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John Robert Bolton:
Confirmation hearings and debates

Verdict


by Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

 

The trouble, with dishonesty

Does Iran have a nuclear weapons program?

See John lie

“ It always disturbs me when people promulgate falsehoods.”

John Bolton, July 27 2006

Is the U.S./Israel attack on Gaza, and Palestine, by blockade and quarantine (“war”), in Israel’s “self-defense”?

Is Israel’s armed attack on Gaza in Israel’s “self-defense”?

Is the U.S./Israel armed attack on Lebanon in Israel’s “self-defense”?

As John Bolton asserts?

Or, instead, in defense of Israel’s aggression, and land theft, against Palestine?

A continuation, of a 40-year criminal war of aggression?

With the U.S., an aggressor co-belligerent?

With the aggressor?

Israel?

And are other nations legally entitled?

To attack the U.S. and Israel?

Any time?

Any place?

In the collective defense of Palestine?

To persuade the U.S. and Israel?

To terminate their aggression?

And pay compensation?

For their violent crimes?

  CJHjr

 2006 

 

Prosecuting U.S. complicity in Israel settlement war crimes

Gaza: Blockade, reprisals

Bombing Iran's IAEA safe-guarded nuclear facilities

War Crimes Act
John Bolton
John Negroponte
Alberto Gonzales
Condoleezza Rice
Robert Gates
Iraq Study Group
Iraq wmd war vote
Iraq war timeline: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008
Iran uranium timeline
Israel/Palestine

To be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (2006)

Blogs: The Bolton renomination (2006): Steven C. Clemons, The Washington Note (archives: July, August, September, October, November, December 2006), Bolton Watch.

George W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 2001-2009 Jan. 20), “Nominations and Withdrawal Sent to the Senate{pf} (White House, September 19 2005), recorded, “Nominations Submitted to the Senate,” 41:38 WCPD 1454-1455, at 1454 {4kb.txt, 42kb.pdf} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:41/38}.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential nominations PN910-109, PN911-109, received, “Nominations,” 151 Congressional Record S10201 {pf} {13kb.txt, 52kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-1, daily edition 151:117, September 19 2005) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/117}.

George Victor Voinovich (Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee), “Why I'll Vote for Bolton{pf} (Washington Post, July 20 2006).

Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Ranking Minority Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee), “Biden Statement on Possible Re-nomination of UN Ambassador John Bolton” (press release, July 20 2006).

Charles Babington, “Bolton's Nomination Revives After Senator Changes Mind” {pf} (Washington Post, July 22 2006).

Warren Hoge, “Praise at Home for Envoy, but Scorn at U.N.{pf, copy} (New York Times, July 23 2006).

Senate Committee hearing, Renomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (unpublished) (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, July 27 2006, 9:30 a.m. ET), Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {9kb.html, 18kb.pdf}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {15kb.pdf}, witness: John Bolton {45kb.pdf, 44kb.html, U.S./U.N. archive, DoS copy, DoS archive} (interim U.S. U.N. ambassador, following his first failed Senate confirmation, a recess appointment on August 1 2005, expiring with the 109th Congress, in December 2006), C-Span video {3:38:05, 212mb.rm, schedule, 166014310, 193556-1, rss}, committee video {3:53:19, 59.2mb.rm}, transcripts {Lexis}: CQ transcript: part-1 {pf}, part-2 {pf}, FNS transcript.

Senate Committee business meeting, scheduled (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 1 2006, 2:15 p.m.): “The Committee will consider and vote on the following agenda items: ... Nominations: The Honorable John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations with rank of Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the United Nations Security Council and U.S. Representative to Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly during his tenure of service as U.S. Representative to the United Nations.”

Reuters, “Senate Panel Puts Off Bolton Vote To September{pf} (Washington Post, July 31 2006, 2:56 p.m.).

Scott T. Paul, “Calling Their Bluff: Bolton Will Not Be Confirmed” (Bolton Watch, September 5, 2006: “Republicans need 60 Senators to win a cloture motion and end debate. Without tipping my hand completely, I can say that the Republican leadership has 53 votes it can count on, and another 4 who are leaning in its direction but uncertain. On a sunny day, that makes 57. Even if they capture the 2 truly undecided votes, that still leaves them a vote short of the 60 they need. It’s simply not going to happen.”

Diplomats against Bolton, letter to Richard G. Lugar (Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee), September 6, 2006, “signed by 61 former U.S. diplomats, State Department officials or officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Many of the signatories have decades of service in Republican and Democratic administrations, working under every president from John F. Kennedy onward. They represent a seasoned, bipartisan diplomatic core who believe that John Bolton has damaged U.S. and UN interests and his continued service would only further that damage.”

Christopher J. Dodd (Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee), floor statement, “Nomination of John Bolton,” 152 Congressional Record S8990-S8992 {pf} {18kb.txt, 60kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:108, September 6 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/108}, C-Span video/text (rm, wm) {15:26, 17mb.rm, September 6, 198170140, 194152-1} (C-Span Congressional Chronicle, Senate, September 6 2006).

“ Christopher Dodd: But there is more.

On the basis of those issues, I urge my colleagues to vote against Mr. Bolton.

But I am going to go a step further.

Because I believe, other actions, taken by Mr. Bolton, are so outrageous, that Mr. Bolton does not even deserve a vote, in my view.

There is Mr. Bolton’s well-documented attempts

 To manipulate intelligence 

To suit his world view,

And seek the removal of at least two intelligence analysts, who wouldn’t play ball.

When these analysts refused to support intelligence conclusions, not supported by available intelligence, Mr. Bolton mounted a concerted effort, to have them fired.

The fact they were not removed, does not excuse his actions.

I don’t mind a heated debate. I don’t mind people having serious disagreements with conclusions.

But.

When you attempt to fire, lower level employees, who are responsible, for gathering intelligence, for the United States.

Because you don’t like their results—

 That is dangerous business 

Indeed.

I do not care in which administration you may serve.

Any individual, in my view, who attempts

To doctor evidence,

To fire people, whose conclusions they disagree with, when it comes to intelligence gathering,

Does not deserve to be promoted, to the high position, of ambassador to the United Nations.

His behavior, in my view,

Endangers our national security.

Because it goes to the very heart, of what we depend upon, to protect that security—

Unbiased, professional, intelligence collection, and analysis.

Mr. Bolton stepped away, and he stepped over the line, and committed an offense, so grievous, in my view, it warrants, that this Senate deny him, an up-or-down vote, on his nomination.

In concluding, Mr. President, I return to the point I made earlier, namely, that Mr. Bolton has largely burned his bridges, with his colleagues in New York, and is not likely to be an effective diplomat, when his diplomacy is increasingly becoming the coin of the realm, in protecting and advancing U.S. interests, at this very unstable moment, in this country.”

Steven C. Clemons, “John Bolton Vote Today” (The Washington Note, September 7, 2006): “Senator Schumer ... is actively supporting Bolton ... the notion, promulgated in part by Schumer, that “a vote against Bolton was a vote against Israel.”

Schumer’s views on this — as well as the calls from some American Jewish organizations — dangerously conflate the question of Israel’s interests and this Bolton vote.

The fact is, that Republican and Democratic Ambassadors at the UN have been effective stewards of the US-Israel relationship, and of Israel’s interests.

To overly personalize this around Bolton is bad policy — and reckless for Schumer to help propogate.”

Query: “Effective stewards”? See, Prosecuting U.S. complicity in Israel settlement confiscations.”  CJHjr

Senate Committee business meeting (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 7, 2006, 9:30 a.m.): “The Committee will consider and vote on the following agenda items: Treaty: Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Treaty Doc. 108-23). Nominations: ... The Honorable John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations with rank of Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the United Nations Security Council and U.S. Representative to Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly during his tenure of service as U.S. Representative to the United Nations.” C-Span video {1:02:31, rss}. Committee video {1:46:32, begins at 40:30}, transcripts {Lexis}: FNS transcript. CQ/FDCH transcript.

“ Richard G. Lugar {0:15, 0:15}: In addition, we had originally intended to vote, on the nomination of John Bolton, to be ambassador to the U.N.

However, I’m removing the nomination, from today’s agenda, after conferring with several Senators.”

Steven C. Clemons, “Lincoln Chafee: Taking a Principled Stand on Bolton” (The Washington Note, September 7, 2006)

“He thinks that the administration has done nothing credible in recent years to push forward a “viable, two state solution” in Israel-Palestine affairs. Today, Chafee told Senator Lugar that he would not support John Bolton as things stood. He would vote no if pushed ... The vote ... is now certain to be delayed, beyond the September 12th primaries in Rhode Island.”

Steven C. Clemons, “A Big Reason to Oppose Steve Laffey in Rhode Island Race” (The Washington Note, September 7, 2006): “Lincoln Chafee’s primary challenger, in the Rhode Island Republican primary, Steve Laffey just sent out this criticism of Chafee:... ‘Over the past year, John Bolton has demonstrated that he is a capable and effective representative of America’s interests in the United Nations ... an effective leader and defender of U.S. interests.’”

Comment: grytpype: “Here’s hoping Laffey wins the primary and loses the general. (September 7, 2006 05:43 PM).”

 

____________________

Query: Can John Bolton be reappointed?

If the Senate doesn’t act?

On John Bolton’s renomination?

His recess appointment (August 1 2005) terminates with the current 109th Congress (said to end in December 2006). U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”).

Can George W. Bush recess-appoint John Bolton.

Again?

A second recess appointment?

Yes.

Because the constitution says so.

But.

John Bolton cannot receive any salary, for his services, from the U.S. Treasury, for his renewed job.

The push-back, from Congress, to enforce the constitution. The Senate’s power, to approve, or reject, the president’s nominees for important positions.

This, according to a long-standing interpretation, by the government’s lawyers, of this opaque statute: 5 U.S.C. § 5503. Recess appointments. See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen (Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel), Reimbursement of Expenses Under 5 U.S.C.  5503(a) (Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, February 2, 1998) (“Section 5503(a) has been interpreted as prohibiting ‘[p]ayment for services’ to individuals receiving successive recess appointments,” citing previous OCLC opinions).

The government’s lawyers can always change their opinion.

If that’s what George W. Bush wants them to do.

But until they do, their existing interpretation is binding on the people who write the salary checks.

The Israeli government would be eager to pay John Bolton’s salary, I’m sure, from the $3 billion cash, U.S. taxpayers deposit in Israel’s New York City bank account, at the beginning of each year.

And, the U.S. government could legally pay his expenses (according to Dawn Johnsen).

The Washington Post reports, “Officials said ... another federal law ... bans full-time employees from working without compensation,” but they cite no law, which says so. Peter Baker, Dafna Linzer, “White House Seeks a Way to Keep Bolton at the U.N.{pf} (Washington Post, September 14 2006).

Is there another way?

To reappoint John Bolton, and pay him, from the U.S. Treasury?

Maybe so.

If George W. Bush nominates a different person to the job, within the last 30 days of the Senate’s current session.

He could then reappoint John Bolton, the day after the current Congress ends, to serve another year, pending Senate action on that nomination, of the new person.

(A renewed nomination, of that or another person, must be submitted within 40 days after the new Congress (110th) begins, around about January 20 2007).

He could nominate a legitimate candidate.

Or, he could nominate a provocative candidate, willing to humiliate himself, or herself, perhaps for a big cash bonus, from the Israelis, for example.

Somebody the Senate would not accept.

Just to show the Senate.

Who’s boss.

Like Otto Reich, for example.

Or Elliott Abrams.

Or Michael Ledeen.

Or John Poindexter.

Apparently, John Bolton could then continue to serve, while the Senate did nothing, and even after the Senate rejected the new nomination.

The above seems to comply with 5 U.S.C. § 5503(a)(2).

That statute makes my eyes glaze over, and I won’t trouble myself further, wondering what it might mean.

A fruitless task.

Because what it actually means doesn’t matter.

It only matters, what the government lawyers say it means.

Normally, they keep their contentious opinions secret.

Government by secret laws.

But, in this case, they would have to make it public, because the public would clamber to know, why John Bolton was still on the job.

I anyway don’t suppose George W. Bush wants to embellish his spectacle.

Though it would be light relief, for the rest of us.

A welcome diversion.

From unrelenting violent crime.

Past.

And promised.

  CJHjr, Sept. 8-14 2006

Christopher S. Rhee, assisted by Junichi Okuhisa, Karen Ku, Tyler Ulrich, Joshua Kaplan, Joshua Brook, James Joseph, “Extending the Tenure of John R. Bolton” {57 kb pf, source} (Arnold & Porter, Washington D.C., November 9 2006):

“ Conclusion

To extend Mr. Bolton’s tenure as U.N. Representative either by a second recess appointment or an acting appointment under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act would be directly at odds with the Senate’s advice and consent function and would likely be without precedent.

An acting appointment would be contrary to law.

If the President took such a controversial step, Mr. Bolton would be subject to statutory restrictions on his ability to collect salary (in the case of a recess appointment) or the length of his tenure (in the case of an acting appointment).”

____________________

Senate Adjournment: “Adjournment Until Thursday, November 9, 2006, at 10 A.M.,” 152 Congressional Record S10818 {pf} {45kb.txt, 80kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:125, September 29 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/125}.

“ Mr. Frist. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the provisions of H. Con. Res 483.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 2:26 a.m., adjourned until Thursday, November 9, 2006, at 10 a.m.”

Senate Rule 31(6):

“ 6. Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they are made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again made to the Senate by the President; and if the Senate shall adjourn or take a recess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally acted upon at the time of taking such adjournment or recess shall be returned by the Secretary to the President, and shall not again be considered unless they shall again be made to the Senate by the President.”

Emily Reynolds (Secretary of the Senate, U.S. Congress) returns, to the President, Presidential nominations PN910-109, PN911-109, “Nominations Returned to the President,” 152 Congressional Record D1075 (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:125, September 29 2006) {copy, 45kb.txt, 80kb.pdf} {SuDoc: X/A.109/2:152/125}.

“ Nominations Returned to the President: The following nominations were returned to the President failing of confirmation under Senate Rule XXXI at the time of the adjournment of the 109th Congress: ...

John Robert Bolton, of Maryland, to be the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, with the rank and status of Ambassador, and the Representative of the United States of America in the Security Council of the United Nations (Recess Appointment).

John Robert Bolton, of Maryland, to be Representative of the United States of America to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations during his tenure of service as Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations (Recess Appointment).”

Anonymous, “Chafee defeated with pro-Israel help” (JTA Today, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Breaking News, November 7 2006).

“ U.S. Sen. Lincoln Chafee (R-R.I.), who drew strong pro-Israel opposition, lost his bid for re-election.

His opponent, Sheldon Whitehouse, drew funding from the pro-Israel community.

Chafee, chairman of the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that deals with the Middle East, was strongly critical of Israel’s West Bank settlement policy and recently blocked the nomination of John Bolton as U.N. ambassador to protest planned settlement expansion.

Chafee was considered a casualty of profound opposition in Rhode Island to the Iraq war.

The senator was not a backer of the war, but it is believed voters sought to punish President Bush by targeting the Republican Party.”

George W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 2001-2009 Jan. 20), “Nominations Sent to the Senate{pf} (White House, November 9 2006), retitled, “Nominations Submitted to the Senate,” 42:45 WCPD 2039-2040 {2kb.txt, 43kb.pdf} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:42/45} (John Robert Bolton).

U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential nominations PN2104-109, PN2105-109, received, “Nominations,” 152 Congressional Record S10843 {pf} {3kb.txt, 41kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-2, daily edition 152:126, November 9 2006) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:152/126} (John Robert Bolton).

 

Sean McCormack (Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Spokesman, U.S. State Department), “Daily Press Briefing” (State Department, November 9 2006, 12:00-12:40 p.m. ET), video (bb) {35:59, 10.6 mb wmv} {bb 84 mb wmv}, audio {8 mb mp3}.

“ Question: Has Secretary Rice reached out to Senator Lugar, or Senator Biden, about John Bolton’s nomination?

And how you foresee that playing out?

Sean McCormack: Well, I think Tony talked a little bit about this at the White House briefing, in terms of outlining what the President’s priorities are, for this lame duck session.

A lot of those priorities are very much at the top of our list here—

Vietnam PNTR, the India civ-nuke deal, as well as John Bolton’s confirmation.

We believe that he deserves an up or down vote.

That if he gets such a vote, that he would win it, in the Senate.

He has been extraordinarily effective up there at the U.N.

And now is not the time to have a gap in your U.N. ambassador.

Just look at all the items that are on the agenda of the Security Council, that are fundamental to peace and security around the world:

Iran, Iraq will be coming up, North Korea, Sudan, issues involving the Middle East.

So there’s a whole list of crucial issues that are now before the Security Council.

And it’s important that we have our Ambassador up there.

And John Bolton’s the right guy to be up there right now.

Question: This is a follow-up.

Senator Biden, on a conference call with reporters yesterday, said that the nomination was pretty much dead.

Has the Secretary, or anybody else in the Department, reached out to the key senators on the Foreign Relations Committee?

Sean McCormack: She’s done a number of different phone calls yesterday, talking to leaders on the Republican side as well as the Democrat side.

I can’t tell you what exactly she talked about.

I didn’t get a readout of it.

She’s ready to do whatever she needs to do, in order to help John get confirmed.

* * *

Question: If Senator Biden says that John Bolton’s nomination is just going nowhere, then what options are open to you?

You must be looking at options.

Could he—

One option that was thrown out there—

Sean McCormack: We’re—

Question: —was that he could work without pay.

Is that a possibility?

Sean McCormack: Well, you know, I don’t know how enthusiastic he would be.

About working without pay.

I haven’t asked him that.

I haven’t asked him that question.

That’s kind of a personal question.

Look.

We think that he should—

He deserves a vote.

He should get his moment before the full Senate.

To have people cast their votes.

One way or the other on him.”

Stephen J. Hadley (U.S. National Security Advisor, from January 26 2005; deputy, 2001-2005), “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley{pf} (White House, November 9 2006, 4:57-5:34 p.m. ET).

“ Question: Today, the administration put forward the nomination of U.N. Ambassador Bolton.

Republicans on the Hill say nothing has changed, and that there’s very—

Extremely doubtful that it would get out of committee.

Democrats, obviously, are saying it’s a non-starter.

So what are the prospects?

And what happens, if it doesn’t get addressed in lame duck?

Steve Hadley: Well, one of the things that’s changed is John Bolton has now had a long period of time up in New York.

And one of the things we hope is that people will step back and look at that record.

And we think it is a strong record.

John has done a terrific job.

He has gotten out of the United Nations some very important resolutions on some of the most important issues for our national security.

A very tough resolution on North Korea, I think actually two tough resolutions on North Korea, which many people thought we could not get.

We have a very strong resolution in terms of Lebanon, at a critical time.

We are now working in terms of Iran.

You know, these are hard to do.

This is bringing countries with different views together.

John has been terrific.

He has been a champion of reform.

And he has been a clear advocate of American values.

So I have to tell you, that I would hope that people would step back, take a look at John’s record up there, and reach the judgment that the President has reached, that he does a terrific job for the American people.

Question: So you think it’s possible that you could pressure Senator Lincoln Chafee into changing his mind into letting it out of committee?

Steve Hadley: You say pressure.

I would say explain and persuade.

Because John has a terrific record up there.

And I just think—

I know what the President wants us to do is to sit down.

We need to do it senator-by-senator.

And explain the record.

And I think, if you want an effective American ambassador in the United Nations, John Bolton has proved he is that.

And the President believes, that the Senate ought to step back, take a look at that record, and confirm him.

Question: How would you bet on the prospects of that?

Steve Hadley: I don’t bet.”

 

Douglas Stanglin, “Bush agenda faces uphill climb in lame-duck Congress{pf} (USA Today, November 10 2006).

“ On Thursday, the White House resubmitted Bolton’s nomination to the Senate, where it has languished for more than a year.

Bolton, strongly opposed by Democrats, assumed the post last year in a recess appointment, which does not require a Senate vote.

But that will expire in January, unless the Senate confirms him in a formal vote.

Democrat Joe Biden, who will be the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Thursday he opposed the nomination, as did Sen. Lincoln Chafee, of Rhode Island, a liberal Republican who was defeated in his re-election bid on Tuesday.

“I see no point in considering Mr. Bolton's nomination again,” Biden said.

Chafee made it clear he would bottle up the nomination in the Foreign Relations Committee during the lame-duck session.

“The American people have spoken out against the president’s agenda on a number of fronts, and presumably one of those is on foreign policy,” Chafee said. “And at this late stage in my term, I’m not going to endorse something the American people have spoken out against.””

Robert Anthony Snow (White House Press Secretary), “Press Briefing by Tony Snow{pf} (White House, November 10 2006, 11:50-12:22 p.m. ET), video {30:57}.

“ Question: Do you consider the John Bolton nomination dead?

Tony Snow: No.

Think of it this way:

I know a lot of people had positions and old views about John Bolton.

But in the spirit of trying to take a fresh look at things, and trying to be fair-minded, it’s probably worth reviewing his record as United Nations Ambassador, which has been highly successful.

John Bolton, in his tenure at the United Nations, has shepherded through two U.N. Security Council resolutions with regard to North Korea. He has been working aggressively and actively with our allies on the issue of Iran. He has put together a U.N. Security Council resolution on Lebanon.

And I think he has demonstrated an ability to work effectively with other members and other U.N. delegations to move forward and show a leadership role in important business.

So, again, the President believes that John Bolton has done an exemplary job.

And if people fairly will examine his record — his real accomplishments, his record at the United Nations — that he not only will have earned confirmation, but will receive it.

Question: You went through this list with me yesterday.

And a lot of people didn’t find it persuasive.

And the Democrats and Senator Chafee say, they’re still against him.

So why do you think there’s any reason for optimism?

Tony Snow: Well, again, I keep hearing all this talk, that people want to sort of have fresh starts.

And I think it’s—

Look.

We think it’s worth the public having a look at John Bolton’s record.

This is a guy who’s been a terrific U.N. Ambassador.

He deserves an opportunity to stay.

Question: Is there any discussion of — if he’s not confirmed — going around, giving him an appointment.

Using some other name than U.N. Ambassador?

To keep him there?

Tony Snow: I am not aware of that.

But I’m not going to rule anything in or out.

* * *

Look at John Bolton’s record.

And the real question is:

 What complaint do you have? 

With a man who has been so successful.

In pushing through vital National Security Council resolutions through the United Nations.

And has been awfully effective.”

John R. Bolton, to George W. Bush, resignation letter {75kb.pdf, copy} (The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, dated December 1 2006), first published, December 4 2006.

“ The Representative
of the
United States of America
to the
United Nations

December 1 2006

Dear Mr. President:

It has been a great honor and privilege for me to serve in your Administration for nearly six years, first as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and now as Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Your leadership has been critical in safeguarding America’s values and interests in a time of peril and challenge.

After careful consideration, I have concluded that my service in your administration should end when the current recess appointment expires.

I wish you every success during the remainder of your Term, and all best wishes.

Sincerely,

{Signature}

John R. Bolton

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500”

George W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 2001-2009 Jan. 20), “President Bush Accepts Ambassador John Bolton's Resignation as U.S. Representative to the United Nations” {pf} (White House, December 4 2006), retitled, “Statement on the Resignation of John R. Bolton as United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations,” 42:49 WCPD 2123-2124 {3kb.txt, 43kb.pdf} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:42/49}. George W. Bush, “President Bush Meets with United Nations Ambassador John Bolton{pf} (White House, Oval Office, 3:49-3:50 p.m. ET), video {0:52}, retitled, “Remarks on the Resignation of John R. Bolton as United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations,” 42:49 WCPD 2123 {2kb.txt, 43kb.pdf} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:42/49}.

“ George W. Bush: I am deeply disappointed that a handful of United States Senators prevented Ambassador Bolton from receiving the up or down vote he deserved in the Senate.

They chose to obstruct his confirmation, even though he enjoys majority support in the Senate, and even though their tactics will disrupt our diplomatic work at a sensitive and important time.

This stubborn obstructionism ill serves our country.

And discourages men and women of talent.

From serving their Nation.”

____________________

Query: Handful”?

46 Senators.

That’s more than a “handful.”

Query: Stubborn obstructionism”?

Stubborn determination.

Query: Men and women of talent”?

Such people are confirmed, by the Senate, regularly.

But sometimes not.

If they flaunt dishonest moral character.

Like John Bolton does.

A bold, audacious, unflinching, relentless, malicious, liar and bully.

He inflicts, thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, of hours, of useless labor, on hundreds, or thousands, of people.

Dealing with his endless, brazen, lies.

And his endless threats.

Instead of, devoting their efforts productively, on the honest political issues, John Bolton designs to conceal, and falsify, with his lies.

Because he knows, he can’t get the result he desires, debating on honest facts.

The next service John Bolton can do his nation.

Is to stand trial.

For his life.

For his very active participation.

In the violent criminal conspiracy.

To lie.

About Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction.

And engineer a criminal war of aggression.

On Iraq.

  Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

  December 4 2006

 2005 

 

To be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (2005)

Blogs: The Bolton nomination (2005): Steven C. Clemons, The Washington Note (archives: March, April, May, June, July, August, September 2005).

James Ridgeway, “Uranium Equals Kryptonite for Bush Nominee: Congressman demands answers from Bolton over Niger fiasco” (Village Voice, March 1 2005) {copy}.

Henry Waxman (Ranking Minority Member, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform), “Concealment of a State Department Official’s Role in the Niger Uranium Claim,” pages 5-7, letter dated March 1 2005 to Christopher Shays (Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations) {1524kb.pdf}. “Evidence of Administration’s Misuse of New Information Restrictions Grows.”

Vincent Cannistraro, interviewed by Ian Masters, “Forgery of Iraq-war-justifying documents done in the United States, says former top U.S. intelligence official” (Pacifica, Radio KPFK, Background Briefing, Los Angeles, Sunday April 3 2005, 11am-1pm PT), BB transcript {comment, copy}, broadcast audio (both hours, 5-6 week archive), archived audio (bb) {58:53, Cannistraro at 0:00-24:50, 10.11 mb mp3, 33.70 mb mp3, rss, archive} (110,000 watts, the most powerful radio transmitter on Mount Wilson, “a superpower site, with typical coverage footprints of 5,000 square miles”). “Niger documents ... a well-known national security operative ... fired from the Reagan National Security Council ... involved in the Iran-Contra scandal ... described by the BBC as an ‘ultra neo-conservative,’ who enjoys strong ties to the Vice President’s office and to the Pentagon.” “Masters: If I said Michael Ledeen ...? Cannistraro: You’d be very close ... but ... I don’t think it’s a proven case.” “Statement from Dr. Michael Ledeen: I have absolutely no connection to the Niger documents, have never even seen them. I did not work on them, never handled them, know virtually nothing about them, don’t think I ever wrote or said anything about the subject.”

George W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 2001-2009 Jan. 20), “Personnel Announcement{pf} (“The President intends to nominate John Robert Bolton, of Maryland, to be Representative of the United States to the United Nations ...”) (White House, March 7 2005), “Presidential Nomination” (White House, March 7 2005), “Digest of Other White House Announcements,” 41:10 WCPD 422-424, at 423 {7kb.txt, 46kb.pdf} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:41/10} {Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (purl), SuDoc: AE 2.109:, ISSN: 0511-4187, LCCN: 65009929, OCLC: 1769543, GPOcat, LL: paper, DL, WorldCat}.

Condoleezza Rice (U.S. Secretary of State), “Announcement of Nomination of John Bolton as U.S. Ambassador to the UN” (March 7 2005, 1:00 p.m. EST).

Jim Lobe (Washington bureau chief), “Bush Appoints Right-Wing Extremist to UN Post” (IPS: Inter Press Service, March 7 2005) {copy}.

Jim Lobe, interviewed by Amy Goodman {copy}, “Bush Nominates Fierce UN Critic and Unilateralist John Bolton As Ambassador to United Nations” (Democracy Now! The War and Peace Report, New York City, March 9 2005), see, Lizzy Ratner, “Amy Goodman's 'Empire': How a prospective biochemist became a muckraker and champion of media reform” (The Nation, New York City, May 6 2005).

Tom Barry, Tanya Garcia, “Bolton's Baggage” (International Relations Center, March 11 2005).

George W. Bush, “Personnel Announcement: Nominations Sent to the Senate{pf} (White House, March 17 2005), “Nominations Submitted to the Senate,” 41:11 WCPD 480-481, at 481 {4kb.txt, 42kb.pdf} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:41/11}.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential nominations PN326-109, PN327-109, received, “Nominations,” 151 Congressional Record S3092 {pf} {8kb.txt, 55kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-1, daily edition 151:33, March 17 2005) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/33}.

B.S. Detector, “Bolton: A question of credibility” (Progreso Weekly, March 17 2005) (Cuba). B.S. Detector? Alvaro Fernandez, editor (email): “Nobody knows who the author is.”

Barry Schweid (Associated Press), “59 American Ex-Diplomats Oppose Bolton” (ABC News, March 28 2005), accord New York Times, March 29, Washington Post, March 29. “‘He is the wrong man for this position,’ the group of 59 former diplomats say in the letter.” {163kb.pdf}.

Mark Hosenball, “Intel: Did Bolton Try to Intimidate Spies?” (Newsweek, April 11 2005, posted April 2) {copy}. “State Department WMD analyst Christian Westermann {copy, copy, correction} testified that he tangled with Bolton about a speech on Cuban germ warfare. According to a Senate intel committee report, Westermann says he sent the CIA an e-mail proposing changes in Bolton’s speech. Bolton later got a copy of the e-mail, ‘berated’ Westermann and tried to have the analyst transferred. ...”

U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq {purl, copy, html}, pages 272-285 {1081kb.pdf}, at 277-279 (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Report No. 108-301, July 9 2004, Select Committee on Intelligence) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/5:108-301, LCCN: 2004356402, OCLC: 55948335, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, July 15 2004}. This partisan report summarizes the Cuba dispute, between Christian P. Westermann (identified not by name, but as a DoS INR “analyst with a, or is it the, “worldwide chemical and biological weapons portfolio”) and John Robert Bolton (identified by his job title, not his name).  CJHjr

“The second case ... involves a senior intelligence-community Latin America analyst. Congressional and administration sources say ... Bolton and Otto Reich ... tried to have the analyst ... fired ... block him from being promoted because they believed he was too soft on Cuba, and because he was once assigned to President Bill Clinton’s National Security Council.”

Referring to Fulton T. Armstrong (NIO/Latin America).

Anonymous (Associated Press), “Former U.S. Officials Show Support for U.N. Nominee” (Washington Post, April 4 2005). “... his views ‘are identical ... to ... a man twice elected by the American people’.” Press release, “On eve of vote on Bolton nomination, ninety-four leading security policy practitioners urge confirmation” (Center for Security Policy, April 4, 19 2005) (letter and names).

Barry Schweid (Associated Press), “5 Ex-Secretaries of State Support Bolton” (San Francisco Chronicle, April 5 2005). But not the three most recent former Secretaries of State: Colin Powell, Madeleine Albright, Warren Christopher.

Jonathan Dean (Former U.S. representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna), interviewed by Nick Clarke, “Ambassador row{pf} (BBC News 24, BBC World, HARDtalk, April 6 2005, 11:30 p.m.) {BBCCat anz2155b}, video {24:35} (“Nick Clarke talks to Ambassador Jonathan Dean, former US Arms Negotiator, about why he thinks John Bolton should not be the next US Ambassador to the United Nations.”).

“ We have very convincing evidence that Iraq maintains an extensive program for the production and weaponization of weapons of mass destruction.”

  John Bolton Jan. 24 2003 {copy}

Douglas Jehl, Steven R. Weisman, “Bush Nominee for U.N. Post Faces Hurdles at Senate Panel” (New York Times, April 7 2005) {copy, copy}.

Editorial, “The Worst of the Bad Nominees” (New York Times, April 8 2005) {link}.

Editorial, “The Bolton Nomination” (Washington Post, April 11 2005). “So far, there is no compelling case for denying Mr. Bush his choice.”

{Post April 11 press reports belowCJHjr}

 

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Senate Committee hearing, Nomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (U.S. Congress 109-1, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings, April 7, April 11-12 2005), Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {20kb.pdf, 15kb.pdf}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {79kb.pdf, 67kb.pdf}, witnesses: John R. Bolton (Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (T), U.S. State Department) {44kb.html}, Carl W. Ford, Jr. (formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department), C-Span video: day-1am {3:21:37}, day-1pm {3:36:47, schedule, 543766309, 186235-1, rss}, day-2 {2:29:28, schedule, 543864275, 186254-1}, committee transcripts {205kb.pdf, 123kb.pdf}, other transcripts {Lexis}: Three CQ/FDCH transcripts: April 11: 9:33 a.m. {139kb.pdf}, partial transcript: 9:33 a.m. (New York Times), 2:07 p.m. April 12: 10:03 a.m. Three FNS transcripts: April 11: 9:33 a.m., 2:07 p.m., April 12: 10:03 a.m..

Senate Committee staff interviews:

•• Frederick Fleitz (Central Intelligence Officer, detailed from CIA WINPAC, as special assistant and chief of staff to John R. Bolton), April 7 2005 {500kb.pdf, 725kb.pdf}, May 5 2005 {43kb.pdf}.

•• Thomas Fingar (Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department, Deputy: June 2001-2003 Oct.), April 8 2005 {68kb.pdf}:

“ Paul Foldi: What did Mr. Bolton say to you?

Mr. Fingar: That he was the President’s appointee, that he had every right to say what he believed, that he wasn’t going to be told what he could say by a mid-level INR munchkin analyst. ... Said that he wanted Westermann taken off his accounts. I said, ‘He’s our CW/BW specialist, this is what he does.’ He expressed again, as I remember it, that he was the President’s appointee, he could say what he wanted. ...

Paul Foldi: What did you tell Mr. Westermann? Did you get a chance?

Mr. Fingar: I didn’t see him until the next day, as I remember, and I told him what had transpired in the conversation. I told him that he, Mr. Bolton, wanted him taken off of those accounts. I said we had no intention of doing that, not to worry about it, he was our CW/BW analyst.”

•• Neil E. Silver (Director, from July 1 2002, Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues (INR/SPM), Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State Department), April 11 2005 {33kb.pdf}, May 5 2005 {33kb.pdf}.

•• Christian P. Westermann (Global CBWN Analyst, Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues (INR/SPM), Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State Department), April 7 2005, {242kb.pdf}, May 4 2005 {52kb.pdf}:

“ Christian P. Westermann: February 12 2002 ... He was quite upset that I had objected and he wanted to know what right I had trying to change an Under-Secretary’s language. ... And I tried to explain to him a little bit ... about the process of how we clear language. And I guess wasn’t really in a mood to listen and he was quite angry and basically told me that I had no right to do that. And he got very red in the face and shaking his finger at me and explained to me that I was acting way beyond my position, and for someone who worked for him.

I told him I didn’t work for him {62kb.pdf} ... I’m recollecting here ... I don’t remember if I said anything or if I— Whether I was just thinking at the time, that I actually worked for Carl Ford. And not for Under-Secretary Bolton.

And so, he basically threw me out of his office and told me to get Tom Fingar up here ... he was yelling and screaming, and red in the face, and wagging his finger. I’ll never forget the wagging of the finger. That’s perhaps his style ...

Carl Ford told me that Mr. Bolton wanted me fired. And Tom Fingar told me sometime later about me being removed. ... and then it was Neil Silver who told me months later, when he showed up in INR and became my Office Director, ... Mr. Bolton took him aside ... five or six months later ... and out of the blue said, and that Westermann fellow we really would like to have him removed from his portfolio and transferred. ...

To be raised again, so many months later, and I was deeply concerned about this, and I did have consultations with a variety of people in management about this, and what I considered, and what I considered was a pattern. ...

Disagreements or different viewpoints on analysis do not constitute pressure. It’s the threat of my job, the removal and the continued sanctioned that I found to be pressure. ... a new Office Director who knew nothing about this past incident really. It took him by surprise, as he recounted to me, and in some way might characterize his views of me, since he was new to the office.

That information somehow got into the New York Times {copy, copy, correction}, and on June 26th Secretary Powell was asked a question on the record while in a press conference {copy} with Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio, and he went on the record with saying that he was quite pleased, and happy that I answered the way I did.

And then subsequent to that, on the record, when there were other issues and I received personal private messages from the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and from Under-Secretary Grossman. When they asked about me, and how I was doing and they told me that everything was fine, and that I had their support. ...

But again, I’ve had incredible support from INR and later of course from Secretary Powell, Deputy Armitage, Under-Secretary Grossman. So I think that while I was upset, and while I thought about doing other — seeking some sort of action to this, the level of support that I received was extraordinary and it kept me from doing anything outside of the normal procedures, or managers’ decisions.”

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Steven C. Clemons, The Washington Note, April 12 2005 (archive) “... speeches ... ‘laced with gratuitous comments’ ... ‘high-decibel hyperbole’... harrassing Christian Westermann ... Carl W. Ford Jr. called Bolton a ‘serial abuser’.”

John Nichols, “John Bolton vs. Democracy” (The Nation, The Online Beat, April 13 2005) {copy}. “‘I’m with the Bush-Cheney team, and I’m here to stop the count.’ Those were the words John Bolton yelled as he burst into a Tallahassee library on Saturday, Dec. 9, 2000, where local election workers were recounting ballots cast in Florida’s disputed presidential race between George W. Bush and Al Gore.”

Ray McGovern, “Exposing Incompetent Incumbents” (TomPaine.com, April 14 2005) {copy}. “Many have asked how it could be that a comparatively small group of intelligence analysts in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) was able to get it right on several key Iraq-related issues, while larger agencies like CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency — with, literally, a cast of thousands — got it so wrong. The answer is simple: ... guts ... backbone ... resisting White House pressure ... in-house prodding from the likes of ... John Bolton, to cook intelligence to the White House recipe. INR stood firm ... dissented loudly ... Bolton’s attempt to bully an INR analyst into changing his conclusions ... no weasel ... stood firm ... prevented Bolton from representing his extreme opinions on Cuba as the views of the U.S. intelligence community ... an important teaching moment for staff ... The former INR chief made it clear that he considered Bolton’s behavior beyond the pale and told his analysts that, were they to encounter such pressure they had just two requirements: (1) do not bend to it; and (2) report it to the director of INR immediately. Ford reported Bolton’s behavior to then-Secretary Powell, and later Powell went over to INR to address the staff and give a highly visible attaboy to the analyst who had stood his ground.”

Otto Reich, “John Bolton vs. the Moral Cowards: The Senate confirmation process needs to be reformed (Opinion Journal, Wall Street Journal, April 14 2005) {copy}. “I documented complaints about the analyst in question in a classified three-page letter which I handed to the supervisor. I specifically stated that I did not wish the officer punished in any way, but that I did expect from the intelligence community a less biased and more professional analysis, which this individual had proven incapable of providing. ... When one errs consistently, and when his errors are exposed by others in the intelligence apparatus, ... then it’s time for someone to step forward and say we can do better. ... When a bad apple is allowed to spoil the barrel of intelligence information, then ... the reputation of good officers suffer.” Re: Fulton T. Armstrong (NIO/Latin America).

Dafna Linzer, “Bolton Faces Allegations That He Tried to Fire Analysts” (Washington Post, April 15 2005). Re: Rexon Ryu.

Douglas Jehl, “Bolton's Pressure on C.I.A. Analyst Caused Anger” (New York Times, April 16 2005).

Robert L. Hutchings: “There was a group of firebrands who we figured would not like the judgment. ... we wanted to ... make clear that it was the assessment of the intelligence community, and not a particular individual.”

Re: Fulton T. Armstrong and Cuba (comment, below).

Steven R. Weisman, “U.N. Nominee Is Accused of Seeking 2nd Dismissal” (New York Times, April 17 2005). “Fulton T. Armstrong ... has charged that Mr. Bolton and Otto Reich, a former assistant secretary of state for Latin America, had sought to press the intelligence community to make its analysis conform with their hard-line policy views on Cuba ... Mr. Reich, in a telephone interview on Saturday, said he too sought to have Mr. Armstrong removed because of what he said was Mr. Armstrong’s tendency to give “the benefit of the doubt” on alleged human rights and security threats from left-wing figures like Fidel Castro of Cuba, President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela and former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti.”

Dafna Linzer, “Bolton Often Blocked Information, Officials Say: Iran, IAEA Matters Were Allegedly Kept From Rice, Powell” (Washington Post, April 18 2005). “... a dozen examples of memos or information that Bolton refused to forward during his four years ... ‘Bolton said that information couldn’t be collected’ ... Rexon Ryu ... Bolton wanted Ryu removed from his duties ... Ryu ... accompanied Powell to CIA headquarters ... U.N. Security Council ... Iraq’s alleged weapons programs ... instrumental in getting the most controversial allegations out of Powell's speech ... Bolton ... a private channel to the CIA ... Bolton’s chief of staff, Frederick Fleitz, is on loan to Bolton from the CIA’s ... WINPAC ... he goes back to the agency’s headquarters from time to time and reports to supervisors there and to Bolton ... CIA analysis on ‘China’s commitment to proliferation’ ... Silver ... attached an alternative view for Bolton ... Fleitz ... told Silver that it was ‘unprofessional’ to circulate the dissent ... asked that a clearance request for controversial intelligence on Cuba be made through WINPAC ... {not} the National Intelligence Council (NIC) ... Bolton had clashed with the council ... national intelligence officer on Latin America {Fulton T. Armstrong} ... speech ... May 2002 ... Cuba ... biological weapons program ... received an abusive e-mail from Fleitz after he had raised objections with the Senate staff about the Cuba speech ... Bolton tried to get the officer removed from his job after the incident.”

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Senate Committee business meeting, April 19 2005, 2:15 3:15 p.m. “The Committee will consider and vote on the following agenda item: Nomination: John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations with Rank of Ambassador.” Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {16kb.pdf}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member), committee transcript {235kb.pdf}, other transcripts {Lexis}: CQ transcript, FNS transcript (missing the opening 3-1/2 sentences), C-Span video {1:49:19, schedule, 544035684, 186361-1, rss}.

Senate Committee decision, April 19 2005. “Committee met and began consideration of the nominations of John Robert Bolton, of Maryland, to be U.S. Representative to United Nations ... Security Council ... General Assembly ... but did not take final action thereon, and recessed subject to the call.”

And why was that?

Because Republican Senator George Victor Voinovich said this, during the discussion:

“Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to apologize to the members of the committee that I wasn’t present during the hearing on John Bolton. I was tied up with other responsibilities, as chairman of a subcommittee, so I wasn’t here.

I’ve heard enough today that I don’t feel comfortable about voting for Mr. Bolton ... I think we all ought to get some more information about this man before we vote him out of this committee.”

Foretelling a would-be 9-9 committee tie vote, or defeat, which could block the nomination, from passing to the full Senate, for a floor vote. The Committee postponed the vote for three weeks, pending futher investigation by the Committee staff.

I wonder.

Will John Robert Bolton now try to punish George Victor Voinovich? or remove him from office? Is he big-shot enough? with clout enough? to succeed? Does he have allies, anybody respects? Is he now all mouth? Isolated? A proven outlaw, bathed in blood, a folly to back? Will first the Committee, then the Senate, confirm him to office?

Teaching all Americans, an important lesson:

The way to succeed in government, and in life, is by “gratuitous comments,” “high-decibel hyperbole,” falsifying intelligence, evading legal safeguards for government integrity, unsubstantiated accusations, corrupt agendas, bullying, threats, harassment, manipulating powerful, oppressive, dangerous, deadly, government forces.

For answers, to these questions, we’ll have to wait and see.

  CJHjr

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Editorial, “The Bolton Mugging: The nominee dared to push the President's foreign policy” (Opinion Journal, Wall Street Journal, April 21 2005). “... if Mr. Bolton loses so does the President.”

Douglas Jehl, “Bush Backs His U.N. Nominee, but Powell Warns of Volatility” (New York Times, April 22 2005). Colin L. Powell, former U.S. Secretary of State (Jan. 20 2001-2005 Jan. 26).

Jim VandeHei, Robin Wright, “Powell Playing Quiet Role in Bolton Battle: GOP Senators Sought Views on Nominee” (Washington Post, April 22 2005).

Paul Richter, Sonni Efron, “Testimony of U.N. Nominee Is Disputed: A former diplomat denies a claim he backed John Bolton’s pointed 2003 speech on North Korea {copy, copy}. He also describes an angry confrontation.” (Los Angeles Times, April 22 2005) {copy}. Thomas C. Hubbard, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea (Aug. 30 2001-2004 Aug. 5) {90kb.pdf}.

Douglas Jehl, “Released E-Mail Exchanges Reveal More Bolton Battles” (New York Times, April 24 2005) {copy}.

Michael Hirsh, “Bolton's British Problem: Fresh complaints of bullying dog an embattled nominee” (Newsweek, May 2 2005, posted April 24). Tim Reid, Richard Beeston, “British complaint could be last straw for Bush's man” (The Times, London, April 26 2005). “Jack Straw ... the Foreign Secretary ... furious ... told Colin Powell ... that Mr Bolton was trying to destroy a European initiative on Iran’s nuclear programme ... convinced that Mr Bolton was the source of an article ... last July quoting an unnamed senior US official who dismissed the initiative ... and advocated ‘regime change’ in Tehran.”

Douglas Jehl,Ex-Officials Say Bolton Inflated Syrian Danger” (New York Times, April 26 2005) {copy}.

David E. Sanger, “Arms Move to Syria 'Unlikely,' Report Says” (New York Times, April 26 2005).

Dana Priest, “Report Finds No Evidence Syria Hid Iraqi Arms” (Washington Post, April 26 2005).

Richard Cohen, “Cut From Cheney's Cloth” (Washington Post, April 28 2005). “... a juvenile personality ... when his way of thinking is rejected, simply raises his voice ... attempts to do with volume what he cannot do with reason ... He must wonder why — of all the fibbers and exaggerators and outright liars in the Bush administration — he alone is being asked to account for what he said and what he did.”

Douglas Jehl,Ex-Official Describes Dispute With Bolton Over Intelligence” (New York Times, April 29 2005). “The C.I.A. specifically rejected an assertion in a classified section of Mr. Bolton’s prepared testimony saying Syria had a biological and chemical weapons program that threatened regional security in the Middle East, intelligence officials have said. Ultimately Mr. Bolton delivered public testimony on Syria, in September 2003, that was fully cleared by the intelligence agencies.” Robert L. Hutchings: “I said that if anyone on the policy side chose to give a speech without our clearance, that was O.K. by me — policy makers have a different set of considerations. But if they asked for our clearance, they would get it only if we could verify the intelligence judgments it conveyed. I had no ax to grind with anyone, but we had a professional responsibility to call it as we saw it.”

 

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Syria

Mr. Jehl has labored mightily, but the full details of the still secret Syria dispute are yet beyond his reach. And Republicans have decided it will remain so. Mr. Jehl provides additional insight in his previous report (April 26, linked above).

John Bolton, in his prepared statement and public testimony, Mr. Jehl cites, boldly asserted, and elaborated, that — like the United States itself — Syria too has “a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles, and has engaged in the research and development of more toxic and persistent nerve agents such as VX.”

As for biological, he was careful to not claim, Syria has a biological warfare program, or any biological warfare weapons, or any biological warfare agents, when he was sticking to his script:

“We believe that Syria is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons capability.”

John R. Bolton, prepared statement, “Syria's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Development Programs{copy}, and testimony, Syria: Implications for U.S. Security and Regional Stability {106kb.html, 290kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 108-1, House Hearing, September 16 2003, International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Serial No. 108-66) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:SY 8/5, OCLC: 54456390, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

But during her opening statement, and later colloquy, the Subcommittee Chairman three times asserted, Syria has a “biological weapons program” (pages 9/2, 40/18), John Bolton did not correct her, and indeed himself referred to Syria’s “BW program” later in the colloquy (page 48/21).

This illustrates the folly, the peril, the negligent, reckless, or willful deceit, of using obtuse, cryptic language, which incites unwarranted inferences, in the minds of partisans, hoping for the worst (the pretext they’ve been advocating), in the minds of government officials, anxious about what they should do, and unwarranted suspicions and doubts, in the minds of impartial observers.

And if this be the purpose of that language, to incite unwarranted inferences, then the people who adopted that language, for that purpose, have committed a crime. And an aggravated criminal conspiracy to lie, by those who willfully reinforce the unwarranted inferences, with background briefings, with lies they plant in the foreign and U.S. press, with unsubstantiated assertions by others they endorse.

This harks back a year, when John Bolton defiled U.S. intelligence, by asserting:

“Syria ... is pursuing the development of biological weapons and is able to produce at least small quantities of biological warfare agents.”

This, in his inflammatory, rogue, speech, “Beyond the Axis of Evil,” at the Heritage Foundation (May 6 2002), clothed with authority of U.S. intelligence.

Escalating, into an willful lie, the mere speculation he first asserted six months earlier. And escalating the asserted threat, into his willful lie, as well:

“We believe that Syria ... has an offensive BW program in the research and development stage, and it may be capable of producing small quantities of agent.”

John R. Bolton, prepared statement, “Biological Weapons Convention: Remarks to the 5th Biological Weapons Convention RevCon Meeting” {copy} (Geneva Switzerland, November 19 2001).

Liar glossary

A “willful” liar knows, what s/he asserts is untrue.

A “reckless” liar knows, s/he does not know, if it’s true, or not.

Both are willful liars. The one as to the fact s/he asserts, the other as to the certitude s/he asserts.  CJHjr

John Bolton’s Heritage Foundation speech about Syria — as with Cuba — was a willful lie, about U.S. intelligence, and a reckless lie, about the facts, which he lied to be unassailably true.

This, judging from the sharp retreat, imposed upon him and his testimony, the next year, by his masters and his betters (September 16 2003, linked above).

It’s little wonder, he didn’t show up, a month later, to repeat his Heritage Foundation lies to Congress, with a 5 year prison sentence staring him in the face, in the unlikely event an honest U.S. Attorney General (an oxymoron) could ever to be found to prosecute him.

John Bolton’s Heritage Foundation claims about Syria, apparently, were just one more of his many rank fantasies, U.S. intelligence had no credible evidence to support.

Or a simple, willful, lie, to bully, terrorize, harass Syria, to obey the whims of his White House masters. And to pretext a war, if Syria would not obey, his Emperors’ orders.

At the very least, a reckless lie, a mendacious effort, to paint Syria with offensive, terrorist, tendencies. (Viruses and bacteria attack whomever they encounter, not just the enemy, and so only a lunatic would use them anywhere near their own homeland, or their own forces).

By the next year, his State Department masters realized, John Bolton is untrustworthy, dishonest, a reckless, incendiary, liar.

And they know a liar when they see one, because they look in the mirror every day.

They took charge of his public statements, or at least some of them:

“Three sources confirmed that Bolton’s speeches had to be specially vetted by Armitage or Powell’s personal staff because Bolton had become so controversial.”

Sonni Efron, Mary Curtius, Doyle McManus, Tyler Marshall, “Bolton's a Tough Guy With a Cause” (Los Angeles Times, May 1 2005).

“Deputy secretary of state, Richard L. Armitage, ordered two years ago that Mr. Bolton be blocked from delivering speeches and testimony unless they were personally approved by Mr. Armitage. ...

“Therefore, the deputy made a decision, and communicated that decision to me, that John Bolton would not give any testimony, nor would he give any speech, that wasn’t cleared first by Rich,”

Mr. Wilkerson said, according to a transcript {73kb.pdf} of an hourlong interview with members of the committee staff last Thursday. ... “No one else was subjected to these tight restrictions,” he said ... in an e-mail message on Monday ... Lawrence B. Wilkerson, a longtime aide to former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell ... a retired Army colonel who was Mr. Powell’s chief of staff from 2002 to early 2005 ... speaking for himself, not for Mr. Powell or Mr. Armitage.”

Douglas Jehl, “No. 2 at State Dept. Was Said to Put Restrictions on Bolton” (New York Times, May 10 2005).

Now, Syria is “unlikely” “able to produce at least small quantities of biological warfare agents” The opposite of his Heritage Foundation lie:

We know that Syria is pursuing the development of biological weapons. Due to its limited biotechnical infrastructure, it is unlikely that Syria has produced effective biological weapons agents or weapons at this point.”

John R. Bolton, prepared statement, “U.S. Efforts to Stop the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction{copy}, and testimony, U.S. Nonproliferation Policy After Iraq {647kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 108-1, House Committee on International Relations, Hearing, Serial No. 108-38, June 4 2003, 10:34-1:32 p.m., 3+85 pages) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:P 75/28, LCCN: 2003373415, OCLC: 53341977, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat, October 31 2003}.

He abandoned one lie, in his second sentence.

But he continued to assert two lies in his first sentence.

What is the explanation for this?

Is this the hand of his masters at work? Who ordered John Bolton to stop his second sentence lie? But not sufficiently informed themselves? To appreciate that his first sentence also contained two lies?

Or is this John Bolton’s own hand at work?

The hand of a lawyer. Eager to fly about the world, lying and bullying whom he pleases. But mindful, of that 5 year prison sentence, for lying to Congress. Wary, of private assurances, his actual masters, in the White House, may have offered, that he is free to lie on their orders, and to pay no mind to his theoretical masters, in the State Department.

A lawyer. Trained to think ahead. Mindful that political winds shift. That a future U.S. Attorney General might not agree, that the U.S. President has legal authority, to order U.S. officials, to lie on orders. A foundation law of all police-states, and of the elected dictatorship of the United States of America, now under construction, and nearing completion, by secret, unlawful, opinions of Justice Department lawyers, in the Office of Legal Council, the breeding ground, the indoctrination center, for aspiring U.S. federal judges. Legal advocates, pretending to be legal advisers.

Whichever, John Bolton’s theoretical masters woke up:

“ A capacity for straight talking rather than peddling half-truths ...”

  Margaret Thatcher

“... planned testimony by ... John R. Bolton ... was to be presented Tuesday ... delayed until September ... prepared to tell members of a House ... subcommittee that Syria’s development of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons had progressed to such a point that they posed a threat to stability in the region ... a “revolt” among intelligence experts ... CIA’s objections and comments alone ran to 35 to 40 pages ... House panel ... considering a bill ... toughen trade and diplomatic sanctions against Syria.”

Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay (Knight Ridder), “CIA: Assessment of Syria's WMD exaggerated” (Miami Herald, July 15 2003).

Lawrence B. Wilkerson {73kb.pdf} ... Mr. Powell’s chief of staff from 2002 to early 2005 ... said ... deputy secretary of state, Richard L. Armitage ... decided in the summer of 2003 to postpone Congressional testimony that Mr. Bolton had planned to give on Syria and that had touched off significant opposition from American intelligence agencies.”

Douglas Jehl, “No. 2 at State Dept. Was Said to Put Restrictions on Bolton” (New York Times, May 10 2005).

They woke up, perhaps to their own ignorance, and called in their own masters:

The ber masters, in charge of intelligence.

The National Intelligence Council.

“ If anyone on the policy side chose to give a speech without our clearance, that was O.K. by me.”

  Robert L. Hutchings

Who are happy, and content, to stand by, and watch U.S. officials lie through their teeth, about the ber masters’ intelligence, feeling no responsibility, for the tens of thousands of dead bodies, slain by those very lies, attributed by the lying U.S. officials to them, the ber masters.

As is the new National Intelligence Director.

“ Let’s say that he took isolated facts and made much more of them to build a case than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was a sort of cherry-picking of little factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to present the starkest-possible case. ”

  Robert L. Hutchings {36kb.pdf}

But, on this occasion, the ber masters were asked to step in (according to Mr. Jehl’s interview with Robert L. Hutchings). And when asked to speak, they themselves strive to speak the truth, they now claim, but did not do, previously.

The /ber masters terminated both of John Bolton’s first sentence lies, by the time he next testified, three months later (September 16 2003, quoted above).

Now, Syria is not pursuing biological “weapons,” as John Bolton lied in his Heritage Foundation speech, but merely a “biological weapons capability.”

Whatever that means, if anything. Likely nothing. A likely cover-up, of previous lies. Pretending, there is some secret substance, somewhere, for something, to do with biological weapons. But we’re not going to tell you what. Because you would laugh at us. And discover our cover-up lie.

And now too, we no longer claim to be sure, even about that:

John Bolton’s lie, “We know,” became “We believe.”

Whether their belief is honest, we know not. Whether it’s reasonable, we know not. Whether it’s based on any credible evidence, we know not.

Judging from their very sordid, very dishonorable, very deadly, very criminal, history, their supposed belief is likely to be dishonest, unreasonable, and based on no credible evidence. And I myself, certainly, do not believe a single word they say, about anything, if it purports to demonize anybody or any country.

A “biological weapons capability” is a pharmaceutical plant, manufacturing vaccines.

A completely innocent operation.

Having nothing, whatsoever, to do with biological weapons.

But which is “capable” of producing biological weapons agents (germs and viruses).

Which then require an additional “capability” to weaponize. How to keep the creatures alive, during storage, surviving disbursal, so they can do their life’s work.

And a further, additional “capability” to manufacture the weapons to contain and disburse the weaponized agents.

And a further, additional “capability” to deploy the weapons, disburse them, store them, create a protocol, for storing, arming, using them.

And so, if this be its factual basis (if there be any factual basis) — a vaccine plant, or some such, they may be thinking about buying from Cuba, for example — then this sinister assertion is willfully misleading, a willful lie, by willful omission of that material fact, necessary to be stated, to prevent the asserted fact from inducing an unwarranted inference.

This asserted fact: “We believe that Syria is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons capability.”

Inducing this, the one and only, inference: That what they are doing (if anything) can be explained only as part of a biological weapons program, and there is no other, innocent, explanation.

A willfully, maliciously, induced inference.

A complete and utter lie.

Asserting to be an unassailable fact, a mere inference (e.g. that a vaccine plant is, or will be, established with a biological warfare motive) and — by willfully lying, that this mere inference is an unassailable fact — willfully inducing a second inference, that there is no innocent explanation (e.g., to manufacture vaccines).

This analysis, if there does indeed be, an innocent, concealed, explanation possible, for whatever factual basis there may be (if any), for this assertion.

A criminal lie. By those knowingly speaking and writing the lie. And, by those principals, orchastrating the lie, complicit in the lie. In a criminal conspiracy to lie.

For which prison is the only suitable remedy.

The prison term, escalating with the malice: As the willfully concealed innocent explanation itself escalates, from theoretical, to possible, to probable, to likely, to reasonably certain, to a verified fact with no contrary evidence.

To deter onlookers. From lying to Congress. Lying to each other, in the Executive Branch. Lying to the public. Inciting fear, hatred, war, missile strikes, sanctions, to punish our innocent “enemies.” To the delight of Zionists, who pack the bank accounts, of voting Members of Congress, with millions {copy} of dollars, each year.

And if death and destruction be a foreseeable consequence of the criminal lie, then greatly extended prison sentences, for the resulting felony murder, manslaughter, arson, war crimes, incitement, complicity, facilitation, conspiracy, racketeering activities.

If I had to guess, I imagine another aspect of the Syria dispute was John Bolton’s plan to assert, that Syria was cooperating with terrorists, giving them biological or chemical weapons.

And I suppose this, because it fits the portrait he was trying to paint with biological weapons.

But especially, because of the utter, complete, absolute, unequivocal, rejection of that assertion, with an authoritative tone, contained in the script imposed upon him.

To my mind, this is the unmistakable hand of the ber masters, writing his script for him (his prepared statement), an unequivocal exoneration, John Bolton — an untrustworthy, immoral, evil, extravagant, dangerous, reckless, liar — would never volunteer, of his own free will:

“... there is currently no information indicating that the Syrian Government has transferred WMD to terrorist organizations or would permit such groups to acquire them.”

Mr. Jehl reports, the CIA rejected John Bolton’s assertion, that Syria “threatened regional security in the Middle East.”

Yet, John Bolton proceeded to assert exactly that, describing Syria as a “a serious threat to our allies and our interests in the region” about 14 times during his testimony, in one form or another, and agreed with questioners who asserted the same, another 4 or 5 times. And he referred to Syria’s weapons as “offensive.”

“ John strongly believed that just because the intelligence community had a conclusion on an issue, that didn’t necessarily have to be his view ... John felt he had every right to interpret what the evidence meant and come to a different conclusion than the intelligence community.”

  Alan A. Foley {96kb.pdf}

Claiming everything he said was “reviewed and commented on by everybody with a stake in the issue within the Executive Branch. And ... what I have said ... is something that there is very broad and deep agreement on in both the policy and intelligence communities of our government.” (page 56/27).

A confused mish-mash of heated rhetoric and bellicose talk, to an unseemly audience, eager to believe all doubts, rumors, and dark speculations about Syria, blind to contrary evidence.

In the midst of which, he nevertheless obeyed the written script, imposed upon him, and confessed, that Syria views its “CW program” as defensive:

“which it believes serves as a deterrent to regional adversaries.”

Not a weapon to enforce offensive ambitions.

A forced confession — buried as it was, in the elaborate fabric, of his Gothic tale, of an evil regime — which appeared to escape the notice of his captivated audience, mindless fans of fiction.

“ Planning, preparing, initiating, or waging aggressive war with its attendant horror, suffering, and loss is a crime which stands at the pinnacle of criminality. For it there is no justification or excuse.”

The Ministries Case (Nuernberg Military Tribunal 4, April 11-13 1949), 12-14 N.M.T., at volume 14, page 352 (opinion).

Which John Bolton, and his agents, doubtless incited the Committee to ignore, by background briefings, packed with his lies, to ignore what he actually said.

This, judging from extensive factual assertions by the Committee chairman.

An apparent criminal conspiracy, to lie to Congress, about U.S. intelligence, to willfully subvert, evade, gut, the command of his theoretical masters, who insisted the conclusion of the ber masters be enforced, honored, and obeyed.

A conspiracy, doubtless blessed, by his actual masters, in the White House, themselves, documented, prima facie criminal liars (President, Vice President, National Security Council, and their staffs). Who deployed this exact same technique, to initiate their prima facie crime against peace, the war on Iraq.

Syria apparently considers itself free to use chemical weapons in its own territory in self-defense.

With a simple message:

If you don’t want to be drenched in chemical weapons, don’t invade Syria.

And, if Syria can manage to deliver a chemical payload by long range missile, then Syria walks in the footsteps of the United States. Which continuously asserts a right to target and attack an innocent civilian population (an otherwise crime), with otherwise criminal weapons (nuclear), in any state which attacks the United States with criminal weapons.

A deterrent.

The threat of an international countermeasure.

With a simple message, to Israel:

If you don’t want chemical weapons raining down on your towns and cities, don’t attack Syria, with your nuclear weapons.

The United States goes much further, and asserts the right, and the intention {copy}, to attack, with its nuclear weapons, offensively.

A war crime, and crime against humanity, in virtually every scenario.

Hence, this simple message, to the United States, too:

If you don’t want chemical weapons raining down on your 106 military bases in Iraq, and your Green Zone Throne, don’t attack Syria, with your nuclear weapons, as a surrogate for Israel, or for your own ambitions, and ensure Israel does not attack us, with their nuclear weapons.

In reciprocol compliance with this, the United States Military Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, page III-2, on first-use of its nuclear weapons (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12, Final Coordination (2), March 15 2005) {1779kb.pdf, 1779kb.pdf, command comments: 1120kb.pdf}:

“ (1) Geographic combatant commanders may request Presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons for a variety of conditions. Examples include: ...

(d) To counter potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces, including mobile and area targets (troop concentration).

(e) For rapid and favorable war termination on US {Syrian} terms.

(f) To ensure success of US {Syrian} and multinational operations.

(g) To demonstrate US {Syrian} intent and capability to use nuclear {chemical} weapons to deter adversary use of WMD.

(h) To respond to adversary-supplied WMD use by surrogates against US {Syrian} and multinational forces or civilian populations.”

The United States regularly uses an even more evil, criminal, weapon, routinely — depleted uranium, a weapon of mass destruction which dwarfs all others, in its evil, persistent, deadly, continuous, eternal, criminality.

Against the use of which — and its invisible, permanent, criminal, poisonous, aerosols — anywhere near Syria, an international countermeasure, with chemical weapons, is perfectly lawful.

And, because it would be lawful, a counter-countermeasure, by the United States, would be unlawful.

As is its use of depleted uranium.

Finally, Syria, repeatedly, over and over again, has offered to give up its chemical weapons, with inspections, if Israel will give up its nuclear weapons, with inspections.

An offer the United States ignores, because its Zionist Masters like their nuclear weapons, and want to keep them.

  CJHjr

 

____________________

Farah Stockman, “In citing Sudan dangers, Bolton went beyond CIA” (Boston Globe, April 29 2005).

“ Fred said something in the conversation, like, “John thinks this guy ought to be fired.” And I remember being jarred by that.”

  Alan A. Foley {96kb.pdf}

 

“ The issue that they were raising was reassigning, not firing. Even though people may use that word.”

  Stuart A. Cohen {39kb.pdf}

 

“ Stu Cohen ... said ... John Bolton or Otto Reich ... might call me and ask to have the NIO reassigned or moved.”

  John E. McLaughlin {39kb.pdf}

Dafna Linzer, “Two Detail Bolton's Efforts to Punish Dissent” (Washington Post, April 29 2005). “Alan Foley {96kb.pdf} ... who until September 2003 ran the CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, known as Winpac, spoke to the committee by phone yesterday for an hour. Committee sources said he confirmed testimony provided by Stuart Cohen {39kb.pdf}, the former acting director of the National Intelligence Council, that Bolton had tried to fire the national intelligence officer for Latin America who disagreed with Bolton’s assertions about an alleged bioweapons programs in Cuba.” “Foley told us that Bolton’s chief of staff, Fred Fleitz, called him up and said that Bolton wanted the analyst fired.” Re: Fulton T. Armstrong.

Sonni Efron, Mary Curtius, Doyle McManus, Tyler Marshall, “Bolton's a Tough Guy With a Cause” (Los Angeles Times, May 1 2005).

Gary Namie (Director), “Dump Bolton, Send Message to Bullies Everywhere” (Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute, May 2 2005). Press release, “Expert Confirms Bolton Is Bully: Committee Vote Reflects National Character” (May 2 2005). Bullying in the News. “Bullies are typically wrong or incompetent ... two-headed snakes who grovel to superiors while terrorizing those below them ... Bosses are free to torment underlings ... When higher ups are bullies, they select hyper-aggressive lieutenants ... What ultimately stops bullying? In lieu of laws ... Sen. Voinovich ... said it best, ‘my conscience got me.’”

Conspiracy & Bullying

C=Richard Dearlove, Chief, Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)

“ C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. ...

The Foreign Secretary {Jack Straw} said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin.”

Matthew Rycroft, “Iraq: Prime Minister's Meeting, 23 July{copy} (Official Record, dated July 23 2002, of a meeting held that day, S 195/02, “Secret and Strictly Personal – UK Eyes Only”); Michael Smith, “Blair hit by new leak of secret war plan{copy}; Michael Smith, “Blair planned Iraq war from start{copy} (The Sunday Times, London, May 1 2005). Ray McGovern, “Proof Bush Fixed The Facts” (TomPaine.common sense, May 4 2005) {copy, copy}. Warren P. Strobel, John Walcott (Knight Ridder), “Memo: Bush made intel fit Iraq policy” (Miami Herald, May 6 2005) {copy}. John Conyers Jr. (Ranking Member, House Judiciary Committee, U.S. Congress), “89 Members of Congress Call For Immediate Answers About Secret Bush/Blair Pre-War Deal” (press release, May 6 2005 {127kb.pdf}; letter, May 5 {707kb.pdf}; typed signatures {6kb.pdf}). The Downing Street Memo.

Downing Street Memo and Iraq War (U.S. Congress 109-1, House Hearing (unofficial), June 16 2005). John Leslie Conyers (Chairman, Ranking Minority Member, House Judiciary Committee). Witnesses: Joseph C. Wilson IV (Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Baghdad Iraq, 1988-1991; Special Assistant to President Clinton, National Security Council; U.S. Ambassador to Gabon, 1992-1995) {statement}, Cindy Sheehan {statement}, Ray McGovern {statement}, John Bonifaz {statement}, Ann Wright {written statement}, Karen Kwiatkowski {written statement}. C-Span video {3:06:30}, audio {3:07:09, 44.1 mb ram source}, transcript {263kb.pdf, 213kb.txt, copy}, reported Amy Goodman, “Downing Street and Beyond: Hearing Builds Momentum for Full Investigation” (Democracy Now!, June 17 2005).

Pre-Iraq War Intelligence: An Oversight Hearing on Pre-War Intelligence Relating to Iraq (U.S. Congress 109-2, Senate Hearing, June 26 2006, Democratic Policy Committee). Byron Leslie Dorgan (chairman) {82kb.pdf}. Witnesses, panel 1: Lawrence B. Wilkerson (Chief of Staff to Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, 2001-2005) {110kb.pdf}, Paul R. Pillar (National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, 2000-2005, U.S. National Intelligence Council) {72kb.pdf}, Carl W. Ford Jr. (Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 2001-2003, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department) {81kb.pdf}, Wayne E. White (former Deputy Director, Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department) {94kb.pdf}, panel 2: Joseph Cirincione (Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy, CAP: Center for American Progress) {154kb.pdf, 51kb.pdf}, Rod Barton (Former Senior Advisor to the Iraq Survey Group) {74kb.pdf}, Michael Smith (Defense Correspondent, London Sunday Times) {104kb.pdf}. C-Span video {3:02:00}. Committee video {3:06:22}, audio {72.4 mb mp3}, transcript {245mb.pdf}. Other transcripts {Lexis}: CQ transcript (panel 1). FNS transcript: None.

“ “I explained to Christian that it was a political judgment as to how to interpret this data, and the I.C. should do as we asked and sanitize my language as long as sources and methods are not compromised,”

Mr. Fleitz wrote to Mr. Bolton, referring to the intelligence community. Mr. Fleitz said of Mr. Westermann, “He strongly disagrees with us.” ...

Mr. Westermann wrote to Mr. Fingar to say that “personal attacks, harassment and impugning of my integrity” by Mr. Bolton and Mr. Fleitz were “now affecting my work, my health and dedication to public service.””

Douglas Jehl, “Released E-Mail Exchanges Reveal More Bolton Battles” (New York Times, April 24 2005) {copy}.

“ Mr. Fingar: Mr. Bolton said: “That he was the President’s appointee. That he had every right to say what he believed. That he wasn’t going to be told what he could say by a mid-level INR munchkin analyst. ... That he wanted Westermann taken off his accounts.”

Christian P. Westermann: Mr. Bolton “was quite angry and basically told me that I had no right to do that. And he got very red in the face and shaking his finger at me and explained to me that I was acting way beyond my position ... he was yelling and screaming, and red in the face, and wagging his finger ...

Carl Ford told me that Mr. Bolton wanted me fired. And Tom Fingar told me sometime later about me being removed. ... and then it was Neil Silver ... Mr. Bolton took him aside ... five or six months later ... and out of the blue said, and that Westermann fellow we really would like to have him removed from his portfolio and transferred. ...

I was deeply concerned ... It’s the threat of my job, the removal, and the continued sanctioned that I found to be pressure.””

____________________

“ {3 N.M.T. 1014} On 10 March 1941 .... Schlegelberger {Secretary of State, Reich Ministery of Justice, 1931-1942} wrote to Hitler ...

{3 N.M.T. 1015} “Apart from this it is desirable to educate the judges more and more to a correct way of thinking, conscious of the national destiny. For this purpose it would be invaluable, if you, my Fuehrer, could let me know if a verdict does not meet with your approval.” ...

{3 N.M.T. 1011} On 26 April 1942 Hitler addressed the Reichstag in part as follows:

“I do expect one thing: That the nation gives me the right to intervene immediately and to take action myself wherever a person has failed to render unqualified obedience. * * *

I therefore ask the German Reichstag to confirm expressly that I have the legal right to keep everybody to his duty {3 N.M.T. 1012} and to cashier or remove from office or position without regard for his person, or his established rights, whoever, in my view and according to my considered opinion, has failed to do his duty. * * *

From now on, I shall intervene in these cases and remove from office those judges who evidently do not understand the demand of the hour.” ...

{3 N.M.T. 1020} The effect of this pronouncement upon such judges as still retained ideals of judicial independence can scarcely be overestimated.

The defendant Rothenberger {Judge, District Court of Appeals, Hamburg, 1935-1942; Under-Secretary of State, Reich Ministry of Justice, 1942-1943} stated it was

“absolutely crushing.”

In a private letter to his brother, the defendant Oeschey {Judge, Nrnberg District Court, N rnberg Special Court, 1939-1945} expressed his view of the situation created by Hitler’s interference in the following words:

“After the well known Fuehrer speech things developed in a frightful manner. ... * * * Now it is an absurdity to tell the judge in an individual case which is subject to his decision how he has to decide. Such a system would make the judge superfluous; such things have now come to pass.

Naturally it was not done in an open manner; but even the most camouflaged form could not hide the fact that a directive was to be given. Thereby the office of judge is naturally abolished and the proceedings in a trial become a farce. ...”

The threat alone of the removal was sufficient to impair the independence of the judges, but the evidence discloses that measures were actually carried out for the removal or transfer of judges who proved unsatisfactory from the Party standpoint. ...

{3 N.M.T. 1023} To the domination by Hitler and the political “guidance” of the Ministry of Justice must be added the direct pressure of Party functionaries and police officials. The record is replete with testimony of specific instances of interference in the administration of justice by officials of Party and police. ...

The defendant Rothenberger describes the manner in which the “administration of justice was burdened by the Party and by the SS,” and referred in his testimony to the

“thousand little Hitlers who every day jeopardized the independence of the individual judge.” ...

{3 N.M.T. 1024} The final degradation of the judiciary is disclosed in a secret communication {October 29 1943} by Ministerial Director Letz of the Reich Ministry of Justice to Dr. Vollmer, also a ministerial director in the department.

Not only were the judges “guided” and at times coerced; they were spied upon. We quote:

“Moreover, I know from documents, which the minister produces from time to time out of his private files, that the Security Service takes up special problems of the administration of justice with thoroughness and makes summarized situation reports about them.

As far as I am informed, a member of the Security Service is attached to each judicial authority. This member is obliged to give information under the seal of secrecy. This procedure is secret and the person who gives the information is not named. In this way we get, so to say, anonymous reports.

Reasons given for this procedure are of State political interest. As long as the direct interests of the State security are concerned, nothing can be said against it, especially in wartime.””

The Justice Case, 3 N.M.T. 1, 954-1201 (opinion, judgment, sentences), at 1010-1024 (U.S. Military Tribunal 3, Nrnberg Germany, trial, 5 March-October 18, judgment, December 4, 1947), volume 3 (1951, 31+1236 pages), Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (“Nuernberg, October 1946–April 1949”) (15 volumes, U.S. GPO, Washington D.C., 1949-1953) (“the green series”) {SuDoc: D 102.8, ditto, LCCN: 49045929, 97071903, OCLC: 12799641, UC, WorldCat}, volume 3 {24.69mb.pdf, source}.

“ July 23, 2000, assassination of Salah Shehada, a senior Hamas activist in Gaza City ... Israel’s air force used an American-made F-16 bomber to drop a one-ton bomb on a house in a densely populated part of Gaza ... killed him ... 14 civilians ... injured more than 100 people.”

  Forward {copy}

Kenneth T. Walsh, Kevin Whitelaw, Danielle Knight, David E. Kaplan, “White House Week: Foggy Bottom's Case of the Missing Memo” (U.S.News & World Report, “Nation & World,” May 9 2005, posted May 2) {copy, copy}. “Several offices of the State Department, including the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the legal office, believed Israel may have violated U.S. arms-export laws by using an American-made F-16 jet in the attack. Bolton disagreed, and officials drafted a “split memo” for Secretary of State Colin Powell, laying out both positions. But late one evening, sources say, just before the memo went to Powell’s office, Bolton recalled it and allegedly replaced it with a new memo, omitting the assessment that Israel may have violated the law. Powell never learned that some of his staffers took a different view, according to officials.”

 

Douglas Jehl,3 Ex-Officials Describe Bullying by Bolton” (New York Times, May 3 2005) {copy}. “... transcripts ...” Barry Schweid (Associated Press), “Ex-Official: Bolton Wanted Analyst Fired” (San Francisco Chronocle, May 4 2005). “... transcripts ...” Thomas C. Hubbard {90kb.pdf}, Alan A. Foley {96kb.pdf}, John S. Wolf {135kb.pdf}.

Farah Stockman, “Bolton's style cited in treaty impasse” (Boston Globe, May 3 2005). “The United States ... rejected in July 2001 a draft agreement — hammered out over six years by 144 countries — for a system of international inspectors to enforce the biological weapons treaty ... Bolton ... a leading voice for rejecting the proposed enforcement system ... could expose the trade secrets of U.S. pharmaceutical companies, as well as biodefense secrets ... said ... germ warfare programs are too difficult to detect ... hard-hitting speech ... accused Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, and Sudan of pursuing biological weapons, prompting angry denials from the accused countries that were present ... Donald Mahley ... speaking for Bolton ... demanded that the committee be dissolved.”

Ira Kurzban, “Diplomacy By Death Squad: How Bolton Armed Haiti's Thugs and Killers” (CounterPunch, May 3 2005). “He has been one of the hard-liners in the State Department who sought the overthrow of Aristide and who bullied intelligence analysts on Haiti who were trying to provide a more-balanced picture. Even his cohort in overthrowing Aristide, Otto Reich, was quoted as stating that they both rightfully went after an intelligence analyst who gave the “benefit of the doubt” to Aristide as the democratically elected president.” Maxine Waters, “Congresswoman Waters Demands That The Senate Investigate (Bolton) Arms Shipment To Haiti” (Information Clearing House, April 27 2005). Kevin Pina, interviewed by Dennis Bernstein, “Does Haiti need more arms?” (KPFK/Pacifica Radio, Los Angeles, Flashpoints! April 8 2005).

Glenn Kessler, “Senate Staff Interviews Show More Nuanced Image of Bolton” (Washington Post, May 4 2005). “... 10 transcripts ... no additional direct evidence of abusive behavior toward subordinates ... Yesterday, the committee interviewed the former top legal adviser at the State Department, William H. Taft IV {45kb.pdf}, and a department nonproliferation lawyer, Newell Highsmith {97kb.pdf}.”

“ We are responding to the Committee Chair.”

Condoleezza Rice

Douglas Jehl, “A Setback to Democrats' Request for Papers on Bolton and Syria” (New York Times, May 5 2005). “The Republican ... chairman of the ... Committee ... declined to endorse a Democratic request that the State Department turn over documents related to a long-running dispute between John R. Bolton and American intelligence agencies over assessments about Syria and its weapons program ... In his letter to Ms. Rice {178kb.pdf}, Mr. Lugar ... suggested ... some of the Democratic requests ... ‘are extremely broad and may have marginal relevance to specific allegations.’”

5 Member Rule

“ An Executive agency, on request of the ... Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, or any five members thereof, shall submit any information requested of it relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee.”

  5 U.S.C. § 2954 Waxman v. Evans (C.D. Cal., 2002) {3.44mb.pdf, 620kb.pdf}

Vicki Allen, “Democrats hint they may try to delay Bolton vote” (Reuters, May 5 2005). “That is not my view,” Biden wrote Rice {153kb.pdf}, adding that the documents “go directly to an issue the committee has been pursuing, namely whether in speeches and testimony, Mr Bolton sought to exaggerate the conclusions that could reasonably be drawn from available intelligence.”

Douglas Jehl, “Democrats, Seeking Files, Threaten to Stall Bolton Vote” (New York Times, May 6 2005). “He warned that he and other Democrats would “consider the failure to produce the requested documents in a timely manner a lack of cooperation” on the part of the State Department, and suggested that such a move would prompt them to seek a further delay in the committee’s vote on whether to send Mr. Bolton’s nomination to the full Senate, which is now scheduled for May 12.

“ Rule 4. Quorums...

(b) Business. A quorum for the transaction of Committee ... business ... shall consist of one-third of the members ... including at least one member from each party.”

The nomination could be blocked if the committee’s eight Democrats succeeded in persuading at least one of the panel’s 10 Republicans to join them in opposing his confirmation.

But under committee rules {40kb.txt, 74kb.pdf; 41kb.txt, 246kb.pdf} for what constitutes a quorum, Democrats could prevent a vote from taking place if they all refused to attend the May 12 meeting.”

Douglas Jehl, “Ex-C.I.A. Official Says Bolton Interfered” (New York Times, May 7 2005). “... transcript ... John E. McLaughlin {39kb.pdf} ... 32 years in the C.I.A. ... “the only time I had ever heard of such a request” from a policy maker, that a C.I.A. officer or analyst be transferred ... “I had a high regard for the individual’s work — I had a strong negative reaction to the suggestion about moving him.”

Mr. McLaughlin said ... Mr. Cohen ... told him that Mr. Bolton and ... Otto Reich had “serious disagreements” with Mr. Armstrong’s work and that they wanted to have Mr. Armstrong “reassigned or moved” from his post.

“Well, we’re not going to do that, absolutely not,” Mr. McLaughlin said he had told the supervisor, Stuart Cohen. “No way. End of story, or words to that effect. I remember having a very strong reaction to it.” ...

A State Department lawyer {97kb.pdf} ... told the committee ... Mr. Bolton and his aides had told her {him} that she {he} was “off the case” in a legal matter involving Mr. Bolton’s office. The State Department legal adviser {April 16 2001-2005 February 28}, William H. Taft IV {45kb.pdf}, later refused Mr. Bolton’s request.

Among those interviewed on Friday ... Lawrence Wilkerson {73kb.pdf} ... chief of staff to Colin L. Powell ... said ... he had told the committee ... he regarded Mr. Bolton as “an extremely poor leader” and “not an effective diplomat.” Also interviewed were Mr. Reich {44kb.pdf}, a close ally and supporter of Mr. Bolton who served as assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs; and Robert L. Hutchings {36kb.pdf}, the former chairman of the National Intelligence Council.”

John E. McLaughlin, interviewed by Wolf Blitzer, on Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer (CNN, May 8 2005, 12:00 p.m. EDT) (archive):

“ Wolf Blitzer: You were a career professional at the CIA for more than three decades, working your way up to become deputy director, acting director at the very end.

Did John Bolton try to get one of your analysts fired, fired because he disagreed with an assessment that he had made on Cuba and weapons of mass destruction in Cuba?

John McLaughlin: Well, the New York Times has accurately reported my reaction {39kb.pdf} to a report along those lines.

A subordinate came to me and said that Mr. Bolton was seeking transfer of one of our employees, and I objected to that, and said that we wouldn’t do it, that it was not on, no way, end of story.

And that’s essentially the report that was in the paper and that is accurate.

Wolf Blitzer: So he did try to get somebody removed because he disagreed with the assessment, and you said, that’s not going to happen?

John McLaughlin: Correct.

Wolf Blitzer: Had you ever in your...?

(Crosstalk)

John McLaughlin: Now, I will say, Mr. Bolton did not raise that directly with me.

Wolf Blitzer: But it came up to you?

John McLaughlin: It came up to me.

Wolf Blitzer: And you said: It's not going to happen.

Had you ever heard of a policymaker in the government trying to get an analyst, an intelligence analyst fired because he disagreed with the assessment?

John McLaughlin: Not in my personal experience.”

Paul Richter, “Senate Democrats Might Extend Inquiry on Bolton: They say documents they need on Bush's nominee for the U.N. have not been furnished.” (Los Angeles Times, May 7 2005). “10 ‘intelligence intercepts’ ... must be approved by John D. Negroponte, the new director of national intelligence.” ... “We are officially frustrated,” said a Democratic aide on the Senate Intelligence Committee. “We have been unable to get access to these NSA intercepts, any information related to these NSA intercepts, and have been unable to get the DNI’s office to tell us when or how we may get access to these things.”

Stonewalling

“ Senator Carl Levin: Mr. President {Presiding Officer of the Senate: Senator Lamar Alexander (Tennessee), at this point in the debate}, I want to discuss the nomination of John Negroponte to be the first Director of National Intelligence.

This is a new position created by Congress as a key element of intelligence reform after the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and after the many failures we saw concerning intelligence on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.

I want to discuss one particular aspect of the problems we had with the intelligence community, and how I hope Ambassador Negroponte will improve upon that situation.

In the course of conducting oversight of the executive branch, Congress requires information and documents produced by the executive branch, including from the intelligence community.

This is especially true in cases where Congress, or members of Congress, are conducting oversight for which they are responsible.

Unfortunately, it has been disturbingly difficult to obtain information and documents from this administration on a number of serious issues and from a number of agencies, including from the intelligence community, as well as from the Defense and Justice Departments.

The only conclusion I can draw from my experience in seeking information and documents from this administration as part of my oversight responsibilities is that too often they have not cooperated fully or appropriately. {S4067}

Let me turn to some specific examples. ...

This brings me back to the nomination of Ambassador Negroponte to be the new leader of the Intelligence Community.

At his nomination hearing before the Intelligence Committee, I asked him about this problem of stonewalling, ignoring, or delaying on requests for information and documents.

I asked him if he would ensure that the intelligence community provides timely and responsive answers to such requests, and he basically said he would look into the situation.

Frankly, I was hoping he would have a more robust and positive answer, and that he would commit to taking steps, if confirmed, to ensure that the intelligence community is fully responsive in a timely manner to congressional requests for information and documents.

However, I am hopeful that when Ambassador Negroponte does look into the matter, he will be more responsive, in light of the law we just passed.

He has a responsibility to the Nation, to the Congress, and to the people — not just to the President.”

Senate debate, “Nomination of John D. Negroponte to be Director of National Intelligence,” 151 Congressional Record S4052-S4074 {pf} {167kb.txt, 194kb.pdf}, at S4066-S4068 (April 21 2005, daily edition 151:49, U.S. Congress 109-1) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/49}.

____________________

A foreseeably, forlorn hope.  CJHjr

____________________

“ Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr.: I am even more concerned about the failure of this Committee to receive any information related to Mr. Bolton’s requests for NSA information and the identity of U.S. persons in these intercepts.

On April 13, Senator Dodd first made a request for this information.

By letter dated April 28, Senator Lugar also made a request for this information through the Intelligence Committee. Specifically, the Chairman asked Senators Roberts and Rockefeller to seek

“all information related to Mr. Bolton’s requests and the responses thereto, including ... the unredacted contents of the documents in question ...” ...

I understand that the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee were briefed on Tuesday by General Hayden, Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

I understand that they were not given the identities of the U.S. persons that Mr. Bolton requested and received. ...

So as far as I can tell, Mr. Chairman, your request has not been fulfilled. ...

After all the work we have done in the past decade to strengthen the role of this Committee, it is a serious mistake to acquiesce in the Administration’s withholding of relevant information, whether they think it is relevant or not.

The integrity of the nomination process, and our constitutional role, are being challenged. Article II, Section II of the Constitution provides that:

“The President shall ... nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States ...”

The failure of the Administration to cooperate with this Committee and the rationale offered for this failure — that the “Department does not believe these requests to be specifically tied to the issues being deliberated by the Committee” — has no constitutional justification and does damage to the standing and ability of this Committee to perform its function of oversight and advice and consent. ...

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, we are a co-equal branch of government, and it is within our power — and ours alone — to decide what we think is relevant to our deliberations in the exercise of the advice and consent power.

With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, I think we’re making a big mistake.

We should not stand for this encroachment on our authority. ...

We do not work for the President.

No one is entitled to appointment to an office requiring advice and consent — unless they have our consent.

No President is entitled to approval of a nominee.

We have undermined our authority and shirked the constitutional responsibility of this Committee.

I intend to continue to seek this information.

I hope you will join me, Mr. Chairman.”

Joseph R. Biden Jr. (U.S. Senator), opening prepared statement, pages 2-4 (May 12 2005) {108kb.pdf}.

Anne Gearan (Associated Press), “Sen. Biden Asks Rice for Bolton Documents: Sen. Biden, D-Del., Asks Rice for More Documents on Bolton, Scolds Her for Ignoring Requests” (ABC News, May 7 2005). “Biden repeated a warning to Rice that Democrats could hold up the vote if they are not satisfied they have investigated Bolton fully ... Biden said that in her public remarks about the Bolton nomination fight last week, Rice implied ‘that you do not believe you have a duty to respond to requests from the minority.’”

Douglas Jehl, “Rice's Reason for Withholding Bolton Files: A Chilling Effect” (New York Times, May 9 2005) “In rejecting the request, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said that the information involves “internal deliberations” and their disclosure could have a chilling effect on debates within the administration. The decision was spelled out in a letter that Ms. Rice sent Friday to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. ... Ms. Rice made clear that the department would not respond to four other Democratic requests, for information about disputes on Syria and Cuba in 2002 and 2003 and a separate dispute on Sudan in 2001.”

Richard Benedetto, “Bolton fight tests Bush’s 2nd-term strength” (USA Today, May 8 2005). “Since 1789, the Senate has voted down only nine of more than 700 Cabinet nominees:” (listed).

Robert L. Hutchings (formerly Chairman, National Intelligence Council, February 11 2003-2005 January 31), interviewed by Robert Siegel, “Bolton Observer Offers Close-Up View of Nominee” (National Public Radio, All Things Considered, May 9 2005) {transcript}.

“ Robert Siegel: Last Friday, Robert Hutchings spoke {36kb.pdf} to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff about John Bolton, who is nominated to be ambassador to the United Nations. ...

The New York Times quotes an e-mail from you accusing Mr. Bolton essentially of having fostered a climate of politicization and intimidation in intelligence analysis.

What exactly did he do?

Robert Hutchings: I was trying not to personalize this quite so much but, really, to speak of a general pattern that was worrying to me — one that happens in every administration but perhaps is particularly acute in this one — in which intelligence analysts, mostly junior-level people, are subjected to pressure to conform to a political line.

So my comments were not directed at Mr. Bolton, per se, whom I hardly know, but at the general problem.

Robert Siegel: Well, to what degree do you hold him accountable for that in this past administration?

Robert Hutchings: Well, my exposure was rather limited.

It did entail the Syrian testimony, and it also included the results of an assessment on Cuba.

So my personal knowledge of Mr. Bolton was not all that direct.

Robert Siegel: By the Syria testimony, we’re talking about 2003, I guess, when Mr. Bolton was preparing his testimony for the House International Relations Committee about Syria and unconventional weapons programs, as the US understood them to be in Syria.

What did the US hold to be the case, and what was he about to say was the case?

Robert Hutchings: Well, I have to rely on memory here because I’m no longer in government, no longer have access to all those records.

But as I recall, we were given an early draft testimony, which I and others reviewed and found went well beyond what we felt the intelligence would verify.

So we pushed back.

And I actually instructed my staff not to clear on language that we could not support.

Robert Siegel: Well, supporters of the Bolton nomination say this describes a process that should be taking place, push back here and there and out comes a result.

Did you find something untoward about that exchange over Syria?

Robert Hutchings: Well, it does happen, and draft testimony and other drafts get circulated around government all the time.

In this case, I thought the initial draft showed, really, a lack of judgment and was a worrying disregard for the intelligence, in my view.

So I instructed my staff to play hardball and not to clear on any draft that looked like this.

Robert Siegel: How often did that happen in the course of your two years on the National Intelligence Council that you had to tell the staff to play hardball?

Robert Hutchings: Maybe a handful of times that I directly got involved.

Robert Siegel: Typically how different might the adjectives be or the verbs be in such a statement to provoke the kind of disagreement you’re describing?

Robert Hutchings: The disagreements that I recall really came out of selection of isolated bits of uncorroborated intelligence that were then used to demonstrate a larger point, which went well beyond where the intelligence would really take you.

And bear in mind this was coming at a time after we were already encountering in Iraq a reality different from that which the National Intelligence estimate on Iraq WMD had projected.

So I thought it was our responsibility to be particularly careful with the evidence.

Robert Siegel: The Silberman-Robb commission {copy} — that is, President Bush’s commission that looked into the intelligence agencies — looked at what happened with discussions of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and concluded that they found, in that case at least, no evidence of political pressure to influence the intelligence community.

Broadly speaking, are they being naive about what’s been happening with policy-makers and the intelligence agencies?

Robert Hutchings: Broadly and narrowly speaking, they are being naive, and I think that they really missed the call on what constitutes politicization.

Just because the intelligence community successfully resists pressures doesn’t mean that there hasn’t been an effect.

And I worry about the effect on more junior analysts, who are led to believe that there’s an expected answer to an intelligence judgment and there’s a penalty to be paid for not reaching the pre-determined answer.

And I saw it at work when analysts were getting more timid about calling things as they saw it.

Intelligence professionals always ought to be willing to tell truth to power, but political officials shouldn’t make it so difficult on them to do so.

Robert Siegel: Well, Robert Hutchings, thank you very much for talking with us today.

Robert Hutchings: Thank you.

Robert Siegel: Robert Hutchings spoke to us earlier today. He’s now diplomat in residence at the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton University.”

Copyright ©2005 National Public Radio®

Douglas Jehl, “No. 2 at State Dept. Was Said to Put Restrictions on Bolton” (New York Times, May 10 2005).

Glenn Kessler, “Powell Aide Says Armitage, Bolton Clashed” (Washington Post, May 10 2005).

Carol Giacomo (Reuters), “Bolton aide targets State Dept. bureau in dispute” (Reuters, May 10 2005, 7:09 p.m. EDT) {copy}.

“A top aide to John Bolton ... threatened to diminish the role of the State Department’s intelligence bureau because of a dispute over analyzing China’s missile export controls, according to declassified e-mails ...

The State Department’s intelligence and research bureau (INR) attached its own separate — opposing — analysis of the Chinese controls when, according to established procedures, it transmitted the CIA memo to then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.

Fred Fleitz, Bolton’s chief of staff, ... in the e-mail to Thomas Fingar, then the bureau’s No. 2 official ... said he was writing “on behalf of Bolton and expressed his boss’ “displeasure” ... Fleitz said Bolton’s office {T} considered the bureau’s decision to attach its rebuttal to the CIA memo “a serious abuse of INR’s liaison role.”

“Actions of this type cannot help but undermine the bond of trust between [Bolton’s office] and INR ... If [Bolton’s office] cannot trust INR to follow established dissemination procedures, we may have to look for an alternate arrangement to send and relay [top secret] material, such as working directly with DS,” the State Department’s diplomatic security bureau ...

A Senate Democratic source said ... the bureau’s role {INR} is to provide “all source” intelligence support to the State Department

“to help ensure that one-sided, or distorted views, do not shape U.S. policy.””

Glenn Kessler, “Bolton Office E-Mails Spotlight Tensions” (Washington Post, May 11 2005).

____________________

Senate Committee staff interviews

Senate Committee Democratic staff (Senate Foreign Relations Committee), “Summary of Concerns, Regarding the Nomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations” (Memorandum, May 12 2005).

Senate Committee business meeting, May 12 2005, 10:00 a.m., to consider and vote on the nomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations with Rank of Ambassador. Transcript: Committee report, Annex C (pages 19-117) (Senate Executive Report 109-1, May 18 2005) {1088kb.txt, 1787kb.pdf, 858kb.pdf}, Richard G. Lugar (chairman) {53kb.pdf}, Joseph R. Biden Jr. (ranking minority member) {108kb.pdf}, C-Span video, “U.N. Ambassador Nomination Hearing” (10:00-3:27 p.m.) {5:24:38}. Transcripts {Lexis}: Two CQ/FDCH transcripts {both}, FNS transcript: May 12, 10:01 a.m..

Senate Committee decision, May 12 2005. “Committee ordered reported, without recommendation, the nominations of John Robert Bolton, of Maryland, to be the U.S. Representative to the United Nations ... Security Council ... General Assembly ...,” presidential nominations PN326-109, PN327-109 (received March 17 2005).

 

____________________

Otto Juan Reich

Robert Novak, “GOP throws Reich at Bolton bashers” (Chicago Sun-Times), “Otto Reich exposes sham of attacks on John Bolton” (New Hampshire Union Leader), “John Bolton's defender” (CNN, Inside Politics) (Conservative Voice, Townhall.com) (May 12 2005).

“ Whatever damage Bolton did to Armstrong professionally could not even compare with Reich’s testimony that the analyst’s work was considered subpar throughout the national security bureaucracy. That fits complaints I have heard from Reagan administration officials about Armstrong’s left-wing bias on Western Hemisphere questions in general, but particularly on Cuba.”

____________________

Reich & Bolton v. Armstrong

Let’s do what Robert Novak hopes we will not do.

Let’s listen, what Otto Reich had to say:

“ Otto Reich: Cuba had, in our opinion —

It was nothing new.

I mean, there had been books written.

The number-two person in the old Soviet chemical/biological warfare development establishment — Ken Hallenbeck {Ken Alibek} — wrote that he had been to Cuba and had seen this.

So, there was no secret that Cuba was involved in this developmental — research and development, or whatever the words were, that were used in the speech:— “effort.””

Transcript, “Interview of Otto Reich With Regard to the Bolton Nomination,” page 9 (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 6 2005) {44kb.pdf}.

____________________

Now, let’s do what Otto Reich hopes we will not do.

Let’s listen, what Ken Alibek had to say:

“ The allegation against Cuba emerged from the book Biohazard {pages 273-274-275}, published recently by Ken Alibek {Kanatjan Alibekov} {comment}, a former KGB colonel who was second in command of the Soviet offensive biological warfare program until his defection in 1992.

Alibek ... told The Herald, he had no firsthand knowledge of Cuba’s programs but had heard some details from his Moscow boss, Maj. Gen. Yuri Kalinin ...

“It was his opinion,” Alibek said.

“Kalinin saw no weapons production ... Maybe we were over-suspicious ...”

U.S. officials on Tuesday cast a skeptical eye ...

“With all the intelligence we get from defectors and other means, there’s never been evidence,”

said another official who said he had just checked with “appropriate agencies” about the Cuba allegations. ...

“We get lots of reports from defectors and others, but when we go to check them out it’s always second and third hand, and the stuff doesn’t check out,”

said a U.S. official who has seen such reports for several years.”

Juan O. Tamayo, “U.S. skeptical of report on Cuban biological weapons” (Miami Herald, June 23 1999) {copy}.

Hearsay speculation.

Ken Alibek had not “been to Cuba.”

Ken Alibek had not “seen this.”

Ken Alibek’s hearsay speaker had not “seen this.”

Even then, a decade out of date.

1990. That’s when he didn’t see it.

And all those intervening years, and all those many other people. They didn’t see it either.

____________________

Query:Subpar”?

When an aggressive cabal, of relentless liars, bullies, willfully blind extremist ideologues, assert, that somebody else is “subpar,” who won’t endorse their fabrications, their fantasies —

How are we to assess, which of them, is subpar?

We listened, to what Otto Reich had to say.

We listened, to what Ken Alibek had to say.

And what did we learn?

We learned, that Otto Reich is superpar, above par, in the world he inhabits, which prizes, scouts, cultivates, recruits, encourages, incites, positions, empowers, promotes, publishes, applauds, rewards, awards, bold, audacious, unflinching, relentless, malicious, liars and bullies.

But in the world I inhabit, we learned, that Otto Reich is subpar.

For the same reason.

Otto Reich is a bold, audacious, unflinching, relentless, malicious, liar and bully.

And because, this hardened, professional, liar and bully, even had he honestly felt certain, that what he asserted was true — an unlikely possibility — then, even on that unlikely hypothesis, he would be: Yet a willful liar, to then attribute his belief to 3 pages he never read, in a book he cited. Yet a reckless and willful liar, to then assert to be an unassailable fact, and willfully conceal its source, the mere hearsay of what other liars said the book said. Yet grossly negligent — prompted by his duty, to read those 3 pages, to read the newspaper, both quoted in a Congressional hearing devoted solely to this very topic, to talk to Ken Alibek, a few miles down the road, a paid consultant to the CIA — then grossly negligent, to disobey his duty, then grossly negligent, to fail to learn the untruth of what he asserted.

Long ago.

A duty arising not merely from his lifelong aggressive enmity for Fidel Castro.

A duty imposed upon him, by the offices of trust he held: Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA), Special Envoy to the Western Hemisphere, 2002 (U.S. State Department); Special Envoy for Western Hemisphere Initiatives, 2003-2004 (National Security Council, White House).

And though no one claims this on his behalf, were Otto Reich to honestly misremember what he once knew, then, even on that unlikely hypothesis, he would be yet a willful liar, to then conceal what he would then well know, that his memory was faulty or failing, and a man in that condition, presuming to assert unassailable facts, would be not merely and plainly “subpar” but maliciously and arrogantly so.

Otto Reich is a bold, audacious, unflinching, relentless, malicious, liar and bully.

It’s little wonder, U.S. Senators, of both political parties, refused to conduct a confirmation hearing, on the nomination of Otto Juan Reich, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs.

The public record was already adequate, to document, that Otto Juan Reich is a liar and a bully, dishonest, untrustworthy, unfit to be an officer of the United States of America, to hold any position of trust, any position of influence.

Details: Jeff Cohen, “The Return of Otto Reich: Will Government Propagandist Join Bush Administration?” (Extra!, FAIR: Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, June 8 2001). Jason Vest, “Our Man in Little Havana: The secret Cold War history of Otto Juan Reich” (American Prospect, May 25, 2001). Robert Parry, Peter Kornbluh, “Iran-Contra's Untold Story” (Foreign Policy, Fall 1988, pages 3-30). Peter Kornbluh, “Reagan's Propaganda Ministry” (Propaganda Review, No. 2, Summer 1988) (and other reports in that link). Thomas Blanton, “Public Diplomacy and Covert Propaganda: The declassified record of Ambassador Otto Juan Reich” (National Security Archive, March 2 2001). Robert Parry, “Fooling America” (speech, Santa Monica, March 28 1993) {copy}.

Three nominations, sent three times, by the President to the Senate. PN630-107, PN850-107, PN1441-107.

Three nominations, returned three times, by the Senate to the President. Senate Rule 31(6).

But those Senators inhabit an alternate reality.

The very traits which disqualify Otto Juan Reich, in their alternate world, recommend him, in the actual world.

The world of reality, not myth.

The United States of America today, and for decades.

A liar, a bully, unrestrained, by the rule of law.

And so, George W. Bush, appointed Otto Juan Reich anyway, the moment Congress recessed, a “recess appointment.”

And when that license expired, George W. Bush appointed him again, anyway, to two jobs in succession, with the same duties, which did not require Senate confirmation, a “special” presidential diplomatic agent.

Johnny H. Killian, George A. Costello, Kenneth R. Thomas (co-editors), David M. Ackerman, Henry Cohen, Robert Meltz (contributors), Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002 {purl, copy, 7.2mb.pdf}, article II {627kb.pdf}, section 2, pages 560-562 (clause 3: “Recess Appointments”), pages 531-533 (clause 2: “Presidential Diplomatic Agents”) (U.S. Congress 108-2, Senate Document No. 108-17, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2004) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/3:108-17, Serial Set: 14866, LCCN: 2005414932, OCLC: 60822213, GPOcat, LL: paper, DL, WorldCat, October 3 2005}. And see, 5 U.S.C. § 5503. Recess appointments.

He lied, bullied, incited, conspired, aided and abetted.

But he couldn’t quite manage, to make his coup stick (April 11-13 2002), to oust Hugo Chvez, in Venezuela, now with a 70% approval rating among his citizens.

“ Concentrate on gluing black hats on the Sandinistas and white hats on UNO.”

From: Walter Raymond, Subject: Otto Reich, Note, 07/08/86 15:12 {copy, copy}

He couldn’t quite manage, to glue those two black hats on Fidel Castro: “state sponsor of terror,” “biological weapons.”

There’s only so much a liar, a thug, a bully, can do, before resorting to force.

Otto Juan Reich managed one thing, and only because he (or somebody) persuaded the President to resort to force, an easy sell, against a weak victim: To kidnap, and oust, the democratically elected president of Haiti (February 29 2004), reinstall, and arm — with the help of John Robert Bolton — yet another U.S. backed terror regime, of violent criminals and thugs.

If you can judge a man, by the company he keeps, you can judge him all the better, by the praise he heaps:

{Quotations to come}

This guy’s a thug

“ Once, in the nineteen-seventies, Reich said, “Colombia and Cuba were vying for the same seat on the U.N. Security Council, and Colombia wouldn’t back off,” so Castro “had the brother of the President kidnapped” by leftist Colombian guerrillas.

Reich added that Castro also had the brother of another President of Colombia kidnapped, for a different reason, and both incidents unfolded in exactly the same way.

“First, Castro offers to negotiate. ‘I’ll try to intercede with those bad people. We had relations with them, and we still know them.’”

Eventually, Reich told me, both victims surfaced in Havana, and were handed back to their families. The Presidents got the message. In the case of the Security Council spat, Reich said, “Colombia withdrew its candidacy, and Cuba got the seat.’

(In fact, Colombia and Cuba both withdrew, and Mexico got the seat. The first of these kidnappings didn’t take place, in any event, until four years afterward. In both cases, the victims turned up in Colombia, not in Havana.)

Reich studied me, as if to see whether I really understood.

“This guy’s a thug,” he said. “It’s like ‘The Godfather.’ They act the same way, except he runs a country, instead of just a family.””

William Finnegan, “Castro's Shadow: America's man in Latin America, and his obsession” (New Yorker, October 7 2002).

____________________

Perfect

“ Otto Reich is the ideal Under-Secretary for a failed U.S. foreign policy in Latin America,” Ricardo Alarcn, president of the National Assembly of the People’s Power, chortled during a recent interview in Havana.

“I’m not worried in the least. The United States is who should be worried.”

Alarc/n said Reich has already generated a negative reaction among Latin-American opinion leaders. He cited a widely published opinion piece {copy} by former Costa Rican president and Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias, who warned that “appointing someone of Reich’s ideological stripe would be a real setback in hemispheric cooperation.”

Alarcn continued:

“Otto Reich is more amusing to us than anything else.

He is going to be concerned not only with Cuba but the whole continent.

Perfect.

Letting him help destroy U.S. relations with Latin America strikes us as a brilliant idea.””

Kirk Nielsen, “Waiting for Otto: Why would a man sullied by Iran-contra and illegal propaganda campaigns be a Bush nominee? Good question.” (Miami New Times, November 8 2001).

____________________

Now, let’s do what Robert Novak also hopes we will not do.

Let’s listen, to what the “national security bureaucracy” has to say, about Fulton T. Armstrong, then National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, National Intelligence Council (June 2000-2004 December).

This was his chain of command:

Armstrong – Cohen – Hutchings – McLaughlin:

“ Stuart A. Cohen, then Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council (May 2002-2004 June):

The evidence that we had was weak, but the logic train — in other words, on the question of whether Cuba had a BW program — the logic train could be quite compelling. And so, I could easily understand why somebody would not be happy with the outcome. ...

Paul Foldi: So, did you ever reprimand Mr. Smith {Fulton T. Armstrong} for any of his actions?

Stuart A. Cohen: No, not at all.

Quite the contrary.

I worked harder to get him promoted than any other officers that I think has ever worked for me. ...

Policymakers like intelligence when it supports their policies.

They hate intelligence when it doesn’t.”

Transcript, “Interview of Stuart Cohen With Regard to the Bolton Nomination,” pages 6, 11 (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 29 2005) {36kb.pdf}.

“ Robert L. Hutchings, then Chairman, National Intelligence Council (February 11 2003-2005 January 31):

I thought he was superb.

He had been —

He had a good sense of the policy side, as well as good connections with the outside academic world.

He had served in the Clinton NSC.

Fulton T. Armstrong, Director for Inter-American Affairs, National Security Council, White House (1995-1997, 1998-1999), Deputy NIO/LA, National Intelligence Council (1997-1998).  CJHjr

I might add, just parenthetically, that people’s politics really didn’t apply in the National Intelligence Council. I made a point of not allowing them to apply. No one really cared who was a Republican or a Democrat. And, in most cases, nobody knew who was a Republican and who was a Democrat.

We had a responsibility to be nonpartisan, really, and I think most of us left our partisan attitudes at the front gate when we — when we walked in.

He was there almost the whole time I was there.

He had terrific analytic skills, and was able to tackle some of the toughest problems very well.

It was a polarized community, the Latin American community, so I did occasionally have issues that arose that involved strong partisan feelings on one side or the other.

But I thought the individual in question handled those rather well. ...

After the Iraq WMD estimate, we —

Anonymous, Iraq's Continuing Programs For Weapons of Mass Destruction (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 2002-16HC, October 2 2002, Top Secret).  CJHjr

I instructed the managers of the worldwide BW estimate to go back and scrub, review, and verify every source — every single one — not to take any for granted. ...

National Intelligence Council:

Lawrence K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology (S&T) (June 1994-2004 April), National Intelligence Officer for Intelligence Assurance (from April 2004).

Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation (WMD) (from April 2004).

  CJHjr

In the course of this, most of the judgements that we had reached earlier held up.

But some did not.

And one of them, that did not hold up, was the judgement on Cuba.

The judgements on Cuba were altered somewhat, on review of the evidence, and came out, sort of, less — with less confidence than we had, well, portrayed the Cuban programs earlier. ...

This was a worldwide BW estimate {2004} that was really produced by technical people ... the individual in question ... wasn’t that intimately involved in the preparation of the estimate.”

Transcript, “Interview of Robert Hutchings With Regard to the Bolton Nomination,” pages 4, 7 (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 6 2005) {36kb.pdf}.

“ John E. McLaughlin, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (October 19 2000-2004 November 12):

I had high regard for his work, and for him personally, so I had a strong reaction to it. ...

I’m acquainted with this NIO, because I had taken him to brief a number of very senior policymakers on some occasions and had admired the way he had done it. ...

I had high regard for the individual’s work; therefore, had a strong negative reaction to the suggestion about moving him.”

Transcript, “Interview of John McLaughlin With Regard to the Bolton Nomination,” pages 6-7, 9 (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 29 2005) {36kb.pdf}.

____________________

Perhaps Robert Novak had a different group in mind.

Not the “national security bureaucracy,” as he asserted, but the national security politiburo.

The politicians, not the civil service.

The likes of George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Stephen J. Hadley, their convicted criminal liar colleague, the El Salvador death squad protector, Elliot Abrams.

This group — which inhabits the thuggish world, of Otto Reich, and John Bolton — most certainly regards Fulton T. Armstrong as subpar — a badge of honor — for stubbornly refusing, to endorse their lies, about Cuba.

Fearing the truth about Cuba.

That it might gain currency, with the U.S. public.

And what is that truth?

From what I can see, this is the truth:

Cuba is a powerful force, for good in the world.

A beacon, in a dark world. A beacon, of empathy, of humanity, of achievement. Justly honored, justly respected, throughout the world, by all who know of Cuba’s hard earned achievements, and good works, free health care, life-enhancing, liberating, free education, generosity, providing many other countries, with life-saving health care, and free education.

A threat indeed.

The threat of a good reputation.

The threat of a good example.

The threat of what could be.

If American citizens followed that good example, abandoned their determination to destroy life, and resolved instead, to devote their talents, their resources, to enhance life.  CJHjr

“ The U.S. military budget will equal rest of world’s combined within 12 months.”

Addicted to war? {copy, 2943kb.pdf}.

“ In 2005 ... 48 per cent of the world total.”

SIPRI Yearbook 2006, “Chapter 8. Military expenditure” (June 12 2006).

 

Niger

One member of the “national security bureaucracy,” outside his chain of command, voiced a complaint about Fulton T. Armstrong:

“ Alan Foley, then director of WINPAC: Office of Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (March 2001-2003 October):

The NIO for Latin America didn’t work for me. ...

The first time I met the NIO LA was in the context of the — a memo he was writing on the Niger business. So, this would have been early '03, I guess, or somewhere in that time frame.

And he had written a memo — I can’t remember what art form it was — a NIC memo, or something like that — where, basically, he said, “Look, the, from a political analyst’s perspective, the notion that the Nigerians {Nigerans} would sell yellow cake to the Iraqis is just crazy.”

I mean, I’m paraphrasing. He didn’t say it —

I mean, he said it much more eloquently.

And my analyst, I remember, came to me and said, you know, “We’re concerned about this memo, because he doesn’t even acknowledge other information we have that suggested maybe they did.”

And so, I remember the NIO coming down to my office, and I think a couple of my analysts were there, and I made the case to him. I said, “Look, you may not agree with this, but I think, analytically, you ought to at least acknowledge that there are these other reports, and, you know, give your reasons why you think they’re ridiculous, and then move on.” But to just ignore this is a little bit arrogant, because it’s, sort of, saying, “Anybody who could fall for this stuff is just totally naive about what goes on in Niger,” and it sort of gives an incomplete picture.

So I think that —

Mr. Levine: Why would the NIO LA be talking about Africa?

Mr. Foley: Wasn’t he — didn’t he have Africa in his portfolio? Africa, Latin America?

Mr. Levine: I don't think so.

Mr. Foley: I thought he did, Ed.

Mr. Levine: I won’t necessarily rule it out.

Ms. O'Connell: It’s news to me. It’s news to me.

Mr. Levine: I believe there was a separate NIO for Africa.

Mr. Foley: Well, you know, that’s interesting.

That’s my recollection.

The first time I met him had to do with this Niger memo.”

Transcript, “Interview of Alan Foley With Regard to the Bolton Nomination,” pages 20, 29-31 (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 28 2005) {96kb.pdf}.

We have no account of what happened next.

Did Mr. Armstrong revise his memo. Was this topic discussed and decided in Mr. Armstrong’s office (National Intelligence Council), by his chain of command, in charge of the memo he wrote. Was Mr. Armstrong’s memo, merely one of several memos on the topic, feeding into a decision process back in his office. Did somebody else’s memo mention the “information” Mr. Foley’s analyst referred to. What was that “information.” Was it the forged Niger documents, which the State Department INR had long ago assessed to be forgeries. Who was Mr. Foley’s analyst. Was s/he a member of the prima facie criminal conspiracy to lie to Congress, attempting to defend and cover-up their criminal lie, desperate to enleague support, from an honest analyst.

We do not have Mr. Armstrong’s account of this matter.

We do not have the account of Robert G. Houdek (then National Intelligence Officer for Africa).

We do not have Stuart A. Cohen’s account (Mr. Armstrong’s boss, at the time of this memo).

But we do have the opinion of Mr. Cohen, who had a fuller view of the NIC work product which this Niger memo pertained to.

Mr. Cohen did not consider Mr. Armstrong to be “subpar.”

“Quite the contrary,” he saidCJHjr

____________________

Barry Schweid (Associated Press), “Panel Sends Bolton Nomination to Senate” (San Francisco Chronicle, May 12 2005, 3:40 p.m. EDT). “But it took the rare step of refusing to endorse the blunt-speaking conservative.” George Voinovich: “I am not so arrogant to think that I should impose my judgment and perspective of the U.S. position in the world community on the rest of my colleagues. We owe it to the president to give Mr. Bolton an up or down vote on the floor.” “Voinovich told reporters he would vote against Bolton in the full Senate. ... He said he hoped the full Senate — where Republicans hold a 55-45 majority — would reject the nomination.”

Senateholds

See Hearing on Senate Resolution 108-151 (May 21 2003), “Eliminating Secret Senate Holds” (Senate Rules Committee, June 17 2003).

  CJHjr

Douglas Jehl, “Nominee for U.N. Moves to Senate; No Endorsement” (New York Times, May 13 2005). “Later Thursday, however, Senator Barbara Boxer, Democrat of California, placed a hold on the nomination ... a privilege that any senator can invoke ... to get State Department documents that Democrats have been seeking involving Mr. Bolton’s dealings with American intelligence agencies over Syria ... Under Senate rules, it takes 60 votes to overturn a ‘hold’.”

Senatecloture

“ ... a motion signed by sixteen Senators, to bring to a close the debate ... vote ... three-fifths of the Senators ... Thereafter no Senator ... entitled to speak ... more than one hour ... no amendment ... After no more than thirty hours ... debate ... equally divided between ... the Majority and Minority Leaders ... vote on the final disposition ...”

Senate Rule 22(2) (Feb. 27 1986)

James Gerstenzang, Mary Curtius, “Boxer May Hang Bolton Vote on State Department Records: California Democrat says she'll invoke a Senate custom to delay proceedings on Bush's controversial nominee to the United Nations.” (Los Angeles Times, May 14 2005). “Boxer said that a simple majority, 51 votes, would be needed to begin debate. But a spokesman for the Senate majority leader, Sen. Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), said that the halt carried an implied threat of a filibuster, meaning that 60 votes would be needed to begin debate. In any case, Boxer’s move amounted to a test of the level of Democratic opposition to Bolton. With 55 members, the Senate’s Republicans have sufficient support to win a straight party-line vote, but not enough to break a filibuster.”

____________________

Senate Committee Report, Nomination of John R. Bolton to be ... U.S. Representative to the United Nations {1088kb.txt, purl, 1787kb.pdf, purl, 858kb.pdf} (U.S. Congress 109-1, Senate Executive Report 109-1, Foreign Relations Committee, May 18 2005, 337 pages) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/6:109-01, OCLC: 60562644, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}, on presidential nominations PN326-109, PN327-109 (received March 17 2005), submitted to the Senate, “Executive Report of Committee,” 151 Congressional Record S5436 {2kb.txt, 45kb.pdf}, D504 {10kb.txt, 76kb.pdf} (May 18 2005, daily edition 151:66, U.S. Congress 109-1) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/66}.


Bullying Armstrong

“ On June 7, an aide to Mr. Bolton circulated a draft letter from Mr. Bolton and Mr. Reich to the Director of Central Intelligence. 70 

The letter outlined alleged unprofessional behavior of the NIO {Fulton T. Armstrong}, but also complained about his objections to Bolton’s draft testimony.

The draft letter to Mr. Tenet urged the immediate replacement of the NIO, and indicated that Mr. Bolton and Mr. Reich would take several measures on their own, including excluding the NIO from official meetings at the State Department and from official travel in the Western Hemisphere.

A later e-mail from a colleague reports that he has discussed the matter with Mr. Bolton, who, he says, “would prefer at this point to handle this in person with Tenet.” 71 

_____

 70  State Department e-mail, June 7, 2002, 2:45 pm.

 71  State Department e-mail, June 7, 2002, 3:46 pm.”

Senate Executive Report 109-1 (May 18 2005), pages 292-293 (Minority views of Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, Obama).

____________________

Bullying Chvez

“ Dan Feder: Did the United States have direct involvement in the April 2002 coup in Venezuela?

Eva Golinger: Well, my opinion, based on my research, is absolutely ... quadrupling in financing specifically to anti-Chsvez groups, at the time that [U.S. officials] knew that the very same organizations and individuals clearly were planning a coup {78kb.pdf, 91kb.pdf, 90kb.pdf, 69kb.pdf}. This shows that they had the intention to support those activities ... influence the action of the high-ranking military officers, many of whom played a direct role in the coup. ...

Dan Feder: How much money is going into opposition groups every year from the U.S.?

Eva Golinger: This particular year, it’s around $6 million ... that’s just NED and USAID; it’s not CIA. ...

Dan Feder: But is it legal in Venezuela then?

Eva Golinger: No, it’s not legal in Venezuela ... for any organization to receive funding from a foreign government to try to overthrow the Venezuelan government ... and then political parties can’t receive funding from a foreign government either ... the only case brought is Smate.

Dan Feder: Where is that case at right now?

Eva Golinger: It’s pending. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for November 2, and it was postponed ... the United States has made an incredible effort to get the case dropped.

The president of the NED, Carl Gershman, went to Venezuela last November and threatened the attorney general and the chief justice of the Supreme Court that if they didn’t drop the case, there would be consequences.

And many of those consequences have already been put into place.

The World Bank cut funding to Venezuela’s Supreme Court for a juridical reform program, and that was one of the threats that Carl Gershman made to [Chief Justice] Ivan Rincon.”

Eva Golinger, interviewed by Dan Feder, “Working Behind the Scenes: The Details of U.S. Government Support for the Venezuelan Opposition: An Interview with Researcher and Attorney Eva Golinger” (Narco News Bulletin, May 31 2005).

“ Venezuela may stop allowing visits by American officials after U.S. immigration authorities canceled the tourist visa of the Venezuelan Supreme Court president ... Omar Mora ... the country’s vice president said.

“But if this kind of policy continues — which attacks Venezuelan institutions and respectable citizens like the Supreme Court president — we will eventually have to adopt a similar measure.”

Mora last week ... suggested U.S. authorities had acted out of revenge against Venezuela for demanding the extradition of Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles, who is wanted by Caracas for the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner in which 73 people were killed.”

Anonymous (Reuters), “Venezuela warns U.S. over judge's canceled visa” (Washington Post, May 30 2005) {copy, copy}.

Senate program, “Wednesday, May 25 ... Senate may begin consideration of the nomination of John Robert Bolton, of Maryland, to be Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations.” 151 Congressional Record D542 {73kb.pdf} (“Senate Chamber, Program for Wednesday”) {7kb.txt} (Daily Digest), accord S5857 {40kb.pdf} (program tomorrow) {2kb.txt} (May 24 2005, daily edition 151:70, U.S. Congress 109-1) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/70} {Congressional Record, daily edition, SuDoc: X/A, ISSN: 0363-7239, LCCN: 80646573, OCLC: 02437919, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

Senate debate, “Nomination of John Robert Bolton to be the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations,” 151 Congressional Record May 25: S5859 {63kb.pdf} (schedule) {2kb.txt}, S5860-S5861 {49kb.pdf} (minority leader, “moving forward) {4kb.txt}, S5876-S5914 {292kb.pdf} (debate) {333kb.txt}, S5939 {42kb.pdf} (floor privilege for Jennifer Gergen, DoS detailee) {1kb.txt}, S5940 {51kb.pdf} (orders for tomorrow) {1kb.txt} (program tomorrow) {1kb.txt}, May 26: S5945 {54kb.pdf} (schedule) {2kb.txt}, (order of business) {2kb.txt}, S5946-S5962 {152kb.pdf} (debate) {146kb.txt}, S5962-S5998 {281kb.pdf} (debate and vote) {305kb.txt}, S6000-S6003 {65kb.pdf} (“historic compromise”) {25kb.txt}, S6065 {54kb.pdf} (orders for June 6) {2kb.txt} (program for June 6) {2kb.txt} (recess until June 6) {1kb.txt} (May 25-26 2005, daily edition 151:71-72, U.S. Congress 109-1) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/71-72}. Presidential nominations PN326-109, PN327-109.

Senate roll call vote 109-1:129 (56/42/2, May 26 2005, 6:17 p.m.) on the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of John R. Bolton, of Maryland, to be Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations. Rejected: 60 votes required under Senate Rule 22(2), 3/5ths of the 100 Members of the Senate.

____________________

Those explaining why they voted “no” (for rejection) asserted their desire, and the Senate’s right to insist, before the Senate consents to vote on it, that executive branch officials surrender such documents, information, testimony, as pertain — in the opinion of the Senators — to their advice and consent on the nomination. They assert, executive branch officials have a duty to obey such directives of the Senators. This, unless no reasonable person could reasonably say, it’s relevant and material, what the Senators want. Executive branch officials assert no privilege, recognizable by law, which entitles them to refuse to comply.

Two Senators, who did not speak in the debate, and voted “yes” (for cloture), have stated they intend to vote against the nomination. Both were among 14 Senators who negotiated an agreement, three days earlier (May 23), to defeat the Senate majority leader, his intention to amend the Senate cloture rule, to end filibusters, by a novel method, and mere majority vote, not contemplated by the Senate rules (the “nuclear option”).

One later stated, she supported the view of those voting for rejection (to insist on additional documents), but believed she herself already had enough evidence, to feel satisfied in her mind, to vote against the nomination. Senator Mary L. Landrieu, “Statement on the Nomination of John Bolton” (May 26 2005).

The other is Senator Mark Pryor. See Douglas Jehl, Carl Hulse, “McCain Urging Accord on Bolton and Secret Documents” (New York Times, May 28 2005): “Of the three Democrats who sided with Republicans on Thursday, two of them, Senators Landrieu and Pryor, said through spokesmen on Friday that they would vote against Mr. Bolton in any roll-call vote. The third, Mr. Nelson, has said he was undecided but leaning in Mr. Bolton’s favor.”

Two other Senators who also voted “yes” (for cloture) have likewise said they too will vote against the nomination: George Victor Voinovich and John Thune.

One who voted “no” (for rejection) supports the nomination: Senate majority leader Bill Frist voted “no” as a tactic, to enable himself to demand a reconsideration of the vote. Only one voting with those who prevail in the vote can do so, under Senate Rule 31(3).

 

____________________

Recess Appointment?

Can George W. Bush, during this 11 day Senate recess, appoint John R. Bolton, to be the U.S. U.N. Ambassador?

Yes, based on 3 U.S. court of appeals decisions, which the U.S. Supreme Court recently refused to review. Stephens v. Evans (11th Cir., No. 02-16424, October 14 2004) (en banc, 10 judges) {199kb.pdf} (recess appointment, during an 11-day recess, of William H. Pryor Jr., to be a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit), certiorari denied March 21 2005 (U.S., No. 04-828). Charles Lane, “Court Declines To Wade Into Battle on Judge” (Washington Post, March 22 2005). And see Henry B. Hogue (Analyst in American National Government, Government and Finance Division), Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, order code RS21308, updated March 15 2005) {38kb.pdf}.

However, this recent decision is not the final word, legally, on what the Constitution means. And the decision opens a can of worms, how to deal with a President determined to evade the Constitution.

Not that this or that isolated appointment imperils the Republic, but it’s a slippery slope and, as Adolph Hitler demonstrated, it can happen fast, if a determined President, with enough allies, decides to seize power. He’s a long way down that road already, insinuating the U.S. Military into domestic law enforcement, with authority to seize control, with armed force, on his command, federalizing state and local affairs, on the pretext of terrorism, with Homeland Security delegating command to the Military.

Politically, at this stage, of this pending nomination, a recess appointment would be a willful evasion of the Constitution. And if he did it, many in his own political circle would likely deem him a coward under fire, isolated politically, ineffectual, further indulging the tendency of his circle to dictatorship, above the law, well established already, by the torture memorandum, and its family of secret legal opinions, by the Justice Department, Office of Legal Counsel, long free of accountability in any court, for their crimes and torts.

Because many in his own crowd would turn against him, I don’t view a recess appointment, at this stage, to be a serious prospect.

Maybe later.  CJHjr

____________________

Anonymous (AP), “Bolton, Out of One Job, Waits on Senate” (San Francisco Chronocle, June 3 2005) {copy, copy}. “Bolton’s successor, former National Security Council official Robert Joseph, was confirmed by the Senate and sworn in at the State Department this week. His title became official Friday, the department said. Bolton has packed up his office and is camped out elsewhere in the building. He holds no formal title but is still employed by the department.”

Charles J. Hanley (AP Special Correspondent), “Bolton Said to Orchestrate Unlawful Firing” (Guardian, London, June 4 2005) {copy, copy}. “John R. Bolton flew to Europe in 2002 to confront the head of a global arms-control agency and demand he resign, then orchestrated the firing of the unwilling diplomat in a move a U.N. tribunal has since judged unlawful, according to officials involved. A former Bolton deputy says the U.S. Under-Secretary of state felt Jose Bustani “had to go,” particularly because the Brazilian was trying to send chemical weapons inspectors to Baghdad. ... Bustani’s inspectors would have found nothing, because Iraq’s chemical weapons were destroyed in the early 1990s. That would have undercut the U.S. rationale for war.”

____________________

Senate program, “Thursday, June 16. Mr. Frist. I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 2 p.m, on Monday, June 20. I further ask that ... at 5 p.m. on Monday the Senate proceed to executive session for the consideration of Calendar No. 103, John Bolton to be Ambassador to the United Nations ... that the time until 6 p.m. be equally divided between the two leaders or their designees and at 6 p.m. the motion to proceed to the motion to reconsider the failed cloture vote be agreed to, the motion to reconsider then be agreed to, and the Senate then proceed to a vote on cloture on the Bolton nomination. The Presiding Officer (Mr. Allen). Without objection, it is so ordered.” 151 Congressional Record S6782 {47kb.pdf} (orders for June 20) {2kb.txt} (June 16 2005, daily edition 151:80, U.S. Congress 109-1) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/80}.

Senate debate, “Executive Session” (“Nomination of John Robert Bolton to Be Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations—Resumed”), 151 Congressional Record S6785 {66kb.pdf} (schedule) {2kb.txt}, S6795-S6802 {88kb.pdf} (“executive session”) {55kb.txt}, (June 20 2005, daily edition 151:82, U.S. Congress 109-1) {SuDoc: X/A.109/1:151/82}. Presidential nominations PN326-109, PN327-109.

Senate roll call vote 109-1:142 (54/38/8, June 20 2005, 6:04 p.m.) on the motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of John R. Bolton, of Maryland, to be Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations. Rejected: 60 votes required under Senate Rule 22(2), 3/5ths of the 100 Members of the Senate.

George W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 2001-2009 Jan. 20), “President Appoints John Bolton as Ambassador to the United Nations{pf} (White House, Roosevelt Room, August 1, 2005, 10:01-10:08 a.m.), WH video {5:53}, C-Span video {6:14, CSCat}, retitled, “Remarks on the Recess Appointment of John Bolton as Ambassador to the United Nations,” 41:31 WCPD 1239-1240 {5kb.txt, 42kb.pdf, ucsb} {SuDoc: AE 2.109:41/31}.

 

____________________

Cuba

“ CIA has approved the unclassified language on Cuba’s biological weapons program. It is as follows {quoted}.

John wants this speech to include additional tough language about Cuba, but not material we will need to clear with CIA (Cuba’s sponsorship of terrorism, for example).

The Heritage Foundation would like to host a dinner for John where he could give this speech.

However, the President will be in Latin America 3/21 through 3/24, and John thinks it would be better to hold off scheduling this speech until after this trip. Another possibility would be for John to give this speech at the Hoover Institution if he goes there March or April.

We should meet on Monday to discuss.

Fred.”

Fred Fleitz, email (Feb. 22 2002, 6:21 p.m., “Cuba Speech”) to Matthew Freedman and [ redacted ] {31kb.pdf}.

____________________

“ Stuart A. Cohen: It seemed to me that if we were sending a reasonably senior officer down to Secretary Bolton’s office, that it would have been his responsibility to make this whole process work a lot more smoothly than it appeared to have been working. ...

I had never met Mr. Fleitz, but I —

Given what I had heard, I had the suspicion that maybe he was a little bit a part of the problem.”

Transcript, “Interview of Stuart Cohen With Regard to the Bolton Nomination,” page 3 (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 29 2005) {36kb.pdf}.


John R. Bolton (Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (T), U.S. State Department):


“ We have no credible evidence ... that the Cuban government has engaged in or directly supported international terrorist operations.”

CIA

“ Cuba ... on the State Department’s list of terrorist-sponsoring states ...

We know that Cuba is collaborating with other state sponsors of terror.

Castro ... continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further revolutionary objectives.

Last year, Castro visited Iran, Syria, and Libya ...

At Tehran University, these were his words:

“Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Here is what we now know:

The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort.”

John R. Bolton, Speech, “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C., May 6 2002) {copy}.

Donald H. Rumsfeld (U.S. Secretary of Defense):

“ A senior administration official said Washington has gathered “broad and deep” evidence of Cuba’s pursuit of such weapons but is “constrained” in what it can disclose publicly.”

Washington Times, May 7 2002

Question: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us a little bit more about the Under-Secretary Bolton’s remarks yesterday about a biological warfare threat in Cuba and if any anthrax threats have been pinned to that to Camp X-Ray or to South Florida?

Donald Rumsfeld: I cannot.

I have not seen the intelligence that apparently led Under-Secretary Bolton to make those remarks.”

Transcript, “Secretary Rumsfeld Meeting with Reporters” (U.S. Defense Department, Pentagon, May 7 2002).

Charles Wilhelm (formerly USMC CinCCentCom):

“ During my three-year tenure — which was from September of 1997 until September of 2000 — at Southern Command, I didn’t receive a single report or a single piece of evidence that would have led me to the conclusion that Cuba was in fact developing, producing, or weaponizing biological or chemical agents.”

Interview, “U.S.–Cuba” (National Public Radio, All Things Considered, May 9 2002) {transcript, copy}.

Fidel Castro (President of Cuba):

“ Someone has failed you badly, Mr. Bolton, when they told you about my speech at the University of Teheran ...

... there is not one single paragraph that resembles the one you dishonestly included in your speech at the Heritage Foundation on May 6. ...

I made not the slightest mention of the use of weapons ... My three speeches in the Iranian capital were broadcast on Cuban radio and television ... tapes ... transcripts ...

For 40 years, 34,307 Cuban medical doctors and health workers have worked, free of charge, in a large number of poor countries, saving the lives, and safeguarding the health, of millions of people ... At this very moment, 2,671 of them are working in isolated, and inhospitable, places in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa.

It would be very difficult to persuade these men and women, to produce viruses and bacteria to kill children, women, old people, or the people of any country. 

39,800 young people, coming from more than 120 Third World countries, have graduated in Cuba from 33 technical and university specialties ... 8,053 young people, from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, are studying medicine in our country, free of charge, a course that costs more than $200,000 in the United States ...

Cuba counts.

With great prestige.

For the health services it devotes to humanity ...

For its true fight, against another kind of terrorism ... diseases that kill more than 11 million children every year. Whose lives could be saved, but for the selfish attitude, of the industrialized world ...

For the people who survive or recover their health. Thanks to the selfless work of the doctors. Who come from a poor, small country. And treat them. With vaccines, and preventive methods, or therapies, developed by Cuba.

We would like to know, if the U.S. government is doing something similar, or if it would be prepared to cooperate ...

We have even offered hundreds of scholarships to American youngsters, who don’t have the money to study medicine, in their country, to come study in the Latin American School of Medical Sciences ...

Cuban children are vaccinated against 13 diseases and enjoy wonderful health ... Medical care is guaranteed to one hundred percent of the population. Absolutely free of charge ...

No one has ever produced a single piece of evidence, that any program for developing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons has been set up in our country ...

... the weapons of morality, reason, and ideas.

With these, no country is weak.

And without them, no nation is powerful ...

We are sorry, Mr. Bolton.

After the lies, slanders, tales, and insults you launched in your May 6 speech.

We are sorry to tell you, that you lack any moral authority, to make exhortations to Cuba. And much less, to make demands on Cuba — with threatening language and threatening tone — absolutely none.

Neither can you pretend to give lessons to Cuba, in politics and ethics.

But you and your government could draw inspiration, from the decency, and the honor, of Cuban behavior.

I can assure you, that we will charge absolutely nothing, for this technology transfer.”

Fidel Castro, reply to John R. Bolton, “There will always be weapons, much more powerful, than any born of technology: The weapons of morality, reason, and ideas.” “Response by President Fidel Castro Ruz to the statements made by the United States government on biological weapons” (televised speech, Council of State, Havana, May 10 2002). Transcripts: Cuban Government (Spanish, English). Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Spanish, English). Granma, Havana, May 11 (Spanish), May 14 (English).

Query: 

Why did John Bolton misquote Fidel Castro?

And lie, that “we know” Cuba is a state sponsor of terror?

In his inflammatory attack on Cuba, at the Heritage Foundation. Fanning the flames, in the question and answer session afterwards. Leaking his full catalog of fantasies, hare-brained theories, pipe dreams, unsubstantiated accusations, to Insight magazine, masqueraded as U.S. intelligence.

Who else has he misquoted?

With what consequences?

Who is responsible? In the State Department, to ensure, that U.S. officials do not misquote foreign officials?

What procedures exist? To require U.S. officials, to submit their speeches for checking and approval, if they contain such quotes?

Did John Bolton evade those procedures? Willfully, maliciously, dishonestly.

Did he request transcripts? Of Fidel Castro’s speeches. Before he presumed to quote what Fidel Castro said in Iran. As any honest official would do. And particularly a lawyer (like John Bolton).

Did State Department officials collude with John Bolton? To willfully, maliciously, misquote Fidel Castro, to strongarm blind, ideological, fantasies.

What are the names of the dishonest officials? Who colluded with John Bolton, to misquote Fidel Castro.

Like Fred Fleitz did. A CIA Officer, who knowing, willfully, maliciously, colluded with John Bolton, to evade CIA pre-clearance procedures for John Bolton’s speech. In which John Bolton lied, that “we know” Cuba is a state sponsor of terror.

Who can the American public depend upon?

For answers to these questions.

Only, upon committees of the U.S. Congress, with oversight of the State Department, and government operations generally. Who have jurisdiction to investigate, with subpoenas, if necessary, backed up by the criminal law, against liars.

Such as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

This is not the only example, of U.S. officials, misquoting foreign officials.

The decision of George W. Bush, to misquote Jacques Chirac, launched a war.

Killing tens of thousands of innocent people (Iraq).

Inflicting harsh sanctions, on a poor nation (Cuba).

Pretexted, instigated, by misquoting foreign officials.

On what basis, do committees of Congress, decide, these deadly misconducts, by their fellow officers, is none of their affair?

  CJHjr

 

 

FBIS

Instead of quoting from transcripts — what Fidel Castro actually said, a year earlier, in Tehran — John Bolton quoted — without saying so — what the anonymous author of a newswire report said, Fidel said.

This newswire report: “Iran and Cuba bolster ties, strengthen anti-US solidarity{copy, copy, copy} (Agence France-Presse (AFP), Tehran, May 10 2001) {Lexis copy}, quoted in a single American newspaper (in Spanish): “Castro Pronostica en Irn la Ca da de EU” (El Nuevo Herald, Miami, May 10 2001, page 15A, anonymous): “El rgimen norteamericano es dvbil y nosotros lo vemos de cerca ... Los pueblos y los gobiernos de Cuba y de Irn pueden poner de rodillas a Estados Unidos.”

And John Bolton lied about Fidel Castro, not only in his Heritage Foundation speech, but also in his testimony to Congress. Again, asserting this quote to be an unassailable fact — “these were his words.” Again, concealing its anonymous hearsay source. (House Committee on International Relations, March 30 2004).

This time, subject to a 5 year prison sentence, if his lie is “material.”

Because lying to Congress is a crime, Members of Congress, and the public, have good reason to believe what U.S. officials say, in testimony to Congress. They do not expect to be lied to, certainly not a bold, unequivocal lie, by a bold, unequivocal liar.

Like this bold, unequivocal lie.

By this bold, unequivocal liar.

John Bolton.

The U.S. government knows what people say, like Fidel Castro in Tehran, verbatim, when they’re talking in public, on TV and radio.

And this was an added reason, for Members of Congress, and the public, to believe John Bolton, and to trust him, when he lied to them.

Recording speeches, press conferences, interviews, and such, broadcast on foreign TV and radio, is the meat and potatoes, of routine intelligence. And preparing translated transcripts of them. Ditto, foreign publications in print and electronically.

The U.S. and U.K. do this together in a joint venture, since 1941, between the CIA’s FBIS: Foreign Broadcast Information Service and BBC Monitoring, part of British Intelligence.

This is “open source” intelligence, no spies need apply. They get paid to do what the rest of us do for free: watch TV, listen to the radio, read the newspaper, newswire reports, magazines, journals, books, surf the web.

But, they’re more thorough about it than the rest of us. They do it even when they don’t feel like it, don’t want to. They do it 24 hours a day, in shifts. They record it. And (what most of us can’t do) they do it in foreign languages. They translate it into English from many other languages, with computers doing much of that work, I imagine.

They divide up the world to report.

FBIS has Cuba.

BBC Monitoring has Iran:

“BBC Monitoring provides a round-the-clock service of news and information derived from the monitoring of Iranian media. The primary aim is to provide accurate, timely and relevant reporting based on verbatim translations of selected material from Iranian radio and television channels, news agencies, a large number of national and provincial press publications and a host of Internet sources.”

Memorandum submitted by the BBC World Service,” Appendix 8, Foreign Affairs—Second Report (U.K. House of Commons, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Minutes of Evidence, January 30 2001).

BBC Monitoring is funded by its four customers: The Foreign Office, Ministry of Defense, Cabinet Office, BBC World Service.

The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) is represented in this list either by the Foreign Office (which I think it reports to) or the Ministry of Defense (where its budget may be reflected).

The most of the BBC Monitoring staff is managed by the BBC World Service, itself part of the U.K. government, funded by the Foreign Office.

(The BBC domestic service is managed independent of the U.K. government, funded by U.K. residents through an annual household license fee (126.50 $240)).

FBIS and BBC Monitoring circulate transcripts privately, within their governments, to officials concerned with the speakers, the topics, the regions.

But some of what they record and transcribe they also publish, for a wider audience, in print (until 1996) and online, for a subscription fee.

FBIS: Foreign Broadcast Information Service (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) {CD-ROM edition: SuDoc: PREX 7.10/3, LCCN: sn 96028310, DL, LFDL, WorldCat. Daily editions: PREX 7.10:FBIS, LoC others}. BBC Monitoring (Caversham Park, Reading England) {LoC various}.

 

Nearly all their subscribers are government officials, including the military, opinion formers, who receive free subscriptions, including Congress and Parliament.

“More than 30 Congressional committees have electronic access to an unclassified computer service, FBIS Online, operated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service of the CIA, which provides access to foreign media and other information derived from publicly available sources.”

L. Britt Snider, Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, CSI 97-10001, February 1997), part III, “How Intelligence-Sharing Works at Present,” footnote 1.

“BBC Monitoring also provides a service to Members of Parliament, House of Commons researchers and library staff. Iranian material can be accessed either through the World Media Monitor (WMM) directly or via the Parliamentary Data Video Network (PDVN). The same procedure and method of access apply to the House of Lords. FCO staff in London or Tehran have access to the WMM or can receive material via an e-mail profile service.”

Memorandum submitted by the BBC World Service,” Appendix 8, Foreign Affairs—Second Report (U.K. House of Commons, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Minutes of Evidence, January 30 2001).

A second group also receive free or reduced rate subscriptions, also opinion-formers: Former officials, scholastics, academics, think-tanks, columnists, and such.

A third group is also opinion formers, the media, both news and editorial writers, university libraries.

They both claim, when they decide to publish something, they do it honestly, a faithful translation, of a faithful recording, be it with or without a faithful unpublished transcript, in the broadcast language. And they publish the whole translated text, and do not selectively edit-out, what they wish the speaker had not said.

I have no opinion on these claims. Except the last one. I’ve seen many instances of BBC Monitoring redacting great chunks of speeches by Muammar Gadhafi. Like Fidel Castro, he writes thorough, lengthy, speeches. You can hardly blame them. But you can’t trust them, either. They had excellent reasons to conceal from their audience, much of what he had to say. They marked the site of these redactions. Whether they were dishonest, redacting matters of substance, I do not know. I doubt they make silent redactions; such blatant deceit would soon be exposed and publicized.

According to professor Valdes (below), FBIS and BBC Monitoring did not publish any of the speeches and press conferences by Fidel Castro in Iran (May 7-10 2001), also broadcast on Cuban radio and TV too (so said Fidel, in his above linked speech).

They had at least two verbatim copies, of what Fidel said in Tehran. One from BBC Monitoring in Iran. One from FBIS, recorded at the U.S. Interests Section, in Havana, and likely fed live, via satellite, to FBIS HQ (Langley Virginia). BBC Monitoring may have recorded the Cuban broadcasts too, from the U.K. embassy there, as a matter of routine, insurance, against being lied to, by their partner (ideological zealots make untrustworthy partners). And if they were broadcast in Cuba, that means they were likely transmitted from Iran (satellite, cable, microwave), and that means the NSA and GCHQ got their copies too. (National Security Agency, Fort Meade Maryland; Government Communications Headquarters, Cheltenham England).

That makes four or five copies.

Why the deafening silence?

A confab, a coven, of satans.

As the likes of John Bolton and Otto Reich would have us believe.

You’d think they’d be selling tickets, and popcorn, to a very large audience, eager to hear the U.S. Nemesis-in-Chief, what he had to say, in the Heart of Darkness.

Which brings us to the mission of FBIS and BBC Monitoring.

They have two missions.

First, to faithfully do their internal duty, to provide select government officials with accurate translated transcripts. This is what 99% of the employees do, I suppose, and it’s a valuable, and honorable, service.

Second, to faithfully do their public duty, their Dark Side, state propaganda:

To lie to their wider public audience, mostly government officials and other opinion formers. To (mis)inform the opinion of their public audience, to garner support, for the government policy of the day. Liars, paid by the taxpayers, to lie to government officials, to lie to opinion formers, to lie to the taxpayers.

The Dark Side is the face of the publishing group, the editors and publishers, who select what to publish, and what to conceal, in the databases, available to a wider audience, including the public. They comprise less than 1% of the employees, I suppose.

In the case of BBC Monitoring, this publishing staff is likely supplied, managed, commanded by MI6, not the BBC World Service, which manages the rest of the staff, albeit itself presumably managed by its paymaster, the Foreign Office (but I know nothing about the World Service management).

These publishing staffs, of FBIS and BBC Monitoring, do their dishonorable work, in three ways, assuming they don’t also falsify what they do publish and redact (which would be a fourth way).

First, they select what to publish. They can publish what they know to be misreported or misleading or unreliable. They can create the impression, that what they publish is what the most of that foreign audience hears and reads and believes, what may in fact be isolated voices, far from the mainstream.

Second, they select what to omit, to conceal what they don’t want their audience to know about. And this is the likely explanation for concealing what Fidel Castro said in Tehran.

Fidel Castro writes thoughtful speeches, with cogent criticisms of the United States, and factual information, and fact-based observations, and opinions, about the evil deeds of the United States, and good deeds of the Cuban people.

And so, as a general proposition, the FBIS editors don’t want to publish what he says. They don’t want the slow, and steady, accumulation, of his wise observations, to cleanse the minds of the FBIS audience, which the FBIS editors, and other U.S. government officials, have taken such great care, over the years, to pollute.

But in this case, they had an added reason, to conceal what he said in Tehran.

They had the anonymous AFP wire story, attributing to Fidel Castro words he never did speak. And this suited the government policy of the day, to glue a black hat on Fidel Castro, make him appear to be a violent terrorist, sponsor of violent terrorists, or at least so spun, in that direction, deceitfully, by maliciously concealing the full text and context of what he said.

If they published transcripts, of what he actually said, they would undo the government policy of the day.

“ You destroyed the strongest gendarme of the region not with guns, but with your thoughts ... Today, there is a king in the world a thousand times stronger than the shah ... however, this imperialist king will finally fall, just as your king was overthrown.”

Fidel Castro, Tehran, May 9 2001 {copy}

Because he never did say any such thing.

He did not advocate terrorism.

He wore a white hat.

He advocated the power of thought, the power of cooperation, the power of ideas.

And the BBC Monitoring editors? Why didn’t they publish what Fidel said in Tehran? On their WMM database?

It’s a joint venture. The British are the junior partners. They obey orders.

And where did this anonymous AFP story come from?

Nobody in the public knows.

It could be honest, a faulty report, by an anonymous reporter, who made a bad job of work.

But the likely source is Langley Virginia. Headquarters of the CIA massive worldwide media organization. With hundreds or thousands of expert, professional, liars, writing news stories and broadcast scripts daily, for hundreds or thousands of paid liars on their payroll, or the MI6 payroll (their partners), in media all around the world, reporters, editors, producers, presenters, executives.

FBIS has a long history of quoting AFP foreign language newswire reports, and the ones they quote usually have this or that unsourced, anonymous, supposed, factoids, factual assertions, in lock-step with the U.S. state propaganda of the day. While it may be innocent, it raises suspicion of a long-standing infiltration of AFP by CIA assets or, more likely, a knowing, willing, cooperation by some AFP senior staff, with the CIA. This, in addition to AFP’s normal operation. For example, this particular AFP newswire report was supplemental to another {copy} AFP newswire report the same day, on the same topic, which did not contain any such quote, nor did the AFP newswire report the previous day, reporting on that speech.

 

Or, it could be Otto Reich, who did exactly this, for a living, planting outright lies in the press, during the U.S. war on Nicaragua, for the U.S. National Security Council, as head (1983-1986) of the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, masquerading as a State Department office (S/LPD).

Whoever its author was, you would expect the editors of FBIS and BBC Monitoring to anyway publish the actual transcripts, because this high level meeting, of the leaders of two countries of great interest, would be a topic of great interest, to their audience.

The decision, by those editors, to not publish, could be an innocent editorial judgment, intended to serve no agenda.

But it could also be this, instead: A conspiracy, to lie to their audience:

A one-two punch:

The lie, in the wire story, published.

The truth, in the transcripts, concealed.

Concealed from Congress too, who could not check, via their FBIS Online computer, to see, if John Bolton quoted Fidel Castro correctly.

As John Bolton and his helpers would well know, else they would not be so bold, to misquote Fidel Castro, in a speech, and in testimony to Congress.

Though not published by FBIS, the unpublished transcripts were nevertheless available to John Bolton.

And they remain yet available still, to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

If they want to compare, what John Bolton said Fidel Castro said, with what Fidel Castro actually said.

If they want to ask John Bolton, and his helpers:

Did they, or did they not, see these transcripts? Or ask for them? And if not, why not? Did they take care to not ask for them? Because they didn’t want to know? or already knew? the wire story misquoted Fidel?

Professor Valdes said this:

“I have secured all the transcripts of all the public statments made by the Cuban leader while visiting Iran, and there is nothing that midly resembles the alleged quote. Mr. Bolton, nonetheless, has recycled an invented and false quote that has been used by rightwing Cuban exiles in the last 12 months.”

Nelson P. Valdes (Professor of Sociology, University of New Mexico), “The Problems of an Under-Secretary of State: Fidel Castro, Bioterrorism and the Elusive Quote” (CounterPunch, May 28 2002) {copy}.

To complete the story, the third main way the FBIS editors lie to their audience, is by publishing the CIA’s own propaganda lies, which the CIA writes and causes to be broadcast or published in foreign media.

I read each and every one of the FBIS daily issues I’m about to mention, covering a period of several years (Latin American edition, Central America section).

See, e.g., Edgar Chamorro, affidavit dated Washington D.C. September 5 1985, filed The Hague September 10 1985, in Nicaragua v. United States, reprinted in International Court of Justice: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), volume 4 (Memorial of Nicaragua (Merits) and supplemental documents), pages 445-454 (supplemental annex G to Memorial of Nicaragua (Merits)) (U.N. International Court of Justice, The Hague, 14+532 pages, 2001) {volume 4: U.N. Sales Number: ICJ756, ISBN: 9210708261} {all 5 volumes: U.N. Sales Numbers ICJ753-ICJ757, ISBNs: 9210708237, 9210708245, 9210708253, 9210708261, 9210708288, LCCN: 2001380451, WorldCat} {series: ICJ Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, ISSN: 0074-4433}.

And see, Edgar Chamorro, Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation (Institute for Media Analysis, New York City, 1987, 5+78 pages) {ISBN: 0941781089, ISBN: 0941781070, WorldCat}.

 

Likewise, the FBIS editors published broadcasts on commercial radio stations, programs created and scripted by the CIA, broadcast on those stations, during leased time-slots, purchased by the CIA. Ibid.

And ditto for printed media, including articles the CIA wrote, and caused to be published, in established commercial newspapers, secretly funded by the CIA.

All these CIA lies, published by the CIA FBIS editors, were picked up and repeated liberally in the press, on TV and radio, and in the Congressional Record, by Members of Congress, to persuade each other, how evil were the Sandinistas (the political party elected by 67% of the vote, on November 4 1984, to govern Nicaragua, with 76% of the registered electorate voting), how wonderful were the Contras (the U.S. mercenary army, seeking to overthrow the democratically elected government of Nicaragua, and murder in cold blood every Sandinista, and every government worker, they could find).

And, of course, the FBIS editors fastidiously omitted to publish the daily stories of Contra atrocities. Every day. Day after day. Year after year. The violent crimes of the U.S. Contra mercenary army. Trained, paid, incited, aided and abetted, conspired, facilitated, by U.S. government officers and officials.

Except on one or two occasions when, to preserve their own credibility, the FBIS editors published foreign stories they could not ignore. Because they were published on the front page of the Washington Post. Their audience would be very suspicious of FBIS, if FBIS didn’t also report something too.

See, “Massacre of Peasants Reported in Tapasle,” PA072201 Managua Barricada in Spanish 31 Jul 84 p 6, [Report by Juan Jose Lacayo] (FBIS, Daily Report, Latin America, Central America, August 8 1984, pages P 5-8) {SuDoc: PREX 7.10:FBIS-LAM-84, ISSN: 0362-5303, LCCN: 75649824, DL, WorldCat}. Published one day after this: Robert J. McCartney, “Nicaraguan Villagers Report Rebels Killed Noncombatants” (Washington Post, August 7 1984, page A1). Further details: Hotline, August 14, August 21 1984 (Witness for Peace, Washington D.C.), reports by Doug Spence, Rebecca Gordon, on-site WFP investigators.

 

All professional liars have to worry about their credibility, because they want to be believed. And so, much of what appears in FBIS may be true and not misleading. Maybe even most of it. Much may be useful. Some of it, maybe harmless entertainment.

Even an audience which wants to be lied to — like most of the FBIS audience — will nevertheless drift away, if the lies are too obvious. They look foolish, and feel foolish, when they pretend to believe obvious lies.

In common with all U.S. government state propaganda (eg: Voice of America), the FBIS editors want to entertain their audience, and inform their audience, in order to have an audience, to listen, when they decide to lie big.

In the meantime, they drip-feed them little lies, every day.

Which accumulate, lodge in memory, mold opinion.

Besides what they publish, don’t forget what the FBIS editors don’t publish, the dogs that don’t bark.

Like, the missing transcripts, of Fidel’s speeches, press conferences, questions and answers sessions, in Tehran.

There’s plenty that goes on in life, the FBIS editors don’t mention.

And if you’re expecting a bark, and don’t hear one, that’s an excellent reason to suspect, they don’t want you to hear it.

For a reason.

With the advent of the internet, the influence of the FBIS editors — who formerly dominated access to foreign broadcasts and publications — is now much diminished, where foreign websites have English translations.

But they dominate still, where there are no English translations, where broadcasts, they record in real time, are not archived, in libraries, on the internet.

And they dominate history, archiving, on microfilm, microfiche, CD-ROMs, in libraries, their careful selections of what to publish, in the service of an agenda. Dooming all else foreign to oblivion, words never spoken, in a world that never was.

Unless those speakers seize their own destiny, and preserve their own words, words they did indeed speak, in the world that is. And preserve them for history, in those self same libraries, eyeball to eyeball, with the liars.

To present the whole history of life, to scholars, not just the CIA version.

  CJHjr

 

____________________

Colin L. Powell (Secretary of State (S), U.S. State Department):

“As Under-Secretary Bolton said recently, we do believe that Cuba has a biological offensive research capability. We didn’t say that it actually had such weapons, but it has the capacity and the capability to conduct such research. This is not a new statement. I think that it is a statement that has been made previously. So Under-Secretary Bolton’s speech which got attention on this issue again wasn’t breaking new ground as far as the United States’ position on this subject goes.”

Press briefing, “On Camera Interview” (Gander Newfoundland, May 13 2002).

Jimmy Carter (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1977-1981 Jan. 20):

“... the dedication of the Cuban people and the government, and their research and humanitarian sharing of knowledge about better healthcare with the rest of the world ... not just how to make a profit ... cooperation ... between Cuba and other countries ... tens of millions of people around the world who have benefited from this research in Cuba ...

In preparation for this unprecedented visit, I requested, and we all received, intense briefings from the State Department, the intelligence agencies of my country, and high officials in the White House.

One purpose of this briefing was for them to share with us any concerns that my government had about possible terrorist activities that were supported by Cuba.

There were absolutely no such allegations made or questions raised.”

Speech, “President Carter's comments at Cuban Biotech Center” (Havana Cuba, May 13 2002).

Otto Juan Reich (Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA), U.S. State Department):

“We know that Cuba has a sophisticated biotechnology infrastructure capable of supporting a biological weapons program and has transferred dual-use technology to a number of countries around the world, including those with known or suspected biological weapons programs. These facts underpin our assessment that Cuba has at least a limited, developmental biological weapons research and development effort.”

Prepared statement {11kb.pdf}, U.S. Trade Policy with Cuba {160kb.txt, purl, 372kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 107-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 107-1109, May 21 2002, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation) {SuDoc: Y 4.C 73/7:S.HRG.107-1109}, LCCN: 2005410983, OCLC: 60859661, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

Gary Speer (Army Major General, acting Commander in Chief, Southern Command):

“The commander of U.S. military forces for Latin America and the Caribbean said Thursday that he has seen no evidence that Cuba is producing biological weapons from its biomedical research program ...

He said he first learned from news reports about an allegation by a senior U.S. diplomat responsible for arms proliferation and terror issues that linked the research-and-development project to biological weapons.

So he rang up the Intelligence Directorate at the Doral-based Southern Command to check.

“I called my J-2, the intelligence officer, and said, ‘What’s the deal?’” ...

Army Major General Gary Speer, a two-star general, has for 10 months been in charge of all U.S. military operations in the region.”

Carol Rosenberg, “Doubt cast on Cuban bioterror: U.S. commander of Latin forces questions weapons accusation” (Miami Herald, May 24 2002).

Senator Christopher J. Dodd:

“Unfortunately, Secretary Powell has refused to allow Mr. Bolton to testify on this matter today because he did not believe he is the appropriate official to answer questions about this matter. That puzzles me as chairman of this subcommittee since he was clearly the appropriate official to attend the Heritage Foundation event on this subject. ...”

Carl W. Ford Jr. (Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. State Department):

“We’ve never tried to suggest that we have the evidence, the smoking gun to prove proof positive that they had a program. A program suggests to us something far more substantial than what we see in the evidence. But we feel very confident about saying that there is — they’re working on an effort that would give them a limited BW offensive capability.”

Testimony, Cuba's Pursuit of Biological Weapons: Fact or Fiction? {178kb.txt, purl, 411kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 107-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 107-736, June 5 2002, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.107-736, LCCN: 2002495133, OCLC: 51024782, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

Mark M. Rasenick, Ph.D. (Professor, Physiology and Biophysics, and Psychiatry, Director, Biomedical Neuroscience Training Program, College of Medicine, University of Illinois Chicago):

“I have wandered freely through these laboratories and no one has stopped me in any incidence wandering the halls on a regular basis. We could also say many American drug companies have the capability of bioterrorism because they are growing large amounts of bacteria or viruses, which is what the chemists are doing in order to make vaccines. To make vaccines, you need to grow bugs. But these companies are not making weapons ... the administration has no data that they are. ... I have no suspicion.”

Cuban (quoted but not named):

“The three great successes of the Cuban revolution are education, health care, and scientific research. The three great failures are breakfast, lunch, and dinner.”

Testimony, Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001, S. 1017 {162kb.txt, purl, 417kb.pdf purl} (U.S. Congress 107-2, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 107-741, June 19 2002, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs) {SuDoc: Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.107-741, LCCN: 2002485972, OCLC: 51004092, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

Martin Arostegui, “Castro Weaponizes West Nile Virus” (Insight on the News, October 1 2002, posted September 16).

“P-4 containment systems ... deadliest toxins ... suspected bioweapons labs ... John Bolton ... scheduled to deliver details of the Cuban program to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June ... testimony ... suppressed ... intelligence bureaucracy ... his gagged statement ... obtained by Insight, Bolton expresses ‘frustration’ at the apparent unwillingness of U.S. intelligence agencies to disclose information about Cuba’s biological weapons which could include anthrax, smallpox and variants of encephalitis such as West Nile virus ... outbreaks ... killed more than 30 Americans ... infected another 675 ... traced to birds that may have been infected at Cuban bioweapons labs, according to defecting scientists ... animals as carriers of weaponized germ agents. ... encephalitis ... leptospirosis ... A dead crow infected with West Nile virus ... discovered on the White House lawn ... Sixty similarly infected birds ... U.S. Navy base ... Boca Chica, Fla., ... encephalitis epidemic ... killed a civilian employee. ... fortified compound ... military hospital ... six giant bubbles to retain toxic gases ... fronted as a cattle-feed producer ... nearby ... Russian-made SS-22 medium-range missiles capable of reaching south Florida ... dissidents would be rounded up and herded into tunnels beneath Havana to be exterminated with poison gas ... Angola ... Colombia ... highly authoritative sources ... U.S. officials ... not cleared to make unambiguous statements ... CIA’s national intelligence officer for Latin America, Fulton Armstrong ... ‘coordinating talking points’ ... declined comment ... Clinton holdovers ... mislead public ... galling ... Bush national-security team ... complaining loudly ... pro-Castro clique under Bill Clinton ... brazen ... ‘discredited published reports about Cuba’s biowarfare capabilities,’ a BBC executive producer tells Insight ... disinformation ... Russian scientists ... While Bolton was blowing the whistle on Cuba’s biowarfare threat in a speech to the Heritage Foundation on May 6, a top CIA analyst identified as a former member of Clinton’s National Security Council (NSC) team and a known advocate of rapprochement with Cuba, was telling Jimmy Carter that there was no evidence to support Bolton’s accusations ... Bolton ... supported by John Ford, head of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, who on June 5 told an open congressional hearing that ‘Cuba does indeed have an offensive biological-weapons research program’ ... Castro’s vice president, Carlos Lage, inaugurated a new biotechnology-research plant in Iran in 2000, purportedly producing Hepatitis B vaccines ... technology ... applicable to weaponizing bacteria ... banks in the United Arab Emirates ... Castro ... visit ... Tehran ... Islamic tour ... terrorist states ... Libya ... Syria ... UAE ... money-laundering ... al-Qaeda ... Hezbollah ... Soviet biotechnology ... Iraq copied Cuban methods to cover up ... industrial fermentation vessels ... related equipment ... Iraqis maintained ... intended to grow single-cell protein for cattle feed ... exhaust-filtration equipment ... 99.99 percent air purity ... bioweapons labs ... Cuba ... possible involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks ... two Cuban DGI deep-cover agents indicted in Florida ... jobs in the U.S. Postal Service ... studies of post-office security ... deadly anthrax letters ... kill Americans.”

 

Pascual Serrano, “Cuba, Cancer, and Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Political Affairs, April 6 2005).

John Bolton ... referred to the island as a criminal state ...

One of those centers of production of biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction — where products are constructed to be shared with other terrorist countries, which could attack the US people at any moment — is the Havana Molecular Immunology Center (CIM).

Its researchers cannot obtain a visa to travel to scientific meetings held in the United States because, according to the US authorities’ document, their presence is a danger to the most powerful nation in the world.

“ We were extended an open invitation: Come down when you want, bring whomever you want, and go wherever you want.”

  Glenn Baker

The Center for Defense Information visited those installations on May 2003 with Pentagon officials, searched every inch of the building, interviewed personnel and prepared reports {742kb.pdf} on six military and scientific specialists ...

Since I have never been to a biological weapons center with such potential to destroy, I decided to visit this institution ...

Without any doubt, weapons of mass destruction are to be found in the Molecular Immunology Center and the 40 centers comprising the so-called Scientific Complex in west Havana, but these are weapons against egoism, lack of solidarity, and the model of scientific development in the first world, based on the enrichment of the large transnationals.”

“ John wants this speech to include additional tough language about Cuba, but not material we will need to clear with CIA (Cuba’s sponsorship of terrorism, for example).”

Fred Fleitz, email (Feb. 22 2002, 6:21 p.m.) {31kb.pdf}

Stanley M. Moskowitz (Director of Congressional Affairs, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency):

We have no credible evidence, however, that the Cuban government has engaged in or directly supported international terrorist operations in the past decade, although our information is insufficient to say beyond a doubt that no collaboration has occurred.”

CIA Response to Questions for the Record (August 18 2003) {1081kb.pdf}, in Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States {172kb.txt (excludes qfr images), 6533kb.pdf, purl, copy, copy}, pages 126-160, at 145 (U.S. Congress 108-1, Senate Hearing S. Hrg. 108-161, February 11 2003, Select Committee on Intelligence) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/19:S.HRG.108-161, LCCN: 2003373661, OCLC: 53414415, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

“ If I have a heart attack ... in my country, no one will ask me my Social Security number.”

Carlos Manuel Mella

Tracey Eaton (Dallas Morning News), “Cuba wins big payoff on biotech bet” (Miami Herald, November 21 2003) {copy}, “A shot in the arm?: Cuba's biotech industry raises hope, suspicion” (Seattle Times, November 28 2003) {copy, copy}.

“Cuba’s $1 billion gamble ... dozens of new treatments and drugs ... the world’s only vaccine against meningitis B ... 53 biotech centers ... 10,000 Cuban scientists and other specialists ... molecular biology ... recombinant DNA ... Cuban drugs ... sold in 50 countries ... vaccines ... antiretroviral HIV/AIDS treatments ...”

John R. Bolton (Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (T), U.S. State Department):

“Rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, and Cuba, whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them hostile to U.S. interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape either detection or consequences ... interdiction ... seizure ... consequences ... no option is off the table.”

Speech, “Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States: Challenge and Response” (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Conference, Washington D.C., December 2 2003) {copy}.

“ The future of our homeland must be, necessarily, a future of men of science.”

Fidel Castro, Jan. 15 1960

Tom Fawthrop, “Cuba Ailing? Not Its Biomedical Industry” (The Straits Times, January 26 2004) {copy}.

“Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, most of Cuba’s resources were ploughed into developing education and health systems ...

{National Center for Scientific Research (CNIC) ... established in 1965 as Cuba’s first biotechnology institute} ... mid-1980s ... started to invest heavily in science and biotechnology ... {263kb.pdf} ... 11 million people... 52 scientific research institutes ... 12,000 scientists ... quality ... efficiency ... comprehensive ... free health-care system ... a new vaccine for meningitis B {VA-MENGOC-BC®} in the late 1980s ...

Havana’s Carlos J. Finlay Institute has entered into a deal that allows major drug multinational GlaxoSmithKline to license its discovery ... joint U.K.-Cuban medical research project ... ‘excellent laboratories ... world-class standards’... {human leptospirosis vaccine vax-SPIRAL®} ... {new generation, low price, typhoid fever vaccine vax-TyVi® {59kb.pdf}} ...

“ ... journal issues on CDs from an American publisher, every disk ... broken ... letter from the IEEE severing connections ... to “comply with U.S. government restrictions” ... visa application ... denied.”

American Scientist

Another centre of excellence is the Pedro Kouri Institute of Tropical Medicine {copy, 2789kb.pdf} (IPK) which works closely with the United Nations World Health Organisation in Geneva. {founded 1937, moved 1993 to new facilities}. It is currently working on a new cholera vaccine ... {Dengue virus patented vaccine candidate {169kb.pdf}} ... {Hepetitis C virus vaccine candidates, patent pending} ... seeking ... the first vaccine against AIDS ... ‘important basic science research, helped develop novel vaccines ... trained thousands of researchers’ ...

“ The U.S. Treasury Department approved a regulation imposing a fine of $50,000 and/or 10 years’ imprisonment on those U.S. editors who publish Cuban articles.”

Granma

Visiting Western scientists are often surprised by the scale and size of the Cuban Biotechnology Centre (CIGB, GNDP) which opened its research and development facilities back in 1986. {“From 1988 to 2003, the CIGB published 681 peer-reviewed papers in scientific journals, according to the ISI Web of Knowledge and the Science Citation Index.”}

In 1994, this was complemented by the launch of a Centre for Molecular Immunology (CIM), which has pioneered the latest research into anti-cancer vaccines. Other scientists are engaged in developing an anti HIV-Aids vaccine. ... 26 inventions with more than 100 international patents ... successful export of the hepatitis B vaccine {Heberbiovac HB®} to more than 30 countries ... ‘all the clinical trials have shown that it is the most effective vaccine (against hepatitis B) in the world’ ... ‘likely to become the standard for the rest of the industry.’ The first {143kb.pdf} synthetic vaccine, for the prevention of pneumonia and meningitis {Quimi-Hib®} ... Aimed at lowering the cost of immunising children in poor, developing countries ... launched late last year ...

“ ... internet access ... via Florida ... slow ... unreliable ... bottleneck ... easily fixed ... glass fibre cable, if the blockade ... In a few years ... the whole world — minus U.S. citizens — will be able to buy innovative and cheap pharmaceuticals made in Cuba.”

Chemistry World

Asian countries ... have been forging {349kb.pdf} links ...

Malaysia last year signed a Memorandum of Understanding {copy} for scientific cooperation ... joint ventures {Heber Bioven, a 70-30 joint venture with Bioven, licensed to produce Cuba’s recombinant alpha and gamma interferons (Heberon Alfa R®, Heberon Gamma R®), and(?) recombinant streptokinase (Heberkinase®), and(?) epidermal growth factor (Hebermin®)} ...

India {Panheber Biotec, a 50-50 joint venture with Panacea Biotec, licensed with Cuba’s Heberbiovac HB® vaccine, registered in India as Enivac HB, manufactured in a Cuban installed factory {2376kb.pdf}, and(?) Cuba’s tetravalent vaccine (Trivac-HB®) against diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, hepatitis B} {Biocon Biopharmaceuticals, a 51-49 joint venture with Biocon {1322kb.pdf}, licensed with eight Cuban products: Three monoclonal antibodies: anti-cancer h-R3 (CIMAher®, TheraCIM®) (an alternative to chemotherapy), anti-CD6 h-T1 (ior t1) {29kb.pdf} (for T-cell lymphoma, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis), anti-CD3 q-T3 (ior® t3) (for organ transplant). Three anti-cancer vaccines: EGF-P64K, TGFa, HER 1. Recombinant human erythropoietin (ior® EPOCIM, Heberitro®). Recombinant G-CSF (ior® LeukoCIM, Hebervital®)} ...

China {Biotech Biopharmaceutical, a joint venture, licensed with Cuba’s} ... monoclonal antibodies to treat head and neck cancers ... anti-cancer therapy known as TheraCIM h-R3 {CIMAher®, TheraCIM®} ...

{Iran: Joint venture licensed with Cuba’s hepatitis B vaccine (Heberbiovac HB®), recombinant streptokinase (Heberkinase®), recombinant human erythropoietin (ior® EPOCIM, Heberitro®), recombinant alpha and gamma interferons (Heberon Alfa R®, Heberon Gamma R®)} ...

{Zambia: Cuba’s 7 low price generic antiretroviral drugs for HAART: Highly Active Antiretroviral Treatment (US$ 31-169 per year per AIDS patient) {478kb.pdf}} ...

{Algeria, Russia, Syria} ...

{Canada: CIMYM, an 80-20 joint venture with YM BioSciences, licensed with Cuba’s anti-cancer h-R3 monoclonal antibody (CIMAher®, TheraCIM®), and two anti-cancer vaccines: TGFa, HER 1} ... joint venture ... German pharmaceutical Oncoscience ... further clinical trials and regulatory processes ... European market ... $1 billion invested since the late 1980s ...

... in the service of a socialist goal.

Dr Rolando Perez: ‘I want all cancer patients in Cuba to receive these drugs for free and we need all the money we can get to finance our free Cuban health service.’”

John R. Bolton (Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (T), U.S. State Department):

Cuba ... on the State Department’s list of state-sponsors of terrorism ... Existing intelligence reporting is problematic, and the Intelligence Community’s ability to determine the scope, nature, and effectiveness of any Cuban BW program has been hampered by reporting from sources of questionable access, reliability, and motivation. ... Cuba’s BW efforts ... developing a limited biological weapons effort ... BW aspirations ... well-developed and sophisticated biomedical industry ... one of the most advanced in Latin America ... pharmaceuticals and vaccines ... sold worldwide ... suspicion ... Soviet patrons ... the case for the existence of a developmental Cuba BW R&D effort is strong ... a terrorist and BW threat to the United States ... this rogue state.”

Prepared statement, “The Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges” {copy}, The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation: A New Strategy Emerges {386kb.html, 1105kb.pdf, purl} (U.S. Congress 108-2, Hearing, March 30 2004, House Committee on International Relations, Serial No. 108-105) {SuDoc: Y 4.IN 8/16:B 96/2, LCCN: 2004438798, OCLC: 56193500, GPOcat, LL: paper, microfiche, DL, WorldCat}.

Steven R. Weisman, “In Stricter Study, U.S. Scales Back Claim on Cuba Arms” (New York Times, September 18 2004) {archive}. Steven R. Weisman (New York Times), “Administration backing off on Cuba's germ warfare ability: New intelligence report says bio-weapons program uncertain” (San Francisco Chronicle, September 18 2004) {copy}.

“... finding fault with some of the conclusions and the way the reports were prepared. The new assessment says the intelligence community ‘continues to believe that Cuba has the technical capability ...’.”

Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. uncertain about a Cuba weapons program” (Miami Herald, Sept. 21 2004) {copy, copy}.

“We’re not saying with absolute certainty that they don’t” have a biological weapons program, the intelligence official said. “What we’re saying is that we’ve lost some confidence in that judgment, that they do.” CJHjr: But, the old assessment never asserted Cuba had a program, in the first place; so, you have to wonder, if this anonymous source knows what the old and new assessments say or, instead, is merely talking hearsay and speculation. Perhaps allied with the hate Castro brigade, tasked to keep the spurious claims alive.

Fitzhugh Mullan, M.D., “Affirmative Action, Cuban Style” (New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 351:26, pages 2680-2682, December 23 2004) {copy, copy}.

Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM, which is its Spanish acronym) in Havana — a school sponsored by the Cuban government and dedicated to training doctors to treat the poor of the Western hemisphere and Africa. Twenty-seven countries and 60 ethnic groups are represented among ELAM’s 8000 students. ... Castro spoke at the Riverside Church in New York, reiterating the offer and committing 500 slots to U.S. students who would pledge to practice in poor U.S. communities. ... the Cuban government pays the students’ room, board, tuition, and a stipend.”

Douglas Jehl, “Bolton's Pressure on C.I.A. Analyst Caused Anger” (New York Times, April 16 2005):

“In his Senate testimony, Mr. Bolton described his request for Mr. Armstrong’s transfer, made during a visit to Stuart A. Cohen, then the acting chairman of the National Intelligence Council, in July 2002 ... Mr. Bolton’s responsibilities at the time included overseeing intelligence estimates on Cuba ... a related visit by Otto Reich {then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA)}, a close ally of Mr. Bolton’s, who also sought Mr. Armstrong’s removal ... Robert L. Hutchings, who succeeded Mr. Cohen as head of the intelligence council, said the effects of Mr. Bolton’s objections to Mr. Armstrong had lingered as late as last year, when the officer was not included in a briefing team assigned to discuss with other senior officials the result of a new intelligence estimate on Cuba to which Mr. Bolton had objected.

“There was a group of firebrands who we figured would not like the judgment,”

Mr. Hutchings said in a telephone interview on Friday, making clear that he included Mr. Bolton among that group.

“We anticipated that the findings would be unwelcome in some quarters, and we wanted to depersonalize this thing as much as we could, to make clear that it was the assessment of the intelligence community, and not a particular individual.”

Mr. Hutchings now holds a teaching post at Princeton University.”

 

____________________

A Punch in the Nose

To his credit, Robert L. Hutchings resisted, what must have been, a mighty temptation, to follow John Robert Bolton’s example, and punch him in the nose.

Yet, metaphorically speaking, that’s exactly what he did, when he delivered him the new U.S. intelligence estimate on Cuba:

A knockout punch.

To John Robert Bolton.

And his side-kick too: Otto Juan Reich.

The roars of approval, from a capacity crowd, of U.S. intelligence officers, must have been deafening, as the both of them hit the canvas, sprawled, unconscious.

An utter, complete, thorough, comprehensive, authoritative, formal, final, official, rejection and defeat, of their inflammatory, unsubstantiated, political, accusations, against Cuba.

U.S. intelligence officers followed Otto Reich’s advice.

They said, “We can do better.”

They stepped forward.

Exposed errors. Corrected spoiled intelligence. Restored the reputation of good officers. Expelled consistent, erroneous, flawed, unprofessional, biased influence, they had allowed to spoil the barrel of intelligence information.

From two bad apples: John Bolton and Otto Reich.

And this is the result, of their new assessment, a slight modification (in red), to John Bolton’s speech, at the Heritage Foundation:

“ Here is what we now know:

The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited does not have an offensive biological warfare research and or development effort.”

And if that’s not what it says, that’s what it ought to say.

Because uncertainty (news report: “... it is no longer clear that Cuba has ...”) is an unreasonable opinion, incompatible with the evidence, they are free to inspect, on the ground.

And it never was clear in the first place. So if that’s what the estimate now says, they are liars, endorsing a prior error, refusing still, in the here and now, to accept responsibility for their previous conduct, unprofessional, negligent, reckless, willful (whichever it be), casting new doubt on their current fitness for their duties, absent reeducation.

They are not handicapped by ignorance. They have actively, intensely, extensively, thoroughly, investigated this topic, with on-site inspections, in Cuba.

There is no evidence to support an opinion of uncertainty. Merely suppositions, supposings, imaginings, theories, hypotheticals, accusations, what ifs, could bes, and inferences from this package of non-evidence.

Hence, a rational, informed, person cannot reasonably express an opinion of uncertainty.

They should say what they believe, and accurately quantify residual doubt, as remote, with the standard qualifier: “It is impossible to prove a negative, beyond all doubt.” And if they have a stable of accusers, they should list them all by name in an addendum, for future reference about their suitability as sources, with relevant observations on the tales they tell, the absence of evidence to support them, and the presence of evidence to refute them.

This, together with a correct observation, “The Cubans have the knowhow, equipment, facilities, to do it if they wanted to.” Just like every drug company in the United States could do, if they wanted to, at least those who can match the Cubans, for scientific prowess, technical competence, professional excellence, an exceptional, formidable, daunting, challenge.

But, apparently, uncertanty is exactly what the new assessment asserts.

And so, if they don’t want to say what they believe, then they should at least accurately describe the evidence, like they said about another baseless assertion: Cuba and terrorism:

We have no credible evidence, however, that the Cuban government has engaged in or directly supported international terrorist operations in the past decade, although our information is insufficient to say beyond a doubt that no collaboration has occurred.”

But that form of words conceals important information. And so, to defeat unwarranted inferences and suppositions — that they may be stupid ignoramuses, who can’t be bothered to inquire, can’t see their hand in front of their face — that form of words should be modified, like this:

“We have no credible evidence, that the Cuban government has an offensive biological warfare research or development effort. We have actively investigated every allegation, inspected every Cuban facility known, or alleged to be, capable of a role in any such effort. No amount of inspections, and no amount of exonerating evidence, can be sufficient, logically, to say, beyond all doubt, that such does not exist. But we have no evidence which warrants any suspicion.”

It’s natural to see enemies behind every tree.

If you work for a violent, criminal, terrorist, rogue state.

Because, there are enemies behind every tree.

You created them. By being a violent, criminal, terrorist, rogue state. Refusing, to be held to account, peaceably, in a courtroom, for your violent crimes and torts. Refusing, to behave with restraint, which the rule of law, accountability, morality, induce, in honest, reasonable, honorable wo/men.

Who obey the Commandments.

And the other like wisdom of the ages, our ancestors, by cycles, first learned, then flouted, then paid the price, then thrashed about, whining, confused, indignant, then repented, then relearned, the perils, the misery of inflicting aggression, hubris, abuse.

The Golden Rule

God: Love your neighbor as yourself.”

Jesus: Do to others as you would have them do to you.”

Jesus: “So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets.”

Muhammed: “None of you [truely] believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.”

Hillel: “What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor. This is the whole Torah. All the rest is commentary.”

Tse-kung: Is there one word that can serve as a principle of conduct for life?

Confucius: “Shu”—reciprocity. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire.”

  CJHjr

Miles A. Pomper, “Bolton Hearings Highlight Internal Differences on Cuba's Biological Weapons” (Arms Control Today, May 2005).

Query:Differences”?

“Differences” implies rational disagreement, each side with credible, weighty, evidence, to support their view.

There are no “internal differences” about Cuba.

There is the considered, informed, rational, judgment, a consensus, of a large number of professionals, on the one hand.

And on the other?

The high decibel, hysterical, rant, of a proven, documented, incendiary, liar.

A prima facie criminal liar.

Who belongs in prison.

As a lesson to onlookers.

The title for this piece should be this:

“Bolton Hearings Highlight Internal Differences on Cuba's Absence of Evidence to Support His Accusations against Cuba: Terrorism, Biological Weapons, Covert Programs,’ ‘Aspirations,’ ‘Effort,’ ‘Threat’.”

  CJHjr

Anita Snow, “Cuban, Venezuelan Leaders Woo Latin American Nations to Trade Pact Minus U.S. Leadership” (Associated Press, April 29 2005). “Cuba will help the South American nation train 40,000 new doctors and help set up hundreds of free health care centers. It will also continue to send Cuban doctors to Venezuela under a program called Plan Barrio, increasing the number to 30,000 throughout the country by year’s end. It will also continue to deepen its involvement in other programs in Venezuela, such as literacy efforts.

30,000 doctors is wrong. Fidel said it’s 3,000 (as I recollect, he gave the exact number), but there are other Cubans there too, teachers, community workers, and such.  CJHjr.

Peer-Reviewed History of the Cuban Revolution

That’s is what we need now.

Like those medical journal articles:

50 authors, peer-reviewed by 250 authors, agreed corrections.

With volumes of documents, to impose discipline, to dispel doubts, to defend the past, from the future.

Interviews, of all the players, peer-reviewed questions, posed, pursued, followed-up, by peer-selected, professional interviewers.

Opinions, dissents, concurring opinions, by all the interested parties, including those who pay-up, and contribute the big bucks, to properly pay for this proper history. 80% of which is probably already written, scattered everywhere, in books, and journals, and still secret documents.

A documented history, the rest of us can cite, with confidence.

  CJHjr

 

 2001 

 

To be Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs

Nomination, George W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 2001-), “President Bush to Nominate Individuals to Serve in His Administration” (“The President intends to nominate John Robert Bolton to be Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs”) (White House, February 21 2001), “Nominations Sent to the Senate” (White House, March 8 2001). 37:8 WCPD 331-332 {40kb.pdf} (“Digest of Other White House Announcements”) {5kb.txt}, at 332 (“February 21”) {SuDoc: AE 2.109:37/8}, 37:10 WCPD 428 {37kb.pdf} (“Nominations Submitted to the Senate,” March 8) {2kb.txt}, 2001 PPPUS 757-781 {83kb.pdf} (“Appendix A: Digest of Other White House Announcements”) {55kb.txt} at 760, 783-801 {64kb.pdf} (“Appendix B: Nominations Submitted to the Senate”) {71kb.txt} at 784 {Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush, 2001 (book 1) (purl) SuDoc: AE 2.114:2001/BK.1, ISSN: 0079-7626, LCCN: 58061050, OCLC: 52344983, 1198154, GPOcat, LL: paper, DL, WorldCat}.

Presidential Nomination PN185-107 (received March 8 2001, U.S. Congress 107-1).

Committee Hearing, Nomination of John Robert Bolton to be Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (U.S. Congress 107-1, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, March 29 2001) (unpublished). FDCH transcript, via Lexis {442kb.pdf}. FNS transcripts: 10:45 a.m., 1:30 p.m. {both}. C-Span video: None.

Committee Business Meeting, April 26 2001, 2:30 p.m. “to consider the nomination of John Robert Bolton, of Maryland, to be Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and other pending calendar business.”

Committee Decision, April 26 2001. “Committee ordered favorably reported the nominations of John Robert Bolton ... {and 5 others}.”

Senate debate, “Nomination of John Robert Bolton of Maryland to be Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,” 147 Congressional Record (2001), May 7 (147:61): S4442-4445 {pf} {26kb.txt, 59kb.pdf}; S4446-4447 {pf} {15kb.txt, 46kb.pdf}; May 8 (147:62): S4449-4461 {pf} {109kb.txt, 148kb.pdf} (May 7-8 2001, daily edition 147:61-62, U.S. Congress 107-1) {SuDoc: X/A.107/1:147/61-62}. C-Span video: None.

Senate roll call vote 107-1:92 (57/43, May 8 2001, 10:15 a.m.)

 

 1989 

 

To be Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs

Nomination, George H.W. Bush (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1989-1993 Jan. 20), “Nomination of John R. Bolton To Be an Assistant Secretary of State{copy} (White House, February 28 1989), submitted to Congress April 4 1989. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1989 (book 1) {SuDoc: AE 2.114:989/BK.1, ISSN: 0079-7626, LCCN: 58061050, DL, LFDL, WorldCat}.

Presidential Nomination PN224-101 (received April 4 1989, U.S. Congress 101-1).

Committee Hearing, Nomination of John R. Bolton, of Maryland, to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs, and two others, for other offices (U.S. Congress 101-1, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing, May 2 1989, 1:30 p.m.) (unpublished). FDCH transcript, via Lexis (none). FNS transcript (none). C-Span video: None.

Committee Business Meeting, none listed (consent?).

Senate debate (none), “Executive Session,” 135 Congressional Record S4878 (committee report); S4939-4942 (John Kerry, “Statement on the Nomination of John Bolton”); S4943 (confirmation recorded); (May 4 1989, daily edition 135:54, U.S. Congress 101-1) {SuDoc: X/A.101/1:135/54}. C-Span video: None.

Senate roll call vote (none).

 

 

National Public Radio asserts copyright in the transcript of its broadcast interview with Robert L. Hutchings. Hence, the text of that interview cannot be lawfully republished (e.g., on a webpage, in print) without the consent of NPR, unless an exception applies (e.g., “fair use”) to any quoted component of the interview which is “creative,” and hence copyrightable (e.g., the artistry of the interviewer in shaping the interview: what questions to ask and not ask, what contrary views to challenge the guest, what to say and not say). No consent, license, or exception, is required, to copy and republish any portion of the interview which is not “creative,” and hence not copyrightable (e.g., its “fact” component: what the guest has to say about what he did and why he did it?).

With that exception, this document is not copyrighted and may be freely copied, including U.S. Government works, which are not copyrighted.

CJHjr

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Posted March 28 2005. Updated May 16 2008.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/congress-john-bolton.html

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