Senate Hearing, p.22 (Sept. 8 1988)

“Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

Executive Order 13292 (March 25 2003) (Wiki).

Query: “Z” time?

Zulu is Greenwich Mean Time, now termed UTC: Universal Coordinated Time.

Concealed behind this Z-time convention, is this material fact, DoD officials concealed, from this their report:

The warship clock was set 30 minutes different from Bandar Abbas Time:

Senate Hearing, p.26 (Sept. 8 1988)

Doubtless, the warship clock was set to Bahrain Time, the headquarters of the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet in the Gulf for 40 years. The same as Dubai Time, IR655’s destination: UTC/GMT + 4 hours.

Bandar Abbas Time was 30 minutes earlier: UTC/GMT + 3-1/2 hours.

And what does this mean?

This means, that when Iran Air Flight 655 took off, at 10:17 a.m. Bandar Abbas Time, the warship clock showed 30 minutes later, 10:47 a.m., about an hour after the flight’s Scheduled Time of Departure, as shown on the warship’s airline schedule, either 9:50 a.m. or 9:59 a.m., depending on whether the typographical error in the DoD Report was a faithful copy of the warship’s airline schedule.

In addition to this 30 minutes, senior U.S. military officers also asserted that take-off time (when the wheels leave the ground) was the same as the Scheduled Time of Departure shown on the airline schedule (when the aircraft door closes at the gate). This assertion neglects to allow for the push-back delay at the gate (eg: starting the engines), the taxi-out time to the runway, and the take-off roll. This routine, predictable, time on the ground was 12 minutes, for IR655.

The negligent failure by senior U.S. military officers to inform their warship crews about both of these times issues is one of the many prima facie proximate causes of the ambush.

Hence, their decision to omit, from their misleading report, the warship clock setting, and their decision to misrepresent what take-off time means, in their report and in their sworn testimony to Congress, are prima facie criminal lies.

In combination, these two negligent failings, by senior U.S. military officers, to explain these time issues, recklessly incited their warship crews to wrongly believe, that an airliner — which their duty required them to stand watch for — taking off 15 minutes late from Bandar Abbas was taking off an hour late, instead.

An excellent criminal motive for senior U.S. military officers to unite, in a prima facie criminal conspiracy, to conceal their reckless negligence from their deceitful report.

And, to lie to Congress about the reason the Vincennes crew member, responsible for that duty, did not understand his airline schedule when he looked at it:

Senate Hearing, p.10 (Sept. 8 1988).

Ditto, Admiral Robert J. Kelly, House Hearing, p.89 (Sept. 9 1988).  –CJHjr

“Confidential” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

Executive Order 13292 (March 25 2003) (Wiki).

Ted Koppel (Nightline Anchor and Managing Editor), “The USS Vincennes: Public War, Secret War” (ABC News, Nightline, July 1 1992) (TV documentary).

Query: “7 minutes”?

Let’s see now.

IR655 took off at 0647.

So the C-130 took off at 0654.

Right?  –CJHjr

ICAO Report, p. A-8.

Senate Hearing, p.25 (Sept. 8 1988).

______________________

The intelligence sources, Mr. Fogarty here alludes to, were, presumably:

• Naval/NSA signals intelligence officers onboard the Vincennes itself with the Naval Security Group Command (NSGC) in charge of the Ship’s Signals Exploitation Space (SSES), recording all Iranian radio broadcasts.

• The NSA/DIA on-shore listening/radar station in Oman, on the Musandam Peninsula {photo: 257kb.html, map: 79 kb gif} (with antennas likely at 2,000 feet or better elevation {67 kb gif}, with line-of-sight to the broadcast antenna at Bandar Abbas airport, no more than 45 n.miles north), recording all Iranian radio broadcasts.

• The Hawkeye crew aloft nearby at the time, above the Northern Gulf of Oman, recording all Iranian radio broadcasts.

• The AWACS crew aloft at the time, above the Northern Persian Gulf, recording all Iranian radio broadcasts.

• Possibly, British Intelligence (on its warships, or its likely GCHQ feed from the same listening station at Musandam), recording all Iranian radio broadcasts.

• And, finally, the NSA Head Office at Fort Meade Maryland, and the Defense Intelligence Agency at the Pentagon in Virginia, each recording in real time, via satellite relay from their listening station at Musandam, if that’s they wanted to do, all Iranian radio broadcasts.

Plainly, Mr. Fogarty had in his possession multiple tape recordings and transcripts of the broadcast conversations between Air Traffic Control and the IR655 pilot. And, between the IR655 pilot and his airport office.

And surely these were tone time-stamped, automatically in the recording (like Air Traffic Control tapes are), at the uniform U.S. Military time, synchronized to a zillionth of a second, worldwide, by the U.S. Military’s atomic clocks.

These time-stamped recordings are among the most material facts in this investigation. As we shall soon see. And, not being a nincompoop, William M. Fogarty knew that too.

And yet, Mr. Fogarty concealed these material tapes and transcripts from his report.

Concealed them from the classified exhibits to his report.

And concealed them from the classified enclosures to his report.

Why did Mr. Fogarty decide to omit this material information? And thereby commit a prima facie crime (lying by material omission).

He must have had a good reason.

Could this be the reason?:

Robert J. Kelly (Rear Admiral, Vice Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense), House Hearings, p.184 (Sept. 9 1988)

Senate Hearing (written questions/answers) p.55-56 (Sept. 8 1988)

______________________

And, there are two other good reasons:

• See below, for a warning broadcast by the Vincennes IAD radio-talker, while the IR655 pilot was busy talking to Air Traffic Control — a carefully concealed material fact and prima facie crime.

• And see here, for carefully concealed evidence that the Vincennes and Montgomery IAD radio talkers were broadcasting and talking at the same time, simultaneously, a jumble of nothing any human being could understand — a carefully concealed material fact and prima facie crime.

______________________

These carefully concealed recordings bear directly on the State Responsibility of the United States of America to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, to conceal this material evidence constitutes all those participating in the prima facie criminal conspiracy to lie (a “felony”), in this official report, and in testimony to Congress, equally complicit in the foreseeable consequences of their felony conspiracy, namely:

The felony-murder, or manslaughter, of the mostly American victims of Pan Am 103, bombed a few months later (December 21 1988, 270 victims), a promised, foreseeable, apparent, international countermeasure to the first criminal enterprise, the conspiracy of criminal liars, who decided to lie, and falsely deny responsibility, on behalf of the United States, thereby threatening more of the same in the future, and so legalizing an eye for an eye (a species of self-defense).  –CJHjr

Query: “900 feet”? “1500 feet”?

Are these the same altitude?

They indeed could be.

The explanation, for why these two altitudes could be the same, senior U.S. military officers concealed from their report.

This explanation would reveal some things they were very eager to conceal, namely, that the Vincennes was several miles inside Iranian territorial waters (to be explained).

A fine piece of obfuscation. One of the many elements in this report, and concealed from it, contributing to the richly deserved recognition DoD officials later received: The annual Doublespeak Award for 1988.

We’ve had the warship clock.

Here, now, is another missing piece of this doublespeak jigsaw puzzle:

The 900-feet altitude value, perceived by the Vincennes, was the altitude broadcast by the aircraft’s transponder (mode-C).

An SSR/IFF transponder broadcasts “pressure altitude” (rounded to an even 100 feet), not actual altitude. This is the altitude value used to denominate Air Traffic Control “Flight Levels”. And, because all transponders broadcast this altitude value, Air Traffic Controllers can know with certainty the vertical separation between aircraft aloft.

To accomplish this certainty, the altimeter connected to the transponder, supplies to the transponder an altitude value based on the “standard” barometric pressure of 1013.25 millibars (hPa: hecto-Pascals) (29.92 inches of mercury) (QNE). And this, the pilot cannot alter.

This “standard pressure” was 15 millibars higher than the actual airport air pressure when Iran Air Flight 655 took-off, namely: 998 millibars (hPa) (29.47 inches of mercury) (QNH: adjusted down to mean sea level pressure, by ISA standard formula).

Thus, when the aircraft was sitting on the runway, its transponder (if interrogated) would broadcast an altitude of roughly 400 feet below sea level (about 28 feet per millibar).

This amounts to about 550 feet lower than what the warship radar perceived to be the aircraft’s actual altitude.

The 150 foot difference (from a runway broadcast) was due to: The 22-foot runway elevation. The height of the warship radar antenna above the sea. The transponder rounding up or down by as much as 50 feet, to an even 100 feet. The DoD report-writers possibly rounding the precise radar altitude value. A slightly different precise air pressure. The state of the tide (on which the warship radar floats up and down, from “mean sea level”): Low tide at 0615. An airport surface air temperature (35°C ) 20°C higher than the ISA standard atmosphere model (15°C), to which altimeters are calibrated. An air temperature at 10,000 feet (18°C) 22.6°C higher than the ISA model, and 2.3°C higher than specified by the ISA “lapse rate” (1.98°C per 1000 feet) from the actual airport temperature. And such. (Meteorological data: ICAO Report, ¶ 1.7, pp.4-5).

The transponder does not broadcast continuously, only in response to an interrogation pulse-train. When interrogated, it broadcasts a pulse-train, encoding either it’s 4-digit identification code number (mode A) or its pressure altitude (mode C) rounded to an even 100 feet. Depending on which pulse-train it received from the interrogator. (The interrogator broadcasts both queries, one after the other).

A transponder broadcasts its reply (on 1090 mHz), 2-microseconds after it receives the last of an interrogation pulse-train (on 1030 mHz). It can reply to 2000 interrogations per second.

The report asserts, that the Vincennes SPY-1 radar interrogated automatically “at one minute intervals”.

Is this a mistake? Perhaps referring to interrogations to an empty sky? Which is not what this report is about. Concealing more frequent automatic interrogations? Once the computer detects a moving target?

I would expect once per second, or thereabouts. An aircraft can cover a lot of altitude in one minute. And though the radar is pulsing fast to watch it, why not pulse the transponder too?

If this assertion be true, and not a mistake, then this detail might have affected events on the day. Because of the sudden jump in altitude displayed to the warship crew, before the radar altitude starts to work (at 6000 feet, in this case). And, thereafter, the jumping disparity between the two altitude values (over a one minute lag). And especially so when, as here, the two altitude values are already more than 500 feet apart to start with.

This sudden jump, in transponder altitude, might be confusing, and suspicious, in a suspicious mind, in a stressed mind. This AirBus was climbing 1500 feet per minute. As it approached.

However, the separate Vincennes rotating air search radar antenna (AN/SPS-49(V)) also interrogates target transponders, as it sweeps, selectable, at either 6 or 12 sweeps per minute (every 10 or 5 seconds). Like an Air Traffic Control radar does. The report does not state whether its radar returns, and transponder responses, are integrated by the SPY-1 computer, automatically updating its database, for all its CRO computer displays. If not, they are anyway certainly shown on the computer console of that rotating radar’s operator (49 ADT).

But I imagine they do update the database, every 5 or 10 seconds. In which event, there is no sudden jump in transponder altitude, and this detail has no bearing on the events of the day.

We’re also supposed to believe this: All warship crew members, in the CIC, having responsibility for aerial threats, can position their computer mouse cursor (“range gate”), on a radar target, displayed on their computer consoles. And thereby manually interrogate a target’s transponder. As often as they wish. And many of them did this, many times, during the flight. Sometimes referred to as a “challenge” (p.48/32, ¶¶ 0650(f); p.49/33, 0651(i)) or an “interrogation” (¶ 7, p.65/47; Crowe endorsement, ¶¶ 5(b)).

This is apparently possible with the UPX-29 transponder-interrogator system:

because its OE-120/UPX antenna is separate from the interrogator antennas connected to the warship’s two radars (phased array and rotating, though the phased array radar may share this interrogator antenna):

According to this DoD report, the transponder response appears on a separate display from the normal CRO computer screen (which also displays transponder responses, from interrogations by the two radars.) We’ll hear more about this later, in connection with a certain C-130, ducting, and an F-14.

______________________

The Sides was 15 n.miles closer to the airport than the Vincennes. But not in the middle of the airway (as the Vincennes was), due to the geography of the area.

The Sides was, however, likely in Iran’s territorial waters (as the Vincennes was too). I haven’t yet tried to determine the precise territorial boundary at the bend in the Strait of Hormuz, but it looks like the shipping lane boundary is also the territorial boundary. This, because the strait is too narrow to enable ships to be 12 n.miles from all surrounding land. And so, a shipping lane has been agreed by the neighboring countries, to enable the “innocent passage” international law requires.

The Sides was not inside that shipping lane, as I plot its position, but, instead, a mile or two towards the airport from the shipping lane boundary.

This may indicate that the report writers decided to conceal the Sides precise location. And to obfuscate which altitude value they reported. (The lower the altitude, the closer to the airport). And why they use their favorite word, “approximately” (“approximately 355 degrees,” “approximately 32 miles”).

They omitted it too from their classified secret exhibits. They list the position log of the Vincennes, and the Montgomery, but not the Sides. (Position Log: The continuous time-stamped position of the ship, from the inertial navigation system).

Did they have a good reason? To purposely conceal position information on the Sides? Or is this merely their unintentional oversight? Or did they honestly consider that information was not material to their task?

It’s almost like the Sides was standing picket, on the airport, while the Vincennes set out to attack and destroy Iran’s coast guard boats. Part of Operation Praying Mantis.

Being much closer to the airport than the Vincennes, the Sides 1500-foot altitude value, reported by the DoD report-writers, could be the aircraft’s radar altitude, not its mode-C transponder broadcast.

The aircraft was well above the Sides’s horizon, at its 32 n.mile range, and well in view by the Sides radars.

Indeed, at 1500 feet radar altitude, the aircraft would have line-of-sight to the Sides at 45 n.miles. And so, at the airport’s apparent actual range (32-33 n.miles), the Sides could theoretically detect the aircraft at 350 feet transponder pressure altitude (900 feet radar altitude):— Long before it reached 1500 feet transponder pressure altitude (2050 feet radar altitude).

And all this without enhanced detection range, from the ducting they claimed existed on the day.

The Sides AN/SPS-49(V) rotating air search radar is a two dimension radar (2D: range, bearing). It cannot determine the height of a target. (The Vincennes SPY-1A phased array radar can).

Therefore, the Sides could determine the target’s altitude in only two ways: From the target’s transponder broadcast and by locking-on with its fire-control radar, which is a three dimenson radar (3D: range, bearing, altitude) and does determine altitude.

And that’s exactly what the Sides commander did, within a minute or so after take-off.

Hence, the 1500 feet, the DoD report-writers asserted, could be the Sides fire-control radar altitude value, not the aircraft’s transponder broadcast.

And, query, does the Sides fire-control radar have a tape recorder attached? And is there a written log in real-time showing these values (time, range, bearing, altitude)? Is switching on a targeting radar, merely to determine altitude, or to warn a pilot, a big enough deal that the Navy requires a written or tape-recorded record of the event? And a justification for it? Or is it routine, and not logged?

The report asserts, that the Vincennes computer system switched, from the aircraft’s transponder mode-C altitude broadcasts, to the warship’s own SPY-1 phased array radar altitude value, at a range of 34 n.miles, when the aircraft was at about 6000 feet radar altitude, and broadcasting about 5400 feet pressure altitude. This fact they concealed from the public report. One of their many obfuscations.

The Vincennes’s initial altitude value of 900 feet pressure altitude (the transponder broadcast) was detected at 0647:37Z. The DoD report writers concealed from their public report both the time and the altitude. And they concealed the time from their classified report. They disclosed the altitude later, in Congressional hearings. (Senate Hearing, p.10 (Sept. 8 1988); House Hearings, p.88 (Sept. 9 1988)). And the secret ICAO Report later disclosed the exact time (ICAO Report, p. A-3 (Nov. 7 1988)). “At approximately 0647Z,” as the DoD report-writers generalized the time in their report (both classified and public) and in their Congressional testimony.

The Sides, 15 n.miles closer to the airport, was able to detect the aircraft before the Vincennes did. Allowing for a few seconds difference between the two observations, the Sides’s value of 1500 feet, “at approximately 0648Z,” could be identical, if it was a radar altitude value.

But, this cannot be the case.

Unless the report writers misposition on the timeline when the Sides first locked on.

The DoD report writers willfully misposition other events and recollections on the timeline, detailed elsewhere herein, in order to portray a false reality. Did they also do that here?

The report writers positioned directly together on the timeline both the Sides lock-on and the Sides “weapons on target” message to the Vincennes (concealed from the 1988 public report). The lock-on and the message are separated in the DoD report only by supposed recollections of the event.

If the “message” they refer to were a verbal radio conversation, then this is unlikely the case. Because the Sides officer first had to lock-on, and wait, before he could evaluate the pilot’s response, if any.

Did the report writers conceal, that the lock-on was that many seconds sooner than the “message,” that the Sides 1500 feet altitude observation was a radar altitude value, not a transponder value?

The Sides did not report altitude to the Vincennes (at least, the DoD report writers don’t say so). Altitude isn’t what the Sides officer was mainly interested in. And that’s not why he locked-on.

He locked-on because that’s what his Rules of Engagement required him to do. To warn the pilot. To attempt to learn if the aircraft was military or civilian.

And so, that purpose required him to wait some seconds to see if the pilot would react, to the cockpit alarm, from his cockpit radar homing and warning receiver (RHAW), which airliners don’t have.

If the DoD report writers buried the Sides earlier radar altitude observation, in this lock-on “message,” then the Sides was yet another mile or two closer still to the airport, and that much deeper still into Iran’s territorial waters, than if the 1500 feet was a transponder value.

An excellent motive. To obfuscate this altitude observation. And to conceal the position of the Sides.

The DoD report writers had two tape recordings of the conversations between the Sides and the Vincennes, and so had no difficulty in knowing precisely who said what, to whom, and when. Any delay, however, between the initial lock-on, and the “message” to the Vincennes would not appear on those tapes. While the Sides officer was evaluating the target’s reaction to being locked-on.

And did the Sides “weapons on target” message to the Vincennes (omitted from the report) specify a radar altitude?

If the 1500 feet was a transponder value, then the two reported observations are that many seconds apart that the aircraft climbed in the meantime.

And this I believe to be the fact of this particular altitude report.

The Sides certainly observed the aircraft much sooner. And I suppose the DoD report writers simply concealed that fact. Though, it may be, that nobody on the Sides was asked about, or mentioned, a lower altitude observation.

The “message” the DoD report writers refer to (which they concealed from the 1988 version of their report) was not a verbal conversation on the radio. It was computer-talk: An automatic, computer-generated, Link-11, computer message. This fact the DoD report writers concealed, from both the public and the classified versions of their report, presumably to conceal three separate items of negligence discussed below.

______________________

To determine the position of the Sides (which the report writers omit from their report), you have to know, where was the aircraft at 1500 feet altitude? Be that actual or transponder.

How far from the end of the runway?

And to know that, you have to know the weight of the aircraft, and its flight profile, on takeoff.

IR655 may have been at 1500 feet actual altitude directly over the coastline, which lies about 1.5 n.miles off the end of the runway, doing about 150 knots. And, conceivably, he may have been higher. (Admiralty Chart 2888, widths: 620px, 780px, 1000px, 1263px, 1580px).

This, based on its take-off weight of 288,026 pounds (130,921 kg). (ICAO Report, pp. A-4, D-10). And, based on the manual for an AirBus A300B4. (IR655 was a B2, and maybe I can eventually find a B2 manual). And, based on two flight profile sheets from AirBus, in the ICAO Report (pp. D-21, D-22). And, assuming he took off about half way down the runway (2.0 n.miles long).

According to this information, at a take-off weight (TOW) of 290,000 pounds, IR655 rotated (V1), on its take-off roll, at 137 knots, took-off (V2) and climbed under full power at about 150 knots (V2+10 knots), at a pitch of 15-18 degrees nose-up. At 800 feet AGL (above ground level), the pilot reduced thrust to his “climb” power setting, and compensated, by reducing pitch to 10 degrees nose-up, thereby maintaining his speed at about 150 knots, and reducing his rate of climb (but maybe not, as he had also retracted his landing gear by then, and eliminated that drag). By 2000 feet, he may have retracted his flaps (V3: 153 knots), thereby beginning his acceleration. Following slat retraction (V4: 192 knots), he was due to reduce pitch again, to 7.5 degrees nose up, continuing to accelerate to his “final take off” speed (Vfto: 222 knots).

If he took off half way down the runway, then the coastline was 2.5 n.miles away.

Could he get to 1500 feet, in two and a half miles? Or 2000 feet?

At 150 knots? (IAS: Indicated Air Speed, not ground speed).

I guess I need an AirBus pilot with a stop watch, or an Air Traffic Controller, to tell me. But I haven’t given up searching for the answer to this. And I’m even thinking about getting out my graph paper, and see if I can plot this profile. And vector his speed (part up), and determine his altitude, from pitch (assuming little additional lift).

If the aircraft was directly over the coastline, at 1500 feet — be that actual (radar) altitude, or be that transponder altitude (about 2050 feet actual) — then the position of the Sides, at that moment, was about 56-24 E, 26-39.5 N. To the right of the “Z” in “HORMUZ,” on the chart, above the bend in the Strait. (Admiralty Chart 2888, widths: 620px, 780px, 1000px, 1263px, 1580px). This, based on the observation the report writers attribute to the Sides: “bearing approximately 355 degrees, range approximately 32 miles at 1500 feet altitude”. (I’ll plot it exact, later).

______________________

Transponder details: “Aircraft information — Equipment,” ICAO Report, ¶ 1.6(c), p.4 (two Collins 621A-6 transponders, Serial Numbers: 3800, 2881). Specification sheet: Rockwell International, Series 500, Collins ATC Transponder, 621A-6A (specification standard ARINC 572), Rockwell document number 074-3874-000, 7M-SP-3-85 (March 1985). What is a Transponder? (Rockwell International, Collins Air Transport Division, Avionics Group, Cedar Rapids Iowa 52498, Instruction Guide, Rockwell document number 523-0773764-10111R, 10-1-88, 8+56 pages, October 1 1988). (A current model Collins transponder: TPR-901). Basic Flight Instruments, Chapter 4 of Instrument Flying Handbook (U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular 61-27C, Jan. 1 1980).

–CJHjr

Senate Hearing, written statement, p.54 (Sept. 8 1988)

______________________

Note:  I suppose the SSES to be under the command of a National Security Agency (NSA) Naval Officer, with the Naval Security Group Command (NSGC), conducting electronic surveillance.  –CJHjr

Iran v. United States (“Oil Platforms”) (U.N. I.C.J.: International Court of Justice, The Hague, Judgment on the Merits, November 6 2003) {29.1mb.pdf, source}.

Query: “But”?

Scheduled Time of Departure (when the aircraft door closes at the departure gate) is shown on a published airline schedule.

Take-off time (when the wheels leave the ground) is not shown on an airline schedule.

These are different events.

Hence, they cannot be contrasted by a “but”.

But, this “but” — purporting to contrast them — foreshadows an intensive campaign of deceit, by senior U.S. military officers, asserting unanimously, that the flight “took off 27 minutes late”.

IR655 took off 15 minutes late, due to an immigration problem of one passenger at the gate, which delayed closing the aircraft door by 15 minutes.

The unanimous deceitful assertion, of 27-minutes, was made by senior U.S. military officers in an official written endorsement of this report. In sworn testimony and written statements to Congress. And in press conferences and other public statements.

Billions of people in the world have never flown on an airliner. And, hence, have never had to apply their minds, to when they have to be at the airport gate to board a flight.

But these senior U.S. military officers are not among them.

It’s impossible to believe, that these senior U.S. military officers actually believed their own assertion: That an airline’s published scheduled time of departure is the same event as its take off time.

Yet, unanimously, that’s exactly what they asserted. As an unassailable fact.

Nevertheless, regardless of what they believed, they were negligent. By failing in their duty to inform their warship crews, of the difference between these two events.

Without this explanation, they incited their warship crews to wrongly believe that an airliner taking off on time (eg: 12 minutes after its scheduled time of departure) was taking off 12 minutes late.

Adding this item of negligence to their apparent negligence in failing to explain the 30-minute warship clock issue, senior U.S. military officers negligently incited their warship crews to wrongly believe, that an airliner taking off 15 minutes late from Bandar Abbas was taking off an hour late.

Senior U.S. military officers united in this prima facie criminal conspiracy, to diminish the perception of their negligence, in failing to properly instruct their warship crews on these time issues.

So that their warship crews could properly stand watch. For the only airliner scheduled to depart Bandar Abbas airport that morning. And the only departing airliner scheduled to cross the Gulf that day.

“Reckless” negligence. Because they could foresee the deadly consequences of their neglect to do their duty.

This negligence, by senior U.S. military officers, to properly instruct their warship crews on these time issues, is a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

An excellent criminal motive for senior U.S. military officers to lie about the extent of the take-off delay. And to conceal the warship clock setting, from their deceitful report.  –CJHjr

Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS).  –CJHjr

Senate Hearing, p.30 (Sept. 8 1988)

Query: “Beaver ... Espero ... 75 n.miles”?

Why did the Beaver record IAD broadcasts, but not the Espero? When they were both together?

And how did the Beaver receive a line-of-sight VHF broadcast (121.5 mHz), over the horizon, from a surface vessel, 75 n.miles away?

The answer to these questions senior U.S. military officers concealed, from the public, when they released their report, in 1988.

But in 1993, a possible answer became apparent:

DoD Report, ¶ (3)(f), p.44 (below).

And so, the Beaver crew might not have received this broadcast via VHF. They might have copied it via UHF relay from Hawkeye, or off the satellite (UHF SATCOM), if the Vincennes sent that IAD communication net to the fleet.

This, because, if the Beaver logged on to Link-11, then they also likely acquired the fleet voice communications, at the same time.

Link-11 was developed for data communications of radar track data, e.g., from warships on radar picket duty.

Initially, Link-11 was broadcast by a HF radio (High Frequency: 2-30 MHz), which normally carries over the horizon, because its long wave-length normally reflects back to earth, bouncing off the earth’s ionosphere. Those who remember long distance AM radio (50,000 watts) will remember its vagaries: sometimes a good powerful signal, and sometimes not, with reception dead-spots, depending on your location in the hop, skip, and jump pattern of the signal bounce, varying with location and time of day (ionosphere altitude and density), and interference, from sun spot activity, distant broadcasts on the same frequency, lightning, rain, wind turbulence (?), and such. Also, such broadcasts require high power (electricity demand) and, for that reason, might also pose a radio frequency radiation hazard to the sailors.

In theory, Link-11 data can also be broadcast by low-powered UHF radio (Ultra High Frequency: 225-400 MHz), line-of-sight to nearby warships, via NTDS (Naval Tactical Data System), and for relay by Hawkeye, via ATDS (Airborne Tactical Data System). UHF normally does not carry over the horizon, because its short wave length normally penetrates the ionosphere and escapes into space.

But, apparently, Link-11 data can also be transmitted via satellite (why not), and this may be what the Vincennes did, according to the ICAO Report (¶ 1.16.1.3, p.8), via its “link 11 OE-82 satellite communications antenna”.

Satellite Link-11 would enable the Pentagon to follow the action in real-time, near Washington D.C. And, enables the Pentagon to tape-record the action, including the position of its warships and all of the radar tracks.

May be, the Link-11 data is broadcast (as designed) by HF radio, and also by satellite, or relayed to the satellite by the NSA/GCHQ listening station on the Musandam Peninsula, or by fleet HQ at Bahrain, so the Pentagon can have it in real time, and so too submarines, aircraft and ships with poor HF reception.

The position of the warship derives automatically from SINS (Ship Inertial Navigation System), a continuous, time-stamped, report of the warship’s exact geographical coordinates, to 5 decimal places (10 yards or so, I suppose, I’ll compute it eventually).

The listening station on the Musandam Peninsula might also be a UHF relay station, receiving UHF broadcasts from warships and aircraft (eg: the AWACS over the Northern Gulf) and rebroadcasting, from its various microwave-linked antennas sited, at high elevations (up to 6800 feet). And, were it necessary (it’s not), thousands of feet higher still, from a tethered helium balloon. The elevations on the linked admiralty chart are in meters. The highest point on the linked image is 1845 meters = 5996 feet. Two n.miles southwest, not shown on that image, the highest point is 2086 meters = 6779 feet (Jabal al Harim, 56-13-54 E, 25-58-38 N, 56.23167 E, 25.97722 N). (Admiralty Chart 2888, widths: 620px, 780px, 1000px, 1263px, 1580px).

Why did senior U.S. military officers decide to conceal what the Beaver did, their business with Link-11?

Could this be the reason?:

There’s no trustworthy proof the IAD broadcasts were ever, in fact, broadcast. (ICAO Report, pp. 15-16, quoted below).

Merely an assertion, this solitary assertion, that the Beaver received it.

And now we learn, the Beaver may not have received it.

The ‘broadcast’ could be recorded, by the warship’s tape recorder, and communicated to its Link-11 transmitter, or its UHF radio transmitter, or its UHF satellite transmitter, via the warship’s internal communication net, its Integrated Communication System.

Without ever being broadcast on VHF.

Without the IAD radio-talker being connected to a VHF transceiver, or that transceiver being connected to an antenna.

Is that what happened?

Emirates Area Control Center had a complete tape recording of the Vincennes warnings on the military frequency (243.0 mHz).

But not the IAD broadcasts.

The Dubai Approach Control IAD tape was blank, recording no broadcasts.

The Bandar Abbas Tower tape contained only part of an IAD broadcast, after the ambush, at 0656:43, to the C-130. Which the report writers omitted from their report. Presumably because it disproves their ducting tale, to do with an F-14 (yet to be explained, below).

This could mean the Vincennes radio crew meanwhile realized the IAD radio-talker was not connected to a VHF transceiver, or that transceiver was not connected to a VHF antenna, and connected him. Perhaps they had the surface warfare radio-talker connected to that transceiver/antenna, because that same frequency is also the emergency frequency for surface vessels. They surely have many antennas. But they have to be connected. And they don’t want two people broadcasting at the same time on the same frequency. So there may be an either/or switch, in the radio room, for that VHF transceiver/antenna. Though, perhaps that’s handled automatically, in the warship’s communication circuitry.

Or, maybe the IAD radio-talker pushed the wrong buttons, on his handset, on the warship’s Integrated Communication System. And thought he was broadcasting, and wasn’t. And someone straightened him out. Judging from where he was sitting, at the Captain’s table, he was not a regular part of the warship crew. A visiting officer, perhaps. He did not obey his talking script (assuming anybody give it to him). Another marker, that he was not trained, and not suited, for the task he misperformed. (Text of talking script to come).

This lack of proof does not mean, with certainty, the broadcasts were not made. There could be some explanation, for example, why the Sides, and the Montgomery, and Hawkeye, and AWACS, and the Musandam NSA/DIA/GCHQ listening station, did not record or report these broadcasts (if any). Ditto the many other ships and boats in that crowded sea. Including the Oman Coast Guard.

But it does mean, that the senior U.S. military officers, who decided what to conceal from the public, were concerned enough about it, that they decided to deceive, and mislead, the public, and Congress, by reporting this Beaver assertion, but concealing, as ‘Secret,’ the possible explanation.

It proves they were willing to lie, to make their case.

If, that is, the Beaver did not copy the IAD ‘broadcast’ on the VHF frequency it was (allegedly) broadcast on.

The asserted Beaver reception is probably fictitious, a malicious, fabricated, lie — the transcript of the asserted recording was later proven to be a lie, by the ICAO report, the British military or MoD or Foreign Office lying to help the Americans.

But there’s another reason the DoD report writers may have cited the Beaver, as the only “proof” of the Vincennes VHF “broadcasts”:

It’s very likely their very many tape recordings of actual VHF broadcasts (as opposed to the Vincennes IAD net, ie: prior to broadcast) revealed a devastating fact:

That each time the Vincennes IAD talker broadcast a “warning,” the Sides IAD talker was also broadcasting a “warning.”

A mish-mash jumble of people talking at the same time, on the same frequency, which no human being could possibly understand.

The evidence of this apparent fact is explained here.

Such simultaneous broadcasts might explain why no other land station received the supposed broadcasts: Their squelch circuits were likely adjusted to mute an over-modulated signal, which this would be, double the usual transmitter power.

If this be the case — simultaneous broadcasts — then this is a prima facie criminal lie by a large prima facie criminal conspiracy of U.S. official criminal liars.

A criminal conspiracy some Members of Congress were likely members of.

As principals.

Each of whom could foresee the deadly consequences of their crimes, namely:

Their felony-murder, or manslaughter, of the mostly American victims of Pan Am 103. A prima facie lawful bombing, a few months later (December 21 1988, 270 victims), if it was conducted by law enforcement officers, acting for Iran, to conduct an international countermeasure (a species of self-defense) to the U.S. refusal to either admit wrongdoing or submit to proper litigation. As Iran publicly promised it would do, if that’s the course U.S. officials decided they preferred.

Finally, there’s always the possibility that the Beaver did not copy these broadcasts. U.K. military officers have lied under oath in their own courtrooms. And so, it’s a very minor matter, for them to step up the plate with a little deceit, to aid and abet an official U.S. Government criminal conspiracy.

Part of a “special relationship.”

A payback, for example, by Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, for the new generation Sidewinder missiles Reagan gave her for the Falklands war (1982), which enabled her pilots to attack an approaching Argentine aircraft, nose-on, not merely from behind, as before.  –CJHjr

ICAO Report, pp. 15-16.

Query: “Located”?

My, my.

Now what would that bearing be?

Is that an unintentional oversight?

Omitting that material bearing?  –CJHjr

Query: “8-10 miles to the north”?

Let’s see now.

North. That’s towards Iran.

But whoops.

We don’t know where the Montgomery was.

So how can we know where the helicopter was?

Is that an unintentional oversight?

Omitting that material information?

Or is this an intentional, prima facie criminal lie (by material omission)?

And is this the reason for that lie?:

The Vincennes was at 26 26 N, 056 02 E. (Admiralty Chart 2888, widths: 620px, 780px, 1000px, 1263px, 1580px).

The Montgomery, at this same time (0610), was “approximately 5 NM to the north-west” of the Vincennes (the missing bearing, omitted by the DoD report writers).

This, according to the secret ICAO Report (p. A-1). Later confirmed by the U.S. Government in its court papers, filed in the U.N. International Court of Justice (quoted below).

That puts the Montgomery in international waters, 1/2 mile outside Iran’s territorial waters, 12.5 n.miles offshore Iran (Hangam Island), at 26 29 31 N, 55 58 01 E (26.492 N, 55.967 E).

That puts the helicopter 2.5 to 4.2 n.miles offshore Iran (Qeshm Island and Hangam Island). Menacing the small boats, defying Iran’s territorial boundaries. As deep as 9-1/2 n.miles into Iran’s territorial waters.

That’s the Vincennes helicopter we’re talking about, the one that’s 8-10 n.miles north of the Montgomery, 5 minutes after this position report, when the small boats fired their warning shots (0615). The military helicopter, at 26 39 32 N, 55 58 01 E (26.659 N, 55.967 E) (10 n.miles), or 26 37 30 N (26.625 N) (8 n.miles).

U.S. lawyers, in their court papers, defy charts, coordinates, mathematics, and such, and claim:

(Cited below, p.25, footnote 3).

A miracle of fantasy and imagination.

Contradicted by the facts they admit.

And substantiated by no supposed information. Such as the continuous, automatic, time-stamped, inertial navigation, position logs of the Vincennes, and the Montgomery.

Which they carefully conceal.

I guess they decided to lie themselves, or neglect their duty to investigate the truth of their factual assertions, to save exposing this prima facie criminal lie, to Congress, by Ronald Reagan, and the prima facie criminal conspiracy of criminal liars assisting him:

Ronald Reagan (U.S. President), Report on United States Military Action (White House, July 4 1988) (U.S. Congress 100-2, House Document 100-210, July 6 1988) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/7:100-210, Serial Set: 13880, CIS: 88 H380-8, OCLC: 18239512, GPOCat, paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}, reprinted, “Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the Destruction of an Iranian Jetliner by the United States Navy Over the Persian Gulf” (July 4 1988) (“Dear Mr. Speaker (Dear Mr. President)”), 1988-89 PPPUS 920-921 (book 2) {ucsb, rr}, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1988-89 (book 2) {SuDoc: AE 2.114:988-89/BK.2, ISSN: 0079-7626, LCCN: 58061050, OCLC: 9054188, 1198154, GPOCat, paper, DL, WorldCat}.

_______________

30 minutes later, the Montgomery was itself more than 5.5 n.miles deep into Iran’s territorial waters, 4 n.miles west of the Vincennes. Itself 3 n.miles deep into Iran’s territorial waters. (Positions at 0654).

When they opened fire on Iran’s small boats (0643).

North and northwest of them (several miles deeper still inside Iran’s territorial waters).

The small boats were lawfully entitled to fire warning shots. Against the armed military helicopter.

They are law enforcement officers. A military force.

Entitled to enforce their nation’s territorial boundary.

Against an unlawful, armed, military invasion of their homeland.

And, had they been in international waters (which they weren’t, according to the two reports), they would also be entitled to fire warning shots, in their self defense, against an armed, hostile, military aircraft, menacing them.

From a nation which had attacked and destroyed half their naval force, less than 3 months earlier. An unlawful, offensive, pre-mediated, crushing, military attack.

A warning to keep its distance.

And, of course, they were entitled to return fire against two warships, which initiated an armed attack against them.

Warning shots.

Is that exactly what Rogers hoped for?

And ordered his helicopter crew to provoke?

To create a pretext?

For him to attack the small boats?

30 minutes later?

“Justified”?

If nobody knew the facts?

And if people believed, or couldn’t disprove, the later lies by the U.S. Government?

Such as lies by Ronald Reagan (U.S. President), to Congress (July 4 1988)?

And lies by Richard S. Williamson (Assistant Secretary of State), to the U.N. ICAO (July 13 1988).

And lies by George H.W. Bush (U.S. Vice President), to the U.N. Security Council (July 14 1988)?

And lies by William M. Fogarty (U.S. Central Command), to the Defense Department (July 18 1988), and to Congress (September 8-9 1988)?

And lies by their many assistants? Aiding and abetting? Conspiring?

Prima facie murder and arson?

Prima facie criminal Rules of Engagement?

Excellent motives for a criminal lie.

By a criminal conspiracy.

Of violent criminals.

And criminal liars.

Richly substantiating this asserton:

Usama Bin Laden, March 20 1997, CNN {543kb.pdf}

_______________

There’s no self defense against self defense.

It’s not self defense to launch an offensive attack 30 minutes after your pretext, even if the pretext had been valid.

It’s no self defense to charge into somebody else’s territorial waters, to menace them, to defy their borders, and to initiate an armed attack. On small boats 10-12 n.miles deep inside their own territorial waters.

The DoD Report writers concealed the position of the Montgomery at this time.

And they concealed the position of the Montgomery and Vincennes both, at the time of the ambush.

But both were later disclosed in the secret ICAO Report.

And in court papers, the U.S. filed in the U.N. International Court of Justice, when Iran sued for this ambush.  –CJHjr

______________________

All U.S. naval vessels prior to the engagement with Iranian small boats were in international waters. The ICAO investigation determined that at 6:10 a.m. the position of the three U.S. ships was as follows:

See ICAO Report, Appendix A, p. A-1. These positions are all outside of Iranian territorial waters.

* * *

[D]uring the 17 minute engagement it became necessary for the USS Vincennes, in defending itself, to maneuver into waters claimed by Iran as territorial waters. ...

At the time the USS Vincennes fired its surface-to-air missiles (6:54 UTC), it was located at 26 30 47 N, 056 00 57 E.

“Preliminary Objections by the United States of America” {7.25mb.pdf, source}, pages 24 n.1, 27, 27 n.1 (March 4 1991), Iran v. United States (“Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988”) (U.N. I.C.J.: International Court of Justice, The Hague, filed, May 17 1989) {70kb.pdf, source, 437kb.pdf, source}, discontinued on settlement, February 22 1996) {115.1kb.pdf, source, 248.7kb.pdf, source}.

_______________

Chart, widths: 620px, 780px, 1000px, 1263px, 1580px}

0610  USS Vincennes in position 26 26 N, 056 02 E.

USS Montgomery approximately 5 NM to the north-west {315°}.

USS Sides approximately 18 NM to the north-east.

0615 USS Vincennes’ helicopter in a position 8 to 10 NM north {0°/360°} of USS Montgomery is fired upon by small boats.

* * *

0654:22  USS Vincennes, first missile launch followed by the second missile. ...

IR655 approximate position 26 40 06 N, 056 02 41 E.

USS Vincennes is at position 26 30 47 N, 056 00 57 E, track 058 degrees, speed 22 kt.

USS Montgomery approximate position 26 31 N, 055 55 12 E, track 132 degrees, speed 17 kt.

* * *

2.11.7  Positions of USS Vincennes and IR655. The position of USS Vincennes at the time of missile launch based on the AEGIS-system data was given as 26 30 47 N, 056 00 57 E and that of flight IR655 as 26 40 06 N, 056 02 41 E.

ICAO Report, pp. A-1, A-11, 19 (Nov. 7 1988)

Query: “At 0639Z ... reported the boats were closing”?

House Hearing, p.18 (July 21 1992).

Query: “Shrapnel, and/or spent bullets”?

Hummm ...

Now what might that be?

At 1,000 yards, a NATO 7.62mm round is dropping 8 inches per 10 yards. And that drop accelerates, as its velocity decays.

But let’s imagine it maintains its velocity.

Over the second 1,000 yards it would drop 67 feet.

What does this trajectory bring to mind?

Splash!

Springs to my mind.

Well, how about a .50 caliber machine gun?

The maximum effective range of a U.S. M2 .50 Caliber (12.7mm) Browning Machine Gun is 2,000 meters (2,166 yards). And, you only have a 50% chance, at 1,600 meters, of hitting something the size of a warship.

Its absolute maximum range is 6,800 meters (7,366 yards). With its barrel cocked-up 45-degrees, I suppose. But its tracer rounds burn out at 2,200 meters (2,383 yards). So it can’t be targeted beyond that. And especially, from a small boat, bouncing on the sea, at 45+ knots.

Now let’s see. How far away was the Vincennes?

They don’t say. In their report. But they said this to the Senate.  –CJHjr:

Senate Hearing, pp.47-48 (Sept. 8 1988)

_______________

Must have been the Hand of God.  –CJHjr

Query: “The group USS Vincennes initially engaged”?

So this group of small boats, deep inside their own nation’s territorial waters, fleeing for their lives, from the Vincennes, attacking them in “self defense,” then find themselves fleeing into a trap? Set by Rogers? Fleeing into the sights of the Montgomery? Waiting to attack them? 6 miles deep into those same territorial waters. In its “self defense”?  –CJHjr

Query: “Greater speed”?

Probably not.

By convention, the speed of the Vincennes, and other U.S. Navy warships, is stated to be “more than 30 knots”.

But this convention is adopted precisely to conceal their true speed, which is a secret.

The Vincennes is powered by 4 jet engines (General Electric gas turbines), the same ones used to power airliners, on two drive shafts (8,000 SHP: shaft horsepower), with two (presumably) computer-designed low drag propellers (anti-cavitating). And it has a narrow hull design (ie: low drag).

In an inteview at the time, Anders Boghammer, an expert in ship design, was adamant the Vincennes was likely faster than his Boghammer small boats, the ones Iran then had, or at least as fast.

When they were loaded down with weapons, fuel, ammunition, and people.

And with their engines not tuned to their peak performance.

As they were, when he conducted a speed trial on the boats, before he delivered them to Iran.

He told me, in 1988 when I interviewed him, the 50 boats he and his brother Lars supplied to the Iranians (model RL-120-2A) had twin Volvo-Penta 70-D diesel 300 SHP engines (shaft horsepower).

In trials, he said, when new, they achieved 45 knots at 100% engine power with a 60% fuel load (600 liters of the 1,000 maximum) and 4 occupants in still air and deep water. From the photographs he saw at the Swedish Ministry of Defense, he guessed they could do 40 knots, configured with the added weight and drag of rocket-launchers mounted over the forward deck, depending on the weight of the rockets and other ammunition and their fuel load. Fully-fueled with 1,000 liters of diesel, he says their range was about 500 nautical miles. They each had a radar and VHF transceiver and cost about $240,000, in 1988 U.S. dollars.

He was confident the Vincennes could do 45 knots or better, based on its dimensions and specifications (from Jane’s Fighting Ships), and allowing for drag from the super-structure, the generators, and other loads.

He explained that “speed” is specified as the speed in still air, with a normal load, and the engines turning at their maximum recommended sustainable revolutions-per-minute (RPMs), typically 80% of maximum RPMs.

But there are higher speeds.

Engine makers, he said, specify both the recommended and the actual maximum RPMs and state how long the engines can be run, without damage, on “overload” (at various RPMs above the recommended maximum), and for how long at each setting. For example, they might specify 88% of maximum for 1 hour every 12 hours, or maybe 30 minutes every 6 hours, and maybe 96% of maximum for 30 minutes every 12 hours.

And speed is affected by loads. For example: generators, bilge-pumps, and other such equipment can pull up to 5% or more of an engine’s power, he said.

During a high-speed chase, a ship seeking full power can disconnect its generators — and increase its RPMs to reload the engines (compensate for the decreased generator load) — and switch to batteries, causing the lights to flicker, when switching over and back again, when later reconnecting the generator.

A tail-wind decreases load, enabling a higher engine RPM, and higher horsepower, without increasing engine load. The Vincennes had a 10-knot tail-wind, when pursuing the small boats in Iran’s territorial waters, until its sharp right turn, at full-rudder.

______________________

The Vincennes was engaged in offensive warfare when it pursued the fleeing boats into Iranian territorial waters.

This is not an act of self-defense.

Likewise, the Vincennes’s helicopter. Deep inside Iranian waters. Menacing the small boats. This too was an offensive threatening act. And a military invasion of their homeland. Against which the Iranians were entitled to defend themselves, by warning shots.

None of this entitled the Vincennes to offensively attack the small boats 30 minutes later.

Which had the legal right to exist.

And the legal right to enforce the integrity of their nation’s territorial boundaries. By firing warning shots at an armed, military, helicopter invading their homeland. And menacing them. And firing at armed, hostile, military, warships invading their homeland.

And the legal right to return fire at armed, hostile, military, warships invading their homeland and initiating fire upon them.

And the legal right — under the international law of blockade — to stop and search passing ships, for contraband, destined for their opponent in a war (Iraq).

And the legal right to attack those who refuse to stop, and submit to a search.

Interfering with their legal right to stop and search is an act of war.

The U.S. Congress has the exclusive legal authority, under the U.S. Constitution, to authorize offensive war. The President has no vote. And Congress did not authorize war against Iran.

The President and his henchmen, the U.S. Military, are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution to usurp the authority of Congress. And any actions they take purporting to do so are unlawful.

Absent a lawful war, offensive acts of war are prima facie criminal, under the laws of peace. Such as attacking Iran’s small boats. These attacks are prima facie attempted murder and arson if they are unsuccessful. And prima facie murder and arson if they succeed.

If the Vincennes had not been engaging in this unlawful activity, it would never have been in the middle of an airway in the first place.

Commanded by a commander, with a guilty conscience. Who knew — or should have known — he was committing a violent crime. And expecting a counter attack. Or at least on guard for one. And in a mind set to convince himself, that any approaching aircraft was military.

And who knew — or should have known — that any airliner he might ambush in the process, of his prima facie criminal attack on the small boats, would be prima facie murder.

Not least, because any military aircraft which might come to attack him would be legally entitled to do so.

A hoodlum — in the act of attempted arson-murder — can not claim self-defense, for killing a pursuing law enforcement officer.

  –CJHjr

Query: “49 ADT”?  “Mode II”?  “0647”?

The 49 ADT — the operator of the warship’s rotating air search radar (AN/SPS-49(V)) — said he saw a mode II:–

“Only one time”.

“At 20 miles”.

At 0652 Zulu.

Five minutes later, from this timeline time.

Here, we’re at 45 n.miles, on the timeline. At 0647 Zulu.

This statement is misplaced on the timeline.

Nobody is making any claims, at this early time, of seeing anything other than reality. That the aircraft was squawking civilian, with its transponder.

Is this an honest mistake, Mr. Fogarty?

Or is this a willful, purposeful, malicious lie?

Preparing us? To excuse Scott Lustig’s F-14 lie?

  –CJHjr

Senate Hearing, pp.48-49 (Sept. 8 1988)

Query: A “Weapons on Target” message?

Why did senior U.S. military officers decide to conceal this, from the 1988 version of their report?

And why did the DoD report writers decide to conceal what this means? From both the public and the classified versions of their report? The nature of this “message”?

Could this be the reason?:

The truth would expose, highlight, and emphasize the reckless negligence of the Vincennes officers and crew.

It was not until 5 years later, that we learned the Sides sent any “message” to the Vincennes (here, in this partially declassified version of the DoD report). And it was not until 12 years later that we learned the nature of this “message.” And what it means.

It was automatic computer-talk:

______________________

Reuben S. Pitts III (“Head of the Data Analysis Team that supported Admiral Fogarty’s formal investigation”), “Human-Centric Warfare,” in “Anonymous” (Comment and Discussion), Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, volume 126, Issue 3, March 2000, pages 10 et seq. (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis Maryland) {ISSN: 0041-798X, OCLC: 02496995, LCCN: 64054905, WorldCat}.

“Voice recordings”?

The 5 erased tracks?

______________________

This fact, concealed from the DoD report, highlights three items of negligence, each a separate prima facie proximate cause of the ambush:

First, Scott Lustig negligently failed to report the Sides lock-on to Anthony Less at Bahrain (0650-0651 Zulu). When seeking permission to attack the aircraft. A material fact in evaluating whether the target was hostile.

Second, the Vincennes officers and crew negligently failed to evaluate the significance of what was staring each of them in the face, on their computer screens: The aircraft did not react to being locked-on by the Sides. A factor their Rules of Engagement explicitly required them to evaluate. No reaction suggests a civilian aircraft because, with no RHWR receiver, it does not know it has been locked-on:

DoD Report, ¶ 19, p.25 (1988: p.16) (above).

Third, concealing the truth, also conceals why the Vincennes crew did not do their duty. Namely, the Commander of the Vincennes violated his duty, and Naval Regulations, and falsely certified an untrained officer as qualified for a duty he was not qualified for. The Vincennes crew were distracted, for several minutes, by this officer’s inability to lock-on with the Vincennes fire control radar — 30 failures to push the correct buttons (all of them concealed from the 1988 public version of the DoD report).

  –CJHjr

Query: “Link 11 was off for 28 seconds”?

Now why might that be?

Could this be a clue?:

Frank C. Carlucci (U.S. Secretary of Defense), Press Briefing, August 19 1988, p.2.

ICAO Report, ¶ 1.16.1.3, p.8.

The warship’s satellite antenna is not likely mounted on a gimbal. To avoid movement by the wind. It’s surely stabilized by gyroscopes.

It stays pointed at the satellite, automatically, as the warship turns.

But not when it heels over:

Electronics Technician, Volume 07— Antennas and Wave Propagation, Chapter 2: Antennas, Satellite Systems, Antenna Groups OE-82B/WSC-1(V) and OE-82C/WSC-1(V), page 2-16 {968kb.pdf}.

Presumably, at the warship’s 32-degree list, the satellite antenna lost its lock on the satellite, and had to regain the satellite after the list abated. And, perhaps the operator had to log-on again, to the Link-11 net. Though log-on is likely automatic, in the warship’s computer software.

And all that took 28 seconds.

The report asserts this turn occurred at 0651 Zulu. Not at 0649 Zulu, here, when it asserts Link-11 disconnected. The report asserts that the foul bore, the asserted reason for the turn, occurred at 0650 Zulu

This could be faulty logging in the Vincennes deck log, which the report writers cite as authority for the time of the turn. And faulty recollection by the redacted individual they cite as additional authority.

But, the time of this turn is shown precisely on the authoritative, secret, time-stamped, Vincennes position log, automatically recorded from the warship’s inertial navigation system.

Which the report writers could have cited.

And didn’t.

DoD Report, ¶ 2, p.41 (1988: p.28).

Senate Hearing, p.47 (Sept. 8 1988)

Perhaps they wanted to obfuscate why Link-11 disconnected.

Perhaps they wanted to create the false illusion that “This turn took place just at the crucial decision point,” a distraction, near to the decision to launch the missiles (0654:05 Zulu).

Instead of when it likely occurred (0649 Zulu).

Or both.  –CJHjr

Query: “MAD”?

No airliner is equipped with a UHF transceiver (military frequencies). Hence, no airliner can receive a MAD broadcast. Military Air Distress is a military frequency: 243.0 mHz.  –CJHjr

Richard S. Williamson (Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs, 1988-1989, a lawyer), statement, ICAO meeting, Montreal Canada, July 13 1988 (ICAO: U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization), printed, “Assistant Secretary Williamson, ICAO Council, Montreal, July 13, 1988,” in “Middle East, Iranian Airbus Tragedy” (Department of State Bulletin, volume 88, number 2138, September 1988, pages 38-43, at 39-42) (“The official monthly record of United States foreign policy”) {3 issues, July.-Sept., 1.61mb.txt, 23.84mb.pdf, source} {SuDoc: S 1.3, LCCN: 39026945, ISSN: 0041-7610, OCLC: 1639364, GPOCat, WorldCat}, reported, Jeff Bradley, “Council Agrees on ICAO Probe, Four Favor Condemnation” (Associated Press, July 14 1988, 12:23 EDT, AP880714-0103), reprinted, in the House Report (yet to be posted).

______________________

Query: “Warning”?

The Vincennes IAD radio-talker did not ask the pilot to identify himself and state his intentions.

As his talking script required him to do.

As the U.S. NOTAM required him to do.

This is not a “warning”:

It contains no threat. Issues no instructions. Requests no reply. And conceals the location of the warship (to “remain clear” of).

It’s a mere “hello” message, informing the pilot (if s/he’s listening) that the warship has radar contact.

This broadcast violated the written orders issued to the IAD radio-talker: His written talking script. Which required him to ask the pilot to identify himself and state his intentions.

This talking-script is a material fact omitted from the DoD Report, and hence a prima facie criminal lie.

This violation, by the IAD radio-talker, of his orders, is a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

An excellent criminal motive for senior U.S. military officers to conceal the radio-talker’s talking script from their deceitful report.

Query: “Issued to”?

This was a broadcast (allegedly).

Heard by whomever happened to hear it.

It was not “issued to” anybody.

But, it’s a simple matter to “issue to” a target aircraft, a broadcast.

And that’s by speaking the target’s transponder squawk code, a unique identifier, which the pilot knows. (And, of course, broadcasting on a frequency the pilot is certain to be listening to, his Air Traffic Control frequency).

Only if the radio-talker speaks the aircraft’s transponder squawk-code, can a pilot know for certain who the radio-talker is referring to. (If, of course, s/he happens to be listening to the broadcast frequency).

The recklessly negligent failure of senior U.S. military officers to require their warship radio-talkers to speak the transponder squawk-code, when seeking to broadcast to a target aircraft, is a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

An excellent criminal motive for senior U.S. military officers to conceal, from their deceitful report, the text of the recklessly negligent talking script, which they issued to their warship radio-talkers.

–CJHjr

Query: “9000 feet”?

Whoops!

We’re at 4000-4500 feet, Mr. Fogarty.

This 9000-foot recollection doesn’t belong at this point. On the timeline. Where you decided to put it.

It belongs down below.

Two minutes later.

At 0652Z.

When IR655 was at 9000 feet.

Just where the IDS recollected it.

After the IDS’s boss — an authority figure — had publicly proclaimed, the target was an F-14.

Talking on the radio to Bahrain.

Are you trying to trick and deceive us, Mr. Fogarty?

Pretending, that the chicken was the egg?

Pretending, that Lustig and Rogers had some reason to suppose the target was an F-14?

Pretending that — when they decided to lie to Less — their lie was merely negligently reckless? Instead of willfully reckless?

Query: A “possible F-14”?

This was a negligent act. To report a “possible” F-14 without also reporting it was only squawking a civilian squawk-code, staring the IDS in the face from his computer console.

His negligent failure (if that’s what he did), to report the civilian squawk-code, was a prima-facie proximate cause of the ambush.

However, the IDS was not a reckless liar. Like Lustig and Rogers were. He did not pretend to know for certain it was an F-14. As they did. That’s what the word “possible” means: Uncertainty. That’s exactly what he was. And exactly what he said. (According to Fogarty).

This would have been a less faulty report, if he had also reported the civilian-only squawk code. Displayed on the computer console of everyone in the CIC to do with aerial threats.

Including Lustig. And Rogers.

But, the IDS had neglected to note the scheduled departure on his airline schedule, when he looked at it. Or, more likely, his senior officers had recklessly neglected to inform him about the time issues, so that he could understand what he was looking at.

Yet, the IDS was negligent in failing to inquire about these time issues. Because he had a job to do. And he knew, or should have known, that he couldn’t do his job without understanding time issues.

Combining the negligence of himself and his senior officers, the IDS was negligent in failing to stand watch for this airliner.

Which his airline schedule plainly informed him was due to take off 15 minutes before it actually did.

The IDS’s task was greatly encumbered, fatally so, by the reckless negligence of senior U.S. military officers to properly equip his warship with sufficient VHF transceivers, so that he could monitor Air Traffic Control frequencies. And listen to the conversations of the pilot.

A citizen of a country with which the United States was not at war.

And which had never attacked a U.S. warship.  –CJHjr

Query: “Recalled hearing F-14 report”? “Said aloud”?

Well that’s hardly surprising.

That crew members would repeat what they heard their boss say aloud.

After Scott Lustig said it aloud.

Talking on the radio to Anthony Less, at Bahrain.

An authority figure.

Making an official report.

To another authority figure.

Looks like another misposition on the timeline.

Pretending this gaggle of witnesses recollected beforehand what, instead, they heard Lustig say out loud.

Preparing us? To excuse Scott Lustig’s F-14 lie?  –CJHjr

Query: “F-14”?

This is a reckless lie.

Scott Lustig (the radio-talker) and William Rogers (the warship commander), seated next to Lustig, both knew for a fact, they had no idea what aircraft was approaching, and that no crew member could possibly know what it was.

Yet, they lied to Less (their commander, at Bahrain) it was an F-14.

Rogers acknowledged, in his testimony, to the DoD investigators, that he didn’t know what it was. And the DoD investigators concealed from their report what he said:

Senate Hearing, p.20 (Sept. 8 1988)

This lie, by Rogers and Lustig to Less, was a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

Query: “Warned”?

The IAD broadcast was not a “warning”: It contained no threat. Issued no instructions. Requested no reply. Contrary to what Rogers and Lustig assured Less.

And this, Lustig should have known, because he was seated right next to the IAD radio-talker. Between the IAD and Rogers.

This erroneous assertion by Rogers and Lustig, misinforming Less, that they had issued a “warning,” was a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

Query: “Ignored”?

The IAD broadcast did not ask the pilot to identify himself and state his intentions (as his talking script, and a U.S. NOTAM, required him to do). Or, to alter his course. Or, to reply.

Hence, the pilot did not “ignore” the broadcast. Contrary to what Rogers and Lustig assured Less.

And this, Lustig should have known, because he was seated right next to the IAD radio-talker.

This erroneous assertion by Rogers and Lustig, misinforming Less, that the pilot had “ignored” a “warning,” was a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

Query: “Inbound”?

Rogers and Lustig concealed from Less, that the warship was in the center of an airway, and inside Iran’s territorial waters.

This location of the warship was an innocent explanation for why an aircraft from Iran might be “inbound” to the warship.

This omission, by Rogers and Lustig, concealing from Less material information, bearing on the threat assessment, and the proper application of the Rules of Engagement, was a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

Query: Illumination?

Rogers and Lustig concealed from Less, that the target had been illuminated with a fire-control radar and did not react.

This is diagnostic of a civilian aircraft.

A military aircraft has a “radar homing and warning” receiver (RHAW) which sounds a loud alarm when it receives such radar broadcasts. A military pilot, on such an occasion, will normally jenk course, to placate the radar operator, by thereby demonstrating the pilot does not intend to attack.

Civilian aircraft, including airliners, do not have such equipment and are therefore oblivious, when they are illuminated by a fire-control radar. Hence, they do not react to such illumination.

And IR655 did not react. When illuminated by the USS Sides fire-control radar, 1-minute after take-off. The USS Sides reported this illumination, to the USS Vincennes, over their Link-11.

But the USS Vincennes crew negligently paid no mind to this important information. Which their Rules of Engagement required them to pay mind to.

And, Rogers and Lustig concealed from Less, that they had not complied with their Rules of Engagement, which required them to illuminate the target, with their own fire-control radar. A necessary step in the process of identifying aerial targets.

This omission, by Rogers and Lustig, concealing from Less material information, bearing on the threat assessment, and the proper application of the Rules of Engagement, was a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

Query: Altitude?

Rogers and Lustig concealed from Less, the aircraft’s altitude. They informed Less only of its range and bearing. This, even though that altitude was staring each of them in their face — on their computer consoles (CRO), directly in front of each of them.

The high altitude of the target was a non-threatening indicator.

The DoD Report writers also concealed the altitude at the time of this radio message (at range 32 NM). At range 34 NM it was at 6160 feet. At range 29 NM it was at 7000 feet.

Extrapolating, IR655 was at 6500 feet at the time of this message to Less.

This omission, by Rogers and Lustig, concealing from Less material information, bearing on the threat assessment, and the proper application of the Rules of Engagement, was a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

Query: Flight profile?

Rogers and Lustig concealed from Less, that the aircraft had an innocent, non-threatening flight profile: Climbing, steeply and steadily, from take-off. At 1500 feet per minute.

This omission, by Rogers and Lustig, concealing from Less material information, bearing on the threat assessment, and the proper application of the Rules of Engagement, was a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

Query: Airline schedule?

Rogers and Lustig concealed from Less, that an airliner, scheduled to take off about 15 minutes earlier, had not previously taken off. An innocent explanation for the approaching, high, and climbing, target.

This omission, by Rogers and Lustig, concealing from Less material information, bearing on the threat assessment, and the proper application of the Rules of Engagement, was a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

Query: Squawk Code?

Rogers and Lustig concealed from Less, the aircraft’s civilian squawk code. This, even though that squawk code was staring each of them in their face — on their computer consoles (CRO), directly in front of each of them.

A civilian squawk code is a non-threatening indicator.

This omission, by Rogers and Lustig, concealing from Less material information, bearing on the threat assessment, and the proper application of the Rules of Engagement, was a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

–CJHjr

Richard S. Williamson (Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs, 1988-1989, a lawyer), statement, ICAO meeting, Montreal Canada, July 13 1988 (ICAO: U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization) (AP880714-0103).

______________________

Query: “Challenge”?

The Vincennes IAD radio-talker did not ask the pilot to identify himself and state his intentions.

As the U.S. NOTAM required him to do.

This warning — the first of two by the Vincennes IAD radio-talker — was broadcast (0651:09–0651:43) while the IR 655 pilot was busy talking to Tehran Area Control Center (0650:54–0651:30):

ICAO Report, p.B-16 and p.16 ¶ 2.10.8 (Nov. 7 1988)

______________________

This material fact senior U.S. military officers concealed from their DoD Report, concealed in their press conferences, and concealed in their sworn testimony to Congress. A prima facie criminal lie.

It’s a material fact, because it highlights the reckless negligence of senior U.S. military officers who failed in their duty to order their warship IAD radio-talkers to monitor and broadcast on relevant civilian ATC frequencies, and not on the IAD frequency, which no civilian aircraft is required to monitor, outside the U.S., unless they are over a vast ocean.

This reckless negligence, by senior U.S. military officers, is a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

An excellent criminal motive for senior U.S. military officers to unite, in a prima facie criminal conspiracy, to lie in an official U.S. Government report, and to lie to Congress, by concealing, from their deceitful report, the text and time-stamps, of the radio conversations by the IR 655 pilot and the time-stamps of the Vincennes IAD broadcast.

Query: “Unidentified aircraft”?

IR 655 was not an “unidentified aircraft”:

It was well identified, by its transponder (SSR) squawk code staring the Vincennes IAD radio-talker in the face from his computer console (CRO).

The recklessly negligent failure of senior U.S. military officers to require their warship radio-talkers to speak the transponder squawk-code, when seeking to broadcast to a target aircraft, is a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

An excellent criminal motive for senior U.S. military officers to unite, in a prima facie criminal conspiracy, to lie in an official U.S. Government report, and to lie to Congress, by concealing, from their deceitful report, the text of the recklessly negligent talking script, which they issued to their warship radio-talkers.

Query: “Your identity is not known”?

The Vincennes IAD radio-talker did not ask the pilot to identify himself and state his intentions. As a U.S. NOTAM required all U.S. radio-talkers to do.

This violation, by the Vincennes IAD radio-talker, of the U.S. NOTAM, is a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

An excellent criminal motive for senior U.S. military officers to unite, in a prima facie criminal conspiracy, to lie in an official U.S. Government report, and to lie to Congress, by concealing, from their deceitful report, the text of that U.S. NOTAM. And the text of the radio-talker’s talking script, which they negligently drafted and issued to him.

Query: “To 270”?

These words were not broadcast by the Vincennes radio-talker. They were broadcast by the Sides radio-talker, according to the later ICAO Report, p.16 ¶ 2.10.8 (Nov. 7 1988).

A material omission and a prima facie criminal lie. Because it concealed this:

The recklessly negligent failure of the Vincennes IAD radio-talker to give the pilot instructions — as his talking-script required him to do. This is a prima facie proximate cause of the ambush.

And this: The Sides was apparently broadcasting at the same time as the Vincennes, nullifying the “warning,” because nobody can understand people talking at the same time on a radio.

An excellent criminal motive for senior U.S. military officers to unite, in a prima facie criminal conspiracy, to lie in an official U.S. Government report, and to lie to Congress, that these words were spoken by the Vincennes radio-talker, when — in fact — the Vincennes radio-talker recklessly neglected to speak these words.

And an excellent criminal motive for senior U.S. military officers to unite, in a prima facie criminal conspiracy, to lie in an official U.S. Government report, and to lie to Congress, by concealing from their deceitful report, transcripts of actual VHF broadcasts, an unintelligible jumble.  –CJHjr

Query: “Holding both tracks”?

How can an aircraft carrier, over the horizon, in the Northern Gulf of Oman, be “holding both tracks” on targets out of reach of its radar?

The report doesn’t give the position of the Forrestal. IR655 being at 9000 feet at this time, the Forrestal would have to be within 110 n.miles, to have line of sight on it, with its own radar.

But Link-11 is the likely answer instead. A radio broadcast encoding radar track data: coordinates, altitude, and such (I suppose), from which the computer can compute course and speed and range and bearing to the various warships on that Link-11 net.

The Vincennes and the Sides each broadcast Link-11 data and, apparently, via “link 11 OE-82 satellite communications antenna”. (ICAO Report ¶ 1.16.1.3, p.8, describing Vincennes equipment).

And that presumably is what the Forrestal received: radar track data, via Link-11, via satellite.

  –CJHjr

Richard S. Williamson (Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs, 1988-1989, a lawyer), statement, ICAO meeting, Montreal Canada, July 13 1988 (ICAO: U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization) (AP880714-0103).

______________________

Query: “Challenge”?

The Vincennes IAD radio-talker did not ask the pilot to identify himself and state his intentions.

As the U.S. NOTAM required him to do.

The first warning, the Vincennes IAD radio-talker broadcast (allegedly) while the pilot was busy talking on another frequency, to Air Traffic Control.

This is his second and final warning.

He allegedly broadcast it while the pilot was one n.mile offshore Iranian soil, 22-25 n.miles from international waters, at 10,000 feet and climbing.

That deep inside Iranian territory, that close to Iranian soil, that far from where any warship might be, and that high, the pilot might not be monitoring the IAD frequency.

Also, the pilot was not headed for the warship. According to the radio-talker, the pilot’s course (210) was different from his bearing to the warship (201). And this means, the aircraft would pass more than 3 n.miles wide of the warship, at 14,550 feet. Way above the NOTAM’s 2,000 foot safety limit.

Or, he could not recognize himself in the warship broadcast.

Because the USS Sides might have been broadcasting at the same time, on the same frequency — an unintelligible jumble of simultaneous broadcasts no human being could understand.

Senior U.S. military officers concealed four of the five Sides warnings from their report. Presumably, to conceal this very fact. Likewise, this is surely the reason they did not disclose any recording or transcripts of any actual VHF broadcasts. They only disclosed a transcript of portions of the internal Vincennes IAD communication net, before it reached the VHF transmitter. And, it may never have been broadcast anyway. There is no trustworthy proof it was.

Even if the Vincennes did broadcast, and even if the Sides did not “step on” the Vincennes broadcast, the pilot would have a hard time knowing who the radio-talker was talking to. This, because senior U.S. military officers recklessly failed in their duty, to require their warship radio-talker to comply with international Air Traffic Control regulations, and speak the aircraft’s unique squawk-code.

And because senior U.S. military officers recklessly failed in their duty, to require their warship radio-talker to broadcast on the Air Traffic Control frequency. Which the pilot was required to monitor. Using the radio-talker’s main VHF transceiver, or his backup VHF. Which he surely had. And which the deceitful report-writers concealed from their report. Nobody goes anywhere in any warship or aircraft without a backup radio, in case one fails.

The Vincennes radio-talker in this broadcast did not ask the pilot to change course, as his talking script required him to do. And, he did not ask the pilot “to identify themselves and state their intentions,” as the U.S. NOTAM required him to do.

Not much of a “warning,” that a firing key will be turned, in exactly one minute (0654:05), and you’ll be dead, in less than two minutes (0654:43).

Even if he broadcast on the right frequency.

And even if he spoke the squawk-code.

Fishy.

And especially so, as the Vincennes IAD radio-talker did not use the mandatory emergency language (“Mayday, Mayday, Mayday”). Even though he was seated right next to Scott Lustig and heard Lustig announce his intention to attack. A minute and a half earlier.

Very, very, Fishy.

But very understandable, as part of Operation Praying Mantis. An unlawful, offensive, prima facie criminal, war of aggression, to destroy Iran’s military assets.

The prima facie violent criminals in such an unlawful U.S. Military Operation seek a pretext to attack. Like Vincennes Commander William Rogers did, when he unlawfully attacked the small boats.

And if they convince themselves, that an approaching aircraft is military, or recklessly hope so, and are willing to gamble, then they likely too would give a purposely defective “warning,” to trick the pilot into doing nothing, so they can kill him, and later claim they did nothing wrong, because they gave him a “warning”.

Is this why they also did not illuminate him with their fire-control radar? As their Rules of Engagement required them to do? Until they launched their missiles? So the pilot would not have a chance to jenk course? To save himself? By demonstrating no hostile intent?

Sick. (If that’s what they did).

But what they claim is, that their unqualified officer did not know what buttons to push, or that he needed to push any buttons, to authorize a lock-on with a fire control radar.

This, because Rogers violated Navy Regulations, and negligently certified as qualified, an officer whom he knew was not qualified, for want of training, to do the job.

  –CJHjr

Richard S. Williamson (Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs, 1988-1989, a lawyer), statement, ICAO meeting, Montreal Canada, July 13 1988 (ICAO: U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization) (AP880714-0103).

______________________

Query: “Challenge”?

The Sides IAD radio-talker did not ask the pilot to identify himself and state his intentions.

As the U.S. NOTAM required him to do.

This is what the Sides radio-talker actually said:

ICAO Report, p.B-16. {Time, from ICAO Report, p.B-16 and p.16 ¶ 2.10.8 (Nov. 7 1988).  –CJHjr}

The distance in yards (15.3 n.miles) is U.S. Navy jargon, for surface distance, unknown to pilots. So too, the term “mode-3,” referring to a military transponder, which can broadcast civilian responses in addition to military responses (modes 1, 2, 4).

The Sides radio-talker broadcast this warning as the pilot was approaching MOBET, a mandatory Air Traffic Control reporting waypoint, 12 n.miles inside Iran’s territory.

17 seconds after this broadcast, the pilot commenced his mandatory report, to the Bandar Abbas Approach/Departure Control (0654:00–0654:11).

When he finished, he was obliged to switch frequencies, to the Tehran Area Control Center (relayed to Tehran via a microwave telecoms network, from an antenna at the Bandar Abbas airport), to make his next mandatory report, less than a minute later, when he reached his assigned flight level 140 (14,550 feet, on that day).

More than 12 n.miles deep inside his own territory, just a mile or two offshore, on the verge of broadcasting these two mandatory reports, and changing frequencies, the pilot was not likely monitoring the IAD frequency.

Senior U.S. military officers recklessly failed in their duty, to require their warship radio-talker to broadcast on the Air Traffic Control frequency. The frequency the pilot was required to monitor.

This ‘warning’ too does not contain emergency language (“Mayday, Mayday, Mayday”).

Yet, it was an heroic effort, by the Sides radio-talker, butting into somebody else’s business, doing the best he knew how to do, to warn the pilot.

While the pilot was switching frequencies, two missiles from the warship were enroute, on their 21 second flight.

Precisely one minute after the Sides broadcast, the aircraft, and its 290 souls on board, were shredded, by two explosions, and 10,000 steel ball bearings (0654:43).

  –CJHjr