the time of firing and included an easily understood chart portraying the Vincennes position. ¶

This information was furnished by the United States, as the chart made clear. ¶

It did not specifically state that Vincennes was in territorial waters, but using the mileage scale on the chart, a simple measurement shows the Vincennes about 9-1/2 miles from Hengam Island at the time of firing, well within Iranian territorial waters.

Clearly, the ICAO investigators also believed it had no bearing on the accidental shootdown. I have read many of the analytical articles that came out of the ICAO press conference, thousands of words, and not a one cited the Vincennes’ location. ¶

In any event, the ICAO report has literally been in the public domain since December 1988, over 3-1/2 years ago. ¶

Again, ABC-Newsweek either didn’t know about or intentionally ignored the ICAO report.

The fact is the tragedy would have likely occurred whether Vincennes was within Iranian waters or not. ¶

ABC-Newsweek chose to concentrate on this peripheral subject and thereby create the leap to the dramatic assertion of coverup.

Perhaps at the time of the ICAO release — the international environment had then calmed and the terrorist activity in the Gulf had ceased — we should have declassified the ship’s position and issued a press release pointing out Vincennes’ location within Iranian waters at the time of firing. ¶

With the prescience of 20-20 hindsight, I wish we had done that. ¶

It would have had no bearing on the conclusions of the Fogarty or ICAO investigations but it might have avoided the hysteria caused by present-day reporting.

Before concluding, I would cite some lesser items, but ones which I still believe to be misleading enough to mention.

One of Newsweek’s colorful charts — page 31 of the issue — asserts in bold print that the Vincennes’ helicopter was in territorial waters at the time it was fired on. ¶

I am aware of two independent groups working through the available data since the Newsweek article was published, and I personally reconstructed the incident. This is the first time I’ve done any navigating in over 20 years. We all concluded that initially both the helicopter and the offending {p.12} boghammers were in international waters, in roughly the same position as the Fogarty report.

A most comprehensive effort was made by the Naval War College, and I will be happy to furnish Congress with a copy of its work and comments. The data is not as clear cut and dried as I would prefer; it never is in battle incidents. There are one or two verbal statements in the record estimating range to the helicopter that would put it in a slightly different location, but those were eyeball judgments and not consistent with the available Aegis data.

In the process I ran across a mistake in Rear Admiral Fogarty’s report which may have contributed to the confusion. ¶

On page 23 of the unclassified version of the report, the Vincennes’ 0610 zulu — that’s Greenwich — position is in error. It places Vincennes approximately 8 miles north of its actual location, which is confirmed by Fogarty’s own investigative charts and independent navigational calculations. Incidentally, if we were covering up the fact, we would have made the error in the opposition direction.

Newsweek reaches its own conclusion through methods it doesn’t recount. Perhaps extrapolating from the incorrect position on page 23 may have contributed in some fashion to Barry and Charles erroneously concluding the helicopter was in Iranian waters when it came under fire. ¶

However, the narrative account and the report’s other conclusions were not based on this incorrect position, so it had no adverse influence on the investigation’s general findings.

Contrary to the contention by Barry and Charles, not all the boghammers retreated immediately into territorial waters. At least one lingered outside even after the Vincennes crossed over the line. In fact, the article continually reaches conclusions about positions, ranges, and conduct of various boghammers and ships without citing any supporting data. Many of their observations are blatantly subjective and/or speculative and couched in very emotional terms. It’s frustrating to attempt to refute material which is long on adjectives and short on cited sources.

At one point the article says Captain Rogers was preparing to fire still lacking a clear target. A review of the communications traffic and Aegis data doesn’t support this statement at all. They say “the gunboats were just slowly milling about,” an opinion at best. Several witnesses gave statements that belie that description, as well as some of the data. I have talked with several over the last few days. I also called the commanding officer of the Montgomery and he gave me a vivid and dramatic account of boghammers moving at high speed toward both Vincennes and Montgomery. There was no doubt in Captain Kearley’s mind that the two ships and their crews were being threatened. Believe me, there are more views available than were expressed in Newsweek. Moreover, there was clear evidence that Vincennes was hit by gun fire.

One of the sidebars in the article, page 32, showed pictures of the Aegis’ large screen display which did not include Hengam Island. ¶

Newsweek, with great delight, accuses the Navy of deleting the island for sinister purposes. ¶

This shows a shallow understanding of the Aegis system. Aegis is not a navigational system and is not billed or intended as such. Operators are specifically warned not to employ it for close-in navigation. Representations of land masses are not detailed or necessarily accurate and do not come from Aegis {p.13} radar returns but from preprogrammed information stored in the data bank in homeport by engineers. These representations are only intended to give the commanding officer some sense of the land picture, not details. ¶

A replay, which was made this week, of all the Aegis tapes which were on Vincennes that day, at all the differing range scales, found Hengam Island, as well as some other land features, had never been put in the Aegis data bank. As a matter of fact, I’m told that there is no Aegis afloat today with Hengam Island in its data bank. Consequently, Hengam could not have been displayed on the large scale screen.

Incidentally, this problem may explain Captain Rogers’ belief that his ship was not in Iranian waters. The bottom line: no one deleted the island, as charged, the screens were accurately photographed. This is a technical limitation of the system, not a covert plot to mislead the American public. ¶

It would have been a relatively easy matter for the authors to have discovered this feature of Aegis. ¶

In any event, I’m not an expert on Aegis and would be glad to direct you to the commanding officer of the Aegis Training Center at Dahlgren, VA and his Aegis engineers who are authorities and are more capable than I to elaborate on these matters.

In dealing with the carrier activity outside the Gulf, Barry and Charles took complicated operations and attempted to make them simple for their own purposes. ¶

I recently talked to Rear Admiral Fogarty, who states he spent considerable time on this issue. In his view, the air control, deconfliction and communication practicalities prevented a quick response. ¶

It is true that the E2C did not launch in time to assume control of the F-14s. ¶

I have with me the catapult log{;} it launched at 9:47. ¶

If Vincennes was to call in the F-14s, it would have had to control them itself.

I also discussed the air picture with the Aegis expert at Dahlgren who handled the analysis of the Vincennes tapes. ¶

He described in some detail the arrival of the F-14s on station. ¶

The threat became apparent to Vincennes around 0950 — that the threat was urgent — 0950 local time, less than 5 minutes before the shootdown. ¶

At that time the F-14s were 58 miles away, orbiting at 390 knots. ¶

In this analyst’s view, to close and identify the airbus in 5 minutes would have been virtually impossible, even if the communication and deconfliction problems could have been resolved. I don’t know that that statement is true, but that’s his view

Also, I have consulted with the group commander who was aboard Forrestal. He had some concerns about the F-14s responding without good communications with Vincennes. He did not know if Vincennes was fully aware of the F-14s location or availability. But that problem was out of his control. Vincennes could have brought them in if it could have established communications and, in turn, established air control.

The article points out that the commanding officer of Forrestal was not called by the investigation. The group commander, however, his immediate superior, did file a full account of events from his vantage point for the investigation. Again, here is an example where the authors, using a little information, have drawn a firm conclusion with no willingness to admit any room for another view or interpretation. {p.14}

For Vincennes to bring in the aircraft after 0950 would require everything to go exactly right. It would have been a near thing at best. ¶

Once they had been vectored in, Rogers would have had to give up the option of using his own weapons to protect himself. ¶

I personally suspect, from my reading of the events, that the press of both a surface engagement and a rapidly closing “unidentified hostile” precluded Captain Rogers from adequately turning his attention to the problem of ordering in friendly aircraft until the last moment.

Quick judgments have to be made in crisis. ¶

Subsequent analysis may lead critics to disagree with some of those decisions. That’s the nature of combat. ¶

But that two analyses disagree on the wisdom of a decision does not necessarily connote coverup. ¶

I can assure you the subject of possible air support was not ignored by the investigators, or covered up. ¶

If you choose to pursue this subject, you need to call the individuals involved rather than rely solely on the simple statements in Newsweek and the Monday morning quarterback-ing of the writers.

The Chairman. Admiral Crowe, could you hold up for just a minute? We have to run over and vote, and we’ll be right back.

Admiral Crowe. But I’m on a roll, Mr. Chairman.

[Laughter.]

The Chairman. I know that, but we’ve got to vote. Sorry. We’ll be right back.

[Whereupon, the hearing was in recess.]

The Chairman. The hearing will come back to order.

Admiral Crowe, please continue.

Admiral Crowe. I have just a few more points, Mr. Chairman.

The authors stated that an F-14 could do little damage to the Vincennes. We had been receiving reports for over a year that Iran was considering kamikaze-style attacks on our ships and actually configuring some aircraft for this mission. We were particularly sensitive to that possibility. Barry and Charles apparently did not know that a suicide attack, if carried out, could do great harm to our ships.

The article makes a great deal of what they call the mysterious ship Stoval. ¶

Like Newsweek, I am unable to find the Stoval in the Liberian registry. Unlike Newsweek, I could not find two sources who could confirm a deception scheme. As mentioned earlier, I could find no evidence of any type of decoy operations. ¶

But, frankly, the Stoval incident as described by Newsweek makes no sense whatsoever. First, we didn’t want to lure out the attack boats — we wanted them to stay in port. The implication of the article is that once they were out, we would destroy them.

That is totally wrong. On the day in question, Montgomery and Vincennes were off and on in the presence of Iranian small craft. As long as these boats behaved themselves, they were left alone. That practice was a matter of policy.

As Vincennes was closing the boghammers that fired on its helicopter, it passed another boghammer close aboard which did not threaten Vincennes and was ignored. Moreover, there were Iranian boats out in the vicinity the day before and all night. Some time before the name Stoval appears in the communication logs, the IRGC small craft were out and on the prowl. ¶

Fogarty’s report spe- {p.15} cifically concluded that no merchant ships had requested assistance that morning. ¶

It was the querying of various merchantmen by the Iranians and the suspicious explosions that were worrisome and provoked the helicopter reconnaissance, not Stoval.

In any event, I don’t understand what purpose a fictitious ship would have served. The Iranians hear the transmission, come out and find no ship. What do they do then? Perhaps, for lack of anything else to do, they would attack an American warship and fall right into our trap? Not likely. I find the whole scenario silly.

Also, there were other merchant ships being harassed by boghammers in the Straits that morning and the authors have not questioned their existence. Incidentally, merchant skippers did, on occasion, use false names in their radio transmissions to disguise their identity. I cannot determine whether Stoval was such a case.

I repeat, there was no decoy operation ordered or mounted during the entire convoy operation. Also, that morning, the skippers of the Vincennes and the Montgomery knew nothing about a decoy operation, and I don’t see what good it would have been if our people didn’t know about it.

Before closing, I believe a word about the Fogarty investigation is in order. ¶

Contrary to the Newsweek assertion, I did not appoint Admiral Fogarty as the investigating officer. General Crist did. It was a Central Command investigation. Admiral Fogarty arrived in Bahrain on 5 July, 1988, and commenced his investigation. He made the wise decision to do it in Bahrain instead of in the United States. He completed taking testimony on the 17th and turned to drafting the report. He returned to Tampa in late July and signed the report on 28 July. By any standards, as investigations go, it was remarkable to complete such a monumental effort so quickly. You may not be satisfied with the quality of it but, believe me, there was considerable pressure to get answers on these questions.

Newsweek said darkly that I had sent my legal advisor, Capt. Richard Debobes, to sit at Fogarty’s side as he prepared his report in Tampa. Nothing could be further from the truth. Captain Debobes arrived in Tampa on the 31st of July, 3 days after Admiral Fogarty had signed and submitted his investigation to General Crist. This is another example of shoddy research leading to accusatory and false conclusions.

I had actually sent Captain Debobes to Tampa to become familiar with the report so, when it arrived in Washington, we could expedite our own review process. Admiral Fogarty has confirmed to me that Captain Debobes offered no comments or advice or suggested changes at any time. Of course not. The report had already been completed. ¶

Captain Debobes did, at General Crist’s request, talk with the general about some aspects of the completed report.

The article, by implication, suggests that I was manipulating the investigation. ¶

Horsefeathers. I did not see or talk to Fogarty throughout the entire process — he was in the Persian Gulf — nor did I send him any cables or messages through third parties. The first time I saw Admiral Fogarty was in Washington, the day before Secretary Carlucci endorsed the investigation and held a press conference addressing the subject. I saw him on 18 August, 1988. The conversation was brief. I recall it lasting about 15 minutes. {p.16}

I had been involved with service legal matters many years — incidentally, on both sides of the table — and fully understood my role and the necessity not to interfere while the judicial process was grinding. Any suggestion that I influenced or manipulated Admiral Fogarty’s efforts is false and personally malicious.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is obvious why I am offended by the newscast and magazine article and believe both were liberally laced with inaccuracies, half truths, unjustified conclusions and accusations. ¶

More importantly, contrary to Koppel’s very serious charge of some type of conspiracy, the appropriate committees of Congress were kept informed throughout. Similarly, the accusations of cover-up are preposterous and unfounded.

There is no question that we kept many of our operations in the Persian Gulf secret. We would have risked American lives had we not, and our mission would have been a great deal more difficult. We put American lives first.

No one suggests — and certainly I do not — that there were no mistakes made on the morning of July 3rd, 1988, and in the time that followed. ¶

But making mistakes is a long step from a deliberate coverup. ¶

We notified Congress accurately and speedily of all our engagements, whether the news was good or bad. ¶

We did not, I emphasize, did not at any time cover up, conspire or conduct a secret war, beyond the knowledge of our leaders, and you who are charged as the safekeepers for all the American people.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. ¶

I will be happy to address your questions.

Les Aspin, Chairman. Admiral Crowe, thank you very much. That is, indeed, a very complete and thorough statement. I think you have covered a lot of the issues that we might want to ask about and might want to follow up on.

Let me pick up on one point and then proceed to let my other colleagues also ask questions. I would like to pick up on the question of the position and whether, in fact, the Vincennes — and the helicopter, for that matter — were in Iranian territorial waters.

Admiral Crowe. Do you mean initially, prior to —

The Chairman. Yes, initially, before the attack on the Iranian gunboats.

I concur with your assessment because I don’t remember that ever being particularly an issue. ¶

You say it was not asked at the press conference, and I don’t think we ever asked the question in any of the —

Admiral Crowe. I don’t believe you did, sir.

The Chairman. Because we had the staff go back and look at whether we, in fact, raised the issue.

The whole focus at the time was on the shooting down of the airbus, not the gunfight with the patrol boats.

Admiral Crowe. That is correct.

The Chairman. The shooting down of the aircraft was admitted at that point, and all around, to be a horrible mistake. As you have said many times since, the information that you were operating on originally about the shooting down of that plane turned out, in a lot of the cases, to be incorrect, and why was that. The whole focus was on the shooting down of the plane. {p.17}

The incident of the gunboats is only important to the extent that it really distracted General Rogers — that was the focus of General Rogers —

Admiral Crowe. Captain Rogers.

The Chairman. Of Captain Rogers until right before he had to give the order as to whether to go ahead and fire at the airbus, because he was involved with the fighting of the gunboats up until the last minute. As you point out in your statement, there was no time then to bring in the F-14s to have a look. So the question then, only in retrospect, has come down to the question about how did this firefight get started.

Clearly, one of the charges in the Newsweek and Nightline stories is that, in fact, Captain Rogers was the aggressor in this case, the implication here, that he was known as sort of a feisty, trigger-happy kind of guy, a very aggressive guy. They had some reference to previous assignments.

Are you in a position to talk about your knowledge of what kind of a commander Captain Rogers was?

Admiral Crowe. I had no personal knowledge. ¶

I did not know Captain Rogers when I was Chairman. ¶

I read the story in Newsweek with some care. ¶

I’ve been in the Navy a long time and I’ve watched these kinds of things. ¶

Not all commanding officers are alike, Mr. Chairman. In fact, since I’ve been a senior officer in the Navy, one of the things that has been the bane of my existence is I am constantly told that we are producing managers and administrators instead of warriors, and then, when we see a warrior come up on the scene, we’re told that we should produce a manager and administrator and not a warrior. ¶

Some of our commanding officers are aggressive and some are not. ¶

Some are cautious and some are not.

I think it’s much more important, in looking at this incident, and to answer the kind of question that you’re talking about, not to concern yourself with personality so much and the reputation. I’ve seen lots of jealousies between ships, particularly when you have a new ship on the scene, one that’s high tech and sort of elite, and I’ve seen skippers arguing — Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley went to their deaths not speaking to each other, still arguing over who won the Battle of Santiago Bay. So we have a long tradition of this kind of argument in the Navy.

But the question that I think you have to address is the facts that day. I did that when I endorsed it, but I have done it again in the last few days. I went back over it. Irrespective of what kind of personality you might attribute to Captain Rogers, he exercised considerable restraint. He didn’t go after every boghammer. ¶

As a matter of fact, when the helicopter was shot at — and this sort of surprised me — when the helicopter was linking back the radar picture to the ship, they were able to identify a specific group of boats that had shot at the helicopter and the Aegis was able to pretty well keep track of those boats through the entire transit, despite all the other activity going on and so forth. They ultimately engaged the boats that they had identified as having shot at the helicopter after some other events happened as well.

I would be the last to dispute that you can look at these events in different ways, but certainly, given the rules of engagement he {p.18} was acting under, and the context of the times — we wanted, first of all, the ships to stay in port. ¶

Second, we wanted the Iranians when they were out to behave themselves. ¶

Third, if they attacked shipping, or if they attacked us, we wanted to prevail and to punish them. ¶

We had essentially established control in the Gulf, and it was partly because of our psychological edge. ¶

We were not conducting passive operations in the Gulf; we were following this activity constantly in any way that we could, particularly intelligence. ¶

If they aggregated, if they started communicating in a fashion we thought preceded attacks, we attempted to arrive on the scene, and we had discovered from experience that generally our presence, our arrival, prevented any kind of violence, and they either dispersed or went home. ¶

When it didn’t, when they took issue with us and they attacked a ship, or we were asked to come in, or it was an American ship, or they attacked us directly, we acted aggressively. ¶

That was part of the rules and that was what we wanted our commanding officers to do. ¶

Otherwise, we would have given up the psychological edge. ¶

You don’t achieve your mission that way.

I tracked that from the very beginning. ¶

The gunboat fight that the Vincennes engaged in was quite confusing. ¶

Incidentally, the Aegis now over a period of months, the analysis of the Aegis tapes is very helpful in this process, which was not available at the time to the investigator. ¶

But we actually have tracks of the patrol boats, the ones that were in the group that fired originally. ¶

We know where they went, from international waters, and we actually know that they turned around toward Vincennes at time 0942 {sic: 0642 Zulu}. ¶

I won’t confuse you with these times and so forth, but the idea that they were all running away all the time, we not only have eyeball reports but we can actually confirm some of this with the Aegis.

The Chairman. What were the ground rules as far as being in the exclusion zone or in Iranian waters? ¶

I mean, those are two different things. ¶

You said at one point in your testimony that it was clearly under the rules of engagement that a U.S. warship, or a helicopter or any flying vessel as well, could pursue Iranian assets, military assets, into Iranian waters.

Admiral Crowe. If he was under imminent threat or he was engaged, yes.

The Chairman. So that clearly implies that the imminent threat —

Admiral Crowe. That was the Fogarty conclusion, yes.

The Chairman. What happens if it developed while you were in Iranian waters or in the exclusion zone? ¶

In other words —

Admiral Crowe. First of all, may I say something about the exclusion zone? We never recognized the exclusion zone. We gave guidance to our people to try and stay out of the exclusion zone. But if anything came up — we actually considered at one point routing a convoy through the exclusion zone, because we didn’t think it would be mined — we could use it if we saw fit to do so. If our ships wandered in there for an unusual reason, there was nothing wrong with that.

Actually, the exclusion zone which Iran defined stopped at Abu Musa. There is a line that has been drawn from Abu Musa clear into the Straits that says exclusion zone, but that was drawn by {p.19} us, not by the Iranians. We often wandered across it, particularly in the Strait, and put no significance one way or another on it.

The Chairman. So we, meaning the U.S. Government, at that point did not recognize the exclusion zone?

Admiral Crowe. No. We honored it as much as we could because we didn’t want to get —

The Chairman. If a boat was in the Iranian territorial waters, had not previously fired on American vessels or other things, what were the ground rules that covered that?

Admiral Crowe. I’m going to get a little out of my ground here because I’m not an attorney, not a legal expert, but first of all, you have the right to go into territorial waters, no matter who they belong to, if you’re conducting innocent passage, going from A to B. ¶

The warship enjoys that right as well as anyone else, as does a helicopter, if you’re not shooting at anybody and if you’re not doing something else harmful. ¶

You also have in the Straits of Hormuz a thing called a transit passage regime, which I don’t think is necessarily germane to what we’re talking about, but it’s another set of rules. ¶

Because the Strait, at its narrowest point, was 20 miles, you’re bound to be in Oman’s waters or Iran’s waters, one or the other.

But to just go into Iranian territorial waters, there is nothing really illegal about that. If you go in there shooting at them and you have not been provoked, or you go in there to make trouble, or you do not do innocent passage, yes, that is illegal.

The Chairman. How would that be applied? ¶

I mean, suppose we had the situation where — ¶

I mean, the thing that set the thing off in the morning was the shooting at this helicopter. ¶

The question, of course, was the helicopter in Iranian waters, or wasn’t it, at the time that the gunboat fired at it?

Admiral Crowe. Incidentally, even if it had of been, if it wasn’t firing at anybody, I don’t see what’s wrong with it being there. ¶

But it was not there.

The Chairman. So it was your conclusion that, even had it been in Iranian waters, there was no justification for the Iranian boat to fire at the helicopter?

Admiral Crowe. I do not see any. ¶

I mean, we tracked those boats all the time. Every time we came through that Strait, our ships, convoys, were preceded by helicopters. It extended the range of the ships’ ability to identify threats, to see, to defend itself. ¶

That was our common pattern.

The Chairman. Where was the Montgomery at this point? ¶

Because one of the peculiar things —

Admiral Crowe. At what point? ¶

At the firing at the helicopter?

The Chairman. At the point that the helicopter was fired upon.

Admiral Crowe. It was near the Vincennes, about 8 or 10 miles south.

The Chairman. Was it in the territorial waters?

Admiral Crowe. No, it was not.

The Chairman. That’s another issue that is highly —

Admiral Crowe. It clearly was not. ¶

There was no argument, I don’t think, about the Montgomery at the time of the firing at the helicopter. ¶

It was down south of the Vincennes. {p.20}

The Chairman. It must have eventually got north of the Vincennes because they eventually got in the position where they saw the airbus —

Admiral Crowe. Yes, it was along side about 8,000 yards abeam of the Vincennes as it went into action. ¶

That’s later.

The Chairman. Later in the day.

Admiral Crowe. Yes. ¶

The boghammers that fired on the helicopter, I emphasize, were also in international waters.

The Chairman. The boghammers that fired at the time —

Admiral Crowe. That is my conclusion. ¶

Now, that is not Newsweek’s conclusion, I do not believe. ¶

It depends on the reconstruction. ¶

But the one that I cited at the Naval War College, we did this independently from the Fogarty report. ¶

We just took the data and attempted to do these things, and they independently came up with the