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Iran’s nuclear enrichment program
Letter to Congress, emailed July 31 2008, 11am ET

Bombing Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities


by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Letter to: Copy to:
John Conyers (chairman)
U.S. Congress
House Committee on the Judiciary
2138 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington D.C. 20515

Patrick Leahy (chairman)
U.S. Congress
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
226 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington D.C. 20510
  Carl Levin (chairman)
U.S. Congress
Senate Committee on Armed Services
228 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington D.C. 20510

Joe Biden (chairman)
U.S. Congress
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
450 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington D.C. 20510

Thursday July 31 2008, 11am ET (via email)

 

Re: Bombing Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities

Dear Mr. Conyers, Mr. Leahy:

This is a patent war crime, to bomb Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities (legal memo attached).

And yet, there’s endless talk about doing it, the pros and cons of it, for several years, now intensifying.

There would be no talk, if U.S. military commanders, and JAG lawyers, said, “No. We won’t do that.”

Obviously, that’s not what they’ve said.

And so, what novel legal theory do Bush-Cheney lawyers decree? that our military high command is standing by? ready to salute, to order tens of thousands of fellow citizens to wage violent crime, on an industrial scale.

What do our military lawyers have to say about it?

Who sidelined them? silenced them? by what methods?

Positing war, are they persuaded these targets are lawful?

Binding DoD Directives require combat commanders to consult JAG lawyers, whether planned targets are lawful to attack.

Have JAG lawyers been excluded from war councils? ordered off the case? to shut up? keep their opinions to themselves? do they feel threatened? intimidated? by whom?

Has one among them stepped forward, to bless this enterprise? the rest, relieved of their duty to condemn it?

Are they, all of them, stood down? on secret orders? targets blessed in secret? by the U.S. Attorney General? his secret government of appointed law-makers? who make secret laws? repeal laws in secret? the OLC? his Office of Legal Counsel? as with their secret torture memos?

Department of Justice lawyers, they can’t hope to pretense legal authority to repeal international laws of war, or the war crimes for violating them.

DoJ lawyers might assert the President has that authority, but any JAG lawyer will surely advise combat commanders, they can not expect to be acquitted, in a criminal prosecution, for relying on it, a patently unlawful legal opinion, and that a future administration might prosecute them, and their support staff, the high command certainly, higher commanders probably, weapons release officers possibly, even extradite them, to an international military tribunal, the International Criminal Court, in a political sea change, a demonstration of public contrition, reconciliation, determination, to change course.

DoJ lawyers can promise immunity from prosecution, but that promise is a criminal act, and anyway no defense to combat commanders, in a later prosecution, as every Nazi government official learned, who was prosecuted for faithfully obeying orders of Adolph Hitler, and his operatives, orders to commit crimes.

What of our combat commanders? entrusted to purvey massive violence, lawfully, and properly? are they standing by? ready to violate DoD Directives? the laws of war? banish JAG lawyers? from the ears of weapons release officers? on orders of the great leader?

And what of our Secretary of Defense? Robert Gates.

Is he colluding? doesn’t want to know about it? did he issue secret orders? will the JAGs plead not guilty? tell the judge they were secretly ordered to keep quiet?

Crime by government officials, the conduct and abuse of government lawyers, secret laws, these are jurisdictions of the judiciary committees, to investigate, to report.

So bold, so extensive, this violent crime, reenactment of a permanent independent counsel, that seems the only feasible remedy. Jurisdiction to prosecute command war crimes, ordered, incited, tolerated, by commanders, officers, in the DoD, NSC, CIA, Homeland Security, private contractors, paramilitaries throughout the government, and all their hired hands.

It’s not possible now, to create that prosecutor, to deter bombing Iran, but s/he can prosecute them later, those who do it, after it’s done, and that will deter onlookers, from obeying criminal orders in that future’s future.

Withholding money, to pay for the bombing, that’s a better additional remedy, to preempt it, protect our military from complicity, prevent another surge of hatred, immense, enduring, justified, hatred of the United States, hatred violent crime incites, in the hearts of decent people.

But these remedies depend on votes, and so there will be no remedies, until a big percentage of the House and Senate, their members, are replaced by the voters.

Meanwhile, your hearings will educate the voters, on this action required from them, if they don’t like what they hear.

So please, give our fine lawyers, in the military, a hearing.

Let’s hear their opinion: Is it lawful, to bomb Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities, their upstream suppliers, their nuclear scientists and technicians.

And stress to them, in your invitation, you want their opinion as advisers, and not just their argument as advocates. Advocates are entitled to conceal their opinion, and to argue against it, and this is what we usually get from government legal advisers, those politically appointed, dishonesty (argument masqueraded as opinion).

Yours truly,

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Attached legal memo: (1) Targeting law, (2) IAEA inspections, (3) U.S. military directives, that article 52 (“General protection of civilian objects”) of 1977 Geneva Protocol-1 is binding customary international law, (4) JAG lawyers, their targeting duties, (5) Iran bombing encyclopedia, (6) silencing JAG lawyers, (7) mutiny, (8) defunding, (9) JSOC covert action, (10) reprisals, (11) questions for JAG lawyers.

From Nashville Tennessee:
Woodmont Grammar School (1948-1956)
Montgomery Bell Academy (1956-1960)
Vanderbilt University (1960-1964 BA)
Vanderbilt Law School (1964-1967 JD)
Tennessee Bar No. 005483 (August 12 1967)

 

Legal memorandum
July 31 2008

Targeting law

Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities are “civilian objects” and, for that reason, are unlawful targets:

________________

1977:

“ Chapter III. Civilian objects

Article 52. General protection of civilian objects

1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.

2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”

Geneva Protocol-1 (1977, targeting+) {unchr, tufts}, article 52 (“General protection of civilian objects”) (ICRC commentary). Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (Geneva, June 8 1977), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (151 pages) {U.N. Doc.: ST/LEG(05)/U5, ISSN: 0379-8267, LCCN: 48022417, OCLC: 1768015, WorldCat}.

Parties {63kb.pdf, 66kb.xls, source} to Geneva Protocol-1 (at July 30 2008): 167 countries, every country in the western hemisphere (except the U.S.), every country in Europe (except Andorra), every component of the former Soviet Union (except Azerbaijan), every country in NATO (except the U.S. and Turkey), the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen).

United Kingdom. Protocols I and II (1977), to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, enacted into U.K. domestic law, Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1995 {1.01mb.pdf} (1995 c.27, July 19 1995) (U.K. Public General Acts, 1995 Chapter 27). U.K. ratification (deposited January 28 1998) implemented into U.K. domestic law, The Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1995 (Commencement) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1505 (C.30) (U.K. Statutory Instruments, 1998 No. 1505 (C.30), June 24 1998), effective (“coming into force”) July 20 1998). The 16 U.K. reservations/declarations, their text, certified into U.K. domestic law, The Geneva Conventions Act (First Protocol) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1754, July 21 1998). Protocols I and II extended to Diego Garcia (BIOT: “British Indian Ocean Territory”), The Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act (Overseas Territories) Order 2002 (S.I. 2002/1076, April 17 2002, effective May 1 2002, deposited July 2 2002).

________________

Prohibited targets. The 1977 Geneva Protocol-1 declares, restates, elaborates, the 1899 Hague-2 treaty, readopted in the 1907 Hague-4 treaty, the general rule on objects:

1899/1907:

[Annex]

“ Section II: Hostilities ...

[Annex] Article 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden ...

(g) To destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;”

1907 Hague-4 (land) {yale, tufts}, annex article 23(g): Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex, “Regulations concerning the laws and customs of war on land” (The Hague, October 18 1907), U.S./U.K. ratified, November 27 1909, 36 Stat. 2277, parties {icrc} (minbuza: Nederlands Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, depositary, 1899/1907 Hague Peace Conventions), incorporating, verbatim, from an earlier treaty annex, with nearly the same names, 1899 Hague-2 {yale, tufts}, annex article 23(g): Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex, “Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land” (The Hague, July 29 1899), ratified by the U.S. (April 4 1902), U.K. (September 4 1900), parties {icrc}, sourced from, 1880 Oxford Manual, article 32(b) (The Laws of War on Land, Institute of International Law, Oxford, September 9 1880), and its parent, 1874 Brussels Declaration, article 13(g) (Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, August 27 1874), accord, 1863 Lieber Code {yale, tufts}: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (U.S. War Department, General Orders, No. 100, April 24 1863) (serial set 3964, pages 148-164) (e.g., “Article 14. ... measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war. Article 15. ... ‘armed’ enemies ... Article 16. ... torture to extort confessions ... wanton devastation of a district ...”).

Permitted targets. The 1977 Geneva Protocol-1 also defines a “military objective,” a concept embodied in the naval bombardment rules of the 1907 Hague-9 treaty, concerning targets outside the combat zone, at locations no army intends to attack and occupy.

1907:

“ Chapter I. The Bombardment of Undefended Ports, Towns, Villages, Dwellings, or Buildings

Article 1. The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden.

A place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbour.

Article 2. Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war ‘matériel,’ workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbour, are not, however, included in this prohibition. The commander of a naval force may destroy them with artillery ...”

Hague-9 (naval bombardment) {copy, copy}, articles 1, 2: Convention concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (The Hague, October 18 1907), U.S./U.K. ratified, November 27 1909, 36 Stat. 2277, parties {icrc} (minbuza: Nederlands Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, depositary, 1907 Hague Peace Conventions).

And so a Super Bowl football game, that’s not transformed into a “military objective” simply because the U.S. military defends it (with aircraft, gunboats, anti-aircraft guns, missiles, armed forces).

Likewise in Iran, defenses surrounding Natanz (centrifuge enrichment plant), Bushehr (electricity plant construction site), Isfahan (converting raw uranium to hex gas, the centrifuge feed stock), Arak (construction site of a heavy water plant, not a nuclear facility):—

Those military defenses (if there be any) (against endless threats from Israel and the U.S.), they do not transform the civilian objects in their care (non military industry), into “military objectives.”

The military defenses themselves are not per se lawful targets either. Positing war, they can be lawfully attacked, only if they make “an effective contribution to military action” and if their destruction “offers a definite military advantage” “in the circumstances ruling at the time.”

Because the targets they defend are civilian objects (unlawful to attack), attacking the defending objects is also a prima facie crime, because there is no lawful military action, in that locale or anywhere else, which could be definitely advantaged by destroying them.

It’s like killing police officers, at a bank you want to rob.

________________

IAEA inspections

Independent experts continuously inspect, monitor, report, and certify, the “civilian object” status of every single one of Iran’s known nuclear facilities, and some of their suppliers too, e.g., centrifuge makers (not a nuclear facility).

Periodically, they inspect other facilities, investigating allegations, and certify that those facilities too have nothing to do with nuclear materials or nuclear weapons.

That’s the IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency, their inspectors, on the ground, in Iran.

2,050 person-days of IAEA inspections by May 19 2006. “Since March 2007, fourteen unannounced inspections have been conducted” (IAEA, May 26 2008) (omitting the number of inspectors).

Logo: U.N. IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)

Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA), report to the IAEA Board of Governors, and U.N. Security Council, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Report by the Director General”) (IAEA Doc. GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008) {66kb.pdf, iaea, 140kb.pdf, isis, 140kb.pdf, casmii}.

The IAEA continuously verifies the accounting for 100% of the nuclear material at these facilities, tests and certifies the small amount of enrichment accomplished so far to be below 5% U-235, an enrichment necessary for light water reactor fuel for producing electricity (80-90% is necessary for a uranium bomb), and reports that nothing to do with making a nuclear weapon exists at any of these facilities.

Separately, the IAEA continuously reports they have seen no credible evidence that Iran has ever undertaken any work pertaining to a nuclear weapon.

The IAEA has investigated allegations to the contrary and found each and every one of them to be without merit, embodying no credible probative value, as documented in their reports.

The final remaining allegations do not pertain to any known nuclear facility in Iran.

They are based solely on a laptop computer, produced by U.S. officials, containing on its hard drive, some drawings and such.

The information and omissions are marked with forgery (in the opinion of IAEA officials), and no U.S. government official has ever vouched for its authenticity, or its chain of custody. The IAEA is unable to provide Iran an opportunity to reply to the allegations. U.S. officials refuse to give the IAEA a copy of the hard drive, or even a printout of the whole of its contents. U.S. officials merely show it to the IAEA, in secret presentations, which exclude the Iranians.

Complicit U.S. government officials conceal the laptop computer’s hard drive, from the public, from the IAEA, from Iran, from independent experts, and so only an honest Congressional hearing can discover the facts about it, what’s omitted from it, and only if each person in its chain of custody is questioned and required to name each other person in the chain of custody they know about.

Apart from the laptop, the rest of the extensive U.S. government criminal enterprise, lying about Iran’s nuclear program, has been exposed by people who pay attention, but their work is ignored by the mainstream media, owners, editors, producers, presenters. In the current era, the mainstream media seem constrained only by “facts” U.S. government officials bless, and rare disclosures elicited during Congressional hearings.

This U.S. government criminal enterprise is not the topic of this letter and warrants a hearing by the judiciary committees and enactment of a separate, permanent, independent prosecutor with jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute crimes of lying by U.S. government officials and those they secretly conspire, incite, facilitate, aid and abet, and pay.

A free society cannot coexist with a lying government.

 

________________

DoD directives

“ Article 1. The Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land, annexed to the present Convention.”

1907 Hauge-4

The U.S. military accepts this provision of 1977 Geneva Protocol-1, that its article 52 accurately declares customary international law, its “civilian object” and “military objective” language, and is binding, on the U.S. government, the U.S. military, and all combat commanders, private contractors, mercenaries, covert operators, civilian support, hired hands, independent operators, groups, states, it conspires, incites, aids and abets, facilitates.

________________

U.S. Air Force, 2006:

“ Targeting must adhere to the LOAC {law of armed conflict} and all applicable ROE {rules of engagement}. It is the policy of the DOD that the Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and, unless otherwise directed by competent authorities, the US Armed Forces will comply with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations {in all other military operations}. The “law of war” is a term encompassing all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law. The “law of war” is also commonly referred to as the LOAC.

* * *

Military Necessity. Is this target a valid “military objective”? “Military necessity” acknowledges that attacks can be made against targets, but only targets that are valid “military objectives.” In this case, the term “military objective” in this context comes from the description in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention that describes military objectives as “... (T)hose objects by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action ...” Though the US is not a signatory to the Additional Protocol it views this definition as an accurate restatement of customary international law that we recognize and with which we comply.

* * *

Distinction (Discrimination). Have we distinguished between combatants and non-combatants; have we distinguished between military objectives and protected property or places? The principle, based on customary international law, requires parties to direct operations only against combatants and military objectives. It prohibits “indiscriminate attacks.””

U.S. Air Force seal

Targeting {1.21mb.pdf, afep, 1.21mb.pdf, dtic}, pages 88-95 at 88-89 (“Appendix A, Targeting and Legal Considerations”) (U.S. Department of the Air Force, AFDD 2-1.9, June 8 2006) (“Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.9, 8 June 2006”), marked-up by CJHjr to conform to binding DoD Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, paragraph 4.1, issued a month earlier (May 9 2006, quoted below), superceding, Air Force Pamphlet 110-34, Commander's Handbook on the Law of Armed Conflict (U.S. Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, AFP 110-34, 25 July 1980) (“OPR: JACI (Maj Burrus M. Carnahan)”) (U.S. Air Force, Judge Advocate General's Corps, International and Operations Law Division), declared obsolete, December 20 1995, together with, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law--The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations (USAF, AFP 110-31, 19 November 1976, 173 pages annotated) (OPR: JACI) (U.S. Air Force, Judge Advocate General's Corps, International and Operations Law Division) (“the first pamphlet published by the United States Air Force on the law of war”). Obsolete Publications {3.52mb.pdf} (USAF, AFD-070808-022, July 8 2008).

Note: An Air Force mistake, the U.S. is a signatory to that Additional Protocol, but did not yet ratify it (Geneva Protocol-1, signed December 12 1977).


“ unless otherwise directed by competent authorities”

If the President says it’s not an armed conflict (labels it something else, covert action, collective self-defense, law-enforcement, non state actors), U.S. military commanders can violate the law of war, e.g., target civilians, civilian objects (murder and arson), conceal prisoners from the ICRC, be cruel, torture them, permit others to torture them, if that’s what the President orders them to do, so says the U.S. Air Force here.

A previous Bush-Cheney regime (President-SecDef) said their invasion of Panama (December 20 1989) was not an armed conflict, ditto Reagan-Bush, their invasion of Grenada (October 25 1983), Clinton-Cohen, their transformed U.N peace keeping operation in Somalia into an offensive U.S. war against local political factions (1992-1994) (Black Hawk down), ouster of a leader of Haiti (1994-1995), Bosnia (1995+).

And the reverse too, the President and his circle fancy he can declare martial law in the U.S., and order law of war permissions: Ambush, snipers, mass arrests, targeting curfew violators, weddings, young men (“insurgents”), political opponents, activists, on computer lists (main core, no-fly, subversives, political enemies).

Panama: Bush-Cheney-Gates (President-SecDef-NSC), when their CIA coup failed, they corrupted a Panama election, as they also did in Nicaragua, with millions of dollars in cash, to secure the election of their designated ruler, in Panama it was Guillermo Endara. Noriega declared the corrupt election void. He had said he was leaving politics, and he might have been defeated without U.S. corruption, but we’ll never know. The U.S. proclaimed their man was the legitimate government, presumed to swear him in secret as Panama president and then, on his invitation, invaded Panama 1 hour later. The JAG lawyer said this:

“Inasmuch as there was a regularly constituted government in Panama in the course of Just Cause, and U.S. forces were deployed in support of that government, the Geneva Conventions did not apply ... nor did the U.S. at any time assume the role of an occupying power as that term is used in the Geneva Conventions.”

“Memorandum from W. Hays Parks to the Judge Advocate General of the Army of 10/1/90” {January 10 1990}, quoted in, Law of War Handbook 2004 {9.84mb.pdf, source, copy, source}, page 240 (TJAGLCS, JA 423, 2003).

U.S. Judge William Hoeveler trashed this analysis, and the Bush-Cheney (SecDef) regime, their pretense, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply. There were hostilities by U.S. armed forces in a foreign country, end of analysis, and no supposed invitation altered that simple fact. U.S. v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791 {214kb.rtf} (S.D. Fla., No. 88-79-Cr, December 8 1992) (at 795, 803: “However the government wishes to label it, what occurred in late 1989-early 1990 was clearly an “armed conflict” within the meaning of Article 2.” “The implications of a less-than-strict adherence to Geneva III are serious”).

Grenada: As they later demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, the U.S. military view prisoners as assets, to be exploited, instead of human beings to be treated humanely.

“the term “prisoner of war” would accord the Cubans certain rights under the Geneva Convention, for example, the right to communicate with relatives ... the Operations Deputies decided to retain the original classification ... “personnel under protective custody” ... The J-5 officers hoped that the results of interrogation would bolster their contention that six hundred prisoners were members of combat units sent to make Grenada into a Cuban military base.”

Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury {214kb.rtf, dtic}, “The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada 12 October - 2 November 1983” (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C. 1997).

When they were done, exploiting their assets, they discovered the Cubans were just building an airport runway, and U.S. military officers covered it up, their earlier secret violations, and pretense, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply. The JAG lawyer said this:

The United States acknowledged that its military forces did engage Cuban forces in combat. It further acknowledged that, as a consequence, de facto hostilities existed and that the article 2 threshold was satisfied.

Memorandum, Hugh J. Clausen (HQDA, DAJA-IA), to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, subject: Geneva Conventions Status of Enemy Personnel Captured During URGENT FURY (4 Nov. 1983), reported, Law of War Workshop Deskbook, footnote 23 page 94 (TJAGLCS, June 2000, Brian J. Bill, editor) {1.07mb.pdf, source, 13.84mb.pdf} {SuDoc: D 108.10:2003019565, LCCN 2003067508, OCLC: 51863372, GPOcat, WorldCat}, Operational Law Handbook 1997, footnote 134 page 13-2 (TJAGLCS, JA 422, 1997) {1.74mb.pdf, pegc, 2.11mb.pdf, cdmha} {2007 edition: 6.13mb.pdf, source} {SuDoc: D 108.10/2:, LCCN 2005208826, OCLC: 54446717, GPOcat, WorldCat}.

4 JAGs (U.S. army, navy, marines, air force), 1986:

“ Subject: 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary International Law Implications

This is in reply to your memorandum of 26 March 1986, same subject, to the undersigned. In that memo you asked our views on which articles of the Protocol are currently recognized as customary international law, and which should be supported for eventual incorporation into that law. Our views were to be based on the list of provisions provided by OJCS {Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff}.

We view the following provisions as already part of customary international law:

* * *

g. Civilians: Articles 51, paragraph 2; 52, paragraphs 1 and 2 (except for the reference to “reprisal”); and 57, paragraphs 1, 2(c) and 4).

* * *

In addition to the undersigned, Lt Col Burrus M. Carnahan, USAF, and CDR John C. W. Bennett, JAGC, USN, participated in preparation of this memorandum.”

“Memorandum to John H. McNeill, Assistant General Counsel (International), OSD” (Office of the Secretary of Defense), “Subject: 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary International Law Implication(8 May 1986) (May 8 1986), from W. Hays Parks (Chief, International Law Branch, DAJA-IA) (Department of the Army, Judge Advocate, International Affairs) (U.S. Army, Office of The Judge Advocate General, International Affairs Division), LCDR Michael F. Lohr (JAGC, USN, NJAG, Code 10) (Lieutenant Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, Navy Judge Advocate General, International and Operational Law), Dennis Yoder (Lt Colonel, USAF, AF/JACI) (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Judge Advocate General's Corps, International and Operations Law Division), William Anderson (HQ USMC/JAR) (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Judge Advocate Division, Research and Civil Law), facsimile, Law of War Documentary Supplement (2007) {3.7mb.pdf, source, ditto, source} (“Law of War (LOW) Documentary Supplement (2007)” “LoW Documentary Supplement (2007)”) (formerly, JA 424), pages 399-401, “Protocol I as an expression of customary international law” (TJAGLCS: United States Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, International and Operational Law Department, 600 Massie Road, Charlottesville Virginia, June 25 2007, Sean M. Watts, editor), facsimile, United States v. Omar Ahmed Khadr (prisoner number 766), William Kuebler (Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, detailed defense counsel), Rebecca S. Snyder (Lieutenant, U.S. Navy Reserve, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, assistant detailed defense counsel), “Defense Motion to Dismiss Due for Lack of Jurisdiction for Failure to Comply with Common Article 3” (17 January 2008) {3.8mb.pdf}, attachment A (“Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Chief, International Law Branch, DAJA-IA, et. al., to Mr. John H. McNeill, Assistant General Counsel (International), OSD (8 May 1986)”) (U.S. Military Commission, under 10 U.S.C. § 948(h), U.S. military base, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, January 17 2008).

USAF, 2007:

“ Military necessity ... Attacks must be limited to military objectives, i.e., any objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Examples include troops, bases, supplies, lines of communications, and headquarters.”

The Military Commander and the Law, pages 617-645 (chapter 17, “International and Operations Law”), at pages 624-629 (“The Law of Armed Conflict”), page 626 (U.S. Air Force, The Judge Advocate General’s School, Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama, 8th Edition 2006, electronic update October 2007) {3.84mb.pdf, source}.

 

________________

U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, 2007:

“ Chapter 8. The Law of Targeting

* * *

8.2 Military Objectives. Only military objectives may be attacked. Military objectives are combatants (see Chapter 5), military equipment and facilities (except medical and religious equipment and facilities), and those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack. Military advantage may involve a variety of considerations, including the security of the attacking force.

* * *

8.3. Civilians and Civilian Objects. Civilians and civilian objects may not be made the object of deliberate or indiscriminate attack. ... Civilian objects consist of all objects that are not military objectives.”

U.S. Navy seal

Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, “Edition July 2007” {2.01mb.pdf, source} (U.S. Navy Warfare Publication NWP 1-14M, U.S. Marine Corps Warfare Publication MCWP 5-12.1, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Publication COMDTPUB P5800.7, July 2007, replacing the October 1995 edition, replacing the October 1989 edition (designated NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10)), {SuDoc: D 201.6/12:L 41, LCCN (none), OCLC: 24497192, GPOcat, paper, DL, WorldCat}, “sources of authority for statements of relevant law” and previous (1995) edition, Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWC: U.S. Naval War College, International Law Department (formerly, Oceans Law and Policy Department), Newport Rhode Island, 1997), reprinted, A. R. Thomas, James C. Duncan (editors), Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWC, ILD, international law studies (“blue book”) series, volume 73, 1999) {5.94mb.pdf, source, copy, source} {SuDoc: D 208.207:73, LCCN: 99229871, OCLC: 43517538, GPOcat, paper, DL, WorldCat}.

________________

U.S. Army, 1956, 1976:

{1956:}

“ Chapter 1. Basic Rules and Principles

Section I. General

* * *

3. Basic Principles

a. Prohibitory Effect. The law of war ... requires that belligerents refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not actually necessary for military purposes ...

* * *

Chapter 2. Hostilities

* * *

Section IV. Bombardments, Assaults, and Sieges

* * *

{1976:}

40. Permissible Objects of Attack of Bombardment

a. Attacks Against the Civilian Population as Such Prohibited. Customary international law prohibits the launching of attacks (including bombardment) against either the civilian population as such or individual civilians as such.

* * *

c. Military Objectives. Military objectives — i.e., combatants, and those objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage — are permissible objects of attack (including bombardment). Military objectives include, for example, factories producing munitions and military supplies, military camps, warehouses storing munitions and military supplies, ports and railroads being used for the transportation of military supplies, and other places that are for the accommodation of troops or the support of military operations. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 25, HR, however, cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which may be classified as military objectives, but which are undefended (para 39b), are not permissible objects of attack.

41. Unnecessary Killing and Devastation

Particularly in the circumstances referred to in the preceding paragraph, loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Those who plan or decide upon an attack, therefore, must take all reasonable steps to ensure not only that the objectives are identified as military objectives or defended places within the meaning of the preceding paragraph but also that these objectives may be attacked without probable losses in lives and damage to property disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated. ... (HR, art. 23, par. (g) ...).

* * *

{1956:}

Section VI. Treatment of Property During Combat

56. Devastation

The measure of permissible devastation is found in the strict necessities of war. Devastation as an end in itself or as a separate measure of war is not sanctioned by the law of war. There must be some reasonably close connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy's army.

* * *

58. Destruction and Seizure of Property

It is especially forbidden * * * to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war (HR, art. 23, par. (g).)”

U.S. Army seal

The Law of Land Warfare {10.3mb.pdf, source, copy, source} (U.S. Army, Field Manual 27-10, July 18 1956, and amendment dated July 15 1976) {SuDoc: D 101.20:27-10, ditto, LCCN: 56062174, OCLC: 39027139, GPOcat, WorldCat}, reprinted, Law of War Documentary Supplement (2007) {3.7mb.pdf, source, ditto, source} (“Law of War (LOW) Documentary Supplement (2007)” “LoW Documentary Supplement (2007)”) (formerly, JA 424), pages 1-145 (TJAGLCS: United States Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 600 Massie Road, Charlottesville Virginia, International and Operational Law Department, June 25 2007, Sean M. Watts, editor).

 

________________

DoD JAG lawyers

“ Article 82. Legal advisers in armed forces
The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed forces on this subject.”

1977 Geneva Protocol I

The Judge Advocate General’s Corps.

Where do JAG lawyers fit, in combat?

Is targeting any of their business?

Must they be consulted?

Can they be excluded?

Do they speak, only if spoken to?

Are they clerical staff? rubber-stampers? of higher orders?

There are U.S. military orders, about law, about lawyers.

These orders say, they’re binding, on the lawyers, on all combat commanders, on all they command, special forces included, the U.S. President’s secret SS commandos.

Can U.S. military lawyers be prosecuted, for the war crime of bombing Iran’s IAEA targets, because of what they say, or what they don’t say.

Can U.S. military combat commanders be prosecuted for the war crime of bombing Iran’s IAEA targets.

JAG lawyers are not combat commanders, they’re not in the combat chain of command, they have no veto.

But JAG lawyers have legal duties, as support staff. They are obliged to examine, and express an opinion about it, planned targets.

By performing their duty, or refusing to do it, JAG lawyers willingly associate themselves with massive violence, and so can exhibit criminal intent, if that violence is unlawful.

Likewise if a JAG lawyer fails to report, and promptly, to a higher command, if a combat commander insists to attack unlawful targets, or attack in unlawful ways, unlawful in the lawyer’s reasonable opinion.

Combat commanders have the legal duty to consult JAG lawyers, on the question, is their intended violence lawful. And so combat commanders can exhibit criminal intent, if they violate that duty, or reject legal advice, and if that violence is unlawful.

Their orders require combat commanders to comply with the law of war and to submit their “plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement” to U.S. military lawyers, whose duty is to “ensure their consistency” with the law of war.

“ DoD Law of War Program

* * *

2. Applicability and scope

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the “DoD Components”).

3. Definitions

3.1. Law of War. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the “law of armed conflict.” The law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.

3.2. Reportable Incident. A possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the law of war, for which there is credible information, or conduct during military operations other than war that would constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict.

4. Policy

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Members of the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.

4.2. The law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by the DoD Components and DoD contractors assigned to or accompanying deployed Armed Forces.

4.3. An effective program to prevent violations of the law of war is implemented by the DoD Components.

4.4. All reportable incidents committed by or against U.S. personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual are reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action.

* * *

5. Responsibilities

* * *

5.7. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

5.7.1. Comply with the policies contained in this Directive.

5.7.2. Institute and implement effective programs to prevent violations of the law of war, including law of war training and dissemination, as required by Articles 47 and 50, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (Reference (c)); Articles 48 and 51, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (Reference (d)); Articles 127 and 130, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Reference (e)); Articles 144 and 147, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (Reference (f)); and Sections 801-940 of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Reference (g)).

5.7.3. Make qualified legal advisers at all levels of command available to provide advice about law of war compliance during planning and execution of exercises and operations; and institute and implement programs to comply with the reporting requirements established in section 6.

* * *

5.10. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.10.1. Provide appropriate guidance to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, consistent with Reference (l) {10 U.S.C. 163(a)(2)}.

* * *

5.10.3. Review appropriate plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement, as necessary, ensuring their consistency with the law of war obligations of the United States.

5.10.4. Ensure that plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement issued by the Commanders of the Combatant Commands are consistent with this Directive and the law of war.

5.11. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall:

5.11.1. Institute programs within their respective commands to prevent violations of the law of war and ensure that their commands’ plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement are subject to periodic review and evaluation, particularly in light of any violations reported.

* * *

5.11.8. Ensure all plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement issued by the command and its subordinate commands and components are reviewed by legal advisers to ensure their consistency with this Directive and the law of war.

5.11.9. Ensure that law of war training and dissemination programs of subordinate commands and components are consistent with this Directive and the law of war obligations of the United States.”

U.S. DoD seal

DoD Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program {115kb.pdf, jel, jdeisfs} (boldface added) (Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense Directive, DoDD 2311.01E, May 9 2006), cancels DoDD 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program (December 9 1998) {42kb.pdf, 36kb.pdf, 16kb.txt, jdeisfs}, cancels DoDD 5100.77 (July 10 1979) {253kb.pdf, source}, cancels DoDD 5100.77 (November 5 1974).

 

The Chiefs:

“ Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program

* * *

4. Policy

* * *

b. At all appropriate levels of command and during all stages of operational planning and execution of joint and combined operations, legal advisors will provide advice concerning law of war compliance.

* * *

Enclosure A
Responsibilities

* * *

3. The commanders of combatant commands are responsible for the overall execution of the DOD Law of War Program within their respective commands. Specific responsibilities include ensuring:

* * *

d. Command legal advisors attend planning and operations-related conferences for military operations and exercises, as appropriate, to enable them to provide advice concerning law of war compliance during joint and combined operations.

e. All operation plans (including preplanned and adaptively planned strategic targets), concept plans, rules of engagement, execute orders, deployment orders, policies, and directives are reviewed by the command legal advisor to ensure compliance with domestic and international law, this instruction, and the DOD Law of War Program.”

Emblem, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Implementation of DoD Law of War Program {110kb.pdf} (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 5810.01C, January 31 2007) (“Directive current as of 29 January 2008”).

 

“ Joint Force Staff Judge Advocate’s Duties and Responsibilities

Law of War and Related International Legal Considerations

Ensure that all plans, orders, policies, rules of engagement (ROE), and target lists issued by the command and its subordinate commands are reviewed by legal advisors for compliance with applicable law and policy as required by Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5810.01B, Implementation of DoD Law of War Program.

Assist the J-3 {operations} or J-5 {plans} in preparing ROE request and authorization messages according to CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

Advise the JFC and staff on the legal authority for, and constraints on, the conduct of military operations, including the use of force.”

Joint Publication 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations “01 March 2007” {640kb.pdf, source, jel} {copy, fas} (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-04, March 1 2007).

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms {2.62mb.pdf, doddict, jp, jel} (“12 April 2001, as amended through 30 May 2008”) (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, May 30 2008).

JFCom: U.S. Joint Forces Command (combat command)

“ 3. Joint Task Force Staff

* * *

b. Operations Directorate

* * *

(2) In coordination with JTF J-2, J-5, and staff judge advocate (SJA), develops the RTL and NSL for CJTF approval. Once approved, forwards them to the JTCB and components for use in the joint targeting planning process.

* * *

i. Staff Judge Advocate. The JTF SJA responsibility is to advise the CJTF on applicable international and domestic laws, multilateral and bilateral agreements, LOAC issues, compliance with published ROE, and other pertinent issues involved in target recommendations and decision procedures.

* * *

8. Phase 2 – Target Development and Prioritization

* * *

e. Target Validation

(1) Target validation is a CJTF responsibility ... In addition, target validation reviews whether attacking the target would be in compliance with LOAC and ROE. ... Target validation is done by targeteers, in consultation with the strategy planners and other experts/agencies, as required. The first part of validation asks such questions as:

* * *

(c) ... Is attacking the target lawful? What are the LOAC and ROE considerations?

* * *

(h) Are there any facilities or targets on the NSL or RTL collocated with the target being validated?

* * *

(3) The CJTF’s intelligence personnel, SJA, planners, and other personnel are included in the target development process and must be familiar with the JTFs target validation process {sic: JTF’s}.

* * *

f. Target List Development

* * *

(3) The second step of Phase 2 (target development) ends with the creation of the JTL. The JTL is a consolidated list of targets (developed, vetted, and validated from the CTL) upon which there are no restrictions placed. The JTL is a dynamic database; the JTF J-2 modifies this database to include periodic TDN inputs from national agencies, combatant commands, and assigned component forces. In simpler terms, what the JTL means to target development is that it is a list of all the valid targets available for nomination for some type of action. The JTL is not a component specific list; these are targets available for any type of exploitation or attack, lethal or nonlethal, air, ground or other delivery methods.

(4) JTF components select targets from the JTL to compile their respective TNLs and forward them to the CJTF. The TNLs are then combined, validated, and prioritized to form a draft JIPTL that is submitted to the JTCB for finalization. Targets are checked against the NSL and the RTL at each successive level. Component commanders must request the CJTF (or the CJTF’s appointed representative) review and approve RTL targets nominated to the JIPTL before execution.

* * *

(6) The CJTF may also prohibit or restrict joint force attacks on specific targets or objects based on military risk, LOAC, ROE, or other considerations. Targeting restrictions fall into two categories, no strike (sometimes called prohibited) and restricted.

(a) The NSL is a list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under international law or the ROE. Attacking these targets may violate the LOAC (e.g., cultural and religious sites, embassies belonging to noncombatant countries, hospitals, schools) or interfere with friendly relations with other nations, indigenous populations, or governments. The NSL is compiled independently of, and in parallel to, the CTL. It is important to note, however, that entities from the CTL may be moved to the NSL if, as a result of additional target development (vetting), it is determined that attacking them may violate the LOAC. Conversely, targets placed on a NSL may be removed and become subject to military action if their status as a protected object or entity has changed. For example, a church that functions as a weapons storage facility or a barracks will lose its protected status and may be legally attacked.

(b) A restricted target is a valid target that has specific restrictions placed on the actions authorized against it, due to operational considerations. Actions that exceed specified restrictions are prohibited until coordiated and approved by the establishing HQ. Attacking restricted targets may interfere with projected friendly operations. This list also includes restrictions on targets directed by higher authorities. The targets on the RTL are nominated by elements of the joint force, approved by the CJTF, and include restricted targets directed by higher authorities. Targets may have certain specific restrictions associated with them that should be clearly documented in the RTL, such as do not strike during daytime or strike only with a certain weapon.

(7) Some targets may require special precautions, such as chemical, biological, or nuclear facilities, or targets in close proximity to no-strike targets. When targets are restricted from lethal attacks, targeteers should consider nonlethal capabilities as a means to achieve desired effects or support the objectives.

For additional information, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence {3.04mb.pdf, dtic}.”

Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook {2.21mb.pdf, dtic}, 19 October 2007 (USJFCom: United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk Virginia, October 19 2007).

 

________________

Iran bombing encyclopedia

1. Who owns the Iran bombing encyclopedia? (euphemistically, basic encyclopedia).

BE: “A compilation of identified installations and physical areas of potential significance as objectives for attack.”

Is there more than one?

2. Who owns the Iran candidate target list?

CTL: “A list of objects or entities submitted by component commanders, appropriate agencies, or the joint force commander’s staff for further development and inclusion on the joint target list and/or restricted target list, or moved to the no-strike list.”

Is there more than one?

3. Who owns the Iran no-strike list?

NSL: “A list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement. Attacking these may violate the law of armed conflict or interfere with friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments.”

Is there more than one?

4. Who owns the Iran restricted target list?

RTL: “A list of restricted targets nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the joint force commander. This list also includes restricted targets directed by higher authorities.”

Is there more than one?

5. Who owns the Iran joint target list?

JTL: “A consolidated list of selected targets, upon which there are no restrictions placed, considered to have military significance in the joint force commander’s operational area.”

Is there more than one?

The quoted Joint Forces Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook recites, that it recounts current best practice in U.S. combat commands, including what the binding DoD Law of War Program directive requires them to require, namely, that combat force JAG lawyers personally evaluate each target, whether it be in the bombing encyclopedia or not, which is nominated to a candidate target list, and personally approve its further destination, namely, each addition to, and each omission from, the three bombing lists: The no-strike list (NSL), the restricted strike list (RSL), or the unrestricted joint target list (JTL).

Obviously, Iran’s nuclear facilities are in the bombing encyclopedia, with no shortage of people eager to nominate them, to a candidate target list, and so the question is, which bombing list are they now on?

Are they ready to bomb (JTL)? are they ready to bomb with restrictions (RTL)? and what is the text of the restrictions? are they on a no-strike list (NSL)?

The answer is apparent, as the bombing talk bears witness, they’re now on the JTL, ready to bomb, on orders.

Impending, massive, unlawful, violence, licensing lawful reprisal targeting of the U.S. public, U.S. civilians and U.S. civilian objects:—

How did this came to be? by what procedure? on whose orders?

How can the law of war be enforced? how can these targets be moved to the no-strike list?

Are there are multiple Iran targets lists? conflicting lists? secret lists? covert action lists? lists with different names? within the same joint forces combat command? in different joint force commands? in single commands? not part of a joint force? special operations combat commands? from the separate military departments (army, navy, marines, air force)? the CIA? private contractors? mercenaries? aided and abetted individuals or groups?

Have one set of commanders outlawed targets, different commanders stand ready to bomb?

To discover the answer, let’s hear the testimony of each individual JAG lawyer, who signed off on these targets, and their explanation.

In addition, JAG lawyers at every combat command which might launch weapons at Iran’s IAEA nuclear facilities, each of the 10 combatant commands, each subcommand, joint task force, and each secret command which the President may have created for covert action. SOCCom, CentCom, JFCom, EUCom, PacCom, SouthCom, AfriCom, StratCom, CentAF, USNavCent, USMarCent, ArCent, SOCCent, MNF-I, CJTF-101, CJTF-HOA.

The public needs accountability, enforcement of the rule of law, criminal penalties, mandatory incarceration, prosecuted in the U.S. federal district court, requiring identified staff to create permanent records, and preserve them permanently, including real time operation logs, identifying the record-keepers and each individual who evaluates targets.

The U.S. military officers who approved bombing the ICRC warehouse in Kabul, twice, are still at large, anonymous hoodlums for hire, willing to sign-off on any target anybody wants to bomb, or those who deceived them.

With accountability, which Congress has not provided, they would long since be expelled from the military and locked up for their crime.

It’s plain, from the DoD Law of War Program, a binding directive, that combat commanders are prohibited from obeying orders, from the national command authority (President, Secretary of Defense), to bomb targets, unless and until the combat commander personally evaluates those targets, whether or not it is lawful to bomb them.

If s/he concludes the targets are not lawful, then if s/he bombs them anyway, on the President’s orders, s/he commits a violent war crime (under both U.S. and international law), and a U.S. court martial crime.

 

________________

Silencing JAG lawyers

What to do, if you want to bomb Iran, their IAEA nuclear facilities, and your military JAG lawyers say, “No.”

Their secret torture memos demonstrate it, Bush-Cheney have their methods, how to paint JAG lawyers out of the picture (civil servants, not politically appointed):

George W. Bush asserted, in a signing statement, his intention, if it suits him, to violate the Act of Congress he signed, which prohibits any officer or employee of the Department of Defense to interfere with the ability of military legal advisers (judge advocates) “to give independent legal advice.” 10 U.S.C. 3037, 5046, 5148, 8037 (Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force).

Signing statement (October 28 2004):

“ George W. Bush: Section 574 of the Act amends sections 3037, 5046, 5148, and 8037 of title 10, United States Code, to prohibit Department of Defense personnel from interfering with the ability of a military department judge advocate general, and the staff judge advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to give independent legal advice to the head of a military department or chief of a military service or with the ability of judge advocates assigned to military units to give independent legal advice to unit commanders. ¶

The executive branch shall construe section 574 in a manner consistent with: (1) the President’s constitutional authorities to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, to supervise the unitary executive branch, and as Commander in Chief; (2) the statutory grant to the Secretary of Defense of authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense (10 U.S.C. 113(b)); (3) the exercise of statutory authority by the Attorney General (28 U.S.C. 512 and 513) and the general counsel of the Department of Defense as its chief legal officer (10 U.S.C. 140) to render legal opinions that bind all civilian and military attorneys within the Department of Defense; and (4) the exercise of authority under the statutes (10 U.S.C. 3019, 5019, and 8019) by which the heads of the military departments may prescribe the functions of their respective general counsels.”

George W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 2001-2009 Jan. 20), “President's Statement on the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act, 2005{pf} (third paragraph, “Section 574 of the Act ...”) (White House, October 28 2004), retitled, “Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,” 40:44 WCPD 2673-2674 {9kb.txt, 43kb.pdf} {ucsb} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:40/44}, concerning, H.R. 4200 (U.S. Congress 108-2), Public Law 108-375, inter alia, § 574 (“Authorities of the Judge Advocates General”), 118 Stat. 1811-2199, at 1921-1924 (October 28 2004) {1.26mb.txt, 2.26mb.pdf}.

And that’s precisely what Bush-Cheney did, to create their secret torture “law,” cram it down the throats of the military, who then saluted, and did as they were told.

The general counsel for the defense department, William J. Haynes II (Jim Haynes), he ordered the JAGs to stop their review of U.S. military torture techniques, a review destined to preempt that cruelty, a violation of the law of war.

His order was passed verbally by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Richard B. Myers) to his JAG lawyer, Legal Counsel to the Chiefs (Jane G. Dalton), ordering her to stop the review she was conducting, with JAGs in all services. She obeyed that verbal order.

The JAG lawyer, she did not insist on a signed, written, order, that she conduct her business in violation of her professional judgment.

She allowed Richard B. Myers to escape responsibility.

People who know, or suspect, they’re doing something wrong, they don’t want to sign anything, and later, they might claim, they can’t recall, don’t remember, what’s not recorded.

If required to put it in writing, and sign it, they might think better of it, and withdraw their order.

Origins of aggressive interrogation techniques “Part I of the Committee's inquiry into the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody” (Senate Armed Services Committee, hearing, June 17 2008, 9:34am-5:15pm) (panel-2, 12:37-2:40pm), C-Span video, broadcast June 17, 18, 20, 21, 2008, C-Span cached video (panel 1) {3:03:10, 177mb.rm, 564752709, rss}, C-Span cached video (panels 2 and 3) {4:10:16, 244mb.rm}, C-Span library video (panels 1 and 2, “Detainee Interrogation Techniques, Morning”) {5:10:44, flv, 206004-1, search}, C-Span library video (“Detainee Interrogation Techniques, Afternoon”) (panel-3, 3:10-5:15pm, William J. Haynes II) {2:06:49, flv, 206004-2}, FNS transcripts: panel 1, 2, 3, Lexis.

This signing statement is the likely work of David Addington, then legal counsel to Dick Cheney (U.S. Vice President) and reasserts the same authority he and Cheney first asserted in 1992, rebuffed by Congress, a mechanism to tempt or coerce military lawyers, to lie about their legal opinions, or else silence them.

Charlie Savage, “Hail to the chief: Dick Cheney's mission to expand -- or 'restore' -- the powers of the presidency” {pf} (The Boston Globe, November 26 2006).

A former Secretary of Defense and DoD General Counsel, Cheney-Addington, they certainly appreciate the obstacle posed by JAGs, to criminal orders, to dubious orders:

Navy “Rules of Professional Conduct,” Rule 1.2(e), 32 C.F.R. 776.21(5):

“ e. A covered attorney shall not counsel or assist a client to engage in conduct that the attorney knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a covered attorney may discuss the legal and moral consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client, and may counsel or assist a client in making a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.

f. Comment

* * *

(4) Criminal, Fraudulent, and Prohibited Transactions

(a) A covered attorney is required to give an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client’s conduct. The fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent does not, of itself, make an attorney a party to the course of action.

However, a covered attorney may not knowingly assist a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct. There is a critical distinction between advising a client on the legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.

(b) When the client’s course of action has already begun and is continuing, the covered attorney’s responsibility is especially delicate. The attorney is not permitted to reveal the client’s wrongdoing, except when required or permitted by Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3.

However, the covered attorney is required to avoid furthering the wrongdoing, for example, by suggesting how it might be concealed. A covered attorney may not continue assisting a client in conduct the attorney originally supposes is legally proper, but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. Seeking to withdraw from the representation may be appropriate.

(c) Paragraph e of the Rule applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a covered attorney should not participate in a sham transaction; for example, a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent escape of tax liability. The last clause of paragraph e recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may include a course of action contrary to the terms of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities.”

JAG Instruction 5803.1C (JAG 132, November 9 2004), Subject: Professional Conduct of Attorneys Practicing Under the Cognizance and Supervision of the Judge Advocate General {6.63mb.pdf/image, source, copy}, enclosure 1, “Rules of Professional Conduct,” rule 1.2(e), 32 C.F.R. 776.21(5), (f) (U.S. DoN JAGC: Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Washington Navy Yard, 1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Washington D.C.), JAGINST 5803.1C (JAG 132, November 9 2004), cancels, JAGINST 5803.1B (JAG 132, February 11 2000) {250kb.pdf, source}, cancels, JAGINST 5803.1A (JAG 132, July 13 1992), and see, Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers {157kb.pdf, legal, epubs} (U.S. Army Regulation 27-26, June 1 1992), Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct (AFRPC) {251kb.pdf, caaflog} (U.S. Air Force, Judge Advocate General's Corps., TJS-2, August 17 2005).

Cheney-Addington might understand how to evade that obstacle, enleague a few JAG lawyers (maybe one’s enough), flatter them, seduce them, corrupt them, bribe them, intimidate them, failing which, banish them, marginalize them, silence them, transfer them, fire them.

It preys on their mind, now, may be, for this very reason, the JAGs, their likely opinion, about bombing Iran’s IAEA nuclear facilities, and may be their opinion about violent DoD covert operations in Iran (murder, arson, kidnapping).

Recently, Jim Haynes did it again (David Addington’s personal pick for that job), fronting for Bush-Cheney, their desperation, to control the JAGs, influence them, dominate them,q intimidate them, weed them, once again rebuffed Congress (informally).

Charlie Savage, “Control sought on military lawyers: Bush wants power over promotions” {pf} (The Boston Globe, December 15 2007), Charlie Savage, “Military lawyers stay unbridled: White House drops veto bid on promotions” {pf} (The Boston Globe, December 19 2007), Globe editorial, “Lawyers with too much integrity{pf} (The Boston Globe, December 20 2007).

Each service has a general counsel (10 U.S.C. 3019, 5019, 8019), a civilian political appointee, and these could be persuaded or ordered to terminate the duty of the JAGs to approve targets, declare they comply with the international laws of war. The Defense Department general counsel (10 U.S.C. 140), a civilian political appointee, could be persuaded or ordered to issue that order and usurp all JAG legal adviser duties on targeting, into the hands of a cooperative lawyer. Persuaded or ordered by the Secretary of Defense, a civilian political appointee, boss of the whole department (10 U.S.C. 113(b)). And if no military lawyer will play ball, then — as with their torture opinions — the U.S. Attorney General can confiscate that duty (28 U.S.C. 512-513), a civilian political appointee, and declare the targets lawful, and this by a secret opinion, eagerly, or persuaded or ordered to do so, may be, by George W. Bush, the political appointor, as commander-in-chief, a Caesar, who fancies he can “supervise” a “unitary executive branch,” according to his whim, the legal regime created by Adolph Hitler’s lawyers, and Richard Nixon’s view too, as he put it to David Frost (Washington D.C., April 25 1977) {transcript, pf, video}:

Richard Nixon. Well, when the president does it, that means it is not illegal.

David Frost. By definition.

Richard Nixon. Exactly, exactly.

If the president, for example, approves something because of the national security, or in this case because of a threat to internal peace and order of significant magnitude, then the president’s decision in that instance is one that enables those who carry it out, to carry it out without violating a law. Otherwise they’re in an impossible position.”

Proper oversight of the rule of law requires the committee to throw a wrench into this mechanism, junk this Führerprinzip.

Let’s hear the JAG lawyers, their opinion about it.

Do they endorse the Fhürerprinzip, acquiesce, submit, to what Nuremberg military tribunals held to be beyond the legal capacity of any government to legalize, any government official (commander-in-chief), any government legislative body (Congress), the presumed legal authority to decriminalize an international violent crime (e.g., a war crime).

If the U.S. president orders bombing of Iran’s IAEA nuclear facilities, will our JAG lawyers say, his order is a legal Führer order (as Adolph’s lawyers would assert), though it violates the laws of war, or a criminal Führer order (as the Nuremberg military tribunals would hold), because it violates the laws of war.

Any such legal dispute involving, as it does, massive violence, this dispute, in an honest government, would be urgently unmasked, ventilated in fresh air, reported to the public, to every military commander with weapons release authority, and to Congress.

So that Congress can consider whether to resolve the dispute, by enacting or clarifying the law. So that military commanders can consider their risk of criminal prosecution, if they obey orders. So that the public can remove members of Congress who shirk their duty, or perform it contrary to their desires, the voters.

In an honest government, lawyers would be protected in their work, to investigate facts, to form, and to express, a free and honest opinion, and those who seek to bribe them, or tempt them, or coerce them, or punish them, for doing their duty, these hoodlums would be prosecuted.

But if members of Congress don’t want to do it, protect honest lawyers, then, for the sake of honest government, they should at least clarify, that military lawyers, their duty, obliges them to obey orders, to deliver legal advice and opinions as they are ordered, as if it were their actual honest advice and opinions.

Lying, on orders, about your legal opinion, this is dishonest, of course, as is the usual method of lying by U.S. government legal advisers, accepting stipulated facts which they have reason to suspect are not, or may not be, the actual facts and concealing their opinion on alternate facts. Dishonesty is a basis to disbar them, revoke, suspend, their license to practice law.

In Re Elliott Abrams, rehearing en banc, 689 A.2d 6 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, No. 91-BG-1518, February 5 1997) (“dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation” “deceived three Congressional committees”) {183kb.pdf}.

Dishonesty, a want of good moral character, disqualifies them to hold the office of a military lawyer, except in the eyes of a criminal military high command, and their civilian provocateurs, wondering how to coerce tens of thousands of soldiers, to obey criminal orders.

A complicit Congress can easily fix this anomaly, by discarding the requirement that military lawyers hold a license to practice law.

But this would be a war crime, by each member of Congress voting to do it, as the laws of war require a state to provide lawyers, to advise commanders, e.g., on targeting.

Members of Congress don’t fear criminal prosecution, for war crimes, else they would not vote, as they routinely do, to conspire, incite, aid and abet, facilitate, the criminal torts and violent war crimes of Israel, its officials, its army.

 

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Mutiny

The President, and his circle, do not release weapons.

For that, they require obedience, from tens of thousands of people. It’s a simple matter for the military high command, the CIA, to lie, deceive, bamboozle, stonewall, silence, most of these people, they are young, ill-informed, and uneducated in such matters. Less so older people, with weapons release authority.

All these people might have their doubts, many might feel convinced, their orders are unlawful, criminal under the laws of war.

Especially, if that’s what their own JAG lawyers are telling them.

But Congress cast them into a deadly dilemma.

Congress threatens each of them with criminal prosecution and execution, if they obey orders to release weapons against unlawful targets. And so does every other country in the world, which can get their hands on them (universal jurisdiction, international war crimes).

Yet, Congress also threatens them death too, if they refuse to obey orders.

And if they ally with others, and refuse to obey orders, to thwart an unlawful attack.

“Mutiny or sedition,” 10 U.S.C. § 894 (UCMJ: Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 94). “Revolt or mutiny of seamen.” 18 U.S.C. § 2193.

It’s poor treatment, for Congress, to threaten our military, with execution, if they obey orders, and execution, if they refuse to obey orders, those very same orders.

Congress created it, this dilemma, and so should remedy it, provide a way for our military to refuse to obey orders they reasonably believe, or reasonably fear, are unlawful, including a war crime, a violation of the international law of war.

Our military law assumes an honest President and an honest military high command.

Recent events illustrate, this assumption is unwarranted, on both accounts, but it has always been unwarranted.

The committee should also solve the dilemma at hand, declare these targets illegal, or any rate off-limits, and so preempt anguish of our men and women in the military.

Most members of Congress vote as the Israel lobby specifies, and so this Congress will not vote to outlaw these IAEA targets.

But the committee might have the votes to do it, to declare their opinion, that these targets are already outlawed, by the law of war.

This expression of committee opinion would bolster combat commanders, their resolve to refuse to obey contrary orders, provide authoritative support to their opinion, their legal right to refuse to obey criminal orders, a defense to a mutiny charge.

 

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Defunding

Much better to protect our military, from becoming violent criminals, against their will, than to prosecute them later, for obeying orders.

An amendment to appropriation bills, is a method to manage this criminal law issue, for the committee to adopt it and report it to the floor, for referral to the appropriations committee to append to the next available bills:

“No funds available to the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, or any other agency or entity or contractor of the United States may be obligated or expended to plan, conduct, or facilitate an attack on facilities or activities, or their personnel, safeguarded by the IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency.”

Defunding must be enforced with criminal law, and include funding from any source, such as the billions of dollars stolen in Iraq, stashed somewhere, maybe under the control or influence of Dick Cheney, Elliott Abrams, other U.S. officials, or their operatives.

This, because Bush, Cheney, Addington (now the Vice-President’s chief-of-staff) do not accept Congress has legal authority to defund U.S. government enterprises, the ones they care about.

The Boland amendment defunding, for a time, the Reagan-Bush war on Nicaragua (1981-1990), Cheney-Addington claimed it was an illegal law, an impermissible infringement on the President’s supposed authority (1987 minority view on Iran-Contra, pages 429-636).

A criminal prosecution of them, and who else participates in funding a defunded activity, this will allow them to test their legal theory, in court, enroute to prison.

Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (U.S. Congress 100-1, Senate Report No. 100-216, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, House Report No. 100-433, House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, November 13 1987, 16+690 pages) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/5:100-216, Y 1.1/8:100-433, Serial Set: 13739, 13810, CIS: 87 H963-4, google, LCCN: 87602662, GPOCat: Senate, House, DL, OCLC: 17162907, 16998535, WorldCat, WorldCat}.

 

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JSOC: Covert action

Emblem: Joint Special Operations Command

JSOC. Joint Special Operations Command.

That’s the DoD component Sy Hersh is told (deduces?), is conducting covert operations in Iran, drawing on all military departments, waging violent crime, terrorism (as Sy Hersh describes what they’re doing).

The JSOC commander, Stanley A. McChrystal, has now been transferred to staff director at the Joint Chiefs (June 13 2008). Is his new duty there to facilitate the JSOC covert, overt, war on Iran? Intercepting statutory consultations, between SecDef and the Chiefs? A necessary formality? On a need to know basis? Keeping the rest of the joint staff in the dark?

McChrystal is a perfect pick, if that’s his assigned task, because he’s a practiced, bold, trustworthy, liar. Scott Lindlaw, Martha Mendoza (Associated Press), “AP: Tillman Memo Contradicted Citation{pf} (The Washington Post, Saturday August 4 2007).

A liar the committee would have to subpoena, because he’s already refused to appear as a witness, before the House Government Operations Committee. As in the past, the Attorney General too will likely refuse to enforce the subpoena, but that’s a necessary formality to pursue, to demonstrate the Attorney General’s complicity, in these violent crimes.

This letter is about bombing Iran, not covert operations. But JSOC raises questions, for the JAG lawyers.

JSOC can bomb Iran, its IAEA nuclear facilities.

On a small scale, and disguise it, as internal armed warfare by Iranians, or a false flag operation, by Israel, setting events in motion to “justify” massive bombing, by CentCom, in a second wave.

JSOC components can operate from airfields, or portions of them, under JSOC command, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, Israel. U.S. Navy submarines, in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, with JSOC mission commanders on board, can launch cruise missiles, as if from Israel’s German submarines.

Then, CentCom could attack, falsely claiming self defense, the moment Iran attacks U.S. bases in response (because no attack on Iran is possible without U.S. complicity), and if Iran attacks Israel too (if the false flag deceit is convincing).

U.S. officials could pronounce the massive CentCom attack as justified self defense.

JSOC’s predecessor did exactly this (MACV-SOG), creating a pretext for the Tonkin Gulf resolution (August 7 1964), bombing n.Vietnam from Thailand, handing n.Vietnam a provocation, to lawfully attack U.S. Navy vessels, penetrating their territorial waters, supporting that violence, by DoD special forces, including their commando raids, following on from the CIA’s ditto covert action in n.Vietnam. All of which U.S. officials lied about, to Congress (with complicity, by some few members of Congress), in order to trick Congress, to vote for the resolution.

There’s no self defense defense against self defense.

And so a second-wave attack, by CentCom, would be unlawful by the United States, and criminal by U.S. officials who understood the JSOC provocation.

This is why the USS Vincennes attack on the Iranian airliner, Airbus flight IR655 (July 3 1988), was murder and arson, and not self defense. Captain Rogers was engaged in a criminal felony at the time, attempted murder and arson, unlawfully attacking Iran’s blockade crews, in their small boats, many miles deep inside Iran’s territorial waters. Those small boats, their duty was to enforce Iran’s lawful blockade against Iraq, during that war (1980-1988), by lawful stop and search, of passing merchant vessels. And so, even if the airliner were a warplane, coming to attack the Vincennes, Captain Rogers, his only lawful remedy was to terminate his violent crime, stop his criminal attack on the small boats, and flee. No different from a bank robber, killing pursuing police officers, Rogers did not have a lawful violent option.

JSOC was also involved in the Vincennes attack, to create a pretext, a fictitious merchant ship (M/S Stoval), which called for help. (I don’t recollect Newsweek or Nightline said it was JSOC, by name). No vessel called for help, DoD officials later said (knowing many tape recordings existed, of all such radio traffic), but they endorsed the fictitious ship, and cited the supposed sound of explosions, some hours earlier. And were that true, that could be JSOC, attempting to create a provocation.

Good public deceit but a hopeless pretext, because a merchant vessel’s duty, when transiting a lawful blockade, is to stop on demand, and submit to a search. And so any cry for help, from a merchant captain attempting, instead, to flee, that’s a cry which cannot be lawfully answered with violence, by a U.S. warship. Iran’s blockade crews were lawfully entitled to attack any merchant ship which refused to stop, and submit to a search. They conducted thousands of lawful searches, during that war.

JSOC was in that picture, tasked to conduct deception operations, to create pretexts to attack Iran’s small boats, Operation Prime Chance, various JSOC commands, helicopters, for example, operated by Army special operations (Task Force 160), from two oilfield barges near Kuwait provided, and masqueraded, by Halliburton, its subsidiary Brown & Root (later KBR: Kellogg Brown & Root).

David B. Crist, “Joint Special Operations in Support of Earnest Will” {1.04mb.pdf, copy, source, source, jel} (JFQ: Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 29, Autumn/Winter 2001-02, pages 15-22, NDU: National Defense University Press).

When they came to explain, U.S. destruction of Iran’s airliner, and the 290 souls on board, U.S. officials lied about the facts and lied about the law, with likely complicity from some members of Congress, e.g., Sam Nunn (then chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee), now mentioned as a possible U.S. Vice President.

And maybe Carl Levin too (then on that committee, now its chairman), who has lied in recent committee hearings — his formal, considered, deliberated, written, opening statements — that Iran has a nuclear weapons program — the powerful mantra of the U.S. Israel lobby, the Israeli government, their message force multipliers, their echo chamber of Congressional servants, rabbi parrots, think-tank hirelings, newspapers, editors, writers, bloggers, producers, radio/TV talkers.

Carl Levin knows, with certainty, and at the time of each his statements, that his assertion is not true, or else, with certainty, that he doesn’t know if it’s true, or not (SASC February 27 2007, statement, DNI transcript {1.04mb.pdf, source}, FNS transcript, GPOcat, C-Span video) (“Iran's nuclear program ... a nuclear weapons capability... its weapons program”), accord, SASC January 30 2007 (“Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons”), SASC December 5 2006, SASC July 31 2007 (“an Iran that seems to be aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons”).

The exact species of lie Carl Levin charges the Bush-Cheney cabal deployed, to incite the prima facie criminal U.S. attack on Iraq (March 20 2003), a prima facie criminal lie and, separately, an overt act in a violent criminal conspiracy of murder, arson, aggressive war.

Having gathered together the JAG lawyers, to apply their minds, to a bombing campaign, a second day’s hearing, on covert operations, seems necessary.

Being on notice from Sy Hersh, of the covert operation in Iran, and its prima facie criminal mission, and criminal methods, the committee members will themselves become complicit, in those violent crimes, if the committee refuses to inquire into it, having jurisdiction to do so.

Here’s a JSOC question for the JAG lawyers:

Are JAG lawyers assigned to JSOC, or is it a lawyer-free zone.

And to each SOC component command (special operations, army, navy, marines, air force, and their joint task forces).

In the opinion of the JAG lawyers, can that commander defeat a court-martial by arbitrary or wilful blindness, or must s/he negate recklessness or wilfulness, criminal intent, by advancing a legitimate reason to exclude the JAGs, and to not “reach-back,” to consult with JAG lawyers at headquarters. And how convincing must that explanation be, more likely than not? a reasonable possibility?

If JSOC assets (boys and toys) are seconded to the CIA, or a private contractor (Halliburton, KBR, Black Water), to conduct missions, are JAGs assigned with them.

Can such seconded DoD people be prosecuted, in a court martial, for their war crimes, for violating the DoD directive, requiring they obey the laws of war. Would a court martial view them as a DoD Component in substance, and disregard their civilian form disguise. If so, with what level of confidence do the JAG lawyers assess that likelihood.

Or does their secondment, in the opinion of the JAG lawyers, terminate their status as a “DoD Component” (defined in that directive), banish their jeopardy, deprive a court martial of jurisdiction to try them, and so license them to wage violent crime, no U.S. court having jurisdiction to try them. Or a willing prosecutor.

And can they resign, if they fear prosecution, and so defeat jurisdiction of a court martial, like Oliver North did.

Evading jurisdiction of a court martial, that’s a reason, to prosecute war crimes in the federal district courts.

A court martial is an unfit forum anyway. It’s fit, only to coerce soldiers to obey orders. It’s unfit to try a criminal chain of command, those who issue criminal orders, those who incite, tolerate, cover-up, violent crime, torture, murder, hostage taking, withholding medical treatment, illegal targeting.

An independent counsel is essential, to prosecute command crimes, in the federal district court. A permanent independent prosecutor, because the U.S. Attorney General is usually complicit in such violent crimes, and so will not prosecute himself, others in his criminal enterprise, or complicit members of his political tribe.

Here’s another JSOC question for the JAG lawyers:

Can the U.S. lawfully launch an armed attack on Iran (overt bombing, covert operations), were it able to prove, Iran (1) supplies money to fighters in Iraq, or political organizations which give them money, or (2) supplies arms for fighters in Iraq (no proof so far). Even were an armed attack lawful, (3) would it be lawful for the U.S. to do it (or aid and abet it), if the government of Iraq did not request it, if they said don’t do it, does the U.S. have rights independent of its host government, Iraq.

“ 229. ... In particular, the Court considers that the mere supply of funds to the contras, while undoubtedly an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, as will be explained below, does not in itself amount to a use of force.

230. ... As stated above, the Court is unable to consider that, in customary international law, the provision of arms to the opposition in another State constitutes an armed attack on that State. Even at a time when the arms flow was at its peak, and again assuming the participation of the Nicaraguan Government, that would not constitute such armed attack.

* * *

232. The exercise of the right of collective self-defence presupposes that an armed attack has occurred; and it is evident that it is the victim State, being the most directly aware of that fact, which is likely to draw general attention to its plight. It is also evident that if the victim State wishes another State to come to its help in the exercise of the right of collective self-defence, it will normally make an express request to that effect.

* * *

238. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plea of collective self defence against an alleged armed attack on El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica, advanced by the United States to justify its conduct toward Nicaragua, cannot be upheld; and accordingly that the United States has violated the principle prohibiting recourse to the threat or use of force by the acts listed in paragraph 227 above, and by its assistance to the contras to the extent that this assistance "involve[s] a threat or use of force" (paragraph 228 above).”

Seal: U.N. ICJ (International Court of Justice)

Nicaragua v. United States (“Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua”) (I.C.J.: U.N. International Court of Justice, The Hague, Case No.70), filed, April 9 1984, judgment, June 27 1986 (“merits”), 1986 I.C.J. 14 {16.5mb.pdf, source, summary, source}, paragraphs 229-230, 232, announced, “Judgment of the Court” (I.C.J., Communiqué, No. 86/8, June 27 1986) {3mb.pdf, source, source}.

 

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Reprisals

What do you do, when your opponent violates the laws of war? Bombs and destroys civilians and civilian objects?

You bring it to their attention, what their commanders did, ask them to punish the commanders, prevent it in the future.

And they reply, “What we did is legal.”

Does that settle the matter?

Is the bomber the judge of his own actions?

Hardly.

Not in the opinion of the U.S. and U.K. governments.

The U.S. and U.K. governments concede, Iran is legally entitled to target U.S. civilians and U.S. civilian objects, as a reprisal, if the U.S. attacks such targets, e.g., Iran’s IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities. See, “Blockade, targeting, capture, self-defense, reprisals.”

The Empire State Building, for example.

Or better, the Chrysler Building, now 75% owned by Abu Dhabi Investment Council, if the UAE permits the U.S. to use its territory to attack or support the attack. UAE (United Arab Emirates): Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Quwain.

The Chrysler Building would then be a fitting, simultaneous reprisal target, against two violent, criminal, hoodlum, nations. A pity, an inspiring work of art.

Though the doing of it, and Iran’s will to do it, are both doubtful.

If reasonable minds can differ, whether an attack or reprisal is lawful, then the state is legally responsible for the damage, if it’s unlawful, but the complicit individuals are not guilty of any crime, for want of criminal intent (they thought it was legal, or anyway that’s what their lawyers said, and the lawyers are the experts).

A rogue state, the U.S. refuses to permit lawsuits against itself for its unlawful targeting and anyway refuses to obey the international court orders it agrees to obey. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir., No. 87-5053, Oct. 14 1988) (affirming U.S. refusal to obey the order of the U.N. International Court of Justice, in Nicaragua v. United States, June 27 1986).

By concealing their official view about it, the legality of reprisals, U.S. officials and U.K. officials and Israeli officials, they lie, when they assert that Hamas are “terrorists,” for permitting Qassam rockets (Israeli spelling Kassam) to be launched at Sderot, an Israeli town a mile from Gaza and, recently, more distant towns (Ashkelon, Ashdod). See, “Israel-Palestine: Criminal lies.” Usually ignored by U.S./U.K. media, Hamas officials routinely cite, as justification, what reasonable minds can agree is unlawful targeting by Israel.

If their officials did not lie to them, but educated them instead, would the U.S. public continue to support unconditional U.S. support for Israel? or punish it instead, boot from office, at the next election, their representatives who vote for it.

 

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{Below: Revision in progress}

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By what method can these silenced lawyers ensure, their contrary opinion is expressed, and delivered, to the necessary audience, those with weapons release authority, and how can they document their action, and preserve the record of it, so they can later produce authoritative evidence, and so feel satisfied, they will not face criminal prosecution, and execution, for remaining silent, under a duty to speak.

By what method can it be documented, the conspiracy to silence them, what procedures exist to record the name of each individual participating in that conspiracy, or in the enterprise it creates, and to preserve those records, beyond the reach of that enterprise. What are the names and titles of the people responsible for creating these records, and those responsible for preserving them, against orders to destroy them.

Let’s hear the JAG lawyers, what they intend to do about it, if a higher command declares lawful, targets they believe are unlawful.

Can the U.S. President, lawfully declare them legal? targets declared illegal by international laws of war? in their opinion, the JAG lawyers?

By his declaration, would the U.S. President bind a U.S. court martial? in their opinion, the JAG lawyers? to dismiss criminal charges against each person releasing a weapon against those targets?

By his declaration, would the U.S. President bind a U.S. federal district court? in their opinion, the JAG lawyers? to quash indictments of such people under the U.S. war crimes act (with definitions from the international laws of war, not Presidential directives).

By his declaration, would the U.S. President bind the International Criminal Court? in their opinion, the JAG lawyers? or an international military tribunal? or the courts of any other country? to quash indictments? if U.S. officials fall into their hands? captured by extraordinary rendition teams? arrested on entry to a foreign country? extradited by a future U.S. administration?

Not on my watch? The bombing encyclopedia, a computer database I suppose, identifies every target in Iran, I imagine. And that would include targets the current JAG lawyer did not personally evaluate for compliance with the international laws of war.

What is their practice, on roatation? Will an incoming JAG lawyer leave it be? what a prior JAG approved? Is it, once approved always approved? And if the targets are unlawful, will we hear, "They were approved by some other lawyer, not on my watch”?

Let’s hear the JAG lawyers, their opinion about it, “Not on my watch.”

If the JAG lawyers refuse to answer the committee’s questions, then let’s hear their opinion about this question:

Because they are on notice, the JAG lawyers, in advance, about possible orders to bomb Iran’s IAEA nuclear facilities, do they exhibit by inaction, the JAG lawyers, in their opinion, criminal intent to willingly associate themselves with a later attack? By their refusal to act, do they incite a war crime? in their opinion? Do they remain silent, under a duty to speak? and thereby, in their opinion, do they commit an overt act, in a prima facie criminal conspiracy? aid and abet it? facilitate it?

And what will the committee recommend be done about it?

And be done by whom?

Should the committee recommend, Congress once again enact an independent counsel statute, fund that office like the judgment fund, a permanent, indefinite appropriation, unlimited money, unlimited time, no annual vote. Jurisdiction to prosecute all war crimes, in the U.S. Federal District Court, those defined in U.S. law, in U.S. ratified treaties, in the charters of the Nuremberg tribunals, and in unratified treaties which the counsel reasonably believes the court would find to be customary international law, e.g., most or all of the Geneva Protocol-1 targeting rules.

All the Gulf States, and Diego Garcia, host U.S. military bases. And, they are parties, all of them, to Geneva Protocol-1 (1977), which, in my opinion, plainly outlaws these targets. So too, every country in Europe, which hosts a U.S. base.

Let’s hear the JAG lawyers, their opinion about it, attacks launched, or supported, from these locations, are they subject to the targeting law of Protocol-1.

U.S. military people and facilities anywhere in the world are lawful targets for Iran, if the U.S. attacks, including every U.S. military base, NSA listening station, military stores, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Israel, the Gulf States, Europe, even if the U.S. could prove (it can’t), this or that facility did not participate in the attack.

And so, the Marine Corps barracks bombing, at the Beirut airport was lawful (1983), and not a terrorist act, as U.S. officials lied, because the U.S. was a belligerent, other U.S. military forces were conducting offensive combat operations in the Lebanon war at the time.

To avoid later misunderstandings, and to preempt lies by U.S. officials, let’s hear what the JAG lawyers say, their reasoned opinion, do they agree.

Any country which permits attacks to be launched, or serviced, from their territory, they too can be lawfully counterattacked, by Iran, not merely the U.S. facilities located there. An effort, for example, to kill the leaders of each country, in hopes their successors can find a way to suppress U.S. military activity in their country, and so gain neutrality in the war. That’s what U.S. military targeting directives assert.

To avoid later misunderstandings, and to preempt lies by U.S. officials, let’s hear what the JAG lawyers say, their reasoned opinion, do they agree.

And the leaders, officials, of each country which permits the U.S. basing, or overflight, or support, for the attack. Are they, each one of them, equally, and jointly with U.S. officials, guilty of the same violent war crime, bombing civilians and civilian objects, as defined by the Geneva Protocol-1 which their country has ratified.

To avoid later misunderstandings, and to preempt lies by U.S. officials, let’s hear what the JAG lawyers say, their reasoned opinion, do they agree.

 

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Jurisdiction

Several U.S. congressional committees have overlapping jurisdiction to conduct this hearing of JAG lawyers.

The judiciary committees should conduct this hearing, whatever other committees might decide to do. This, because the topic is legal and so too the remedy: Appointment of an independent counsel, a federal prosecutor beyond the control of the U.S. attorney-general, who criminally complicit in most U.S. government criminal enterprises.

The judiciary committees, their jurisdiction: House, Senate (Senate rule 25(l)).

Oversight (administrative practice and procedure). Above, conduct and abuse of JAG lawyers, DoJ secret laws, target designation controls. The hearing should document, for the record, the chain of command of the military legal advisers, in all services, and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, job titles and the names of the current individual job-holders, so the public can know exactly, who bears what responsibility.

Mutiny (above).

International law, criminal law enforcement, judicial proceedings. One purpose of the hearing is to propose legislation to bolster the opinion of the JAG lawyers (if such it be) and to anyway affirm the international law of war, that such an attack is a war crime. This, either by amending the U.S. criminal code or by clarifying the existing war crimes jurisdiction of the U.S. federal district courts (18 U.S.C. § 2441, as amended), that this is an already existing war crime and it is part of that jurisdiction.

In order to know whom to prosecute, and to prove their case, prosecutors in a future administration will need business records, naming each individual who authorized release of a weapon targeted on an unlawful target (or should have known it was so targeted), and the name of each individual, in every chain of command, who authorized that order, endorsed it, issued it, or passed it down the chain of command.

The U.S. military has a long history of falsifying records and lying. The committee should therefore ensure, that procedures exist, to create such records, and that criminal penalties exist, for the prosecution and punishment of each individual who fails to create such a record, each individual who destroys such a record, each individual who authorizes, endorses, issues, or transmits orders to that effect, and that punishment be the same as for the release of the weapons themselves (e.g., death).

This crime should be prosecuted in the U.S. federal district courts, and not in military courts (because the military high command will be complicit in the crimes), and custodians should be required (under criminal penalties) to deliver all such records, on request of federal prosecutors, in secret grand jury investigations, and no claim of secrecy, classification, privacy, or national security, should apply.

 

Impeachment? It’s the habit of the current President to order his employees to refuse to testify to Congress, and that would justify impeachment of all military lawyers, and their chains of command, revocation of their commissions, as officers, should they choose to obey any such order, on this particular serious matter (massive violence).

I presume military legal advisers hold the rank of major or above (lieutenant commander in the navy) and so require Senate confirmation of their appointment, and promotion. 10 U.S.C. 531(a)(2), 634(c).

Refusal to testify is a very high misdemeanor, in my opinion, as it frustrates Congress, its constitutional duty, to regulate the business of the military.

But the constitution confines impeachment to civil officers, exempting military officers, so it appears, a topic I have not researched (constitution, article 2, section 4). Seems odd, they require Senate confirmation, yet cannot be later impeached.

Be that as it may, may be Congress can defend it’s constitutional oversight responsibility, by its power of the purse, and deny them compensation, all U.S. officers who refuse to testify (absent a recognized excuse). Like the law denying compensation to an officer the President appoints after the Senate refuses to confirm (e.g., John Bolton). 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (“Recess appointments”).

Because your committee has jurisdiction to summon them, you likewise have apparent jurisdiction to recommend that legislation, if they refuse to appear and testify (no lawful basis for refusal appearing).

It’s a different story, with the four general counsels. They are not military officers. They are civilians. They are not civil servants (bureaucrats). They are political appointees, requiring the consent of the Senate.

And so they can be impeached. And so too those who ordered, encouraged, them to misbehave (e.g., White House officials).

Ordering JAGs to not testify (no lawful reason appearing), ordering them what to say, what to not say, about attacking Iran’s IAEA nuclear facilities, this plainly warrants immediate impeachment, immediate because its purpose is to conspire, incite, aid and abet, facilitate, criminal violence, on an industrial scale.

See also:

Independent Review Panel to Study the Relationships Between Military Department General Counsels and Judge Advocates General, Legal Services in the Department of Defense: Advancing Productive Relationships {1.29mb.pdf, source} {619kb.pdf, source} (September 15 2005), report to Donald H. Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), mandated by Public Law 108-375, § 574(d), the independent panel dissolving upon delivery of its report (ignores targeting).

Scott Horton (blog), “When Lawyers Are War Criminals{42kb.pdf, source} (“To the memory of Helmuth James von Moltke”) (Remarks to the ASIL: American Society of International Law, centennial conference, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial and Its Policy Consequences Today, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green Ohio, October 7 2006) (flyer).

 

 

Context

Chris Hedges, “The Iran Trap{pf} (Truthdig, June 8 2008.

Michael R. Gordon, Eric Schmitt, Ethan Bronner, “U.S. Says Israeli Exercise Seemed Directed at Iran{pf} (The New York Times, June 20 2008, page 1).

Ray McGovern, “Bomb Iran? What's to Stop Us?{pf} (Antiwar.com, June 20 2008.

Seymour M. Hersh, “Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran” {pf, ich} (The New Yorker, “Annals of National Security,” issue dated Monday July 7 2008, posted Sunday June 29 2008), reported, Dan Froomkin, “Cheney's Fingerprints{pf} (The Washington Post, washingtonpost.com, blog, “White House Watch,” Monday June 30 2008, 12:43pm).

Dana Milbank, “Not So Quiet on the Third Front{pf} (The Washington Post, Wednesday July 2 2008, page A3).

Benny Morris, “Using Bombs to Stave Off War{pf} (The New York Times, July 18 2008).

{in progress}

 

This document is not copyrighted and may be freely copied.

CJHjr

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Posted July 8 2008. Updated October 19a 2008.

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