Without a vote in Congress:—
Will you:—
1. Issue orders, to the U.S. military, to attack Iran.
At the behest of the President, the Vice-President, CIA Director, Director of National Intelligence, or another U.S. official, or foreign official, or anyone else, on your own initiative, or for any reason.
2. Permit to continue, any armed attacks on Iran now underway:
By any U.S. military personnel directly, or seconded to other U.S. agencies, foreign agencies, private contractors, or operating free lance.
By any private contractors or private groups or individuals, or foreign governments or agencies, operating under the protection of the U.S. military, or with the use of any U.S. military assets, or with the use of any private company assets.
Like you did in 1988.
Using barges of the Brown & Root Company, as fire-bases, to launch attacks on Iran.
Permit any battlefield intelligence, or other intelligence, to be given to any individuals or groups, to assist them to attack Iran.
Like you did in the 1980s.
Providing battlefield intelligence to Iraq, to assist Iraq wage its criminal war of aggression against Iran.
Permit any members of the U.S. military, or civilians, or others under your control, to provide advice and assistance, of any sort, to such groups or individuals.
Like you did in the 1980s.
Seconding U.S. military and CIA advisers to Baghdad, to advise Saddam’s forces in their attacks on Iran.
And advising them on how to improve their mustard gas munitions.
3. Actively seek to avoid receiving information about any of the above.
Like you did in the 1980s.
Actively seeking to avoid learning of unlawful activities, by U.S. officials, and others, supporting the U.S.-Contra army, attacking Nicaragua.
Charles Judson Harwood Jr.
December 4 2006
Robert M. Gates told a Senate committee today that the Central Intelligence Agency had actively avoided gathering information about how the Nicaraguan rebels were raising money.
Under tough questioning at a hearing on his confirmation as Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Gates said the C.I.A. ordered its operatives last year not to have any contact with Americans helping the contras.
In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence about the Administration's clandestine dealings with Iran, Mr. Gates ... said,
“Agency people, and I would say here from the director on down, actively shunned information.
We didn’t want to know how the contras were being funded, in part because we were concerned it would get us involved in crossing the line imposed by the law.
And so we actively discouraged people from telling us things.
We did not pursue lines of questioning. We knew — you know, we are not dumb — we knew the contras were getting a lot of money.”
According to Mr. Gates, the C.I.A. insructed all of its officers in the field to avoid any contact with the private network raising money for the contras.
• Stephen Engelberg, “Nominee for C.I.A. Says Agency Erred on Iran Arms Deal” {pf} (The New York Times, February 18 1987), accord, pages 111-112, Senate hearing number S. Hrg. 100-241, February 17, 18, 1987 (cited below) (“Well, I was just going to say, that this is an area where I realize that it is very difficult for a lot of people to accept that when it came to funding of the contras Agency people, and I would say here from the Director on down, actively shunned information. We didn't want to know how the Contras were being funded; in part, because we were concerned it would get us involved in crossing the line imposed by the law. And so we actively discouraged people from telling us things. We did not pursue lines of questioning. We knew — you know, we are not dumb. We knew the Contras were getting a lot of money. And we heard all kinds of stories about where they were getting it. From private benefactors, from several foreign countries — but it was on the 1st of October that we got the first indication that there might be something otherwise involved. And we, to be perfectly honest, I think we made, and I would have to go back and check, this should not be the final word. But I guess for my part, everything that I saw and what Allen was telling me was that our accounts were straight but that somebody else was involved in this.”).
Deputy Director Gates told the Senate Intelligence Committee: “Agency people ... from the Director on down, actively shunned information. We didn't want to know how the Contras were being funded ... we actively discouraged people from telling us things. We did not pursue lines of questioning.” 73 When Gates first heard Charles Allen’s suspicions that a diversion of funds had taken place, his “first reaction was to tell Mr. Allen that I didn’t want to hear any more about it.” 74
Thus, when witnesses appeared before the Intelligence Committees, they could deflect inquiries because they had consciously chosen to avoid knowledge. This turned upside down the CIA’s mission to
collect all intelligence relevant to national security.
________
73 Gates, Tower Test., 12/4/86, at 38.
Quoted, pages 47-48, Senate hearing S. Hrg. 100-241, February 17, 18, 1987 (cited below) (“This is an area where I realize that it is very difficult for a lot of people to accept, that when it came to funding of the Contras, agency people, and I would say from the Director on down, actively shunned information. We didn’t want to know how the Contras were being funded in part because we were concerned it would get us involved in crossing the line imposed by the laws, so we actively discourage people from telling us things.”).
74 Id. at 18-19.
Quoted, page 78, Senate hearing S. Hrg. 100-241, February 17, 18, 1987 (cited below) (“I was startled by what he told me. And frankly, consonant with the way we had responded to such stories in the past, my first reaction was to tell Mr. Allen that I didn’t want to hear any more about it, and I didn’t want to hear anything about funding the Contras.”).
• Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair {2.82mb.txt, 39mb.pdf, 34mb.pdf/bw, source, appendixes}, pages 381-382, 386 (“Misuse of Intelligence”) (U.S. Congress 100-1, Senate Report 100-216, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, House Report 100-433, House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, November 13 1987, 16+690 pages) {SuDoc: Y 1.1/5:100-216*, Y 1.1/8:100-433*, Serial Set: 13739, 13810, CIS: 87 H963-4, OCLC: 16998535, LCCN: 87602662 pf, GPOCat: House, report, appendixes, Senate: report, appendixes, Serial Set, SuDoc: Y 1.1/2:Serial 13739-13774, DL, WorldCat}.
• Iran-Contra Investigation “Joint Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, One Hundredth Congress, first session” {SuDoc: Y Y 4.In 8/20:*, GPOcat, DL, WorldCat} (May 5 to August 3 1987) (11 volumes, 13 books). “The Committees took testimony from 28 witnesses during 40 days of joint public hearings — from May 5 to August 3 — and took private testimony from 4 witnesses during 4 days of closed hearings (a total of approximately 262 hours of testimony). There were 1,092 exhibits presented during the public hearings.” (Report, Iran-Contra Affair, page 685). Robert Gates was not a witness in those public hearings, but he gave a deposition (next item).
• Iran-Contra Investigation, Appendix B, Depositions, volume 11 {1.16mb.txt, 42mb.pdf, 26.3mb.pdf/bw, source, appendixes}, pages 960-1049, exhibits, 1050-1062 (“Deposition of Robert M. Gates, Friday, July 31, 1987”) (U.S. Congress 100-1, Senate Report 100-216), “United States Congressional Serial Set, Serial Number 13752” (appendix B, volume 11) {Serial Set: 13752, GPOCat, SuDoc: Y 1.1/5:100-216/app.B/v.11, Y 1.1/8:100-433/app.B/v.11}. “The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order” “approximately 290 individuals” (appendix B, volume 27, front matter, preface, pages XXI-XXII)
–CJHjr, March 14 2009