IR655: DoD Press Briefings

 

August 19 1988 Defense Department Briefing Concerning the Report on the Shootdown of the Iranian Airbus by the USS Vincennes Aegis Cruiser

News Briefing by Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. at the Pentagon Friday, August 19, 1988, 11:00 a.m. {EDT}, C-Span video (request) {44:55, smil, 50mb.rm, August 19, 144327685, 4065-1}.

{ DoD transcript, conformed to the C-Span video }

{in progress}

ASD/PA Dan Howard {Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs}: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. ¶

The Secretary and the Chairman will be with you in just a moment. ¶

The Secretary has a few remarks at the beginning. He will introduce the Chairman. The Chairman has a long narrative statement which he will make and then the Secretary will return to the podium and take your questions. You can also direct your questions to the Chairman. ¶

We will have a copy of the unclassified versions of the Fogarty report {740kb.html} available to you at the conclusion of this briefing. Also, the unclassified versions of the first endorsement by General Crist at CENTCOM, and the second endorsement by the Chairman and the third endorsement and final review by the Secretary. ¶

So we’ll have all of that available right outside the door as soon as we finish the briefing.

{ C-Span video begins here }

Secretary Frank C. Carlucci: Good morning.

As Dan says, we are today issuing the report of the investigation conducted by Admiral Fogarty and his team on the circumstances surrounding the downing of Iranian Air flight 655.

In addition we will make available to you endorsements of this report by General Crist, CENTCOM Commander; Admiral Crowe; and myself.

A copy of the report has been provided to the President. The President has been briefed on the findings and on the endorsements and concurs in them.

I’ll call on Admiral Crowe in a moment to outline the report for you, but let me say at the outset that in my judgment this has been a thorough investigation.

I believe the facts to the extent they can be known are clearly presented in the report and I commend Admiral Fogarty and his team for a thorough job.

On the day that the incident occurred, Admiral Crowe appeared before you and made available virtually every scrap of information that we had in our possession.

This was a deliberate decision.

We chose not to withhold anything.

Admiral Crowe stated repeatedly that our initial information, as is always the case, was sketchy, preliminary, and very likely to prove false in some instances.

But nonetheless, we decided to go ahead with it, running the risk that there would subsequently be stories that the Pentagon had put out mistaken information, and indeed we’ve had some of those stories.

We now have a complete report which tells a very complex story and I hope you will help us convey to the public the very complexity of the situation.

This tragedy occurred, of course, {p.2} in the context of the long and bloody Iran-Iraq War. The ceasefire is scheduled to go into effect tomorrow, and the whole world hopes that this chapter of suffering, conflict, and tension will be closed.

The President has already expressed our great regret at the loss of life in this tragedy, just as we regret the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives in this long and difficult war.

This week Admiral Crowe and I have spent hours going over this report.

The other day I said to Admiral Crowe, it’s very hard to get a sense of this report just reading the written word. Let’s see if we can’t get a mock-up.

So yesterday Admiral Crowe and I and some others flew down to Wallops Point where they have a mock-up of the Aegis System. We had the tapes replayed once in real time, once in slow motion so to speak, so we could go over every step of the incident.

A couple of things come through to you very clearly when you go through this process.

One is the sense of inexorability when you see that one target moving steadily at you on a constant bearing, decreasing range, refusing to respond or not responding to all of the challenges and in total I think there were some 12 challenges between the Vincennes and the Sides.

The other thing that comes through is the number of things you have to concentrate on.

The Captain, and in this case the Force Anti-Air Warfare Controller had before them two large display screens: the Captain with his screen on a larger scale working the surface situation, the surface combat that was underway; and the Anti-Air Warfare Controller worrying not just about this track but about an Iranian P-3 over to the west, a couple of E2C’s or an E2C taking off from a carrier, and worrying about communicating with Commander Task Force Middle East.

Bear in mind that all of this is happening within, well a total of about seven minutes from the time the plane was first spotted and the actual decision process and the firing is closer to four minutes, the time that the Captain began to focus on it.

So there were a tremendous number of things to do and a lot of distractions.

There are a couple of things that can’t be replicated in a simulator.

The number of voices coming at you over the ear phones being one.

Or the actual environment in which they were operating.

It’s important to bear in mind that this ship was engaged in combat with Iranian Boghammers. There have been reports of sounds of metal hitting the side of the ship which we assumed and still assume today were bullets from the Boghammer.

The ship had a foul mount, mount 51 {16kb.jpg, 110kb.jpg, 461kb.jpg}, and had to turn, a 30 degree turn. This turn took place just at the crucial decision point so it was heeling over at about a 32 degree angle and things were falling in the CIC, lights were flickering, and in the background guns were booming.

I dare say it would be hard {p.3} to even have this press conference under those conditions, much less reach a crucial decision on a number of targets during a very short time frame.

Nonetheless, the investigators found that the Captain acted prudently on the basis of the information available to him.

Both Admiral Crowe and I and General Crist concurred in that judgment.

Admiral Crowe has given me a clearly detailed presentation of his views, and I’ll let him now summarize those for you.

Admiral William J. Crowe Jr.: Good morning.

Secretary Carlucci has just informed you of the action he’s taken on the Vincennes investigation.

I forwarded my advice yesterday to him and will go over briefly some of the major points of my review.

Admiral Fogarty’s investigation was conducted with complete independence from any pre-conceived notions of culpability or non-culpability.

The investigation after four weeks of work submitted its findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations to Commander in Chief U.S. Central Command.

The main recommendation of the investigation was that no disciplinary action should be taken against any U.S. Naval personnel associated with this incident.

I concurred, and so recommended to the Secretary.

Let me briefly touch on the highlights of ay review.

An examination of the events on 3 July leads quickly to the conclusion that Iran must share the responsibility of the tragedy and the investigation so found.

By any measure, it was unconscionable to ignore the repeated warnings of the United States and to permit an airliner to take off from a joint military/civilian airfield and fly directly into the midst of the ongoing surface action in the Strait of Hormuz which the Iranians themselves had initiated.

The tragic events of July 3rd did not occur in a vacuum as the Secretary explained to you.

They happened in an area where 37 American sailors on board the USS Stark had been killed by an air attack in May 1987 and where our military has been tested by fire time and again over the last year.

The actions of Captain Rogers and the Vincennes crew must be judged in that context.

The investigation paints in vivid terms the history of our commitment, the Iranian threats, intelligence reports, and the commanding officer’s fundamental responsibility to protect his ship and his people.

It also describes in detail the stress which surrounded events in Vincennes on July 3.

During the critical seven minutes that flight 655 was airborne, Captain Rogers and his CIC team were conducting a {p.4} surface action, tracking a multitude of contacts, coordinating U.S. units, and trying to sort out friend from foe with spotty information.

He had a genuine dilemma.

In the midst of all this, the threatening air contact was closing at five to six miles a minute, and he felt if it continued to present a danger he should fire before it got much closer than ten miles.

The villains of the piece were six significant problems which plagued the Captain and which he could not control or discount.

It was only prudent for Captain Rogers to assume that the contact was related to his engagement with the Iranian boats until proven otherwise.

The proof never came.

Given the time available, the commanding officer could hardly meet his obligation to protect his ship and crew and also clear up all of the possible anomalies or ambiguities.

It is not unusual in combat to have to deal with uncertainties and conflicting information.

Although it might not seem fair, commanding officers do not have the luxury of reconciling all such questions before committing themselves.

They have to go with the weight of the evidence and their best judgment.

These are the realities of combat.

The commanding officer, if he is to be effective, must be given the latitude to deal with them.

Admiral Fogarty’s investigation alto revealed that mistakes were made on board Vincennes that day. That in itself is not surprising to anyone who understands the stress of hostile action in a life or death situation. No military combat operation is flawless, even when there is a successful outcome. The more important question in this case was whether those mistakes were critical to the tragic result.

Our early Washington briefings of the accident were based on information received from the ship shortly after the action, some of which were found by the investigation to be incorrect. Let me comment on the significant items.

Admiral Fogarty’s probing revealed the IFF emission from flight 655 was Mode 3 which a commercial aircraft normally uses. The Vincennes also detected a contradictory Mode 2 military squawk and mistakenly concluded that it came from flight 655. That detection did lead the CIC team to declare the contact an F-14. Much has been made of that error. However, this decision must be understood in the total context. It was not a crucial element in Captain Roger’s ultimate decision to {p.5} fire. Military aircraft on attack runs can disguise their identity using civilian IFF signals, or on occasion, no IFF signal at all. For example, significantly Iranian F-4’s operating against U.S. units on 18 April were squawking only Mode 3, the civilian code.

Under standard procedures even if the F-14 designation had not been made, the plane would have remained designated an unidentified assumed hostile and would have been treated as a potential threat by the captain and the crew. That was standard procedure.

Questions have been raised about the ship’s initial report that the aircraft was outside of the air corridor. The report was wrong. Whether or not an aircraft is in a commercial air corridor is a peripheral point to a commanding officer engaged in hostile action, particularly when the corridor covers the engagement area. The Persian Gulf is blanketed by commercial air routes. They cover over 50 percent of the Gulf. Captain Rogers testified that in his experience commercial airliners tried hard to stay on the center line of the corridor. He did not focus on the fact that the corridor is 20 miles wide, but rather that the contact was three to four miles off the median. The CO interpreted that as unusual.

Perhaps the most puzzling mistake was the ultimate call of flight 655 as descending instead of climbing. The investigation concluded that the range in altitude information passed to the commanding officer was correct until the airbus reached a range of approximately 15 miles from Vincennes. Captain Rogers had already received permission to fire from his immediate superior. One of the radar operators reported at 11 miles that the aircraft was no longer climbing and that the altitude had commenced to decrease, a report that was not supported by a subsequent review of the Aegis tapes. Two other reports of descending altitude may have been made at 10 and 9 miles. It is not altogether clear. The last report was apparently announced after the decision to fire had been made. In fact, the investigation concluded that the time between the initial report of decreasing altitude and the decision to fire was in the neighborhood of 20 to 30 seconds.

It is impossible to say with assurance how those two inputs bore on the commanding officer’s final decision.

But it is important to keep in mind, that the CO had this information for only 20 to 30 seconds, and that during this interval, he was involved in other things, as well as preparations to fire.

The investigation made the point clearly that this was only one consideration among the many in the CO’s mind.

Singly, these errors or mistakes were not crucial to the fateful decision. Even cumulatively they do not appear to change {p.6} the picture in a decisive way.

The commanding officer never received the clear evidence, that he felt he needed, to establish that the Iranian aircraft had not come to participate in the ongoing surface action.

Our past experience in the Gulf, the intelligence available to the ship, and the rules of engagement, all supported such a judgment.

I believe that given the operating environment, Captain Rogers acted reasonably, and did what his nation expected of him, in the defense of his ship and crew.

In all good conscience, I concur with Admiral Fogarty’s finding, that there was no culpable conduct, displayed on board Vincennes.

This regrettable accident, and it was an accident, was a byproduct of the Iran-Iraq War, and saddened all Americans, most of all, the crew of the Vincennes.

{ Q&As, C-Span video at 17:27 }

Carlucci (SecDef): Why don’t we take questions.

Question 1: Mr. Secretary, you outlined a number of mistakes.

You say none of them were crucial, but it raises the question of what they did right. What did the crew of the Vincennes do right?

And if all of these are understandable mistakes, is not the captain of the ship responsible for the training of his crew.

Shouldn’t he have to take responsibility, for the mistakes they make?

Carlucci (SecDef): Well, the question is not whether mistakes were made. Mistakes are made in virtually every combat situation.

The question is whether the mistakes were made through negligence, or whether there is culpability. And the determination is that no, these mistakes were not due to negligence, or culpability.

And that includes the question of how the captain organized his CIC {Combat Information Center}.

He made some changes in the CIC structure. He gave additional responsibilities to one officer, Lieutenant Commander Lustig, in effect making him ship’s Anti-Air Warfare Controller as well as Force Anti-Air Warfare Controller, because he had tactical control of the Sides at the time.

Which put a substantial burden on Lieutenant Commander Lustig.

Well, one can say, maybe the captain should not have done that. That was, once again, within his prerogative. Who knows, whether it would have made any difference in the outcome? I myself, doubt it.

Similarly, as Admiral Crowe has said, the mistakes in shouting out range, probably wouldn’t have substantially affected the outcome. Certainly there was no negligence there. In connection with the misidentification of the Mode 2 squawk, that was due to the radar operator leaving his range gate at the airport.

We think it was due to that, leaving it at the airport, for 90 seconds, instead of moving it.

The ship had undergone extensive training. The investigating team found that the training had been adequate.

There were a number of things, to answer your question, there were a number of things clearly that were done right, including the engagement of the Boghammers, securing the helicopter.

The principal responsibility of the commanding officer, and I can’t emphasize this too strongly, under the rules of engagement, is to protect his ship.

The finding is, that the captain behaved prudently, and {p.7} within the rules of engagement, based on the information that he had received.

So the question is not whether mistakes were made. There is no military operation that is error-free. Admiral Crowe, I’m sure, will verify that.

The question is whether the mistakes were critical, and whether they were due to culpability, or negligence, and the finding is that they were not.

Molly?

Question 2: Admiral Crowe, did the investigation show how the operator misread whether the plane was descending or ascending?

Isn’t that a digital readout? he would be looking at?

Carlucci (SecDef): It is a digital readout.

And we went over, and went down the digital readout, yesterday.

The report talks a little bit about the possibility of a scenarial fulfillment syndrome, which could have happened, once the airplane was identified as F-14.

There is also the possibility that he could have—

He, or some of the listeners, could have confused range and altitude.

But, once again, the fundamental point is, what Admiral Crowe said, that this reading of descending altitude was made within 20 to 30 seconds of the time of firing. And it’s really questionable, whether a different reading would have affected the judgment at that point.

It would have had to have been a negative decision, by the captain, at that point in time.

Bill? Do you want to add anything?

Crowe (CJCS): No. The specific question you asked, it was never adequately reconciled.

Question 3: Mr. Secretary, during the efforts to replicate this particular incident, were the tapes played through the Vincennes, or through the tape readers, in an automatic mode.

And did the Vincennes, on its own, without human involvement, elect to fire.

Carlucci (SecDef): You mean, in replicating?

I’m not sure I understand—

Question 3a: In trying to replicate the incident.

The Vincennes will operate in automatic mode, if you turn it on, so it will automatically fire.

Carlucci (SecDef): I’ll have to defer to Admiral Fogarty, or Admiral Crowe.

Fogarty (RAdm): It was in manual, that day, not automatic.

Question 3b: Did you try it in automatic?

To see if it would replicate the incident?

Fogarty (RAdm): No. We didn’t need to, because our investigation was based on the fact that it was in manual.

Crowe (CJCS): It would not make a decision itself to fire, just—

Unless you had decided all these other parameters were right, and you could fire the minute you got in the envelope.

Question 3c: It could make a conclusion though, that you should fire, and then you make the decision.

Crowe (CJCS): But there’s an awful lot of information involved in a firing decision that is not in the computer. The Iran-Iraq War, the Boghammers, the bullets impinging on it, the intelligence report, the experience of the last year, the RoE.

The computer doesn’t sort them all out. {p.8}

Question 4: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, sir, were there any recommendations, or have any actions been taken, in the nature of non-punitive punishment?

Of the type that you don’t normally discuss?

Carlucci (SecDef): General Crist, in his endorsement, indicated that he was issuing a non-punitive letter of censure, to Lieutenant Commander Lustig, basically because of the failure of Lieutenant Commander Lustig to verify the data coming to him.

By that, I assume he means, the designation of F-14 — although that would have been very difficult to verify, in fact impossible for him to verify — but more significantly, the range data, that was received, within the last 30 to 40 seconds, prior to firing.

The investigators did not reach that kind of a determination.

Admiral Crowe has recommended to me, and I have accepted his recommendation, that that letter be withdrawn.

First of all, let me emphasize, that it is a non-punitive letter. And the purpose of a non-punitive letter is to try and explain things, and teach lessons.

It is Admiral Crowe’s judgment, and I share that judgment, that in the current circumstances, with all the publicity surrounding this incident, there is no such thing, as a non-punitive letter. Any letter that is sent is going to be punitive.

Therefore, I have decided to withdraw the letter.

Question 5: Secretary Carlucci, you mentioned, that the radar operator may have made a mistake, reading the Mode 3, Mode 2, that particular crucial mistake, because his range finder was still at the airport? on the scope?

Can you explain that mistake?

And was not that mistake a crucial one, mixed with the intelligence, that F-14’s had been squawking different modes?

Carlucci (SecDef): Well it is not crucial, as Admiral Crowe pointed out, in the sense that you still had these fundamental factors:

You had an unidentified aircraft, that had lifted off from a civilian airport, that was on constant bearing, decreasing range, did not emit any radar signals, had refused to respond to seven warnings, from the Vincennes — and five from the Sides — and was closing rapidly.

So, even if it had not been designated, an F-14, they probably would have considered it a hostile aircraft.

Now, the explanation — and this gets a bit technical, and I’m perhaps not the best person qualified to do it, and I’ll defer to others, in a minute — is, that you have a spy radar, which will do IFF.

But you also have something called an RCI, a remote control indicator, which is a separate, manual, IFF, generally used for backup.

And there, you have to put the ball, or the range gate, on the target.

And the radar operator apparently left his range gate on the target, a little bit too long.

And it is possible, that due to ducting, in the Persian Gulf, that that RCI picked up the Mode 2 squawk.

That’s, that’s speculation.

We do know, that he had his range gate on the target, on the airport, on the airfield, for about 90 seconds.

We cannot verify from tapes what he actually picked up.

There is no Mode 2 squawk on the tapes. {p.9}

And Bill, if you, or any of your experts, want to add anything.

Crowe (CJCS): I just wanted to add, on the word “crucial.”

That the guidance advises the commanding officer, not to put that as a single piece of information, to make decisions, on the base of it.

Because we know, that the Iranians can, and do, play with the IFF, in order to confuse our ships.

It is supporting information, but it is not crucial, in itself.

Question 6: You say these mistakes weren’t crucial.

But it seems to be the accumulation, of mistakes, that was crucial.

The misidentification—

Crowe (CJCS): I don’t know how you can say that.

Question 6a: Well, the misidentification, on the squawking IFF.

The descending report, from the radar operator.

Crowe (CJCS): But he had a lot of other information.

Question 6b: But you get—

You don’t—

When you put all of these—

Crowe (CJCS): I mean, you got to explain to me, what you mean, when you make that general statement.

And I don’t accept it.

{Crosstalk}

Carlucci (SecDef): The critical facts are, that you had an unidentified aircraft, lifting off from a combined civilian/military field, airfield, heading into a zone, where there’s a battle going on, on a constant bearing, decreasing range, that did not acknowledge any, of 12 challenges.

Those are the crucial facts.

Question 7: What about the commercial airlines schedules, in the area?

Was the Vincennes unable to check those?

Carlucci (SecDef): They did check the commercial airlines schedule.

That too does not, is not a crucial element.

So there’s—

Actually, the plane was some 20 minutes behind schedule.

So, the—

Question 8: But that’s normal.

Crowe (CJCS): It doesn’t say that, on the schedule.

Question 9: Mr. Secretary, what happened when they checked the schedule?

Did they see the fact, that flight 655 was scheduled, for that time period?

Or did they miss that, also?

Carlucci (SecDef): I believe I’ll have to defer to Admiral Fogarty.

Fogarty (RAdm): He referred to the schedule, and the plane took off 27 minutes late.

Carlucci (SecDef): He did identify, he identified 655 on the schedule.

If your question is, was it on the schedule that he had, the answer is yes.

Question 10: Did he call it to Captain Rogers’ attention?

That there is a flight 655, scheduled to take off, from Bandar Abbas airport, heading for Dubai, at about this time?

Carlucci (SecDef): There was one officer, in the CIC, that did say, “Possible com air.” Possible commercial air.

Question 11: Mr. Secretary, excuse me.

Are you all saying, that these mistakes are in no way responsible, for the downing of this airliner?

You use the word “crucial.”

But there is some responsibility here.

And these mistakes are in no way responsible for that?

Carlucci (SecDef): If your question is, had these mistakes not been made, would the events have unfolded in a different direction.

Obviously, {p.10} no one can say for sure.

It is the judgment, of those who have investigated this, and it is Admiral Crowe’s judgment, which I accept, that the errors were not crucial to the decision.

That is to say, the factors that I just listed, and the factors that Admiral Crowe has listed, were fundamental to the decision.

And that these mistakes did not alter those fundamental factors.

Question 12: Did the investigation disclose any evidence, that the pilot of the Iran air jet, or the ground controllers in Iran, were aware of the warnings?

And secondly, did the ship make any effort to communicate, with the tower at Bandar Abbas, to determine whether this could have been a commercial aircraft?

Carlucci (SecDef): We have no indications, that the air controller was aware of the warnings, although I’ll have to defer once again to the experts.

Admiral Fogarty?

Fogarty (RAdm): We tried to retrieve the black box, and we were unsuccessful, so we did not confirm that the pilot heard the warnings, or the tower.

Question 13: Was there any effort to communicate with the tower at Bandar Abbas, to see whether this might be a commercial aircraft?

Carlucci (SecDef): Not to my knowledge.

No. I don’t believe there was.

But once again, you have to put yourself inside that CIC, in a four minute time frame, with a lot of things going on.

The ship heeling over, 30 degree turn, firing at small boats, everybody focused on the small ship engagement.

Now, one can think of a thousand different things, the captain might have done.

But how many of those things are reasonable to do, during that short time frame, under the conditions that I just described.

Question 14: Are you going to make any changes, in the operating procedures of the Aegis, or any modifications to the Aegis equipment?

Carlucci (SecDef): No.

We’ve discussed that, and the report does suggest a few things, that I think are healthy.

One is, that there be some adjustment, to the large screen display.

Indeed, I myself when I looked at the large screen and then wanted to determine the range, or altitude, of an object on the screen, found that I had to look down, at the computer readout, so-called CRO. And I had to use my finger to track it. I assume if you’re more familiar with it you don’t have to use your finger.

But nonetheless, you are distracted looking down.

So we think it’s a good idea to display altitude and range on the large screen. I think you could probably even put an arrow, on whether it’s ascending or descending.

A recommendation has been made, that there be an additional talker, voice communicator, put in the CIC, to help communicate with superior commands.

Because that was being done by one of the officers.

Admiral Crowe has recommended, that we look at the process, for certain critical designations. That is to say, designation of an aircraft as an F-14, to see whether there shouldn’t {p.11} automatically be some checks, on that process.

The report recommends, that a psychological profile be developed, for certain critical jobs, in the Aegis system.

So, there are a series of recommendations, looking at what can be done, to improve both the system and the people operating it.

Question 15: So, the equipment itself, and the procedures, did contribute, to the errors made.

Carlucci (SecDef): No.

The equipment—

The equipment functioned as designed.

We cannot find any errors in the equipment.

Question 16: Then you’re indicating, it wasn’t designed correctly.

Carlucci (SecDef): I’m not indicating, it wasn’t designed correctly.

I am indicating, that as you go through experience, with any weapon system, you improve the design.

Crowe (CJCS): Particularly in combat.

Carlucci (SecDef): Particularly in combat.

And we’re taking this experience, and trying to make some improvements, that will make it easier, for people to read the display, and to communicate with each other.

Once again, who knows, whether these would have been critical elements.

It does not seem to me that they are critical elements, at all.

Question 17: Mr. Secretary, you indicated that one officer in the CIC said, that it was a possible commercial aircraft.

Were you able to identify who that was?

And on what he based that?

And to whom he communicated that?

Carlucci (SecDef): It was a CIC officer, and he simply made the statement, on circuit 15, I assume, which was—

Fogarty (RAdm): He just announced it, directly.

Carlucci (SecDef): He said it directly.

He was standing behind the commanding officer.

His name is in the report.

Question 18: Mr. Secretary, the Iranians indicated, or made the point, at the time this happened:

That the plane was in frequent radio communication with the control tower, from the time the engines were turned on, until shortly before it was shot down.

And they said, this information should have been available to the Vincennes, and made it clear, this was a commercial aircraft.

Can you comment on that?

Carlucci (SecDef): They certainly didn’t make it available to the Vincennes. And as we say,—

Question 19: {crosstalk:} They said, you should have been monitoring—

Carlucci (SecDef): —it is certainly negligent, for a country to start a fire fight, and then allow an aircraft, a civilian aircraft, to go directly into that fire fight.

But we, the ship, the Vincennes, was not in communication with the control tower.

And as a practical matter, if you just sit in that simulator, that kind of communication is not possible, during the short time frame, in which decisions had to be made.

Question 20: Did the Vincennes, or any of the ships in the task force, in the immediate area, pick up any of the communications {p.12} between the AirBus and the control tower?

Carlucci (SecDef): I do not believe so.

Question 21: Mr. Secretary, with the ceasefire going into effect tomorrow, have there been any changes in the force status, in the Persian Gulf, or are you contemplating any?

Carlucci (SecDef): No.

There have been no changes, in the force status, in the Persian Gulf.

As I’ve indicated, on numerous occasions, we keep the ROE under continual review, based on the nature of the threat.

And as soon as the threat abates, we’ll take another look at the ROE, and we’ll take a look at the number of ships we need, in the Gulf.

But, as a prudent matter, we want to make sure, that the ceasefire takes hold. We don’t want to put our people in jeopardy, by beginning to withdraw our ships too soon.

On the other hand, we’re just as anxious as the next person to get them out of there.

Question 22: As a result of the Iran Air incident, are you contemplating any changes in the ROE?

Carlucci (SecDef): Once again, we review the RoE, based on the nature of the threat.

We keep it under continuous review.

We did review it, in the light of the Iranian Air incident.

And we have not changed the fundamental aspects of the ROE.

Question 23: Mr. Secretary, could you clarify one thing.

I think, Admiral Crowe, you said there were seven warnings that went unanswered.

Mr. Secretary, I think you said there were a dozen challenges.

Carlucci (SecDef): Challenge and warning are the same thing.

The other five were from the Sides.

Question 24: Did the Sides tell the Vincennes, at any time, that the ship was climbing and not descending?

Carlucci (SecDef): I don’t believe, that that was—

No. That was—

Crowe (CJCS): There wasn’t any disagreement, except that last 20 seconds, when the Sides did not know—

Question 25: Gentlemen, one point of clarification.

You both said, that the failure of the AirBus, to emit clear radar signals, was one of the elements, that contributed to the decision, that it was potentially hostile.

Why is that?

Had the plane been an F-14, trying to search for a ship on the surface, trying to zero in, to fire on it, would it have been emitting radar signals?

Crowe (CJCS): Yes, it would have been distinguishing.

In other words, if the F-14 had been using the radar it normally does, it would have definitely identified it as an F-14.

If the AirBus had had its air weather radar on, and we’d picked it up, it would definitely have identified it, as a commercial aircraft.

Incidentally, the commanding officer, that was the one thing he was really zeroing in on, the last few seconds.

He kept asking for readouts. In fact held up firing because of that. He wanted a readout on the radar. And he never got it. {p.13}

Dan Howard: Ladies and gentlemen, a lot of these questions that you’re asking are going to be answered by the paper that we’re going to provide you with, by the reviews that were done by General Crist, by Admiral Crowe.

And we will have those available for you, at the conclusion of this.

Why don’t we wrap up, with 3 or 4 more questions.

Carlucci (SecDef): Well, let me take one, over here {gesturing left}.

Question 26: Mr. Secretary, you said, the investigating team said, the training of the Aegis crew was adequate.

Now three weeks ago, the General Accounting Office came out with a report, on DoD’s Operational Test and Evaluation Office.

Within that report they said the training of the Aegis system was inadequate. Primarily they said the amount of stress placed on the crews in training was not adequate to simulate a combat situation.

Will you be going back and looking at the training?

Carlucci (SecDef): We will be responding to the GAO report. Unfortunately, as happens in many cases, the GAO did not ask our views before they issued that report.

Question 27: Actually they did.

They did sit down with OT&E.

Carlucci (SecDef): But they did not submit the report to us, and ask for our views, on that particular point, that’s my recollection.

But we will be responding.

Question 28: Mr. Secretary, does the report vindicate the Aegis weapon system?

Carlucci (SecDef): I don’t know what you mean.

The Aegis weapon system was never on trial.

So it’s not a question of vindicating it.

Did it work as designed?

The answer is yes. It worked as designed.

Question 29: Mr. Secretary, there were, several reports that came out, that there was some difficulty, in launching the standard missiles, that someone was having problems getting the missiles launched.

Were there errors made?

Were there problems getting those fired?

Carlucci (SecDef): Lieutenant Zucker {Clay Zocher} — who was the Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator, but who had had his responsibilities somewhat reduced — did have some trouble.

I guess that was trouble illuminating the aircraft.

There was no trouble is firing the standard missile.

Question 30: Admiral Crowe, you said this plane was sending no radar signals.

I’m a bit confused about the transponders.

Were there any transponder signals, at all?

Crowe (CJCS): The IFF.

But that’s civilian.

Question 31: You said the Iranians are partially responsible.

Do you have indications that the Bandar Abbas airport was aware, that there was fighting going on, between the Vincennes and Boghammers?

Carlucci (SecDef): When we say Iranians, we don’t distinguish between the people at Bandar Abbas airport and the people controlling the {p.14} ships, that are engaged in the fire fight.

It’s certainly not our job to make sure, that the Iranian military communicates with Bandar Abbas airport. I would hope they would have.

But surely the Iranian Government bears some responsibility here.

Question 32: But they had to know there was fighting going on.

You’re talking about three small ships.

Carlucci (SecDef): Who had to know?

The Iranians?

Question 33: Yes.

Carlucci (SecDef): I assume they knew.

The fighting had been going on for about three hours.

So they must have known, there was fighting going on.

Question 34: —talking about the Iranian regular army—

Carlucci (SecDef): I am not responsible for their connectivity.

Question 35: You’re making the assumption that they work together on joint operations.

Is that really the case?

Carlucci (SecDef): Whether it’s the case or not, the point is they were all Iranians.

And all we can do is hold the Iranians responsible for sending a civilian aircraft into a zone, where they had initiated a fire fight.

We think that obviously contributed to this incident.

Question 36: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned several modifications. There were several aircraft including the F-14 have long range visual identification systems. Is there any thought to equipping the surface Navy with some kind of long range visual ID? Very long range?

Carlucci (SecDef): I’d have to defer that question to one of the experts.

We’ll have to come back to you, to answer that one.

Question 37: Can Admiral Crowe go over the speed?

That was the other crucial point.

Crowe (CJCS): There was a mention in a report right after the incident, at 450 {knots}, that was picked up by a note taker, from one observer, one operator in the console.

Those were not the speeds, however, they were working with, and the speeds were all the way in the range, after it got really airborne, 300 right on up to, gradually increased right up to the time, the speed did.

Consistently throughout it could be either a military or a commercial. It was in the envelope of either a military or a commercial aircraft.

And the people in the fire control, and the captain, were dealing with correct speeds.

Question 38: Speeds of 300 to 350, would that have been consistent with an F-14?

Crowe (CJCS): It would have been yes. Our experience with it is yes. Unless it’s in an air to air fight with a fighter.

Then the final speed was 380.

They wanted a speed that would distinguish, and they couldn’t get it.

– END –

Source:  Attachment to News Release No. 419-88 dated August 19 1988 (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)), scanned and converted to text, with these spelling changes (original/change): Abas/Abbas, F4/F-4, F14/F-14, P3/P-3. FNS: Federal News Service, transcript. Excerpts: Bryan Brumley, “Pentagon Acknowledges Vincennes Crew Made Several Mistakes” (Associated Press, August 19 1988, 3:03 p.m. EDT, AP880819-0148): “Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci told reporters he had decided to withdraw a letter of censure proposed for Lt. Cmdr. Scott Lustig, the operations officer, who was faulted for not adequately verifying information he was passing to the captain.” DoD transcript conformed to the C-Span video, on February 5 2008.