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Iraq War 2003

Iraq attack: How to supplement the US budget  (pre-war)

Ultimatum: The Bush/Blair lie: France’s veto (March 12-20 2003)

WarTalk-1  (March 20 – April 13 2003: Combat)

WarTalk-2  (April 15-18 2003: Occupation)

The pretexts for war: WMD + France’s veto

“Saddam was a bad man”: The post-war pretext for war (coming-up)

 

Hutton Report: Exemplifying Zealotry

by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Brian Hutton did the whole world a very great service, on January 28 2004, when he issued his 328 page Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G. (HC 247, Jan. 28 2004, 740+6+3 pages), with a further 412 pages of appendixes.

God appeared pleased, that her faulty creations had set aside their daily affairs and applied their minds to some fundamental, elemental aspects of life and society. That night in London, she punctuated the events of the day with a very unusual metrological event: A snow storm laced with thunder and lightening. A great celebration.

This, after many had expressed their view on Hutton’s surprising report, and after David Kay, that very same day, confessed to the Senate Armed Services Committee in Washington D.C. {140 kb pdf} that he now believed Iraq had no Weapons of Mass Destruction, just as Iraqi officials had always said. No stockpiles of any sort, large or small; the two mobile trailers were not intended for biological warfare but were likely intended for the production of hydrogen gas for weather baloons, just at the U.K. manufacturer of those trailers had explained and as Iraqi officials had always said; etcetera, etcetera.

Hutton, a Law Lord, was in an excellent position to provide an impartial forensic examination of a sad episode connected to the US/UK war on Iraq (2003). An older man — from the generation of the father of U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair — he had no apparent connection with anything to do with the decision by Tony Blair to attack Iraq, and hence no axe to grind. (Hutton’s family and social connections are not on public view, but all observers prior to his report expressed the view that he was independent and impartial).

The sad episode was the apparent suicide on a scenic hillside in the Oxfordshire countryside of the U.K.’s leading expert on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), principally biological weapons.

But it was the connection with the decision to attack Iraq which gripped the attention of the media, and a very large segment of the public (as I suppose), in the Hutton Inquiry, which posted on its website the transcript of its proceedings and virtually all of the evidence it received. This evidence, and the testimony, pertained in large part to the text of the drafts of the deceptive U.K. Government dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and the process by which those drafts came to be. Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government (439 kb pdf, 429 kb pdf, 429 kb pdf) (No. 10 Downing Street, London England, September 24 2002 8:00 a.m. BST).

And, because the media itself was a central force in the events Hutton was examining. And, at the center of the center: the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), generally respected by British citizens as the most trustworthy and most important institution in Britain. An opinion generally shared by the citizens of the rest of the world, Britain’s most important and most valuable export, and the most influential and respected voice on news and current affairs in world journalism today, in the opinion many in today’s world.

It is precisely the BBC’s worldwide influence which stoked the anger of U.K. Government officials when a BBC radio reporter made a report at 6:07 a.m. on May 29 2003, on Today, BBC Radio 4’s influential 3 hours of daily political news and interviews, listened to in Britain by most political officials and citizens interested in news and politics (6-9 a.m.):

This report contained two items of big news, unknown to the public before this radio broadcast.

The biggest news was dissatisfaction among sections of the U.K. intelligence community about the content of the dossier, which Tony Blair had promised the public was the unanimous agreed view of the U.K. intelligence services.

The other big news was that Tony Blair’s Office had a hand in toughening the wording of that dossier, which Tony Blair had promised the public was the work of the intelligence agencies.

Both these two items of big news have later proved to be the absolute unvarnished truth.

A third important item in this report was the inflammatory opinion of the anonymous source (David Kelly) that Tony Blair’s Office (“the Government”) “probably knew” the 45-minute claim was wrong. This judgment by David Kelly has likewise proven to be probably true as well, on the evidence in the Hutton Inquiry, if you view John Scarlett (below) as part of “the Government” for this purpose.

However, the report contains mistakes as well. The BBC reporter did not follow BBC guidelines and first put these allegations to Tony Blair’s Office so that he could include their response as part of his report. This error was quickly corrected, however, because the BBC received a prompt telephone call from Tony Blair’s Office, denying every detail of the report, and their denial appeared in subsequent reports, the first on that very same Today show, at 7:32 a.m.

And, the BBC reporter speculated wrong about the reason the 45-minute claim arrived late into the dossier; he attributed to the entire intelligence community the dissatisfaction of the one part David Kelly knew about (Ministry of Defense intelligence); and he mistakenly described David Kelly to be one of those “in charge of drawing up that dossier” — David Kelly wrote two parts of the dossier (history and biological weapons), but he had no hand in the rest of it.

The effect of Gilligan’s mistakes was to portray Kelly to be in a slightly better position to estimate “the Government’s” likely state of mind than Kelly was actually in. And so, Gilligan thereby implied that Kelly’s inflammatory opinion about what “the Government probably knew” was likely to be something more authoritative than mere supposition, speculation, and suspicion on Kelly’s part. And, a related lingering question: Did “the Government” know that a segment of its intelligence services was unhappy with part of the dossier?

Kelly being Britain’s top expert, at the heart of the U.K. expertise on Iraq’s WMD, Gilligan may himself have been unaware that Kelly’s assertion about what “the Government probably knew” was merely Kelly’s suspicion, based perhaps on Kelly’s assumption that his boss had conveyed their analysis to the dossier-drafters as the boss’s duty presumably required him to do. Gilligan was severely constrained in how he could describe Kelly, his anonymous source, a member of a very small group of people who knew what they were talking about.

But what U.K. Government officials were angry about was not subtle refinement in the credibility portrait of each separate assertion from a journalist’s source. They were angry that the BBC allowed Gilligan to report what Kelly said, under any circumstances, regardless of how comprehensively Gilligan might have described Kelly’s vantage-point, or why Kelly believed what he said he believed, and even if Gilligan had followed BBC guidelines and made no mistakes. They did not want to hear on the radio anything the anonymous source (David Kelly) had to say, period.

David Kelly was a witness to the content of the various drafts of the dossier and to dissatisfaction among intelligence officials in the U.K. Ministry of Defense. But he was not a witness to the mind of Tony Blair and others in Blair’s close circle or to the minds of every intelligence official involved in the dossier.

The BBC reporter made a much less blameworthy version of the exact same mistake U.K. Government officials themselves made, repeatedly, in their deceptive dossier and in numerous public statements: misrepresenting supposition and suspicion to be informed opinion, and misrepresenting intelligence sources to be knowledgeable about matters they were ignorant about. The fruits of zealotry.

On numerous occasions, U.K. and U.S. officials went much further than Andrew Gilligan did. They boldly asserted (rather than merely implied) that mere supposition and suspicion was informed opinion based on evidence. And, they misrepresented opinion to be unassailable fact — a prima facie willful criminal lie under U.S. law (18 U.S.C. § 1001) — and much of it uninformed opinion as well, an aggravated offense.

45 Minute Claim

Mr. Hutton did not inquire into the veracity of any assertion in the U.K. Government’s dossier on Iraq’s supposed Weapons of Mass destructon, published on September 24 2003.

But he did inquire into one such assertion — not its veracity, but merely how it came to be included in the dossier, worded as it was. This, because it was mentioned in the BBC reporter’s account of what his anonymous source said (David Kelly).

At the conclusion of his account of the evidence on this topic, Hutton expressed what he represented to be his opinion, that the final wording of the 45-minute claim did not constitute “sexing-up” the dossier; that the strengthening of the wording about that claim, during evolution of the dossier through several drafts, was not the result of a willful, intentional, dishonest state of mind:

Hutton Report, ¶ 228(1).

This opinion makes no comment on the behavior of the BBC reporter (whether he correctly reported what David Kelly said), or on the behavior of David Kelly (whether he believed what he said to Gilligan). Hutton merely asserts that David Kelly’s reported opinion about what “the Government probably knew” was “unfounded”.

In my opinion, the opinion Hutton expressed, however, is not supported by the evidence he cites. And more than that, it contradicts that evidence. And so, applying the test that an appellate judge (such as himself) would apply on appeal from a finding of fact, Hutton’s opinion would likely be reversed on such an appeal. This, because no reasonable, rational, impartial adult could reasonably form the opinion Hutton expressed, based on the evidence before him.

The 45-minute claim was based on two documents, both of which are concealed from the public and from Hutton himself. The first is “intelligence”: A field report about what a spy said somebody told him. The second is an “assessment” of that intelligence by analysts in MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service: SIS).

The product of these two documents first appeared in the dossier draft of September 5 2003, quoted by Hutton:

Hutton Report, ¶ 178.

This assessment is not about whether Saddam has CBW (a claim strongly doubted by David Kelly and by others inside British intelligence, and contradicted by an abundance of evidence, but not a claim Hutton inquired about).

This assessment asserts the opinion that, if Saddam does have CBW, then they have probably been been forward-deployed ready for use by the military. It simply states the obvious, that if he has these weapons, and if they are forward-deployed, then, naturally, they can be ready to fire in 45-mnutes. That’s the purpose of forward deployment, so the troops can use them.

These two big ifs disappeared during the evolution of the dossier, transforming a mere supposition into an unassailable fact. This constitutes a prima facie willful, malicious lie. Prima facie, because you never know what defense accused liars may advance. They might claim they were confused, or tired, or rushed, or overworked, and didn’t appreciate the gravity of their decisions.

Was the 45-minute claim in the dossier “sexed-up”? In Hutton’s opinion that term requires dishonest intent in the mind of the dossier drafters:

Hutton Report, ¶ 228(8).

“Sexed-up” is a term David Kelly said he sometimes used, and he told the Intelligence and Security Committee (a Cabinet Office committee composed of members of Parliament), in secret testimony, that he may have used that term during his meeting with BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan.

I believe the public would readily agree with David Kelly, that the 45-minute claim in the dossier was “sexed-up”. With the disappearance of the two big ifs, the 45-minute claim bore no resemblance to its underlying intelligence (as implied by the September 5 draft).

Now how did this come to be? Did the Hand of God reach down and sex-up the dossier when no one was looking?

No matter how honestly the drafters of the dossier may have deluded themselves into believing that what they said was honest. It was not truthful. It was an erroneous account of its underlying intelligence and the assessment of that intelligence.

I believe a typical radio listener would understand the term “sexed-up” to mean the dossier did not conform to the underlying intelligence. The dossier claimed it did conform. It did not conform.

Mr. Hutton expresses the view that more is required, that radio listeners would expect dishonest intent on the part of the drafters before the term “sexed-up” would rightly describe, in their minds, what happened. In Mr. Hutton’s view, simple negligence by the drafters is not enough — their failure to properly perform the duties they had undertaken to perform.

In my opinion, no radio listener would believe that the Hand of God drafted the dossier. And every radio listener would believe that professional experts normally perform the duties correctly which they undertake to perform. Hence, I believe the typical radio listener would believe that this untruthful dossier — a carefully crafted political work-product of many people — is not the result of simple negligence. It is probably (more likely that not) the result of either dishonesty or else gross negligence: an excess of zeal by which the dossier-drafters disabled themselves, and blinded themselves, in a sort of group psychotic episode, hallucinating.

Like all human beings, the typical radio listener would hold this provisional opinion together with an open mind, ready to receive any further evidence which might materialize to illuminate the mental state of the dossier drafters. Pending any such further evidence, I believe the provisional opinion of the typical radio-listener would be that the dossier had probably been “sexed-up” — whether by dishonesty or gross negligence, it matters not: it’s blameworthy. The lives of 10,000 Iraqis was snuffed-out because of it, twice the number Saddam gassed at Halabja. And millions reduced to destitution and unemployment due to a willful refusal to obey a Security Council Resolution the U.S. and U.K. had agreed to obey.

In reality, the honest state of mind of the drafters is doubtful. This particular claim, and its wording, was the topic of intense scrutiny and written communications, to the point where the master drafter, John Scarlett (Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the U.K. Cabinet Office), ordered his forces to go back and reexamine the underlying two secret documents. All we have is his hearsay assertion that this was done by persons unknown and the resulting wording, which is not supported by the assessment quoted by Hutton.

Because this is not the only prima facie lie in the deceitful dossier produced by John Scarlett, it’s not prudent to trust the word of John Scarlett. And, in any event, he is not a witness to the underlying intelligence, or to its reexamination, and hence, by his own admission, he has no earthly idea whether what he wrote is truthful or not.

Thus, John Scarlett is a prima facie “reckless” liar, if the two big ifs — absent from 45-minute claim — do indeed exist in its underlying intelligence, as implied by the September 5 dossier draft. Scarlett exhibits the prima facie willful dishonest intent demanded by Hutton: When he wrote the 45-minute claim, John Scarlett knew that he did not know whether it was true or not.

Scarlett would claim he was entitled to rely upon what others told him. We are unable to assess that claim because we don’t know who these people are or their state of mind. We do know, however, a great deal about why intelligence officers in David Kelly’s circle (Ministry of Defense Intelligence) did not believe Saddam had chemical or biological weapons — the biggest of the big ifs. And any assessment which did not take account of their analysis would itself be a recklessly negligent piece of work.

It may be, that the Director of MI6 (SIS), Richard Dearlove, is like his counterpart in the U.S., the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, and ready and willing to lie for the cause — to give John Scarlett the answer John Scarlett wanted to hear so John Scarlett could please Tony Blair’s aide in charge of the dossier project: Alastair Campbell. Officials in MI6 would surely well know that their reply to John Scarlett would not survive assessment at the Ministry of Defense, and this possible dishonesty may explain why that response was concealed from them.

But, whatever be John Scarlett’s state of mind, his 45-minute claim is contrary to the evidence in the record and, based on that record, that claim is — in my lexicon — “sexed-up,” exactly as David Kelly said it was.

And this is by far the least important of several deceitful claims in the dossier, the truth of none of which were the topic of the Hutton Inquiry.

Hutton’s Neglect

Central to the “Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly” were a catalog of abuse, negligence, and failings by various sectors of the U.K. Government, none of which Hutton mentioned. And by failing in his duty, Hutton has provided the whole world with an excellent and illuminating model of the perils of zealotry and the importance and value of editors in the media and honest independent advisors in government.

Coming up:

Joint Intelligence Committee: John Scarlett usurping the Committee’s jurisdiction by preempting face-to-face meetings where assertions and judgments might be challenged and dissent might emerge.

Joint Intelligence Committee: Failure to affirmatively seek dissent and require the expression of dissent in reports.

Ministry of Defense Intelligence: Failure to provide rules and procedures whereby dissent from line-managers and analysts and contracted experts can be expressed and formally evaluated, minuted, and passed up to the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Ministry of Defense Intelligence: Appointing a manager without experience and ostensibly unfit for his duties (Brian Wells).

Ministry of Defense: Bullying, threats, and blackmail of David Kelly, threatening loss of job and punishment if he didn’t testify as they wished to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons.

Ministry of Defense: Assigning David Kelly the duty of talking to the Press under rules which permit the Ministry to punish him if they disliked what he said: Government by whim, not by the rule-of-law.

U.K. Intelligence Community: Failure to provide a chain-of-command for independent experts, like David Kelley, who worked simultaneously for several U.K. Government agencies not knowing at any one time who his bosses were, with no one boss.

 

© 2003 Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

This document may be freely copied.

CJHjr

Posted Jan. 29 2004. Updated Jan. 31 2004.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/hutton-report.html