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Ditto Iran?
Full-text: January 28 2004


“ And God spoke all these words: ...

God: You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor.”

Bible, Exodus 20:1, 16  
Torah, Exodus 20:1, 13

“ The Lord said to Moses: ...

God: Love your neighbor as yourself.”

Bible, Leviticus 19:1, 18  
Torah, Leviticus 19:1, 18

“ Hillel: What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor. This is the whole Torah. All the rest is commentary.”

(Shabbat 31a) Talmud (Babylonian), Shabbath 31a

“ Question: Teacher, what good thing must I do to get eternal life?

Jesus: Obey the commandments.

Question: Which ones?

Jesus: ... “do not give false testimony” ... and “love your neighbor as yourself.””

Bible, Matthew 19:16-19

“ Moses proclaimed to the Israelites all that the Lord had commanded him concerning them. ... East of the Jordan in the territory of Moab, Moses began to expound this law, saying: ...

Moses: If a malicious witness takes the stand to accuse a man of a crime, the two men involved in the dispute must stand in the presence of the Lord before the priests and the judges who are in office at the time.

The judges must make a thorough investigation, and if the witness proves to be a liar, giving false testimony against his brother, then do to him as he intended to do to his brother.

You must purge the evil from among you. The rest of the people will hear of this and be afraid, and never again will such an evil thing be done among you. Show no pity: life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.”

Bible, Deuteronomy 1:3, 5; 19:16-21  
Torah, Deuteronomy 1:3, 5; 19:16-21

 

 

David Kay transcript:  
Annotated, linked, and challenged

Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Subject:  Efforts to Determine the Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related Programs
Chaired by:  Senator John W. Warner (R-Va)
Witness:  David Kay, Former Head of the Iraq Survey Group
Location:  106 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D.C.
Time:  11:05 a.m. EST
Date:  Wednesday, January 28, 2004
Video:  C-Span video (request) {2:44:45, smil, schedule, 538818909, 180284-1}, broadcast video: part-1 {2:04:09, source}, part-2 {37:49}
Source:  Transcripts (linked below) conformed to video
Published:  November 26 2004, S. Hrg. 108-678 {156kb.txt, 167kb.pdf, fdsys.id} {152kb.txt, 162kb.pdf, sasc108hrg} {Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-678, GPOstock: 552-070-32082-2}.

_______________

“ Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.”

George W. Bush, March 17 2003 {12kb.txt, 45kb.pdf} {video 13:45, audio 13:26}


“ Had we failed to act, the dictator’s weapons of mass destruction would continue to this day.”

George W. Bush, January 20 2004 {32kb.txt, 44kb.pdf, 32kb.txt, 60kb.pdf} {video 1:00:30}


“ A true democracy ... operates on faith.

Faith, that government officials are forthcoming and honest.

And faith, that informed citizens will arrive at logical conclusions.”

Damon J. Keith (circuit judge), Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft {pf}, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir., No. 02-1437, Aug. 26 2002) {255kb.pdf} {508kb.pdf}

Senator John Warner (R-Va): The committee meets today, to review a further report, and I stress a “further” report, from Dr. David Kay, on his efforts, and the efforts of the team which he was privileged to work with, known as ISG {Iraq Survey Group}.

He served as the special advisor to the director of Central Intelligence in determining the status of weapons of mass destruction and related programs in Iraq.

After assuming this position last July {June 11 2003}, Dr. Kay made his initial interim official report to this committee on October 3rd.

As members of the committee are aware, Dr. Kay has stepped down from this position and has been succeeded by Dr. — excuse me — Mr. Charles A. Duelfer, a former colleague and member of the U.N. Special Commission with Dr. Kay, who has been appointed by Director Tenet to continue this important mission. I met with Mr. Duelfer the day before yesterday, and we just momentarily met with him in the Intel Committee room.

Dr. Kay volunteered — and I emphasize that, volunteered — to resume his public service; worked diligently for six months in Iraq, under difficult and often dangerous conditions; and just concluded his work last week, and reported to the director of Central Intelligence.

I thank you, and I thank your wife, for public service.

Working with General Dayton and the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) your mission was to search for all facts — repeat, all facts — relevant to the many issues about Iraq and Iraq weapons of mass destruction and related programs.

You initiated what was and continues — I emphasize “continues” — to be a very difficult, complex, mission that, in your own words, is yet to be completed.

As you cautioned us when you took up this post in July {June 11 2003}, patience is required, to ensure we complete a thorough assessment of this important issue.

In this hearing today, we hope to receive your assessment of what has been accomplished to date. I repeat, to date. And what in your professional judgment remains to be done by the ISG.

It is far too early to reach any final judgments or conclusions.

In recent days I mentioned I’d met with both General Dayton — I’ve met extensively with you over the recess period — and Mr. Duelfer, and received the assurances of Dayton and Duelfer that they will be prepared to present to the {p.2} Congress a second official interim report of the ISG group in the time frame of late March.

It is crucial that the important work of the ISG group go on.

Thus far, the findings have been significant.

Dr. Kay has stated that — although we’ve not found evidence of large stockpiles of WMD or forward-deployed weapons — the ISG group have made the following evidence as a part of their record that will be forthcoming:

  First, evidence of Saddam Hussein’s intent to pursue WMD programs on a large scale.

  Actual, ongoing chemical and biological research programs.

  An active program to use the deadly chemical ricin as a weapon, a program that was interrupted only by the start of the war in March.

  And evidence of missile programs.

  And evidence that in all probability they were going to build those weapons to incorporate in the warheads what we know not for sure, but certainly the possibility of weapons of mass destruction.

  Evidence that Saddam Hussein was attempting to reconstitute his fledgling nuclear program as late as 2001.

  And most important, evidence that clearly indicates Saddam Hussein was conducting a wide range of activities, in clear contravention of the United Nations resolutions.

As you recently stated, Dr. Kay —

And I quote you:

“It was reasonable to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat. What we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war.”

End quote.

David Kay, interviewed by Liane Hansen, “Iraq Arms Inspector Casts Doubt on WMD Claims: Kay’s stance differs with White House view of situation in Iraq” (NPR: National Public Radio, Weekend Edition Sunday, Washington D.C., Sunday January 25 2004, 8-10am ET), NPR audio {13:52, 4.5mb.rm}, reported,CIA under fire for Iraq failure{pf} (BBC News, January 26 2004).

Further, you said, on NBC’s “Today Show” on Tuesday, that it was, quote:

“Absolutely prudent for the U.S. to go to war.”

David Kay, interviewed by Matt Lauer (NBC News, The Today Show, Tuesday, January 27 2004, 7-10am ET), MSNBC video {7:03, 5.36mb.wmv}, transcript printed, “David Kay Interview,” 150 Congressional Record S315-S316 {pf} {12kb.txt, 38kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, daily edition 150:7, January 28 2004) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/7}.

Dr. Kay, I concur in those conclusions.

I believe a real and growing threat has been eliminated, and a coalition of nations acted prudently in the cause of freedom.

I’d be interested if you concur in my conclusions.

While some have asserted that the president and his senior advisors may have exaggerated, or manipulated, prewar intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs, Dr. Kay reached the following conclusion, which I think is different.

As you stated recently {NPR, just above}, quote:

“We have to remember that this view of Iraq” — prewar assessment of WMD capabilities {“stockpiles of WMDs”} — “was held during the Clinton administration and did not change in the Bush administration.

It is not a political ‘gotcha’ issue.

Often estimates are different than reality.

The important thing is when they differ, to understand why.”

End quote.

That’s precisely why I called this meeting, Dr. Kay, to continue the work of this committee in developing a body of fact from which reasonable people, at the conclusion of that collection of facts, can reach their own objective thoughts and conclusions.

It’s been a difficult process. But the ISG work is not completed.

David Kay’s “no large stockpiles” statements, in prior interviews: Reuters, Jan. 23 {copy}; NPR, Weekend Edition Sunday, Jan. 25 {audio 13:52}; New York Times, Jan. 26 {copy}  CJHjr

Now, you have stated that you believe there did not exist large stockpiles of {p.3} biological and chemical weapons.

But I hope that you will, in your testimony, indicate that since the work is not completed — since Iraq is as big as California, and Baghdad approximates the sprawling territory of Los Angeles — that we could find caches and reserves of weapons of mass destruction, chemical or biological, or even further evidence about their nuclear program.

We also would hope that you’d address the question of whether or not Saddam Hussein had some kind of, quote, “breakout” capability for quickly producing chemical or biological weapons.

And was this not a basis for constituting a conclusion that there was an imminent threat from Saddam Hussein and his military?

Why were the Iraqi WMD records systematically looted or destroyed?

And why do scientists in custody today continue not to be forthcoming, if there was nothing to hide or nothing substantial existed?

 

Query: Saying what you don’t want to hear is “not forthcoming”?


“ Amer al-Saadi:

{0:16 bb} {0:52 bb} {0:30 bb, audio}

I was knowledgeable about those programs.

The past programs.

And I was telling the truth.

Always telling the truth.

Never told anything but the truth.

And time will bear me out.

You’ll see.

There will be no difference.

After this war.”

Amer al-Saadi (Iraq scientific adviser, and liaison with UNMOVIC), speaking to German ZDF TV, just before his voluntary surrender, in Baghdad, on April 12 2003, reported, Ray Suarez, “War News Roundup” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, April 12 2003), video {bb} {13:45 bb, 4:16-5:08 bb, at 4:36-4:52 bb}, rebroadcast (truncated), Ray Suarez, “Weapons Hunt” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, May 5 2003), video {bb} {16:21 bb, at 1:36-2:06 bb}, audio {16:08, at 1:28-1:59}. “Saddam Aide Surrenders: A senior aide to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, General Amir al-Saadi, has surrendered to US forces in Baghdad” (BBC News, April 12 2003) video {1:33}. “Iraqi scientist 'has nothing to hide'” (BBC News, April 13 2003).

Walter Pincus, Kevin Sullivan, “Scientists Still Deny Iraqi Arms Programs{pf} (Washington Post, July 31 2003) {copy}.

Dafna Linzer (Associated Press), “U.S. Still Holds 8 Iraqi Scientists” (The State, December 9 2003) {copy}: “... involved years ago with former biological programs ... [S]cientists say a lack of fear today has not changed their stories.

‘We ... told them the truth,’

said al-Saeed ... who oversaw stockpiles of the deadly nerve agent VX ...

‘To the best of my knowledge, there are no weapons of mass destruction. They were either destroyed by U.N. inspectors, or unilaterally by Iraq, years ago’.”

  CJHjr

 

The work of the Iraq Survey Group has shown that Saddam Hussein had WMD intentions, had WMD programs that did survive, and did outwit for 12 years the United Nations Security Council and the resolutions — indeed, the inspections, in large measure.

Query:Differ”? In what way, exactly?:

United Nations:  All known banned weapons destroyed before 1995, mostly in 1991. No later evidence.

Germany:  No evidence.

France:  No evidence.

Russia:  No evidence.

I see no difference. CJHjr

If ultimately the findings of the Iraq Survey Group do differ from the prewar assessments of our intelligence community, differ from assessments of the United Nations, differ from assessments of intelligence services of many other nations, indeed that is cause for concern.

But we are not there yet, in terms of the totality of fact on which to draw such serious conclusions.

Today and tomorrow our policymakers must be able to rely on the intelligence they are provided. The safety and security of the men and women of the armed forces are dependent on intelligence. And indeed the security of our nation.

Query:Other nations”? An excellent idea. Why not invite back the UN inspectors? The only people the rest of the world trusts, to report the true facts, honestly, including exculpatory facts which U.S. officials stubbornly conceal, and minimize.

CJHjr

So collectively, all of us — the Congress, the executive branch, and other nations — we must vigorously continue to pursue the collection of the facts, as the ISG is doing, and upon that completion then draw our conclusions and take such corrective measures as may be necessary.

As we speak, over 1,400 individuals, military and civilian, are on the ground in Iraq, seeking the facts about Iraq’s WMD programs.

Query: Our “best and brightest”? I doubt it. Anonymous, some weren’t honest enough, many not rational enough, and most not fearless enough, to speak truth to power. And with good reason: Rewarding deceit, and not integrity, their culture was in plain view when, seated behind him, CIA Director George J. Tenet nodded approvingly while Colin Powell misinformed the UN Security Council, on February 5 2003. CJHjr

I have confidence in the commitment and the ability of General Dayton, Mr. Duelfer (your successor), and representatives from our coalition partners to complete this mission. They have some of the best and brightest of our military, and our intelligence community, to complete this task.

And Congress has provided the necessary means — a very substantial appropriation of recent. We remain committed to providing the resources that are necessary for the completion of the ISG work.

Dr. Kay, I thank you for your public service once again.

 

Senator Levin.

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me join you in welcoming Dr. Kay to the hearing, and stating our thanks for his work on the Iraq Survey Group.

Dr. Kay’s recent reported statements — for example:

  that the intelligence community was wrong about there being stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the war;

  that it is the intelligence community’s {p.4} consensus, he recently said, that the two alleged biological trailers were for hydrogen production, not for producing biological warfare agents; and

  that Iraq had not reconstituted its nuclear weapons program —

stand in sharp contrast to the statements made by the administration before going to war in Iraq.

Dr. Kay’s recent statements raise serious questions, about the accuracy and objectivity of our intelligence, and about the administration’s public statements before the war that were supposedly based on that intelligence.

“ ... numerous, vivid, unqualified, statements about ... weapons of mass destruction — not programs, not “program-related activities,” not intentions. Actual weapons.”

Before the war, the administration — in order to support its decision to go to war — made numerous, vivid, unqualified, statements about Iraq having in its possession weapons of mass destruction — not programs, not “program-related activities,” not intentions.

Actual weapons is what the administration’s statements focused on.

For example, on August 26th 2002, Vice President Cheney gave a major speech {copy} about a threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. He asserted the following, quote:

“Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”

Close quote. Vice President Cheney was not talking about programs or intentions, he was specifically referring to existing “weapons” that were being “amassed” for use against us.

Here is what Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, in his testimony {83kb.pdf} to this committee, on September 19th 2002:

“Saddam Hussein has amassed large clandestine stockpiles of biological weapons, including anthrax, botulism toxins, and possibly smallpox.

He’s amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX, sarin, and mustard gas.”

“ We never said there were stockpiles.”

Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense), March 16 2004

Close quote.

Notice again.

Not programs or intentions.

It’s “stockpiles.”

That Saddam Hussein was said to have “amassed.”

On September 27th, President Bush said {pf} {31kb.txt, 53kb.pdf} that we must make sure, that Saddam Hussein, quote:

“Never has the capacity to use the stockpiles of anthrax that we know he has.

Or VX.

The biological weapons which he possesses.”

“ The president of the United States, and the secretary of defence, would not assert, as plainly and bluntly as they have, that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, if it was not true, and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it.”

Ari Fleischer (Press Secretary to President George W. Bush), Dec. 5 2002 {ABC, PBS, BBC}

Close quote.

Again, not reference to programs or intentions.

The representation is “stockpiles.”

And “weapons.”

In the possession of Saddam Hussein.

On October 7th 2002, President Bush said {pf} {22kb.txt, 43kb.pdf} that, quote:

“Iraq possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons.”

Close quote.

“Possesses and produces.”

Not “programs.”

Or “intentions.”

On February 5th 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke at the U.N. and said {780kb.html with images}, quote:

We know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations. Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one-to-four weeks to escape detection. There can be no doubt,”

Secretary Powell said:

no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction.”

Secretary Powell talked about, quote:

“The existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents.”

He said that:

We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors, and other parts look like. We know how they fit together. We know how they work. We know a great deal about the platforms on which they are mounted. We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile biological-agent production factories.”

Close quote. And then he said, quote {p.5}:

“Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agents. That is enough to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets.”

And he followed on by saying,

“Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons, and we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them.”

Close quote.

Secretary Powell, in other words, spoke of actual “weapons.”

Not about “program-related activities.”

Or “intentions.”

And on March 11 2003 — just before the start of the war — Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said the following, quote:

We know he continues to hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours and placing them in residential neighborhoods.”

Close quote.

About two weeks later, Secretary Rumsfeld said:

We know where the weapons of mass destruction are.”

Close quote.

And just in case there was ever any doubt, about the reason given, for why we went to war, the president’s secretary restated {pf} the point this way, on April 10th 2003 {video, 41:40, at 31:43-32:36}

Quote {0:51}:

“Make no mistake.

We have high confidence, that they have weapons of mass destruction.

That is what this war was about.

And is about.

And we have high confidence it will be found.”

Close quote.

Incredibly enough, administration leaders are still saying that we found weapons of mass destruction production facilities.

Just last week, Vice President Cheney said that the two trailers, found in Iraq, were part of a mobile biological weapons labs program and were, in his words—

Quote:

Conclusive evidence.

That he did, in fact, have programs for weapons of mass destruction.”

Close quote.

But today’s witness, Dr. David Kay, is reported {copy} in The New York Times as saying that the consensus in the intelligence community is that those two trailers were for producing hydrogen for weather balloons, or possibly rocket fuel, not for biological weapons.

Surely, we should find out, what is the basis for Vice President Cheney’s recent statement, as well as the basis for the unqualified administration statements made before the war, which I have just quoted.

Unfortunately, as of now, the leadership of the Senate will not allow an inquiry into how the administration characterized the intelligence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

The Intelligence Committee’s inquiry is limited to the question of the production of intelligence. That committee is not looking into how that intelligence was used, and characterized, by policymakers.

We will continue to press for an inquiry, looking to get the whole story, the full picture.

And, if the only way to obtain that is to have an outside, independent, nonpartisan, commission to conduct a comprehensive and objective review of the entire matter, so be it.

Whether one agreed or disagreed with the decision to proceed to war, and whether one agreed or disagreed with the decision to proceed without the support of the international community, acting through the U.N., the case made by the administration for initiating the war against Iraq was not because Iraq {p.6} had intentions, to someday resume production of weapons of mass destruction. It was because they had, in their possession, weapons of mass destruction.

Although the issue of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction “intentions” or “ambitions” and “program-related activities” is a serious issue, it is not why we went to war.

The case for war was Iraq’s possession, production, deployment, and stockpiling, of weapons of mass destruction.

A different case for war against Iraq can be made.

“ It was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world. ... The absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus. It changes the answer you get.”

Colin L. Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), Feb. 2 2004 {interview}, article {copy}

But the case which the administration made, to the American people, was the presence of actual weapons of mass destruction.

When lives are at stake and our military is going to be placed in harm’s way — in other words, when we decide to go to war — it is totally unacceptable to have intelligence that this far off, or to exaggerate, or shape, the intelligence, for any purpose, by anybody.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 

Sen. Warner: Dr. Kay, we’ll now receive from you any preliminary comments you wish to make.

David Kay: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, and we discussed, I have—

I do not have a written statement. This hearing came about very quickly.

I do have a few preliminary comments. But I suspect you’re more interested in asking questions. And I’ll be happy to respond to those questions, to the best of my ability.

I would like to open by saying, that the talent, dedication, and bravery of the staff of the ISG, that was my privilege to direct, is unparalleled. And the country owes a great debt of gratitude to the men and women who have served over there, and continue to serve, doing that.

A great deal has been accomplished by the team, and I do think—

I echo what you said, Senator.

I think it important that it goes on, and it is allowed to reach its full conclusion.

In fact, I really believe, it ought to be better resourced, and totally focused on WMD. That that is important to do it.

But I also believe, that it is time to begin the fundamental analysis of how we got here, what led us here, and what we need to do, in order to ensure that we are equipped with the best possible intelligence, as we face these issues in the future.

Let me begin by saying, we were almost all wrong.

And I certainly include myself here.

 

“ Scores of intelligence professionals, retired or still in service, who studied Iraq and its WMD capabilities, are reasonable men. We got it right. The Bush administration, in its rush to war, ignored our advice and the body of factual data we used, and instead relied on rumor, speculation, exaggeration and falsification to mislead the American people and their elected representatives into supporting a war.”

Scott Ritter (Chief U.N. Inspector in Iraq, 1991-1998), Feb. 6 2003, IHT

 

Senator Kennedy knows very directly.

Senator Kennedy and I talked on several occasions, prior to the war.

Query: What “evidence”?

And that my view was, that the best evidence that I had seen, was that Iraq, indeed, had weapons of mass destruction.

I would also point out, that many governments that chose not to support this war — certainly the French, President Chirac, as I recall, in April of last year — referred to Iraq’s possession of WMD.

 

Query:Referred to”?

Jacques Chirac did indeed “refer to” Iraq and WMD. But not to “Iraq’s possession of WMD”.

Jacques Chirac said the exact opposite of what David Kay here implies Jacques Chirac said. And what David Kay explicitly claims Jacques Chirac said, when challenged, later in this hearing. And, before and after this hearing, in radio and TV broadcasts, and in webcasts, misinforming millions of people. Masking and minimizing the isolation and wrongdoing by U.S. officials, asserting certainty, and concealing uncertainty.  CJHjr

“ Jacques Chirac: I have no evidence that these weapons exist in Iraq.”

Jacques Chirac (France President), joint press briefing with Vladimir Putin (Russia President) (Elysée Palace, Paris, February 10 2003), reported, Peter Finn, “U.S.-Europe Rifts Widen Over Iraq: France, Germany, Russia Urge Extension of Inspections; Iraq Approves U-2 Flights” (Washington Post, February 11 2003) {pf} {French transcript}.

 

“ Christiane Amanpour: Do you believe that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction?

For instance, chemical or biological weapons?

Jacques Chirac: I don’t know.

I have no proof of that.

What we can say today, is that if we believe Mr ElBaradei and his team of experts, there are no longer any weapons, there are no nuclear weapons or programs capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons. That is something that the inspectors seem to be sure of.

As for chemical, biological weapons of mass destruction, I don’t know at all.

We have no proof.

But that is precisely what the inspector’s task is. They have to go on with their work, to find these weapons, if there are any, and then destroy them.

And the inspectors are telling us, “This is a job we can do.”

So when, for one reason or another, it appears that they can’t or can no longer do it, then of course, it will be the time to resort to other methods.

Including war.

But this isn’t the case.

So I think that going into battle, rushing into war today, is totally disproportionate, and inadequate, given the goal we have set, which is to disarm Iraq. That’s a point on which everybody of course agrees.”

Jacques Chirac (President of France), interviewed by Christiane Amanpour (Elysée Palace, Paris, March 16 2003, before 5:00 p.m. GMT, “just before the Sunday summit started,” the Azores Summit), “Chirac Makes His Case on Iraq{pf} (CBS News, 60 Minutes, March 16 2003, 7:00 p.m. ET), video excerpt {1:15}, “Chirac: ‘A Lot of Progress Has Been Achieved’{pf} (CNN Special Report, March 16 2003, 7:00 p.m. ET), French transcript {pf, source, copy}, English transcript, transcript audio {16:21} (reading the French transcript), reported, Steven Gray, “Chirac Suggests Iraq Be Given 30 More Days: French Leader Speaks Before Summit” {pf} (Washington Post, March 17 2003).

 

The Germans, certainly the intelligence service, believed that there were WMD.

It turns out, we were all wrong, probably, in my judgment.

And, that is most disturbing.

We’re also in a period in which we’ve had intelligence surprises, in the proliferation area, that go the other way.

The case of Iran, a nuclear program that the Iranians admit was 18 years on, that we underestimated. And that, in fact, we didn’t discover. It was discovered by a group of Iranian dissidents outside the country, who pointed the international community at the location. {p.7}

The Libyan program, recently discovered, was far more extensive, than was assessed, prior to that.

There’s a long record here of being wrong.

There’s a good reason for it. There are probably multiple reasons.

Certainly, proliferation is a hard thing to track. Particularly in countries that deny easy and free access. And don’t have free and open societies.

In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group — and in fact that I reported to you in October — Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of Resolution S/Res/1441 {58kb.pdf, copy, copy, copy, also via this, this, or ODS}.

Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities.

One last chance, to come clean about what it had.

We have discovered hundreds of cases — based on both documents, physical evidence, and the testimony of Iraqis — of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 {32kb.pdf, copy, copy, via this, this, or ODS}.

And that should have been reported under 1441.

With Iraqi testimony, that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it, and they hid material.

 

Query:Hundreds of cases”?

Do we get to hear about these? Or will history simply validate your bare assertion, as another unassailable fact, we accept on trust?

Like we trusted your unequivocal assertion about the “centrifuge tubes”? Omitting to mention artillery rockets? Your unequivocal assertion about the “biological vans”?:— “This is it”? Your material omissions about the UAVs? Your numerous unequivocal assertions about what Jacques Chirac said? And what Russia believed? And what Germany believed? Which people, who trusted you, allowed you to repeat, misinforming tens of millions of people, in the U.S. and worldwide (WP, NPR, NBC, CNN, PBS, CNN, USIP, KSG).

And next?

Surely, you — or your ilk Charles Duelfer — won’t beguile us with chilling tales, of the sinister potentials, of “hundreds of cases,” of entirely innocent, “dual use” facilities and equipment.  CJHjr

“ Hans Blix: He also said, that clearly they saw that there were programs, going on. And, they had seen a number of underground laboratories.

And, you got the feeling that he would say, that the Iraqis were preparing a jump-start capability.

Well, that’s entirely plausible. We also suspected that could happen.

But I must say that — after all the evidence that we have seen crumbling here, about the existence of the weapons — I would like to see evidence also of the programs.

When he said “We have seen laboratories that were “suitable for” biological or chemical weapons.” Well “suitable for” is not the same thing as saying that they were for this purpose.

So I think we would like to know the whole story.

Put the facts on the table.

And perhaps, even, let the UN look at it.”

Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video, audio (at 48 minutes)

 

I think the aim — and certainly the aim of what I’ve tried to do, since leaving — is not political.

And certainly not a witch-hunt at individuals.

Ah. It’s to try to direct our attention at what I believe is a fundamental fault analysis that we must now examine.

Now, let me take one of the explanations most commonly given:

Analysts were pressured to reach conclusions that would fit the political agenda of one or another administration.

I deeply think that is a wrong explanation.

 

Query: Not “pressured”?

How about silencedCJHjr

 

“ During 2002, a senior Defense Intelligence Agency officer for Middle Eastern Affairs, Bruce Hardcastle, was tasked with giving briefings to foreign delegations about the threat posed by Iraq.

But Hardcastle refused to embellish the level of threat to match the views of the head of the Pentagon’s former Office of Special Plans, William J. Luti. ...: “‘I can’t take your opinion and put it in, and make it into intelligence.’” ...

He was not allowed to brief. ... India ... did receive a discussion and briefing from Office of Special Plans ... it contradicted what DIA was saying.” ...”

Karen Kwiatkowski, Oct. 27 2003 (video)

 

As a leader of the effort, of the Iraqi Survey Group, I spent most of my days, not out in the field, leading inspections.

It’s typically what you do at that level. I was trying to motivate, direct, find strategies.

In the course of doing that, I had innumerable analysts who came to me in apology, that the world that we were finding was not the world that they had thought existed, and that they had estimated. Reality on the ground differed in advance.

Ah. And never — not in a single case — was the explanation, “I was pressured to do this.”

The explanation was very often:

“The limited data we had led one to reasonably conclude this. I now see that there’s another explanation for it. It didn’t—”

Query: So, because our data is so limited, we can “reasonably conclude” our hypothesis is correct? And when confronted with “honest difficulty” to prove our hypothesis, we can assume it’s correct? Supported by “no reliable information”? Refuted by abundant reliable evidence? And you got your PhD from where? Doctor David Kay? CJHjr

And each case was different.

But the conversations were sufficiently in depth, and our relationship was sufficiently frank, that I’m convinced that — at least to the analysts I dealt with — I did not come across a single one that felt it had been, in the military term, “inappropriate command influence” that led them to take that position.

It was not that.

It was the honest difficulty — based on the intelligence that had, the information that had been collected — that led the analysts to that conclusion.

And, you know, almost in a perverse way, I wish it had been undue influence.

Because we know how to correct that.

Query: How about this?: Let’s imprison the people without moral character, who decided to lie about their opinion, those who decided to lie that a mere hypothesis or ambiguity was an unassailable fact, and those who decided to lie about what France said. And those who blinded themselves with zeal, let’s reeducate. CJHjr

 

We get rid of the people who in fact were exercising that.

The fact that it wasn’t, tells me that we’ve got a much more fundamental problem of understanding, what went wrong.

And we’ve got to figure out what was there.

And that’s what I call fundamental fault analysis.

And like I say, I think we’ve got other cases, other than Iraq.

I do not think the problem of global proliferation of weapons technology of mass destruction is going to go away.

And that’s why I think it is an urgent issue.

Ah. And let me really wrap up here, with just a brief summary, of what I think we are now facing in Iraq.

I regret to say, that I think, at the end of the work of the ISG, there is still going to be an unresolvable ambiguity about what {p.8} happened.

A lot of that traces to the failure on April 9th to establish immediately physical security in Iraq.

The unparalleled looting and destruction.

A lot of which was directly intentional, designed by the security services, to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program, and their other programs as well.

Query: The “regime’s”? This was public property, belonging to Iraq, in the care of the United States, as trustee. It was not the private property of any regime characters. Though protecting private property too was also the legal duty of the United States.

CJHjr

A lot of which was what we simply called Ali-Baba looting:

“It had been the regime’s. The regime is gone. I’m going to go take the gold toilet fixtures and everything else imaginable.”

I’ve seen looting around the world and thought I knew the best looters in the world. The Iraqis excel at that.

The result is — and document destruction — is we’re really not going to be able to prove beyond the truth the negatives and some of the positive conclusions that we’re going to come to.

There will be always unresolved ambiguity here.

 

Query: Curious. That the Senate Armed Services Committee is indifferent to the crimes and torts of the U.S. Military, under their oversight. Iraqis are not indifferent, nor millions of observers, who took careful note that U.S. and U.K. Military incited and aided and abetted looting, except at the Oil Ministry {copy}CJHjr:

 

“ It was the 8th of April ... four American tanks ... blasted apart the doors to the building and ... Arab interpreters in the tanks told the people to go and take what they wanted in the building. The word spread quickly and the building was ransacked. ... Afterwards the tank crushed the entrance to the Justice Department, which was in a neighboring building, and the plundering continued there.”

Khaled Bayomi, April 11 2003 (original)

 

“ The honorable Gentleman referred to looting ... Fortunately, it appears so far to be confined to Iraqi citizens — shall I use the word — “liberating” those items that are in the charge of the regime, by entering its former facilities and the secret organisations, and redistributing that wealth among the Iraqi people. I regard such behaviour as good practice ...”

Geoff Hoon (U.K. Defense Minister), April 7 2003

__________

 

Oh.

I see.

The looters are Abraham Lincolnites:

“A government of the people, by the people, and for the people.”

CJHjr

 

“ 18 U.S.C. § 2. Principals

(a)  Whoever commits an offense...or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”

 

“ ¶ 501. Responsibility for Acts of Subordinates

... The commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge, or should have knowledge ... that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to punish violators thereof.”

The Law of Land Warfare {10.3mb.pdf/txt, source}, ¶ 501 (Chapter 8) (U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 27-10, July 18 1956, and amendment dated July 15 1976) {SuDoc: D 101.20:27-10, ditto, LCCN: 56062174, OCLC: 39027139, GPOcat, WorldCat}.

 

“ Annex article 23. It is especially forbidden ... (g) To destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.

Annex article 28. The pillage of a town or place ... is prohibited.

Annex article 43. The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.

Treaty article 3. A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”

Hague-4/1907 {source, copy}: Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, Oct. 18 1907, Jan. 26 1910), U.S./U.K. ratified, Nov. 27 1909, status (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, depositary, 1907 Hague Peace Conventions).

 

“ 18 U.S.C. § 2441. War crimes ...

(c)  Definition.— As used in this section the term “war crime” means any conduct— ...

(2)  prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907;  ...”

War Crimes Act of 1996, as amended by the Expanded War Crimes Act of 1997, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, fully cited with legislative history links hereCJHjr

 

But I do think the Survey Group—

And I think Charlie Duelfer is a great leader. I have the utmost confidence in Charles.

I think you will get as full an answer as you can possibly get.

And let me just conclude by my own personal tribute, both to the president, and to George Tenet, for having the courage to select me to do this. And my successor, Charlie Duelfer, as well.

Both of us are known for — probably, at times — regrettable streak of independence.

I came not from within the administration.

And it was clear — and clear in our discussions, and no one asked otherwise — that I would lead this the way I thought best.

And I would speak the truth as we found it.

I have had absolutely no pressure — prior, during the course of the work at the ISG, or after I left — to do anything otherwise.

I think that shows a level of maturity and understanding, that I think bodes well for getting to the bottom of this.

But it is really up to you, and your staff, on behalf of the American people, to take on that challenge.

It’s not something that anyone from the outside can do.

So I look forward to these hearings, and other hearings, and how you will get to the conclusions.

Query:Expectations and estimate”? Which one would that be? The one you would have had, if you had taken account of what the U.N. inspectors didn’t find? Or the one you decided to not update?

CJHjr

I do believe, we have to understand why reality turned out to be different than expectations and estimate.

But, you have more public service, certainly many of you, than I’ve ever had. And you recognize, that this is not unusual.

I told Senator Warner that — earlier — that I’ve been drawn back, as a result of a recent film of reminding me of something.

At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the combined estimate — it was unanimity in the intelligence service — was that there were no Soviet warheads, in Cuba, at the time of the missile crisis.

Fortunately, President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy disagreed with the estimate and chose a course of action less ambitious and aggressive than recommended by their advisors.

 

“ As former Secretary of Defense McNamara said in the recent movie The Fog of War {copy}, two societies came within seconds of destroying each other, based on a misperception of what reality were {?was?}.”

David Kay, interviewed by Liane Hansen, “Iraq Arms Inspector Casts Doubt on WMD Claims” (NPR: National Public Radio, Weekend Edition Sunday, January 25 2004), audio {13:52}, transcript.

 

Here’s another film, concealing U.S. provocation: “For nearly forty years most American accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis have left Cuba out of the story. With the blockbuster film Thirteen Days the story now ignores the Soviet Union as well. The film turns history on its head and drums into our heads exactly the wrong lessons of the crisis.”  Philip Brenner, “Turning History on Its Head

 

But the most important thing about that story, which is not often told, is that as a result, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, immediate steps were taken to correct our inability to collect on the movement of nuclear material out of the Soviet Union to other places.

So that by the end of the Johnson administration, the intelligence community had a capability to do what it had not been able to do at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

 

Query: “The most important thing about that story”?:—

John F. Kennedy (U.S. President), and his brother Robert F. Kennedy (U.S. Attorney-General), and the CIA, conducted a secret, intensive, offensive, prolonged, violent, prima facie criminal, war of aggression against Cuba (post the also prima facie criminal Bay of Pigs invasion), in violation of the U.S. Constitution (without consent of Congress) and U.S. criminal law (several provisions).

It was that U.S. official violent offensive enterprise which provoked the USSR to defend Cuba with its missiles in the first place, ready to attack U.S. military bases in Florida — and, presumably, the White House, Pentagon, CIA, and NSA as well — if the U.S. invaded again.

John Kennedy violated his agreement with the USSR: John Kennedy, his brother Robert Kennedy, the CIA, and a violent prima facie criminal conspiracy of others, in the State Department and elsewhere, continued, and intensified, their secret, violent, prima facie criminal, offensive war after the USSR withdrew their missile deterrent.

Violent crimes and torts by the United States.

Which Congress refuses to suppress, and refuses to permit the United States to be held accountable for, in any court, under the rule of law.

This, was the topic of the Cuban Missile Crises.

U.S. official violent criminal enterprises, and other torts, and criminal conspiracies of U.S. official criminal liars.

This, was topic of the whole of the past 50 years.

This, is the topic of today.  CJHjr

 

I think you face a similar responsibility in ensuring that the community is able to do a better job in the future, than it has done in the past.

Senator, I’m happy to answer your questions.

 

Senator John Warner (R-Va): Thank you very much. {p.9}

Colleagues, we will go to a round of six minutes.

In the event there’s a vote, it’s my intention to continue the hearing on a rotation basis as members come and go so we have continuity.

Doctor, I assure you that the Congress; this committee; the Intelligence Committee under Senator Roberts, Senator Rockefeller; that Senator Levin and I will pursue this.

But we’ll wait until such time as the work of the Intelligence Committee — we both serve on that committee — is completed; we’ve had a chance to analyze it; and then we’ll sit down to determine what the next step may be.

But the bottom line — and you’ve emphasized it — and that is, that we’ve got to make such corrections as we deem necessary to the intelligence system, to the security of this country, for the safety of the men and women in uniform who — today and tonight and tomorrow and for the definite future — will be out there, taking risks in the cause of freedom.

So I assure you, it will be done.

Now, I want to pick up on your comment, that “we were all wrong”.

Let’s stop to think about that.

We agreed, you and I — we’ve had extensive discussions — that the work of the ISG has got to continue.

Correct?

Mr. Kay: Absolutely.

Query: What “other nations”? Not France. Not Germany. Not Russia. Not the U.N. inspectors. Who?

CJHjr

Sen. Warner. That, given the size of Iraq (California), the size of Baghdad (Los Angeles), we could discover some facts that would confirm the conclusions that were reached by the intelligence community — not only in this country, but other nations — in the future.

Am I not correct in that assumption?

Mr. Kay: I certainly think that’s a theoretical possibility.

Yes, Senator Warner.

Sen. Warner. So maybe we better not pronounce, “we’re all wrong,” yet. Because I think, until we have finished the work — the ISG, and the other nations that are working for this, with the ISG — I think we better hold such conclusion in abeyance.

That would be my thought.

Mr. Kay: Senator Warner, may I only add, I—

Look, I {chuckles}

It would be totally out of character for me to be against continued investigation in almost any area. I—

That’s my life.

I believe that the effort that has been directed to this point has been sufficiently intense that it is highly unlikely that there were large stockpiles of deployed, militarized, chemical and biological weapons there.

Is it theoretically possible, in a country as vast as that, that they’ve hidden—?

It’s theoretically possible.

But we went after this, not in the way of trying to find where the weapons are hidden.

When you don’t find them in the obvious places, you look to see:

  Were they produced?

  Were there people that produced them?

  Were there the inputs to the production process?

And you do that.

And you eliminate—

And that’s what I mean by unresolved ambiguity.

When the ISG wraps up its work — whether it be six months, or six years, from now — there’re still going to be people to say:

“You didn’t look everywhere. Isn’t it possible it was hidden someplace?”

And the answer has got to be, honestly:

“Yes, it’s possible.”

But you try to eliminate that, by this other process. {p.10}

 

 

“ American authorities have promised rewards to Iraqis for information leading to discovery of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons programs, the U.S.-run Information Radio said Saturday ... “regarding any site that manufactured or held weapons of mass destruction.” ...

The lengthy spot on the Arabic-language radio ... said the U.S.-British coalition was interested in “locations of components, materials, and supplies that had been used in developing, processing, manufacturing, and maintaining weapons of mass destruction.””

Jim Avila, MSNBC News, May 11 2003

 

“ It seems highly improbable that any significant stocks or stores of other prohibited weapons or items would have escaped discovery, had they existed.

Considering the miserable economic and social situation of Iraqi scientists, military people, and technical experts, the rewards promised, to persons who helped to reveal any stocks, should have produced leads and results.”

Hans Blix, January 2004, Disarming Iraq, p.258 (March 2004).

 

“ I had millions of dollars of reward money that I could have paid for information on weapons.

And, believe me, if someone had come in and said, “This is where they’re hidden,” we would have taken care of them for the rest of their life.

The fact that no one came forward for it was a worrying concern.”

David Kay, March 2 2004

 

And when I reached the conclusion — which I admit is partial and is purely mine — that I think there are no large, were no large stockpiles of WMD, it’s based on that process.

But I agree. I—

We’re not in disagreement at all.

The search must continue.

Sen. Warner. Right.

But, the operative word in your assumption is “large.”

Several small caches could constitute an imminent threat.

Mr. Kay: Uh. And that’s—

Sen. Warner. Am I not correct in that?

Mr. Kay: —that’s always possible. I— I—

Sen. Warner. Pardon?

Mr. Kay: That’s always possible. And I doubt that we will ever—

I mean, it’s possible that they could be there and we could never find them.

Sen. Warner. All right.

So—

But—

Let’s give this process the chance to continue.

And I think that’s—

Mr. Kay: Absolutely.

Sen. Warner. And, we agree that there could be the discovery, in some future date, of the evidence which confirms perhaps — not in totality, but in part — the conclusions of the international intelligence community.

 

Query:International intelligence community”?

Who would that be?

France, Germany, Russia, and the United Nations inspectors — Their prewar conclusions have already been confirmed (so far), namely:

No evidence of weapons of mass destruction. CJHjr

 

So we leave open that option.

David Kay’s 85 percent statements, in prior interviews: Reuters, Jan. 23 {copy}; New York Times, Jan. 26 {copy}; Washington Post, Jan. 28 {pf} {copy, copy}  CJHjr

But let’s go back to your other statement, that you feel that perhaps as much as 85 percent of the work of the ISG has been completed.

Am I correct in that?

Mr. Kay: I’ve said, I think 85 percent of the major elements of the Iraqi program are probably known. Ah. That’s not 85 percent of the total volume.

Sen. Warner. But in our discussions, you’ve emphasized that 15 percent, yet to be done, could yield productive evidence that’s just as important to what you’ve accumulated — or not accumulated — to date.

Mr. Kay: Senator Warner, that’s certainly true. Particularly with regard to the foreign countries and individuals that assisted that program, which remain a continuing threat, in other countries, unless we know fully, who they were and what they contributed.

Query:Destruction of documents”? Whoops ... Did you forget to mention, “We have recovered millions of documents”?

 

Query:Refusing to talk”? Whoops ... Did you forget to mention, “ISG has met with hundreds of scientists” who do talk?

CJHjr

Sen. Warner. Clearly, at the outbreak of the war, or prior thereto, and during the war, an awful lot of destruction of documents took place, and perhaps other tangible evidence.

Today, the persons who were most likely involved in weapons programs, most likely to have the knowledge, are refusing to talk.

Does that not lend itself to an assumption, that there had to be something there?

Otherwise they wouldn’t have gone about so methodically to destroy all the records?

Mr. Kay: Senator Warner—

Sen. Warner. And refusing to talk?

Mr. Kay: Senator Warner, you’re absolutely right.

 

Query:Destruction of documents”? “All the records”? “Refusing to talk”?

Is John Warner here willfully designing to induce an erroneous inference? In the minds of his colleagues? And the public? Including journalists? Watching on TV?

Unwarranted by the facts he omits to mention?

And is the inference persuasive? From the assumption he advocates?

Or, instead, are any destroyed documents notmaterial” to the inquiry? Because his compound-inference is overwhelmed? By abundant, contrary, documents, interviews, and “other evidence that points to something else{pf} {copy, copy}?

David Kay is apparently persuaded by the evidence. Which obviously conflicts with the inference John Warner advocates. David Kay stands on his firm opinion: There were no weapons.

The “millions of documents” which are not destroyed are evidence. And interviews of “hundreds of scientists” are evidence. And they apparently tell a persuasive tale, which Mr. Warner omitted to mention.

Charles Duelfer later tell us, “We have recovered millions of documents.” And that “ISG has met with hundreds of scientists.” David Kay says (below) his group has already looked at “hundreds of thousands of pages.” “We now have records of the Iraqis,” he says (below), illuminating WMD destruction in 1991. He previously said, “U.S. forces had collected a massive amount of documents” {copy, accord, copy}. And “CIA officials have said{copy} “there are millions of pages of documents still to be translated from Arabic” {pf} {copy, copy}. And there are “25 tons of documents” {copy} — “truck-loads of Iraqi intelligence documents” — seized by Ahmed Chalabi {copy}. Groomed by the U.S., to be its puppet-dictator of Iraq, head of its new secret police, with absolute power already, to disqualify {copy} his opponents for jobs, and to designate them for disappearance.

When John Warner omitted — on worldwide TV — to mention “millions” of preserved documents, while advocating an inference from what he asserts to be “methodically” destroyed documents (“all the records”).

And when John Warner omitted — on worldwide TV — to mention interviews with “hundreds” of scientists, while advocating an inference from what he asserts to be knowledgeable people “refusing to talk”.

Was John Warner lying? By material omission? Willfully inducing an unwarranted inference? Was he willfully blind? Reckless? Grossly negligent? An “innocent liar”? Deceived or misinformed by David Kay? Was he ignorant?

David Kay wasn’t ignorant.

By agreeing with John Warner, was David Kay willfully colluding in the misleading inference John Warner’s omission-laden question induced?

A fine piece of dramatic deceit.

Which even CIA scriptwriters could be justly proud of.

Thickening “a cloud of dust and mist”.  CJHjr

 

I think—

And I think I’ve said—

But let me be absolutely clear about it.

Iraq was in clear material violation of 1441.

They maintained programs and activities.

Ah. And they certainly had the intentions, at a point, to resume their programs.

So there was a lot they wanted to hide. Because it showed what they were doing, that was {p.11} illegally—

I hope we find even more evidence of that.

Sen. Warner. Part of that program were missiles.

Clearly, clearly, in defiance of the U.N. resolution.

In terms of range.

They had the potential to incorporate in those warheads — although small quantities — nevertheless, very lethal types of WMD.

Am I not correct in that?

Mr. Kay: You’re absolutely correct.

Sen. Warner. Could you say that the work thus far of the ISG—

And I recounted a number of things, including the ricin and so forth, in my opening statement.

Does not that lend itself to the understanding, the conclusion, that Saddam Hussein, and this military machine under his control, posed an imminent threat?

Perhaps to the neighbors?

Perhaps to those beyond the perimeter of the neighbors?

Mr. Kay: Senator Warner, I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and the removal of Saddam Hussein.

 

Query:Imminent threat”?

So, Iraq had short-range missiles. And one tested 33-kilometers above the U.N. range-limit of 150-kilometers (81 n.miles, 93 s.miles). And their small warheads might “potentially” be filled with a chemical or biological agent, instead of an explosive, and thereby be transformed into a weapon of mass destruction?

And this theoretical threat is “imminent”? And entitles us to attack in defiance of a Security Council Resolution we agreed instead to obey?

  Even though Iraq did not refuse to destroy any banned items, on orders of the U.N. inspectors?

  Even though they had no chemical or biological agents to fill those warheads with?

  Even though they had no facilities, or equipment, or chemical precursors, to manufacture such agents?

  Even though the 150-kilometer range is too short to traverse the no-fly zones inside their own country to reach their neighbors?

  Even though they declared and destroyed those very same missiles anyway, on orders of the U.N. inspectors?

Is John Warner here modeling the corrupt process, by which a mere hypothesis blossoms into an unassailable fact? Supported by “no reliable information”? Refuted by abundant reliable evidence?

A U.S. Officer, desperately seeking — and asserting — a plausible “imminent threat”? Which cannot await an inspection process to conclude its business?

Incited, and aided and abetted, by a like-minded, complicit, “expert”? Cooperating? By declining to ground that flight of fantasy, with the weight of incompatible facts?

I wonder if the intellect, and moral character, here modeled by John Warner, reflect the voters of Virginia? And their desires, agendas, and notion of the proper oversight duty of a U.S. Senator, the only tool available in the U.S. democracy to curb the violent, criminal, and other unlawful enterprises of U.S. officials?

A question “terrorists” also ponder, when contemplating whether to target “innocent” Americans, in a violent international countermeasure, a species of self-defense.

Apparently so. Virginia voters return him to office every 6-years, election after election. CJHjr

 

I have said, I actually think, this may be one of those cases where it was even more dangerous than we thought.

I think, when we have the complete record, you’re going to discover, that after 1998, it became a regime that was totally corrupt. Individuals were out for their own protection.

And, in a world where we know others are seeking WMD, the likelihood, at some point in the future, of a seller and a buyer meeting up, would have made that a far more dangerous country than even we anticipated, with what may turn out not to be a fully accurate estimate.

Sen. Warner. Thank you, Dr. Kay.

 

Senator Levin.

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI): Dr. Kay, on the question of stockpiles.

You have stated, I believe, that in your opinion, Iraq did not have large stockpiles, of chemical and biological weapons, in 2002.

Is that correct?

Mr. Kay: That’s correct, Senator.

Sen. Levin. Do you have any evidence that they had any stockpiles, large or small, in 2002?

Mr. Kay: Simply have no evidence, Senator.

Sen. Levin. You have not uncovered any evidence of small stockpiles?

Mr. Kay: We have not uncovered any small stockpiles, that’s correct.

Sen. Levin. Have you uncovered any evidence that they had small stockpiles in 2002?

Mr. Kay: We have got evidence that they certainly could have produced small amounts.

But we have not discovered evidence of the stockpiles.

 

“ Christiane Amanpour {0:42, audio}:

When, just a few months ago, David Kay went to the Congress, and essentially said:

“We were probably all wrong. There aren’t any stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. What everybody was talking about was around 1991. We’ve done 85% of the search work. And we still haven’t found anything. And it’s unlikely we’re going to find anything else.”

When he said all that.

In front of Congress.

What did you think?

I mean—

Did you feel vindicated?

Did you think—

What?

Hans Blix: Well, first of all, I said to myself,

“What else could he say?”

Because, if he had said,

“We have found some weapons.”

We would have asked,

“Where are they?””

Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video {1:31:47, at 48:05}, audio {1:31:48, at 48:19}.

 

Sen. Levin. On the question of the vans.

According to The New York Times, on January 26th {copy}, you indicated that there is a consensus, in the intelligence community, that the trailers that were found were intended to produced hydrogen for weather balloons, or possibly rocket fuel, but not for producing biological warfare agents.

Was that an accurate report of your position? {p.12}

Mr. Kay: That’s probably not my exact words, but roughly accurate.

I think the consensus opinion is that when you look at those two trailers, while they had capabilities in many areas, their actual intended use was not for the production of biological weapons.

Sen. Levin. Now, on January 22nd — just a week ago — Vice President Cheney said that we know, for example, that:

“prior to our going in, he had spent time and effort acquiring mobile biological weapons labs, and we’re quite confident he did, in fact, have such a program. We found a couple of semitrailers at this point which we believe were, in fact, part of that program.”

And

“I would deem that conclusive evidence, if you will, that he did in fact have programs for weapons of mass destruction.”

Now, those vans—

According to the vice president.

One week ago.

Are “conclusive evidence.”

That he had weapons.

And yet.

You’re saying, that the consensus in the intelligence community is, that those vans were for some non-weapons-related purpose:

They were either for weapons, for weather balloons, for hydrogen, or rocket fuel.

But not for weapons of mass destruction.

Do you know what intelligence Vice President Cheney is relying on?

When he tells the public a week ago?

Not before the war. Everyone—

They were all wrong before the war.

But now.

A week ago.

Still saying that those vans are “conclusive evidence”.

That there was a biological weapons program.

My question:

Do you know what intelligence Vice President Cheney was relying on?

One week ago?

When he made that statement?

To the American people?

Mr. Kay: Well, Senator Levin, if you want the short answer—

And the obvious answer, as you probably know, is:

“Am I aware of what the vice president was reading a week ago?”

I’m not.

If you’ll let me—

If you’ll let me—

Sen. Levin. Have you seen intelligence which would support that conclusion?

Mr. Kay: Yes, I have.

In fact, if you had asked me — as I think in fact you did, or members of Senator Roberts’ committee certainly did — in July and August, this has been a source of real struggle with regard to those vans.

There was a point during the process when I would have said the consensus opinion is that they were for biological weapons.

It’s been an ongoing struggle to understand those two vans. And it’s been a shifting target with that regard.

 

“ Military teams ... found three trailers ... capable of producing deadly germs for weapons ... at a bombed-out rocket and missile factory near Mosul in northern Iraq. One ... was missing its canvas cover, wheels, and plumbing — most likely taken by looters — but the essential parts, including a compressor and dryer needed to produce weapons grade anthrax, were intact ...

Former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay told NBC there was no other possible purpose for the lab.

This is it,”

he said.”

Jim Avila, “Suspected bioweapons labs found(MSNBC News, May 11 2003)

Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants” (CIA/DIA, May 28 2003)

Judith Miller, William J. Broad, “Some Analysts of Iraq Trailers Reject Germ Use” (New York Times, June 7 2003)

Peter Beaumont, Antony Barnett, “Blow to Blair over ‘mobile labs’: Saddam’s trucks were for balloons, not germs” (The Observer, June 8 2003): “... for hydrogen production to fill artillery balloons, part of a system originally sold to Saddam by Britain in 1987 {sic: 1982?}.”

Peter Beaumont, Antony Barnett and Gaby Hinsliff, “Iraqi Mobile Labs Nothing to do with Germ Warfare, Report Finds” (The Observer, June 15 2003)

Douglas Jehl, “State Department Disputes CIA View of Trailers as Labs” (New York Times, June 26 2003).

Douglas Jehl, “Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen, Not Biological Arms” (New York Times, August 9 2003): “Engineering experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency”.

Barton Gellman, “Iraq's Arsenal Was Only on Paper{pf} (Washington Post, Jan. 7 2004) {copy}. “Masraf ... explained that Iraq actually used such trailers to generate hydrogen during the eight-year war with Iran. Masraf ... managed a contract to refurbish some of the units beginning in 1997 ... including the two discovered by coalition forces around Mosul.”

Mark Hosenball, John Barry, “The Tale of the Lying Defector: How an Iraqi ‘fabricator’ duped America’s spooks” (Newsweek, Feb. 16 2004). “As early as May 2002, analysts at the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency issued a warning about the credibility of one of the mobile-lab informants, believed to be the Iraqi major ... a ‘fabricator notice’ ... reported that he had been ‘coached by Iraqi National Congress’.”

Walter Pincus, “Experts Say U.S. Never Spoke to Source of Tip on Bioweapons{pf} (Washington Post, March 5 2004) “In his presentation before the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5 2003, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said ‘firsthand descriptions’ of the mobile bioweapons fleet had come from an Iraqi chemical engineer who had defected and is ‘currently hiding in another country’...”  CJHjr

 

“ Kay also said “the dominance of analytical opinion” was that two trailers found in northern Iraq were meant to make hydrogen for balloons, not biological weapons ... Documents and testimony from Iraqis point strongly toward the hydrogen idea, he said.”

David Kay, Feb. 12 2004{pf}.

Bob Drogin, Greg Miller, “Iraqi Defector’s Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War: Colin Powell presented the U.N. with details on mobile germ factories, which came from a now-discredited source known as ‘Curveball’” (Los Angeles Times, March 28 2004) {copy, copy}. “His story was provided by German agents ... the defector was the brother of one of Chalabi’s top aides ... David Kay said ... Curveball turned out to be an ‘out-and-out fabricator’ ... A former U.S. official, who has reviewed the classified file, said ... Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service ... the BND warned the CIA last spring that it had ‘various problems with the source’ ... after Powell first described the biowarfare trucks in detail to the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5 2003 ... Kay ... said Powell’s account was ‘disingenuous’ ... Kay added: ‘If Powell had said to the Security Council:

“It’s one source, we never actually talked to him, and we don’t know his name,”

as he’s describing this, I think people would have laughed us out of court’ ... U.N. weapons hunters who returned to Iraq in November 2002 ... checked every site Curveball had identified, as well as others picked by U.S. intelligence ... ‘We didn’t find anything,’ the former inspector said ... After Powell’s U.N. speech, inspectors demanded that Baghdad identify every mobile facility it owned. In letters delivered on March 3 and March 15, just days before the war started, Iraqi officials handed over detailed descriptions, backed by 39 photographs and four videotapes, of mobile disease analysis labs, mobile military morgues, X-ray trucks, military bakery vans, mobile ice factories, refrigerated drug and food transport trucks, and other special vehicles. Some had stainless steel equipment that appeared similar to the diagrams Powell had shown the U.N.”

 

Sen. Levin. Now I understand that, shifting target thing.

I’m talking about right now.

You’ve said the conclusive — excuse me — that the consensus in the intelligence community is that those vans are not related.

Is that a correct statement, which you just gave here this morning?

Is that the consensus opinion in the intelligence community now?

Mr. Kay: It is my view of the consensus opinion. But there are, no doubt — given the nature of opinions — people out there who hold a different opinion.

Sen. Levin. All right. But in your judgment, the consensus in the intelligence community now, is that those are not biological weapons vans?

Mr. Kay: That is my personal judgment. Others may well hold a different one. {p.13}

Sen. Levin. All right.

I think it’s critically important that we find out the basis of the vice president’s statement.

I’m saying this to our chairman, not to you.

That we find out the basis of the vice president’s statement. Because this is where intelligence becomes so important. If there’s intelligence out there that still supports the conclusion with certainty

“We’re confident he had a program.”

He deems this conclusive evidence, that he had programs for weapons of mass destruction.

This is a week ago.

Now, we’ve got to find out what the basis, it seems to me, of that statement is.

This is the vice president’s statement.

And I would ask the chairman, that we ask the vice president for the basis of that statement, which he made publicly on, just about a week ago.

Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS):  Would the senator yield on that point?

Sen. Levin. No, I’d like to first, if I could, just ask our chairman, whether or not we could ask the vice president for the basis of that statement that was made a week ago.

Sen. Roberts: I think I have an answer for you, if you’d yield.

Sen. Levin. Well, I’d like to hear it, frankly, from the vice president. In writing.

Sen. Warner: Very well.

Let’s, uh—

We’ve got to continue here, colleagues.

I’m going to ask the indulgence of the committee, while the chair requests of the committee action on the following list of military nominations.

A quorum now being present, I ask the committee to consider a list of 4,763 pending military nominations. The nominations have been before the committee the required length of time, and no objection has been raised regarding them.

Is there a motion to favorably report the 4,763 nominations to the Senate?

Sen. Levin. Support.

Sen. Warner. Second?

Sen.{speaker unknown}:  Second.

Sen. Warner. All in favor, say aye.

{A chorus of “ayes”}.

Sen. Warner. Opposed?

{No audible response}.

The motion carries.

Sen. Levin. My final question, Dr. Kay, subject to the chair perhaps commenting on my request, is this:

Is it your judgment, that the aluminum tubes {photo}, that Iraq was trying to acquire, were intended or used for a centrifuge program, to enrich uranium, for nuclear weapons?

Is that your view?

 

“ Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.”

George W. Bush, U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 12 2002 {pf} {4kb.txt, 37kb.pdf, copy} {video 26:54, bbc 26:40, audio 26:16}.

 

“ Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.”

George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, Cincinnati, Oct. 7 2002 {22kb.txt, 43kb.pdf}.

 

“ Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.”

George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Jan. 28 2003 {34kb.html, 34kb.txt, 60kb.pdf, 34kb.txt, 50kb.pdf}

 

Mr. Kay: Senator Levin, this is an area, which falls into what Senator Warner referred to, where I think it’s important that the investigation continue.

Query: Is the aluminum tube body, of an unguided 81mm artillery rocket (range: 10-12 miles), part of a “missile program”?

CJHjr

It is my judgment — based on the evidence that was collected, but there clearly can be more — that it’s more than probable that those tubes were intended for use in a conventional missile program rather than in a centrifuge program.

But it’s an open question, still being investigated. {p.14}

Sen. Levin. All right. But that is your judgment — that they were not related to uranium enrichment?

Mr. Kay: That is my personal judgment — that they probably were not, based on evidence. But there’s still more evidence possible to gain.

Sen. Levin. And one short final question, my second final question.

Do you—

In your judgment, was—

Did Iraq—

Had Iraq reconstituted its nuclear weapon program? In the way you understand the word “reconstitute”?

Mr. Kay: It was in the early stages of renovating the program, building new buildings.

It was not a reconstituted, full-blown nuclear program.

 

Query:Program”?

Was this is a “program” in any sense of the word:– A feasible plan, approved, adopted, budgeted, funded, staffed, with efforts under way to achieve an achievable banned goal?

Were these buildings to house a nuclear bomb program?

Or something more innocent? Such as putting scientists back to work on science activities, including legitimate weapons research. CJHjr

 

Sen. Levin. Thank you.

Sen. Warner: Senator, I will take under consideration your request.

I think Senator Roberts, when it becomes his turn, may have a statement that’s relevant to it.

Senator McCain.

 

Senator John McCain (R-AZ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Kay, for your service to our country for many years. We’re very proud to have people like you who are willing to serve the country.

Dr. Kay, you find yourself today in a very highly charged political environment.

Query:scientist”?:

 

“ David Kay is not a scientist. His PhD is in Foreign Affairs or some such. On the other hand, I am a Physicist and was Chief Scientist for the Army during the Reagan Years.”

Gordon Prather, June 25 2003

And, you are by nature a scientist and not one who’s familiar with these kinds of passions around an election year.

And I think it’s important for — to establish your belief and that of the overwhelming body of intelligence, and the intelligence community, both here, overseas, and in the Clinton administration, the following facts:

Saddam Hussein developed and used weapons of mass destruction.

True?

Mr. Kay: Absolutely.

Sen. McCain: He used them against the Iranians and the Kurds.

Just, yes or no.

Mr. Kay: Oh, yes.

Sen. McCain: Okay.

And U.N. inspectors found enormous quantities of banned chemical and biological weapons in Iraq in the ’90s.

Mr. Kay: Yes, sir.

 

Query:Found enormous quantities”?

Are 12 artillery shells “enormous quantities”?

That’s the only banned weapons U.N. inspectors “found,” from 1991 to 1998.

And they were at a declared site.

All the rest, Iraq voluntarily destroyed in 1991.

Or declared in 1991.

Exactly as the U.N. resolution required.  CJHjr:

 

“ Hans Blix: Sizeable quantities of chemical weapons ... were also destroyed by Iraq unilaterally {in 1991} ...

A significant number of remaining weapons declared by Iraq ... were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in the period from 1991 to 1994 ...

[F]indings in the chemical area comprised hidden production capabilities.

But not weapons themselves.

With the exception of a dozen artillery shells, filled with mustard gas, found in the period 1996-1997, at a former storage site. ...

No biological weapons ... were declared and destroyed by Iraq under UNSCOM supervision ...

Iraq continued to maintain that all biological munitions and biological warfare agents produced had been destroyed, unilaterally, in 1991, along with the associated documentation.”

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), Thirteenth Quarterly Report of the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, pages 39-41 (U.N. Doc. S/2003/580, May 30 2003) {282kb.pdf, copy, also via this, and ODS}.

__________

 

“ Hans Blix {1:18 bb}: Another feature.

That should have raised some doubts.

In the minds of analysts.

Was that UNSCOM and the IAEA had not identified and destroyed any prohibited weapons.

After the early years, up to around 1994.

I think that this has escaped public attention, quite a lot.

But it emerges clearly from our documentation.

That the destruction took place, by the Iraqis, or such weapons as were kept at declared sites, were destroyed by UNSCOM.

Before 1994.

After that, no weapons were found.

Infrastructure: Yes. Growth media: Yes. Chemical precursors: Yes.

But.

Weapons: No.

Until, we ordered destruction of Al-Samoud-2 missiles, which was in February of the past year.

We destroyed about— or supervised the destruction of about 70 big missiles.

Indeed, I think I can say, that neither UNSCOM nor UNMOVIC, ever found arms that were hidden.

We found some warheads.

But they were not hidden.

They were at a site that was declared.

UNSCOM destroyed large quantities of chemical weapons, which were not among those Iraq had destroyed in ’91.

But they were, again, at sites which had been declared.

And they could thus not be characterized as “hidden.””

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, until June 30 2003, UNMOVIC), “Means of Reducing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Edinburgh University, Montague Burton Lecture 2004, McEwan Hall, February 24 2004), video {bb} {1:07:56 bb, at 21:45-23:03 bb}.

 

Sen. McCain: We know that Saddam Hussein had once a very active nuclear program.

Mr. Kay: Yes.

Sen. McCain: And he realized and had ambitions to develop and use weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Kay: Clearly. {p.15}

Sen. McCain: So the point is, if he were in power today, there is no doubt that he would harbor ambitions for the development and use of weapons of mass destruction.

Is there any doubt in your mind?

Mr. Kay: There’s absolutely no doubt. And I think I’ve said that, Senator.

Sen. McCain: Good. But it’s important to emphasize this point when we look at what has obviously been an intelligence failure.

Mr. Kay: I agree.

Sen. McCain: When you stated—

When you answered a question from Reuters:

What happened to the stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons that everyone expected to be there,”

your answer {copy} was simple. Quote:

I don’t think they existed.”

So, what needs to be established here is that when we — at least I hope is, I believe is, your view, and certainly mine — that, as you just stated, America, the world, and Iraq is a far better and safer place with Saddam Hussein gone from power.

Query:Justified”? And the 10,000 Iraqi civilians {article, copy} we sacrificed? Twice the number Saddam gassed at Halabja? And 10,000 Iraqi combatants? Doing their patriotic duty? Both groups carefully not counted, and not recorded, by the U.S. Military? Or by the Government of Iraq, in U.S. hands (the Coalition Provisional Authority)? Just like Saddam didn’t do? And for the same reason? And 10,000 disappeared {ditto, ditto}? And maybe 20,000 maimed or wounded? A wrecked economy?

If regime-change is all you wanted, we could have had an entirely different war, with a very different post-war result.  CJHjr

And the sacrifice made by American citizens, and that are serving and sacrificing today, was not only worth it, but very important to the future of the Middle East and the world.

Do you share that—?

Mr. Kay: That’s certainly true, Senator.

I’ve probably learned not to speak to wire reporters and even to watch out for senators who want one-word answers {chuckles}.

Sen. McCain: Yeah.

Mr. Kay: It tends to compress complex issues.

Sen. McCain: But you agree with the fundamental principle here, that what we did was a justified and, and enhanced the security of the United States and the world, by removing Saddam Hussein from power.

Mr. Kay: Absolutely.

Sen. McCain: Okay. I—

That’s important to establish. Because now, in this political season, those are attempted to be mixed:

That because we didn’t find the weapons of mass destruction, therefore the conflict was not justified.

That’s why I think it’s important to establish those salient facts.

 

Query:Facts”?

So, the opinion you advocate, that the war was justified, is now a “fact”?

Indeed, a “salient,” “established,” “fact”?

Is this how history is written?

By Senatorial ipse dixit? Presidential proclamation? Imperial fiat? Royal decree? The Emperor’s butler?

History is written in the criminal prosecutions of pernicious government officials.

Who decide to cross a line.

A bright line.

Established to safeguard the integrity of government:

That s/he who decides to lie, in governmental matters, has earned 5 years in prison.

And so too, each helper.

And s/he who decides to conspire with others to so lie, has earned 5 years in prison.

And s/he who decides to do both has earned 10 years in prison.

And s/he who decides to lie, as an overt act, in a violent criminal conspiracy, to wage a criminal war of aggression, or a war in violation of a treaty (S/Res/1441), has earned a noose, on the gallows.

The crime against peace.

  CJHjr

 

Now.

But obviously, we were wrong. As you said.

Now, why were we wrong?

Mr. Kay: Senator, I wouldn’t pretend that I know all the answers or even know all the questions to get at that.

I am convinced that that is the important forefront of the inquiry that, quite frankly, you must undertake.

I’ve got hypotheses of where I think things generically have occurred.

Query:Addicted”?

They cured themselves. By the time Mr. Blix began his inspections. With an unprecedented “flow of information”. Which U.S. and U.K. intelligence officers, and their political masters, ignoredCJHjr

I think we became almost addicted to the incredible amount of effort that UNSCOM and U.N. inspectors could produce on the scene — and that flow of information —

Sen. McCain: Including in the intelligence gained by the previous administration. {p.16}

Mr. Kay: That’s correct.

— and did not develop our own HumInt sources there.

 

Query: No “HumInt”?

The U.N. inspectors were the supreme HumInt (Human Intelligence).

They visited every single site, U.S. intelligence specified as suspicious, which U.S. officials notified to the inspectors.

By surprise, without notice. With ground-penetrating radar, environmental sampling, site tours, worker interviews, document analysis, aerial surveillance.

Every single site, that is, U.S. officials permitted them time to inspect.

Before George W. Bush ordered them to leave.

Three days before he attacked Iraq (March 20 2003).

This quality of human intelligence the CIA has never, can never, and will never, hope to match.

Ever.

It can only be provided by international inspectors.

Boots on the ground.

People who can visit the sites.

Mr. Blix proved, that U.S./U.K. intelligence officers — and their political masters — were variously mistaken, exaggerators, and malicious liars.

He was, systematically, gutting their pretext for war.

The sole pretext, the U.N. Security Council agreed to, when they adopted the resolution (S/Res/1441).

The resolution written by the U.S./U.K. governments themselves.

Their own resolution.

Which specified, as its sole topic:

Disarmament

Its sole purpose.

And this is the apparent explanation, why, George W. Bush abruptly terminated inspections and attacked Iraq.

Over fierce, vociferous, objections, by 12 of the 15 members of the U.N. Security Council.

Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA) had time to inspect only about 36 of the about 100 extra sites designated to them as suspicious, by U.S. and other intelligence agencies.

By the time George W. Bush ordered them to leave.

Extra to the about 700 sites they were already inspecting, anyway, identified from their previous history of inspections.

If George W. Bush had permitted them, over the next several months, to investigate all the sites, U.S. intelligence officials asserted to be suspicious, they would have found no weapons, or weapons programs, or prohibited items.

And this, U.S. officials surely feared.

Because they knew for a fact.

That nothing suspicious existed.

At sites they considered most suspicious.

A fact.

Because Hans Blix, and Mohamed ElBaradei, told them so.

They found no weapons, or weapons programs, or prohibited items, at any of the intelligence sites they inspected, inspected at the specific request of those very same U.S. officials.

The very sites, those same U.S. officials asserted, to be the most suspicious, the most likely to contain prohibited items, their highest value targets.

U.S./U.K. officials were careful, to not update their estimates, to reflect these discoveries, by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei.

That every single one of the intelligence targets — they gave them — proved entirely innocent.

Every single site, that is, U.S./U.K. officials permitted them time to investigate.

The decision, by U.S./U.K. officials, to not update their estimates, to reflect what the inspectors did not find, what they disproved on the ground:—

This is a smoking-gun, of criminal intent.

The decision, by U.S./U.K. officials, to terminate inspections, before the inspectors had time to inspect 100% of the sites and targets considered suspicious by their own intelligence officials:—

This is a smoking-gun, of criminal intent.

  CJHjr

____________________

 

“ Dave Russell {1:09}: How much difference.

Would another three or four months have made.

Of inspections?

Hans Blix: I think a great deal, frankly.

Because, we were given tips, by the intelligence agencies, in various countries.

About—

Perhaps, round about a hundred sites.

That were indicated by them.

And we went, actually, with inspections, to about three dozen sites, if I remember rightly.

And we didn’t find any weapons of mass destruction.

Because there’re weren’t any.

Now.

We told the intelligence agencies—

We told the world, Security Council, that,

“Sorry.

There weren’t any.”

And that impressed them, somewhat.

Now.

If we had had three months more.

We would have been able to go.

To all the sites.

Indicated by intelligence.

And there would not have been.

Any weapons of mass destruction.”

Hans Blix, interviewed by Dave Russell (Sveriges Radio, SR International, Radio Sweden, December 8 2005), segment audio {4:29, at 3:20, source}, podcast audio (entire program) {24:51, 4:30-9:22, at 8:10} {17 mb mp3, source, source}.

 

“ Carl Levin: Prior to the war.

The CIA identified 550 sites in Iraq.

As possibly having weapons of mass destruction.

Or prohibited WMD materials or equipment.

They were called “suspect sites.”

Madam President {Senate presiding officer}, 150 of those sites were so-called “top suspect” sites where the CIA believed it would be more likely to find such items.

The 150 top suspect sites were, in turn, divided into three categories:

High priority, medium priority, and low priority.

At two public hearings, shortly before the war, on February 11 and February 12, 2003, I pressed Director Tenet on the issue of how many suspect WMD sites were shared with the United Nations.

On February 12, Director Tenet said the following: ...

“As I said yesterday, we have briefed all of these high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.”

Mr. Tenet did not say “some.”

He did not say “most.”

He said “all.”

“We have briefed all of these high value and moderate value sites.”

To the U.N.

I told Director Tenet.

At the time.

In two public hearings.

That he was wrong.

And that, classified numbers told a different story.

On March 6 2003, Director Tenet again stated, in writing, that:

“We have now provided detailed information on all of the high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.”

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice made the same representation.

In a letter to me, on March 6 2003, in which she said:

“United Nations inspectors have been briefed on every high or medium priority weapons of mass destruction, missile, and UAV-related site the U.S. intelligence community has identified.”

On January 20 2004, the CIA.

After a year of resistance.

Finally declassified the number ...

They finally acknowledged.

That.

21 of the 105 “high and medium” priority.

“Top suspect sites.”

On the CIA list.

Were not shared.

With the United Nations, before the war.

So the record is now clear.

That Director Tenet twice gave false information.

On this matter.

To the public.

And to the Congress.

Shortly before the war. ...

Last February, Director Tenet could have answered honestly ...

Instead, he chose a different path.

One of misstating the facts.

I can only speculate as to Director Tenet’s motive.

If he had answered honestly.

And said, that there were 21 high and medium priority top suspect sites, that we had not yet shared with the United Nations.

It would have put an obstacle in the path.

Of the administration’s move.

To end U.N. inspections.

And proceed to war.

It would have been more difficult.

For the administration.

To proceed to war.

Without first having shared with the U.N.

Our intelligence.

On all.

“High and medium” priority.

“Top suspect” WMD sites.

And, it would have reinforced.

Widely held.

Public, and international, sentiment.

That we should allow the U.N.

To complete their inspections.

Before going to war.

In other words.

Honest answers.

By Director Tenet.

Might have undermined the false sense of urgency.

For proceeding to war.

And could have contributed to delay.

Neither of which.

Fit the administration’s policy goals.

For the last year.

I have attempted, to have declassified, the number, of high and medium priority top suspect sites, that the U.S. did not share, with the United Nations.

The CIA stonewalled doing that.

For no reason that I can think of.

Except.

That the facts are embarrassing to them. ...

It is more evidence.

Of the shaping of intelligence.

To fit the administration’s policy objectives.”

Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, member, Senate Intelligence Committee), floor statement, “Flawed Intelligence Assessments,” 150 Congressional Record S1422-S1447 {222kb.txt; 182kb.pdf}, at S1436-S1437 {14kb.txt, 27kb.pdf, 29kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, daily edition 150:19, February 23 2004) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/19}, CIA letter: Stanley M. Moskowitz (CIA Director of Congressional Affairs) to Carl Levin, January 20 2004 {182kb.pdf, 108kb.pdf}, transcribed: 150 Congressional Record S1422-S1447, at S1437 {14kb.txt, 29kb.pdf}, Carl Levin, “The CIA Director Misled Congress” (press release, February 23 2004), reported, Douglas Jehl, David E. Sanger, “C.I.A. Admits It Didn't Give Weapon Data to the U.N.” (New York Times, February 21 2004) {copy, copy, copy}.


“ Hans Blix: We had about, all in all, 700 inspections.

And—

And at sites then that were given by intelligence.

So we became increasingly doubtful. ...

It’s clear that, at the end, they did not listen to us.

They ignored what we said.

Now, recently, we have learned, that maybe we were bugged.

And my comment to that was that:

“Well, if only they had listened to what we said!”

However, in December, and later on, we realized that the U.S. didn’t listen very much.

Nor did the U.K.

But.

The other members of the Security Council did.

And I think, the fact that we reported, that we had not seen any smoking guns. And, that we were questioning some of the evidence. But, at the same time, could not deny and rule out the possibility that there were weapons.

This position, I think, led Europeans, and many others on the Council, to say:

“Let’s have more of inspections. We have not had denials of access, at any rate. So we should continue inspections.”

And that deprived the U.S. and the U.K. of the possibility of having a majority for the resolution, that they wanted to get through.”

Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video, audio (at 25:30 minutes, 9:30 minutes)

 

“ Greg Thielmann: What is really most damning of the White House and the senior intelligence leadership — and I might even add to this the majority in the Congress — is what happened between November 2002 and the beginning of war in March 2003 {March 20 2003}.

This was the period in which the problem in the intelligence assessment — of having no one on the ground — was mitigated, if not resolved, by returning the U.N. inspectors to their previous activities.

I would note that a few days or one week after the U.N. inspectors hit the ground, the White House, other Cabinet members, the U.S. administration, were calling their mission a failure. They were denigrating their competence. They were describing their efforts as feckless, and doomed, one week into the inspections.

Within one month, we were actually getting information which would resolve a lot of the prudent concerns that the intelligence community had about what was happening ... by taking a look at the equipment, by talking to people on the ground, by comparing things that the inspectors had seen before but had been blind to for a period of four years.

So even at the time of the president’s State of the Union address in January, there was already a lot of important information which we had acquired that would change the assessments ...

There was no request in January, as far as I know, for the intelligence community to say, to itself and to the president:

What have we learned as a result of the return of the U.N. inspectors?

At the time of the president’s speech {Jan. 28 2003}, the IAEA had already delivered an interim judgment {Dec. 19, Jan. 9, Jan. 20, Jan. 27} that the aluminum tubes account of the administration was incorrect.

In February, a full month before the U.S. invasion, they arrived at a definitive judgment {Feb. 14, March 7} the aluminum tubes were not going into the nuclear weapons program.

We knew at that point, more than a month before the invasion, that the document on which the uranium in Africa was based was a forgery. The two most important legs, then, of the nuclear reconstitution theory had just collapsed.

There was no effort, as far as I know, on the part of the White House or anyone else in the administration, to go to the intelligence community and say:

“Before we invade this country on the assumption that the threat is as it was characterized several months earlier, how would we now characterize the threat?” ...

But it was not done.

That, to me, is a very damning comment, on whether or not this administration was trying to figure out what was going on in Iraq.

Or were they trying to build a case for war?

Based on reasons other than weapons of mass destruction.”

Greg Thielmann (Director to September 2002, Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department), February 3 2004 {pf}.

 

Now this really goes back — quite frankly, the change took place, if you look at it — it goes back to the Carter administration when, as a result of things that had occurred in the Vietnam area, essentially our HumInt capability was spun down.

Query:Liaison services”? Like Israel? Who lied, that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction? Which U.S. officials could pretend to believe? And credit as a “reliable source”? A secret, undisclosed, source? With a powerful motive to lie?

CJHjr

And we got in the habit of relying on intelligence collected by liaison services.

If a liaison — an individual from another country — gets caught as a spy, it doesn’t make the front page of the Washington Post or the New York Times. It’s not politically embarrassing.

And quite frankly, you don’t have a dead American.

So there are good reasons to do it.

More importantly, and things that I think you’ve got to worry about:

We have all stressed: Why didn’t the intelligence community connect the dots, prior to 9/11? It all looks very clear in retrospect.

Quite frankly, the most common problem you have with analysts is you do not want them to overanalyze the data. If there are only a few dots connected, maybe they don’t belong connected.

I’m convinced, in this area, partly because of Iraqi behavior — to a large extent because of Iraqi behavior: they cheated; they lied; we knew it; UNSCOM, the U.N., had caught them — we got in the habit of new pieces of information accreted to this overall consensus view, without challenging that consensus.

Sen. McCain: Do you believe that those that provided false intelligence estimates ought to be held accountable?

Mr. Kay: Absolutely.

Sen. McCain: Do you believe that we need an independent, outside, investigation?

Mr. Kay: Senator—

Sen. McCain: You don’t have to answer that, if you don’t choose to, Dr. Kay. It’s not a fair question.

Mr. Kay: It’s really what goes to the heart of the integrity of our own process.

I generally believe that it’s important to acknowledge failure.

I also think we’ve got enough history to understand that closed orders and secret societies — whether they be religious or governmental — are the groups that have the hardest time reforming themselves in the face of failure, without outside input.

I must say, my personal view — and it’s purely personal — is that, in this case, you will finally determine that it is going to take an outside inquiry, both to do it and to give yourself and the American people the confidence that you have done it.

Sen. McCain: Not only for what happened in the past, but so that we can rely on intelligence in the future.

Mr. Kay: I would say entirely with regard to the future.

Witch-hunting is not a profitable inquiry.

It is for the future that you need this.

 

Query: No “witch-hunt”?

Surely, all witches would applaud.

And so too all criminals.

Look to the future,” is their unanimous chorus.

Forget about the past.”

But then, there’s the matter of deterrence.

And so, we don’t forget about the past. We punish those who decide to cross the line. And this is how we look to the future. By instructing bystanders, tempted to cross that line, and watching carefully, “Is there any price to pay”?

But, we don’t fulfill our duties. And we don’t hold ourselves accountable, under the rule of law. When it comes to our own, governmental, crimes and other torts. We transfer our jurisdiction, to the councils of “terrorists,” law-enforcement officers, who understand deterrence, who don’t forget about the past, who fulfill our duties, and look to the future, in our stead.

Let’s call it, “outside input.”  CJHjr

 

Sen. McCain: Well, again, every once in a while we get a chance to see again someone who has served his country with distinction and honor and courage.

And we thank you, Dr. Kay. {p.17}

Mr. Kay: Thank you, Senator.

Sen. Warner: Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Kennedy.

 

Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA): Thank you.

Thank you, Dr. Kay. And I join in all of those that thank you for your service to the country. It is impressive indeed.

And we thank you for your appearance here, before the committee.

Now, the real question, Dr. Kay, is whether there was a greater failure than a failure of intelligence.

Yesterday, you said:

“If anyone was abused by the intelligence, it was the president of the United States, rather than the other way around.”

David Kay, interviewed by Tom Brokaw (NBC Nightly News, Monday, January 26 2004, 6:30-7:00pm ET), MSNBC video, “Kay: No evidence of WMD{4:24, 3.4mb.wmv, 9.59mb.flv}, transcript {pf}.

But Greg Thielmann — the former director of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research — stated last July:

“Some of the fault lies with the performance of the intelligence community. But most of it lies with the way senior officials misused the information they were provided.”

He said {copy, copy, copy}:

“They surveyed the data. Picked out what they liked. The whole thing was bizarre. The Secretary of Defense had this huge Defense Intelligence Agency. And he went around it.”

In fact, on the question of Iraq’s chemical weapons program, the Defense Intelligence Agency got it exactly right:

“ The declassified section on Iraq’s chemical warfare program from the September 2002 classified Defense Intelligence Agency study: Iraq – Key WMD Facilities – An Operational Support Study.”

U.S. DIA, Press Releases {83kb.pdf, copy, copy}

In September 2002, according to the February 2d 2004 edition of the New Republic {June 30 2003}, an agent’s report stated:

“There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has, or will, establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.”

Yet, the president told {267kb.pdf, 19kb.txt, 48kb.pdf} the United Nations in September 2002 that:

“Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard, and other chemical agents.”

The next month, the State Department said that the evidence was “inadequate” to support a judgment that a nuclear power had been restarted. It said it was impossible

to project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening.”

Yet, in an October 7th speech, 2002, in Ohio, President Bush said {22kb.txt, 43kb.pdf}:

“If the Iraqi regime is able to produce or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.”

And then, in September, the Department of Energy had serious concerns about whether the famous aluminum tubes {photo} had anything to do with the Iraqis’ nuclear programs.

Yet, Secretary Powell used the information in his speech before the United Nations.

 

“ Jane Corbin: Saddam has the raw material for the bomb. Natural uranium, mined and processed, inside Iraq. But it needs to be enriched, to reach weapons grade.

Now, there’s new information, that Saddam is seeking centrifuges, machines to enrich uranium, just as he did before.

In the last 14 months, several shipments, a total of 1000 aluminium centrifuge tubes, have been intercepted by intelligence agencies, before they actually reached Iraq.

David Kay: I’ve seen one of them. The centrifuge tubes look like they’re of the design, which is German derived, that the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s and developed.

They’re for enriching uranium. That is, taking natural uranium up to the level that makes it useful for a weapon. ... it tells me that they’re going for a large scale program.”

David Kay, interviewed by Jane Corbin, “The Case Against Saddam” (BBC, Panorama, September 23 2002), video {47:13}.

__________

 

By labeling them “centrifuge tubes,” David Kay and Jane Corbin violated BBC guidelines, because they omitted to mention a credible innocent explanation:

The opinion of centrifuge experts (which David Kay is not) that these tubes cannot be used for centrifuges.

And the determination by other experts (which David Kay is not) that these tubes precisely {pf} met the specifications for the combustion chamber of an Italian 81mm rocket which Iraq was manufacturing.

 

Query: David Kay saw a tube (then in the possession of U.S. intelligence). And he later said he had full access (at least later) to 100% of U.S. intelligence, which knew about the 81mm rockets, since “well before 1996.”

Was he ignorant when he spoke to Jane Corbin? Was he duped and by whom? Was he blinded by zeal?

Or was he — and she — a knowing, willing, active, participant in a criminal conspiracy, to deceive Congress, Parliament, the U.N. Security Council, and the worldwide public?

In the lexicon of deceit, David Kay’s unequivocal assertion, and his material omissions, are prima facie lies (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), § 1515(a)(3)(B)). Grooming the public for war.

Was he — and she — a paid liar for the CIA? Or MI-6? Through a chain of cooperative organizations? Think tanks? Defense contractors? Media companies? The BBC World Service? (Itself funded by MI-6). Tasked to propagate propaganda lies? Crafted by professional government liars? Funded by the taxpayers, to lie to the taxpayers?  CJHjr

 

In October last year, the CIA sent two memos to the White House, voicing strong doubts about the reliability of claims that Iraq was trying to obtain nuclear materials from Africa.

But, the president still used the statement in his State of the Union {34kb.html, 34kb.txt, 60kb.pdf, 34kb.txt, 50kb.pdf}, attributed to the British intelligence.

Many of us feel that the evidence so far leads only to one conclusion:—

That what has happened was more than a failure of intelligence. It was the result of manipulation of the intelligence, to justify a decision to go to war. {p.18}

Now, did you have the access to those different intelligence reports, as a civilian?

Mr. Kay: Yes, Senator. I had full access to everything in the intelligence community with regard to Iraq.

Sen. Kennedy: You had it with regard to the State Department’s intelligence and the Department of Energy?

Mr. Kay: Yes.

Sen. Kennedy: All of those with their conclusions that I’ve read, just summaries of their conclusions?

Mr. Kay: I had that as well as well as the individuals. I had on my team members of the Department of Energy who had, in fact, participated in writing that view.

Sen. Kennedy: Well, do you see—

Can you give us any explanation of why these agencies, in retrospect, appear to have had it right?

And the information that the administration used appear to have it wrong?

Mr. Kay: Senator—

Sen. Kennedy: What weight was given to these reports? When you look at, in retrospect? And when you have a number of those that were involved in the reports believing that the information reports were used selectively to justify a policy decision to take the country to war?

Mr. Kay: Senator Kennedy, it’s impossible — in the short time I have to reply — to take you through fully that. And in fact, that’s my hope, that Senator Roberts and his committee will have done that.

But let me just say, that while it—

There’s a selective process that goes on both ways.

Query: “Department of Energy”? Who?

CJHjr

There were people in the DoE who believed that those aluminum tubes were indeed for a centrifuge program.

It’s a lot easier after the fact, and after you know the truth, to be selective that you were right. I have gone through this a lot in my career.

 

“ All intelligence experts agree that ... these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program.”

Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (CIA, Oct. 4 2002)


“ Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. ... All the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use.”

Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), U.N. Security Council, Feb. 5 2003

 

“ Most experts are located at Oak Ridge. And that was not the position there.”

 

“ I don’t see how you do it. I do not know any real centrifuge experts that feel differently.”

 

“ “They were too heavy, three times too thick {3mm tube wall} and certain to leak,” says Wood, who reached that conclusion back in 2001. ... Thielmann reported to Secretary Powell’s office that they were confident the tubes were not for a nuclear program.”

 

“ You want the mass to be as small as possible so you can contain this high-speed rotating device. Scientifically, these tubes do not fit the mold of gas centrifuges — you know, period.”

Houston G. Wood III (founder, Oak Ridge Centrifuge Physics Department), Oct. 14 2003, Aug. 10 2003 {pf}, Oct. 14 2003, Oct. 27 2003

 

“ William Domke, who ran the centrifuge investigation, returned last month to his intelligence post at the Energy Department’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Jeffrey Bedell, Domke’s counterpart at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, has also come home.

Domke and Bedell, according to people who know their work, confirmed their prewar analysis that the tubes were not suited for centrifuges and that Iraq had no program to use them as such. ... They were also principal authors of the Energy Department’s dissent from the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002.

Tim McCarthy, an experienced U.N. inspector ... said ... the Iraqi rocket program based on 81mm tubes had been known to Western analysts “well before 1996.” ...

Australian Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Meekin ... said the Nasr 81 rocket “appeared in a public arms show in 1999” at which Iraqi munitions were displayed for sale.”

Barton Gellman, Oct. 26 2003 {pf} {copy}, reaffirmed: Nov. 16 2003

 

“ Kay said analysts have concluded Iraq had no active nuclear program. “There’s no substantial disagreement that there was no centrifuge program,” Kay said. The most likely explanation for the tubes, Kay said, is that they were to be used for artillery rockets.”

David Kay, Feb. 12 2004{pf}.

 

All I can say, is that, if you read the total body of intelligence, in the last 12 to 15 years, that flowed on Iraq, I quite frankly think it would be hard to come to a conclusion other than Iraq was a gathering, serious, threat to the world with regard to WMD.

And I remind you, it was Secretary Cohen who stood — I think, in this very committee room — with five pounds of flour, and talked about anthrax.

Sen. Kennedy: That’s—

Just to come back.

As we have limited time.

“Gathering, serious, threat.”

Do you really think that that is—

Those are the words that brought us to war?

Those were the words that justified us going into war?

“Gathering, serious, threat”?

Mr. Kay: Senator, that’s probably {chuckles} far more in your realm than in my realm. I will take Senator McCain’s defense of, I being a naive {phonetically: knave}, in the world of politics {chuckles}.

Sen. Kennedy: Yeah.

That’s—

Well.

No.

I appreciate your response.

And I appreciate your appearance here. {p.19}

But, I think that there’s—

When we look at who has the responsibility, I think it’s fair enough to look not only what the intelligence — the intelligence, but all the intelligence agencies.

And, as Senator Levin, how that intelligence was used.

I think that is going to be the key.

To find out just what representations were made.

And the reasons of why they were made.

Because I think—

On the basis of the information we have now, I think — it’s difficult to draw a conclusion, that it wasn’t—

That it was used selectively.

And in many instances manipulated,

To carry on a policy decision.

 

“ Hans Blix: But I think the politicians should also take a look at how they use this intelligence.

And be a little more cautious.

We know that, in advertising, you exaggerate things—

A refrigerator will cool your ice in 45 minutes.

Or, we know that in media, you want to have headlines, you want to have listeners.

And I also understand that politicians, who have to explain things to people, that there you have to simplify things.

I also understand that politicians, unlike inspectors, have to act on less than a 100%, of knowledge, and data.

We were in the luxury that we report.

And we can report black, and white, and grey.

And they had to come to conclusions, to action.

But I don’t think that really excuses them from using their critical judgment.

And, to be frank, with the public.

And, if they had other motives behind the armed action, than the weapons of mass destruction.

And if they were unsure about the strength of the evidence.

I don’t think there was quite the sincerity, that we, as citizens, would like to see.”

Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video, audio (at 88 minutes)

 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sen. Warner: Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Colleagues, just an administrative announcement.

We had scheduled this morning a 9:30 hearing on three nominations for the Department of Defense. It was my judgment, given the uncertainty of the weather, we could not hold it at 9:30.

This committee will meet at 4:00 for the purpose of considering Mr. DiRita to be nominee assistant secretary of Defense for public affairs, Mr. Harvey assistant secretary of Defense for network integration, Mr. Chatfield to be director of the Selective Service. I do hope as many as possible can attend.

Thank you very much.

Senator Inhofe.

 

Senator James Inhofe (R-OK): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, Dr. Kay, I would repeat everything that has been said about you and your service. And I appreciate it. I appreciate also the private conversations we have had, and you being very straightforward.

Just out of curiosity—

And this is something you may have a difficult time answering, because you are trying to get into somebody else’s mind.

But, in our conversations, when we talked, a year ago now — a year ago this month, I believe — about the fact that there were weapons of mass destruction, we knew he had used weapons of mass destruction.

And then, last week, there was an article where you are quoted {pf} {copy, copy} to say that “contemporary documents” that prove that Iraq destroyed the weapons of mass destruction in the 1990s.

Just out of curiosity, do you have any idea why Saddam Hussein did not come forth with that evidence when it would have served to his benefit to do so?

Mr. Kay: Senator, we’ve wrestled hours with trying to get an explanation for Iraqi, and particularly Saddam’s, behavior when, in fact, his rule was at stake, and why he didn’t do something else.

I think we, most of us, come down on two essential issues.

He did not want to appear to the rest of the Arab world as having caved-in to the U.S. and the U.N. So the creative ambiguity of maintaining weapons was important to him and his view of Iraq, and particularly himself and the rest of the world.

And the second is domestic politics. We often forget that it is, he used chemical weapons against the Kurds and the Shi’a. And that was a continuing threat to him. And he thought that that, in fact, gave him leverage against it.

That’s our best explanation.

Sen. Inhofe: That—

And that’s a very good answer. I appreciate that. {p.20}

 

Senator Warner talked about—

Well, Senator Levin talked about large caches of weapons of mass destruction, and Senator Warner talked about some small ones.

You know, I think back, and I can recall when—

And this is about a year ago now, it was in January, I believe.

That they found 11 chemical rockets that had the capabilities of holding 140 liters of something like VX gas, and which he had used in the past.

Now, if we found those rockets, and they could use, they could carry 140 liters of VX — which all the professional people, in discussing this, said could kill a million people — why is that not considered a weapon of mass destruction?

Mr. Kay: Well, I think, Senator, the reason—

And we actually found additional warheads during, uh, the same warheads—

Sen. Inhofe: Some 36 after that, I believe. Yes.

Mr. Kay: Yes. Afterwards.

—is that there was no evidence— that— that—

Look, clearly they were in violation not having declared those and turned them over.

But there was no evidence that the warheads themselves had ever been filled.

But they were in violation of 1441. They possessed those, and they should have declared them and allowed the U.N. to destroy them.

Sen. Inhofe: Yeah, okay. Because I consider that to be a weapon of

Anything that can potentially kill a million people is a weapon of mass destruction.

 

Query: A “weapon”?

Are 18 empty warheads for a 122mm artillery rocket, for training purposes, from the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), a “weapon”?

  Absent any chemical agent to fill them with?

  Absent any facility, equipment, or chemical precursors, to manufacture chemical agents?

  Absent tens of thousands of additional warheads necessary to constitute a weapons system, or a weapons program?

And did S/RES/1441 authorize war upon the finding of such objects? Or only if Iraq refused (which it didn’t) to destroy them, on orders of the U.N. inspectors?  CJHjr

 

Now, let me—

The third question I have is, you are quoted {pf} {copy, copy} in saying that you believed:

“Hussein had been {“may have been”} pursuing a course of “constructive ambiguity” before the war, bluffing about having weapons, to give the illusion of power and to put up a deterrent.”

And your, your quote was:

“Saddam wanted to enjoy the benefit of having chemical or biological weapons without having to pay the costs.”

Now, in other articles, you had suggested that Saddam was being deceived by scientists who duped him into funding non-existent programs. You’re quoted {copy} as saying:

“Whatever was left in an effective weapons capability was largely subsumed into corrupt money-raising schemes by scientists, skilled in the arts of lying, in a police state.”

Well, it—

Some have said there’s some inconsistency there.

“ It’s like putting up a sign on the door saying, “Beware of the dog”. When you don’t have a dog.”

Hans Blix, June 23 2003

Which of those do you think is the case?:

That he thought he had them?

Or—

That he knew he didn’t have them, and was bluffing?

Mr. Kay: I certainly—

I—

Look, the— the—

Saddam being deceived was a common phenomenon after 1998. And it crossed all areas — not just WMD — as it became a more corrupt society.

I don’t—

I don’t see—

I—

I remember the New York Times editorial, which sees an inconsistency between doing that.

I actually don’t see it.

I think—

It’s—

He knew he had the capability.

He—

He wanted to enjoy the benefits of others thinking he had it.

Query:Not just WMD”? The question was, “Which of those do you think is the case”? And your answer is: You think, “He knew he didn’t have them, and was bluffing.” In plain, honest, English.  CJHjr

The deception related to more advanced programs.

And that’s where it continued. Up until the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sen. Inhofe: I appreciate that very much. And thank you for your responses.

Sen. Warner: Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Robert Byrd just informed me that he is required to be on the floor for the vote and other reasons. I will put into the record his questions.

And I thank you very much.

Well, now, Senator Roberts is not here. {p.21}

Senator Reed?

Let’s see.

Senator Clinton.

 

Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And Dr. Kay, I join with my colleagues in thanking you for your public service. And it’s with great admiration that I have followed your service over a number of years. And I thank you, greatly.

I just wanted to clarify a few other comments that have been reported in the press, just to get the record clear in my own mind.

There were some references to your decision to leave the effort, due to the failure to have the full complement of analysts, translators, interrogators, and others to work with you.

And, I know that that was a concern that had been expressed to this committee, and others, because of the movement of people out of the group into counterinsurgency efforts.

Was that a factor, in either impacting the quality and substance of the search?

Or your decision to step down?

Mr. Kay: Senator Clinton, there were two factors that led me to decide it was the appropriate time to return to private life.

When I agreed to take on this job, I had only two conditions.

When you—

As you {chuckles} know well.

When you negotiate with the federal government, salary is not one of the things {chuckles} you can negotiate about.

I said that there were two things that were important to me.

One is that the instrument we were going to use, the Iraqi Survey Group, be totally focused on elimination of WMD, as long as we carried out that mission.

That was based on two facts:

One, my experience with the federal government is that, when you have multiple masters and multiple tasks, you get the typical interagency mush. And you don’t get directive action. And I didn’t think we had the time to do that.

The second was — and I told George Tenet directly this — by undertaking this task from the president, of investigating and trying to determine reality compared to your estimates, you were going to run a moral hazard, the moral hazard of self-investigation, and that the only way I was willing to be a party to that is that I had the independence to choose the instrument that was going to be doing it and I had the resources that were necessary to do it. And that was agreed.

By September, I was in the process of running battles, both with the DoD and with the intelligence community. They wanted to redirect resources and the activities of the ISG to the looming political insecurity crisis that was Baghdad.

I perfectly understood the difficulty we were having. I lived there. I knew how hazardous it was.

I just thought the ISG and those resources were inappropriate for it.

By November, I had lost that battle. The decision had been made to give ISG parallel priorities, in addition to WMD. And resources were being halved off.

And at that point I did what I had said in June when I took the job. I’m simply not prepared to run that moral hazard for myself, or for someone else, under those conditions.

Um. No big surprise. And no anger on my part.

You know, I was clear going on— And it’s actually in writing, on those two points.

When the administration felt that it couldn’t live up to that any longer, because of the security situation, which I fully understood, I {p.22} thought it best to let someone else — who has, who I have great respect for, and has capabilities, and think he can do it — take on the job.

Sen. Clinton: Well, Dr. Kay, I appreciate your explanation. But it raises two additional questions, at least in my mind, that we have addressed one before. And that is whether we had enough resources on the ground to begin with.

Making this Hobson’s choice — as to whether to continue with the full complement of resources and personnel you required, and were agreed to be given to you, to pursue this important task, or having to divert because we didn’t have enough resources on the ground to do the other job — illustrates clearly the confusion at the very center of this whole enterprise, post-military action.

But it raises an additional concern to me, which is that this wasn’t a priority.

You know, if you have a real priority, you figure out how to meet that priority.

And I think that the administration’s decision, to divert resources and personnel, speaks volumes about what they really thought was at stake.

I think by certainly November, if not by September, the fact that so much of the documentary evidence had been destroyed in the looting, the preliminary reports that you provided the Congress, and the administration, presaged what has become the final conclusion you’ve reached — that we were not going to find such evidence of weapons of mass destruction — certainly raises, for me, serious questions about the real intention of the administration to begin with.

 

Query: The “real intention of the administration”?

 

“ Hans Blix: The political establishment, the governments, perhaps may prefer that it ends in a cloud of dust and mist, rather than any clarity. If they don’t find good evidence that programs of bio and chemical were going on, then maybe they will continue to search for it. They might search for it for quite some time. ... They would rather end the whole thing by controversy than by an admission that it was wrong.

Jane Corbin: So no one can say, “Well, there definitely weren’t weapons.”

Hans Blix: I think so. Controversy will be preferable to a judgment. ... Politicians will prefer to retreat under a cloud of dust or mist. But we ordinary people would like to have some clear clarity.”

Hans Blix, Nov. 2003

 

Secondly, I’m very interested in what you have concluded about the Iraqi decisions to abandon production of WMD because of the U.N. inspection process.

That during the 1990s, in fact, the international community’s efforts to discover and destroy Saddam’s weapons was working.

Is that a fair statement of your findings?

Mr. Kay: It’s compressed, but fair. And I must say I had — as you know, because you were there — I had a number of former U.N. inspectors working for me.

We often sat around and said that, you know, it turned out we were better than we thought we were, in terms of the Iraqis feared that we had capabilities. And although they took tremendous efforts to try to compromise us and to lie, in fact the U.N. inspection process achieved quite a bit.

Sen. Clinton: And of course my time has expired.

But I think that rightly does raise questions, that we should be examining, about whether or not the U.N. inspection process pursuant to 1441 might not also have worked.

Without the loss of life that we have confronted.

Both among our own young men and women, as well as Iraqis.

 

“ Hans Blix {0:45}: The Iraqis were actually beginning to try to do cooperation on substance.

And they were almost frantic to do so. ...

I don’t exclude that we could have got more.

We could, in particular, have interviewed a lot of the people whom they said participated in the destruction of weapons of mass destruction in 1991.

James Naughtie {1:22}: The argument was, that more time would drag on. And that, in the end, nothing would happen. And at some point the whole process had to be brought —

Hans Blix: Ah. Right.

James Naughtie: — to a conclusion.

If you’d had more time, what would have happened, do you think?

Hans Blix: Ah. Well, we would in particular have gone for more interviews.

When we began interviewing, we had people resisting. They insisted upon having tape recorders, or minders present. And we resisted that. We never did such an interview. And they gave way. And we had more and more people who came for interviews without these things.

And I think that having got all the lists of the people who were present — who they said were present — in 1991, at the destruction of weapons, we would have gone through those lists.

Now even that, of course, I’m aware that one has to be a little cautious. Because, because interviewing people in a totalitarian country will always be a little problematic. Even if they don’t have tape recorders on the table, you can have bugs on the wall. And they could be scripted.

Nevertheless, interviewing a very large number of people, through professionals whom we would have available, I think that in the large number there could also have been chances to feel your way towards what was true.

Hans Blix {0:17}: Now if, in fact, they had destroyed them in 1991, and did not have any records of that, then it would indeed have been difficult for them, to prove, that they destroyed them.

Except through the witnesses.

And that’s why I’m coming back to the interest we had in pursuing interviews.”

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), interviewed in New York City from London, June 5 2003, by James Naughtie (BBC Radio 4, Today, June 6 2003) {extended audio 17:28, broadcast audio 9:47}.

 

“ Hans Blix: I made it clear that I would welcome more time for inspections.

And I was asked:

“How long time would you need?”

And to that I answered {video 1:01}:

“It is not a question weeks.

Nor a question of years.

It is a question of months.”

And I also said that we — like many members of the Council — the inspectors did not want to have inspections going on forever. That was a clear thing.

Now how long—

What would have been the dream scenario, as it were?

Well, I think—

First of all the resolution that was adopted, the Draconian one, adopted in the autumn of 2002, did not suggest that the end would come in March of 2003.

We were there for only three and a half months. And, although we could not give a clean bill of health — certainly not — nevertheless, there were never any denials of access. So the inspections worked much better.

And, what the Europeans and others were saying, mainly, was that:

“We want to see a little more, a period more of this.” ...

And we could have gone on, in April and May, in 2003. And we could have gone to all the sites that intelligence had given us.

And there wouldn’t have been found anything.

And I’m sure that the intelligence would have been somewhat impressed by that. Because they had—

Very many of their sites came from defectors. And they would then have realized this was not true. That the information they had was not exact.

That could have impacted upon the U.S. and the U.K. governments.

Christiane Amanpour: So, in scenario one: Several more months. Lots of access. No doors closed to you. You declare definitively that there are no weapons of mass destruction.

Hans Blix: Well, I’m not sure that we would have declared that there were no—

Christiane Amanpour: Well, what would it have taken? What would the Iraqis have had to do to get you to declare there were none?

Hans Blix: Ah. You see, there was always the problem, of proving the negative. As we said. How can you prove that in this room there is not a tennis ball? Or something.

That’s, that’s the problem. As the Iraqis often said. And I agreed with them:

“No, that’s very difficult for you to prove, “There is no anthrax in Iraq.” How do you prove that?” ...

And the Iraqis then complained. And I said:

“Yes. You have a point. It is very difficult for you to do that. And I don’t think you can prove the negative. But you can make it plausible. You can make it probable.” ...

But eventually, we said:

“If you don’t have any documents, if you really have destroyed them, at least you must have people, who were handling this in the past. Let us talk to these people.”

And by the end, they came, with a long list of people, whom they said:

“Yes. These people took part in the destruction of the chemical and biological weapons in 1991.”

And we started some interviews. But we didn’t get very far before the whole thing was over. It was too late.”

Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video, audio (at 38:10 minutes)

 

Mr. Kay: Well, Senator Clinton, let me just add to that.

We have had a number of Iraqis who have come forward and said:

“We did not tell the U.N. about what we were hiding. Nor would we have told the U.N., because we couldn’t — we would run the risk of our own”.

I think we have learned things that no U.N. inspector would have ever learned, given the terror regime of Saddam and the tremendous personal consequences that scientists had to run by speaking the truth.

That’s not to say — and it’s not incompatible with the fact — that inspections accomplished a great deal, in holding a program down.

And that’s where the surprise is. In— In holding the program down, and keeping it from break-out, I think the record is better than we would have anticipated.

I don’t think the record is necessarily better than we thought with regard to getting the final truth, because of the power of the terrorist state that Saddam Hussein had. {p.23}

Sen. Clinton: Thank you.

Sen. Warner: Senator, that question you raised is an important one. And our witness addressed it and gave his views about the resources.

But I would withhold any final judgment on that issue until we have before this committee General Dayton and General Abizaid.

I talked with General Dayton two weeks ago extensively about this issue. He has a somewhat different perspective than our distinguished witness. And as recently as last night, I talked to General Abizaid. And he likewise has, respectfully, a different view.

But there is one point that you all concur on, and that is, there came a time in that fall period when we were losing brave soldiers — death, wounded, and otherwise — and General Abizaid felt that he had to call upon some of your people, who had capabilities, and who indeed were on an ongoing basis contributing intelligence from your work to the war, of trying to stop the insurrection in Iraq.

Mr. Kay: Senator Warner, as you understand, competing priorities are the hardest choice that a military commander or others have to make. What most people don’t understand but I know you do, is how genuinely short we are, as a nation, of people with certain limited capabilities.

For example, intelligence officers who speak Arabic. There are more people in this room, or there were at the beginning, than we have in the intelligence community who are actually case officers who speak Arabic.

Ah. That’s not a surprise. The committee’s— Senator— The Intelligence Committee has addressed it before.

The fact is, we’ve done a very poor job of addressing it.

And like I say, I have no anger or bitterness about it. It was simply a fact of life. We peeled resources away.

Sen. Warner. But I think you also concurred that the urgency of the loss of life and limb—

Mr. Kay: Absolutely.

Sen. Warner. —amongst the coalition forces dictated bringing together, quickly, such resources as he could, to try and stem the tide of that loss.

Mr. Kay: That was certainly General Abizaid’s judgment.

Sen. Warner. And I thank you.

I’ll go vote. And colleague, I will tell—

Sen. Sessions: Mr. Chairman, if you’re going to go vote, I’m not safe staying {chuckles}.

Sen. Warner. Well.

Sen. Sessions: As long as you’re here, I know they won’t call that vote.

Sen. Warner. I realize that. But I’ll guarantee you’re going to be protected.

Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL):  I’ll just be brief.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know that—

I think everybody on this committee believed that there was weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Very few doubted it. {p.24}

And I remember very distinctly, the most tough questioner on that was Chairman Warner. And he would ask every major witness:

“When this war is over, are you going to find weapons of mass destruction there?”

I believe he did it a half a dozen times.

Note: This is not the question Abizaid said he asked. But no question could elicit an informed response from his uninformed staff, merely the hearsay opinions of others (unless they knew of U.S. lies).  CJHjr

General Abizaid recently testified that, after he was asked that question, he went back to CentCom, called all his staff officers in, and said:

“Senator Warner asked me this, and are we going to find it?”

And everyone told him that they would.

So, I don’t feel like there’s any deliberate activities here, that would indicate that the president, or somebody, is trying to manipulate intelligence.

 

Query:And everyone told him that they would”?

My, My.

Is Senator Jeff Sessions entitled to rely upon the speculations, hearsay, and locker-room bravado of CentCom staff officers? Who contradict their own experts and the informed findings of UN inspectors? Or, instead, is such reliance reckless negligence?

 

Query: Is Senator John Warner entitled to question witnesses about what he knows they don’t know? Are those witnesses entitled to conceal their ignorance? Is Senator Warner entitled to transform a Senate hearing into a propaganda theater? For staging fictional dramatic illusions? From a chorus of ignorant officials? Proclaiming the certain truth?

And were these dramas staged? As “deliberate activities”? To deceive the public? And his skeptical colleagues?  CJHjr

 

In fact, I felt, always, that the strongest argument for taking military action was the fact that the war of ’91 really never ended.

We were shooting at the Iraqis. They were—

Dropping bombs on them.

They were shooting at our planes.

They were in violation of U.N. resolutions.

They had promised to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, as part of that ’91 agreement, for stop the American attack on Baghdad.

And they didn’t comply with that.

 

Query:They didn’t comply”?

Is Senator Jeff Sessions disputing David Kay, Hussein Kamal, and the U.N. inspectors, and claiming Iraq did not destroy its banned weapons? Exactly as it agreed to do? And mostly in July and August 1991?

Or is this just the mindless cant, and rant, of an indoctrinated True Believer of U.S. official deceit?

Or is he an acolyte, in that cult of deceivers? To bolster their prestige? Willingly, or negligently?  CJHjr

 

And there were pressure in the world to quit embargoing the people of Iraq.

They were suffering.

And we had to make a decision.

Were we going to allow them to not comply with the agreement they made to end that war?

Allow them to be free to build weapons of mass destruction, and threaten the neighborhood?

Or were we going to act on the U.N. resolutions?

 

Query:We”?

“ Hans Blix: It’s the Security Council that is party to the ceasefire, not the U.K. and U.S. individually. And therefore it is the Council, that has ownership of the ceasefire, in my interpretation. ... And I think one must argue that individual countries cannot proceed on the basis of such a resolution.”

Hans Blix, March 5 2004, March 7 2004 {video 9:26}

 

Query:Did those resolutions have any value at all”? Obviously not. The U.S. and U.K. defied the resolution they agreed to obey:— To permit inspectors to dispel doubt about Iraq’s WMD.

CJHjr

Did those resolutions have any value at all.

But anyway—

So the president, I think, could have justified action on that basis, had he chose to.

I think that indicates to me he clearly believed there were weapons of mass destruction there. Or he could have used other arguments.

I guess, Dr. Kay, your view is that Saddam Hussein, in his own mind, had expansionistic intentions with regard to the world, and that he felt that the possession — or threat — of weapons of mass destruction enhanced that ability to be a powerful force in the region.

Isn’t that correct?

Mr. Kay: Absolutely right, Senator. I think he—

Both in the region, and he thought of them as a potential weapon to use against his own citizens to enforce compulsion and agreement. I mean, the Kurds and the Shi'a were threats to Saddam. And he recognized them. And he had used chemical weapons.

Sen. Sessions: Now I noticed that—

I believe at one point you noted, that even his own military officers believed they had them. In other words, they would think—

Mr. Kay: That someone else had them.

Sen. Sessions: So, would you explain that?

Mr. Kay: Well, in interviewing the Republican Guard generals, and Special Republican Guard generals, and asking about their capabilities and having them, the assurance was, they didn’t personally have them, and hadn’t seen them, but the units on their right or left had them.

And as you worked the way around the circle — those defending Baghdad, which is the immediate area of concern — you’ve got this very strange phenomena of:

“No, I don’t have them. I haven’t seen them. But look to my right and left.”

This was an intentional ambiguity.

And realize, freedom of discussion and movement was not something encouraged in Iraq. {p.25}

For example, Republican Guard divisions never entered into the city limits of Baghdad. Only the SRG was allowed to. You didn’t even train in multidivisional units, because of that issue, of his concern about them.

It’s a—

It was a powerful deception technology:

“We have it. But we haven’t seen it. But we know that someone else has it.”

Sen. Sessions: And it is true — I think, no one can dispute — that had he not had these weapons of mass destruction, and had opened his country, and plainly demonstrated it, this war would have been avoided.

Mr. Kay: Yes, I think that’s true.

 

Query: What “weapons”?

There are no weapons.

 

Query: Saddam didn’t “open his country”?

What on earth can you be talking about? How else can you describe the most intrusive arms inspection in the history of the world?  CJHjr:

 

“ Hans Blix: No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found ... we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance. ...”

Hans Blix, March 7 2003

 

... which U.S. officials, therefore, had good reason to fear would dispel all lingering doubt, if they didn’t bring inspections to an abrupt end, to preserve their corrupt pretense for war.  CJHjr

 

“ Hans Blix: In the last month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons ... who took part in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons, and proscribed missiles in 1991. ...

There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also found. Samples have been taken. ... In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results.

Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. ...

With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. ...

What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January.”

Hans Blix, UNMOVIC, March 7 2003

 

“ Demetrius Perricos: 13.  Eight intact R-400 bombs were recovered, together with components from 96 additional bombs of the same type ... subsequent laboratory analysis ... revealed evidence of fragments of the DNA of Bacillus anthracis and of the chemical compounds Iraq used to neutralize the biological agent.”

Demetrius Perricos, UNMOVIC, Feb. 27 2004

 

And that’s one, always been one of the mysteries for all of us to determine:

How—

Why {chuckles} would he have run this risk, that cost him his regime, and the death of members of his family, if he didn’t have those weapons?

Query: I don’t see that your mind plays any role in your behavior, Mr. Sessions. You certainly aren’t paying attention. And your complicity — willingly, or negligently — is what the President and his circle depend upon.

CJHjr

Sen. Sessions: That was certainly, I think, on the heart and mind of the members of Congress.

We just felt that it was so impossible they didn’t exist.

Now, as your investigation went about, it strikes me that there hasn’t — in the, in the time building up to this final initiation of military action — that the Iraqi individuals, who may have been involved in weapons of mass destruction, knew that their programs were the target of this action, and that they were in violation of U.N. resolutions.

And isn’t it true they, they could have seen themselves as being subject to prosecution for war crimes?

Mr. Kay: Ah, absolutely. And a number of those in custody are worried about that greatly. It’s one reason they’re not talking.

Sen. Sessions: So not being unclever, they would know and would have a real incentive to destroy every evidence that they had anything to do with weapons of mass destruction.

So we could realistically expect many of the documents, that would have shown all these actions, are no longer in existence?

Mr. Kay: That’s right, Senator. And that’s why I referred to the—

There’s probably a level of unresolvable ambiguity we’re going to have to learn to live with, about this program.

Sen. Sessions: And, uh, how—

I would just add, if you would like to comment.

I think—

You indicated the intelligence community has made mistakes, in your opinion, and missed much with regard to the ideas about Iraq.

Query:Wise leader”? In 1939, when Adolph Hitler announced that Poland had just attacked Germany, you would consider him a “wise leader,” Mr. Sessions, if he ignored, preempted, and attacked in the teeth of contrary findings by inspectors?  CJHjr

I think it’s wise, that a wise leader in this country — he has different groups of intelligence agencies — really try to find out what each is saying. To personally interview the, as close as he can to, the people that are involved. And to make sure that he is getting the nuances from different groups.

Do you think the vice president, or other administration leaders, should be criticized for talking with individual intelligence agencies? As they try to make a decision about whether or not to go to war?

Mr. Kay: {Chuckles} Absolutely not. In fact, Senator Sessions, uh, you know, as, as—

It’s—

I won’t say, “funny”.

It’s one of these strange things that, for those of us inside, worry—

I’ve had analysts complain that no one talked to them. And then analysts who are talked to complain.

Look, analysts are not generally shrinking — good ones — shrinking violets. They know the difference between people. They’re used to being questioned closely. They should be questioned closely. And they are.

And that’s why I think—

I’ve never met an analyst who felt — in this case with {p.26} regard to these set of issues — that there was any inappropriate pressure.

And in most cases, they would love to have been questioned more. Certainly by the vice president, or the president, or anyone else. That’s their profession. That’s what they—

Sen. Sessions: They long for the opportunity to talk to someone in authority.

Mr. Kay: That’s what they do.

Sen. Sessions: And, I thought it was odd, that the vice president was criticized, for going over on a Saturday morning, and sitting down with really true people involved in this, and asking their opinions.

I just don’t think that was a legitimate criticism.

 

“ Who was in the room with him? Who was there? Were there people from all of the key agencies? Were there people from just one or two intelligence agencies?”

Daryl Kimball (Executive Director, Arms Control Association), Feb. 3 2004, referring to Colin Powell’s 3-day visit to the CIA, excluding his skeptical intelligence officers, preparing for his U.N. speech, on Feb. 5 2003.

 

Thank you.

Sen. Roberts:  It is my distinct pleasure, serving as the acting presiding chairman, to recognize Senator Reed for any comments he might wish to make.

 

Senator Jack Reed (D-RI): Thank you.

Dr. Kay, let me also commend you, not only for your service, but for your integrity. We appreciate your being here today.

“ No terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people than the regime of Saddam Hussein and Iraq."”

Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), Sept. 19 2002 {83kb.pdf}

In your discussion with Tom Brokaw, you were asked about the nature of the threat posed by Iraq. And Mr. Brokaw said:

“But an imminent threat to the United States?”

And your response was:

“Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment.”

Now, what does that mean?

Does that mean that when you’re presented with analysis from — in fact, conflicting analysis — that the president can impose a political calculation?—

Mr. Kay: Senator Reed—

Sen. Reed: —Particularly a president that seems to have a very preconceived notion of the threat? In Iraq?

Mr. Kay: Senator Reed, it means that any president, when he’s presented with intelligence, has got to make a choice about how much risk he’s prepared to run for the nation that he leads.

It is my belief that regardless of political party, after 9/11, the shadowing effects of that horrible tragedy changed, as a nation, the level of risk that all of us are prepared to run, that we would like to avoid. And—

But where you place yourself on that spectrum — of how much risk you’re going to run — is a political responsibility, which elected officials have, and I certainly don’t have.

And so I think, fundamentally, that’s why, in a democracy, we elect people like you — and we elect a president — to make those determinations. It’s not a fixed point that is ever going to be carved as pi’s constant. It is:

“What’s the world look like, and how much risk will I run?”

Sen. Reed: But also, Doctor, that judgment has to be logically, related to the evidence you have before you.

And like so many — and I think you, too — there was a supposition that perhaps this Saddam had chemical or biological {p.27} weapons — less credibility in claims about having nuclear weapons or a nuclear program.

And in fact, you know, not just my conclusion but many people concluded similarly, that — despite that assumption — that there was not an imminent threat to the United States.

That wasn’t just a political judgment.

That was looking at the facts that were presented by the intelligence community, even if they were flawed, and making a judgment based on those facts.

Mr. Kay: Senator Reed, I think it’s often easy to forget that in the case of Saddam, here’s an individual who had invaded two neighboring countries, used chemical weapons against one of those, used them against his own neighbors, and who, by U.N. testimony, had cheated and lied for a decade.

 

Query:Lied for a decade”?

Iraq lied for 4 years that they ever had biological weapons.

In July 1995 (before Hussein Kamal defected, on August 8th), they disclosed that weapons program, and showed where it had been chemically deactivated, and buried in 1991, before inspections ever began.

This is not “lied for a decade”.

And, it’s not lies about existing weaponsCJHjr

 

So I mean, as I look back on the evidence, I understand the decision, while honoring the right of any elected leader to choose how much risk he’s prepared to run. And that’s what I mean by that.

I don’t think it’s something that is a physics constant, that you can just pull out of a table.

 

Query: What “evidence”?

Query: What “risk”?

There was “no reliable information” of banned weapons (DIA).

Was it to create the perception of risk — where none existed — that George W. Bush, and his circle, decided to make untrue unequivocal assertions of unassailable fact?

Because the decision about risk and offensive war is a decision the Constitution prohibits the President to take?

And he conspired to lie to those with authority to take it? (Congress).

To trick them?

To deceive them?

To give them the excuse they wanted?

To vote for war?  CJHjr

 

“ The Court is not prepared to read out of the Constitution the clause granting to the Congress, and to it alone, the authority “to declare war”.”

Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C., Dec. 13 1990) (emphasis added)

 

Sen. Reed: Dr. Kay, you also were quoted — and Senator Kennedy referred to it —

Query:Abused by the intelligence”? The President? Poor baby. And the 20,000 innocent Iraqis the President ordered to be killed? On the pretense of that intelligence? And the maybe 20,000 he maimed and wounded?

“I think if anyone was abused by the intelligence, it was the president of the United States, rather than the other way around.”

Are you suggesting that the president was misled by the American intelligence community?

Mr. Kay: No, sir. What I’m suggesting is that the actual facts on the ground will turn out to be substantially different, at least with regard to large stockpiles, than the estimate before, and that we better understand why that’s true.

There are other reasons and other things about Iraq to be concerned with. And certainly, I think Iraq, if you look back at its history of using these weapons, the fact that they remained in violation of 1441, and all of those facts are provable.

But with regard to the actual existing weapons, which people keep coming back to, because they are the most demonstrable symbol of the threat, reality is very likely going to turn out to be different than the estimates.

Sen. Reed: Dr. Kay, you used the term “abused” by the intelligence.

Mr. Kay: That’s right. I think if — if —

Sen. Reed: He was misled?

Mr. Kay: If I were your broker and you were investing on my advice — a course I would not advise you to do — and at the end of the day, I said Enron was the greatest company in the world, and you had lost a substantial amount of money on it, because it turned out that they—, you would think I had abused you.

I think the estimate is going to turn out to be different than reality.

That’s abuse, as far as I’m concerned.

Sen. Reed: Well, part of the intelligence process, as I understand it, is not only the presentation of evidence and analysis by the agencies, but the probing questioning of leaders, decision-makers.

Particularly when the evidence is not totally reconciled.

Do you think that those probing questions were made?

Particularly since so many people in the administration had preconceived notions about the nature of the threat? {p.28}

 

“ Hans Blix: What failed here, and what was missing, was something a university should realize.

Namely, critical thinking.

If you write the thesis, on a subject, at university, it’s submitted. And you have some opponent, from the faculty, or other. And they examine what you do. If you go to a court, again, you have a witness, and you have cross-examination.

But here, in the relation between intelligence and the policy-making levels, you did not have that.

The intelligence came with their very simple question-marks. And then the political leaders, they wanted to come to the conclusion.

So they took away the question-marks, and they put exclamation-marks, instead.

Christiane Amanpour: So it was hyped.

Hans Blix: Yes.”

Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video, audio (at 33 minutes), accord, Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, p.263

 

Mr. Kay: Senator Reed, I was not party to that. I hope in whatever process a review is going on, that the full record is out there.

I will just say, I’m convinced myself, if I had been there, presented what I have seen as the record of the intelligence estimates, I probably would have come to — not probably — I would have come to the same conclusion that the political leaders did.

Sen. Reed: Dr. Kay, is North Korea today a “gathering serious threat”?

Mr. Kay: North Korea is an enigma probably with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. I would probably put it higher up on my scale of gathering threat. I think it’s a existing threat.

Sen. Reed: And we are approaching North Korea with the same deeply flawed intelligence community that abused the president of the United States?

Mr. Kay: I have no knowledge of whether we’re approaching it with the same — in a case where the reality will turn out to be different from the estimate. I just don’t know. I think that’s an appropriate question for you and others to ask.

Sen. Reed: Dr. Kay, the U.N. inspectors were readmitted into Iraq for a brief period of time.

Had they been allowed to continue their mission, with adequate support, would they have likely reached the same conclusion you have?

“ We ... told them the truth,” said al-Saeed ... who oversaw stockpiles of the deadly nerve agent VX ... “To the best of my knowledge, there are no weapons of mass destruction. They were either destroyed by U.N. inspectors, or unilaterally by Iraq, years ago.”

Alaa al-Saeed,  
Dec. 9 2003 {copy}

Mr. Kay: All I can say is that among an extensive body of Iraqi scientists who are talking to us, they have said:

“The U.N. interviewed us. We did not tell them the truth. We did not show them this equipment. We did not talk about these programs. We couldn’t do it as long as Saddam was in power.”

I suspect regardless of how long they had stayed, that attitude would have been the same.

Sen. Reed: Just one final point, because my time has expired.

I do recollect that there were some missiles destroyed, because of their either disclosure or discovery by these inspectors, which suggested — you know, another data point. We seldom remember that, too. Remember that despite —

Mr. Kay: Oh, absolutely. That’s true.

Sen. Reed: So that there was degree of cooperation and degree of success. Perhaps not as conclusive as yours. But that was happening.

Is that correct?

Mr. Kay: It wasn’t cooperation.

This was a case of the Samoud-2 missile, which had been, even under UNSCOM days, a source of dispute with regard to its range.

They continued to develop it after the inspectors left in 1998.

By the time the U.N. was readmitted — and there actually existed Samoud-2s — there was no way you could contend that that was shorter than 150 kilometers.

And, in fact, destruction had begun of those missiles.

That’s correct.

 

Query: This isn’t cooperation?:

“ Hans Blix: In the latest update of the semi-annual monitoring declarations, Iraq has declared that in 13 flight tests of the Al Samoud the missile has exceeded the permitted range. The greatest range achieved was 183 kilometres.

__________

 

Hans Blix: ... a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km. ... We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km. ...

__________

 

Hans Blix: Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision.”

Hans Blix, UNMOVIC, Report, Dec. 19 2002, Report, Jan. 27 2003, Report, March 7 2003.

 

“ The scrapping of the Al Samoud 2 missiles made headway: 70 of them have now been destroyed.”

Joschka Fischer (German Foreign Minister), U.N. Security Council, March 19 2003.

 

Sen. Reed: My time has expired.

Thank you, Dr. Kay.

Sen. Warner: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Roberts. {p.29}

 

Senator Pat Roberts (R-KA): Yes, thank you very much.

Sen. Warner. I — by way of introduction, Senator Roberts — say that I feel that you and the committee that you lead are making a lot of progress towards coming to a body of fact, putting it together, that will help not only members of Congress but others trying to have a better understanding of this situation.

Sen. Roberts: I thank the chairman.

And I would hope you would write a personal note to Senator Kennedy and Senator Levin, maybe indicate that as well.

Dr. Kay, thank you for your service. And thanks to the membership of the ISG team that you led. You have earned our respect.

We’ve repeated that in the Intelligence Committee, where you appeared as of this morning for two hours.

That was classified and closed. We won’t get into that.

But, I want to assure you one thing.

There is an outside investigation taking place, under the jurisdiction of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which is our jurisdiction and our obligation.

This involves 10 staffers working 24/7 on floor-to-ceiling documents, having interviewed over 175 people, analysts and critics, and everybody else that wants to come in.

And we take that job very seriously. And we are progressing. And I think that when members finally get the draft, the first draft, of the working paper, many of these questions will be answered.

And I personally take some umbrage at people who, for one reason or another, think we need to have an outside investigation, before our inquiry is even complete.

As a matter of fact, we had a memo, that came out several months ago, indicating conclusions, before we even finished the inquiry.

So, I have some strong feelings about that.

In response to Senator Levin, and in reference to the Intelligence Committee inquiry, the draft inquiry report is complete. It will be available to members next Thursday, for their study and their perusal. And it’s going to take some time. Because you have to wade through this. And it’s very voluminous.

And hopefully, during that week, they will become educated. And many of these questions will be answered.

As I said, we interviewed 175 analysts and critics, and some policymakers, and others. And, like your analysts at the ISG, not one said that they were intimidated, or coerced, or that their product was somehow manipulated.

Every statement referred to by Senator Levin, with regard to the administration officials, was a reflection of what was provided by the intelligence community.

I mean, why would you do otherwise?

The reason that the vice president apparently keeps referring to the trailers as mobile labs is that that is the view of the CIA as I speak.

It’s on the CIA Web page.

It is a part of the National Intelligence Estimate. Which is provided to the vice president, and the National Security Council, and the president.

That’s what the CIA believes. Right now.

A very clear paragraph. It goes into very specific reasons as to why they think that this is a mobile lab.

Now, as you pointed out, there are other points of view.

That’s always the case in regards to, I guess, intelligence. {p.30}

 

 

Query:As I speak”? “Right now”?

Senator Pat Roberts, his bold assertion, of certain knowledge, about “what the CIA believes right now”—

Is he exemplifying the very deceit he’s supposedly investigating? A preview of deceit in his forthcoming report? That a faulty, out-of-date, estimate is valid? Or does he have an honest and reasonable basis for his ignorance?:

 

“ There is no consensus within our intelligence community today over whether the trailers were for that use ... mobile biological warfare agent production ... or if they were used for the production of hydrogen.”

George J. Tenet (CIA Director), “Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Speech at Georgetown University, Feb. 5 2004) (transcript {pf}, as prepared).

In his speech, George Tenet continued to conceal that the men who made these actual trailers said {pf} {copy} they made them to produce hydrogen for artillery balloons, just like the equipment Iraq bought from Britain in the 1980s, and used in the Iran-Iraq war. Presumably they have plans, and explained how the trailers work. So too the British Marconi company (now AMS), who sold Iraq the Artillery Meteorological System (AMets), from which these trailers were supposedly reversed-engineered.

If Pat Roberts also decides to conceal this material evidence, from his report to Congress, then he will be lying to Congress, a prima facie crime under U.S. law (18 U.S.C. § 1001).

CJHjr

 

By the way, this National Intelligence Estimate was mandated, by Senator Graham and Senator Durbin, in 60 — uh, err, uh — in 30 days.

And so, to some extent, I believe part of the problem is, it became a dump, if you will — and I don’t mean to use that as a pejorative — of all past intelligence, which you have indicated, most of us think was on a train that was moving.

Query:Throughout the world”? Not France. Not Germany. Not Russia. Not the U.N. inspectors. Who?

And that train just kept moving. And it was very difficult to change the direction of the opinion of virtually every intelligence community all throughout the world.

I think the draft report, again, will answer all of the Senator’s questions.

You recently have been quoted in the press, as has been said, as saying that “the intelligence community owes the president” an explanation, about what went wrong with their analysis.

You also said:

“It’s not a political issue”.

(Well, it is, but it shouldn’t be).

“It’s an issue of the capabilities of one’s intelligence service to collect valid and truthful information.”

What do you think went wrong? Both in the collection and the analysis of intelligence? You have already touched on this.

Have you seen any evidence through your discussions with the intelligence community analysts — or officials over at the DCI — that the intelligence community recognizes that all of the intelligence and their analysis was so wrong?

Any admission on that part?

And do you have any thoughts on what should be done to fix these problems?

And I am really interested in your commentary on the dots.

Prior to 9/11, if you had 10 dots to connect, you had to connect eight or nine of them, to at least have a report, and a threat-warning, out there.

After 9/11 — so that we wouldn’t be risk-averse — if you connected two or three dots, and you didn’t report, you were really in trouble.

So the {chuckles} the intelligence community can’t have it, you know, both ways.

First, we really criticize them for saying, “Wait, wait, wait, wait” until you have the appropriate jigsaw puzzle in place, that you can really read the intelligence.

After 9/11, why, we have a situation, say, if you have two or three of the dots connected, why, then, you’re criticized as well.

Now that’s a speech, not a question.

But if you have any thoughts on this, I would appreciate hearing from you.

Mr. Kay: No, I think the appropriate thing, Senator Roberts, would be to concur {chuckles}.

No, I—

Sen. Roberts: I appreciate that.

But what went wrong?

Both in the collection and the analysis of intelligence?

You have touched on that.

Mr. Kay: Senator Roberts, you’re far more likely, having done — as you quite rightly have pointed out — a far more exhaustive study than I have had the opportunity. I have been on the sharp end of the stick, out there.

I think, it will turn out, that we will find, that there were major shortfalls in collection.

 

Query:Collection”?

We were unable to “collect” the information the U.N. inspectors handed to us? And which we decided to ignore and disregard?

Analysts don’t ignore and disregard reliable, first-hand, information.

Was it a political decision? To disregard this valuable information? Made by a criminal conspiracy? A cabal of violent criminal liars? Whose carefully-laid plans were rapidly disintegrating? As the U.N. inspectors disproved their assertions? One-by-one? As the days ticked-by?

CJHjr

 

As a nation — and this really goes back over 20 years — we decided to concentrate most of our intelligence resources on technical collection. We got better definition from space. Ah—

There is only so much you can see, when you’re looking at judgments of this sort.

And we’re particularly bad about understanding societal trends.

I think we will, in the end, when the appropriate historian comes around, be able to say that, somewhere after 1998, the social glue that held Iraq together had been corrosively destroyed by Saddam Hussein. That it had become the ultimate criminal terrorist conspiracy, internally.

And that’s one reason we’re having such great difficulty — and our troops are having such great difficulty — putting it back together again.

It’s not just the number of troops there. It’s that the glue that holds people together in a relationship, that allows cooperation, was destroyed by Saddam Hussein.

 

Query:Glue”?

You mean, like:— A job {pf}? A salary? A workplace which hasn’t been looted? Family and friends which haven’t been killed, or disappeared {ditto, ditto}? By an unaccountable military force? An evening out? Without being gunned-down by soldiers? A government free of international bank-defrauding {copy, copy} prima facie criminal liars? With their private black-shirt army? Appointed by a complicit U.S. military dictatorship, to do its bidding? A homeland free of permanent foreign military bases? National oil revenues spent on health {pf}, education, welfare — not raked-off to foreign looters?

Is this the sort of glue you’ve got in mind?  CJHjr

 

Just as the infrastructure was destroyed.

But you know, that turns out to be one of the hardest things for intelligence services to read.

As you recall, we got it wrong in World War II.

And it was the very famous Strategic Bombing Survey

All the intelligence leading up through the end of World War II said, the bombing campaign was destroying the German will to fight. The civilians were less willing. And the German war production was falling.

As it turned out, afterwards, the German will to fight increased under the bombing. And the war production went up till the last two months of the war — it was still increasing.

In the case of the Soviet Union—

Well—

Skip Vietnam.

But similar estimates, about societal determination, and economy, turned out to be wrong.

 

Query:Skip Vietnam”?

You mean:

  Skip the accurate intelligence the CIA successfully collected?

  And skip their accurate estimate? Which turned out to be right?: That “possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader”?

  And skip that reason, the U.S. defiled its honor, its integrity, its citizens, and its formal written promise {copy}, to ensure a nationwide election in July 1956 {copy}?:

“The United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this.”

  And skip the “societal determination” of the people of Vietnam, to unify their single country? Which we decided to pretense was two?

  And skip our violent criminal war-of-aggression? To stop them electing the government of their choice? “To determine their own future”?

  And skip the 40,994 non-combatant civilians, targeted and murdered in cold blood, one-by-one, by the CIA and DoD, in their criminal Phoenix Program?

  And skip the 3-million Vietnamese we killed in combat? Mostly civilians?

  And skip the dioxin poison we left behind? A Satanic weapon of mass destruction, killing and deforming them still?

It’s little wonder, you want to “skip Vietnam”.  CJHjr

 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, what had looked like a 10-foot power turned out to be an economy that barely existed. And a society that had horrible levels of human health problems, of lack of education and all, leading to the current situation.

It is a fundamental issue that we have — all intelligence services have had — understanding that.

And yet, in many ways, it turns out to probably be far more important than counting trailers.

And yet, we’ve invested in counting trailers, as opposed to understanding the other.

I think in—

I am convinced that we have sadly underfunded and developed our human intelligence capability.

We have genuinely become risk-adverse. And looked at ways that will not put Americans either at political or human risk, as being spies.

And tried to do it on the cheap, using others.

I think there will turn out to be trade-craft problems, that you probably have already identified — and I haven’t had the advantage of reading your report — that are out there, that you’ll — that need to be looked at.

And the last one, which you referred to—

We put the analysts under tremendous pressure. And the tendency is to overanalyze limited data.

There is a point where an analyst simply needs to tell people:

“I can’t draw a conclusion. I don’t have enough data. Go get me more data.”

But in the wake of 9/11, believe me, that is difficult to do.

It’s always been difficult. But it is much more difficult now.

Sen. Roberts: I thank you for your candor and service.

My time is expired.

But I would say, that we are constantly having these “Oh my God” hearings on the Intelligence Committee:

“Oh my God, how did this happen?”

And you go back to the USS Cole. And you go back to the Khartoum chemical plant. You go back to the India nuclear test. You go back to Khobar towers. You go back to the Belgrade bombing. And it goes on and on and on. Same kind of thing.

 

Query:Chemical” plant?

Does Senator Pat Roberts claim El-Shifa Pharmaceutical was manufacturing precursor chemicals for VX nerve agent? Or can’t he be bothered to trouble himself with such details? With the deceit of U.S. intelligence officials. Pardoned from the oversight of his committee? Or with the victims, of the violent iron fist of his fellow officers (August 20 1998, U.S. missiles). At a cradle of civilization far away. At the junction of the White Nile and the Blue Nile.

Millions of people pay close attention to such unlawful violence. And to the complicity of the U.S. Congress oversight committees. And of the whole Congress, in refusing to submit the United States to the rule of law and to grant jurisdiction to U.S. Courts to hear the claims for damages by the foreign victims of U.S. violence. Or to remedy those claims by legislating damage awards. And to the complicity of voters, who return these complicit Members of Congress to office.

They don’t forgive it. And they don’t forget it.

The stubborn refusal of U.S. Officers to admit wrongdoing in destroying that plant and killing its night watchman, and their stubborn refusal to submit to litigation in any court to resolve such controversies peaceably:— This is all the evidence anyone needs that the United States is grimly determined to continue its unlawful violent aggression. Without restraint, or accountability, by the rule of law. A violent rogue state. Justly hated. An international pariah. Which only force can deter. By violent international countermeasures. A last-resort species of self-defense.

CJHjr

 

And I hope—

We have to come up with better solutions on how to fix these problems that we have been referring to.

And I know that Senator Collins is waiting patiently.

So I yield back my time.

Sen. Warner: But we’re going to recognize Senator Dayton in between you.

Sen. Roberts: Oh, I’m sorry.

Sen. Warner. Thank you.

 

Senator Mark Dayton (D-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. {p.32}

Dr. Kay, I was, met you in July {switching-on his microphone}.

I met you in July, in our, in Baghdad. It was 115 degrees there. And we left after three days. And you stayed on.

And under those conditions, to persevere as you have, and with the veracity that you’ve shown in your report, and your candor here today, I would echo the others: Your service to our country has been not only patriotic but heroic.

And I thank you for that.

It seems to me, one of the traps that we may be falling into here — and I’m not an expert, so I ask you the question — is that we— we—

Are all weapons of mass destruction alike?

It would strike me intuitively they are not. And if we’re talking about biological capabilities, chemical capabilities, I would draw a line and say nuclear strikes me as something of a different order.

Conventional weapons:— Just about everything we put into the air, or on land, or in the water, these days, I would think constitutes a “weapon of mass destruction.”

Are we putting ourselves in a trap here?

Where anything, of any viability at all, starts to fall into that category?

 

“ Hans Blix: We talk about weapons of mass destruction. And that is a very poor concept. It sort of lumps together apples and pears, and mushrooms. ... Nuclear weapons are in a category by themselves. ... Chemical weapons are not generally weapons of mass destruction. They’re much more localized. And some of the biological weapons, are also, certainly not weapons of mass destruction. Anthrax is not epidemic. Some of them are epidemic.

So it lumps together a number of weapons that you really should treat separately. They pose different dangers. Some of them, more like terrorist weapons.”

Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video, audio (at 34:45 minutes)

 

Mr. Kay: It’s an important question, particularly as technology drives capabilities of even what formerly would been said “conventional weapons,” of capability to do mass disruption, at least, if not mass destruction.

The same thing is true in the cyber era. I mean, we have today an email worm spreading throughout the world, that is doing {chuckles} vast mass disruption, if not mass destruction. It may be doing that in some capabil—, in some areas.

So these old terms don’t serve us particularly well.

It’s one thing I hope to write about as I finish this.

Sen. Dayton: Which weapons of mass destruction qualify in that upper echelon of truly mass destruction?

Mr. Kay: Well, I think all of us have, uh, and would continue to put the nuclear weapons in a different category.

It’s a single weapon that can do tremendous damage, as opposed to multiple weapons that can do the same order of damage.

As you know, the fire bombing of Tokyo, in terms of number of people killed, was roughly equivalent to a single bomb in Nagasaki, but it took a lot more aircraft to do it.

So I still treat — and I think we should politically treat — nuclear as a difference.

 

Query:In terms of number of people killed”?

And in terms of the number of people tortured to death? Slowly? Over weeks and months? From lingering, ghastly, radiation poisoning? And blast radiation? Including distant rescuers, first-responders, who rushed to the scene to help, only to become infected themselves? With that slow inhumane death? Which only a Great Satan could conger to inflict?

And that?, constitutes “the same order of damage”?

Nuclear weapons are indeed in a different category.

But it’s not a “political” category.

It’s a “criminal” category.

Because it’s a war-crime, to inflict a lingering death, by unnecessary suffering.

And it’s a war-crime, to target a weapon which cannot be confined to a military target.

And its a war-crime to use weapons of poison. (Uranium, and its progeny, is a toxic chemical poison, as well as a death-dealing, DNA-mutating, alpha-beta-gamma radiation hazard).

As far as I know, there’s only one lawful target for a nuclear weapon: Entirely military, remote from civilians, unlikely to poison the surrounding environment, and likely to kill all combatants with the blast — not by lingering death. And that’s Diego Garcia, isolated, in the Indian Ocean.

Or, a warship, at sea.  CJHjr:

“ Hans Blix: If you drop a nuclear bomb on an aircraft carrier. Well that’s a military target. If you do it on the high sea. It’s conceivably possible.”

Hans Blix, March 17 2004

 

But I must say, the revolution in biology, some developments in cyber, I think we’re going to have a blurring, out there, of capabilities.

And that makes the control — and makes the intelligence problem — far more difficult to estimate.

Sen. Dayton: Would— It—

Just based on your general knowledge, how many countries do, would you say, in the world today, would qualify under the category of developing “weapons of mass destruction” and “related program activities”?

Or having such?

“Activities.”

Mr. Kay: Senator Dayton, I hesitate to give you an off-the-cuff number, because I know I’ll probably—

It’s going to be like the 85 percent. I’m going to have to live with it for longer than I want to.

Uh, I would say that, in the nuclear area, in addition to those that we know have, possess nuclear weapons, that includes India—

Sen. Dayton: I want to go to the vernacular that we’re using, this broader category we’re using— {p.33}

Mr. Kay: The broader category? Oh, I suspect you’re talking about, uh, probably, 50 countries that have—

Sen. Dayton: Fifty.

Mr. Kay: —programs that would fall somewhere in that broader vernacular.

Sen. Dayton: So, if we’re going to take-out those countries, or their governments, which are engaged in what we would call “weapons of mass destruction-related program activities{32kb.txt, 44kb.pdf, 32kb.txt, 60kb.pdf} {video 1:00:30}, we’re going to be cutting quite a world swath?

Mr. Kay: Well, Senator Dayton, I think you’re on to the issue. It’s not—

We no longer may be living in a world in which we can control capabilities.

Intentions are what are going to be important.

And quite frankly, that’s what made Saddam so dangerous, in my view. Here was an individual who had invaded his neighbors, used chemical weapons against one of them, and used them against the others. So, it was hard to have a benign interpretation of that individual’s intentions.

And the real challenge for intelligence is going to be giving to our political leaderships not just judgment about capabilities, but judgments about real intentions.

And that is tough.

Sen. Dayton: Mr. Chairman, I—

Well, I guess he’s left.

I will commend the chairman, even in his absence, for holding this hearing, and letting these answers, “the chips fall where they may.”

Because I think what we’re, at issue here is, is, goes way beyond politics or partisan advantage, one way or the other. This is about the survival of our country and the world as we know it.

And, I guess I would ask you, in the context of—

I’m assuming that our—

And I’m not on the Intelligence Committee. But I am impressed that they’re very dedicated men and women who are spending all of their lives trying their very, very best to come up with the answers to these very difficult questions and assessments.

Given the limits, as you say, which go both way — and Iraq may be less developed, and countries like Iran and Libya, further developed — what does that argue about the wisdom of a policy of preemptive strikes?

Mr. Kay: I don’t know about the wisdom, but it certainly argues about the difficulty, of doing it wisely. (Chuckles.)

Sen. Dayton: I guess it would strike me, that the—

And I hope—

Again, the chairman’s not here.

But I would hope we would hold a hearing, or two, here, about the success, it appears, with regard to Libya.

And the administration’s role and, I gather, the preceding administration’s role also, in secret negotiations, which have brought about a denuclearizing of that country, and that threat, which certainly sounds like it would qualify in the upper echelon, as you describe it.

And contrast that approach — and its success, without a loss of American life — in that country, to what has occurred in Iraq.

So, I hope we can look at both sides of this question.

And I will give the administration credit, wherever that case may be, for its successes.

But I also want to recognize the, I think, the grave risks, that this limitation of intelligence information, and its veracity, imposes on a doctrine that says we’re going to preemptively strike a country that we believe has things that we’ve now discovered, in this case, with the best of intentions — I’ll concede that — that they did not have.

My time is up.

But again, I thank you for your public service, sir. {p.34}

Mr. Kay: Thank you.

 

Senator Wayne Allard (R-CO): Since the chairman of the Armed Services Committee has had to go vote, I’ll go ahead and be chairman temporarily until he gets back.

In the meantime, it’s my turn to go ahead and talk to Dr. Kay, and visit with him, about some of the issues related to his duties.

First of all, I’m trying to think back, at the time our men and women were going into Iraq.

There was a lot of concern about that particular pont in time, about Iraqis having weapons of mass destruction.

Particularly, chemical weapons.

And, did you find evidence that there was chemical weapons there?

At the battlefield?

That perhaps maybe was not in large quantities?

But small quantities?

That would have been a decided threat to our men and women on the field?

Mr. Kay: Senator Allard, that’s really one of our immediate focuses, because both of the concern — and consequently the threat it posed to Americans — uh, but also because of the evidence—

We kept, as you will recall, discovering Iraqi defensive chemical gear, protective suits and all, as we moved across.

We have not found any chemical weapons that were present on the battlefield, even in small number.

Sen. Allard: So all we had is a history, of him having used chemicals — of weapons of mass destruction, using chemicals — because we knew about the Kurds, and where he had used chemicals in that particular instance.

Is that right?

Mr. Kay: No. I would not say it was just a history.

Sen. Allard: Uh-huh.

Mr. Kay: There was real reporting, that he had it — Iraqi defectors and others — that he had it. And ambiguous conversations overheard.

So it was more than a history.

It was reality.

 

Query: If it’s “reality,” where are the weapons?

 

Query:Ambiguous conversations”?

They don’t make “reality.”

 

Query:Defectors” and “others”?

They don’t make “reality.” Especially, if they’re ‘produced and directed’ by Ahmed Chalabi, the head of a prima facie criminal conspiracy of criminal liars.

 

Query: A possibility? Certainly.

A probability? Possibly.

A “reality”? Certainly not.  CJHjr

 

And, if you’ve ever had the opportunity to put one of the U.S. protective suits on, you realize the men and women you saw dressed up in those chemical suits, as they marched towards Baghdad, did that out of real fear, that he had chemical weapons. That was not because of political pressure. You don’t {chuckles} put those suits on out of political pressure. They’re too uncomfortable.

It was a genuine fear, based on the best available information, that was present at that time.

Sen. Allard: Yes.

I recall, about the time that our men and women were going into the field in Iraq, that also they discovered a nuclear disposal site.

If you recall that? They had that on TV? And they actually showed the barrels of nuclear waste?

Mr. Kay: Oh, yes. Okay, yes.

Sen. Allard: You recall that?

Mr. Kay: Yes, I do.

Sen. Allard: And what was the source of that nuclear material? Why was that there? And what was the source of that nuclear material?

Mr. Kay: There was a large amount of nuclear waste and material that the U.N. had purposely left there, as the Iraqi program was taken down. {p.35}

Sen. Allard: And that was after the Persian Gulf conflict, then?

Mr. Kay: That was after the Persian Gulf conflict.

What was removed was the direct-use material, that could have been used in a normal fission weapon.

On the other hand, there was a large amount of yellow cake. There was nuclear residue, highly radioactive sources. There was a large cesium source, a cobalt source, and others, that in fact had been stored away.

And I think the waste you’re referring to is of that.

Sen. Allard: Do we have any idea of the origin of that material?

Mr. Kay: The origin of most of that material is pretty well understood. The Iraqis both mined uranium of their own as well as imported uranium in the 1980s, from Africa.

There was also—

There had been—

Sen. Allard: What country in Africa would that come from?

Mr. Kay: Niger.

Sen. Allard: Niger?

Mr. Kay: Niger.

Sen. Allard: Uh-huh.

Mr. Kay: There also had been—

The French had provided reactor fuel, as had the Russians provided reactor fuel. And some of the waste probably had origins in that.

Sen. Allard: Mm-hmm.

Do we know when that nuclear program was brought down?

And when that material was stored in that waste site?

Mr. Kay: Yeah. We know very precisely, Senator. We started doing it in late 1991, and it continued, was almost complete by 1995, as material was moved out of Iraq, and was sealed, and was stored.

It’s very well documented. The International Atomic Energy Agency did a good job.

 

“ George Bush: Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program — weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance.”

George W. Bush, U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 12 2002 {pf} {4kb.txt, 37kb.pdf, copy} {video 26:54, bbc 26:40, audio 26:16}.

 

“ Mohamed ElBaradei {1:25}: After three months, of intrusive inspections, we have, to date, found no evidence, or plausible indication, of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme, in Iraq.”

Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA),  
Report to the U.N. Security Council, March 7 2003 {video 1:24:39, 19:05-36:49 (Elbaradei), at 33:24-34:40 (nuclear conclusion)}.

 

“ Dick Cheney: And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of the International Atomic Energy Agency and this kind of issue, especially where Iraq’s concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing.”

Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16 2003

 

Sen. Allard: Okay.

The National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Iraq could build its first nuclear weapon “when it acquired sufficient weapon-grade fissionable material”.

Did you think that conclusion was accurate?

Mr. Kay: Yes.

You have to realize, this was a country that had designed, and had gone through, a decade-long nuclear program. They knew the secrets.

But we took away—

The critical element in making a nuclear weapon — once you know the secrets, which they had, and they’d run a physical test — is the actual fissile material. It’s difficult, expensive, takes a fairly substantial footprint, to develop.

And the estimate — as I read that estimate, and I think all of us did who were concerned with it — is if they managed to acquire a sufficient amount of plutonium, or high enriched uranium, from a place like the former Soviet Union stockpile, how long would it take to fashion that into a nuclear explosive device?

And I think that estimate was actually fairly conservative.

Sen. Allard: Now, you ran over one part of your statement that I want to go back—

You said they actually ran a test?

On the material that they had there?

Right at the—

About the— {p.36}

Mr. Kay: Oh. With regard to nuclear material?

Sen. Allard: Yes.

Mr. Kay: Oh.

During the 1980s, they ran a number of tests, using both what were normal stimulants that you use in a physics experiment, as well as they had separated out a small quantity of plutonium. And they had some high enriched uranium they had been supplied in French fuel.

At the time of the first gulf war {1991}, we subsequently learned, they were taking the French fuel and trying to produce, fashion together, a crude nuclear explosion — explosive device — for which they had run experiments, understanding how much conventional explosions it would take to move the mass together.

They were good physicists.

 

“ Hussein Kamal: Before the Gulf War {1991} ... These were only studies. They had highly enriched uranium from France but it was under the IAEA safeguards. They also tried to make their own.... but had never reached a point close to testing. ... In the nuclear area, there were no weapons.”

Hussein Kamal (Hussein Kamel), Saddam’s son-in-law, defected to Jordan on August 8 1995, interviewed August 22 1995 by UNSCOM/IAEA, asserting destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in 1991, leaked and first reported February 24 2003 by John Barry, The Defector’s Secrets {copy, 58kb.pdf} (Newsweek, March 3 2003), U.N. Interview transcript, pages 4, 14 {979kb.pdf, 458kb.pdf, 458kb.pdf}.

 

Sen. Allard: Did they use the aluminum tubes, at that point in time, to enrich their uranium?

Do we know?

Mr. Kay: No, they did not.

They relied on different processes.

 

“ David Kay: The centrifuge tubes look like they’re of the design, which is German derived, that the Iraqis acquired some time in the 1980s and developed.

They’re for enriching uranium.”

David Kay, Panorama (BBC, Sept. 23 2002)

 

Sen. Allard: Okay. I have one other question.

What can you tell us about Iraq’s efforts to restart its nuclear program in 2000 and 2001?

Mr. Kay: As best as has been determined—

And this is obviously something the investigation is continuing.

In 2000, they had decided that their nuclear establishment had deteriorated to such a point, that it was, it was totally useless.

They started—

The main center is a center called al-Tuwaitha, which is—

In fact, I think you probably flew over it.

Ah, you generally do when you go around Baghdad.

Ah, it had deter—

It’s a large site. But, the physical facilities had seriously deteriorated.

They started building new buildings, renovating it, hiring some new staff, and bringing them together.

Ah, fortunately—

And they ran a few physics experiments. Re-run. Re-ran experiments they had actually run in the ’80s.

 

Query: I’m confused.

And that’s because David Kay omits the factual basis for most of his assertions.

The reported details {pf} {copy} of these “few experiments” have nothing to do with nuclear bombs; they are basic science.

As David Kay elsewhere conceded.

“ David Kay: They were tentative — but quite frankly rudimentary — efforts to reconstruct the program, to continue the science base. It’s not substantial at all.”

David Kay, Jan. 29 2004 (PBS, NewsHour)

 

Ah, fortunately, from my point of view, Operation Iraqi Freedom intervened, and we don’t know how, or how fast, that would have gone ahead.

Sen. Allard: So it was definitely a threat as far as you’re concerned — what they — in 2001, 2000?

Mr. Kay: Given their history, it was certainly an emerging program, that I would not have looked forward to their continuing to pursue.

It was not yet up as a full nuclear production site again.

 

Query:Program”?

Do “a few physics experiments” add up to a “program”?

 

Query:Again”?

Did Iraq ever have “a full nuclear production site”?

Denying an extreme — David Kay’s trademark — induces a question mark over all possibilities short of that extreme.

It’s a standard formula for CIA/MI-6 deceit:—

To willfully induce erroneous inferences in the minds of partisans and, in others, to willfully induce unwarranted doubt.

It’s the mark of a liar.

Or of an advocate.

Concealing something.  CJHjr

 

Sen. Allard: Thank you, Dr. Kay.

I’ll now call on Senator Pryor.

 

Senator Mark Pryor (D-AR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kay, thank you again for being here. I know that a number of people have expressed their gratitude. And I want to join in that chorus.

Let me just ask a few questions here.

How long were you searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?

Mr. Kay: I started—

I arrived in June and I left in late December.

Sen. Pryor: Okay. And were you on the ground, most of that time? {p.37}

Mr. Kay: Yes. Yes. Only—

Except the time I was required to be back here before you.

Sen. Pryor: Right. How many sites did you, or your team, visit in Iraq?

Mr. Kay: Senator Pryor, I’m sure we can give you the exact number, but it was in the hundreds. I—

Sen. Pryor: And also, I’m sure you looked at — what? — thousands of pages of documents? Is that fair?

Mr. Kay: Ah, closer to hundreds of thousands of pages of documents.

Sen. Pryor: And how many inspectors — and I guess you might want to call them “analysts” — did you have on your team there, to assist in this effort?

Mr. Kay: Roughly, in terms of—

They fall into three areas, to give you the count that you can deal with, that makes some meaning.

In terms of subject matter experts, that is “analysts”, we had at the max count somewhere around 110, maybe as high as 130 at the very max. It got lower than that at other times.

In terms of “case officers” — these are clandestine officers, who are used to working in the field and equipped by tradecraft and training to do that — the figure comes out to be somewhere around 30, to occasionally 40.

Translators and interpreters was roughly somewhere between 300 and 400, at various times.

Sen. Pryor: Okay. And did you have full access to our intelligence, our pertinent intelligence on WMD?

Mr. Kay: Absolutely.

Sen. Pryor: Nothing was screened from you? As far as you know?

Mr. Kay: As far as I know, nothing was screened. Nor do I believe anything was screened.

Sen. Pryor: Right.

At what point during this process did you start to get that uneasy feeling, about WMD in Iraq? Where you thought you might not find anything? Or your search might be unfruitful?

Mr. Kay: Well, Senator Pryor, it was not a 3:00 a.m. wake-up call in the middle of the night. It was the emerging picture that we were gathered.

And by late September, early October, we were all starting to look at the data and look at the conclusion and come to it.

And by, certainly by November, I think, if asked — and I have been asked internally — I kept saying, “I think we’ve got a program here that looks different than the estimate, with regard to assembled weapons”.

Sen. Pryor: All right.

At what point did you begin communicating that with the Pentagon, or the administration, or the CIA? I mean, I don’t know exactly who you were reporting to.

Mr. Kay: It was with the intelligence agencies.

Oh, I think my first communication about this program may look like one that doesn’t have assembled weapons, but has capability to rapidly restart its program, actually came in {p.38} July, based on—

You know, here again, I’m—

As all analysts, it may have been a case of connecting dots when there were few dots.

And certainly, by the fall, there was a fairly regular dialogue with regard to these.

Sen. Pryor: Okay.

And do you—

I know that when you’re talking to the intelligence agencies to some extent you’re talking to the White House.

But did you ever report this directly to the White House?

Mr. Kay: No. In fact, I’ve spoken to the president, directly to the White House only once.

It was in July, when I was back.

The channels went, as they appropriately should, through the Director of Central Intelligence.

Sen. Pryor: In this summer and fall period — where you started expressing concerns, and started to, you know, tell them about your findings and some of your conclusions perhaps — what was their response to that?

What was their reaction to that?

Mr. Kay: It was the absolutely appropriate one:

“Where’s the data? What’s the data? Have you considered this? Will you look here? Have you done that?”

It was the healthy skepticism and dialogue that I, too, exercised with regard to my own staff, and I expect to be held to.

There was absolutely no inappropriate, no refusal to consider it. It was the healthy skepticism and demand for data. Which is appropriate.

Sen. Pryor: You know you testified today that we know Iraq had some WMD, and used some, in the ’80s and on into the very early 1990s.

What is your thinking on how they got from that point — where they clearly had some — to today where, I guess your conclusion is, fair to say, is that they don’t have a weapons program?

And, if they have any WMD at all, it’s very, very small?

Mr. Kay: Well, it’s not that they don’t have a weapons program, didn’t have a weapons program. I hope they don’t now.

It is that they had a weapons program.

But it was a program activity, designed to allow future production at some time.

And that the missile program was actually moving ahead and, I continue to emphasize, I think is one that we paid inadequate attention to.

I think how they got there is they got there because the U.N. inspectors did a better job. I had them tell me ’91, they told me personally, directly, “You’re not behaving like we thought a U.N. inspector would behave.” I took that as a compliment. I mean, we were intrusive. Ah, we were aggressive, in the best sense of that word.

As we kept finding things—

And then the key defection we come back to — Hussein Kamal, in 1995 — which they feared would lay open their whole past five years of deceit and lying to the U.N.

They decided to reduce the thing that they were most vulnerable to.

And that’s large retained stocks, knowing that at some point they’d get rid of us, they thought, and they could restart production.

So they kept the scientists and they kept the technology.

 

Query:They kept the technology”?

What technology?

Iraq destroyed 100% of its equipment and facilities for manufacturing WMD, years ago, on orders of the UN inspectors.  CJHjr

 

But they didn’t—

They came to what I think is a fair conclusion:

Why keep stockpiles of weapons that are vulnerable to inspectors when you’ve lost your delivery capability?

Wait till you have your delivery capability and then it’s a relatively short order.

 

Query: Is David Kay contradicting the U.N. Inspectors and Hussein Kamal and claiming Iraq did not destroy 100% its banned weapons before Kamal’s defection in 1995 (except for 12 artillery shells and 18 empty rocket shells)

“ Rolf Ekeus: Did you restart VX production after the Iran-Iraq war {1988}?

Hussein Kamal: ... We gave instructions not to produce chemical weapons. I don’t remember resumption of chemical weapon production before the Gulf War {1991}. ... All chemical weapons were destroyed. I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons — biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed. ... In the nuclear area, there were no weapons.”

Hussein Kamal (defector, head of Iraq’s chemical weapons production, Saddam’s son-in-law), U.N. transcript, August 25 1995, pages 13, 14 (secret, until leaked to Newsweek, reported on February 24 2003).

 

We have documentary evidence, and testimony, that Saddam and Uday and Qusay ask, in both 2000 and 2001, how long it would take to restart production of {p.39} mustard and VX nerve gas.

This—

You know, this was a key point, and part of this reckoning, of, “When did you think they might be following a different strategy than the estimate?”

When you get senior officials asking, “How long will it take you to produce these agents,” that tells you at least to be awake to the possibility that they didn’t have those agents.

Sen. Pryor: So—

And this is my last question, because I’m out of time.

But is it your opinion, then, that the regime that was set up after the Gulf War in 1991 was at least to some degree effective in ending their WMD capabilities?

Mr. Kay: I think UNSCOM deserves a considerable amount of credit for disarming and destroying the typical thing which all of us who have served on UNSCOM are proud of.

In terms of destruction, we destroyed more of the WMD program than bombing did during the Gulf War.

I think where we always worried — and appropriately so, we know now — is getting at what they retained, and what they hid. Because you were up against things that were smaller, easier to hide in a terrorist regime.

We took the easy stuff out: nuclear reactors, big plants, large amounts of material.

And that gets to your earlier, very good question: Why did they change the strategy?

They changed to the things that we were not particularly good at unmasking, that would allow them to restart the program as soon as they got rid of us.

Sen. Pryor: That’s all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Sen. Warner: Yes. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Collins.

 

Senator Susan Collins (R-ME): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kay, let me start by joining my colleagues in thanking you for your most impressive, extraordinary, public service.

And we very much appreciate your being here today to share your experiences and your conclusions with us.

I am deeply troubled by what appears to be a colossal failure by our intelligence agencies.

And I would note that this failure spans agencies. It spans years. But it also spans countries.

It really is a global intelligence failure.

It wasn’t just our intelligence agencies alone that so misread this vital situation.

 

Query:Global”?

Which other intelligence agencies asserted — as an unassailable fact — that Iraq had WMD, besides the British, who ignored their own experts?

The Germans didn’t. The French didn’t. The Russians didn’t. The U.N. inspectors didn’t.

Who did?

The corrupt, unequivocal, assertions by U.S. officials made many apprehensive it might be true.

But their solution was to dispel uncertainty, by pursuing inspections, not by war, except only if Saddam wouldn’t destroy what they found or obstructed inspections to the point of impasse.

The U.S. and U.K. agreed to this solution.

And then launched war. In defiance of the Security Council Resolution they had agreed to obey:—

Rogue states, and international pariahs.

Richly deserving the justified, worldwide, contempt and hatred they thereby earned for themselves.  CJHjr

 

{broadcast video link, part-1, ends here}

I personally believe that the war was justified, for the reasons that Senator McCain listed, as well as others.

We know that Saddam had chemical and biological weapons at one point. We know that he invaded his neighbors, that he used chemical weapons to kill some 5,000 Kurdish citizens. We know that he planned to assassinate a former president of the Untied States. He shot at our planes. He violated the cease-fire agreement for the first Gulf War. He ignored numerous United Nations resolutions.

So there was lots of justification to hold Saddam accountable.

But, what if we’re faced with making a decision where there isn’t this additional justification?

That is what is so frightening to me.

Because we make such serious life and death decisions, relying on this intelligence information.

I, for one, don’t know whether or not to trust the intelligence estimates on {p.40} North Korea now.

We’ve turned out to be wrong in the other direction on Libya and Iran.

 

So, that’s why this is so troubling to me.

It’s particularly troubling because the briefings that we had were so detailed and so specific.

 

Query:Trust the intelligence estimates”?

Next time, try honoring your agreement.

To trust the U.N. inspectors.

You might feel less frightened and troubled, that way.

When served-up with detailed and specific assertions, by U.S. officials, disproved one-by-one, by the very U.N. inspectors you agreed to trust, but decided, instead, to ignore.

I’d be troubled too if — like you did — I’d authorized the order to kill 20,000 innocent people, in the teeth of repeated, authoritative, notice, that numerous, detailed, specific, unequivocal, assertions by U.S. officials were proven to be erroneous.  CJHjr

 

And I want to cite an example.

We had known, based on the Iraqi declarations to the U.N. inspectors, that Iraq had produced thousands of tons of deadly chemical weapons — such as mustard gas, sarin, and VX — as well as very large quantities of biological agents, such as anthrax.

And I recall being told — and I used it in my statement — that when the inspectors left, in 1998, there were very large discrepancies between the weapons that were declared and the amounts that were destroyed {S/1999/94, Jan. 29 1999; S/1999/356, March 27 1999}.

“ If you pour 10 liters of milk in the ground. And come back 10 years later. Can you prove it was 10 liters? That you poured in the ground?”

Hans Blix, June 23 2003

For example, I was told that at least 1.5 tons — tons — of deadly nerve agent, the VX, were unaccounted for.

What, in your opinion, happened to all of those chemical agents and biological agents?

Where did the VX and anthrax go?

Mr. Kay: It’s still a subject of investigation.

It looks specifically—

Let me deal with the VX.

And interestingly enough, the Iraqis—

We now have the records of the Iraqis as they tried to investigate that in order to get the evidence to answer UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC on that.


Query:Now”?

Is David Kay here claiming we did not have these records before the U.S./U.K. attacked Iraq (March 20 2003)?


“ Hans Blix: On 26 February 2003, Iraq submitted a report describing a study it had initiated to try and show, through scientific means, that it had indeed disposed of chemically inactivated B. anthracis (anthrax) agent, in the quantity it had declared, at the Al Hakam dump site in 1991. ... On 19 March 2003, Iraq submitted another paper with more analytical results...

Iraq made considerable effort ... to try and resolve the outstanding issues concerning VX and VX precursors. Iraq provided nine letters on VX and its precursors ... a paper of 9 February ... results for VX were reported on 3 March 2003 ... A final report entitled “Estimation of VX degradation products in soil at the dump site in the Muthanna State Establishment” ... was received by UNMOVIC on 15 March 2003...

[E]xtensive excavations ... showed that a large number of R-400 bombs declared to have contained biological agents and to have been unilaterally destroyed in 1991 were in fact destroyed. ... The excavations made from 19 February to 16 March 2003 unearthed ... 128 (out of 157 declared destroyed). ... Samples ... indicated ... DNA of virulent B. anthracis. ... In addition, ... high levels of manganese and formic acid ... indicative verification of Iraq’s chemical inactivation, as declared, of bomb contents with potassium permanganate and formaldehyde.

[A] chemical analysis of soil samples from the site where a quantity of anthrax was declared to have been dumped in 1991 ... were consistent with the declaration that anthrax had been dumped at the site.

The other step taken by the Iraqi side was to supply lists of the persons who in 1991 had been engaged in the operations to destroy anthrax. Regrettably, those lists were received only shortly before the suspension of inspections and the Commission did not have the opportunity to embark on a series of potentially important interviews...”

Hans Blix (Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC), Thirteenth Quarterly Report of the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, pages 24-25, 21-22, 5-6 (U.N. Doc. S/2003/580, May 30 2003) {282kb.pdf, copy, also via this, and ODS}.

 

And this is what happens at—

Remember, they had the ends of two chaotic wars. They had the end of the Iran-Iraq war {1988}. And they had the end of Gulf War Two {sic: Gulf War One: 1991}.

One large amount of VX apparently, as they were moving it back from the—

It had been forward-deployed in Iraq, towards the Kuwaiti border.

As they were moving it back in 1991, there was a traffic accident. The truck carrying it was totally consumed in a fire.

They, you know, they documented it in part.

{broadcast video link, part-2, begins here}

But there was the usual embarrassment of “Do we tell Saddam we’ve just burned up a large amount of chemical warfare agent?”

So it wasn’t fully reported and fully documented.

They didn’t do analytical sampling.

So they had nothing of—

And only partial records.

That now looks like an explanation that increasingly looks like it was true.

Some of it was simply accounting errors that were wrong in material balance.

Others are going to be in what I call this unresolved ambiguity, that we may simply never know.

Sen. Collins: I’m intrigued by the interviews.

That you conducted with some of the Iraqi scientists.

Who outlined a plan of deception, of their own.

Where may have told Saddam what he wanted to hear.

For fear of the consequences to them.

If they said they couldn’t deliver on certain weapons.

That leads me to ask you—

Do you believe that Saddam himself believed, that he had these stockpiles?

Of chemical and biological weapons?

I realize it’s in some ways an unanswerable question.

But what is your feeling on that?

What’s your judgment?

Mr. Kay: It’s one of the toughest questions around.

And we’ve just got little pieces of evidence.

So let me tell you—

Not what I believe.

Because I don’t know.

But—

Or what I think is true—

But what I, the evidence shows.

We have these questions about “How long will it take you to produce?”

That sounds like he knows he doesn’t have anything.

And so he’s asking for restarts of production.

And these included Saddam, Usay — Uday and Qusay.

There are other reports from the interrogation.

At times, Saddam referred to secret stockpiles, a—

You know, small amounts, that was existing.

No confirmation of that.

My suspicion is that he probably thought he was closer to getting it to restart faster than it — than the scientists and engineers actually knew — it would take.

So when it really came down—

These, these {p.41} requests — one in 2000, and I think it’s two in 2001, in which they gave him estimates that were longer than he obviously had expected them to be — was when they were confronting the truth.

I think he knew—

He had been told they had got rid of it all. But that, “We could really turn the tap on very quickly.”

And it turned out they lied about how quickly.

It was quick.

But it wasn’t as quick as he anticipated.

 

Query:Confronting the truth”?

An excellent idea. Let’s us confront the truth.

And answer John Warner’s question.

About “quickly”.

And about “imminent threat”:

We can’t allow Mr. Blix’s inspections to continue because Saddam is an “imminent threat”?

How “quickly,” Doctor Kay, could Iraq create weapons, containing chemical or biological agents? Starting with a single vial in somebody’s refrigerator? With no chemical precursors in country? With all equipment and facilities to manufacture such agents destroyed (previously on U.N. orders)? With no warheads to deliver those agents?

It was quick,” you say.

How quick?

Was it “imminent”?  CJHjr

 

But, this is one of those areas — as Senator Warner correctly keeps referring to — as where the investigation really does need to continue.

Sen. Collins: Thank you.

Sen. Warner: Thank you, very much, Senator.

We have Senator Ben Nelson.

 

Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kay—

Staff: Microphone?

Sen. Ben Nelson {switching on his microphone}:  Dr. Kay, I want to add my appreciation for your candor.

It’s very refreshing to see such public candor in a time when, too often, the trend is progressive candor.

But I want to thank you for many of your points that you have made.

Because I think it helps us understand the importance of intelligence.

And the importance of accurate intelligence.

And yet the difficulty there is in—

First of all, achieving the role that you need, to gather intelligence, let alone establishing its accuracy.

It’s based on that, that I have concerns about the use of preemptive force being predicated on intelligence.

I think, many supported the president’s decision to use force, to liberate Iraq, because—

And believe that the world’s a safer place, because of Saddam being in a prison cell.

But many of us supported Saddam’s removal because we believed in the credibility of the intelligence that was provided.

And we believe also — and I believe personally — that the president did not intentionally mislead the American people.

Nor do I believe Prime Minister Blair would mislead his public.

But there is, unquestionably a credibility issue here, that must be addressed.

That credibility problem involves the accuracy of the intelligence information — or lack of accuracy — its uses, and most likely its embellishment.

Your findings indicate, that Iraq had only a rudimentary chemical/biological/nuclear program.

And you have identifiedm, and you have said, that—

“Weapons of mass destruction-related program activities”.

And I have to ask you, what does that mean?

What are “weapons of mass destruction-related program activities{32kb.txt, 44kb.pdf, 32kb.txt, 60kb.pdf}?

Mr. Kay: That includes, for example—

And take the specific examples of the Iraqis—

A program to develop a substitute for a major precursor for VX, using indigenous production capability, and indigenous chemicals, so they would not have to import it.

Query:Simulant”?

Milk?

They learned how to freeze dry milk? In that hot country, without dependable refrigeration?

And this is a “weapons of mass destruction-related program activity”?

Concealing the facts of what you’re alluding to, while portraying those material (concealed) facts in a menacing manner:—

What’s the word I’m searching for?

Pathetic?

Willful, malicious, lie?

A criminal lie?

CJHjr

It includes a study, for example, on a simulant for anthrax. Pre-1991, their anthrax was liquid. They had tried to freeze dry it and get it down to the dry anthrax, which is stable and much more deadly, lethal, as we found out here. By using this simulant, they actually pushed ahead about two {p.42} generations the production capability. Now for this simulant, the same production capability that produces it is exactly the same as produces anthrax, so they in fact had moved ahead their anthrax capability by working on a simulant.

And so it’s in those areas that you get program.

They had looked at lethality of various agents and classified them.

That’s WMD-related work.

Sen. Ben Nelson: All right.

You know, you’ve indicated that you found no evidence of existing stockpiles of WMDs.

Is it possible that they found their way to Syria?

Is there any way of knowing whether they found their way to Syria or to another location?

Mr. Kay: In terms of possibility, I mean, you can’t rule out anything.

The way I tried to direct our activities—

I knew we were not going to get permission to conduct inspections in Syria.

As much as I would professionally and personally have enjoyed it.

I also knew that the intelligence we collected, that showed movement of material across the Iraq-Syrian border, didn’t show what was in the containers.

So you try to answer that question by saying, “Was there something to be moved back across the border?”

Look at production capability.

It’s totally inadequate for saying, “Did they move small amounts? Did they move technology? Did they move documentation?”

Absolutely possible.

I would say probable.

But my personal belief is that they did not move large stockpiles, because I do not believe they had reconstituted a capability that had produced large stockpiles.

So that’s how you get at it.

Is it inadequate?

Yeah.

Will it probably always remain as an—

Unless the Syrian regime, you know, really changes course.

Will it always remain uncertain?

Yeah.

Sen. Ben Nelson: Is it a basic assumption on your part?

Or a suspicion?

That’s based on the evidence, that you said, movement of certain undefined, non-inspected containers, or other activity, that took things across the border?

Mr. Kay: My belief, that they did not move large stockpiles of WMD to Syria, is based on my conclusion, that there were not large stockpiles to move.

My assumption, that it might have been something else, is there was so much movement, that you just can’t rule out what was there.

I don’t know.

Sen. Ben Nelson: Well, is it fair to say that the people who were in charge of the weapons of mass destruction activity probably were better informed about how to secret it than those who decided to bury airplanes?

Mr. Kay: {Chuckles} One makes that assumption.

Sen. Ben Nelson: I would think so.

Mr. Kay: Now, I, and, as you know, I also have to say, that the people most likely to have been involved in this movement were the people in the intelligence services and around Uday and Qusay.

And fortunately for the world, Uday and Qusay are no longer around to give evidence. And a lot of those intelligence agents are either now dead or they’re in opposition to the U.S. and not available for ISG.

So, there is a limited circle of people who probably had firsthand knowledge about moving it.

And here’s how we get to irreducible uncertainty. They’re dying. Not soon enough, in my view. But they are dying.

Sen. Ben Nelson: Well, Dr. Kay, I appreciate very much, as I say, your candor.

And I, I totally agree with you that an outside body investigating and {p.43} looking into this intelligence credibility issue is important.

Certainly, it’s, it’s absolutely critical to the first-strike doctrine, which has to be on the basis of what you knownot what you think you know.

And I appreciate your candor with respect to that as well.

I’m certain that that’s not always an easy thing, to be able to take a position that strong.

But I do appreciate that you’ve done that.

Mr. Kay: Thank you.

Sen. Ben Nelson: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sen. Warner: Thank you, Senator, for your participation.

Senator Cornyn.

 

Senator John Cornyn (R-TX): Thank you.

Dr. Kay, I too want to thank you for your service.

I’m deeply concerned lest the politics of the moment overshadow some important facts.

First, would you agree that not only our intelligence agencies, but Democrats, Republicans, President Clinton, President Bush, France, Germany, Britain, all believed that Saddam had stockpiles of WMD?

Mr. Kay: I think that’s true.

Query:Germany”?

 

“ Donald Rumsfeld {2:31 bb, audio}: It’s difficult to believe that there still could be questions in the minds of reasonable people open to the facts before them.

The threat is there to see.

Joschka Fischer: {German} In this democracy, my generation has learned, {English} you have to make the case.

And to make the case in a democracy, you must convince by yourself {be convinced yourself}.

And, excuse me—

I am not convinced.

This is my problem.

And I cannot go to the public, and say:

“Well, let’s go to war, because there are reasons,”

and so on, and I don’t believe in that.”

Joschka Fischer (German Foreign Minister) replying to Donald Rumsfeld (U.S. Defense Secretary), February 8 2003, at the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy (Munich, February 7-9 2003), reported, Kwame Holman, “Background: Deepening Divide” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, February 10 2003), video {bb} {4:16 bb, at 2:32 bb (Rumsfeld), 3:28 bb (Fischer), 1:34 bb (both, in context)}, audio {14:53, at 2:31 (Rumsfeld), 3:27 (Fischer), 1:33-4:05 (both, in context)}.

 

Sen. Cornyn: And until your report, after your long work with the Iraqi Survey Group, have you found that anyone — any one of those people or groups that I’ve identified have in fact learned that it was not true, but nevertheless, tried to manipulate it and present it as fact for some improper purpose?

Mr. Kay: No, I know of no manipulation.

I know of a lot of skepticism and — because it was such a widely held view — and wanting to know the facts.

And I view that as absolutely appropriate.

Sen. Cornyn: So you know of no evidence, no indication, that anyone tried to intentionally manipulate the intelligence that we got, in order to justify going to war in Iraq?

Mr. Kay: I’ve seen no evidence of that. Nor have I seen any evidence after the fact of anyone trying to influence the conclusions that I, or others, are reaching as part of the survey group.

Sen. Cornyn: Let me just try to nail down a couple other facts.

Although it now appears that Saddam — or at least so far appears — that Saddam did not have large stockpiles of WMD, he did continue research on chemical and biological and even nuclear weapons.

Correct?

Mr. Kay: Absolutely.

Query:Nuclear weapons”?

 

“ Mohamed ElBaradei {1:25}: After three months, of intrusive inspections, we have, to date, found no evidence, or plausible indication, of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme, in Iraq.”

Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General, IAEA),  
Report to the U.N. Security Council, March 7 2003 {video 1:24:39, 19:05-36:49 (Elbaradei), at 33:24-34:40 (nuclear conclusion)}.

 

Sen. Cornyn: Would you say then, Dr. Kay, that it was just a matter of time? Before Saddam would build such stockpiles or have that capability, in a way that would threaten not only people in Iraq but people in that neighborhood, and perhaps others? {p.44}

Mr. Kay: I think you will have, when you get the final ISG report, pretty compelling evidence that Saddam had the intention of continuing the pursuit of WMD when the opportunity arose, and that the first start on that, the long pole in the tent, was this restart of the long-range missile program.

 

Query:Compelling evidence”?

Are U.S. long-range missiles “compelling evidence” of secret U.S. chemical and biological weapons?

CJHjr

 

Sen. Cornyn: So that given time, these programs would have matured and Saddam would have been able to reconstitute his WMD arsenal?

Mr. Kay: I hesitate, Senator.

Only—

I think that’s the safe assumption.

What I don’t know, over time — and I’m more and more struck with — is how corrupt and destructive that society had become. But you can’t count on when it would fall apart. And it might fall apart in ways that are far more dangerous.

So I think that is a safe assumption.

Sen. Cornyn: You said something during your opening statement that intrigues me and something that I’m afraid may be overlooked in all of this back and forth.

And that has to do with proliferation.

You said that there was a risk of a willing seller meeting a willing buyer of such weapons or weapons stockpiles, whether they be large, small, or programs, whether it’s information that Iraqi scientists might be willing to sell or work in cooperation with rogue organizations or even nations.

 

Query:Weapons”?

What weapons?

There are no weapons.

We were justified to attack Iraq?

Because someone might, in the future, try to sell something?

Which doesn’t exist?

Should we attack Pakistan?

Because someone there actually did sell something?

Which did exist? CJHjr

 

But do you consider that to have been a real risk in terms of Saddam’s activities and these programs?

The risk of proliferation?

Mr. Kay: Actually, I consider it a bigger risk than—

And that’s why I paused on the preceding question.

I consider that a bigger risk than the restart of his programs being successful.

I think the way the society was going, and the number of willing buyers in the market, that that probably was a risk that, if we did avoid, we barely avoided.

Sen. Cornyn: And indeed that continues to be a concern we have today in the old Soviet Union and other places where—

Mr. Kay: Pakistan and other places.

Sen. Cornyn: Pakistan. Other nations where they’ve had official weapons programs, biological, chemical and nuclear, the risk of proliferation into the hands of terrorists like al Qaeda and others.

Is that correct, sir?

Mr. Kay: That’s correct.

Sen. Cornyn: And indeed the deception that you’ve talked about, of Saddam’s own military and scientists and others who perhaps led him to believe that they were following through on his orders to develop these weapons of mass destruction.

Would you say that that deception not only convinced perhaps Saddam, to some extent, but indeed that contributed to his intransigence before the world community and defiance of the United Nations, and particularly, finally, of U.N. Resolution 1441?

Mr. Kay: I think that probably did.

I’m just hesitant because analyzing the mind of someone who would end up in a spider hole like Saddam requires a skill that I suspect I was not equipped by, for.

But, yeah, I think that’s a reasonable interpretation.

Sen. Cornyn: Thank you very much, Dr. Kay—

Mr. Kay: Yeah. {p.45}

Sen. Cornyn: —I appreciate it.

Sen. Warner: Thank you, Senator, very much.

Senator Bill Nelson.

 

Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kay, in the interview {copy} with the New York Times a few days ago you had said:

“I think that the system should have a way for an analyst to say, ‘I don’t have enough information to make a judgment.’ There is really not a way to do that under the current system.”

Then the New York Times article goes on, and this is what I want to ask you about.

“He added” — meaning you — “that while the analysts included caveats on their reports, those passages tended to drop off as the reports would go up the food chain, inside the government.”

Tell me about that.

How is that possible?

That in the intelligence community—

Specifically, when caveats are there, about intelligence—

That they get dropped off.

As it goes up the pecking order?

Mr. Kay: Senator, when Jim Risen asked me about that, I gave him an example which he did not include in the article.

I said, writing caveats has about the same intellectual enjoyment as being a writer for the National Geographic. I read the— I look at the pictures. I read the captions. I confess — although I think we have in the basement probably a 20-year collection of National Geographics — I would be hard pressed on a polygraph to say that I’ve ever read more than five of them.

And what happens is, it’s not that they are physically removed.

 

Query: Caveats are notphysically removed”?

There are no caveats in the NIE version published by the CIA on October 4 2002 (1170 kb, copy}.

The only source of intelligence to all but a few Members of Congress.

“ Such contradictions between classified information in {sic: and} the administration’s public statements make it very difficult for Congress to have a meaningful debate. It puts those few Members of Congress who have access to this information ... in a truly awkward position and leaves the rest of us, and the American people, in the dark.

Senator Graham, who chairs the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that the classified information he has received does not tally with the public statements of the administration. But, of course, he is not permitted to explain why. ...

We cannot discharge our constitutional responsibilities by allowing the administration to control the flow of information and simply trusting that they know what they are doing. That is an unacceptable situation in a democracy, Mr. Speaker. And that is not what the founders had in mind when they gave Congressnot the President — the power to declare war.”

Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.), 148 Congressional Record H7723 (Oct. 9 2002) {319kb.txt, 240kb.pdf}.

 

“ A close comparison of the unclassified version ... and the original classified NIE ... reveals striking differences. ... Some convey the impression that the intelligence community was much more confident, and more united in its views, than it actually was. Others appear designed to portray a sense of heightened threat, and particularly of a threat that could touch the U.S. homeland. Sentences and phrases in the classified NIE expressing uncertainty were deleted while new formulations alluding to gathering danger were added.”

Jessica T. Mathews, Jeff Miller, “A Tale of Two Intelligence Estimates” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 31 2004).

 

It’s the higher you go up—

Just in your office, I suspect there are things that your staff passes up that you read the headlines of.

You read the summary.

You’re busy.

You’ve got other things to do.

Caveats tend to fall into footnotes.

They tend to fall into smaller point type.

And so you—

And they’re, after all—

They’re not what most people think.

 

Query:Most people”?

So, the experts think one thing (eg: centrifuge experts, USAF UAV experts)?

And the more numerous non-experts, who have not studied the issue, some of them cling to their theories? And others of them assert no opinion? About what they don’t know?

And you’re persuaded by the non-experts?

Because they get to write the Estimate?

And impose their theories?

Presumably, obeying orders to do so?

You’re easily impressed.

By what you want to hear.  CJHjr

 

And you’ve just got limited time and attention.

And it’s a natural filtering phenomenon, as opposed to a physical cutting.

It’s just one of those things that—

I’ve—

And—

Look, I can point to myself, as having been a consumer point of intelligence.

You like to believe that you fully read it. And you searched the caveats. And you gave them the same attention that you give the dominant opinion.

Very often you don’t.

There are just not that many hours in the day.

 

Query:Not that many hours in the day”?

You’re about to sign the death warrant for 20,000 innocent people?

To disappear 10,000 loved-ones {ditto, ditto}?

To maim and wound thousands?

To wreck the lives and livelihoods of millions?

And you can’t be bothered?

To apply your mind?

To why experts (which you are not) insist on their caveats? And what evidence, if any, opposes their careful, detailed, investigations?

And you wonder why people hate America?  CJHjr

 

Sen. Bill Nelson: Dr. Kay, I, along with 76 other senators, voted for the resolution authorizing the president the expenditure of funds for starting the war.

And, I want to tell you some specific information, that I was told by the intelligence community that has subsequently been made public by Secretary Powell in his speech to the United Nations.

At the time, it was highly classified.

And subsequently, the administration declassified it, and made it public.

And I haven’t heard these comments, from anybody else.

But I was told:

Not only did we have the weapons of mass destruction — did he have the weapons of mass destruction.

And that he had the means to deliver them through unmanned aerial vehicles

But that he had the capability of transporting those UAVs outside of Iraq.

And threatening the homeland, here, in America.

Specifically, by putting them on ships off the eastern seaboard, of which they would then drop their WMD on eastern seaboard cities.

You can see, all the more why I thought there was an imminent threat.

Can you bring any light on this?

 

“ U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson said Monday the Bush administration last year told him and other senators that Iraq not only had weapons of mass destruction, but they had the means to deliver them to East Coast cities.

Nelson, D-Tallahassee, said about 75 senators got that news during a classified briefing before last October’s congressional vote authorizing the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Nelson voted in favor of using military force. ...

Nelson said the senators were told Iraq had both biological and chemical weapons, notably anthrax, and it could deliver them to cities along the Eastern seaboard via unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones.”

John McCarthy, Florida Today, Dec. 15 2003.

 

Mr. Kay: Senator, what we have spent a great deal of time exploring—

And it’s still being explored—

Is the UAV program.

It was a very large UAV program.

And discoveries are being made really in the last two months with regard to that program.

The Iraqis acknowledged that at least one of those {p.46} families of UAVs was a direct descendant from an earlier one, that had a spray tank on it.

I think that the judgment you will find, and certainly it’s—

Let me not judge what others will say.

My judgment, having looked at that evidence, of the UAV program, is that was an active program.

It’s one of these program, WMD program elements that continued.

It was not at fruition.

 

Query: Are these prima facie criminal lies?

“ David Kay: ... deliberate concealment efforts ... information they deliberately withheld ... they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.”

David Kay (CIA), October 2 2004


“ Charles Duelfer: UAVs were flight tested that easily exceeded the UN limit of 150 kilometers.”

Charles Duelfer (CIA), March 30 2004

 

“ Hans Blix: Did any one of them have a range beyond the 150 km permissible for missiles?

Although the US claimed they had identified a flight of 500 km, it appeared to have been in racetrack mode {circular}, showing that the fuel was enough for this distance, though the effective reach might be limited by how far the guiding signal went.

Was its body of drop tanks designed to carry and disperse biological or chemical weapons?

Or only to contain photo equipment?

These relevant questions had not yet been sufficiently explored. Accordingly, we had not drawn any conclusions.”

Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, excerpts (March 2004)

__________

 

The reach of a powerful VHF/UHF radio-signal to a UAV at 4,800 feet is 150 km (81 n.miles, 93 s.miles) (line-of-sight), the U.N. range-limit for missiles.

Could any WMD be disbursed at such altitudes with any effect on the ground?

Were the UAVs fitted for photos? Were they merely experimental? Prototypes?

If it’s not a “missile,” was there any U.N. range-limit for a UAV?

David Kay and Charles Duelfer apparantly decided to “deliberately conceal” and “deliberately withhold” from Congress, in their reports to Congress, information, about the racetrack course, the (possible) low-powered radio-signal, and the photo-reconnaissance issues.

If so, their decisions are prima facie willful, deliberate, malicious, misleading, criminal lies, in a criminal conspiracy to lie.

Their reports are full of such assertions, coupled to material omissions, by which they induce erroneous inferences.

As Senator Levin himself asserted, in a press release on March 30 2004, “deeply troubled” at the misleading material omissions from the published version of Charles Duelfer’s secret testimony.  CJHjr

 

While it may have been theoretically possible, that you could have snuck one of those on a ship off the East Coast of the United States, that might have gotten — been able to deliver a small amount someplace—

And that’s certainly always possible.

A good hobbyist could probably do it right now, with off-the-shelf material here.

I don’t think there was the deployment capability — the existing deployment capability at that point — for any sort of systematic military attack.

But certainly as a terrorist action.

Who knows what he would have done?

But we just did not discover—

I mean, we discovered the UAVs.

And we discovered their development.

And one of them is tied to a sprayer application.

But, uh, it was not a strong point.

 

Query:We discovered”?

Hans Blix detailed all of these topics — and a plan to investigate them — on March 6 2003.

Prior to the U.S./U.K. attack on Iraq (March 20 2003).

CJHjr

 

Sen. Bill Nelson: Well Dr. Kay, needless to say, I was absolutely told thatthat that was a fact.

And I have subsequently found out now — after the fact — that there was a vigorous dispute in the intelligence community.

And one part of the community said that was absolutely not true.

And therefore, you can see the chagrin with which I approach this discussion.

Mr. Kay: I understand, Senator.

 

Query: Caveats are notphysically removed”?

And what of the opinion of Air Force intelligence — omitted from this deceitful secret briefing — that the UAVs were for photo reconnaissance?

And the opinion of the Defense Intelligence Agency (September 2002) — omitted from this deceitful secret briefing — that “There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons”?

These omissions are prima facie willful criminal lies (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), § 1515(a)(3)(B)).  CJHjr

 

“ Sen. Bill Nelson (D-FL):  I was not told was that there was a dispute in the intelligence community ... My question to you is why was I not told that there was this disagreement in the intelligence community? Instead of being told that it was gospel truth that those UAVs could be flown over eastern seaboard cities?

Stephen A. Cambone (Under-secretary of Defense for Intelligence): That, I can’t answer, sir.”

Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing, Feb. 4 2004 {pf}

 

“ Sen. Bill Nelson (D-FL):  I was not told that there was a dispute in the intelligence community. And that what I found out after the fact was that Air Force intelligence — which would know more about UAVs than other folks — totally disputed the veracity of that claim. ...

But that’s not what I and others were told in S-407.

There was no statement that there was a dispute in the intelligence community.

Lowell E. Jacoby (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency):  Senator, I don’t know which briefings—

Sen. Bill Nelson: Well, this would have been the briefings prior to the vote on the resolution ... we don’t make recordings of those briefings, and so there’s not going to be any way to prove it ...

George J. Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence):  I didn’t do the S-407 briefing ...

You should have been told ...

Sen. Bill Nelson: From my part of the country, where I come from, we take a person at their word.

And if there had been any question, I would have gone and got that NIE, and looked at it.”

Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing, March 9 2004 {151kb.pdf}

 

Sen. Warner: Thank you very much, Senator.

Colleagues, I take note that our distinguished witness has been under the scrutiny of the Congress since approximately 9:00 o'clock this morning, when I first met with you in another setting. And Senator Levin joined us at that setting.

So, I would suggest maybe just a few minutes, and then we will conclude this, what I believe has been a very thorough and broad-ranging series of questions and responses.

Your responses are very forthright, in my personal judgment.

So, Senator Levin, if you would like to start off, I’ll wrap up.

 

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI): Okay. Thank you.

“ I’m a great admirer of Carl Levin. He’s one of the most thoughtful and intellectually capable members of the Senate on national security issues.”

John McCain, April 6 2004

Thank you again, Dr. Kay.

Are you familiar with the Carnegie Endowment report? {Jan. 8 2004, 703kb.pdf}

Mr. Kay: I’m familiar with it, Senator. I have not read it cover-to-cover.

Sen. Levin. Let me read you just a portion of it, then, on page 34. It has to do with the assessments before December 2001, and after December 2001.

“Assessments prior to December 2001 had voiced concerns and warned of intentions to restart weapons programs, but did not assert that any programs or weapons existed. Most were consistent with the 1998 intelligence report to Congress — while UNSCOM inspectors were still in Iraq.”

And now I’m quoting that report, that 1998 report—

Mr. Kay: Yeah.

Sen. Levin. from this Carnegie report. {p.47}

“After four years of denials, Iraq admitted to an offensive program resulting in the destruction of Al Hakam, a large BW production facility Iraq was trying to hide as a legitimate biological plant.

Iraq still has not accounted for over a hundred BW bombs and over 80 percent of imported growth media — directly related to past and future Iraqi production of thousands of gallons of biological agent. This lack of cooperation is an indication that Iraq intends to reconstitute its BW capability when possible.”

That’s the assessment prior to 2001.

After 2001, the assessment was, they have biological weapons. In their possession. Not that they intend to “reconstitute its BW capability when possible” — which is the prior assessment — but that, after 2001, after November 11th in effect {sic: September 11th}, they have possession — inventories, stockpiles — of weapons of mass destruction.

Do you see a difference between the before and after?

Mr. Kay: Senator Levin, I don’t think that is a fair—

As my memory—

And I don’t have the documents in front of me.

I do not think that is a fair characterization of the intelligence reports and judgments prior to 2001.

And I refer you again

If you go back to Secretary Cohen’s testimony before this committee, Secretary Cohen, in the Clinton administration, was not referring to anthrax that might be reconstituted, produced in some reconstituted program.

He was referring to actual weapons.

I—

I think—

Sen. Levin. Which—

Which Iraq had at what point?

Because we’ve gone back to at least look at his—

The part that we’re able to get on Secretary Cohen.

Which was an interview on a TV station.

Mr. Kay: Ah—

But there was also testimony.

Sen. Levin. Yeah.

And it seems from this, he’s talking about what they had in the early ’90s.

And what we caught them with.

And what that can do.

What that anthrax can do.

And what we destroyed.

That’s what he was talking about in that interview.

Are you saying he came before this committee?

Mr. Kay: I don’t—

Sen. Levin. I—

Mr. Kay: My memory

Sen. Levin. I might go back and look.

Mr. Kay: My memory is it was this committee.

It may not have been this committee.

Sen. Levin. Okay.

But you’re saying that Secretary Cohen said:

“In our judgment, they’ve got anthrax.

They are producing anthrax.

And here—

This bag of five pounds is what they can do.”

That’s what you’re saying today?

Mr. Kay: My memory is that—

In holding that 5-pound bag.

And talking about how much destruction that could do.

He made reference to Iraq having those capabilities—

Sen. Levin. Currently? {p.48}

Mr. Kay: That’s my memory, sir.

Uh—

But, you know, you’ve got the record.

Sen. Levin. Yeah.

Mr. Kay: You’ve {laughs} got staff behind you.

I don’t.

Ah—

Sen. Levin. We’ll—

We’ll—

We’ll check it.

Mr. Kay: Yeah.

Sen. Levin. Because it’s pretty important.

Because you’re, you’re saying, that Secretary Cohen said that they—

The same thing, basically, as we were told immediately prior to the attack on Iraq.

Which is, that they had possession of BW weapons.

And here’s what five pounds can do.

I’m not saying he didn’t say that, by the way.

I’m going to go back and check too.

But you’re now saying, that we better check the record before—

Mr. Kay: I’m saying my memory is that that’s what he said.

But I always believe in checking the record.

Sen. Levin. Yeah.

Okay.

Well, we will surely do that.

To see if your memory is correct.

 

“ William S. Cohen: Anthrax—

If you took a five-pound bag of sugar and accept—

William Coehn holding sugar bag

Call this Anthrax.

This amount of Anthrax could be spread over a city—

Let’s say, the size of Washington.

It would destroy at least half the population of that city. ...

Cokie Roberts: Would you put that bag down please.

William Cohen: Now I want to point out — I will spill it on the table — point out that he has had enormous amounts, and I’d like to go to some of the lies that have been told about this ...

He said he had no offensive biological weapons program. We found 2,100 gallons of anthrax — that little pound of sugar here that I showed you — had 2,100 gallons of that. ...

Sam Donaldson: Tariq Aziz, their foreign minister, says if they have these things, they were manufactured before the Gulf War {1991}.

True?

William Cohen: Well, they were manufactured before the Gulf War, and we want to—

Sam Donaldson: But his point seemed to be that after the Gulf War, they had stopped their manufacture.

William Cohen: Well, ... they were successful in hiding the facilities that were in fact producing these types of — the anthrax and VX and sarin gas. ...

So I think what we’re seeing here is because the UN team has been on the ground inspecting these facilities, we are inhibiting his ability to reconstitute the manufacture of these deadly gases and weapons. ...

That facility was in fact destroyed by UNSCOM.”

William S. Cohen (U.S. Secretary of Defense, Jan. 27 1997-2001 Jan. 20), interviewed by Sam Donaldson, Cokie Roberts, “The Iraq Situation(ABC News, This Week, November 16 1997).

 

But let me—

Let me then also read to you, something from the assessments, on the BW {Biological Weapons}.

This is the report—

This is the last Clinton administration report, for the period January to June 2000, on BW {source, copy}.

And I’m going to read you this paragraph. And then I’m going to read you the report for the period of January to June by the Bush administration.

And I want to see if you think they’re the same.

Here’s what the last Clinton administration report said:

“In 1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted the first in a series of full, final, and complete disclosures, that were supposed to reveal the full scope of its BW program. According to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete, and filled with inaccuracies. Since the full scope and nature of Iraq’s BW program was not verified, UNSCOM assessed that Iraq continues to maintain a knowledge base, and industrial infrastructure, that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time, if needed.”

“Knowledge base,” “infrastructure,” “that could be used to produce”.

Now this is the report for the period January to June 2002 of the Bush administration {copy, 357kb.pdf}.

“During this reporting period, Baghdad continued to pursue a BW program.”

Continued to pursue” a program.

Do you consider those words to be the same as “continuing to maintain a knowledge base and an industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce”?

Do you consider those to be same assessments?

Mr. Kay: I’m not sure they’re terribly different.

I think they’re —

Sen. Levin. Are they somewhat different?

Mr. Kay: They’re somewhat different.

Nor—

Quite frankly, your memory is better than mine.

I’m not sure that is the total scope of what the Clinton administration had on the biological program at that point.

I remember a more voluminous statement about it.

But, uh—

Sen. Levin. It is.

It’s far more.

I’m trying to — obviously, because I can’t quote the entire — to pick out representative parts. {p.49}

Mr. Kay: Yeah, I understand that.

But in judging similarities and accuracies, selection is always a danger in any field.

Sen. Levin. It is.

I agree.

Anybody that attempts to communicate, that’s always a problem.

Mr. Kay: Absolutely.

Sen. Levin. But what I would like you to do, then, because you’ve made a representation here, that these were the same assessments, that were made — by both the Clinton intelligence folks and the Bush intelligence folks — that you go back and see whether or not, in fact, that is accurate.

I’ve given you quotes.

And I can continue to show differences.

The Carnegie report shows significant differences, between intelligence—

Not so much Clinton-Bush.

It’s prior-to-9/11, and after-9/11.

That’s the key thing when intelligence, at that point, changed significantly.

In the opinion—

Not the opinion—

In the analysis.

Of the Carnegie folks.

And I would think that, since you’re making a statement, that it didn’t, that you take a look, at least at their assessment, and the documentation that they provide, that shows a significant shift, in intelligence, before and after 9/11.

Are you willing to do that?

Mr. Kay: Senator Levin, I’m always willing to take homework assignments from you. I—

Sen. Levin. Yeah.

Mr. Kay: I hope it comes with an address for one of those “undisclosed locations.”

Quite frankly, after I get out of here, I’m going to tell Senator Warner, {chuckles} I’m, I’m disappearing to an undisclosed location, for a couple weeks {chuckles}.

Sen. Levin. You’re entitled to it.

Ah—

Mr. Kay: But I, I certainly will do that.

It’s a point well taken.

Sen. Levin. You’re very much entitled to it.

I— I— I do think—

One other comment here.

And people have talked about France, Russia, and everybody else.

This is a quote from Chirac.

I don’t know whether this is representative or not:

“‘I have no evidence that these weapons exist in Iraq.’ Chirac said. U.S. officials, however, say they are certain that Iraq has the weapons and insist that it must turn them over for destruction or face war.”

That’s what his quote is, in The Washington Post, in February of 2003 {Feb. 11 2003 pf, copy, copy, French}.

Now maybe you have other information—

Mr. Kay: There—

There are other quotes from the French.

Query: Other quotes?

There are no such “other” quotes.

  CJHjr

Sen. Levin. Where—

Mr. Kay: And from Chirac.

Sen. Levin. Where—

Where Chirac says they do have weapons?

Mr. Kay: Yes.

Sen. Levin. Okay. That’s just one quote.

 

“ Hans Blix: A number of intelligence services, including the French, were convinced that weapons of mass destruction remained in Iraq.

But we had no evidence showing it. ...

Chirac said France did not have any “serious evidence” that Iraq retained proscribed weapons.

Having met people from French intelligence, and listened to them, I registered with keen interest, that Chirac did not share their conclusions on Iraq.

The intelligence services sometimes “intoxicate each other,” he said.

Personally, he did not believe that Iraq had any weapons of mass destruction.”

Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, pages 127-128 (March 15 2004) (reporting a private meeting with Jacques Chirac, on January 17 2003).

 

“ Jacques Chirac: I have no evidence that these weapons exist in Iraq.”

Jacques Chirac (France’s President), joint press briefing with Vladimir Putin (Russia’s President) (Elysée Palace, Paris, February 10 2003), reported, Peter Finn, “U.S.-Europe Rifts Widen Over Iraq: France, Germany, Russia Urge Extension of Inspections; Iraq Approves U-2 Flights” (Washington Post, February 11 2003) {pf} {French transcript}.

 

“ Christiane Amanpour: Do you believe that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction?

For instance, chemical or biological weapons?

Jacques Chirac: I don’t know.

I have no proof of that.”

Jacques Chirac (France’s President), interviewed March 16 2003 by Christiane Amanpour, “Iraq: Interview of Mr Jacques Chirc, President of the Republic on CNN and CBS” (CBS News 60 Minutes, “Chirac Makes His Case on Iraq,” March 16 2003) (CNN Special Report, “Chirac: ‘A lot of progress has been achieved’,” March 16 2003).

__________

 

David Kay here replies, under oath, with unequivocal certainty, that Jacques Chirac said the exact opposite of what Jacques Chirac actually said.

And so too, before and after this hearing, in radio and TV broadcasts, and in webcasts, to millions of people (WP, NPR, NBC, CNN, PBS, CNN, USIP, KSG). In a likewise plain effort to mask and minimize wrongdoing by U.S. officials.

The exact opposite of what Jacques Chirac in fact, actually, said.

David Kay’s bold, unequivocal, assertion, to Carl Levin, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and to millions of people, about what Jacques Chirac said, was a prima facie willful, reckless, or grossly negligent, lieCJHjr

 

And, and Russia, however, did not— said that they, they did not have— or that they had not seen “undeniable proof of “Iraqi arms {p.50} programs or terrorist ties”.

 

That’s a quote we have in the Associated Press—

Mr. Kay: Yeah.

Sen. Levin. —and maybe that’s not accurate, or representative.

Do you know whether Russia—?

Mr. Kay: I don’t—

I—

I—

The Russian intelligence—

I—

I don’t have on the tip of my tongue.

Unless—

 

“ Hans Blix: Not the Russians.

They were doubtful all the time.”

Hans Blix, March 17 2004, video {at 1:02:44}, audio {at 1:03:02}

 

“ Vladimir Putin: Russia does not have in its possession any trustworthy data that supports the existence of nuclear weapons.

Or any weapons of mass destruction, in Iraq.

And, we have not received any such information, from our partners, as yet ...

We have apprehensions, that such weapons might exist in Iraq.

That is why we want to see the inspectors travel there.”

Vladimir Putin (Russia’s President), joint press briefing with Tony Blair (U.K. Prime Minister) (Zavidovo, October 11 2002), BBC video {2:12}, reported,Russia Foresees Deal on Iraq” (BBC News, Friday, October 11 2002, 14:05 GMT) {copy}, Steven Rosenberg (Zavidovo), “President Putin’s Doubts Over Iraq” (BBC News, Friday, October 11 2002, 20:45 GMT) {copy}, Steven Lee Myers (Moscow), “Putin Offers Qualified Support for U.N. Proposals for Iraq” (New York Times, October 11 2002), Lisa McAdams (Moscow), “Russia Willing to Negotiate on Tough New UN Iraq Resolution{pf}, audio {2:31} (Voice of America, October 11 2002), Michael White (Zavidovo), “Putin Demands Proof Over Iraqi Weapons{pf} {copy} (Guardian, London, October 12 2002).

 

“ Sergei Lavrov: Throughout their many years of work in Iraq, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted some 7,000 inspections.

As a result, they achieved significant progress in shutting down Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programmes. ...

Up to now, we — like all unbiased observers — have not seen any kind of persuasive evidence that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Or programmes to develop them.

Nor have we seen any other facts that would situate Iraq in the context of combating terrorism.

The only way to remove any doubts is the immediate redeployment of the international inspectors to Iraq.

And today, there are no legal or technical impediments to doing this. ...

Baghdad has consented — not only to an unconditional return of the United Nations inspectors — but also to UNMOVIC’s and IAEA’s new, enhanced, and very effective parameters for conducting the inspections. ...

We see no reason to delay deployment of the UNMOVIC and IAEA structures in Iraq.

Neither formally nor legally, in order to begin the inspections, do we need any new decisions to be taken by the Security Council.

This has been confirmed by Messrs. Blix and ElBaradei.

They do not need new decisions. ...

What are we waiting for?

The inspectors can travel as early as tomorrow.

And Iraq knows, that it must fully and scrupulously cooperate with the inspectors.

If we are talking — not about the deployment of the inspections — but about an attempt to use the Security Council, to create a legal basis, for the use of force, or even for a regime change of a United Nations Member State—

And this goal has been constantly and publicly alluded to by several officials—

Then we see no way, how the Security Council could give its consent to that.”

Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), statement {copy} (U.N. Security Council meeting, October 17 2002), transcript, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4625(Resumption3) {328kb.pdf, 219kb.doc, via this or ODS} (U.N. Security Council meeting 4625, Resumption 3, October 17 2002, 3:10-7:15 p.m., 36 pages), unrelated correction, S/PV.4625(Resumption3)/Corr.1 (1 page) {20kb.pdf, 39kb.doc}, summaries of the 2-day meeting, SC/7534, SC/7536, reported,Security Council Speakers Agree Iraq Must Comply With Demands, Differ On Enforcement{pf} (U.N. News, October 16 2002), “Security Council Wraps Up Two Days Of Debate On Iraq{pf} (U.N. News, October 17 2002). U.N. video (dead links).

 

“ Sergei Lavrov {0:46 bb}: We repeatedly said, that we have been hearing allegations that Iraq does continue its WMD programs.

We have heard it many times.

We never saw any evidence that this is the case.

We don’t know whether this is true or not.

And we want this to be verified.

By professionals.

By UNMOVIC, and by IAEA.

To say that, “We know, but we wouldn't tell you,” is not something which is persuasive, frankly speaking.

It’s not a poker game.

When you hold your cards.

And call others’ bluff.”

Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, December 19 2002), broadcast, Ray Suarez, “Background: What Next?” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, December 19 2002) video {bb} {10:26 bb, at 1:00-1:46 bb}, transcript, “Reactions From Security Council” (CNN, December 19 2003). U.N. video (dead link).

 

“ Sergei Lavrov {0:43 bb}: All these new finds — documents and physical evidence — do not change the basic assumption, on which UNMOVIC and IAEA are working.

Namely, that they don’t have any evidence that Iraq has resumed its WMD programs.

Nor can they assert, that all these programs have been stopped.

Flowing from this is the need for inspections to continue.

Reporter: The U.S. says that time is running out.

What does their pressure due to the process?

Sergei Lavrov: I think, I think—

If somebody feels that time is running out, the question “why” should be asked from that particular country.

Not from me.”

Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 27 2003), broadcast, Ray Suarez, “The Reaction” (PBS: Public Broadcasting Service, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, January 27 2003), video {10:26 bb, at 2:48-3:31 bb}. U.N. video (dead link).

 

“ Sergei Lavrov: We have heard the accusations ...

We would like to see undeniable proof ...

We have not seen any reason, so far, to undercut the inspection process ...

We are not in favor of inspections in spite of Iraqis cooperation.

But as long as Iraq cooperates, they must continue.”

Sergei Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), media stakeout (U.N. Security Council lobby, January 29 2003) {transcript, reported}. U.N. video (dead links).

 

“ Sergey Lavrov: We said that we don’t have information which would prove that the WMD, weapons of mass destruction, programs remain in Iraq.

We also said we don’t have information that those programs have been fully stopped,” Lavrov said.

Consequently, he said he supported a Security Council resolution in November 2002 giving “an unprecedented, intrusive mandate to U.N. inspectors and that is why we wanted the inspectors to finish their job.”

Sergey Lavrov (Russia U.N. Ambassador), press conference, February 10 2004.

__________

 

David Kay here replies that he is not knowledgeable, about what the Russians believed.

At least not in the moment, here, when confronted, under oath, by Carl Levin.

Yet, before and after this hearing, in radio and TV broadcasts, and in webcasts, to millions of people, in a plain effort to mask and minimize wrongdoing by U.S. officials, David Kay asserted — boldly, and unequivocally, and not under oath — that Russia knew, believed, and said, that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WP, NPR, NBC, CNN, PBS, CNN, USIP, KSG).

The exact opposite of what these Russian officials in fact, actually, said.

David Kay’s bold, unequivocal assertions, to millions of people, about what the Russians knew, believed, and said, was a prima facie willful, reckless, or grossly negligent, lieCJHjr

 

Sen. Levin. All right.

Uhm. The uh.

Have you been asked by the, uh — I guess the intelligence — by the CIA, for whom you were working until a week ago, I believe. Whenever—

Mr. Kay: That’s correct.

Sen. Levin. Have you been asked to give a final report?

Mr. Kay: I— I—

Of your views.

Mr. Kay: I did a final— I did a final.

I did a briefing-out for the, uh, DDCI, and the DCI, of what I found.

It was an oral briefing. And it was {chuckles}

It lasted a substantial portion of a day.

I think they fully understand, what I concluded in my report, at that point. Yes.

Sen. Levin. Do you know whether or not they made notes of your briefing?

Mr. Kay: Ah. There were note-takers in the room. But I don’t know what—

Sen. Levin. Well, I think it—

I think we either—

And it’s not up to me. I’m not the chairman.

It seems to me it’s, it’s important for the history, and for the future, that we have your views in a formal report.

You, you didn’t give us written testimony today. It was just a couple days that you had the invitation of the chairman to come here.

And so I’m not at all critical, by the way, of that, believe me. You’re entitled to—

I’m not critical of the chairman. I’m not critical of you. Either one.

I’m glad you’re here.

But I do think it’s important, that we get the views, your views, in some kind of a formal, cohesive way, ’cause they’re valuable to us. They’re important. We’ve obviously followed your views very carefully, but with—

The country has.

And it, it seems to me, in these circumstances, that you should put, in the way you want to say it, your views, for the record, for the nation, for us, even though we’re not in the middle of an inquiry in this committee, uh—

I wish we were, frankly, but we’re not. I’m trying to do the best I can as ranking member.

But the Intelligence Committee is.

So, perhaps they would ask you. I can’t ask on behalf of Senator Roberts, either.

But, in any event, if asked — put it this way — by either our chairman, or by Senator Roberts, would you be willing to provide a report, your report, your final report, on the way out?

Mr. Kay: If asked by those two senators, and certainly the senior senator from the Commonwealth of Virginia, where I live, under I {chuckles}

My general policy — as I told Senator Warner, when he asked me to appear here — is never to say “no” to Senator Warner.

There may be a point in my life when I decide that’s unwise. But I have not reached that point yet.

Sen. Levin. Most of us are in the same position. We don’t say no to Senator Warner either, as a matter of fact.

Mr. Kay: {Chuckles}.

Sen. Levin. Okay. That’s then up to those two senators — {p.51}

Sen. Warner: I think that you raise an interesting point. And I’ve given it some consideration. And I’ll discuss it with our distinguished witness.

But it seems to me, it could well be done in the context of your commenting on the next interim report, that would be forthcoming.

Mr. Kay: I leave it to you. I’m —

Sen. Levin. One other—

One other question, that I would hope the chairman would take under advisement.

And that is that we ask the CIA, if they have taken notes of a day-long debrief, that they share those notes with us.

Your comments here obviously are significant. Your comments here and—

Period.

Your statement {copy} in the New York Times has been read by, by, I’m sure, not just millions of New York Times readers, but by every member of this committee, and their staff, probably more than once.

That’s how significant those views are.

So I would think that we ought to take full advantage at least of the notes of the CIA, at a minimum, that they took of the day-long debrief.

And again, I close with my statement of thanks for your willingness to come, as a private citizen, and to share your opinions with the committee and with the nation.

 

Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va):  Thank you, Senator Levin.

Do you have any final comment?

I would simply ask one last question, that I think—

There may be an omission in the record, that should be plugged.

Any evidence with regard to participation by either Saddam Hussein — or his principal henchmen — in the WMD-sharing with al Qaeda? Or any other terrorist organizations.

 

“ George W. Bush: We’ve removed an ally of Al Qaida.

And cut off a source of terrorist funding.”

George W. Bush (U.S. President), “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended{pf} (deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, at sea, off the coast of San Diego, May 1 2003, 6:00-6:27 p.m.) video {23:44}, audio {22:15}, retitled, “Address to the Nation on Iraq From the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln,” 39:18 WCPD 516-518 {12kb.txt, 50kb.pdf (faulty), copy} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:39/18}.

 

“ Dick Cheney: We learn more and more that there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda that stretched back through most of the decade of the ’90s. That it involved training, for example, on BW and CW {Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons}. That Al Qaeda sent personnel to Baghdad to get trained on the systems. It involved the Iraqis providing bomb-making expertise and advice to the Al Qaeda organization.”

Dick Cheney (U.S. Vice President), interviewed {pf} by Tim Russert (NBC News, Meet the Press, September 14 2003) {FDCH transcript pf}.

 

“ Dick Cheney: I think there’s overwhelming evidence that there was a connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government.”

Dick Cheney (U.S. Vice President), NPR Morning Edition, Jan. 22 2004.

 

“ [A] secret report by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence that was updated in January 2003, on the eve of the war.

“We could find no provable connection between Saddam and al Qaeda,”

a senior U.S. official acknowledged.”

Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay, John Walcott, Hussein ties to al Qaeda appear faulty (Miami Herald, March 3 2004).  CJHjr

 

Mr. Kay: Senator Levin, uh—

Senator Warner, there’s no evidence that I can think of, that I know of.

This was obviously, as you know, a very high investigative target.

There may well have been evidence produced since I left. Or will be by the time of the March area.

It’s certainly something that has a great deal of attention.

Sen. Warner. All right.

Thank you.

The hearing will now be concluded with my, again, expression of appreciation to you and your very lovely wife who made it possible for you to be here today.

Mr. Kay: {Chuckles} Thank you very much. I’ll convey that.

Sen. Warner. Thank you very much {gavels}.

{End}

Copyright: {See contrary claim, below} © 2004 by Federal News Service, Inc., Suite 220 1919 M St. NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA. Federal News Service is a private firm not affiliated with the federal government. No portion of this transcript may be copied, sold or retransmitted without the written authority of Federal News Service, Inc. Copyright is not claimed as to any part of the original work prepared by a United States government officer or employee as a part of that person’s official duties. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service, please visit http://www. fednews.com or call (202) 347-1400.

 

 

 

Bush/Cheney Doctrine on pre-emptive offensive war

We’re going to attack you.

Not because we’re certain you deserve it (beyond all doubt). And not because we’re satisfied you deserve it (beyond reasonable doubt). And not because you probably deserve it (more likely than not), or possibly deserve it (less likely than not), or even might deserve it (a hint of evidence, an unsubstantiated hypothesis, a theory).

We’re going to attack you, because we are not certain you don’t deserve it.

We have lingering doubt.

We’re not certain (beyond all doubt) you are innocent.

We’re going to attack you, to be on the safe side.

It’s prudent.

And, we’re going to conceal our uncertainty, and assert “conclusive evidence,” because disclosing uncertainty might provoke assertions about our true motives:— That we want permanent military bases in your country. That our friends want to rake-off your oil profits. And reward us, in due course.

And because public debate might disquiet our armed forces, and instill doubt in their minds, that our orders might be unlawful.

Indeed, criminal:

____________________

 

“ Suspicion is a state of mind of the accuser and not a state of mind or an act by the one accused.

It is a monstrous proposition containing the very essence of license that the state of mind of the accuser shall be the determining factor, in the absence of evidence of guilt, whether the accused shall or shall not be summarily executed. ...

The orders to execute such persons and mere suspects on suspicion only and without proof, were criminal on their face.

Executions pursuant thereto were criminal.

Those who gave or passed down such orders must bear criminal responsibility for passing them down and for their implementation by the units subordinate to them.”

The High Command Case, 11 N.M.T. 462-697 (opinion), at 531 (U.S. Military Tribunal 5, Nürnberg Germany, trial, 5 February-August 13, judgment, October 27-28, 1948), volumes 10-11, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (“Nuernberg, October 1946–April 1949”) (15 volumes, U.S. GPO, Washington D.C., 1949-1953) (“the green series”) {SuDoc: D 102.8, ditto, LCCNs: 49045929, 97071903, OCLC: 12799641, UC, WorldCat}, volume 10 (1951, 31+1308 pages) {55.9mb.pdf, source}, volume 11 (1951, 31+755 pages) {58.5mb.pdf}, also reported, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (“Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission”), volume 12, page 86 (15 volumes, U.K. HMSO, London, 1947-1949) {LCCNs: 47022747, 97080284, OCLC: 45912266, UC, WorldCat}.

____________________

 

“ John Warner: You said, on NBC’s Today Show, on Tuesday, that it was, quote:

“Absolutely prudent.

For the U.S. to go to war.”

Dr. Kay, I concur in those conclusions.

I believe a real and growing threat

has been eliminated.

And a coalition of nations.

Acted prudently.

In the cause of freedom.”

John W. Warner (chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee), Senate Hearing 108-678, January 28 2004, addressing and quoting David Kay, interviewed by Matt Lauer (NBC News, The Today Show, Tuesday, January 27 2004, 7:00-10:00 a.m. ET), MSNBC video {7:03, 5.36mb.wmv}, transcript printed, “David Kay Interview,” 150 Congressional Record S315-S316 {pf} {12kb.txt, 38kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 108-2, daily edition 150:7, January 28 2004) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/7}.

____________________

 

If they do not fear.

The rule of law:—

All violent criminal enterprises.

Do their killings.

Because.

It’s prudent.

To protect their interests. Achieve their objectives. Deter law-enforcement. Banish the rule of law. Install the rule of force:

The Law of Empire.

And, if they feel the need to persuade anybody, the public for instance, all violent criminal enterprises do the exact same thing:

They lie.

About the facts.

About their motives.

Advancing, for justification, whatever comes to hand, which sounds plausible.

____________________

 

“ Gustave Mark Gilbert (U.S. Army military intelligence, assigned to the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Germany):

“We got around to the subject of war again and I said that, contrary to his attitude, I did not think that the common people are very thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction.”

Hermann Wilhelm Goering (prisoner and defendant):

“Why, of course, the people don’t want war,” Goering shrugged.

“Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war, when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece.

Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany.

That is understood.

But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy.

And it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”

Gilbert: “There is one difference,” I pointed out.

“In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives.

And in the United States only Congress can declare wars.”

Goering: “Oh, that is all well and good.

But, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders.

That is easy.

All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger.

It works the same way in any country.””

Hermann Wilhelm Goering, interviewed by Gustave Mark Gilbert, April 18 1946, printed in Nuremberg Diary, pages 278-279 (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947) {LCCN: 47004157}, (reprint: New York: Da Capo Press, 1995) {LCCN: 95020429}.

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 

 

Liar Glossary

A willful liar knows, or believes correctly, what s/he asserts is untrue. In U.S. executive, legislative, or judicial proceedings, this lie is prima facie criminal, if it’s “material”.

A reckless liar does not know, or believe, what s/he asserts is untrue. But s/he does know that s/he doesn’t know it is true. S/he pretends s/he knows. This lie is likewise prima facie criminal (as I suppose). S/he’s not willful as to the asserted fact (because s/he doesn’t know, or believe, it’s untrue). But s/he is willful as to a material omission: That s/he’s ignorant. And merely guessing, hoping, supposing, inferring it’s true, perhaps concealing ambiguities, contrary evidence, credibility issues, and such. Asserting certainty, and concealing ignorance, or uncertainty:— A willful, deceitful, coupling.

A willfully blind liar has a reasonable basis, ostensibly, for believing what s/he asserts is true but, secretly, doubts it, or questions it, or fears it may not be true. And decides to not investigate further, as a reasonable person would, because s/he wants it to be true. This too is a criminal lie (as I suppose), if the jury believes, beyond reasonable doubt, s/he had the opportunity and resources to investigate those doubts, and decided not to, because s/he feared a proper investigation might substantiate those doubts.

A negligent liar believes what s/he asserts is true, but omits to first inquire properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances. This lie is not criminal, if the jury is not satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the failure to investigate was willful.

For example: The claim by Condoleezza Rice, that National Intelligence Estimate, submitted to her office, precisely to inform her about her about a topic central to her legal duties. This document contained caveats, and language of uncertainty, concealed from Congress, and from the public, in the unclassified version published by the CIA, four days later.

A recklessly negligent liar can reasonably foresee, that deadly or other serious consequences will likely result, if the assertion is untrue. And yet, s/he still omits to first inquire properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances, in light of these heightened consequences. This lie too is not criminal (absent willfulness, as with negligence). But the reckless nature of it supplies the criminal intent for any underlying crime of recklessness (the deadly or other serious consequences which follow from it). For example, involuntary manslaughter. Or “depraved indifference”.

A grossly negligent liar has been put on notice, that the assertion is likely untrue, or possibly untrue. And yet, s/he persists, in later repeating the assertion, without first inquiring properly into its truth, in the way a reasonable person would, in the same circumstances, prompted to do so, by the notice. This lie too is not criminal (absent willfulness).

But, notice can be so significant, in focusing the liar’s mind on the issue, that a jury can feel satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that what previously may have been non-willful negligence, constitutes willful intent to deceive, afterwards, in later assertions, following the notice, or in failing to correct previous assertions, thus elevating the liar to more a culpable category. This depends on how the jury feels about the quality of the notice, the authority of its basis, the competing authority of whatever basis the liar might have, if any, for the assertion, and the opportunity and resources s/he had available, and decided to not use.

For example: The decision by U.S. officials to repeat assertions, and to not correct previous assertions, on the basis of information provided by Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei, that intelligence targets, which U.S. officials supplied, proved to be entirely innocent.

For example: David Kay’s numerous assertions, that Jacques Chirac and Russia said, they believed Iraq had WMD. David Kay was put on notice, by Carl Levin, in this hearing, that his assertions were likely untrue, quoting documents. And yet, David Kay, in the days, weeks, and months after this hearing, repeated these assertions, many, many, times.

An innocent liar reasonably believes, without doubts, what s/he asserts is true, because s/he was lied to by others, and tricked by them into voicing their lie. S/he’s an “innocent agent” of the actual liar(s), blameless, without criminal or moral turpitude.

It’s an honest mistake, if s/he reasonably believes, without doubts, what s/he erroneously asserts is true, if neither s/he, nor anyone one on whom s/he may have relied, was willful, reckless, or negligent in formulating the erroneous assertion. Likewise, if s/he misspeaks:— If s/he says, without realizing it, what s/he did not intend to say, or would not have said, if s/he had thought about it more carefully in context. For example, if s/he was thinking about some other aspect of what s/he said, instead, and was not mentally focused on the erroneous assertion, if it was merely incidental, for example, and not “material” to what s/he was talking about. Or, if s/he forgot what s/he once knew. Or was confused about what s/he thought s/he was talking about.

A simple cure, to all issues about assertions, is to disclose the basis of the assertion: “I believe this, because so-and-so told me so. Because this document seems to prove it.” Et cetera. Such disclosures validate an honest intent, and alert listeners how to investigate the assertion further, if they question it.

But the absence of such disclosures does not necessarily indicate dishonest intent, as people normally facilitate conversation by omitting diversions from the main theme into subsidiary issues about substantiation.

But, on important assertions, on which lives depend, an honest person would normally disclose the basis for a belief, if s/he has any reason to suspect there is any conceivable possibility it may not be true.

The reliability of hearsay is always suspect. Even if the hearsay source is honest, and knowledgeable, the speaker might have misunderstood, or misremembered, what the hearsay speaker actually said. Or the subtleties of it. Its nuances and caveats. And the fact that it too might, in turn, be based on yet further hearsay.

For example: This is the mistake Brian Hutton made in his flawed, inquiry judgment, accepting a hearsay assertion as true, instead of calling for an examination of the source of that hearsay.

I presume Hutton was afraid of what he would find out. In which case, he was willfully blind.

If not, then he was grossly negligent, at the very least, because he well knows, being a judge, the unreliability of hearsay: His experience constitutes “notice,” that he cannot make reliable findings of fact based on hearsay, particularly when the credibility of the witnesses, asserting the hearsay, is at issue.

Brian Hutton was willfully blind, or grossly negligent. He might have been lucky, and be right. But his finding of fact is disputed by Brian Jones, the U.K. expert, who did what Hutton declined to do, and actually investigated the source of the hearsay, as best he could.

But Hutton was not a liar as to the supposed “fact” he found. Because he disclosed the basis for his finding (unreliable hearsay) and, hence, did not represent it to be more authoritative than it is (unauthoritative).

Though he may have lied about his opinion, willfully, recklessly, or negligently (that he believed the fact he found, or that it deserved the dignity of the label “fact,” or “finding,” despite the unreliable hearsay evidence of it).

He made no effort, as far I know, to ask for the intelligence.

His duty was to ask for the underlying intelligence — the “best evidence” of the supposed fact.

And, if the government refused to give it to him, his duty was to report, that he was unable to form an informed, reliable, opinion, and to decline to make any finding of fact on that point.

______________________

Note: All species of lies include material omissions, which are necessary to be stated in order to prevent a truthful assertion from inducing a material erroneous inference, in the mind of the listener. Material omissions are the principal technique of deceit, employed by CIA and other government liars.

For example: The Bush/Blair lie, that Jacques Chirac said he would vote against war, “under any circumstances.” An incendiary lie. A vivid display of criminal intent. An overt act, in a violent criminal conspiracy. Omitting to mention, what he was talking about:— Not war generally, but only about the particular second resolution, then-tabled by the U.S./U.K. (authorizing war after March 17 2003), and a technical explanation of the “circumstances” of the vote, that a “no” vote is not a “veto,” unless there are also 9 “yes” votes, and a majority of the 15-member Security Council had already indicated they too would vote “no,” not “yes,” on that particular resolution, at that particular time. And, what he was not talking about:— The “circumstances” of the inspections. He plainly said (concealed by Bush/Blair in their lie), he would vote for war later, if Saddam frustrated the inspections (then producing promising results). While the assertion is true (he said, “under any circumstances”), the omissions induce an erroneous inference, namely that inspections were fruitless because Saddam knew he could frustrate them without consequences. The truth — which both Bush and Blair chose to conceal, by their material omissions — is the exact opposite.

Another example: David Kay’s assertion, that a UAV was tested “out” to a range of 500 km. Omitting to mention (if it was the case), that the test was on a circular course, and that its associated radio equipment would not operate beyond a range of 150 km, suggesting its fuel capacity was merely to provide dwell-time over the target area, if it was for photo-reconnaissance. (I don’t know the truth of these UAV issues, merely that Mr. Blix identified them as issues, and that the U.S./U.K. prevented him from investigating them, by attacking Iraq.)

Another example: David Kay’s unequivocal assertions — grooming the public for war, on BBC’s Newsnight (September 13 2002) and Panorama (September 23 2002) news programs — that the aluminum tubes were “centrifuge tubes.” This was either a willful or reckless lie, if he knew of the contrary opinion of the centrifuge experts (which he is not). Or else a willfully blind lie, or negligent lie, if he had available to him an easy way to discover the opinion of those experts and did not seek it. But, on the topic of material omissions, even if he disagreed with the opinion of the experts (which he is not), their expert opinion is a material “fact,” though they may be mistaken. Hence, it was a separate willful or reckless lie, by him, to omit to mention their expert opinion (if he knew about it) and, as well, the innocent plausible explanation of other experts (which he is not): That the tubes met the specifications for Iraq’s 81mm artillery rocket program. This, if he knew about that possibility, and their opinion, as I presume he did.

  Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 

 

Source: FNS transcript (Federal New Service), adopting some formatting and some uncertain words from the FDCH transcript (Federal Document Clearing House), and then corrected and conformed to the video (all linked below).

By CJHjr: Converted to text (OCR: FineReader 6.0), formatted (xhtml/css), bold-face, italics, links, bullets (), text {in braces}, text beside a green bar |, text in yellow boxes, highlighting, corrected, formatted, paragraphed, punctuated, to conform to the video (linked below), paragraphing added to other quoted documents (for ease of reading) marked with this trailing paragraph symbol:  ¶ .

This document: Efforts to Determine the Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related Programs {156kb.txt, 167kb.pdf, fdsys.id} {152kb.txt, 162kb.pdf, sasc108hrg} (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-678, January 28 2004, Senate Armed Services Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-678, LCCN: 2005414430, OCLC: 57070686, GPOcat, paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, November 26 2004}, John W. Warner (Chairman), Carl Levin (Ranking Minority Member) {11kb.html}, witness: David Kay (Head, CIA Iraq Survey Group, June 11 2003-2004 Jan. 23), C-Span video (request) {2:44:45, smil, schedule, 538818909, 180284-1}, broadcast video: part-1 {2:04:09, source}, part-2 {37:49}, transcripts {Lexis}: FDCH transcript {178kb.html, copy, source}, FNS transcript {130kb.pdf, copy}.

Subsequently: The Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-855, October 6 2004, Senate Armed Services Committee), witnesses: Charles A. Duelfer (Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs), Head (from January 23 2004), CIA Iraq Survey Group) {105kb.pdf}, Joseph J. McMenamin (Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps; Commander, CIA Iraq Survey Group).

Background: The pretexts for war: WMD + France’s veto: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/iraq-2003d.html

Copyright: In my opinion, the Federal New Service transcript is not copyrighted, and may be freely copied, because the words of U.S. government officials speaking in the course of their duties are not copyrightable.

And this, as I suppose, regardless of who writes down those words, because transcribing an audio tape is hard work, and it’s important work, and it’s valuable work, but it’s not creative work, and it’s only creative work which qualifies for copyright protection. Indeed, the words spoken by anyone, though they may be lies, are nevertheless “facts” in the ears of a listener (the words themselves) and, for that reason too, are not copyrightable by a transcriber.

But were I mistaken, I would submit it’s fair use (17 U.S.C. § 107) to copy this transcript because it’s a report of a governmental legislative proceeding, a traditional view of fair use (a public policy superior to copyright protection), to educate the public and further democratic government.

Finally, I’ve added links, and queries and information (in yellow boxes and green {braces}), which add understanding to this transcript, and challenge mistakes, assertions, and opinions, and this I can’t do without copying it. These additions constitute “fair comment,” which is a separate “fair use” license to copy a document (“for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ..., scholarship, or research”).

I do not, however, rely upon a fair use license, because I believe this document is not copyrightable, and hence not copyrighted, and no license is necessary to copy it.

In the meantime, this transcript was published, on November 26 2004, by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a “work of the United States Government” {GPOcat}, which is not copyrighted and not copyrightable.

I claim no copyright in my copyrightable comments and compilation of links and additions.

From all of which, I conclude:

This document, including my additions, may be freely copied.

CJHjr

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Posted Feb. 1 2004. Updated Feb. 1 2010.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/davidkay-sasc-20040128.html

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