Alt+left-arrow to return from a link
Bombing Iran
Bombing Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities
by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
| Letter to: | Copy to: |
John Conyers (chairman)
U.S. Congress
House Committee on the Judiciary
2138 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington D.C. 20515
Patrick Leahy (chairman)
U.S. Congress
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
226 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington D.C. 20510 |
Carl Levin (chairman)
U.S. Congress
Senate Committee on Armed Services
228 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington D.C. 20510
Joe Biden (chairman)
U.S. Congress
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
450 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington D.C. 20510 |
Thursday July 31 2008, 11am ET (via email)
| Re: | Bombing Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities |
Dear Mr. Conyers, Mr. Leahy:
This is a patent war crime, to bomb Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities (legal memo attached).
And yet, there’s endless talk about doing it, the pros and cons of it, for several years, now intensifying.
There would be no talk, if U.S. military commanders, and JAG lawyers, said, “No. We won’t do that.”
Obviously, that’s not what they’ve said.
And so, what novel legal theory do Bush-Cheney lawyers decree? that our military high command is standing by? ready to salute, to order tens of thousands of fellow citizens to wage violent crime, on an industrial scale.
What do our military lawyers have to say about it?
Who sidelined them? silenced them? by what methods?
Positing war, are they persuaded these targets are lawful?
Binding DoD Directives require combat commanders to consult JAG lawyers, whether planned targets are lawful to attack.
Have JAG lawyers been excluded from war councils? ordered off the case? to shut up? keep their opinions to themselves? do they feel threatened? intimidated? by whom?
Has one among them stepped forward, to bless this enterprise? the rest, relieved of their duty to condemn it?
Are they, all of them, stood down? on secret orders? targets blessed in secret? by the U.S. Attorney General? his secret government of appointed law-makers? who make secret laws? repeal laws in secret? the OLC? his Office of Legal Counsel? as with their secret torture memos?
Department of Justice lawyers, they can’t hope to pretense legal authority to repeal international laws of war, or the war crimes for violating them.
DoJ lawyers might assert the President has that authority, but any JAG lawyer will surely advise combat commanders, they can not expect to be acquitted, in a criminal prosecution, for relying on it, a patently unlawful legal opinion, and that a future administration might prosecute them, and their support staff, the high command certainly, higher commanders probably, weapons release officers possibly, even extradite them, to an international military tribunal, the International Criminal Court, in a political sea change, a demonstration of public contrition, reconciliation, determination, to change course.
DoJ lawyers can promise immunity from prosecution, but that promise is a criminal act, and anyway no defense to combat commanders, in a later prosecution, as every Nazi government official learned, who was prosecuted for faithfully obeying orders of Adolph Hitler, and his operatives, orders to commit crimes.
What of our combat commanders? entrusted to purvey massive violence, lawfully, and properly? are they standing by? ready to violate DoD Directives? the laws of war? banish JAG lawyers? from the ears of weapons release officers? on orders of the great leader?
And what of our Secretary of Defense? Robert Gates.
Is he colluding? doesn’t want to know about it? did he issue secret orders? will the JAGs plead not guilty? tell the judge they were secretly ordered to keep quiet?
Crime by government officials, the conduct and abuse of government lawyers, secret laws, these are jurisdictions of the judiciary committees, to investigate, to report.
So bold, so extensive, this violent crime, reenactment of a permanent independent counsel, that seems the only feasible remedy. Jurisdiction to prosecute command war crimes, ordered, incited, tolerated, by commanders, officers, in the DoD, NSC, CIA, Homeland Security, private contractors, paramilitaries throughout the government, and all their hired hands.
It’s not possible now, to create that prosecutor, to deter bombing Iran, but s/he can prosecute them later, those who do it, after it’s done, and that will deter onlookers, from obeying criminal orders in that future’s future.
Withholding money, to pay for the bombing, that’s a better additional remedy, to preempt it, protect our military from complicity, prevent another surge of hatred, immense, enduring, justified, hatred of the United States, hatred violent crime incites, in the hearts of decent people.
But these remedies depend on votes, and so there will be no remedies, until a big percentage of the House and Senate, their members, are replaced by the voters.
Meanwhile, your hearings will educate the voters, on this action required from them, if they don’t like what they hear.
So please, give our fine lawyers, in the military, a hearing.
Let’s hear their opinion: Is it lawful, to bomb Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities, their upstream suppliers, their nuclear scientists and technicians.
And stress to them, in your invitation, you want their opinion as advisers, and not just their argument as advocates. Advocates are entitled to conceal their opinion, and to argue against it, and this is what we usually get from government legal advisers, those politically appointed, dishonesty (argument masqueraded as opinion).
Yours truly,
Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
Attached legal memo: (1) Targeting law, (2) IAEA inspections, (3) U.S. military directives, that article 52 (“General protection of civilian objects”) of 1977 Geneva Protocol-1 is binding customary international law, (4) JAG lawyers, their targeting duties, (5) Iran bombing encyclopedia, (6) silencing JAG lawyers, (7) mutiny, (8) defunding, (9) JSOC covert action, (10) questions for JAG lawyers.
From Nashville Tennessee:
Woodmont Grammar School (1948-1956)
Montgomery Bell Academy (1956-1960)
Vanderbilt University (1960-1964 BA)
Vanderbilt Law School (1964-1967 JD)
Tennessee Bar No. 005483 (August 12 1967)
Legal memorandum
July 31 2008
Targeting law
Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities are “civilian objects” and, for that reason, are unlawful targets:
________________
1977:
Chapter III. Civilian objects
Article 52. General protection of civilian objects
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.
• Geneva Protocol-1 (1977, targeting+) {unchr, tufts}, article 52 (“General protection of civilian objects”) (ICRC commentary). Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (Geneva, June 8 1977), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (151 pages) {U.N. Doc.: ST/LEG(05)/U5, ISSN: 0379-8267, LCCN: 48022417, OCLC: 1768015, WorldCat}.
• Parties {63kb.pdf, 66kb.xls, source} to Geneva Protocol-1 (at July 30 2008): 167 countries, every country in the western hemisphere (except the U.S.), every country in Europe (except Andorra), every component of the former Soviet Union (except Azerbaijan), every country in NATO (except the U.S. and Turkey), the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen).
• United Kingdom. Protocols I and II (1977), to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, enacted into U.K. domestic law, Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1995 {1.01mb.pdf} (1995 c.27, July 19 1995) (U.K. Public General Acts, 1995 Chapter 27). U.K. ratification (deposited January 28 1998) implemented into U.K. domestic law, The Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1995 (Commencement) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1505 (C.30) (U.K. Statutory Instruments, 1998 No. 1505 (C.30), June 24 1998), effective (“coming into force”) July 20 1998). The 16 U.K. reservations/declarations, their text, certified into U.K. domestic law, The Geneva Conventions Act (First Protocol) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1754, July 21 1998). Protocols I and II extended to Diego Garcia (BIOT: “British Indian Ocean Territory”), The Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act (Overseas Territories) Order 2002 (S.I. 2002/1076, April 17 2002, effective May 1 2002, deposited July 2 2002).
________________
Prohibited targets. The 1977 Geneva Protocol-1 declares, restates, elaborates, the 1899 Hague-2 treaty, readopted in the 1907 Hague-4 treaty, the general rule on objects:
1899/1907:
[Annex]
Section II: Hostilities ...
[Annex] Article 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden ...
(g) To destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
• 1907 Hague-4 (land) {yale, tufts}, annex article 23(g): Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex, “Regulations concerning the laws and customs of war on land” (The Hague, October 18 1907), U.S./U.K. ratified, November 27 1909, 36 Stat. 2277, parties {icrc} (minbuza: Nederlands Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, depositary, 1899/1907 Hague Peace Conventions), incorporating, verbatim, from an earlier treaty annex, with nearly the same names, 1899 Hague-2 {yale, tufts}, annex article 23(g): Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex, “Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land” (The Hague, July 29 1899), ratified by the U.S. (April 4 1902), U.K. (September 4 1900), parties {icrc}, sourced from, 1880 Oxford Manual, article 32(b) (The Laws of War on Land, Institute of International Law, Oxford, September 9 1880), and its parent, 1874 Brussels Declaration, article 13(g) (Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, August 27 1874), accord, 1863 Lieber Code {yale, tufts}: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (U.S. War Department, General Orders, No. 100, April 24 1863) (serial set 3964, pages 148-164) (e.g., “Article 14. ... measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war. Article 15. ... ‘armed’ enemies ... Article 16. ... torture to extort confessions ... wanton devastation of a district ...”).
Permitted targets. The 1977 Geneva Protocol-1 also defines a “military objective,” a concept embodied in the naval bombardment rules of the 1907 Hague-9 treaty, concerning targets outside the combat zone, at locations no army intends to attack and occupy.
1907:
Chapter I. The Bombardment of Undefended Ports, Towns, Villages, Dwellings, or Buildings
Article 1. The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden.
A place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbour.
Article 2. Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war ‘matériel,’ workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbour, are not, however, included in this prohibition. The commander of a naval force may destroy them with artillery ...
• Hague-9 (naval bombardment) {copy, copy}, articles 1, 2: Convention concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (The Hague, October 18 1907), U.S./U.K. ratified, November 27 1909, 36 Stat. 2277, parties {icrc} (minbuza: Nederlands Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, depositary, 1907 Hague Peace Conventions).
And so a Super Bowl football game, that’s not transformed into a “military objective” simply because the U.S. military defends it (with aircraft, gunboats, anti-aircraft guns, missiles, armed forces).
Likewise in Iran, defenses surrounding Natanz (centrifuge enrichment plant), Bushehr (electricity plant construction site), Isfahan (converting raw uranium to hex gas, the centrifuge feed stock), Arak (construction site of a heavy water plant, not a nuclear facility):—
Those military defenses (if there be any) (against endless threats from Israel and the U.S.), they do not transform the civilian objects in their care (non military industry), into “military objectives.”
The military defenses themselves are not per se lawful targets either. Positing war, they can be lawfully attacked, only if they make “an effective contribution to military action” and if their destruction “offers a definite military advantage” “in the circumstances ruling at the time.”
Because the targets they defend are civilian objects (unlawful to attack), attacking the defending objects is also a prima facie crime, because there is no lawful military action, in that locale or anywhere else, which could be definitely advantaged by destroying them.
It’s like killing police officers, at a bank you want to rob.
________________
IAEA inspections
Independent experts continuously inspect, monitor, report, and certify, the “civilian object” status of every single one of Iran’s known nuclear facilities, and some of their suppliers too, e.g., centrifuge makers (not a nuclear facility).
Periodically, they inspect other facilities, investigating allegations, and certify that those facilities too have nothing to do with nuclear materials or nuclear weapons.
That’s the IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency, their inspectors, on the ground, in Iran.
2,050 person-days of IAEA inspections by May 19 2006. “Since March 2007, fourteen unannounced inspections have been conducted” (IAEA, May 26 2008) (omitting the number of inspectors).
• Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), report to the IAEA Board of Governors, and U.N. Security Council, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Report by the Director General”) (IAEA Doc. GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008) {66kb.pdf, iaea, 140kb.pdf, isis, 140kb.pdf, casmii}.
The IAEA continuously verifies the accounting for 100% of the nuclear material at these facilities, tests and certifies the small amount of enrichment accomplished so far to be below 5% U-235, an enrichment necessary for light water reactor fuel for producing electricity (80-90% is necessary for a uranium bomb), and reports that nothing to do with making a nuclear weapon exists at any of these facilities.
Separately, the IAEA continuously reports they have seen no credible evidence that Iran has ever undertaken any work pertaining to a nuclear weapon.
The IAEA has investigated allegations to the contrary and found each and every one of them to be without merit, embodying no credible probative value, as documented in their reports.
The final remaining allegations do not pertain to any known nuclear facility in Iran.
They are based solely on a laptop computer, produced by U.S. officials, containing on its hard drive, some drawings and such.
The information and omissions are marked with forgery (in the opinion of IAEA officials), and no U.S. government official has ever vouched for its authenticity, or its chain of custody. The IAEA is unable to provide Iran an opportunity to reply to the allegations. U.S. officials refuse to give the IAEA a copy of the hard drive, or even a printout of the whole of its contents. U.S. officials merely show it to the IAEA, in secret presentations, which exclude the Iranians.
Complicit U.S. government officials conceal the laptop computer’s hard drive, from the public, from the IAEA, from Iran, from independent experts, and so only an honest Congressional hearing can discover the facts about it, what’s omitted from it, and only if each person in its chain of custody is questioned and required to name each other person in the chain of custody they know about.
Apart from the laptop, the rest of the extensive U.S. government criminal enterprise, lying about Iran’s nuclear program, has been exposed by people who pay attention, but their work is ignored by the mainstream media, owners, editors, producers, presenters. In the current era, the mainstream media seem constrained only by “facts” U.S. government officials bless, and rare disclosures elicited during Congressional hearings.
This U.S. government criminal enterprise is not the topic of this letter and warrants a hearing by the judiciary committees and enactment of a separate, permanent, independent prosecutor with jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute crimes of lying by U.S. government officials and those they secretly conspire, incite, facilitate, aid and abet, and pay.
A free society cannot coexist with a lying government.
________________
DoD directives
Article 1. The Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land, annexed to the present Convention.
1907 Hauge-4
The U.S. military accepts this provision of 1977 Geneva Protocol-1, that its article 52 accurately declares customary international law, its “civilian object” and “military objective” language, and is binding, on the U.S. government, the U.S. military, and all combat commanders, private contractors, mercenaries, covert operators, civilian support, hired hands, independent operators, groups, states, it conspires, incites, aids and abets, facilitates.
________________
U.S. Air Force, 2006:
Targeting must adhere to the LOAC {law of armed conflict} and all applicable ROE {rules of engagement}. It is the policy of the DOD that the Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and, unless otherwise directed by competent authorities, the US Armed Forces will comply with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations {in all other military operations}. The “law of war” is a term encompassing all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law. The “law of war” is also commonly referred to as the LOAC.
* * *
Military Necessity. Is this target a valid “military objective”? “Military necessity” acknowledges that attacks can be made against targets, but only targets that are valid “military objectives.” In this case, the term “military objective” in this context comes from the description in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention that describes military objectives as “... (T)hose objects by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action ...” Though the US is not a signatory to the Additional Protocol it views this definition as an accurate restatement of customary international law that we recognize and with which we comply.
* * *
Distinction (Discrimination). Have we distinguished between combatants and non-combatants; have we distinguished between military objectives and protected property or places? The principle, based on customary international law, requires parties to direct operations only against combatants and military objectives. It prohibits “indiscriminate attacks.”
• Targeting {1.21mb.pdf, afep, 1.21mb.pdf, dtic}, pages 88-95 at 88-89 (“Appendix A, Targeting and Legal Considerations”) (U.S. Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-1.9, June 8 2006) (“Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.9, 8 June 2006”), marked-up by CJHjr to conform to binding DoD Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, paragraph 4.1, issued a month earlier (May 9 2006, quoted below), superceding, Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander's Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict (U.S. Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, AFP 110-34, 25 July 1980) (“OPR: JACI (Maj Burrus M. Carnahan)”) (U.S. Air Force, Judge Advocate General's Corps, International and Operations Law Division), declared obsolete, December 20 1995, together with, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law--The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations (USAF, AFP 110-31, 19 November 1976, 173 pages annotated) (OPR: JACI) (U.S. Air Force, Judge Advocate General's Corps, International and Operations Law Division) (“the first pamphlet published by the United States Air Force on the law of war”). Obsolete Publications {3.52mb.pdf} (USAF, AFD-070808-022, July 8 2008).
Note: An Air Force mistake, the U.S. is a signatory to that Additional Protocol, but did not yet ratify it (Geneva Protocol-1, signed December 12 1977).
unless otherwise directed by competent authorities
If the President says it’s not an armed conflict (labels it something else, covert action, collective self-defense, law-enforcement, non state actors), U.S. military commanders can violate the law of war, e.g., target civilians, civilian objects (murder and arson), conceal prisoners from the ICRC, be cruel, torture them, permit others to torture them, if that’s what the President orders them to do, so says the U.S. Air Force here.
A previous Bush-Cheney regime (President-SecDef) said their invasion of Panama (December 20 1989) was not an armed conflict, ditto Reagan-Bush, their invasion of Grenada (October 25 1983), Clinton-Cohen, their transformed U.N peace keeping operation in Somalia into an offensive U.S. war against local political factions (1992-1994) (Black Hawk down), ouster of a leader of Haiti (1994-1995), Bosnia (1995+).
And the reverse too, the President and his circle fancy he can declare martial law in the U.S., and order law of war permissions: Ambush, snipers, mass arrests, targeting curfew violators, weddings, young men (“insurgents”), political opponents, activists, on computer lists (main core, no-fly, subversives, political enemies).
Panama: Bush-Cheney-Gates (President-SecDef-NSC), when their CIA coup failed, they corrupted a Panama election, as they also did in Nicaragua, with millions of dollars in cash, to secure the election of their designated ruler, in Panama it was Guillermo Endara. Noriega declared the corrupt election void. He had said he was leaving politics, and he might have been defeated without U.S. corruption, but we’ll never know. The U.S. proclaimed their man was the legitimate government, presumed to swear him in secret as Panama president and then, on his invitation, invaded Panama 1 hour later. The JAG lawyer said this:
“Inasmuch as there was a regularly constituted government in Panama in the course of Just Cause, and U.S. forces were deployed in support of that government, the Geneva Conventions did not apply ... nor did the U.S. at any time assume the role of an occupying power as that term is used in the Geneva Conventions.”
“Memorandum from W. Hays Parks to the Judge Advocate General of the Army of 10/1/90” {January 10 1990}, quoted in, Law of War Handbook 2004 {9.84mb.pdf, source, copy, source}, page 240 (TJAGLCS, JA 423, 2003).
U.S. Judge William Hoeveler trashed this analysis, and the Bush-Cheney (SecDef) regime, their pretense, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply. There were hostilities by U.S. armed forces in a foreign country, end of analysis, and no supposed invitation altered that simple fact. U.S. v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791 {214kb.rtf} (S.D. Fla., No. 88-79-Cr, December 8 1992) (at 795, 803: “However the government wishes to label it, what occurred in late 1989-early 1990 was clearly an “armed conflict” within the meaning of Article 2.” “The implications of a less-than-strict adherence to Geneva III are serious”).
Grenada: As they later demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, the U.S. military view prisoners as assets, to be exploited, instead of human beings to be treated humanely.
“the term “prisoner of war” would accord the Cubans certain rights under the Geneva Convention, for example, the right to communicate with relatives ... the Operations Deputies decided to retain the original classification ... “personnel under protective custody” ... The J-5 officers hoped that the results of interrogation would bolster their contention that six hundred prisoners were members of combat units sent to make Grenada into a Cuban military base.”
Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury {214kb.rtf, dtic}, “The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada 12 October - 2 November 1983” (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C. 1997).
When they were done, exploiting their assets, they discovered the Cubans were just building an airport runway, and U.S. military officers covered it up, their earlier secret violations, and pretense, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply. The JAG lawyer said this:
The United States acknowledged that its military forces did engage Cuban forces in combat. It further acknowledged that, as a consequence, de facto hostilities existed and that the article 2 threshold was satisfied.
Memorandum, Hugh J. Clausen (HQDA, DAJA-IA), to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, subject: Geneva Conventions Status of Enemy Personnel Captured During URGENT FURY (4 Nov. 1983), reported, Law of War Workshop Deskbook, footnote 23 page 94 (TJAGLCS, June 2000, Brian J. Bill, editor) {1.07mb.pdf, source, 13.84mb.pdf} {SuDoc: D 108.10:2003019565, LCCN 2003067508, OCLC: 51863372, GPOCat, WorldCat}, Operational Law Handbook 1997, footnote 134 page 13-2 (TJAGLCS, JA 422, 1997) {1.74mb.pdf, pegc, 2.11mb.pdf, cdmha} {2007 edition: 6.13mb.pdf, source} {SuDoc: D 108.10/2:, LCCN 2005208826, OCLC: 54446717, GPOCat, WorldCat}.
4 JAGs (U.S. army, navy, marines, air force), 1986:
Subject: 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary International Law Implications
This is in reply to your memorandum of 26 March 1986, same subject, to the undersigned. In that memo you asked our views on which articles of the Protocol are currently recognized as customary international law, and which should be supported for eventual incorporation into that law. Our views were to be based on the list of provisions provided by OJCS {Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff}.
We view the following provisions as already part of customary international law:
* * *
g. Civilians: Articles 51, paragraph 2; 52, paragraphs 1 and 2 (except for the reference to “reprisal”); and 57, paragraphs 1, 2(c) and 4).
* * *
In addition to the undersigned, Lt Col Burrus M. Carnahan, USAF, and CDR John C. W. Bennett, JAGC, USN, participated in preparation of this memorandum.
• “Memorandum to John H. McNeill, Assistant General Counsel (International), OSD” (Office of the Secretary of Defense), “Subject: 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary International Law Implication” (8 May 1986) (May 8 1986), from W. Hays Parks (Chief, International Law Branch, DAJA-IA) (Department of the Army, Judge Advocate, International Affairs) (U.S. Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General, International Affairs Division), LCDR Michael F. Lohr (JAGC, USN, NJAG, Code 10) (Lieutenant Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, Navy Judge Advocate General, International and Operational Law), Dennis Yoder (Lt Colonel, USAF, AF/JACI) (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Judge Advocate General's Corps, International and Operations Law Division), William Anderson (HQ USMC/JAR) (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Judge Advocate Division, Research and Civil Law), facsimile, Law of War Documentary Supplement (2007) {3.7mb.pdf, source, ditto, source} (“Law of War (LOW) Documentary Supplement (2007)” “LoW Documentary Supplement (2007)”) (formerly, JA 424), pages 399-401, “Protocol I as an expression of customary international law” (TJAGLCS: United States Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, International and Operational Law Department, 600 Massie Road, Charlottesville Virginia, June 25 2007, Sean M. Watts, editor), facsimile, United States v. Omar Ahmed Khadr (prisoner number 766), William Kuebler (Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, detailed defense counsel), Rebecca S. Snyder (Lieutenant, U.S. Navy Reserve, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, assistant detailed defense counsel), “Defense Motion to Dismiss Due for Lack of Jurisdiction for Failure to Comply with Common Article 3” (17 January 2008) {3.8mb.pdf}, attachment A (“Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Chief, International Law Branch, DAJA-IA, et. al., to Mr.
John H. McNeill, Assistant General Counsel (International), OSD (8 May 1986)”) (U.S. Military Commission, under 10 U.S.C. § 948(h), U.S. military base, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, January 17 2008).
USAF, 2007:
Military necessity ... Attacks must be limited to military objectives, i.e., any objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Examples include troops, bases, supplies, lines of communications, and headquarters.
• The Military Commander and the Law, pages 617-645 (chapter 17, “International and Operations Law”), at pages 624-629 (“The Law of Armed Conflict”), page 626 (U.S. Air Force, The Judge Advocate General’s School, Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama, 8th Edition 2006, electronic update October 2007) {3.84mb.pdf, source}.
________________
DoD lawyers: JAGs
Article 82. Legal advisers in armed forces
The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject.
1977 Geneva Protocol-1
The Judge Advocate General’s Corps.
Where do JAG lawyers fit, in combat?
Is targeting any of their business?
Must they be consulted?
Can they be excluded?
Do they speak, only if spoken to?
Are they clerical staff? rubber-stampers? of higher orders?
There are U.S. military orders, about law, about lawyers.
These orders say, they’re binding, on the lawyers, on all combat commanders, on all they command, special forces included, the U.S. President’s secret SS commandos.
Can U.S. military lawyers be prosecuted, for the war crime of bombing Iran’s IAEA targets, because of what they say, or what they don’t say.
Can U.S. military combat commanders be prosecuted for the war crime of bombing Iran’s IAEA targets.
JAG lawyers are not combat commanders, they’re not in the combat chain of command, they have no veto.
But JAG lawyers have legal duties, as support staff. They are obliged to examine, and express an opinion about it, planned targets.
By performing their duty, or refusing to do it, JAG lawyers willingly associate themselves with massive violence, and so can exhibit criminal intent, if that violence is unlawful.
Likewise if a JAG lawyer fails to report, and promptly, to a higher command, if a combat commander insists to attack unlawful targets, or attack in unlawful ways, unlawful in the lawyer’s reasonable opinion.
Combat commanders have the legal duty to consult JAG lawyers, on the question, is their intended violence lawful. And so combat commanders can exhibit criminal intent, if they violate that duty, or reject legal advice, and if that violence is unlawful.
Their orders require combat commanders to comply with the law of war and to submit their “plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement” to U.S. military lawyers, whose duty is to “ensure their consistency” with the law of war.
DoD Law of War Program
* * *
2. Applicability and scope
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the “DoD Components”).
3. Definitions
3.1. Law of War. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the “law of armed conflict.” The law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.
3.2. Reportable Incident. A possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war, for which there is credible information, or conduct during military operations other than war that would constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict.
4. Policy
It is DoD policy that:
4.1. Members of the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.
4.2. The law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by the DoD Components and DoD contractors assigned to or accompanying deployed Armed Forces.
4.3. An effective program to prevent violations of the law of war is implemented by the DoD Components.
4.4. All reportable incidents committed by or against U.S. personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual are reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action.
* * *
5. Responsibilities
* * *
5.7. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
5.7.1. Comply with the policies contained in this Directive.
5.7.2. Institute and implement effective programs to prevent violations of the law of war, including law of war training and dissemination, as required by Articles 47 and 50, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (Reference (c)); Articles 48 and 51, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (Reference (d)); Articles 127 and 130, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Reference (e)); Articles 144 and 147, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (Reference (f)); and Sections 801-940 of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Reference (g)).
5.7.3. Make qualified legal advisers at all levels of command available to provide advice about law of war compliance during planning and execution of exercises and operations; and institute and implement programs to comply with the reporting requirements established in section 6.
* * *
5.10. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
5.10.1. Provide appropriate guidance to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, consistent with Reference (l) {10 U.S.C. 163(a)(2)}.
* * *
5.10.3. Review appropriate plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement, as necessary, ensuring their consistency with the law of war obligations of the United States.
5.10.4. Ensure that plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement issued by the Commanders of the Combatant Commands are consistent with this Directive and the law of war.
5.11. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall:
5.11.1. Institute programs within their respective commands to prevent violations of the law of war and ensure that their commands’ plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement are subject to periodic review and evaluation, particularly in light of any violations reported.
* * *
5.11.8. Ensure all plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement issued by the command and its subordinate commands and components are reviewed by legal advisers to ensure their consistency with this Directive and the law of war.
5.11.9. Ensure that law of war training and dissemination programs of subordinate commands and components are consistent with this Directive and the law of war obligations of the United States.
• DoD Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program {115kb.pdf, jel, jdeisfs} (boldface added) (Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense Directive, DoDD 2311.01E, May 9 2006), cancels DoDD 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program (December 9 1998) {42kb.pdf, 36kb.pdf, 16kb.txt, jdeisfs}, cancels DoDD 5100.77 (July 10 1979) {253kb.pdf, source}, cancels DoDD 5100.77 (November 5 1974).
The Chiefs:
Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program
* * *
4. Policy
* * *
b. At all appropriate levels of command and during all stages of operational planning and execution of joint and combined operations, legal advisors will provide advice concerning law of war compliance.
* * *
Enclosure A
Responsibilities
* * *
3. The commanders of combatant commands are responsible for the overall execution of the DOD Law of War Program within their respective commands. Specific responsibilities include ensuring:
* * *
d. Command legal advisors attend planning and operations-related conferences for military operations and exercises, as appropriate, to enable them to provide advice concerning law of war compliance during joint and combined operations.
e. All operation plans (including preplanned and adaptively planned strategic targets), concept plans, rules of engagement, execute orders, deployment orders, policies, and directives are reviewed by the command legal advisor to ensure compliance with domestic and international law, this instruction, and the DOD Law of War Program.
• Implementation of DoD Law of War Program {110kb.pdf} (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 5810.01C, January 31 2007) (“Directive current as of 29 January 2008”).
Joint Force Staff Judge Advocate’s Duties and Responsibilities
Law of War and Related International Legal Considerations
Ensure that all plans, orders, policies, rules of engagement (ROE), and target lists issued by the command and its subordinate commands are reviewed by legal advisors for compliance with applicable law and policy as required by Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5810.01B, Implementation of DoD Law of War Program.
Assist the J-3 {operations} or J-5 {plans} in preparing ROE request and authorization messages according to CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.
Advise the JFC and staff on the legal authority for, and constraints on, the conduct of military operations, including the
use of force.
• Joint Publication 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations “01 March 2007” {640kb.pdf, source, jel} {copy, fas} (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-04, March 1 2007).
JFCom: U.S. Joint Forces Command (combat command)
3. Joint Task Force Staff
* * *
b. Operations Directorate
* * *
(2) In coordination with JTF J-2, J-5, and staff judge advocate (SJA), develops the RTL and NSL for CJTF approval. Once approved, forwards them to the JTCB and components for use in the joint targeting planning process.
* * *
i. Staff Judge Advocate. The JTF SJA responsibility is to advise the CJTF on applicable international and domestic laws, multilateral and bilateral agreements, LOAC issues, compliance with published ROE, and other pertinent issues involved in target recommendations and decision procedures.
* * *
8. Phase 2 – Target Development and Prioritization
* * *
e. Target Validation
(1) Target validation is a CJTF responsibility ... In addition, target validation reviews whether attacking the target would be in compliance with LOAC and ROE. ... Target validation is done by targeteers, in consultation with the strategy planners and other experts/agencies, as required. The first part of validation asks such questions as:
* * *
(c) ... Is attacking the target lawful? What are the LOAC and ROE considerations?
* * *
(h) Are there any facilities or targets on the NSL or RTL collocated with the target being validated?
* * *
(3) The CJTF’s intelligence personnel, SJA, planners, and other personnel are included in the target development process and must be familiar with the JTFs target validation process {sic: JTF’s}.
* * *
f. Target List Development
* * *
(3) The second step of Phase 2 (target development) ends with the creation of the JTL. The JTL is a consolidated list of targets (developed, vetted, and validated from the CTL) upon which there are no restrictions placed. The JTL is a dynamic database; the JTF J-2 modifies this database to include periodic TDN inputs from national agencies, combatant commands, and assigned component forces. In simpler terms, what the JTL means to target development is that it is a list of all the valid targets available for nomination for some type of action. The JTL is not a component specific list; these are targets available for any type of exploitation or attack, lethal or nonlethal, air, ground or other delivery methods.
(4) JTF components select targets from the JTL to compile their respective TNLs and forward them to the CJTF. The TNLs are then combined, validated, and prioritized to form a draft JIPTL that is submitted to the JTCB for finalization. Targets are checked against the NSL and the RTL at each successive level. Component commanders must request the CJTF (or the CJTF’s appointed representative) review and approve RTL targets nominated to the JIPTL before execution.
* * *
(6) The CJTF may also prohibit or restrict joint force attacks on specific targets or objects based on military risk, LOAC, ROE, or other considerations. Targeting restrictions fall into two categories, no strike (sometimes called prohibited) and restricted.
(a) The NSL is a list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under international law or the ROE. Attacking these targets may violate the LOAC (e.g., cultural and religious sites, embassies belonging to noncombatant countries, hospitals, schools) or interfere with friendly relations with other nations, indigenous populations, or governments. The NSL is compiled independently of, and in parallel to, the CTL. It is important to note, however, that entities from the CTL may be moved to the NSL if, as a result of additional target development (vetting), it is determined that attacking them may violate the LOAC. Conversely, targets placed on a NSL may be removed and become subject to military action if their status as a protected object or entity has changed. For example, a church that functions as a weapons storage facility or a barracks will lose its protected status and may be legally attacked.
(b) A restricted target is a valid target that has specific restrictions placed on the actions authorized against it, due to operational considerations. Actions that exceed specified restrictions are prohibited until coordiated and approved by the establishing HQ. Attacking restricted targets may interfere with projected friendly operations. This list also includes restrictions on targets directed by higher authorities. The targets on the RTL are nominated by elements of the joint force, approved by the CJTF, and include restricted targets directed by higher authorities. Targets may have certain specific restrictions associated with them that should be clearly documented in the RTL, such as do not strike during daytime or strike only with a certain weapon.
(7) Some targets may require special precautions, such as chemical, biological, or nuclear facilities, or targets in close proximity to no-strike targets. When targets are restricted from lethal attacks, targeteers should consider nonlethal capabilities as a means to achieve desired effects or support the objectives.
For additional information, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence {3.04mb.pdf, dtic}.
• Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook {2.21mb.pdf, dtic}, 19 October 2007 (USJFCom: United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk Virginia, October 19 2007).