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Hearings, Congressional Record, video, press
2005 (DNI), 2004 (Iraq), 2001 (U.N.), 1993 (Philippines), 1989 (Mexico)

John Dimitri Negroponte:
Confirmations hearings and debates


by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

2005


Iraq wmd war vote
War Crimes Act
John Bolton
John Negroponte
Alberto Gonzales
Condoleezza Rice
Robert Gates
Iraq Study Group
NIE: Iraq wmd
Iraq war timeline: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008
Iran uranium timeline
Israel/Palestine
Settlements
Blockade, reprisals

To be Director of National Intelligence

Is he fit?

To be Director of National Intelligence?

A criminal liar? and criminal aider and abettor of liars? in a criminal conspiracy to lie?

So it appears, from government documents, which Congress has mostly concealed from itself and the public. And from government officials, whose testimony Congress does not want to hear. And from eye witness accounts, which Congress cannot conceal.

On this record, John D. Negroponte prima facie incited, ordered, aided and abetted, officers of the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Department, to criminally lie to their own headquarters, and to Congress, in a criminal conspiracy, first to dissuade Congress, then to violate the laws of Congress.

Boland Amendments

1982: U.S. Public Law 97-377, § 793, 93 Stat. 1830, 1865 (December 21 1982): “None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a country’s armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.” Source: H. Amdt. 974, introduced/adopted December 8 1982, House roll call vote 97-2:424 (411/0), and see S. Up Amdt. 1541, introduced/adopted December 18 1982, Senate roll call vote 97-2:445 (56/38).
1983: U.S. Public Laws No. 98-212, § 775, 97 Stat. 1421, 1452 (December 8 1983) and 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (December 9 1983): “During fiscal year 1984, not more than $24,000,000 of the funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.” Source: H. Amdt. 461, introduced/adopted October 20 1983, House roll call vote 98-1:403 (227/194).
1984: U.S. Public Law 98-473, § 8066(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 (October 12 1984), effective October 1 1984-1985 August 8: “During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.” House roll call vote 98-2:421 (316/91), Senate roll call vote 98-2:287 (78/11).
1985: U.S. Public Law 99-83, § 722(g), 99 Stat. 190, 254-255 (August 8 1985): “... $27,000,000 for humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Such assistance shall be provided in such department or agency of the United States as the President shall designate, except the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense... As used in this subsection, the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ means the provision of food, clothing, medicine, and other humanitarian assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapons, weapons systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death.” House roll call vote 99-1:275 (262/161). Senate roll call vote 99-1:82 (75/19).

On this record, John D. Negroponte is prima facie complicit in violent crimes by Honduras government officials and by the Contra army based there.

All in aid of a secret CIA/DoD war. Launched from Honduras in secret. Prohibited by the U.S. Constitution (for want of Congressional approval). Prohibited by international law (U.N. International Court of Justice, judgment, summary). A war of aggression, a tort, a prima facie international crime, the crime against peace.

Larry Boyd, “Nicaragua declares 'state of siege' after bridges bombed” (Christian Science Monitor, March 17 1982). “The March 14 attacks on bridges spanning the Coco and Negro rivers follows a resurgence of sabotage attempts and attacks in border regions. The Negro River bridge, more than 200 feet long and just five miles from a key border crossing at El Guasaule, was totally destroyed. The Coco River bridge near Ocatal was damaged. ... Besides the bridges, another major attack was the bombing of a Nicaraguan airliner. ... A plot to blow up Nicaragua’s only cement plant and only oil refinery was headed off in January.”

I speak of his “service” in Honduras (October 29 1981-1985 May 30). And of Nicaragua.

On this record, John D. Negroponte is a safe and trusted pair of hands, to manage proliferating U.S. government criminal enterprises. And to lie about them. Especially to a Congress which wants to be lied to.

Like his circle of conspirators did about Iran Air Flight 655, when he was later in the White House, as Deputy National Security Adviser (1987-1989) to Colin Powell, telephoning the President, with the news. Constituting themselves members of a second prima facie criminal enterprise, the felony-murder, or manslaughter, of the mostly American victims of Pan Am 103, a promised, foreseeable, apparent, international countermeasure to the first criminal enterprise, that self-same conspiracy of criminal liars, who decided to lie — to protect themselves, instead of the citizens in their charge — and falsely deny responsibility, on behalf of the United States, thereupon legalizing an eye for an eye.

Demonstrating, it’s not only foreigners who have to worry about U.S. government criminal liars.

The families, friends, neighbors, of the 1500+ U.S. service wo/men killed in Iraq, and the 10,000+ maimed for life, they too can attest to that. As can every U.S. taxpayer, and their distant descendants, crippled by debt, from this lying war, feeding their expanding military shadow-state, from the plates of their needy.

And those citizens U.S. government criminal liars decided to poison, with their criminal munitions, they lied about, to hundreds of thousands of our soldiers, and their families. According to truthful {262kb.pdf} U.S. government officials {2682kb.pdf, copy}, whose truthful research, lying U.S. government officials, deeply complicit in a massive U.S. government criminal enterprise, decided to conceal, misrepresent, coverup.

Depleted uranium. The only weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq. Each one, atomizing 70% of itself, when used, into alpha radiating aerosols, a DNA-mutating and chemical poison, hundreds of tons of invisible, micron-sized particles of uranium oxide dust (U-238), wafting in the wind, and their beta and gamma cousins (decay progeny U-234 and 0.2% U-235),billions and billions and billions” of them, we imported into Iraq, to poison our soldiers, and their progeny, attacking them, when they breathe (lodging in their lungs), when they eat (migrating through their gut wall, into their blood, to lodge in their organs), when they break their skin (infecting their blood and organs via wounds, cuts, abrasions). And to likewise poison the doomed men, women, children, progeny, of that land we blighted, for eternity.

A transgenerational catastrophe. A breath-taking, staggering, immense, war crime, and crime against humanity, surpassing even the Nazis, who confined their criminal killings to the living, not unborn generations, and mostly by quick and humane methods, not by slow, debilitating, lingering, “unnecessary suffering,” condemned particularly, as a separate, additional, war crime. Against expendable American and allied cannon-fodder, and Iraqis alike.

The reduced numbers of Iraqis, that is, who manage to survive their “liberation,” and permanent occupation {copy}, by a Great Satan, ensconced on a Green-Zone throne, disappearing billions of dollars of trust-fund money, smirking, from 106 military bases, to strong-arm demands of his oil and business clientele {detail, comment}, and his Zionist kin nearby. As many or most Iraqis view their fate. And most of the rest of the world do too.

Is he fit?

If you want to be lied to, he’s fit.

If you want him to wage crime on orders, he’s fit.

If you want him to thumb his nose at Congress, the Constitution, the laws, he’s fit.

Gary Cohn, Ginger Thompson, “When a wave of torture and murder staggered a small U.S. ally, truth was a casualty. Was the CIA involved? Did Washington know? Was the public deceived? Now we know: Yes, Yes, and Yes.” (Baltimore Sun, Unearthed: Fatal Secrets, June 11 1995).

Gary Cohn, Ginger Thompson, “Glimpses of the 'disappeared'” (Baltimore Sun, Unearthed: Fatal Secrets, June 11 1995).

Gary Cohn, Ginger Thompson, “Torturers' confessions: Now in exile, these CIA-trained Hondurans describe their lives — and the deaths of their victims” (Baltimore Sun, Unearthed: Fatal Secrets, June 13 1995).

Gary Cohn, Ginger Thompson, “A survivor tells her story. Treatment for a leftist: Kicks, freezing water and electric shocks. In between, a visitor from the CIA.” (Baltimore Sun, Unearthed: Fatal Secrets, June 15 1995).

Gary Cohn, Ginger Thompson, “How a journalist was silenced” (Baltimore Sun, Unearthed: Fatal Secrets, June 15 1995).

Gary Cohn, Ginger Thompson, “A carefully crafted deception” (Baltimore Sun, Unearthed: Fatal Secrets, June 18 1995).

Gary Cohn, Ginger Thompson, “Former envoy to Honduras says he did what he could” (Baltimore Sun, December 15 1995).

Frederick Porter Hitz (CIA Inspector General), Americo R. Cinquegrana (Deputy Inspector General for Investigations), “Selected Issues Relating to CIA Activities in Honduras in the 1980s” (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 96-0125-IG, August 27 1997, 238 pages) and Supplement (October 23 1997, 5 pages), released October 22 1998 (about 70% redacted) {copy} {SuDoc: PREX 3.10:H 65x}. And see Honduras Documentation Project (National Security Archive).

Sarah Wildman, “Contra Aide: W. Picks an Amoralist for the United Nations” (The New Republic, March 19 2001).

Maggie Farley, Norman Kempster, “Bush's U.N. Pick Faces Battle Over Contra Role: Critics raise questions about John Negroponte's actions as ambassador to Honduras and his knowledge of a CIA-backed death squad (Los Angeles Times, March 25 2001). “The sudden deportations of several former death squad members ... could have provided evidence for the hearings ... within a few weeks of Negroponte's floated nomination.”

T. Christian Miller, Maggie Farley, Norman Kempster, Doyle McManus, Alex Renderos, “Cold War Stalks Bush's U.N. Pick” (Los Angeles Times, May 7 2001) {copy, archive}.

Terry J. Allen, “Scandal? What Scandal? Bush's Iran-Contra appointees are barely a story” (FAIR: Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, Extra! September/October 2001).

Larry Birns (Director), Jenna Wright, Jeremy Gans, Matthew Tschetter, “Negroponte: Nominee for Baghdad Embassy, a Rogue for all Seasons” (Council On Hemispheric Affairs, April 27 2004, Memorandum to the Press).

Jim Lobe, “Congress Ignores 'Dirty War' Past of New Iraq Envoy” (IPS: Inter Press Service, April 30 2004) {copy}.

Anonymous, “Negroponte: The Right Man for the Job but for the Wrong Reasons” (Council On Hemispheric Affairs, February 17 2005, Memorandum to the Press).

Peter Kornbluh, Laetitia Bordes, Andrés Thomas Conteris, interviewed by Amy Goodman, “Promoting the 'Ambassador of Torture': Bush Nominates Negroponte for Intel Czar” (Democracy Now!, February 18 2005).

Ray McGovern, “Hail, Hail The Gang's All Here” (TomPaine.com, February 18 2005) {copy}.

Gabriel Wildau, “FOX's Special Report downplayed concerns over Negroponte's questionable actions in Honduras” (Media Matters, February 18 2005) (links to 11 news reports).

Anonymous, “Media Omissions on Negroponte's Record” (FAIR: Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, February 22 2005) (11 news reports analyzed).

Robert Parry, “Negroponte's Dark Past: The case against Bush's new intelligence czar” (In These Times, March 3 2005).

Michael Dobbs, “Negroponte's Time in Honduras at Issue: Focus Renewed on Intelligence Pick's Knowledge of Death Squads in 1980s” (timeline) (Washington Post, March 21 2005). Oscar Reyes: “If they saved our lives, they could have saved a lot of other people’s lives as well.” (referring to Negroponte’s decision to secure his release from the Honduras government death squad, because the fame of this Honduran journalist attracted unwanted attention, and his wife Gloria, both kidnapped and tortured for a week, on July 8 1982, four months after the U.S. attacked Nicaragua from Honduras, launching a secret, covert, unlawful war.

Scott Shane, “Poker-Faced Diplomat, Negroponte Is Poised for Role as Spy Chief (New York Times, March 29 2005) {copy}. Lee H. Hamilton: “It takes courage and considerable gumption to say, ‘Mr. President, the intelligence does not run the way you’d like it to.’” Jack R. Binns: “I think he was complicit in abuses, I think he tried to put a lid on reporting abuses, and I think he was untruthful to Congress about those activities.” Leo Valladares Lanza: “I think he could have stopped all these assassinations and torture.”

Peter Kornbluh, “The Negroponte File: Negroponte’s Chron File From Tenure In Honduras Posted (National Security Archive, April 12 2005). 470 cables. Part 1:392 cables and memos ... sought to undermine regional peace efforts ... CIA covert operations ... Nicaragua ... advice on how to rewrite a Presidential finding {75kb.gif} on covert operations to overthrow the Sandinistas ... back channel communications with then CIA director William Casey ... Conspicuously absent from the cable traffic, however, is reporting on human rights atrocities that were committed by the Honduran military and its secret police unit known as Battalion 316, between 1982 and 1984, under the military leadership of General Gustavo Alvarez, Negroponte’s main liaison with the Honduran government.” “The Negroponte File: Additional Papers Posted on"Special Project" (update, April 12 2005). Part 2: 78 cables. “A virtual day-to-day record of Negroponte’s unique tenure as ambassador, as he secured Honduran military, logistical and political support for the controversial CIA paramilitary campaign to overthrow the Sandinista government.” (Nicaragua).

Michael Dobbs, “Papers Illustrate Negroponte's Contra Role: Newly Released Documents Show Intelligence Nominee Was Active in U.S. Effort” (Washington Post, April 12 2005) {copy}. “Shakespeare’s play ‘Julius Caesar’ ... the ambassador quoted from the play to illustrate the relationship between the Honduran and U.S. governments:

Cassius: You love me not.

Brutus: I do not like your faults.

Cassius: A friendly eye could never see such faults.”

 

____________________

Presidential nomination PN329-109 received, 151 Congressional Record S3092 {54kb.pdf} (“Executive nominations received by the Senate March 17, 2005”) {8kb.txt} (March 17 2005, daily edition 151:33, U.S. Congress 109-1) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/33}.

Nomination of Ambassador John D. Negroponte to Be Director of National Intelligence {254kb.txt, 6959kb.pdf, purl, copy} (U.S. Congress 109-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-79, April 12 2005, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/19:S.HRG.109-79, OCLC: 62187149, LCCN: 2006415042, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Witness: John D. Negroponte {280kb.pdf}. Transcripts {Lexis}: CQ/FDCH transcript (New York Times). FNS transcript. C-Span video {3:00:22}.

Committee Business Meeting, April 14 2005, secret vote approving the nomination.

Senate debate, “Nomination of John D. Negroponte to be Director of National Intelligence,” 151 Congressional Record S4041 (schedule) {2kb.txt, 64kb.pdf}, S4052-S4074 (debate) {167kb.txt, 194kb.pdf}, S4078-S4079 (debate) {11kb.txt, 53kb.pdf}, S4084 (vote) {4kb.txt, 47kb.pdf}, S4138 (confirmed list) {2kb.txt, 54kb.pdf} (April 21 2005, daily edition 151:49, U.S. Congress 109-1) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/49} {Congressional Record, daily edition, SuDoc: X/A, ISSN: 0363-7239, LCCN: 80646573, OCLC: 02437919, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. C-Span video: None.

Senate roll call vote 109-1:107 (98/2, April 21 2005, 3:50 p.m.).

 

____________________

Is he fit?

What would you do?”

“ Senator Carl Levin {8:25}: Mr. Ambassador, we need a director of national intelligence who will tell a president what a president may not want to hear.

But what he needs to hear.

We’ve too often seen heads of the intelligence community exaggerate or misrepresent or misstate intelligence to support the policy preferences of the White House.

We saw this with Bill Casey, who a bipartisan Iran-Contra report concluded had, quote,

“misrepresented or selectively used available intelligence to support the policy that he” — Bill Casey — “was promoting.” ...

Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, page 382 (“Misuse of Intelligence”) (U.S. Congress 100-1, Senate Report No. 100-216, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, House Report No. 100-433, House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, November 13 1987, 16+690 pages) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/5:100-216, Y 1.1/8:100-433, Serial Set: 13739, 13810, CIS: 87 H963-4, LCCN: 87602662, DL, WorldCat}CJHjr

Now, more recently, George Tenet also was engaged in exaggerations and misstatements when he said, for instance, publicly that Iraq had, quote,

“provided training in poisons and gases to two Al Qaida associates.”

Which was close to what the president was saying publicly about the same issue.

George John Tenet (Director, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency), Prepared statement (page 6) {copy, 974kb.pdf, copy} at page 12, and testimony at page 28, in Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States (U.S. Congress 108-1, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Hearing 108-161, February 11 2003, 3+239 pages) {172kb.txt, 6533kb.pdf, copy, copy} {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/19:S.HRG.108-161, LCCN: 2003373661, DL, LFDL, WorldCat}.

“We’ve learned that Iraq has trained Al Qaida members in bombmaking and poisons and deadly gases.”

George W. Bush (U.S. President), Address to the Nation (Cincinnati Ohio, October 7 2002), 38:41 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, pages 1716-1720 {22kb.txt, 43kb.pdf}CJHjr

But the underlying intelligence said that that reporting was contradictory and was from sources of varying reliability.

“In the past several years, Iraq has reportedly provided specialized training to al-Qa'ida in explosives and assistance to the group’s chemical and biological weapons program, although the level and extent of this is assistance is not clear. ... Our knowledge of Iraqi links to al-Qa'ida contains many critical gaps because of limited reporting [ redacted ] and the questionable reliability of many of our sources.”

Anonymous, Iraq and al-Qa'ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Counter-Terrorism Center, Report CTC 2002-40078CH, June 21 2002, Top Secret) {excerpt: 175kb.pdf} (report number). “Reportedly” by whom? Elliot Abrams & Ahmed Chalibi Productions?: “We Plant Lies and Supply Liars. Anywhere. Anytime. Any Media.”?  CJHjr

“As with much of the information on the overall relationship, details on training and support are second-hand or from sources of varying reliability. ...

None of the hundreds of al-Qa'ida members captured during Operation Enduring Freedom report having been trained in Iraq or by Iraqi trainers elsewhere, but given al-Qa'ida’s interest over the years in training and expertise from outside sources, we cannot discount reports of such training entirely.”

Anonymous, Iraq's Continuing Programs For Weapons of Mass Destruction, page 68 (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate, October 2 2002, NIE 2002-16HC, Top Secret) {excerpt: 100kb.pdf} (page number).  CJHjr

“At least [ redacted ] of the reports appear based on hearsay ... [ redacted ] of the reports are simple declarative accusations of Iraqi-al Qa'ida complicity with no substantiating detail or other information that might help us corroborate them.”

Anonymous, Iraqi Support for Terrorism (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Counter-Terrorism Center, Report CTC 2003-40004HJX or CTC 2003-1000/HS, January 29 2003, Top Secret) {excerpt: 546kb.pdf} (report number).  CJHjr

Judge Silberman explained recently in talking about his report {copy} that, quote,

“The intelligence community was quite resistant to notions that there was an important connection between Saddam and Al Qaida or terrorism.”

And yet, you had the director, the DCI, talking about Iraq, quote,

“providing training in poisons and gasses to Al Qaida associates.”

My question is this:

Are you troubled by that kind of a public statement of Director Tenet?

Which differs or differed from the underlying intelligence relative to the connection between Al Qaida and Saddam Hussein?

John Negroponte: ... I believe in calling things the way I see them. And I believe that the president deserves from his director of national intelligence and from the intelligence community unvarnished truth as I best understand it.

Carl Levin: That’s critically important because it’s not been the case.

When the DCI said that something was a slam dunk {copy} which was not a slam dunk, even given the underlying classified intelligence, that was not giving the president the unvarnished truth.

Now, you’re not responsible for what Tenet said, but your assurance here that you will do that is important.

There’s another aspect of unvarnished truth here, though.

And that is, that if you conclude that policymakers are making public statements that differ from the classified intelligence.

What action will you take?

And I want to just give you a couple recent examples.

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, a single uncorroborated report alleged that the lead 9/11 hijacker, Mohammed Atta, had met in Prague in April 2001 with an Iraqi intelligence officer named Al-Ani.

On December 9th, 2001, Vice President Cheney said {copy, copy} that the Prague meeting had been, quote,

“pretty well confirmed,”

although it had never been confirmed.

On September 8th, 2002, Vice President Cheney was asked if the CIA thought the report of the meeting was credible.

And he said it was

“credible.”

But in fact — in fact — as early as late spring of 2002, long before that statement, the intelligence community was skeptical that the meeting had taken place.

In June of 2002, the CIA issued a then-classified report that said that the information about the meeting was contradictory.

“Reporting is contradictory on hijacker Mohammed Atta’s alleged trip to Prague and meeting with an Iraqi intelligence officer, and we have not verified his travels.”

Anonymous, Iraq and al-Qa'ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Counter-Terrorism Center, Report CTC 2002-40078CH, June 21 2002, Top Secret) {excerpt: 175kb.pdf}CJHjr

It now turns out that in January 2003 — now that’s still before the war — that the CIA published a then-classified report that said the following, quote:

“Some information asserts that Atta met with Al-Ani. But — and these are the key words — “the most reliable reporting to date casts doubt on that possibility.”

Close quote.

Anonymous, Iraqi Support for Terrorism (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Counter-Terrorism Center, Report CTC 2003-40004HJX, January 29 2003, Top Secret) {excerpt: 546kb.pdf}.

For post-war reports on the evidence, see:

Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay, John Walcott, “Hussein ties to al Qaeda appear faulty” (Miami Herald, March 3 2004) {copy}.

The 9-11 Commission Report, “Atta's Alleged Trip to Prague,” pages 228-229 (chapter 7) {949kb.pdf, 771kb.pdf}, 522-523 note 70 (notes) {669kb.pdf, 1164kb.pdf}, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (July 22 2004, 18+567 pages) {SuDoc: Y 3.2:T 27/2/FINAL, LCCN: 2004356401, DL, LFDL, WorldCat}.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence decided to conceal all evidence, and virtually all text of the CIA reports, and gave no reasons for doing so. Some of what’s in the report is useful. But, due to its many redactions, concealments, and silence on many issues, their report appears to be untrustworthy on all issues, a successful, determined, willful, mendacious, effort to deceive, conceal, and cover-up, not inform:

U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq {copy, html}, pages 304-349 (chapter 12) {2670kb.pdf}, at 338-341 (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report No. 108-301, July 9 2004, 511 pages) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/5:108-301, LCCN: 2004356402, DL, LFDL, WorldCat}CJHjr

Now that language was just declassified at my request within the last week by the CIA.

So you have the CIA, in its classified assessment, saying that

“the most reliable reporting to date casts doubt on that possibility.”

But yet you have the top policymakers saying that, that meeting, we believe, took place.

My question to you is this:

What would you do?

If you were DNI at the time that kind of a public statement were made.

If you believed that it went beyond the classified intelligence.

John Negroponte: I think you’re raising a hypothetical.

Carl Levin: No, that’s a real one.

John Negroponte: But looking to the facts here, Senator, it seems to me that everything we’ve gone through in these last months — the 9/11 report {copy}, the WMD Commission report {copy}, the reports that you have done — are to look at ways in which we can correct and reform and improve the modus operandi of the intelligence community in order to avoid these kinds of situations being repeated.

I would, first of all, do my utmost to make sure that the right intelligence is presented to the president, the vice president, the Cabinet members and our armed forces and the Congress.

Carl Levin: And if you believed an erroneous statement was made by a top policymaker to the public?

What would you do?

John Negroponte: Well, I think that, first of all, given an opportunity to comment beforehand on the correctness or not of the statement, and if I had information that contradicted what was in a draft presidential speech, I would seek to ensure that that incorrect information did not find its way into a presidential or ...

Carl Levin: And if it did?

John Negroponte: Well, you know, we have to cross that bridge, Senator.

But I believe that we’ve got to work to establish objective intelligence. And the Intelligence Reform Act deals with a number of mechanisms designed to do that.

Carl Levin: Thank you.”

Nomination of Ambassador John D. Negroponte to Be Director of National Intelligence {254kb.txt, 6959kb.pdf, purl, copy}, pages 18-20 (U.S. Congress 109-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 109-79, April 12 2005, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/19:S.HRG.109-79, OCLC: 62187149, LCCN: 2006415042, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}, witness: John D. Negroponte {280kb.pdf}, transcripts {Lexis}: CQ/FDCH transcript (New York Times), FNS transcript, C-Span video {3:00:22, at 1:03:51}.

____________________

Never in the history of the world, has a simplier question been asked of an honest man:

“What would you do?”

Yet, Mr. Negroponte did not answer the question.

In his mind, the question doesn’t compute.

His duty is to obey orders.

That’s what he’s always done. That’s why George W. Bush gave him the job. A safe and trusted pair of hands.

Sure, he’s got no problem laying the truth before policy makers. Those are his orders. And it’s a very simple matter, to ensure what that truth is, if they don’t want to hear the actual truth. Just like last time.

Because intelligence, by definition, is opinion, not fact. Mainly, a judgment on the knowledge and credibility of sources and intercepts. On guard against dupers and manipulators, with agendas, criminal enterprises, with inside knowledge of the intelligence community, fictitious evidence, forged documents, doctored soil samples, scripted electronics (telephone talk, emails, faxes, radio talk), designed to be intercepted. Just like last time.

And it’s easy to find like minded people, to make the final decisions, in a National Intelligence Estimate, what to assert is the community opinion, and what to footnote as a minority view. Or omit entirely. Just like last time. When they bypassed the National Intelligence Council, and appointed a CIA WINPAC official instead, to be their designated liar, the engine room of the criminal conspiracy, who proceeded to footnote the opinion of experts — on aluminum tubes, battlefield rockets, Niger uranium, unmanned aerial vehicles — pretending the indifferent, deferential, acquiescence of non-expert agencies, on those expert topics, was the community’s opinion. And concealing all of this from the unclassified public version of the NIE, the only version nearly every Member of Congress ever saw, omitting the Air Force’s dissent on unmanned aerial vehicles, for example, a key lie, which many Members of Congress have mentioned as influencing their vote, because the liars who briefed them said Saddam could attack the United States with these nonexistent UAVs.

All to please his political masters.

Exactly like Tony Blair’s designated liar did, in the U.K., John Scarlett, who also cancelled a committee meeting, where experts would have refused, to endorse the false claims he inserted, at the last minute, without their approval, into Tony Blair’s discredited dossier, on Iraq’s supposed WMD. A willful or reckless liar, who has so far escaped judgment as such, by a U.K. judge (Brian Hutton), who decided to join with John Scarlett, the both of them violating their duties, blinding themselves, to the underlying evidence, erroneously, negligently, recklessly, willfully, representing intelligence, neither had ever seen, to be what it is not.

And simpler still, if the various agencies — now safely operating under different chains of command — are brought under a unified chain of command, so all officials will now know, their jobs are imperiled, and whom they must now please, to keep their jobs, to gain advancement.

Which John R. Bolton will be glad to see, because the WMD analyst he berated did not work for him, and had no duty to collude in a lie about Cuba, because that analyst’s chain of command excluded Bolton, reporting directly {62kb.pdf} to the Secretary of State instead, not to Bolton, or to any other Under Secretary.

Failing which, scope for imposing his will on an Estimate is sharply reduced, and can operate only where there’s difference of opinion, among the separate agencies, who now have no duty to obey orders from other agencies. A difference of opinion he can create, by enleaguing at least one agency, though plagued by those niggling footnotes, from others, he cannot eradicate.

But laying whatever “truthful” intelligence he can manage to create, before policy makers, that’s where his job ends, in his mind.

If the President and his henchmen then decide to lie about it, that’s their business, not his.

But the duty of the Director of National Intelligence, surely, is to protect the integrity of intelligence and the use of it. If the President and his henchmen want to conduct a criminal enterprise, then they’ll have to find some other way of doing it besides lying about intelligence. That is the duty of the director to ensure.

The whole country depends upon him doing his duty, not least Members of Congress, who have the exclusive authority to declare war and agree to a continuation of war. And that’s the whole Congress, not just those Members complicit in criminal enterprises, desiring to be lied to, enabling them.

People can have a change of heart, as they journey through life, and even change their character. Had Mr. Negroponte done so, there would be evidence of it, and I’ve seen none. From what I can see, he marked his path long ago, and he travels it still, with a heart of stone.

What would an honest man say, in answer to Senator Levin’s question?

“I would confront the speaker with the truth of the intelligence and give him the option of correcting his misstatements, with the same prominence he made them.

Failing which, I would do it myself, personally.

I would then investigate, whether procedures had been circumvented, designed to ensure such didn’t happen, and correct any defects, and ensure that any who willfully circumvented the system are removed from office.

And if I found myself thwarted in that effort, I would report my difficulties to Congress.

And finally, I would ensure, from the outset, that everybody knows, in advance, this is exactly what I will do.”

Would George W. Bush nominate an honest man to this job?

John Dimitri Negroponte.

Is he fit?

If you want to be lied to, he’s fit.

If you want him to wage crime on orders, he’s fit.

If you want him to thumb his nose at Congress, the Constitution, the laws, he’s fit.

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.,
a 13th generation American (1620).

 

2004


To be U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

Presidential nomination PN1542-108.

Executive nominations received by the Senate April 26, 2004,” 150 Congressional Record S4381 {2kb.txt, 12kb.pdf} (April 26 2004, daily edition 150:54, U.S. Congress 108-2) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/54}.

Nomination of Hon. John D. Negroponte to be U.S. Ambassador to Iraq {209kb.txt, purl, 541kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Hearing 108-474, April 27 2004, Foreign Relations Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.108-474, LCCN: 2004438754, OCLC: 56026207, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Hearing transcript. Two FDCH transcripts via Lexis. Federal News Service transcript: 10:03 a.m. C-Span video {2:56:00}.

Committee Business Meeting, April 29 2004. “The Committee met today, and approved all items on the agenda,” including: “Nomination of John D. Negroponte to be Ambassador to Iraq.”

Senate debate, “Nomination of John D. Negroponte, of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Iraq,” 150 Congressional Record S4951-4980 {251kb.txt, 193kb.pdf} (May 6 2004, daily edition 150:62, U.S. Congress 108-2) {SuDoc: X/A.108/2:150/62}. C-Span video: None.

Senate roll call vote 108-2:85 (95/3/2, May 6 2004, 04:34 p.m.).

2001


To be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

Presidential nominations PN414-107, PN415-107, PN854-107, PN855-107.

Nomination of Hon. John D. Negroponte to Serve as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations {274kb.txt, purl, 609kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 107-1, Senate Hearing 107-781, September 13 2001, Foreign Relations Committee) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.107-781, LCCN: 2003387487, OCLC: 51324438, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}. Two FDCH transcripts via Lexis. Federal News Service transcripts: 11:07 a.m., 2:15 p.m. C-Span video: None.

Committee Business Meeting, September 13 2001, approving the nomination (14/3) (published hearing, pages 63-66).

Senate debate (none), “Nomination of John Negroponte to Represent the U.S. at the United Nations,” 147 Congressional Record S9431-9433 {25kb.txt, 63kb.pdf}, S9461-9464 {32kb.txt, 73kb.pdf} (September 14 2001, daily edition 147:120, U.S. Congress 107-1) {SuDoc: X/A.107/1:147:120}. C-Span video: None.

Senate roll call vote: None.

1993


To be U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines

Presidential nomination PN546-103.

Nomination of Hon. John D. Negroponte to be U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines (U.S. Congress 103-1, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Hearing, September 14 1993) (unpublished). FDCH transcript via Lexis: None. Federal News Service transcript: None.

Senate debate (none), “Nomination of John D. Negroponte, of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of the Philippines,” 139 Congressional Record S13249 (October 7 1993, daily edition 139:135, U.S. Congress 103-1) {SuDoc: X/A.103/1:139:135}.

Senate roll call vote: None.

1989


To be U.S. Ambassador to Mexico

Presidential nomination PN177-101.

Nomination of Hon. John D. Negroponte to be U.S. Ambassador to Mexico (U.S. Congress 101-1, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Hearing, April 6 1989) (unpublished). FDCH transcript via Lexis: None. Federal News Service transcript: None.

Senate debate (none), “Nomination of John D. Negroponte to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Mexico,” 135 Congressional Record S6635 (June 14 1989, daily edition 135:79, U.S. Congress 101-1) {SuDoc: X/A.101/1:135:79}.

Senate roll call vote: None.

 

 

This document is not copyrighted and may be freely copied.

CJHjr

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Posted March 28 2005. Updated May 1 2009.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/congress-john-negroponte.html

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